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**HISTORY OF EUROPE**  
**FROM THE COMMENCEMENT**  
**OF THE**  
**FRENCH REVOLUTION**

**IN M.DCC.LXXXIX.**

**TO THE RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS**

**IN M.DCCC.XV.**

**BY ARCHIBALD ALISON, F.R.S.E.**

**ADVOCATE.**

*"Nullum maxime omnium memorabile quod unquam gesta sint me scripturum ; quod Hannibale deo Carthaginiensem cum populo Romano gessere. Nam neque validiores opibus ullas inter se civitates gentesque contulerunt arma, neque his ipsis tantum unquam virum aut roboris fuit : et haud ignotas belli artes inter se, sed expertas primo Panico consecrarent bello ; odiis etiam prope majoribus certarunt quoniam viribus ; et adeo varia belli fortuna, ancepsque Mars fuit, ut propius periculum foret qui vicerunt."—TIT. LIV. lib. 21.*

**VOL. III.**

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**1841.**





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# HISTORY OF EUROPE

## FROM THE COMMENCEMENT

### OF THE

# FRENCH REVOLUTION.

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## CHAPTER XX.

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NAPOLÉON BONAPARTE was born at Ajaccio, in Corsica, on the 15th August, 1769. The Duke of Wellington was born in the same month. "Providence," said Louis XVIII, "owed us that counterpoise (1)."

Birth and family of Napoléon. His family, though noble, had not been distinguished, and had suffered severely from misfortune. He was too great a man to attempt to derive distinction from any adventitious advantages which did not really belong to him, and could afford to discard all the lustre of patrician descent. When the Emperor of Austria endeavoured, after he became his son-in-law, to trace his connexion with some of the obscure Dukes of Treviso, he answered that he was the Rudolph of Hapsburg of his family; and when the genealogists were engaged in deducing his descent from an ancient line of Gothic princes, he cut short their labours by declaring, that his patent of nobility dated from the battle of Montenotte (2).

His mother, who was distinguished by great beauty, and no common firmness and intrepidity of mind, shared in the fatigues and dangers of her husband during the civil dissensions which distracted the island at the time of his birth, and had recently before been engaged in some expeditions on horseback with him. His father died at the age of thirty-eight, of a cancer in the stomach, a complaint hereditary in his family, and which also proved fatal to Napoléon himself; but the want of paternal care was more than supplied by his mother, to whose early education and solicitude he, in after life, mainly ascribed his elevation (3). Though left a widow in the prime of life, his mother had already born thirteen children, of whom five sons and three daughters survived their father. She lived to see one of them wearing the crown of Charlemagne, and another seated on the throne of Charles V (4).

On the day of his birth, being the festival of the Assumption, she had been at Church, and was seized with her pains during high mass. She was brought home hastily, and, as there was not time to prepare a bed, laid upon a couch covered with tapestry representing the heroes of the Iliad, and there the future conqueror was brought into the world (5).

(1) Bour. i. 18. Sberer, 1. Las Cas. 137.

(2) Las Cas. i. 108, 112. Bour. i. 23.

(3) "My opinion," said Napoléon, "is, that the future good or bad conduct of a child depends entirely on the mother."—O'MEARA, ii. 100.

(4) Las Cas. i. 117, 119, 120. O'Meara, ii. 100. D'Abr. ii. 376, 377.

(5) D'Abr. ii. 377. Las Cas. i. 126.



In the years of infancy he exhibited nothing remarkable, excepting irritability and turbulence of temper; but these qualities, as well as the decision with which they were accompanied, were so powerful, that they gave him the entire command of his eldest brother Joseph, a boy of a mild and unassuming character, who was constantly beaten, pinched, or tormented by the future ruler of the world. But even at that early period it was observed that he never wept when chastised; and on one occasion, when he was only seven years of age, having been suspected unjustly of a fault, and punished when innocent, he endured the pain, and subsisted in disgrace for three days on the coarsest food, rather than betray his companion, who was really in fault. Though his anger was violent, it was generally of short endurance, and his smile from the first was like a beam of the sun emerging from the clouds. But, nevertheless, he gave no indications of extraordinary capacity at that early age; and his mother was frequently heard to declare, that of all her children, he was the one whom she would least have expected to have attained any extraordinary eminence (1).

His character, resolute, and habits, which in Corsica. The winter residence of his father was usually at Ajaccio, the place of his birth, where there is still preserved the model of a cannon, weighing about thirty pounds, the early plaything of Napoléon. But in summer the family retired to a dilapidated villa near the isle Sanguinière, once the residence of a relation of his mother's, situated in a romantic spot on the sea-shore. The house is approached by an avenue, overhung by the cactus and acacia, and other shrubs, which grow luxuriantly in a southern climate. It has a garden and a lawn, showing vestiges of neglected beauty, and surrounded by a shrubbery permitted to run to wilderness. There, enclosed by the cactus, the clematis, and the wild olive, is a singular and isolated granite rock, beneath which the remains of a small summer-house are still visible, the entrance to which is nearly closed by a luxuriant fig-tree. This was the favourite retreat of the young Napoléon, who early showed a love of solitary meditation during the periods when the vacations at school permitted him to return home. We might suppose that there were perhaps formed those visions of ambition and high resolves, for which the limits of the world were ere long felt to be insufficient; did we not know that childhood can hardly anticipate the destiny of maturer years; and that, in Cromwell's words, a man never rises so high as when he does not know where his course is to terminate (2).

Removed to the Military School at Brienne; his character there. At an early age he was sent to the Military School of Brienne. His character there underwent a rapid alteration. He became thoughtful, studious, contemplative, and diligent in the extreme. His proficiency, especially in mathematics, was soon remarkable; but the quickness of his temper, though subdued, was not extinguished. On one occasion, having been subjected to a degrading punishment by his master, that of dining on his knees at the gate of the refectory, the mortification he experienced was so excessive that it produced a violent vomiting and a universal tremor of the nerves (3). But in the games of his companions he was inferior to none in spirit and agility, and already began to evince, in a decided predilection for military pursuits the native bias of his mind.

During the winter of 1783-4, so remarkable for its severity, even in southern latitudes, the amusements of the boys without doors were completely

(1) D'Abr. i. 49, 52, 54. Las Cas. i. 126.

(2) Benson, 4, 6. Scott, iii. 10.

(3) Las Cas. i. 127. Bour. i. 22.

stopped. Napoléon proposed to his companions to beguile the weary hours by forming intrenchments and bastions of snow, with parapets, ravelins, and horn-works. The little army was divided into two parties, one of which was intrusted with the attack, the other with the defence of the works; and the mimic war was continued for several weeks, during which fractures and wounds were received on both sides. On another occasion, the wife of the porter of the school, well known to the boys for the fruit which she sold, having presented herself at the door of their theatre to be allowed to see the *Death of Cæsar*, which was to be played by the youths, and been refused an entrance, the serjeant at the door, induced by the vehemence of her manner, reported the matter to the young Napoléon, who was the officer in command on the occasion. "Remove that woman, who brings here the license of camps," said the future ruler of the Revolution (1).

It was the fortune of the school at Brienne at this time to possess among its scholars, besides Napoléon, another boy, who rose to the highest eminence in the Revolution, PICHEGRU, afterwards conqueror of Holland. He was several years older than Napoléon, and instructed him in the elements of mathematics and the four first rules of arithmetic. Pichegru early perceived the firm character of his little pupil; and when, many years afterwards, he had embraced the Royalist Party, and it was proposed to him to sound Napoléon, then in the command of the army of Italy, he replied, "Don't waste time upon him: I have known him from his infancy; his character is inflexible; he has taken his side, and will never swerve from it." The fate of these two illustrious men afterwards rose in painful contrast to each other: Pichegru was strangled in a dungeon when Napoléon was ascending the throne of France (2).

The speculations of Napoléon at this time were more devoted to political than military subjects. His habits were thoughtful and solitary; and his conversation, even at that early age, was so remarkable for its reflection and energy, that it attracted the notice of the Abbé Raynal, with whom he frequently lived in vacations, and who discoursed with him on government, legislation, and the relations of commerce. He was distinguished by his Italian complexion, his piercing look, and the decided style of his expression: a peculiarity which frequently led to a vehemence of manner, which rendered him not generally popular with his school-fellows. The moment their play-time arrived, he flew to the library of the school, where he read with avidity the historical works of the ancients, particularly Polybius, Plutarch, and Arrian. His companions disliked him, on account of his not joining their games at these hours, and frequently rallied him on his name and Corsican birth. He often said to Bourrienne, his earliest friend, with much bitterness,—“I hate these French—I will do them all the mischief in my power.” Notwithstanding this, his animosity had nothing ungenerous in it; and when he was intrusted, in his turn, with the enforcing of any regulation which was infringed, he preferred going to prison to informing against the young delinquents (3).

Though his progress at school was respectable, it was not remarkable; and the notes transmitted to government in 1784, exhibited many other young men, much more distinguished for their early proficiency—a circumstance frequently observable in those who ultimately rise to greatness. In the private instructions communicated to government by the masters of the

(1) Bour. i. 25, 26.

(2) Las Cas. i. 128, 131. O'Meara, i. 240.

(3) Bour. i. 27, 32, 33, 35. Las Cas. i. 136. D'Abr. i. 111.

school, he was characterised as of a “domineering, imperious, and head-strong character (1).”

During the vacations of school, he returned in general to Corsica; where he gave vent to the ardour of his mind, in traversing the mountains and valleys of that romantic island, and listening to the tales of feudal strife and family revenge by which its inhabitants are so remarkably distinguished. The celebrated Paoli, the hero of Corsica, accompanied him in some of these excursions, and explained to him on the road the actions which he had fought, and the positions which he had occupied during his struggle for the independence of the island. The energy and decision of his young companion, at this period, made a great impression on that illustrious man. “Oh, Napoléon!” said he, “you do not resemble the moderns—you belong only to the heroes of Plutarch (2).”

Is sent to the Ecole Militaire at Paris Enters the Army. At the age of fourteen, he was sent from the school of Brienne to the Ecole militaire at Paris, for the completion of his military studies. He had not been long there, when he was so much struck with the luxurious habits in which the young men were then brought up, that he addressed an energetic memorial to the governor on the subject, strongly urging, that instead of having footmen and grooms to wait upon their orders, they should be taught to do every thing for themselves, and inured to the hardships and privation which awaited them in real warfare. In the year 1785, at the age of sixteen, he received a commission in a regiment of artillery, and was soon promoted to the rank of first lieutenant, in a corps quartered at Valence. Shortly after, he gave a proof of the varied subjects which occupied his mind, by writing a History of Corsica, and an Essay for a prize, proposed by the Abbé Raynal, on the “Institutions most likely to contribute to Public Happiness.” The prize was adjudged to the young soldier. These productions, as might have been expected, were distinguished by the revolutionary doctrines then generally prevalent, and very different from his maturer speculations. The essay was recovered by Talleyrand after Napoléon was on the throne; but the moment the Emperor saw it he threw it into the flames (3).

His character there. At this period, Napoléon was generally disliked by his companions: he was considered as proud, haughty, and irascible; but with the few whose conversation he valued, and whose friendship he chose to cultivate, he was even then a favourite, and high expectations began to be formed of the future eminence to which he might rise. His powers of reasoning were already remarkable; his expressions lucid and energetic; his knowledge and information immense, considering his years, and the opportunities of study which he had enjoyed. Logical accuracy was the great characteristic of his mind; and his subsequent compositions have abundantly proved, that if he had not become the first conqueror, he would have been one of the greatest writers, as he assuredly was one of the profoundest thinkers of modern times (4).

His figure, always diminutive, was at that period thin and meagre in the highest degree; a circumstance which rendered his appearance somewhat ridiculous, when he first assumed the military dress. Mademoiselle Permon, afterwards Duchess of Abrantes, one of his earliest female acquaintances, and who afterwards became one of the most brilliant wits of the Imperial court,

(1) Bour. i. 37, 38.

(2) Las Cas. i. 136. ii. 348.

(3) O'Meara, ii. 168, 169. Las Cas. i. 43, 136, 141.

Bour. i. 44. D'Abr. i. 76.

(4) D'Abr. i. 111. Las Cas. i. 140, 141.

mentions, that he came to their house, on the day on which he first put on his uniform, in the highest spirits, as is usual with young men on such an occasion; but her sister, two years younger than herself, who had just left her boarding-school, was so struck with his comical appearance, in the enormous boots which were at that period worn by the artillery, that she immediately burst into an immoderate fit of laughter, saying, he resembled nothing so much as Puss in Boots. The stroke told; the libel was too true not to be felt: but Napoléon soon recovered his good-humour, and a few days afterwards, presented her with an elegantly bound copy of Puss in Boots, as a proof that he retained no rancour for her raillery (1).

He espouses, with his regiment, the cause of the Revolution When the Revolution broke out, he adhered, like almost all the young officers of a subaltern rank, to the popular side, and continued a warm patriot during the whole time of the Constituent Assembly. But, on the appointment of the Legislative Assembly, he has himself declared that his sentiments underwent a rapid change; and he soon imbibed, under the Reign of Terror, that profound hatred of the Jacobins, which his subsequent life so strongly evinced, and which he never, even for the purposes of ambition, made any attempts to disguise. It was his fortune to witness both the mob which inundated the Tuileries on the 20th June, and that which overturned the throne on the 10th August; and on both he strongly expressed his sense of the ruinous consequences likely to arise from the want of resolution in the government. No man knew better the consequences of yielding to popular clamour, or how rapidly it is checked by proper firmness in the depositaries of power: from the weakness shown on the 20th June, he predicted the disastrous effects which so speedily followed on the next great revolt of the populace. When he saw the monarch, in obedience to the rabble, put on the red cap, his indignation knew no bounds. "How on earth," he exclaimed, "could they let those wretches enter the palace! They should have cut down four or five hundred with grape-shot, and the rest would speedily have taken to flight (2).

His first service in Corsica. The first military exploit of Napoléon was in his native country. The disturbances in Corsica having led the revolutionary forces into that island, he was dispatched from Bastia, in spring 1793, to surprise his native city of Ajaccio, and succeeded in making himself master of a tower called the Torre di Capitello, in its vicinity, where he was shortly afterwards besieged, and compelled to evacuate it (3). His talents, and the high character which he had received from the masters of the military academy, soon, however, led to a more important employment. At the siege of Toulon, the command of the artillery, after the operations had advanced a considerable length, was intrusted to his direction, and he soon communicated a new impulse to the hitherto languishing progress of the siege. By his advice, the attack was changed from the body of the place to the forts on the *Hauteur de Grasse*, and on the Mountain of Faron, which proved so successful, that the siege, which before his arrival was on the point of being abandoned in despair, was speedily crowned with complete success. During this operation he was first struck by the firmness and intrepidity of a young corporal of artillery, whom he immediately recommended for promotion. Having And at the siege of Toulon. occasion to send a despatch from the trenches, he called for some person who could write, that he might dictate the order. A young soldier

(1) D'Abr. i. 113.

(2) *Peur*, i. 49. *Las Cas*, i. 116.(3) *Benson*, 4. *Scott*, iii. 21.

stepped from the ranks, and resting the paper on the breastwork, began to write as he dictated, when a shot from the enemy's batteries struck the ground close to him, and covered the paper with earth. "Thank you," said the soldier; "we shall have no occasion for sand on this page." Napoléon asked him what he could do for him. "Every thing," replied the young private, blushing with emotion, and touching his left shoulder with his hand; "you can turn this worsted into an epaulet." A few days after, Napoléon sent for the same soldier to order him to reconnoitre in the enemy's trenches, and recommended that he should disguise himself, for fear of his being discovered. "Never," replied he. "Do you take me for a spy? I will go in my uniform, though I should never return." And in effect he set out instantly, dressed as he was, and had the good fortune to return unhurt. Napoléon immediately recommended him for promotion, and never lost sight of his courageous secretary. He was Juxor, afterwards Marshal of France, and Duke of Abrantes (1).

On another occasion, an artilleryman having been shot while loading a gun, he took up the dead man's ramrod, and with his own hands served the piece for a considerable time. He first took notice, at the same siege, of another young soldier named Duroc, whom he never afterwards lost sight of, made Marshal of the Palace, and ever treated with the most unlimited confidence, till he was killed by his side on the field of Bautzen. Duroc loved Napoléon for himself, and possessed, perhaps, a larger share of his confidence than any of his other generals; and none knew so well, in after years, how to let the first ebullitions of the imperial wrath escape without producing fatal effects, and allowing the better judgment of his sovereign to resume its sway in cooler moments (2).

The reputation which Napoléon acquired from the successful issue of this siege was very great. All the generals, representatives, and soldiers, who had heard the advice which he gave at the councils, three months before the capture of the town, and witnessed his activity at the works, anticipated a future career of glory to the young officer. Dugommier wrote to the Committee of Public Safety in these words:—"Reward and promote that young man; for, if you are ungrateful towards him, he will raise himself alone (3).

This success procured for Napoléon the command of the artillery of the army of Italy during the campaign of 1794. Dumerbion, who was advanced in years, submitted all the operations to a council of younger officers, among whom Napoléon and Massena soon acquired a decided lead; and the former, from the force of superior talents, gradually came to direct the whole operations of the campaign; and it was his ability which procured for the French armies the capture of Saorgia, the Col di Tende, and all the higher chain of the Maritime Alps. These successes awakened in his ardent mind those lofty visions of ambition which he was so soon destined to realize; one night, in June 1794, he spent on the summit of the Col di Tende, from whence at sunrise he beheld with delight the blue plains of Italy, already to his prophetic eye the theatre of glorious achievement (4).

In July 1794, Napoléon was sent by the Commissioners of the Conven-

(1) *Duchess d'Abr.* ii. 191. *Las Cas.* i. 166. *Nap.* i. 10, 12.

So strongly did Napoléon's character impress Junot at that time, that he quitted his regiment to devote himself to his fortunes as aide-de-camp, and wrote to his father in 1794, in answer to his enquiries, what sort of young man he was to whom he

had attached himself,—“He is one of those men of whom nature is sparing, and whom she does not throw upon the earth but with centuries between them.” [*D'Abr.* ii. 193. *Las Cas.* i. 165.]

(2) *Las Cas.* ii. 156, 157. *Scott,* iii. 35.

(3) *Nap.* iii. 15.

(4) *Nap.* iii. 26, 34.



Sent to  
Genoa, and  
there ar-  
rested and  
liberated.

tion to Genoa upon a secret mission, in which he was connected with Robespierre's brother, then intrusted with the supreme command at Toulon. This mission saved his life; the younger Robespierre, for whom, at that period, he had conceived the highest admiration, earnestly entreated Napoléon to accompany him to Paris, whither he was returning to support his brother; but he was inflexible in his refusal. Had he yielded, he would infallibly have shared the fate of both; and the destinies of Europe would have been changed. As it was, he was exposed, from his connexion with these leaders, to no inconsiderable dangers even on his Italian mission. Within a month after, he was, in consequence of the fall of Robespierre, arrested by the new commissioners, whom the Thermidorien party sent out to the army of Italy, and made a narrow escape with his life. He addressed, in 6th Aug. 1794. consequence, an energetic remonstrance to the commissioners, remarkable for the strong sense, condensed thought, and powerful expression which it contains; while his friend Junot was so penetrated with grief at his 20th Aug. misfortune, that he wrote to the commissioners, protesting his innocence, and imploring to be allowed to share his captivity. It was attended Returns to with complete success; a fortnight afterwards, he was provisio- Paris. nally set at liberty, and immediately returned to Paris. He was 15th Sept. there offered a command in la Vendée; and, having declined it, he was deprived of his rank as a general officer, and reduced to private life (1).

The period which now intervened from the dismissal of Napoléon to the attack of the Sections on the Convention, in October 1795, he has himself described as the happiest in his life (2). Living almost without money, on the bounty of his friends, in coffee-houses and theatres, his ardent imagination dwelt incessantly on the future; and visions floated across his mind, tinged with those bright colours in which the eye of youthful genius arrays the path of life,—a striking proof of the dependence of happiness on the mind itself, and the slight influence which even the greatest external success has in replenishing the secret fountains from which the joys or sorrows of existence are drawn. During these days of visionary romance, he dwelt with peculiar pleasure on his favourite idea of repairing to Constantinople and offering his services to the Grand Signior, under the impression that things were too stable in the Western World, and that it was in the East alone that those great revolutions were to be effected, which at once immortalize the names of their authors. He even went so far as to prepare, and address to the French government, a memorial, in which he offered, with a few officers, who were willing to follow his fortunes, to go to Turkey, to organize its forces against Russia; a proposal which, if acceded to, would probably have changed the fate of the world. This impression never forsook him through life; it was, perhaps, the secret motive of the expedition to Moscow; and, even after all the glories of his subsequent career, he looked back with regret to these early visions (3); and, when speaking of Sir Sidney Smith and the check at Acre, repeatedly said—"That man made me miss my destiny."

His destitute  
condition  
there.

So low, however, were the fortunes of the future Emperor fallen at that period, that he was frequently indebted to his friends for a meal, which he could not afford to purchase himself. His brother Lucien and he brought the black bread received in their rations to Madame Bourrienne, and received in exchange loaves of white flour, which she had clandestinely,

(1) Bour. i. 60, 61, 69, 70. Las Cas. 167. D'Abr. ii. 194.

(2) O'Meara, ii. 155.

(3) O'Meara, ii. 155. Las Cas. i. 172. Bour. i. 72, 76.



and at the hazard of her life, received during the law of the *Maximum*, from a neighbouring confectioner. At this period she lodged in a new house in the Rue des Marais. Napoléon was very anxious to hire, with the assistance of his uncle, afterwards Cardinal Fesch, the one opposite. "With that house," said he, "the society of yourself, a few friends, and a cabriolet, I should be the happiest of men (1)."

But another destiny awaited the young soldier. The approaching conflict of the Convention with the Sections was the first circumstance which raised him from the obscurity into which he had recently fallen. His great abilities being known to several persons of influence in government, he was, on the first appearance of the approaching struggle, taken into the confidence of administration, and had been consulted by them for some months before the contest began. When the attack by Menou on the Section Le Pelletier failed, Napoléon was sent for. He found the Convention in the utmost agitation; and measures of accommodation with the insurgents were already talked of, when his firmness and decision saved the government. He painted in such vivid colours the extreme peril of sharing the supreme authority between the military commander and three commissioners of the convention, that the committee of public safety agreed to appoint Barras commander-in-chief, and Napoléon second in command. No sooner was this done than he dispatched at midnight a chief of squadron, named MURAT (2), with three hundred horse, to seize the park of artillery lying at Sablons. He arrived a few minutes before the troops of the sections, who came to obtain them for the insurgents; and, by this decisive step, put at the disposal of government those formidable batteries, which, next day, spread death through the ranks of the national guard, and, at one blow, extinguished the revolt. Barras declared in his report, that it was to Napoléon's skilful disposition of the posts round the Tuileries that the success of the day was owing; but he himself never ceased to lament, that his first success in separate command should have been gained in civil dissension; and often said, in after times, that he would give many years of his life to tear that page from his history (3).

Receives the  
command  
from the  
Directory,  
on the 13th  
Vendémiaire.

(1) Bour. i. 76, 81, 86.

In these days Napoléon wore the grey great-coat, which has since become more celebrated than the white plume of Henry IV; he had no gloves, for, as he said himself, they were a useless expense; his boots, ill made, were seldom blackened; his yellow visage, meagre countenance, and severe physiognomy, gave as little indication of his future appearance, as his fortunes did of his future destiny. Salicetti had been the author of his arrest. "He did me all the mischief in his power," said Napoléon; "but my star would not permit him to prevail." [D'Abr. i. 255, 256.] So early had the idea of a brilliant destiny taken possession of his mind. He afterwards made a generous return to his enemy: Salicetti was ordered to be arrested by the Convention after the condemnation of Romme, the chief of the conspirators, and he was concealed in the house of the mother of the future Duchess of Abrantes. Napoléon learned the secret in consequence of a love intrigue between his valet and their maid; but he concealed his knowledge, facilitated their escape, and sent a letter to his enemy on the road, informing him of the return he had made for his malevolence. [Ibid. 351.]

(2) "Murat," said Napoléon, "was a most singular character. He loved, I may rather say, adored me; with me he was my right arm; as without me he was nothing. Order Murat to attack and destroy

four or five thousand men in such a direction, it was done in a moment; leave him to himself, he was an *imbécille* without judgment. In battle he was perhaps the bravest man in the world: his boiling courage carried him into the midst of the enemy, covered with plumes and glittering with gold; how he escaped was a miracle, for, from being so distinguished a mark, every one fired at him. The Cossacks admired him on account of his excessive bravery. Every day Murat was engaged in single combat with some of them, and returned with his sabre dripping with the blood of those he had slain. He was a Paladin in the field; but in the cabinet destitute of either decision or judgment." —O'MEARA, ii. 96.

(3) Bour. i. 90, 96. Nap. iii. 67, 74.

Though not gifted with the powers of popular oratory, Napoléon was not destitute of that ready talent which catches the idea most likely to divert the populace, and frequently disarms them even in the moment of their greatest irritation. When in command at Paris, after the suppression of this revolt, he was frequently brought in collision with the people in a state of the utmost excitement: and on these occasions his presence of mind was as conspicuous as his humanity was admirable. Above a hundred families, during the dreadful famine which followed the suppression of the revolt of the Sections in the winter 1795—6, were saved from

His marriage with Josephine.

The next event in Napoléon's career was not less important on his ultimate fortunes. On occasion of the general disarming of the inhabitants after the overthrow of the Sections, a boy of ten years of age came to request from Napoléon, as general of the interior, that his father's sword, which had been delivered up, should be restored to him. His name was EUGÈNE BEAUHARNAIS; and Napoléon was so much struck by his appearance, that he was induced not only to comply with the request, but to visit his mother, Joséphine Beauharnais. Her husband had been one of the most elegant dancers of his day, and from that quality was frequently honoured with the hand of Marie Antoinette at the court balls. Napoléon, whose inclination already began to revert to the manners of the old *régime*, used to look around if the windows were closed, and say, "Now let us talk of the old court; let us make a tour to Versailles." From thence arose the intimacy which led to his marriage with that lady, and ultimately placed her on the throne of France (1).

Her history, and remarkable silence at the fall of Robespierre.

Her history had been very remarkable. She was born in the West Indies; and it had early been prophesied, by an old negress, that she should lose her first husband, be extremely unfortunate, but that she should afterwards be greater than a queen (2). This prophecy, the authenticity of which is placed beyond a doubt, was fulfilled in the most singular manner. Her first husband, Alexander Beauharnais, a general in the army on the Rhine, had been guillotined during the Reign of Terror; and she herself, who was also imprisoned at the same time, was only saved from impending death by the fall of Robespierre. So strongly was the prophecy impressed on her mind, that, while lying in the dungeons of the Conciergerie, expecting every hour to be summoned to the revolutionary tribunal, she mentioned it to her fellow prisoners, and to amuse them, named some of them as ladies of the bedchamber; a jest which she afterwards lived to realize to one of their number (3).

death by his beneficence. [D'Abr. ii. 28.] On one occasion, he was trying to appease a mob in a state of extreme irritation, when a fat woman, bursting from the throng, exclaimed, "These wearers of epaulets, provided they fill their own skins, care not though the poor die of famine."—"My good woman," said Napoléon, who at that time was exceedingly thin, "look at me, and say which of us has fed the best." This at once turned the laugh on his side, and he continued his route without interruption. [Las Cas. ii. 173.]

(1) Las Cas. i. 173. ii. 190, 191. D'Abr. iii. 314. Nap. i. 72. Scott, iii. 80.

(2) The author heard this prophecy long before Napoléon's elevation to the throne, from the late Countess of Bath, and the Countess of Ancran, who were educated in the same convent with Josephine, and had repeatedly heard her mention the circumstance in early youth.

(3) Méin. de Joséphine, par Mad. Crevier, i. 251, 252, 253. Scott, iii. 82. Note.

Josephine herself narrated this extraordinary passage in her life in the following terms:—

"One morning the jailer entered the chamber where I slept with the Duchess d'Aiguillon and two other ladies, and told me he was going to take my mattress to give it to another prisoner. 'Why,' said Madame d'Aiguillon, eagerly, 'will not Madame de Beauharnais obtain a better one?'—'No, no,' replied he, with a fiendish smile, 'she will have no need of one; for she is about to be led to the Conciergerie, and thence to the guillotine.'

"At these words my companions in misfortune

uttered piercing shrieks. I consoled them as well as I could; and at length, worn out with their eternal lamentations, I told them that their grief was utterly unreasonable; that not only I should not die, but live to be Queen of France. 'Why, then, do you not name your maids of honour?' said Madame d'Aiguillon, irritated at such expressions at such a moment. 'Very true,' said I; 'I did not think of that;—well, my dear, I make you one of them.' Upon this the tears of these ladies fell asunder, for they never doubted I was mad. But the truth was, I was not gifted with any extraordinary courage, but internally persuaded of the truth of the oracle.

"Madame d'Aiguillon soon after became unwell, and I drew her towards the window, which I opened to admit through the bars a little fresh air;—I there perceived a poor woman who knew us, and who was making a number of signs, which I at first could not understand. She constantly held up her gown (*robe*); and seeing that she had some object in view, I called out '*robe*,' to which she answered 'yes.' She then lifted up a stone and put it in her lap, which she lifted up a second time; I called out '*pierre*,' upon which she evinced the greatest joy at perceiving that her signs were understood. Joining, then, the stone to her robe, she eagerly imitated the motion of cutting off the neck, and immediately began to dance, and evince the most extravagant joy. This singular pantomime awakened in our minds a vague hope that possibly Robespierre might be no more.

"At this moment, when we were floating between hope and fear, we heard a great noise in the cor-

<sup>Her character.</sup> **Joséphine** possessed all the qualities fitted to excite admiration; graceful in her manners, affectionate in her disposition, elegant in her appearance, she was qualified both to awaken the love, and form the happiness of the young general, whose fate was now united with her own. Her influence in subsequent times, when placed on the throne, was never exerted but for the purposes of humanity; and if her extravagance sometimes amounted to a fault, it was redeemed by the readiness with which she gave ear to the tale of suffering. Napoléon himself said, after he had tasted of all the greatness of the world, that the chief happiness he had known in life had flowed from her affection (1).

<sup>Marries her, and receives the command of the army of Italy.</sup> In the first instance, however, motives of ambition combined with a softer feeling to fix Napoléon's choice; madame Beauharnais had formed an intimacy in prison with Madame Fontenoy, the eloquent and beautiful friend of Tallien: and she was an acknowledged favourite of Barras, at that period the leading character of the Directory, though, with his usual volatility, he was not sorry of an opportunity of establishing her in marriage with the young general (2); and his influence, after the fall of Robespierre, promised to be of essential importance to the rising officer. He married her on the 9th March, 1796; he himself being in the twenty-sixth, and she in the twenty-eighth year of her age. At the same time, he laid before the Directory a plan for the Italian campaign, so remarkable for its originality and genius, as to attract the especial notice of the illustrious Carnot, then minister at war. The united influence of these two directors, and the magnitude of the obligation with Napoléon had conferred upon them, prevailed. With Joséphine he received the command of the Italian armies; and, twelve days after, set out for the Alps, taking with him two thousand louis-d'or for the use of the army, the whole specie which the treasury could furnish. The instructions of the Directory were, to do all in his power to revolutionize Piémont, and so intimidate the other Italian powers; to violate the neutrality of Genoa; seize the forts of Savona; compel the Senate to furnish him with pecuniary supplies, and surrender the keys of Gavi, a fortress, perched on a rocky height, commanding the pass of the Bocchetta. In case of refusal, he was directed to carry it by assault. His powers were limited to military operations, and the Directory reserved to themselves the exclusive power of concluding treaties of peace or truce; a limitation which was speedily disregarded by the enterprising genius of the young conqueror (3).

At this period, the military forces of the Italian states amounted to one hundred and sixty thousand men under arms, which could with ease have raised, from a population of nineteen millions, three hundred thousand. But, with the exception of the Piedmontese troops, this military array was of no real use; except when led on by French officers, the soldiers of the other Italian states have never been able to bear the sight of the French or Austrian bayonets (4).

Bitterly did Italy suffer for this decay in her national spirit, and extinc-

tion, and the terrible voice of our jailer, who said to his dog, giving him, at the same time, a kick, 'Get on, you cursed Robespierre.' That coarse phrase at once taught us that we had nothing to fear, and that France was saved."—*Mém de Joséphine*, i. 252, 253.

(1) Bour. i. 101; viii. 372. Scott, iii. 83.

"Joséphine," said Napoléon, "was grace personified. Everything she did was with a grace

and delicacy peculiar to herself. I never saw her act inelegantly the whole time we lived together. Her toilet was a perfect arsenal; and she effectually defended herself against the assaults of time."—*O'Meara*, ii. 101.

(2) Hard. iii. 301.

(3) Hard. iii. 302 303. Las Cas. i. 173, Bour. i. 103. Scott, iii. 83, 84.

(4) Th. viii. 220. Nap. iii. 129, 130.

**Calamities which the French invasion brought on Italy.** tion of her military courage. With the French invasion commenced a long period of suffering : tyranny, under the name of liberty ; rapine, under the name of generosity ; excitement among the poor, spoliation among the rich ; clamour in public against the nobility, and adulation of them in private ; use made of the lovers of freedom by those who despised them ; and revolt against tyranny, by those who aimed only at being tyrants ; general praise of liberty in words, and universal extinction of it in action ; the stripping of churches ; the robbery of hospitals ; the levelling of the palaces of the great, and the destruction of the cottages of the poor ;—all that military license has of most terrible, all that despotic authority has of most oppressive. Then did her people feel, that neither riches of soil nor glories of recollection—neither a southern sun, nor the perfection of art, can save a nation from destruction, if it has lost the vigour to inherit, or the courage to defend them (1).

**State of the French army when Napoléon took the command, 27th March, 1796.** When Napoléon assumed the command of the army in the end of March, he found every thing in the most miserable state. The efficient force under arms, and ready for offensive operations, did not exceed forty-two thousand men ; but it was continually reinforced by troops from the dépôts in the interior, after Napoléon's successes commenced ; so that, notwithstanding the losses of the campaign, it was maintained throughout at that amount. The artillery did not exceed sixty pieces, and the cavalry was almost dismounted ; but the garrisons in the rear, amounting to eight thousand men, could furnish supplies when the war was removed from the frontier and the arsenals of Nice and Antibes were well provided with artillery. For a very long period the soldiers of all ranks had suffered the extremity of want. Perched on the inhospitable summits of the Apennines, they had enjoyed neither tents nor shelter ; magazines they had none ; the troops had for a long time been placed on half a ration a day, and even this scanty supply was for the most part procured by marauding expeditions of the soldiers into the neighbouring valleys. The officers, from the effect of the depreciation of paper, had for years received only eight francs a month of pay ; and the staff was entirely on foot. On one occasion the Directory had awarded a gratification of three louis-d'or to each general of division ; and the future marshals and princes of the empire subsisted for long on the humble present. But, considered with reference to their skill and warlike qualities, the army presented a very different aspect, and were, beyond all question, the most efficient one which the republic possessed. Composed, for the most part, of young soldiers, whom the great levies of 1793 had brought into the field, they had been inured to hardship and privations during the subsequent campaigns in the Pyrenees and Maritime Alps ; a species of warfare which, by leading detached parties continually into difficult and perilous situations, is singularly calculated to strengthen the frame, and augment the intelligence of the soldier. " Poverty," says Napoléon, " privations, misery, are the school of good soldiers." Its spirit had been greatly elevated by the successful result of the battle of Loano ; and its chiefs, Massena, Augereau, Serrurier, and Berthier, had already become distinguished, and, like stars in the firmament on the approach of twilight, began to give token of their future light (2).

Berthier, above forty years of age, son of a geographical artist, was chief of

(1) Bot. i. 298.

(2) Nap. iii. 135, 136, 151. Jom. viii. 57, 59. Hard. iii. 306. Th. viii. 220, 221.

Character of the staff, a situation which he continued to hold in all the campaigns his officers. Brühl. of Napoléon, down to the battle of Waterloo. Active, indefatigable alike on horseback and in the cabinet, he was admirably qualified to discharge the duties of that important situation, without being possessed of the originality and decision requisite for a commander-in-chief. He was perfectly master of the geography of every country which the army was to enter, understood thoroughly the use of maps, and could calculate with admirable precision the time requisite for the different corps to arrive at the ground assigned to them, as well as direct in a lucid manner the course they were to pursue (1).

Masséna. Masséna, a native of Nice, was a lieutenant in the regiment of Royal Italians when the Revolution broke out, but rose rapidly to the rank of general of division. Gifted by nature with a robust frame, indefatigable in exertion, unconquerable in resolution, he was to be seen night and day on horseback, among the rocks and the mountains. Decided, brave, and intrepid, full of ambition, his leading characteristic was obstinacy; a quality which, according as it is right or wrong directed, leads to the greatest successes, or the most ruinous disasters. His conversation gave few indications of genius; but at the first cannon-shot his mental energy redoubled, and when surrounded by danger, his thoughts were clear and forcible. In the midst of the dying and the dead, of balls sweeping away those who encircled him, Masséna was himself, and gave his orders with the greatest coolness and precision. Even after defeat, he recommenced the struggle as if he had come off victorious; and by these means saved the republic at the battle of Zurich. But these great qualities were disfigured by as great vices. He was rapacious, sordid, and avaricious; shared the profits of the contractors and commissaries, and never could keep himself clear from acts of peculation (2).

Augereau. Augereau, born in the faubourg St.-Marceau, shared in the opinions of the democratic quarter from which he sprung. He had served with distinction both in la Vendée and the Pyrenees. With little education, hardly any knowledge, no reach of mind, he was yet beloved by the soldiers, from the order and discipline which he always enforced. His attacks were conducted with courage and regularity, and he led his columns with invincible resolution during the fire; but he had not the moral firmness requisite for lasting success, and was frequently thrown into unreasonable dejection shortly after his greatest triumphs. His political opinions led him to sympathize with the extreme Republicans; but no man was less fitted by nature, either to understand, or shine in, the civil contests in which he was always so desirous to engage (3).

Serrurier. Serrurier, born in the department of the Aisne, was a major at the commencement of the Revolution, and incurred many dangers in its early wars, from the suspicion of a secret leaning to the aristocracy under which he laboured. He was brave in person, firm in conduct, and severe in discipline; but, though he gained the battle of Mondovi, and took Mantua, he was not in general fortunate in his operations, and became a marshal of France, with less military glory than any of his other illustrious compeers (4).

State of the Allied forces.

On the other hand, the Allies had above fifty thousand men, and 200 pieces of cannon; while the Sardinian army, of twenty-four

(1) Nap. iii. 185.

(2) Nap. iii. 187, O'Meara, i. 239.

(3) Nap. iii. 188.

(4) Ibid. 190.



thousand, guarded the avenues of Dauphiné and Savoy, and was opposed to the army of Kellerman of nearly equal strength. Their forces were thus distributed: Beaulieu, a veteran of seventy-five, with thirty thousand combatants, entirely Austrians, and 140 pieces of cannon, was on the extreme right of the French, and in communication with the English fleet; while Colli, with twenty thousand men, and sixty pieces, was in a line with him to the north, and covered Ceva and Coni (1). Generally speaking, the French occupied the crest of the mountains, while the Allies were stationed in the valleys leading into the Italian plains.

Napoleon's  
first procla-  
mation to  
his soldiers.

Napoléon arrived at Nice on the 27th March, and soon gave indications of the great designs which he was meditating, by the following striking proclamation to his troops:—"Soldiers! you are almost naked, half-starved: the Government owes you much, and can give you nothing. Your patience, your courage, in the midst of these rocks, are admirable, but they reflect no splendour on your arms. I am about to conduct you into the most fertile plains on the earth. Fertile provinces, opulent cities, will soon be in your power: there you will find rich harvests, honour, and glory. Soldiers of Italy, will you fail in courage (2)?"

His plan for  
the cam-  
paign.

The plan of the young general was to penetrate into Piémont by the Col de Cadibone, the lowest part of the ridge which divides France from Italy, and separate the Austrian from the Piedmontese armies, by pressing with the weight of his forces on the weak cordon which united them. For this purpose, it was necessary that the bulk of the troops should assemble on the extreme right—a delicate and perilous operation in presence of a superior enemy, but which was rendered comparatively safe by the snow which encumbered the lofty ridges that separated the two armies. Early in April, the whole French columns were in motion towards Genoa, while the French minister demanded from the Senate of that city leave to pass the Bocchetta, and the keys of Gavi, that being the chief route from the maritime coasts to the interior of Piémont. At the same time Beaulieu, in obedience to the directions of the Aulic Council, was, on his side, resuming the offensive, and directing his columns also towards his own left at Genoa, with a view to establish a connexion with that important city and the English fleet. He left his right wing at Dego, pushed his centre, under d'Argenteau, to the ridge of MONTENOTTE, and himself advanced with his left, by Bocchetta and Genoa, towards Voltri, along the sea-coast (3).

The two armies, respectively defiling towards the sea-coast through the higher Alps, came into contact at Montenotte: the Austrian general having advanced his centre to that place, in order to cut asunder the French force, by falling on its left flank, and intercept, by occupying Savona, the road by the Cornice, which they were pursuing, from Provence to Genoa. The Imperialists, ten thousand strong, encountered at Montenotte only Colonel Rampon, at the head of twelve hundred men, whom they forced to retire to the Monte Prato and the old redoubt of Monte Legino; but this brave officer, feeling the vital importance of this post to the whole army, which if lost would have been cut in two, defended the fort with heroic courage, repeatedly repulsed the impetuous attacks of the Austrians, and in the midst of the fire made his soldiers swear to conquer or die. With great difficulty he maintained his ground till nightfall, and by this heroism saved

(1) Th. viii. 223. Jom. viii. 57. Nap. iii. 134, 136. Hard iii. 304, 305.

(2) Nap. iii. 136.

(3) Jom. viii. 64. Nap. iii. 138. Th. viii. 138, 224. Hard iii. 307.



the French army. The brave Roccavina, who commanded the Imperialists, was severely wounded in the last assault, and forced to be removed to Montenotte. Before retiring he strenuously urged his successor, d'Argenteau, to renew the attack during the night, and gain possession of the fort before the distant aid of the Republicans could advance to its relief; but this advice that officer, not equally penetrated with the value of time and the vital importance of that position (1), declined to follow. If he had adopted it, and succeeded, the face of the campaign and of the world might have been changed.

Source of the French. When this attack was going forward, Napoléon was at Savona; but no sooner did he receive intelligence of it, than he resolved to envelope the Austrian force, which had thus pushed into the centre of his line of march. With this view, having stationed Cervoni to make head against Beaulieu in front of Voltri, he himself set out after sunset from Savona with the divisions of Masséna and Serrurier, and having crossed the ridge of 12th April. Cadibope, occupied the heights in rear of Montenotte. The night was dark and tempestuous, which entirely concealed their movements from the Austrians. At daybreak the latter found themselves surrounded on all sides. La Harpe and Rampon attacked them in front, while Masséna and Joubert pressed their rear; they resisted long and bravely, but were at length broken by superior force, and completely routed, with the loss of five pieces of cannon, two thousand prisoners, and above one thousand killed and wounded. This great success paralysed the movements of Beaulieu, who had advanced unopposed beyond Voltri; he hastened back with the bulk of his forces to Millesimo, but such was the circuit they were obliged to take, that ~~it was~~ two days before he arrived at that place to support the ruined centre of his line (2).

This victory, by opening to the French the plains of Piedmont, and piercing the centre of the Allies, completely separated the Austrian and Sardinian armies; the former concentrated at Dego to cover the road to Milan, and the latter around Millesimo to protect the entrance into Piémont. Napoléon, in possession of a central position, resolved to attack them both at once, although by drawing together their detachments from all quarters, they had

Action at Millesimo. more than repaired the losses of Montenotte. On the 13th, Augereau, on the left, assailed the forces of Millesimo, where the Piemontese were posted, while the divisions of Masséna and La Harpe descended the valley and moved towards Dego. With such fury was the attack on the Piemontese conducted, that the passes were forced, and General Provera, who commanded, was driven, with two thousand men, into the ruins of the old castle of Cossaria. He was immediately assaulted there by superior forces; but the Piemontese, skilled in mountain warfare, poured down upon their adversaries such a shower of stones and rocks, that whole companies were swept away at once, and Joubert, who was in front animating the soldiers, was severely wounded. After many ineffectual efforts, the Republicans desisted on the approach of night, and entrenched themselves at the foot of the eminence on which the castle was situated, to prevent the escape April 14. of the garrison. The following day was decisive; Colli and the Piemontese on the left made repeated efforts to disengage Provera, but their exertions were in vain; and after seeing all their columns repulsed, that brave officer, destitute of provisions and water, was compelled to lay down his

(1) *Jom.* viii. 69. *Th.* viii. 226. *Bot.* i. 306. *Hard.* iii. 311. 312. *Nap.* iii. 139.

(2) *Nap.* iii. 141. *Th.* viii. 227. *Jom.* viii. 70.

And at Dego. arms, with fifteen hundred men. Meanwhile, Napoléon himself, with the divisions of Masséna and La Harpe, attacked and carried Dego after an obstinate resistance, while Joubert made himself master of the heights of Biestro. The retreat of the Austrians was obstructed by the artillery, which blocked up the road in the defile of Spegno, and the soldiers had no other resource but to disperse and seek their safety on the mountains. Thirteen pieces of artillery and three thousand prisoners fell into the hands of the victors. No sooner was this success achieved, than the indefatigable conqueror moved forward the division of Augereau, now disengaged by the surrender of Provera, to the important heights of Monte Zemolo, the occupation of which completed the separation of the Austrian and Piedmontese armies. Beaulieu retired to Acqui, on the road to Milan, and Colli towards Ceva, to cover Turin (1).

Bold advance of Wukossowich to Dego.

Meanwhile the brave Wukossowich, at the head of six thousand Austrian grenadiers, made a movement which, if supported, might have completely re-established the affairs of the Allies. Separated from the body of the Imperial forces, he advanced to Dego, with the intention of forming a junction with d'Argenteau, who he imagined still occupied that place. Great was his surprise when he found it in the hands of the enemy; but instantly taking his resolution, like a brave man, he attacked and carried the place, making prisoners six hundred French, and regaining all the artillery lost on the preceding day. But this success not being supported by the other divisions of the Austrian army, which were in full retreat, only led to the destruction of the brave men who had achieved it. Napoléon instantly

Which, at first successful, being unsupported, at length fails.

returned to the spot, and commenced a vigorous attack with superior forces. They were received with such gallantry by the Austrians, that the Republican columns were in the first instance repulsed in disorder, and the general-in-chief hastened to the spot to restore the combat; but at length General Lanusse, putting his hat on the point of his sword, led them back to the charge, and carried the place, with the loss of fifteen hundred men to the Imperialists, who escaped with difficulty by the road to Acqui, after abandoning all the artillery they had retaken. In this action Napoléon was particularly struck by the gallantry of a young chief of battalion, whom he made a colonel on the spot, and who continued ever after the companion of his glory. His name was LANNES, afterwards Duke of Montébello, and one of the most heroic marshals of the empire (2).

Arrival of the Republicans on the heights of Monte Zemolo.

After the battle of Dego, La Harpe's division was placed to keep the shattered remains of Beaulieu's forces in check, while the weight of the army was moved against the Sardinian troops. Augereau drove the Piedmontese from the heights of Monte Zemolo, and soon after the main body of the army arrived upon the same ridge. From thence the eye could discover the immense and fertile plains of Piémont. The Pô, the Tanaro, the Stura, and a multitude of smaller streams, were descried in the distance, while a glittering girdle of snow and ice, of a prodigious elevation, surrounded from afar the promised land. It was a sublime spectacle when the troops arrived on this elevated point, and the soldiers, exhausted with

(1) Nap. iii. 143, 144. Th. viii. 229, 230. Hard. iii. 312, 315. Nap. iii. 143

(2) Jom. viii. 85. Nap. iii. 145.

"The talent of Lannes," said Napoléon, "was equal to his bravery. He was at once the Roland of the army, and a giant in capacity." [Las Cas. ii. 374. D'Abr. vi. 326.] He had great experience in war, had been in fifty-four pitched battles, and three

hundred combats. He was cool in the midst of fire, and possessed a clear, penetrating eye, ready to take advantage of any opportunity which might present itself. Violent and hasty in his temper, sometimes even in my presence, he was yet ardently attached to me. As a general, he was greatly superior to either Moreau or Soult." — O'MEARA, i. 239.

fatigue, and overwhelmed with the grandeur of the sight, paused and gazed on the plains beneath. These gigantic barriers, apparently the limits of the world, which nature had rendered so formidable, and on which art had lavished its treasures, had fallen as if by enchantment. "Hannibal," said Napoléon, fixing his eyes on the mountains, "has forced the Alps, but we have turned them." Soon after the troops descended the ridge, passed the Tanaro, and found themselves in the Italian plains (1).

Serrurier was now detached by the bridge of St.-Michael to turn the right of Colli, who occupied the intrenched camp of Cervo, while Masséna passed the Tanaro to turn his left. The Piedmontese, who were about eight thousand strong, defended the camp in the first instance with success; but, finding their communications on the point of being lost, they retired in the night, and took a position behind the deep and rapid torrent of the Cursaglia. There they were assailed, on the following day, by Serrurier, who forced the bridge of St.-Michael; while Joubert, who had waded through the torrent farther up, in vain endeavoured to induce his followers to pass, and was obliged, after incurring the greatest risks, to retire. Relieved now from all anxiety about his flank, Colli fell, with all his forces, on Serrurier, and, after a severe action, drove him back again over the bridge, with the loss of six hundred men (2).

19th April.  
Actions of  
Serrurier  
with Colli.

This check exposed Napoléon to imminent danger. Colli occupied a strong position at Mondovi in his front, while Beaulieu, with an army still formidable, was in his rear, and might easily resume offensive operations. A council of war was held in the night, at which it was unanimously resolved, notwithstanding the fatigue of the troops, to resume the attack on the following day. All the dispositions, accordingly, were made for a renewed assault on the bridge, with increased forces; but, on arriving at the advanced posts at daybreak, they found them abandoned by the enemy, who had fought only in order to gain time for the evacuation of the magazines in his rear, and had retired in the night to Mondovi. He was overtaken, however, in his retreat, near Mondovi, by the indefatigable victor, who had seized a strong position, where he hoped to arrest the enemy. The Republicans immediately advanced to the assault, and, though Serrurier was defeated in the centre by the brave grenadiers of Dichat, yet that courageous general having been struck dead by a cannon-ball at the moment when his troops, somewhat disordered by success, were assailed in flank by superior forces, the Piedmontese were thrown into confusion, and Serrurier, resuming the offensive, attacked and carried the redoubt of Bicoque, the principal defence of the position, and completed the victory. Colli retired to Cherasco, with the loss of two thousand men, eight cannon, and eleven standards. Thither he was followed by Napoléon, who occupied that town, which, though fortified, and important by its position at the confluence of the Stura and the Tanaro, was not armed, and incapable of resistance; and, by so doing, not only acquired a firm footing in the interior of Piémont, but made himself master of extensive magazines (3).

Danger of  
Napoléon.

Actions at  
Mondovi.

Immense  
advantages  
gained by  
the French  
by these  
operations.

This important success speedily changed the situation of the French army. Having descended from the sterile and inhospitable summits of the Alps, they found themselves, though still among the mountains, in communication with the rich and fertile plains of

(1) Nap. iii. 147. Th. viii. 233.

(3) Th. viii, 234. Nap. iii. 150. Jom. viii. 92, 95.

(2) Th. viii. 233. Jom. viii. 96, 91. Hard. iii.

Italy; provisions were obtained in abundance, and with the introduction of regularity in the supplies, the pillage and disorders consequent upon prior privations disappeared. The soldiers, animated with success, speedily recovered from their fatigues; the stragglers, and those left behind in the mountains, rejoined their colours; and the bands of conscripts from the depôts in the interior eagerly pressed forward to share in the glories, and partake the spoils, of the Italian army. In a short time the Republicans, notwithstanding all their losses, were as strong as at the commencement of the campaign; while the Allies, besides having been driven from the ridge of the Alps, the barrier of Piémont, were weakened by the loss of above twelve thousand men, and forty pieces of cannon (1).

Consternation of the court of Turin.

The court of Turin was now in the utmost consternation, and opinions were violently divided as to the course which should be pursued. The ministers of Austria and England urged the king, who was by no means deficient in firmness, to imitate the glorious example of his ancestors, and abandon his capital. But, as a preliminary to so decided a step, they insisted that the fortresses of Tortona, Alexandria, and Valencia, should be put into the possession of the Austrians, in order to give Beaulieu a solid footing on the Po; and to this sacrifice in favour of a rival power, he could not be brought to submit. At length the Cardinal Costa persuaded him to throw himself into the arms of the French, and Colli was authorized to open negotiations. This was one of the numerous instances in the history of Napoléon, in which his audacity not only extricated him from the most perilous situations, but gave him the most splendid triumphs; for at this period, by his own admission, the French army was in very critical circumstances. He had neither heavy cannon nor a siege equipage to reduce Turin, Alexandria, or the other numerous fortresses of Piedmont, without the possession of which it would have been extremely hazardous to have penetrated farther into the country: the Allied armies, united, were still superior to the French, and their cavalry, of such vital importance in the plains, had not at all suffered; while his own troops, confounded at their own achievements, and as yet unaccustomed to his rapid success, were beginning to hesitate as to the expedience of any farther advance. "The King of Sardinia," says Napoléon, "had still a great number of fortresses left; and in spite of the victories which had been gained, the slightest cheek, one caprice of fortune, would have undone every thing (2)."

It was, therefore, with the most lively satisfaction that Napoléon received the advances of the Sardinian government; but he insisted that, as a preliminary to any armistice, the fortresses of Coni, Tortona, and Alexandria, should be put into his hands. The Piedmontese commissioners were at first disposed to resist this demand; but Napoléon sternly replied,—“It is for me to impose conditions—your ideas are absurd: listen to the laws which I impose upon you, in the name of the government of my country, and obey, or to-morrow my batteries are erected, and Turin is in flames.” These words so intimidated the Piedmontese, that they returned in consternation to their capital, where every opposition speedily gave way. After some negotiation, the treaty was concluded, the principal conditions of which were, that the King of Sardinia should abandon the Alliance, and send

Armistice. Its conditions.

(1) Jom. viii. 66. Nap. iii. 150.

(2) Nap. iii. 151, 152, 153. Hard. iii. 323, 326. Jom. viii. 96, 97.

an ambassador to Paris to conclude a definitive peace; that in the mean time Ceva, Coni, and Tortona, or, failing it, Alexandria, should be delivered up to the French army, with all the artillery and magazines they contained; that the victors should continue to occupy all the positions which at present were in their possession; that Valence should be instantly ceded to the French in lieu of the Neapolitans; that the militia should be disbanded, and the regular troops dispersed in the fortified places, so as to give no umbrage to the French (1).

16th May,  
1796.

The armistice was followed, a fortnight after, by the treaty of peace between the King of Sardinia and the French Republic.

Followed by  
a treaty of  
peace be-  
tween  
France and  
Sardinia.

By it his Sardinian Majesty finally renounced the coalition; ceded to the Republic, Savoy, Nice, and the whole possessions of Piedmont to the westward of the highest ridge of the Alps (extending from Mount St.-Bernard by Mount Geneva to Roccabarbone near Genoa): and granted a free passage through his dominions to all the troops of the Republic. The importance of this accommodation may be judged by the letter of Napoléon to the Directory the day the armistice was signed,—“Coni, Ceva, and Alexandria are in the hands of our army; if you do not ratify the convention, I will keep these fortresses, and march upon Turin. Meanwhile, I shall march to-morrow against Beaulieu, and drive him across the Po; I shall follow close at his heels, overrun all Lombardy, and in a month be in the Tyrol, join the army of the Rhine, and carry our united forces into Bavaria. That design is worthy of you, of the army, and of the destinies of France. If you continue your confidence in me, I shall answer for the results, and Italy is at your feet (2).”

Its immense  
importance  
to Napoleon.

This treaty was of more service to the French general than many victories. It gave him a firm footing in Piedmont; artillery and stores for the siege of Turin, if the final conditions should not be agreed to by the Directory; stores and magazines in abundance, and a direct communication with Genoa and France for the future supplies of the army. Napoléon, from the solid base of the Piedmontese fortresses, was enabled to turn his undivided attention to the destruction of the Austrians, and thus commence, with some security, that great career of conquest which he already meditated in the Imperial dominions. Nevertheless, a large proportion of his troops and officers openly condemned the conclusion of any treaty of peace with a monarchical government; and insisted that the opportunity should not have been suffered to escape of establishing a revolutionary government in the frontier state of Italy. But Napoléon,—whose head was too strong to be carried away by the fumes of democracy, and who already gave indications of that resolution to detach himself from the cause of revolution by which he was ever after so strongly distinguished,—replied, that the first duty of the army was to secure a firm base for future operations; that it was on the Adige that the French standard must be established to protect Italy from the Imperialists; that it was impossible to advance thus far without being secured in their rear; that a revolutionary government in Piedmont would require constant assistance, scatter alarm through Italy, and be a source of weakness rather than strength; whereas the Sardinian fortresses at once put the Republicans in possession of the keys of the Peninsula. (3).

(1) Nap. iii. 155. Hard. iii. 328. Jom. viii. 93.

(3) Nap. iii. 157, 161. Th. viii. 237.

(2) Corresp. Secrète de Nap. 28th April 1796. Jom. viii. 102.



His triumphant proclamation to his soldiers.

At the same time, he despatched his aide-de-camp, Murat, with the standards taken, to Paris, and addressed to his soldiers one of those exaggerated but eloquent proclamations, which contributed as much as his victories, by captivating the minds of men, to his astonishing success. "Soldiers! you have gained in fifteen days six victories, taken one-and-twenty standards, fifty-five pièces of cannon, many strong places, and conquered the richest part of Piedmont; you have made fifteen thousand prisoners, killed or wounded ten thousand men. Hitherto you have fought on sterile rocks, illustrious, indeed, by your courage, but of no avail to your country; now you rival, by your services, the armies of the Rhine and the North. Destitute at first, you have supplied every thing. You have gained battles without cannons; passed rivers without bridges; made forced marches without shoes; bivouacked without bread! The phalanxes of the Republic—the soldiers of liberty,—were alone capable of such sacrifices. But, soldiers, you have done nothing, while any thing remains to do. Neither Turin nor Milan is in your hands; the ashes of the conqueror of Tarquin are still trampled on by the assassins of Basseville! I am told that there are some among you whose courage is giving way; who would rather return to the summits of the Alps and the Apennines. No—I cannot believe it. The conquerors of Montenotte, of Millesimo, of Dego, of Mondovi, burn to carry still farther the glories of the French name (1)!"

Intoxication at Paris on this intelligence.

When these successive victories, these standards, these proclamations, arrived day after day at Paris, the joy of the people knew no bounds. The first day the gates of the Alps were opened; the next, the Austrians were separated from the Piedmontese; the third, the Sardinian army was destroyed, and the fortresses surrendered. The rapidity of the success, the number of the prisoners, exceeded all that had yet been witnessed. Every one asked, who was this young conqueror whose fame had burst forth so suddenly, and whose proclamations breathed the spirit of ancient glory? Three times the Councils decreed that the army of Italy had deserved well of their country, and appointed a fête to Victory, in honour of the commencement of the campaign (2).

Designs of Napoléon.

Having secured his rear by this advantageous treaty, Napoléon lost no time in pursuing the discomfited remains of Beaulieu's army, which had retired behind the Po, in the hope of covering the Milanese territory. The forces of the Austrians were plainly now unequal to the struggle; a *coup de main*, which Beaulieu attempted on the fortresses of Alexandria, Tortona, and Valence, failed, and they were immediately after surrendered to the Republicans; while the army of Napoléon was about to be united to the corps of Kellermann, and the division of the Col di Tende now rendered disposable, by the conclusion of the armistice, a reinforcement of above twenty thousand men. Napoléon, on his side, indulged the most brilliant anticipations; and confidently announced to the Directory that he would cross the Po, expel the Austrians from the Milanese territory, traverse the mountains of the Tyrol, unite with the army of the Rhine, and carry the war, by the valley of the Danube, into the heart of the Imperial dominions (3).

(1) Th. viii. 240.

(2) Th. viii. 241. Hard. iii. 338.

(3) Jom. viii. 110, 112. Th. viii. 253. Hard. iii. 337.

Napoléon wrote to the Directory at this pe-

riod:—"The King of Sardinia has surrendered at discretion, given up three of his strongest fortresses, and the half of his dominions. If you do not choose to accept his submission, but resolve to dethrone him, you must amuse him for a few

By inserting a clause in the treaty with the King of Sardinia, that the French army was to be at liberty to cross the Po at Valence, he completely deceived the Austrians as to the place where the passage was to be effected. The whole attention of Beaulieu having been drawn to that point, the republican forces were rapidly moved to Placentia, and began to cross the river in boats at that place. Lannes was the first who effected the passage, and the other columns soon crossed with such rapidity that a firm footing was established on the opposite bank, and two days afterwards Napoléon arrived with the bulk of his forces and established a bridge. By this skilful march not only the Po was passed, but the Ticino turned, as Placentia is below its junction with the former river; so that one great obstacle to the conquest of Lombardy was already removed (1).

7th May.  
Crosses the  
Po, and  
proceeds  
against  
Beaulieu.

Beaulieu was now considerably reinforced, and his forces amounted to thirty-six battalions, and forty-four squadrons, besides 120 pieces of cannon, in all nearly forty thousand men. He was at Pavia, busily engaged in erecting fortifications, when he received intelligence of the passage at Placentia. He immediately moved forward his advanced guard, consisting of three thousand infantry, and two thousand horse, under General Liptay, to Fombio, a small town a short distance from the republican posts. Napoléon, who feared that he might be strengthened in this position, and was well aware of the danger of fighting a general battle with a great river in his rear, lost no time in moving forward his forces to dislodge him. D'Allemagne, at the head of the grenadiers, attacked on the right; Lanusse by the chaussée on the centre; and Lannes on the left. After a vigorous resistance, the Austrians were expelled from the town, with the loss of above a thousand men. Liptay fell back to Pizzighitone (2). Meanwhile, Beaulieu was advancing with the bulk of his forces; and the leading division of his army surprised General La Harpe in the night, who was killed while bravely fighting at the head of his division, but not before the Austrians had been compelled to retire.

Actions at  
Fombio.

The French troops having now entered upon the states of Parma, it was of importance to establish matters on a pacific footing in their rear before pressing forward to Milan. The Grand Duke had no military resources whatever; the victor, therefore, resolved to grant him terms, upon the surrender of what he had to give. He was obliged to pay 2,000,000 of francs in silver, and to furnish 1600 artillery-horses, of which the army stood in great need, besides great supplies of corn and provisions. But on this occasion Napoléon commenced another species of military contribution, which he has himself confessed was unparalleled in modern warfare, that of exacting from the vanquished the surrender of their most precious works of art. Parma was compelled to give up twenty of its principal paintings, among which was the celebrated S.-Jerome by Correggio. The Duke offered a million of francs as a ransom for that inestimable work of art, which many of his officers urged the French general to accept, as of much more service to the army than the painting; but Napoléon, whose mind was fixed on greater things, replied,—“The million which he offers us would soon be

Capitulation  
of the Grand  
Duke of  
Parma.

weeks, and give me warning; I will get possession of Valence, and march upon Turin. On the other hand, I shall impose a contribution of some millions on the Duke of Parma, detach twelve thousand men to Rome, as soon as I have beaten Beaulieu and driven him across the Adige, and when I am assured that you will conclude peace with the King of Sar-

dinia, and strengthen me by the army of Kellermann. As to Genoa, by all means oblige it to pay fifteen millions.”—*Secret Despatch to Directory, 29th April, 1796. Corresp. Secrète de Napoléon, i. 103.*

1) Nap. iii. 165. Th. viii. 254, 257. Jom. viii. 116.

(2) Th. viii. 258. Nap. iii. 166. Jom. viii. 117.

spent; but the possession of such a *chef-d'œuvre* at Paris will adorn that capital for ages, and give birth to similar exertions of genius (1)."

Commence-  
ment of  
Napoleon's  
system of  
levying con-  
tributions on  
the works  
of art.

Thus commenced the system of seizing the great works of art in the conquered states, which the French generals afterwards carried to such a height, and which produced the noble gallery of the Louvre. The French have since had good reason to congratulate themselves that the Allies did not follow their bad example; and that on occasion of the second capture of Paris, they had the generosity to content themselves with enforcing restitution of the abstracted spoils, without, like them, compelling the surrender of those that had been legitimately acquired. Certainly it is impossible to condemn too strongly a use of the powers of conquest, which extends the ravages of war into the peaceful domain of the fine arts; which transplants the monuments of genius from the regions where they have arisen, and where they can rightly be appreciated, to those where they are exotics, and their value cannot be understood; which renders them, instead of being the proud legacy of genius to its country, the mere ensign of a victor's glory; which exposes them to be tossed about by the tide of conquest, and subjected to irreparable injury in following the fleeting career of success; and converts works, destined to elevate and captivate the human race, into the subject of angry contention, and the trophies of temporary subjugation.

Terrible  
Passage of  
the Bridge  
of Lodi.

On the 10th, Napoléon marched towards Milan; but, before arriving at that city, he required to cross the Adda. The bridge of Lodi over that river was held by a strong rear-guard, consisting of twelve thousand Austrian infantry and four thousand horse; while the remainder of their forces had retired to Cassano, and the neighbourhood of Milan. By a rapid advance, he hoped to cut off the bulk of their troops from the hereditary states, and make them prisoners; but, as there was not a moment to be lost in achieving the movements requisite to attain this object, he resolved to force the bridge, and thus get into their rear. He himself arrived at Lodi, at the head of the grenadiers d'Allemagne; upon which, the Austrians withdrew from the town, and crossed the river; drawing up their infantry, with twenty pieces of cannon, at the further extremity of the bridge, to defend the passage. Napoléon immediately directed Beaumont, with all the cavalry of the army, to pass at a ford half a league further up, while he himself directed all the artillery which had come up against the Austrian battery, and formed six thousand grenadiers in close column, under cover of the houses at his own end of the bridge. No sooner did he perceive that the discharge of the Austrian artillery was beginning to slacken, from the effect of the French fire, and that the passage of the cavalry on their flank had commenced, than he addressed a few animating words to his soldiers, and gave the signal to advance. The grenadiers rushed forward through a cloud of smoke over the long and narrow defile of the bridge. The terrible storm of grape-shot for a moment arrested their progress; but finding themselves supported by a cloud of tirailleurs, who waded the stream below the arches, and led on by their dauntless general, they soon recovered, and, rushing forward with resistless fury, carried the Austrian guns, and drove back their infantry. Had the French cavalry been ready to profit by the confusion, the whole corps of the Imperialists would have been destroyed; but, as it had not yet come up, their numerous squadrons protected the retreat of the in-

(1) Nap. iii. 169. Th. viii. 255.



infantry, which retired with the loss of two thousand men, and twenty pieces of cannon. The loss of the victors was at least as great. The object of this bold measure was indeed lost, for the Austrians, whom it had been intended to cut off, had meanwhile gained the chaussée of Brescia, and made good their retreat (1); but it contributed greatly to exalt the character and elevate the courage of the Republican troops, by inspiring them with the belief that nothing could resist them; and it made a deep impression on the mind of Napoléon, who ever after styled it “the terrible passage of the bridge of Lodi.”

The victory at Lodi had an extraordinary effect on the French army. After each success, the old soldiers, who had at first been somewhat distrustful of their young commander, assembled, and gave him a new step of promotion. He was made a corporal at Lodi; and the surname of “Le Petit Caporal,” thence acquired, was long remembered in the army. When, in 1815, he was met by the battalion sent against him from the fortress of Grenoble, the soldiers, the moment they saw him, exclaimed, “Long live our little corporal! we will never oppose him.” Nor did this fearful passage produce a less powerful impression on the mind of the general, “The 13th Vendémiaire, and the victory of Montenotte,” said Napoléon, “did not induce me to believe myself a superior character. It was after the passage of Lodi that the idea shot across my mind, that I might become a decisive actor on the political theatre. Then arose, for the first time, the spark of great ambition (2).”

After this disaster, Beaulieu retired behind the Mincio, leaving Milan to its fate; and Pizzighitone, with its garrison of five hundred men, capitulated. Serrurier was placed at Cremona, from whence he observed the garrison of Mantua, while Augereau pushed on from Pizzighitone to Pavia. On the 15th, Napoléon enters Milan. Napoléon made his triumphal entry into Milan at the head of his troops, with all the pomp of war, to the sound of military music, amidst the acclamations of an immense concourse of spectators, and through the lines of the national guard, dressed in three colours, in honour of the tricolor flag (3).

His proclamation there to his troops. On this occasion the conqueror addressed to his soldiers another of those heart-stirring proclamations which so powerfully contributed to electrify the ardent imagination of the Italians, and added so much to the influence of his victories.—“Soldiers! you have descended like a torrent from the summit of the Apennines; you have overwhelmed and dispersed every thing which opposed your progress. Piedmont, delivered from the tyranny of Austria, has felt itself at liberty to indulge its natural inclination for peace, and for a French alliance: Milan is in your hands; and the Republican standards wave over the whole of Lombardy. The Dukes of Parma and Modena owe their existence only to your generosity. The army which menaced you with so much pride, can now no longer find a barrier to protect itself against your arms: the Po, the Ticinio, the Adda, have not been able to stop you a single day; these boasted bulwarks of Italy have proved as nugatory as the Alps. Such a career of success has carried joy into the bosom of your country: fêtes in honour of your victories have been ordered by the National Representatives in all the communes of the Republic; there, your parents, your wives, your sisters, your lovers, rejoice at your success, and glory in their connexion with you. Yes, soldiers! you

(1) *Jom. viii. 123, 126. Scott, iii. 131. Bot. iii. 351. Nap. iii. 172—174. Th. viii. 260, 261.*

(2) *Las Cas. i. 162, 163.*

(3) *Th. viii. 263. Nap. iii. 176. Jom. viii. 127.*

have indeed done much; but much still remains to be done. Shall posterity say that we knew how to conquer, but not how to improve victory? Shall we find a Capua in Lombardy? The hour of vengeance has struck, but the people of all nations may rest in peace; we are the friends of every people, and especially of the descendants of Brutus, Scipio, and the other great men whom we have taken for examples. To restore the Capitol; to replace there the statues of the heroes who have rendered it immortal; to rouse the Romans from centuries of slavery—such will be the fruit of our victories: they will form an era in history; to you will belong the glory of having changed the face of the most beautiful part of Europe. The French people, free within and dreaded without, will give to Europe a glorious peace, which will indemnify her for all the sacrifices she has made for the last six years. Then you will return to your homes, and your fellow-citizens will say of each of you in passing—‘He was a soldier in the army of Italy (1)!’”

Enthusiasm  
excited by  
these suc-  
cesses  
among the  
Democratic  
party in  
Italy.

Great was the enthusiasm, unbounded the joy, which these unparalleled successes and eloquent words excited among all that ardent and generous part of the Italian people, who panted for civil liberty and national independence. To them Napoléon appeared as the destined regenerator of Italy, the hero who was to achieve their liberation from Transalpine oppression, and bring back the glorious days of Roman virtue. His burning words, his splendid actions, the ancient cast of his thoughts, diffused an universal enchantment. Even the coolest heads began to turn at the brilliant career thus begun, by a general not yet six-and-twenty years of age, and the boundless anticipations of future triumph of which he spoke with prophetic certainty. From every part of Italy the young and the ardent flocked to Milan; balls and festivities gave token of the universal joy; every word and look of the conqueror was watched, the patriots compared him to Scipio and Hannibal, and the ladies on the popular side knew no bounds to their adulation (2).

Cruel dis-  
pelling of  
the illusion  
by the  
French con-  
tributions.

But this illusion was of short duration, and Italy was soon destined to experience the bitter fate and cruel degradation of every people who look for their deliverance to foreign assistance. In the midst of the general joy, a contribution of twenty millions of francs, or L.800,000 sterling, struck Milan with astonishment, and wounded the Italians in their tenderest part—their domestic and economical arrangements. So enormous a contribution upon a single city seemed scarcely possible to be realized; but the sword of the victor offered no alternative. Great requisitions were at the same time made of horses for the artillery and cavalry in all the Milanese territory; and provisions were amassed on all sides, at the expense of the inhabitants, for which they received nothing, or Republican paper of no value. Nor did the Duke of Modena escape more easily. He was compelled to purchase peace by a contribution of ten millions of francs in money, or stores for the army, and to submit to the exaction of twenty paintings from his gallery for the Republican museum. Liberated Italy was treated with more severity than is generally the lot of conquered states (3).

War made  
to support  
war.

Thus commenced the system of “making war support war,” which contributed so much to the early success of the Republican arms, which compensated for all the penury and exhaustion of the Republican ter-

(1) Nap. iii. 178.

(2) Bot. i. 356—358. Th. viii. 265.

(3) Th. viii. 265. Jom. viii. 130. Nap. iii. 183.

ritory, which raised to the clouds the glory of the empire, and occasioned with certainty its ultimate destruction. France, abounding with men, but destitute of resources,—incapable of supporting war, from the entire stoppage of domestic industry, but teeming with a restless and indigent population,—found in this system the means of advancement and opulence. While the other armies of the Republic were suffering under the horrors of penury, and could hardly find food for their support, or clothes for their covering, the army of Italy was rolling in opulence, and the spoils of vanquished states gave them every enjoyment of life. From that time there was no want of soldiers to follow the career of the conqueror; the Alps were covered with files of troops pressing forward to the theatre of glory, and all the chasms occasioned by the relentless system of war which he followed, were filled up by the multitudes whom the illusion of victory brought to his standard (1).

But the Republican soldiers were far from anticipating the terrible reverses to which this system of spoliation was ultimately to lead, or that France was destined to groan under exactions, as severe as those she now so liberally inflicted upon others. Clothed, fed, and lodged at the expense of the Milanese, the soldiers pursued with thoughtless eagerness the career of glory which was stretched before them. The artillery, the cavalry, were soon in the finest condition, and hospitals established for fifteen thousand sick in the different towns in the conquered territory; for to that immense number had the rapidity of the marches, and the multiplicity of the combats, swelled the hospital train. Having amply provided for his own army, Napoléon dispatched several millions by the route of Genoa for the service of the Directory, and one million over the Alps to Moreau, to relieve the pressing wants of the army of the Upper Rhine (2).

The Directory, jealous of his power, orders Napoleon to march to Rome—He refuses. These great successes already began to inspire the French Government with jealousy of their lieutenant, and they in consequence transmitted an order by which Kellermann, with twenty thousand men, was to command on the left bank of the Pô, and cover the siege of Mantua, while Napoléon, with the remainder of the forces, was to march upon Rome and Naples. But he was both too proud to submit to any division of his authority, and too sagacious not to see that by thus separating the forces, and leaving only a small army in the north of Italy, the Austrians would speedily regain their lost ground, drive their inconsiderable opponents over the Alps, and cut off, without the possibility of escape, the corps in the south of the Peninsula. He, therefore, at once resigned his command, accompanying it with the observation, that one bad general is better than two good ones. The Directory, however, unable to dispense with the services of their youthful officer, immediately reinstated him, and abandoned their project, which was indeed in itself so absurd as would have thrown great doubts on the military capacity of Carnot, the minister at war, if it had not in reality been suggested by the wish to extinguish the rising ambition of Napoléon (3).

(1) Th. viii. 137, 265, 266.

(2) Th. viii. 266. Nap. Cor. Conf. i. 159.

(3) Th. viii. 269. Nap. iii. 184. Jom. viii. 133.

Napoléon on this occasion wrote to Carnot:—“Kellermann would command the army as well as I; for no one is more convinced than I am of the courage and audacity of the soldiers; but to unite us together would ruin every thing. I will not serve with a man who considers himself the first general in Europe; and it is better to have one bad general than two good ones. War is, like govern-

ment, decided in a great degree by tact.” To the Directory he observed,—“It is in the highest degree impolitic to divide into two the army of Italy, and not less adverse to the interests of the Republic, to place at its head two different generals. The expedition to Leghorn, Rome, and Naples, is a very inconsiderable matter, and should be made by divisions in echelon, ready, at a moment's warning, to wheel about and face the Austrians on the Adige. To perform it with success, both armies must be under the command of one general. I have

In less than ten days after the occupation of Milan, national guards in the Republican interest were organized in the whole of Lombardy; revolutionary authorities were every where established, and the country rendered subservient to the military power of France. The garrison of two thousand men, which Beaulieu had left in the citadel of Milan, was closely invested, and the 25th May. head-quarters moved to Lodi. But an event here occurred which threatened great danger to the French army, and was only averted by the decision and severity of their chief (1).

Alarming  
insurrection  
at Pavia.

Opinions were much divided in Italy, as in all states undergoing the crisis of a revolution, on the changes which were going forward. The lower classes in the towns had been moved by the equality which the French every where proclaimed; but the peasantry in the country, less liable to the contagion of new principles, and more under the influence of the nobility and priests, were still firmly attached to the ancient *régime*, with which the Austrian authority was now identified. When men's minds were in this divided state, the prodigious contributions levied upon Milan, and the vast requisitions of provisions and horses which had been made for the use of the army, inflamed the rural population to the highest degree. The people of Lombardy did not consider themselves as conquered, nor expect to be treated as such: they had welcomed the French as deliverers, and now they found a severer yoke fastened about their necks than that from which they had just escaped. Roused to indignation by such treatment, a general insurrection was rapidly organized over the whole of that beautiful district. An attack, in concert with a sortie from the garrison of the castle, was made on Milan; and though it failed, the insurgents were more successful at Pavia, where the people rose against the garrison, forced it to capitulate, admitted eight thousand armed peasants within their walls, and closed their gates against the French troops (2).

Storm and  
sack of that  
city by the  
French  
troops.

The danger was imminent; the tocsin sounded in all the parishes; the least retrograde movement would have augmented the evil, and compelled the retreat of the army, whose advanced posts were already on the Oglio. In these circumstances, prudence prescribed temerity; and Napoléon advanced in person to crush the insurgents. Their vanguard, posted at Brescia, was routed by Lannes; the village burnt, and a hundred of the peasants killed; but this severe example having failed in producing intimidation, he marched himself next day to the walls of Pavia, with six pieces of light artillery. The grenadiers rushed forward to the gates, which they

hitherto conducted the campaign without consulting any one; the result would have been very different, if I had been obliged to reconcile my views with those of another. If you impose upon me vexations of every description; if I must refer all my steps to the commissaries of government; if they are authorised to change my movements, to send away my troops, expect no farther success. If you weaken your resources by dividing your forces; if you disturb in Italy the unity of military thought, I say it with grief, you will lose the finest opportunity that ever occurred of giving laws to that fine peninsula. In the position of the affairs of the Republic, it is indispensable that you possess a general who enjoys your confidence; if I do not do so, I shall not complain, and shall do my utmost to manifest my zeal in the service which you intrust to me. Every one has his own method of carrying on war; Kellermann has more experience, and may do it better than I; but together we would do nothing but mischief. Your resolution on this matter is of

more importance than the fifteen thousand men whom the Emperor has just sent to Beaulieu." [Corresp. Secrète Nap. i. 160, 162.] But Napoléon did not intrust this important matter merely to these arguments, strong as they were. Murat, who was still at Paris, received instructions to inform Barras, that a million of francs were deposited at Genoa for his private use; and the influence of Joséphine was employed both with him and Carnot to prevent the threatened division, and the result was that it was abandoned. "The Directory," said Carnot, "has maturely considered your arguments; and the confidence which they have in your talents and republican zeal, have decided the matter in your favour. Kellermann will remain at Chambery, and you may adjourn the expedition to Rome as long as you please."—HARDENBERG, iii. 49, 351.

(1) Nap. iii. 191. Th. viii. 272.

(2) Th. viii. 272, 273. Nap. iii. 195. Jom. viii. 136.

broke open with hatchets : while the artillery cleared the ramparts, the victorious troops rushed into the town, which the peasants precipitately abandoned to its fate. Napoléon, wishing to terrify the insurgents, ordered the magistrates and leaders of the revolt to be shot, and the city to be delivered up to plunder, while the unhappy peasants, pursued into the plain by the French dragoons, were cut down in great numbers. The pillage continued the whole day, and that opulent and flourishing town underwent all the horrors of war; but the terrible example crushed the insurrection over the whole of Lombardy, where hostages were taken from the principal families, and dispatched into France (1).

In this act was displayed another feature of Napoléon's character, who, without being unnecessarily cruel, never hesitated to adopt the most sanguinary measures when requisite for his own purposes. Pillage and rapine, indeed, invariably follow the capture of a town carried by assault, and it is impossible to prevent it : but Napoléon in this instance authorized it by a general order, and shot the leading persons of the city in cold blood. It is in vain to appeal to the usages of war for a vindication of such cruelty; the words of Napoléon himself furnish his own condemnation :—"It is the first duty," said the Emperor, in his proclamation to the peasantry of France, in February 1814, "of every citizen to take up arms in defence of his country. Let the peasantry every where organize themselves in bands, with such weapons as they can find; let them fall upon the flanks and rear of the invaders; and let a consuming fire envelope the presumptuous host which has dared to violate the territory of the great nation (2)."

28th May.  
Napoléon  
enters Bre-  
scia and the  
Venetian  
territory.

Having by this severity stifled the spirit of insurrection in his rear, Napoléon continued his march, and, on the 28th, entered the great city of Brescia, situated on the neutral territory of Venice.

Meanwhile, Beaulieu experienced the usual fate of a retiring army, that of being weakened by the garrisons necessary for the fortified places which it leaves uncovered in its retreat. He threw twenty battalions of his best troops into Mantua, and took up a defensive position along the line of the Mincio. There he was assailed on the following day by Napoléon, who, after forcing a bridge in front of his position, attacked his rear-guard at Vallegio with all his cavalry, and made prisoners, in spite of the bravest efforts of the Austrian horse, twelve hundred men, and five pieces of cannon (3).

Debate in  
the Venetian  
Senate on  
what should  
be done.

When the French army entered the Venetian territory, and it had become evident that the flames of war were approaching its capital, it was warmly discussed in the Venetian Senate what course the Republic should pursue in the perilous circumstances that had occurred. Peschiera had been occupied by the Austrians, but, being abandoned by them, was instantly seized by the French, who insisted that, though a Venetian fortress, yet, having been seized by one of the belligerent powers, it had now become the fair conquest of the other; and, at the same time, Napoléon threatened the Republic with all the vengeance of France, if the Count de Lillo, afterwards Louis XVIII, who had long resided at Verona, was not immediately compelled to leave their territories. The Republican forces, under Manéna, were advancing towards Verona, and it was necessary to take a

(1) Th. viii. 275. Nap. iii. 194. Jom. viii. 133.  
Det. i. 399, 394.

(2) Proclamation, Feb. 28, 1814. Baron Fain,  
Camp. 1814, 142.

(3) Nap. iii. 202. Jom. viii. 139, 142.



decided line. On the one hand it was urged, that France had now proclaimed principles subversive of all regular governments, and in an especial manner inimical to the aristocracy of Venice; that certain ruin, either from foreign violence or domestic revolution, was to be expected from their success: that the haughty tone even now assumed by the conqueror, already showed that he looked upon all the continental possessions of the Republic as his own, and was only waiting for an opportunity to seize them for the French nation; and, therefore, that the sole course left, was to throw themselves into the arms of Austria, the natural ally of all regular governments. On the other, it was contended, that they must beware lest they mistook a temporary irruption of the French for a permanent settlement; that Italy had in every age been the tomb of the French armies; that the forces of the present invader, how successful soever they had hitherto been, were unequal to a permanent occupation of the peninsula, and would in the end yield to the persevering efforts of the Germans; that Austria, therefore, the natural enemy of Venice, and the power which coveted, would, in the end, attempt to seize its territorial possessions; that their forces were now expelled from Lombardy, and could not resume the offensive for two months, a period which would suffice to the French general to destroy the Republic—that interest, therefore, equally with prudence, prescribed that they should attach themselves to the cause of France; obtain thereby a barrier against the ambition of their powerful neighbour, and receive, in recompense for their services, part of the Italian dominions of the Austrian empire. That, in so doing, they must, it is true, to a certain degree, modify their form of government; but that was no more than the spirit of the age required, and was absolutely indispensable to secure the dominion of their continental possessions. A third party, few in numbers but resolute in purpose, contended, that the only safe course was that of an armed neutrality; that the forces of the Republic should be instantly raised to fifty thousand men, and either of the belligerent powers which should violate their territory, threatened with the whole vengeance of the Republic (1).

Had the Venetians possessed the firmness of the Roman Senate, they merely deprecate the hostility of France. they would have adopted the first course; had they been inspired by the spirit of the Athenian democracy, they would have followed the second; had they been animated by the courage of the Swiss Confederacy, they would have taken the third. In either case, the Republic might have been saved; for it is impossible to consider the long and equal struggle which ensued round Mantua, between France and Austria, without being convinced that a considerable body, even of Italian troops, might have then cast the balance. They had three millions of souls; their army could easily be raised to fifty thousand men; thirteen regiments of Sclavonians in their service were good troops; their fleet ruled the Adriatic. But Venice was worn out and corrupted; its nobles, drowned in pleasure, were destitute of energy; its peasantry, inured to peace, were unequal to war; its defence, trusted merely to mercenary troops, rested on a tottering foundation. They adopted in consequence the most timid course, which, in presence of danger, is generally the most perilous: they made no warlike preparations; but merely sent commissioners to the French general to deprecate his hostility, and endeavour to secure his good-will (2). The consequence was, what might have been anticipated from conduct so unworthy of the ancient fame of the Republic: the

(1) Bot. i. 403, 405, 406, 409. Th. viii. 276, 279

(2) Bot. i. 408, 413. Nap. iii. 204, 205. Th. viii. 276, 280. Hard. iii. 357.

commissioners were disregarded; the war was carried on in the Venetian territories, and at its close the Republic was swept from the book of nations (1).

June 3.  
1796.  
Mantua  
enters Ve-  
rona, and  
Napoleon is  
established  
on the  
Adige.

Masséna entered the magnificent city of Verona, the frontier city of the Venetian dominions, situated on the Adige, and a military position of the highest importance for future operations, in the beginning of June. Its position at the entrance of the great valley of the Adige, and on the high-road from the Tyrol into Lombardy, rendered it the advanced post of the French army, in covering the siege of Mantua. He occupied, at the same time, Porto Legnago, a fortified town on the Adige, and which, along with Verona, strengthened that stream, whose short and rapid course from the Alps to the Po formed the best military frontier of Italy. There Napoléon received the commissioners of Venice, who vainly came to deprecate the victor's wrath, and induce him to retire from the territories of the Republic. With such terror did his menaces inspire them, that the Venetian government concluded a treaty, by which they agreed to furnish supplies of every sort for the army, and secretly pay for them; and the commissioners, overawed by the commanding air and stern menaces of Napoléon, wrote to the Senate—"This young man will one day have an important influence on the destinies of his country (2)."

Description  
and blockade  
of Mantua.

Napoléon was now firmly established on the line of the Adige, the possession of which he always deemed of so much importance, and to the neglect of which he ascribed all the disasters of the succeeding campaigns of the French in Italy. Nothing remained but to make himself master of Mantua; and the immense efforts made by both parties for that place, prove the vast importance of fortresses in modern war. Placed in the middle of unhealthy marshes, which are traversed only by five chaussées, strong in its situation, as well as the fortifications which surround it, this town is truly the bulwark of Austria and Italy, without the possession of which the conquest of Lombardy must be deemed insecure, and that of the Hereditary States cannot be attempted. The entrance of two only of the chaussées which approached it, were defended by fortifications at that time; so that by placing troops at these points, and drawing a cordon round the others, it was an easy matter to blockade the place, even with an inferior force. Serurier sat down before it, in the middle of June, with ten thousand men; and with this inconsiderable force, skilfully disposed at the entrance of the highways which crossed the lake, and round its shores, he contrived to keep in

(1) In adopting this course, Napoléon exceeded the instructions of his government; and, indeed, on him alone appears to rest the atrocious perfidy and dissimulation exercised in the sequel towards that Republic. The directions of the Directory were as follows:—"Venice should be treated as a neutral, but not a friendly power; it has done nothing to merit the latter character. [Corresp. Secrète. 7th May, 1796.] But to the Venetian commissioners Napoléon from the first, used the most insulting and rigorous language. "Venice," said he, "by daring to give an asylum to the Count de Lille, a pretender to the throne of France, has declared war against the Republic. I know not why I should not reduce Verona to ashes—a town which had the presumption to esteem itself the capital of France." [Hard. iii. 261.] He declared to them that he would carry that threat into execution that very night, if an immediate surrender did not take place. The perfidy

of his views against Venice, even at this early period, was fully evinced in his Secret Despatch to the Directory on 7th June. "If your object," said he, "is to extract five or six millions out of Venice, I have secured for you a pretence for a rupture. You may demand it as an indemnity for the combat of Borghetto, which I was obliged to sustain to take Peschiera. If you have more decided views we must take care not to let that subject of discord drop; tell me what you wish, and be assured I will seize the most fitting opportunity of carrying it into execution, according to circumstances, for we must take care not to have all the world on our hands at once." [Corresp. Secrète de Nap. i. 232.] The truth of the affair of Peschiera is, that the Venetians were cruelly deceived by the Austrians, who demanded a passage for fifty men, and then seized the town.

(2) Th. viii. 288, 289. Hard. iii. 364. Nap. iii. 205.

check a garrison of fourteen thousand men, of whom more than a third encumbered the hospitals of the place (1).

As the siege of this important fortress required a considerable time, Napoléon had leisure to deliberate concerning the ulterior measures which he should pursue. An army of forty-five thousand men, which had so rapidly overrun the north of Italy, could not venture to penetrate into the Tyrol and Germany, the mountains of which were occupied by Beaulieu's forces, aided by a warlike peasantry, and at the same time carry on the blockade of Mantua, for which at least fifteen thousand men would be required. Moreover, the southern powers of Italy were not yet subdued; and, though little formidable in a military point of view, they might prove highly dangerous to the blockading force, if the bulk of the Republican troops were engaged in the defiles of the Tyrol, while the French armies on the Rhine were not yet in a condition to give them any assistance. Influenced by these considerations, Napoléon resolved to take advantage of the pause in military operations, which the blockade of Mantua and retreat of Beaulieu afforded, to clear the enemies in his rear, and establish the French influence to the south of the Apennines (2).

The King of Naples, alarmed at the retreat of the German troops, and fearful of having the whole forces of the Republic upon his own hands, upon the first appearance of their advance to the south, solicited an armistice, which the French commander readily granted, and which was followed by the secession of the Neapolitan cavalry, two thousand four hundred strong, from the Imperial army. Encouraged by this defection, Napoléon resolved instantly to proceed against the ecclesiastical and Tuscan states, in order to extinguish the hostility, which was daily becoming more inveterate, to the south of the Apennines. In truth, the ferment was extreme in all the cities of Lombardy; and every hour rendered more marked the separation between the aristocratical and democratical parties. The ardent spirits in Milan, Bologna, Brescia, Parma, and all the great towns of that fertile district, were in full revolutionary action, and a large proportion of their citizens seemed resolved to throw off the patrician influence under which they had so long existed, and establish republics on the model of the great Transalpine state. Wakened by these appearances to a sense of the danger which threatened them, the aristocratic party were every where strengthening themselves: the nobles in the Genoese fiefs were collecting forces; the English had made themselves masters of Leghorn; and the Roman Pontiff was threatening to exert his feeble strength. Napoléon knew that Wurmser, who had been detached from the army of the Upper Rhine with thirty thousand men, to restore affairs in Italy, could not be at Verona before the middle of July, and before then there appeared time to subdue the states of central Italy, and secure the rear of his army (3).

Having left fifteen thousand men before Mantua, and twenty thousand on the Adige, to cover its blockade, the French general set out himself, with the division of Augereau, to cross the Apennines. He returned, in the first instance, to Milan, opened the trenches before its castle, and pressed the siege, so as to compel its surrender, which took place shortly after. From thence he proceeded against the Genoese fiefs.

(1) Th. viii. 290. Nap. iii. 158, 205, 209.  
(2) Nap. iii. 209. Jour. viii. 146.

(3) Nap. iii. 213. Bot. i. 414, 420. Th. viii. 293, 294.



Laanes, with twelve hundred men, stormed Arquata, the chief seat of hostilities; burned the village; shot the principal inhabitants; and, by these severe measures, so intimidated the Senate of Genoa, that they implicitly submitted to the conqueror, sent off the Austrian minister, and agreed to the occupation of all the military posts in their territory by the French troops. From

Letters Modena and Bologna. thence Napoléon moved towards the Apennines, entered Modena; where he was received with every demonstration of joy; and, on the road to Bologna, made himself master of the fort of Urbino, with sixty pieces of heavy artillery, which proved a most seasonable supply for the siege of Mantua. His appearance at Bologna was the signal for universal intoxica-

June 19. tion. The people at once revolted against the Papal authority; while Napoléon encouraged the propagation of every principle which was calculated to dismember the Ecclesiastical territories. The Italian troops were pursued to Ferrara, which the republicans entered without opposition, and made themselves masters of its arsenal, containing 114 pieces of artillery; while General Vaubois crossed the Apennines, and, avoiding Florence, directed his steps towards Rome (1).

14th June. Submission of the Pope. At the intelligence of his approach, the Council of the Vatican was thrown into the utmost alarm. Azara, Minister of Spain, was dispatched immediately with offers of submission, and arrived at Bologna to lay the tiara at the feet of the Republican general. The terms of an armistice were soon agreed on:—It was stipulated that Bologna and Ferrara should remain in the possession of the French troops; that the Pope should pay twenty millions of francs, furnish great contributions of stores and provisions (2), and give up a hundred of the finest works of art to the French commissioners. In virtue of that humiliating treaty, all the great monuments of genius, which adorned the eternal city, were soon after transported to the museum at Paris (3).

26th June. Violation of the neutral territory of Tuscany, and seizure of Leghorn. Having arranged this important treaty, Napoléon, without delay, crossed the Apennines, and found the division of Vaubois at Pistoia. From that point he detached Murat, who suddenly descended upon Leghorn, and seized the effects of a large portion of the English merchants, which were sold in open violation of all the usages of war, which hitherto had respected private property at land, and from their sale he realized twelve millions of francs for the use of the army. What rendered this outrage more flagrant was, that it was committed in the territories of a neutral power, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and from whom he himself at the time was getting the most splendid reception at Florence (4). Thus early did Napoléon evince that unconquerable hatred of English commerce, and that determination to violate the usages of war for its destruction, by

(1) *Jom.* viii. 151, 152. *Bot.* i. 416. *Th.* viii. 299. *Nap.* iii. 214.

(2) *Nap.* iii. 219.

(3) Genoa at the same period occupied the rapacious eyes of the French general. "You may dictate laws to Genoa as soon as you please," were his expressions, in his instructions to Faypault, the 6th July. French envoy there. And to the Directory he wrote,—*"All our affairs in Italy are now closed, excepting Venice and Genoa. As to Venice, the moment for action has not yet arrived; we must first beat Würmser and take Mantua. But the moment has arrived for Genoa; I am about to break ground for the ten millions. I think, besides, with the minister Faypault, that we must expel a dozen of families from the government of that city, and oblige*

the Senate to repeal a decree which banished two 14th July. families favourable to France." And to Faypault, Napoléon prescribed his course of perfidious dissimulation in these words:—"I have not yet seen M. Catanio, the Genoese deputy; but *I shall neglect nothing which may throw them off their guard.* The Directory has ordered me to exact the ten millions, but interdicted all political operations. *Omit nothing which may set the Senate asleep; and amuse them with hopes till the moment of waking has arrived.*" [*Confident. Despatch, 14th July, 1796. Corresp. Conf. i. 330, 334.*] The moment of waking thus contemplated by Napoléon, was an internal revolution, which was not yet fully prepared.

(4) *Th.* viii. 301. *Bot.* i. 436. *Nap.* iii. 222.

which he was afterwards so strongly actuated, and which had so powerful a share in contributing to his downfall (1).

Massacre of the peasants at Lugo. After a short stay at Florence, Napoléon returned to Bologna, where Augereau took a severe vengeance on the inhabitants of the village of Lugo, which had taken up arms against the Republicans, and killed and wounded some soldiers in a detachment sent for its reduction. The village was carried by assault, burnt to ashes, and the unfortunate peasants, to the number of one thousand, put, with merciless severity, to the sword. This terrible example having struck terror into all the inhabitants of that part of Italy, he returned to the vicinity of Mantua, to superintend the operations of the siege, which Serrurier was now about to undertake in good earnest, with the battering train taken at the castles of Milan, Urbino, and Ferrara; but for the relief of which place Austria was making the most vigorous exertions (2).

The resolution of Napoléon to stir up a quarrel with Venice was more and more clearly evinced, as matters approached a crisis in the north of Italy. On the 25th July, he had a long and confidential conversation with Pesaro, the commissioner of that Republic; and such was the vehemence of his language, the exaggeration of his complaints, and the sternness of his manner, that he forthwith wrote to the Senate of St.-Mark that war appeared inevitable. It was in vain that Pesaro represented, "that ever since the entrance of the French into Italy, his government had made it their study to anticipate all the wishes of the General-in-chief; that, if it had not done more, it was solely from inability, and a desire not to embroil themselves with the Imperialists, who never ceased to reproach them their partiality to France; that the Senate would do every thing in its power to restrain the public effervescence; and that the armaments, so much complained of, were directed as much against the English and Russians as the French (3). The determination of Napoléon in regard to the Venetian Republic is revealed in his secret despatches at this period to the Directory: "I have seized," said he, "the citadel of Verona, and armed it with the Venetian cannon, and summoned the Senate to dissolve its armaments. Venice has already furnished three millions for the service of the army; but, in order to extract more out of it, I have found myself under the necessity of assuming a menacing tone towards their commissaries, of exaggerating the assassinations committed against our troops, of complaining bitterly of their armaments; and by these means I compel them, to appease my wrath, to furnish whatever I desire. That is the only way to deal with such persons. There is not, on the face of the earth, a more perfidious or cowardly government. I will force them to provide supplies for the army till the fall of Mantua, and then announce that they must farther make good the contributions fixed in your instructions (4)."

No sooner had they received intelligence of the defeat of Beaulieu, and the retreat of his forces into the Tyrol, than the Aulic Council resolved upon the most energetic measures to repair the disaster. The army of Beau-

(1) The rapine and pillage of the French authorities consequent on this irruption into Tuscany, knew no bounds. "If our administrative conduct," said Napoléon, to the Directory, "was detestable at Leghorn, our political conduct towards Tuscany has been no better"—*Secret Correspond. of Napoléon*, 11th July, 1796. His views extended even farther, for, on the 25th, he wrote to the Directory,—"Reports are in circulation that the Emperor is dying;

the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the heir to the throne, will instantly set out for Vienna. We must anticipate him, by taking military possession of the whole of Tuscany."—*Secret Despatch*, 25th July.

(2) *Bot.* i. 420. *Nap.* iii. 225.

(3) Letter of Lallemand to Napoléon, 26 July, 1796. *Corresp. Confid. de Nap.* Hard. iii 424.

(4) *Secret Despatch of Napoléon*, July, 22, 1796. *Corresp.* i. 327.

Efforts of  
the Aus-  
trians for  
the relief of  
Mantua.

Advance of  
Wurmser  
through the  
Tyrol with  
30,000 men.

lien retired to Roveredo, where they threw up intrenchments to cover their position, while eight thousand Tyrolese occupied the crests of the mountains, which separated the valley of the Adige from the lake of Guarda. Meanwhile, Marshal Wurmser was detached from the Upper Rhine with thirty thousand men, to assume the chief command of the army destined for the relief of Mantua; which, by that great reinforcement, and numerous detachments drawn from the interior, was raised to sixty thousand effective troops. These great preparations, which were magnified by report, and had roused the aristocratic party throughout Italy to great exertions, filled Napoléon with the most lively apprehensions: To oppose them he had only fifty-five thousand men, of whom fifteen thousand were engaged in the siege of Mantua, ten thousand in keeping up his communication and maintaining garrisons in the conquered territory; so that not above thirty thousand could be relied on for operations in the field. He had incessantly urged the Directory to send him reinforcements; but, although eight thousand men from the army of Kellermann had joined his standard, and numerous reinforcements from the dépôts in the interior, they were barely adequate to repair the losses arising from that wasteful campaign (1).

Nothing but the greatest ability on the part of the general, and courage among the soldiers, could have compensated for this inferiority in numbers; but the genius of Napoléon, and the confidence arising from a series of victories, proved adequate to the task (2). His success was mainly owing to the vicious plan of attack adopted by the Austrians, which, like all the others framed by the Aulic Council, was exposed to defeat from the division of their forces.

Description  
of the  
theatre of  
war.

The waters which descend from the southern ridges of the Tyrol, unite into two streams, flowing nearly parallel to each other, and issuing in the same latitude into the plain of Lombardy, the Mincio, and the Adige. The first forms in its course, the noble sheet of water called the lake of Guarda, flows through the plain immortalized by the genius of Virgil, swells into the lakes which surround Mantua, and afterwards discharges itself into the Po. The latter, after descending from the snowy ridges of the Higher Alps, flows in an open valley to a narrow and precipitous pass above Verona, next emerges into the open country, winds in a deep and rocky bed to Legnago, after which it spreads into vast marshes, and is lost in the dikes and inundations of Lombardy. Three roads present themselves to an enemy proposing to issue from the Tyrol to the Italian plains:—The first, turning sharp to the left at Roveredo, traverses the romantic defiles of the Val Sugana, and emerges into the open country at Bassano. The second passes by the upper end of the lake of Guarda, and comes down by its western shore to Salò and Brescia; while the third descends the left bank of the Adige, and after traversing the gloomy pass of Calliano and Chiusa, reaches the town of Verona. The space between the Adige and the lake of Guarda, though only three leagues broad, is filled by the Montebaldo, whose precipices restrain the river on the one hand and the lake on the other. In this narrow and rocky space a road descends between the Adige and the lake, from Roveredo to the plain (3). It follows the right bank of the stream as far as Osteria della Dugana, when, meeting impracticable precipices, it turns to the right, and ascends the plateau of Rivoli.

(1) Jom. viii. 302, 303, Nap. iii. 231, 232, Th. viii. 300.

(2) Jom. iii. 305.

(3) Th. viii. 362, 364. Jom. viii. 305.

The entrance of all these passes was occupied by the French troops. Sauret, with only four thousand five hundred men, was posted at Salo, to guard the western side of the lake of Guarda, as the road there was not accessible to artillery. Masséna, with fifteen thousand, guarded the great road on the Adige, and occupied the plateau of Rivoli; while Despinos, with five thousand, was in the environs of Verona; and Augereau, with eight thousand in reserve, at Legnago. Napoléon himself, with two thousand horse took post at Castelnuovo, in order to be equally near any of the points that might be menaced (1).

Austrian  
plan of at-  
tack.

Wurmser's plan was to make demonstrations only against Verona, and the left of the Adige; and to bring down the bulk of his forces by the Montebaldo and the valley of Salo, on the opposite sides of the lake of Guarda. For this purpose he detached Quasdanowich, with twenty thousand men, to go round the upper end of the lake, and descend upon Salo, while he took the command of forty thousand himself, whom he distributed on the two roads which descend the opposite banks of the Adige; the one division was destined to force Corona and the plateau of Rivoli, while the other was to debouche upon Verona. The whole columns were in motion by the end of July; rumour had magnified their numbers; and the partisans of Austria and of the aristocratic system were already breaking out into exultation, and anticipating the speedy verification of the proverb—That Italy was the tomb of the French (2).

In truth, the circumstances of the Republicans were all but desperate. July 29. On the 29th July, the Imperial outposts attacked the French at all points, and every where with success. Masséna, vigorously assaulted at three in the morning by superior forces, was driven from the intrenchments of Corona, and retired with loss to Rivoli, from whence he was glad to escape

And great  
success in  
the outset.

towards Castelnuovo, upon finding that the column which followed the left bank of the Adige was getting in his rear. At the same time, the Imperialists drove in the Republican posts on the great road, forced the pass of Chiusa, and appeared before Verona; while, on the other side of the lake of Guarda, Lusignan attacked and carried the town of Salo, and thus cut off the principal line of retreat towards France (3).

In this extremity Napoléon, for the first time in the whole campaign, called a council of war. All the officers, with the exception of Augereau, recommended a retreat behind the Po; but that intrepid chief resolutely held out for battle. The generals were dismissed without the commander-in-chief having signified his own opinion, but in the course of the night he formed a resolution which not only extricated him from his perilous situation, but has immortalized his name in the annals of war (4).

Extreme  
peril of  
Napoléon.

The Austrians, fifty thousand strong, were descending the opposite banks of the lake of Guarda, and it was evident that if they succeeded in enclosing the French army near Mantua, they would infallibly crush it by their great superiority of force. But in so doing they exposed themselves to be attacked and beaten by superior forces in detail, if the siege of that place were rapidly raised, and the bulk of the French army borne first on the one invading column and then on the other. Napoléon resolved on this sacrifice. Orders were immediately despatched to Serrurier to raise the siege of Mantua; the division of Augereau was moved from Legnago across the Mincio, and the French army, with

He raises  
the siege of  
Mantua.

(1) Th. viii. 4. Nap. iii. 235.

(2) Th. viii. 364, 365. Nap. iii. 233.

(3) Th. viii. 366, 367. Jom. viii. 312, 313.

(4) Th. viii. 367.

the exception of Masséna, concentrated at the lower extremity of the lake of Garda, to fall, in the first instance, upon the corps of Quasdanowich, which already threatened his communication with Milan. These orders were promptly obeyed. During the night of the 31st July, the siege of Mantua was raised, the cannon spiked, and the stores thrown into the lake, while Napoléon himself, with the greater part of his army, crossed the Mincio at Peschiera, and prepared to fall on the Austrian forces on the western shore of the lake of Garda. There was not a moment to lose; in a few hours the Allied columns would be in communication, and the French compelled to fight greatly superior forces in a single field (1).

1st August. No sooner had Napoléon arrived with his reinforcements, than he sent forward Augereau to clear the road to Milan, and ordered Sauret to retake Salò. Both expeditions were completely successful; Brescia was regained, and the Austrians driven out of Salò. Meanwhile, Napoléon himself, with the brigade of D'Allemagne, advanced to Lonato; and after a violent struggle, drove the Imperialists out of that place, with the loss of five hundred prisoners. In these actions, Quasdanowich lost few men; but they arrested his progress, and, astonished at finding himself assailed by imposing masses, in a quarter where he expected to find only the rear of the enemy, he fell back towards the mountains, to await intelligence of the operations of the main body under Wurmser (2).

August 1. Wurmser enters Mantua. Meanwhile that brave commander, having dislodged Masséna from his position, advanced to Mantua, where he made his triumphal entry on the 1st August. The sudden raising of the siege, the abandonment of the equipage, the destruction of works which it had cost the Republicans so long to construct, all conspired to increase his satisfaction at this event, and promised an easy conquest over the retiring remains of the enemy. But, on the very night of his arrival, he received intelligence of the check of Quasdanowich, and the capture of Brescia. Immediately he advanced his columns across the Mincio, and moved upon Castiglione, with the design of enveloping the French army with all his forces, while Quasdanowich resumed the offensive, and retook the town of Salò (3).

The crisis was now approaching: the Austrian armies were not only in communication, but almost united, while the Republicans, with inferior forces, lay between them. Napoléon immediately drew back the divisions of Masséna and Augereau, above twenty thousand strong, and caused his whole army to face about: what had been the rear became the advanced guard. He put forth more than his wonted activity and rapidity of movement. Incessantly on horseback himself, he caused the soldiers, who had marched all night, to fight all day. Having, by this rapid countermarch, accumulated the bulk of his forces opposite to Wurmser, he resolved to deliver himself from that formidable adversary by an immediate attack. It was full time. The Austrians had discovered a passage over the Mincio, and driven the French from Castiglione, where they had already begun to intrench themselves (4).

2d August. On the third August, Napoléon advanced, with twenty-five thousand men, upon Lonato, while Augereau moved towards Castiglione. The first attack of the Republicans was unsuccessful; their light troops were

(1) Nap. iii. 238, 239. Th. viii. 369. Jom. viii. 316. Hard. iii. 480.

(2) Jom. viii. 360. Nap. iii. 236.

(3) Th. viii. 371. Jom. viii. 318. Hard. iii. 482, 483.

(4) Nap. iii. 241. Th. viii. 372.



thrown into confusion; General Pegion, with three pieces of artillery, captured by the enemy, and Lonato taken. Upon this, the French general put himself at the head of his soldiers, and formed the centre into one formidable mass, while the Imperialists were extending themselves towards Salo, in the double view of enveloping the French, and opening a communication with Quasdanowich, whose artillery was already heard in that direction. Napoléon immediately perceived the error of his adversary, and made a desperate charge, with a column of infantry supported by cavalry, upon his centre, which, being weakened for the extension of the wings, speedily gave way. Lonato was retaken by assault, and the Austrian army cut asunder. One part of it effected its retreat under Bayalitch to the Mincio, but the other, which was moving towards Salo, finding itself irrecoverably separated from the main body of the army, endeavoured to effect a junction with Quasdanowich at Salo; but Guyeux, with a division of French, already occupied that place; and the fugitive Austrians, pressed between the dragoons of Junot, who assailed their rear, and the infantry at Salo, who stopped their advance, disbanded, and suffered a loss of three thousand prisoners, and twenty pieces of cannon (1).

While the Austrians were experiencing these disasters at Lonato, Augereau, on the right, had maintained an obstinate engagement at Castiglione. In that quarter the Republicans were the assailants; and the French general had maintained the combat all day with great resolution against superior forces, when Napoléon, having defeated the centre of the enemy, hastened to his support. After a furious combat, Augereau succeeded in carrying the town, and the Austrians retired towards Mantua, with the loss of one thousand killed and wounded, besides as many prisoners (2). They had not proceeded far when they met the reinforcements which Wurmser was bringing up from that place for their relief.

As it was evident that the Austrian veteran was still disposed to contend for the empire of Italy in a pitched battle, Napoléon deemed it indispensable to clear his rear of Quasdanowich before engaging in it. On the following day he employed himself in collecting and organizing his forces at Lonato, with a view to the decisive conflict; while, by moving two divisions against Quasdanowich, whose troops were now exhausted by fatigue, he compelled him to remount the Val Sabbia towards Riva. A singular event at this time took place, highly characteristic both of the extraordinarily intersected situation of the two armies, and of the presence of mind and good fortune of Napoléon.

He had arrived at Lonato to expedite the movement of his forces in the opposite directions where their enemies were to be found; and, from the dispersion which he had directed, only twelve hundred men remained at head-quarters. Before he had been long there he was summoned to surrender by a corps of four thousand Austrians, who had already occupied all the avenues by which retreat was possible. They consisted of a part of the troops of Bayalitch, which, having been defeated in its endeavours to effect a junction with Quasdanowich, was now, in desperation, endeavouring to regain the remainder of the army on the Mincio. Napoléon made his numerous staff mount on horseback; and, having ordered the officer bearing the flag of truce to be brought before him, directed the bandage to be taken from his eyes, and immediately told the astonished Austrian, that he was in the middle of the French army, and in presence of

Battles of  
Lonato and  
Castiglione.

Surrender  
of 4,000  
Austrians  
to Napoléon's staff  
and 1,200  
men.

(1) Th. viii. 373, 374. Nap. 242. Jom. viii. 320.

(2) Th. viii. 374. Nap. iii. 242.

its general-in-chief, and that unless they laid down their arms in ten minutes, he would put them all to the sword. The officer, deceived by the splendid *cortége* by which he was surrounded, returned to his division, and recommended a surrender; and the troops, cut off from their companions, and exhausted by fatigue and disaster, laid down their arms. When they entered the town, they had the mortification of discovering not only that they had capitulated to a third of their numbers, but missed the opportunity of making prisoner the conqueror who had filled the world with his renown (1).

On the following day both parties prepared for a decisive engagement. The Imperialists under Wurmser were twenty-five thousand strong, the corps of Quasdanowich, and that which blockaded Peschiera, being detached, and unable to take any part in the battle; the French about twenty-three thousand. Both parties were drawn up in the plain at right angles to the mountains, on which each rested a wing; the French right was uncovered, while the Imperialists' left was supported by the mill of Medola. Augereau commanded the centre, Masséna the left, Verdier the right, but the principal hopes of Napoléon were rested on the division of Serrurier, which had orders to march all night, and fall, when the action was fully engaged, on the rear of the enemy. The soldiers on both sides were exhausted with fatigue, but all felt that on the result of this contest depended the fate of Italy (2).

Wurmser fell into the same error as Bayalitch had done in the preceding engagement, that of extending his right along the heights, in order to open a communication with Quasdanowich, who was within hearing of his artillery. To favour this movement, Napoléon drew back his left, while at the same time he accumulated his forces against the Austrians' right; Marmont, with a powerful battery of heavy artillery, thundered against the post of Medola, which Verdier, with three battalions of grenadiers, speedily carried. At the same time, General Fiorilla, who commanded the division of Serrurier, drawn off from Mantua, came up in rear of the Austrians, and completed their confusion by a vigorous attack, which had wellnigh carried off Wurmser himself. Seeing the decisive moment arrived, Napoléon ordered a general charge by all his forces; and the Austrians, pressed in front by Augereau and Masséna, threatened in rear by Fiorilla, and turned on their left by Verdier, fell back at all points. The excessive fatigue of the Republican troops prevented their pursuing the broken enemy far, who fell back behind the Mincio, with the loss of two thousand killed and wounded, one thousand prisoners, and twenty pieces of cannon (3).

This action, the importance of which is not to be estimated by the number of troops engaged, was decisive of the fate of Italy. With a view to prevent Wurmser from reassembling his scattered forces, Napoléon, on the following day, sent Masséna to raise the siege of Peschiera, and after an obstinate engagement, he succeeded in routing the Austrian division before that place, with the loss of ten pieces of cannon, and five hundred prisoners. In this action a young colonel particularly distinguished himself, named SERRIER, afterwards Duke of Albufera. At the same time Napoléon advanced to Verona, which the Austrians abandoned on his approach; and Masséna, after some sharp skirmishing, resumed his old positions at Rivoli and the Montebaldo; while Wurmser, having revictualled Mantua, and raised its garrison to fifteen thousand men, composed chiefly of fresh troops, re-

(1) Nap. iii. 243, 245. Th. viii. 375. Jom. viii. 326, 327. Bot. i. 453.

(2) Jom. viii. 328. Th. viii. 378, 379.

(3) Nap. iii. 240. Th. viii. 379. Jom. viii. 331.

sumed his former station at Roveredo, and in the fastnesses of the Tyrol (1).

By this expedition Wurmser had relieved Mantua, and supplied it with a garrison of fresh troops; but he had lost nearly twenty thousand men, and sixty pieces of cannon; and the spirit of his soldiers was, by fatigue, defeat, and disaster, completely broken. The great successes which attended the French arms, are mainly to be ascribed to the extraordinary vigour, activity, and talent, displayed by their general-in-chief. The Austrian plan of attack was founded on an undue confidence in their own powers; they thought the main body under Wurmser would be able to defeat the French army, and raise the siege of Mantua, while the detachment under Quasdanowich would cut off their retreat: and it must be admitted, in favour of this plan, that it was on the point of being attended with complete success; and against a general and troops of less resolution, unquestionably would have been so.

Causes of  
the success  
of the  
French.

When opposed, however, to the vigour and activity of Napoléon, it offered the fairest opportunity for decisive defeat. The two corps of the Imperialists could communicate only by Roveredo and the upper end of the lake of Guarda, a circuit of above sixty miles, while the French, occupying a central station between them, at its southern extremity, were enabled, by a great exertion of activity, to bring a superior force, first against the one, and then against the other. Their successes, however, were dearly purchased: above seven thousand men had been killed and wounded; Wurmser carried with him three thousand prisoners into the Tyrol; and the whole siege equipage of Mantua had fallen into the hands of the enemy (2).

The democratic party in all the Italian towns were thrown into transports of joy at this success; and the rejoicings among them at Milan, Bologna, and Modena, were proportioned to the terror with which they had formerly been inspired. But Napoléon, judging more accurately of his position, and seeing the siege of Mantua was to be commenced anew, while Wurmser, with forty thousand men, was still on the watch in the Tyrol, deemed prudence and precaution more than ever necessary. He did not attempt, therefore, to collect a second battering train for the siege of that fortress, but contented himself with a simple blockade, in maintaining which during the autumnal months, his troops became extremely sickly, from the pestilential atmosphere of its marshes. To the powers in the southern parts of the Peninsula who had, during the temporary success of the Austrians, given indication of hostile designs, he wrote in the most menacing strain; the King of Naples was threatened with an attack from seventy thousand French if he violated the armistice; the Papal legate obtained pardon for a revolt at Ferrara only by the most abject submissions; the Venetians were informed that he was aware of their armaments, though he still kept up negotiations, and continued to live at their expense; while the King of Piedmont received commands to complete the destruction of the guerilla parties which infested the mountainous parts of his dominions. To the Milanese, on the other hand, who had remained faithful to France during its transient reverses, he wrote in the most flattering terms, and gave them leave to raise troops for their common defence against the Imperial forces. The most ardent of the youth of Lombardy were speedily enrolled under their banners; but a more efficient force was formed out of the Poles, who, since the last partition of their unhappy country (3), had wandered without a home

Blockade of  
Mantua re-  
sumed—  
Formation  
of the Polish  
Legion.

(1) Nap. iii. 247, 248. Jom. viii. 333, 335.

(2) Nap. iii. 248, 250. Th. viii. 381.

(3) Nap. iii. 251, 253. Th. viii. 382, 384. Hot. i. 454. Hard. iii. 346.



through Europe, and now flocked in such numbers to the Italian standard, as to lay the foundation of the Polish legion which afterwards became so renowned in the Imperial wars.

The troops on both sides remained in a state of repose for three weeks after this terrible struggle, during which Wurmser was assiduously employed in reorganizing and recruiting his forces, while Napoléon received considerable reinforcements from the army of Kellermann and the interior of France. The numbers on both sides were, at the end of August, nearly equal; Wurmser's forces having been raised to nearly fifty thousand men, by additions from the hereditary states, and Napoléon's to the same amount by the junction of part of Kellermann's forces (1). Untaught by former disasters, of the imprudence

of forming plans at a distance for the regulation of their armies, the Aulic Council again framed and transmitted to Wurmser a plan for the expulsion of the French from the line of the Adige. According to this design, he was to leave twenty thousand men under Davidowich, to guard Roveredo and the valley of the Adige, and descend himself, with thirty thousand, by the gorges of the Brenta to Bassano, and so reach the plains of Padua. Thus, notwithstanding their former disasters, they were about again to commit the same error, of dividing their force into two columns, while Napoléon occupied a central position equidistant from both (2); with this difference that, instead of a lake, they had now a mass of impassable mountains between them.

Napoléon, at the same time, resolved to resume the offensive, in order to prevent any detachments from the Imperial army into Bavaria, where the Archduke Charles was now severely pressed by Moreau. The two armies broke up at the same time, Wurmser descending the Brenta, and Napoléon ascending the Adige. Foreseeing the possibility of a descent upon Mantua during his absence, the French general left Kilmaine, with three thousand men, to occupy Legnago and Verona, while ten thousand still maintained the blockade of Mantua, and he himself, with thirty thousand, ascended the Tyrol by the two roads on the banks of the Adige, and that on the western side of the lake of Guarda (3).

<sup>24 Sept.</sup> The French were the first to commence operations. Early in September, Vaubois, with the division of Sauret, ascended the lake, and, after several combats, reached Tortola, at its upper extremity. On the same day Napoléon, with the divisions of Masséna and Augereau, arrived in front <sup>4th Sept.</sup> of the advanced posts of the Austrians at Serravalle, on the Adige, and on the following day attacked their position. The Imperialists stood firm; but Napoléon sent a cloud of light troops on the heights on either side of their columns, and, the moment they began to waver, he made so vigorous a charge along the chaussée with the hussards, that the Austrians were driven back in confusion, and the Republicans entered Roveredo pell-mell with the fugitives (4).

Davidowich rallied his broken divisions in the defile of Calliano, a formidable pass on the banks of the Adige, formed where the precipices of the Alps approach so closely to the river, that there is only the breadth of four hundred toises left between them. An old castle, which the Austrians had strengthened and mounted with cannon, was placed at the edge of the pre-

(1) The sick and wounded in the French army at this period were no less than fifteen thousand.—*Confidential Despatch, 25th Aug.—Corresp. Conf. i.*  
441.

(2) Th. viii. 393, 394. Nap. iii. 256.

(3) Th. viii. 394. Bot. i. 460. Nap. iii. 256.

(4) Th. viii. 396. Nap. iii. 259.

Defeat of Davidowich near Calliano. 5th Sept. cipice, and a ruined wall stretched across the gorge, from the foot of the rocks to the margin of the stream. Napoléon threw his light troops on the mountains upon his own right, placed a battery, which commanded the Austrian cannon, and forming a close column of ten battalions, precipitated them along the high-road upon the enemy. Nothing could withstand their impetuosity; the Imperialists were routed; horse, foot, and cannon rushed in confusion through the narrow defile in their rear; and the Republican cavalry, charging furiously along the chaussée, drove them, in the utmost disorder, towards Trent. Seven hundred prisoners, and fifteen pieces of cannon fell into the hands of the victors; and the following day Napoléon entered that city, the capital of the Italian Tyrol, while the discomfited remains of Davidowich's corps retired behind the Lavis (1).

Napoléon advances against Wurmser. The intelligence of this disaster, so far from stopping, only accelerated the march of Wurmser through the defiles of the Brenta. He now imagined that Napoléon intended to penetrate by Brixen and the Brenner into Germany, in order to co-operate with Moreau in the plains of Bavaria; and the Austrian veteran immediately conceived the bold design of hastening, with his whole disposable force, down the Val Sugana into the plain of Bassano, turning rapidly to the right, seizing upon Verona, and both raising the siege of Mantua and preventing the return of Napoléon into Italy. The French general, who, by treachery at the Austrian headquarters, was uniformly put in possession of his adversary's plans before they could be put into execution, immediately perceived the danger which would result from this measure on the part of the enemy, and resolved to oppose it by another, equally bold, on his own side. This was, to leave the division of Vaubois alone in the Tyrol to make head against Davidowich, and descend himself, with twenty-four thousand men, the defiles of the Brenta, and attack Wurmser before he had got round to Verona. In doing this, he ran the risk, it is true, of being himself shut up in the terrible defiles of the Val Sugana, surrounded by precipices and peaks of a stupendous elevation, between Wurmser in front and Davidowich in rear; but he trusted to the resolution of his troops to overcome every obstacle, and hoped, by driving his antagonist back on the Adige, to compel his whole force to lay down their arms (2).

Action near Primolano, in the Val Sugana. At break of day on the 6th, the French troops were in motion, and they reached Borgo di Val Sugana at night, after having marched ten leagues. On the following morning they continued their march, and, at the entrance of the narrow defiles, came up with the Austrian rearguard, strongly posted near Primolano. Napoléon put in practice the same manœuvre which had succeeded so well at Calliano, covering the mountain on either side with his tirailleurs, and forming a close column of infantry to attack the pass along the high-road. Nothing could resist the impetuosity of the French troops. The Austrians, who were greatly inferior in number, being only the rearguard of the main force, were routed, with the loss of two thousand prisoners and nine pieces of cannon. The fugitives were pursued as far as Cesmona, where head-quarters were established. Napoléon, in his eagerness to pursue the enemy, outrode all his suite, and passed the night alone, wrapped in his cloak, on the ground, in the midst of a regiment of infantry who bivouacked round the town. A private soldier shared with him his rations, and reminded him of it, after he became Emperor, in the camp of Boulogne (3).

(1) Nap. iii. 258, 260. Th. viii. 397, 398.  
(2) Th. viii. 399. Nap. iii. 262. Hard. iii. 448.

(3) Bot. i. 464. Nap. iii. 263, 264. Th. viii. 400.

On the same day in which this action took place, in the gorges of the Val Sagana, the advanced guard of Wurmser, under Mezaros, had reached to Verona, and was already skirmishing with the posts of the Republicans on the fortifications which had been erected round that city, when they were recalled to make head against the terrible enemy which had assailed their rear. Wurmser collected all his forces at Bassano to endeavour to bar the passages, and throw the French back into the defiles; the heavy infantry and artillery were placed on a strong position in front of the town and round its mouldering towers, while six battalions of light troops occupied the opening of the valley into the plain. These were speedily overthrown, and the divisions of Masséna and Augereau, emerging from the defiles, found themselves in presence of a brilliant force of twenty thousand men, with a powerful artillery, drawn up in battle array. But the Austrians, discouraged by repeated defeats, made but a feeble resistance. Masséna speedily routed them on the right, while Augereau broke them on the left: the fugitives rushed in confusion into the town, where they were speedily followed by the victorious troops, who made four thousand prisoners, and captured thirty pieces of cannon, besides almost all the baggage, pontoons, and ammunition of the army (1).

Wurmser  
driven near  
Bassano by  
Masséna. During the confusion of this defeat the Austrians got themselves separated from each other; Quasdanowich, with three thousand men, was thrown back towards Friuli, while Wurmser, with sixteen thousand, took the road to Mantua. The situation of the veteran marshal was all but desperate: Masséna was pressing his rear, while Porto Legnago and Verona were both in the hands of the enemy, and the loss of all his pontoons at Bassano rendered it impossible to pass the Adige but at one or other of these places. Fortunately for him, the battalion which occupied Porto Legnago had been withdrawn to Verona during the attack on that place, and the one destined to replace it had not yet arrived. By a rapid march he reached that town before the Republicans, and thus got his troops across the Adige. Napoléon, following his prey with breathless anxiety, no sooner discovered that the passage at Legnago was secured, than he pushed Masséna across the river to Cerra, in order to cut him from the road to Mantua. But the Austrians fought with the courage of despair, and their cavalry, five thousand strong, who were unbroken, and whose spirit had not suffered by disaster, proved irresistible to their enemies. Napoléon himself, who had come up during the engagement, had great difficulty in saving himself by flight; and Wurmser, who arrived a few minutes after, deemed himself so secure of his antagonist that he recommended to his dragoons to take him alive. Having missed so brilliant a stroke, the old marshal continued his march, passed the Molenilla, cut to pieces a body of eight hundred infantry which endeavoured to interrupt his progress, and entered Mantua in a species of triumph which threw a ray of glory over his long series of disasters (2).

14th Sept. Encouraged by these successes, he still endeavoured to keep the field with twenty thousand infantry and five thousand horse, and soon after his cuirassiers destroyed a regiment of light infantry at Due Castelli. But this was the termination of his transient gleam of prosperity. Napoléon brought up the greater part of his forces, and soon after Augereau stormed Porto Legnago, and made prisoners a thousand men, and fifteen pieces of cannon; a stroke which, by depriving Wurmser of the means of passing the Adige,

(1) Th. viii. 401, 402. Nap. iii. 265, 266. Bot. i. 465.

(2) Th. viii. 404. Nap. iii. 270. Bot. i. 465. Hard. iii. 447, 449.

threw him back on Mantua. On the 19th he was attacked by the divisions of Augereau and Masséna with an equal force. The Austrian cavalry at first drove back Augereau, and the battle seemed for a time doubtful; but a vigorous charge of Masséna in the centre restored affairs, and Wurmser was at length driven back into Mantua, with the loss of three thousand men and twenty pieces of cannon. Two days afterwards, he threw a bridge over the Po, and attacked Governolo, one of the fortresses erected by the French at the conclusion of the dikes, with the design of cutting his way through to the Adige; but he was repulsed with the loss of six hundred men, and four pieces of cannon; and in the beginning of October, Kilmaine resumed his old lines round the town, and the Austrians were shut in on every side within its walls. Wurmser killed the horses of his numerous and splendid cavalry, salted their carcasses, and made every preparation for a vigorous defence; while Napoléon dispatched his aide-de-camp, MARMONT, afterwards Duke of Ragusa, with the standards taken in these glorious actions, to lay at the feet of the French government (1).

Results of  
these ac-  
tions.

By the result of these conflicts the Austrian army in the field was reduced from fifty thousand to fifteen thousand men, of whom twelve thousand, under Davidowich, had taken refuge in the defiles leading to Mount Bremer, while three thousand, under Quasdanowich, were in the mountains of Friuli. Wurmser, it is true, had brought sixteen thousand into Mantua; but this force, accumulated in a besieged and unhealthy town, was of no real service during the remainder of the campaign, and rather, by increasing the number of useless mouths within the place, accelerated the period of its ultimate surrender. Before the end of October, ten thousand of the garrison were in the hospitals, so that the besieged were unable either to make any use of their superfluous numbers, or get quit of the unserviceable persons who consumed their scanty provisions. But these successes, great as they were, had not been purchased without a very heavy loss to the French army, who, in these rapid actions, were weakened by above fifteen thousand men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners (2).

Vast efforts  
on both  
sides to re-  
cruit their  
forces.

Both parties remained in inactivity for a considerable time after these exhausting efforts, during which the Austrians were energetically employed in repairing their losses, and the Republicans in drawing forces from the other side of the Alps. They took advantage of the delay to organize Revolutionary powers throughout all the north of Italy. Bologna and Ferrara were united under a provisional government; Republican forces, and Jacobin clubs established, and all the machinery of democracy put in full operation; Modena was revolutionized, the old government replaced by a popular assembly, and French troops admitted within its walls; while legions of national guards were organized throughout the whole of Lombardy (3).

But more efficient auxiliaries were approaching. Twelve battalions from the army of la Vendée, besides the remainder of the forces of Kellermann, joyfully crossed the Alps, happy to exchange the scene of utter penury and inglorious warfare, for the luxurious quarters and shining achievements of the Italian army. In the end of October, Alvinzi, who had assumed the command of the army in Friuli, had assembled forty thousand men under his standards, while the corps of Davidowich was raised, by the junction of a

(1) Nap. iii. 273. Bot. i. 472, 473. Th. viii. 405.

(3) Jom. ix. 133, 145.

(2) Harl. iii. 450. Nap. iii. 273. Jom. ix. 126.  
Th. iii. 406.

large body of the Tyrolese militia, a force admirably adapted for mountain warfare, to eighteen thousand men. To oppose this mass of assailants, Napoléon had twelve thousand men under Vaubois, on the Lavis, in front of Trent; twenty thousand on the Brenta and the Adige observing Alvinzi, and ten thousand guarding the lines round Mantua. The disproportion, therefore, was very great in every quarter, and Napoléon, justly alarmed at his situation, and chagrined at the Directory for not putting a larger force at his disposal, wrote to the government that he was about to lose the whole of his Italian conquests (1).

Nov. 6.

Alvinzi  
again ad-  
vanced.

The Austrian preparations being completed, Alvinzi, on the 1st November, threw two bridges over the Piave, and advanced against Masséna, whose headquarters were at Bassano. At the approach of the Imperialists in such superior force, the French fell back to Vicenza, and Napoléon hastened, with the division of Augereau and the reserve, to their support. On the 6th, a general battle took place. Masséna overthrew the Austrian left, commanded by Provera and Liptay, and drove them with loss over the Brenta; while Napoléon himself defeated the right, under Quasdanowich, and would have carried the town of Bassano, which the Imperialists occupied in force, had not Hohenzollern, who advanced at the head of the Austrian reserve, made good the place till nightfall. But early on the following morning, the general received intelligence from Vaubois, in the Tyrol, which not only interrupted his career of success, but rendered an immediate retreat on the part of the whole Republican army unavoidable (2).

Nov. 7.

Defeat of  
Vaubois by  
the Impe-  
rialists.

In obedience to the orders he had received, that general, on the same day on which the Austrians crossed the Piave, commenced an attack on their position on the Lavis; but he was not only received with the utmost intrepidity, but driven back in disorder, through the town of Trent, to the defile of Calliano, with the loss of four thousand men. There he made a stand; but Davidowich, having caused a large part of his forces to cross to the right bank of the Adige, passed that post, and was moving rapidly down on Montebaldo and Rivoli, so as to threaten his communications with Verona, and the remainder of the army. Nothing was left for Vaubois but to retire in haste towards Verona (3), which was seriously menaced by the increasing forces of the Tyrolese army, while their progress on the Montebaldo could only be arrested by bringing up Joubert in the utmost haste from the lines of Mantua.

Napoléon  
hastens in  
person to  
the Platée  
of Rivoli.

No sooner was this disastrous intelligence received by Napoléon, than he drew back his whole force through Vicenza to Verona, while Alvinzi, who was himself preparing to retire, after his check

(1) Th. viii. 448, 449. Jour. ix. 158. Nap. iii. 345, 346.

2d Oct. Napoléon's letter was in those terms:—  
1796. "Mantua cannot be reduced before the middle of February; you will perceive from that how critical our situation is; and our political system is, if possible, still worse. Peace with Naples is indispensable; an alliance with Genoa and Turin necessary. Lose no time in taking the people of Lombardy, Modena, Bologna, and Ferrara under your protection, and, above all, send reinforcements. The Emperor has thrice reformed his army since the commencement of the campaign. Every thing is going wrong in Italy; the prestige of our forces is dissipated; the enemy now count our ranks. It is indispensable that you take into your instant consideration the critical situation of the Italian army, and forthwith secure it friends both among kings

and people. The influence of Rome is incalculable; you did wrong in breaking with that power; I would have temporized with it, as we have done with Venice and Genoa. Whenever the general in Italy is not the centre of negotiation as well as military operations, the greatest risks will be incurred. You may ascribe this language to ambition; but I am satiated with honours, and my health is so broken, that I must implore you to give me a successor. —I can no longer sit on horseback; my courage alone is unshaken. *Every thing was ready for the explosion at Genoa; but Faypoult thought it expedient to delay. We must conciliate Genoa till the new order of things is more firmly established.*"—*Confident. Despatches*, Oct. 8, 1796, ii. 92, 93.

(2) Nap. iii. 437. Th. viii. 543.

(3) Nap. iii. 348, 349. Th. viii 453, 455.



on the preceding day, immediately resumed the offensive. Napoléon in person proceeded, with such troops as he could collect, in the utmost haste to the Montebaldo, where he found the division of Vaubois all assembled on the plateau of Rivoli, and so much reinforced as to be able to withstand an attack. He here deemed it necessary to make a severe example of the regiments whose panic had so nearly proved fatal to the army. Collecting the troops into a circle, he addressed them, with a severe tone, in these words:—"Soldiers, I am displeased with you. You have evinced neither discipline, nor valour, nor constancy. You have allowed yourselves to be chased from positions, where a handful of resolute men might have arrested an army. Soldiers of the 39th and 85th, you are no longer French soldiers. Chief of the staff, cause it to be written on their standards, *They are no longer of the Army of Italy.*" These terrible words, pronounced with a menacing voice, filled these brave regiments with consternation. The laws of discipline could not restrain the sounds of grief which burst from their ranks. They broke their array, and, crowding round the general, entreated that he would lead them into action, and give them an opportunity of showing whether they were not of the Army of Italy. Napoléon consoled them by some kind expressions (1), and, feigning to yield to their prayers, promised to suspend the order, and a few days after they behaved with uncommon gallantry, and regained their place in his esteem.

Returns to  
Caldiero  
and is there  
defeated.

Notwithstanding his check on the Brenta, the operations of Alvinzi had hitherto been crowned with the most brilliant success. He had regained possession of the whole of the Italian Tyrol, and of all the plain of Italy between that river and the Adige. But the most difficult part still remained, which was, to pass the latter stream in the face of the enemy, and effect a junction with the right wing, under Davidowich, which had achieved such important advantages. He followed the retiring columns of the Republicans, who took a position on the heights of Caldiero, determined to defend the road to Verona to the very uttermost. Napoléon arrived there from the Montebaldo on the evening of the 10th, and resolved to attack Alvinzi on the following day, who had occupied a strong position directly in front, his left resting on the marshes of Arcola, and his right on the heights of CALDIERO and the village of Colognola. Masséna was directed to attack the right, which appeared the most accessible, and his advanced guard succeeded in ascending an eminence, surmounted by a mill, which the Austrian general had neglected to occupy; but the Imperialists, returning in force, regained the post, and made the brigade prisoners. The action continued the remainder of the day along the whole line, without decisive success to either party; but the rain, which fell in torrents, and the mud which clogged their wheels, prevented the French artillery from being brought up to meet the fire of the Austrian cannon, which, in position, thundered with terrible effect upon the Republican columns (2). Wearied and dispirited, they drew back at night, yielding, for the first time in the campaign, the victory in a pitched battle to their enemies.

The situation of Napoléon was now, to all appearance, utterly desperate. He had lost four thousand men under Vaubois, three thousand in the recent actions with Alvinzi; his troops, dispirited with these disasters, had lost much of their confidence and courage, and a depressing feeling of the great strength of the enemy had gained every breast. The army, it was true, had

(1) Nap. iii. 350. Th. viii. 455.

(2) Nap. iii. 353. Th. viii. 457.

still the advantage of a central position at Verona, in the midst of their enemies; but they could resume the offensive in no direction with any appearance of success. In the north they were arrested by the defiles of the Tyrol; in the east by the position of Caldiero, known by recent experience to be impregnable; in the south the blockading force was hardly able to make head against the frequent sorties of the garrison of Mantua. The peril of their situation rapidly gained the minds of the French soldiers, more capable than any others in Europe of judging of the probable course of events, and extremely susceptible of strong impressions; and it required all the art of the general, aided by the eloquence of his lieutenants, to hinder them from sinking under their misfortunes. Napoléon wrote in the most desponding terms to the Directory, but in public he assumed the appearance of confidence; and the wounded in the city, hearing of the peril of the army, began to issue, with their wounds yet unstanched, from the hospitals. (1).

His new design. But the genius of Napoléon did not desert him in this eventful crisis. Without communicating his design to any one, he ordered the whole army to be under arms at nightfall, on the 14th November, and they began their march in three columns, crossed the Adige, and took the road to Milan. The hour of departure, the route, the universal ignorance in regard to their destination, all inspired the belief that they were about to retreat, and relinquish to their insulting rivals the plains of Italy. Breathless with anxiety, the troops defiled through the gates of Verona; not a word was spoken in the ranks; grief filled every heart; in the dark columns, the measured tread of marching men alone was heard; when suddenly the order was given to turn rapidly to the left, and all the corps, descending the course of the Adige, arrived before daybreak at Ronco. There they found a bridge of boats prepared, and the whole army was rapidly passed to the other side, and found itself in an immense sea of morasses. A general feeling of joy was immediately diffused over the army: the soldiers now perceived that the contest for Italy was not abandoned, and passing quickly from one extreme to another, prepared with alacrity to follow the footsteps of their leader, without any regard to the fearful odds to which they were exposed (2).

(1) Th. viii. 458, 460. Nap. iii. 356, 357.

The gloomy anticipations of Napoléon at this period are strongly depicted in the following interesting secret despatch to the Directory:—"If the events I have to recount are not propitious, you will not ascribe it to the army; its inferiority, and the exhaustion of its brave men, give me every reason to fear for it. Perhaps we are on the eve of losing Italy. None of the promised succours have arrived; they are all arrested at Lyon or Marseille. The activity of our government at the commencement of the war can alone give you an idea of the energy of the Court of Vienna; hardly a day elapses that they do not receive five thousand men, and for two months I have only been joined by a single battalion. I do my duty; the army does its part; my soul is lacerated, but my conscience is at ease. I never received a fourth part of the succours which the Minister of War announces in his despatches.

"To-day I shall allow the troops to repose; but to-morrow we shall renew our operations. I despair of preventing the raising the blockade of Mantua; should that disaster arrive, we shall soon be behind the Adda, if not over the Alps. The wounded are few, but they are the *élite* of the army. Our best officers are struck down; the Army of Italy, reduced

to a handful of heroes, is exhausted. The heroes of Lodi, of Millesimo, of Castiglione, of Bassano, are dead, or in hospital; there remains only their reputation, and the pride they have given to the soldiers. Joubert, Lanusse, Victor, Murat, Charlot, are wounded: we are abandoned in the extremity of Italy.

"I have lost few soldiers, but those who have fallen are the flower of the army, whom it is impossible to replace. Such as remain have devoted themselves to death. Perhaps the hour of the brave Augereau, of the intrepid Masséna, of Berthier, is about to strike; what then will become of these brave soldiers? This consideration renders me circumspect; I know not how to brave death, when it would so certainly be the ruin of those who have so long been the object of my solicitude.

"In a few days we shall make a last effort; should fortune prove favourable we shall take Mantua, and with it Italy. Had I received the 83d, three thousand five hundred strong, I would have answered for every thing; in a few days forty thousand men will perhaps not give me the same security."—*Confidential Despatch, 14th Nov., ii. 246-251.*

(2) Th. viii. 461. Nap. iii. 357.

He moves  
down the  
Adige, to  
turn the  
position of  
Caldiero by  
Arcola.

Having perceived, during the former action at Caldiero, that the position was too strong to be carried by an attack in front, Napoléon had resolved to assail it in flank, by the village of Arcola, and for that purpose placed his army in the midst of the morasses, which stretched from thence to the banks of the Po. He thought with reason that, on the narrow causeways which traversed these marshes, the superiority of numbers on the part of the enemy would be unavailing; every thing would come to depend on the resolution of the heads of columns; and he hoped that the courage of his soldiers, restored by being thus brought to combat on equal terms with the enemy, and animated by this novel species of warfare, would prevail over the discipline and tenacity of the Germans. The position which he had chosen was singularly well adapted for the purpose in view. Three chaussées branch off from Ronco; one, following the left bank of the Adige, remounts that river to Verona; one in the centre leads straight to Arcola, by a stone bridge over the little stream of the Alpon; the third, on the right, follows the descending course of the Adige to Albando. Three columns were moved forward on these chaussées; that on the left was destined to approach Verona, and observe that town, so as to secure it from any sudden attack of the enemy; that in the centre, to attack the flank of their position by the village of Arcola; that on the right, to cut off their retreat (1).

15th Nov.  
Direful  
actions  
there.

At daybreak on the 15th, Masséna advanced on the first chaussée as far as a small eminence, which brought him in sight of the steeples of Verona, and removed all anxiety in that quarter. Augereau, with the division in the centre, pushed, without being perceived, as far as the bridge of Arcola; but his advanced guard was there met by three battalions of Croats, who kept up so heavy a fire on the head of the column, that, notwithstanding the greatest exertions on the part of the soldiers, they were driven back. In vain Augereau himself hastened to the spot, and led them back to the charge: the fire at the bridge was so violent, that he was overthrown, and compelled to halt the column. Meanwhile, Alvinzi, whose attention was fixed on Verona, where he imagined the bulk of the enemy's forces to be, was confounded in the morning at hearing a violent fire in the marshes. At first he imagined that it was merely a few light troops, but soon intelligence arrived from all quarters that the enemy were advancing in force on all the dikes, and threatened the flank and rear of his position. He immediately dispatched two divisions along the chaussées by which the enemy was approaching; that commanded by Mitrouski advanced to defend the village of Arcola, while that under Provera marched against the division of Masséna. The latter column soon commenced an attack on their antagonists, but they were unable to withstand the impetuous shock of Masséna's grenadiers, and were driven back with heavy loss. Mitrouski, at the same time, passed through Arcola, crossed the bridge, and attacked the corps of Augereau; but they also were repulsed and followed to the bridge by the victorious French. There commenced a desperate struggle; the Republican column advanced with the utmost intrepidity, but they were received with so tremendous a fire from the artillery in front, and a line of infantry stationed along the banks of the Alpon in flank, that they staggered and fell back. Napoléon, deeming the possession of Arcola indispensable not only to his future operations, but to the safety of his own army, put himself

(1) Nap. iii. 358, 360. Th. viii. 462, 463.



with his generals at the head of the column, seized a standard, advanced without shrinking through a tempest of shot, and planted it on the middle of the bridge; but the fire there became so violent that his grenadiers hesitated, and, seizing the general in their arms, bore him back amidst a cloud of smoke, the dead and the dying. The Austrians instantly rushed over the bridge, and pushed the crowd of fugitives into the marsh, where Napoléon lay up to the middle in water, while the enemy's soldiers for a minute surrounded him on all sides. The French grenadiers soon perceived that their commander was left behind; the cry ran through their ranks, "Forward to save the general," and, returning to the charge, they drove back the Austrians, and extricated Napoléon from his perilous situation. During this terrible strife, Lannes received three wounds. His aide-de-camp, Meuron, was killed by his side, when covering his general with his body, and almost all his personal staff were badly wounded (1).

Meanwhile Guieux, who commanded the column which had been directed against Albaredo, had arrived at that place, and was directly in rear of the village of Arcola: but it was too late. During the desperate stand there made by the Austrians, Alvinzi had gained time to draw off his baggage and artillery, and it was no longer possible to take the enemy in rear. Towards evening, the Austrians abandoned Arcola, and drew up their army, facing the marshes, at the foot of the heights of Caldiero (2).

20th Nov. During the night, Napoléon, on his side, drew back his forces to the right bank of the Adige, leaving only an advanced guard on the left bank; while the Austrians re-occupied the village of Arcola, and all the ground which had been so vehemently disputed on the preceding day. They even advanced, in the confidence of victory, along the dikes, to within six hundred yards of the village of Ronco; but when they were thus far engaged in the defiles, the French attacked them with the bayonet, and drove back their columns, after an obstinate engagement, to the vicinity of Arcola. The battle continued the whole day, with various success, and at nightfall both parties retired, the Austrians over the Alpon, the Republicans across the Adige (3).

During the whole of these eventful days, big with the fate of Italy and the world, the conduct of the Austrian generals was timid, and unworthy of the brave troops whom they commanded. Davidowich, while the contest was raging on the lower Adige, remained in total inactivity on the upper part of that stream; while Alvinzi, fettered by secret instructions from the Aulic Council to attempt nothing hazardous, and rather keep on the defensive, in order to facilitate the hidden negotiations which were going forward or about to commence, repeatedly halted in the career of success, and lost the fairest opportunities of crushing his adversary. Napoléon, aware, from the treachery which constantly prevailed at the Imperial headquarters, of these secret restrictions, augmented the irresolution of the commander-in-chief by privately dispatching intelligence from Verona to him of the approaching mission of Clarke to conduct negotiations for peace, of the conferences opened at Paris with England, and the probability of an immediate accommodation. Alvinzi rejected the proposal for an armistice which he made, but suspended his movements to join Davidowich, and paralysed every successful operation for fear of injuring the negotiations. To such a length did this timidity proceed, that when, after the repulse of the French from Arcola, his bravest

(1) Nap. iii. 361, 363. Th. viii. 463, 467. O'Meara, i. 216, and ii. 226.

(2) Nap. iii. 364. Th. viii. 467.

(3) Nap. iii. 366, 367. Th. viii. 468.

officers besought him instantly to form a junction with Davidowich, and terminate the war by a general attack on Verona, instead of following the heroic advice, he retired towards Viemza (1).

17th Nov. Again the sun rose on this dreadful scene of carnage, and both parties advanced, with diminished numbers but undecaying fury, to the struggle which was to decide the fate of Italy. They met in the middle of the dikes, and fought with the utmost animosity. The French column in the centre was routed, and driven back so far, that the Austrian balls fell upon the bridge of Ronco, where the action was restored by a regiment which Napoléon had placed in ambuscade among the willows on the side of the road, and which attacked the victorious column in flank, when disordered by success, with such vigour, that they were almost all driven into the marshes. Masséna, on his dike, experienced similar vicissitudes, and was only enabled to keep his ground by placing himself at the head of the column, and leading the soldiers on with his hat on the point of his sword. Towards noon, however, Napoléon, perceiving that the enemy were exhausted with fatigue, while his own soldiers were comparatively fresh, deemed the moment for decisive success arrived, and ordered a general charge of all his forces along both chaussées; and, having cleared them of the enemy, formed his troops in order of battle at their extremity, on the firm ground, having the right towards Porto Legnago, and the left at Arcola. By the orders of Napoléon, the garrison of that place issued forth with four pieces of cannon, so as to take the enemy in rear; while a body of trumpeters was sent, under cover of the willows, to their extreme left flank, with orders to sound a charge, as soon as the action was fully engaged along the whole line. These measures were completely successful. The Austrian commander, while bravely resisting in front, hearing a cannonade in his rear, and the trumpets of a whole division of cavalry in his flank, ordered a retreat, and, after a desperate struggle of three days' duration, yielded the victory to his enemies. Alvinzi had stationed eight thousand men in echelon along his line of retreat, so that he was enabled to retire in good order, and with very little further loss (2).

It was so apparent to all the Austrian army that this last retreat was the result of a secret understanding with the French general, and with a view to the negotiation which was now depending, that they openly and loudly expressed their indignation. One colonel broke his sword in pieces, and declared he would no longer serve under a commander whose conduct brought disgrace on his troops. Certain it is, that Alvinzi, during this dreadful strife at Arcola, had neither evinced the capacity nor the spirit of a general worthy to combat with Napoléon;—not that he was in reality deficient in either, but that the ruinous fetters of the Aulic Council paralysed all his movements; and the dread of hazarding any thing on the eve of a negotiation, made him throw away every chance of success (3).

Operations of Davidowich. While this desperate struggle was going forward in the marshes of Arcola, Davidowich, who had opened the campaign with such brilliant success, was far from following up his advantages with the vigour which might have been expected. He merely advanced with his forces to Nov. 18. the neighbourhood of Verona on the 18th, following Vaubois, who abandoned the positions of Corona and Rivoli on his approach; whereas, had he pressed him hard on the preceding days, Napoléon would have been

(1) Hard. iv. 67, 75.

(2) Nap. iii. 368, 369. Th. viii. 470, 472. Jom. ix. 172, 192.

(3) Hard. iv. 71, 77.

compelled to cross the Adige, and raise the siege of Mantua. Without losing an instant, the French general returned with a large part of his forces through Verona, and compelled Davidowich to retire into the Tyrol, while the French resumed their old positions at Corona and Rivoli; and Augereau drove them from Dolce, with the loss of one thousand prisoners and nine pieces of cannon. The inhabitants of that town were lost in astonishment when they beheld the army which had left their walls by the gate of Milan three days before, return in triumph, after so terrible a combat, by the gate of Venice; and without halting, pass through the town to make head against the fresh enemies who approached from the Tyrol (1).

Alvinzi, when Napoléon was absent in pursuit of Davidowich, advanced towards Verona, now chiefly occupied by invalids and wounded men, and a universal joy pervaded the army when the order to march in that direction was given; but his old irresolution soon returned; the instructions of the Aulic Council prevailed over his better genius, and the final order to retire to Vicenza again spread grief and despair among his heroic followers (2).

Results of these actions. The results of the battle of Arcola, how glorious soever to the French arms, were by no means so decisive as those of the previous victories gained in the campaign. The actions had been most obstinately contested; and though the Imperialists ultimately retired, and Mantua was unrelieved, yet the victors were nearly as much weakened as the vanquished. The loss of the French in all, including the actions with Davidowich, was fifteen thousand men, while that of the Austrians did not exceed eighteen thousand. During the confusion consequent on such desperate engagements, the garrison of Mantua made frequent sorties; and Wurmser availed himself with such skill of the temporary interruption of the blockade, that considerable convoys of provisions were introduced into the place, and, by putting the garrison on half rations, and calculating on the great mortality among the troops, which daily diminished their number, he still held out hopes that he could maintain his position till a fourth effort was made for his relief (3).

Extraordinary joy at Paris. The intelligence of these hard-fought victories excited the most enthusiastic transports throughout all France. The battle of Arcola especially, with its desperate chances and perilous passages, was the object of universal admiration. The people never were weary of celebrating the genius which had selected, amidst the dikes of Ronco, a field of battle where numbers were unavailing and courage irresistible; and the heroic intrepidity which made the soldier forget the general, and recalled the exploits of the knights of romance. Every where medals were exhibited of the young general on the bridge of Arcola, with the standard in his hand, in the midst of the fire and smoke. The Councils decreed that the Army of Italy had deserved well of their country, and that the standards which Napoléon and Augereau had borne on that memorable occasion, should be given to them, to be preserved as precious trophies in their families (4).

Great efforts of the Austrians. Nor were the Austrians less distinguished by patriotic feeling. While the triumphs of the Archduke Charles on the Danube had saved Germany, and raised to the highest pitch the ardour of the people, the reverses in Italy came to damp the general joy, and renew, in a quarter where it was least expected, the peril of the monarchy. With unconquerable resolution they prepared to face the danger; the affectionate ardour of the

(1) Nap. iii. 371. Th. viii. 472.

(2) Hard. iv. 75.

(3) Jour. ix. 231. Nap. iii. 371, 372. Th. viii. 472, 473.

(4) Th. viii. 473.

hereditary states showed itself in the moment of alarm; the people every where flew to arms; numerous regiments of volunteers were formed to repair the chasms in the regular forces; Vienna alone raised four regiments, which received standards embroidered by the hand of the Empress; and, before the end of the year, a fourth army was formed in the mountains of Friuli and Tyrol, nowise inferior either in numbers or resolution to those which had wasted under the sword of Napoléon (1).

Mission of Clarke to negotiate for peace, which is thwarted by Napoléon. After the battle of Arcola, the negotiation, the commencement of which had been attended with such fatal effects to the Imperial fortunes during the action, was continued with the greatest activity between the headquarters of the two armies. General Clarke, the Republican envoy, arrived at the headquarters of Napoléon; and it was at first proposed to conclude an armistice of three months, in order to facilitate the negotiations; but this the French general, who saw the command of Italy on the point of slipping from his grasp, and was well aware that the fate of the war depended on Mantua, resolutely opposed (2). Clarke, however, continued to argue in favour of the armistice, and produced the instructions of his government, which were precise on that point; but Napoléon, secure of the support of Barras, at once let him know that he was resolved not to share his authority with any one. "If you come here to obey me," said he, "I will always see you with pleasure; if not, the sooner you return to those who sent you the better (3)." Clarke felt he was mastered; he did not answer a word; from that moment the negotiation fell entirely into the hands of Napoléon, and came to nothing. So completely, indeed, did the Republican envoy fall under the government of the young general, that he himself wrote to the Directory—"It is indispensable that the general-in-chief should conduct all the diplomatic operations in Italy (4); and thenceforth his attention was almost entirely confined to arresting the scandalous depredations of the civil and military authorities, both on the Italian states and the funds of the Republic; an employment which soon absorbed all his time, and was attended with as little success as those of Napoléon himself had been. The conferences which were opened at Vicenza in December, were broken up on the 3d January, without having led to any result; and both parties prepared to try once more the fate of arms (5).

For two months after the battle of Arcola, and during this negotiation, both parties remained in a state of inactivity, and great efforts were made on either side to recruit the armies for the final contest which was approaching. Napoléon received great reinforcements; numbers of the sick were discharged from the hospitals, and rejoined their ranks on the approach of the cold weather, and ten thousand men flocked to his standards from the interior; so that, by the beginning of January 1797, he had forty-six thousand men under arms. Ten thousand blockaded Mantua, and the remainder of the army was on the line of the Adige, from the edge of the Po to the rocks of Montebaldo (6).

(1) Toul. vi. 142. Jom. ix. 267. Hard. iv. 152.

(2) "Masters of Mantua," said he, "the enemy will be too happy to leave us the line of the Rhine. But if an armistice is concluded, we must abandon that fortress till May, and then find it completely provisioned, so that its fall cannot be reckoned on before the unhealthy months of autumn. We will lose the money (30,000,000) we expect from Rome, which cannot be influenced but by the fall of Mantua; and the Emperor being nearer the scene of action, will recruit his army much more effectually

than we can, and in the opening of the campaign we shall be inferior to the enemy. Fifteen days' repose is of essential service to the Army of Italy; three months would ruin it. To conclude an armistice just now, is to cut ourselves out of all chance of success—in a word, every thing depends on the fall of Mantua."—*Corresp. Confid.* ii. 423.

(3) Hard. iv. 133, 134.

(4) Report, Dou. 1796, by Clarke. *Confid. Corresp.*

(5) Hard. iv. 136, 146, 149.

(6) Jom. ix. 262. Th. viii. 507.

It was high time that the Imperialists should advance to the relief of this fortress, which was now reduced to the last extremity, from want of provisions. At a council of war, held in the end of December, it was decided that it was indispensable that instant intelligence should be sent to Alvinzi of their desperate situation. The English officer attached to the garrison volunteered to perform in person the perilous mission, which he executed with equal courage and address. He set out, disguised as a peasant, from Mantua, on the 29th December, at nightfall, in the midst of a deep fall of snow, eluded the vigilance of the French patrols, and, after surmounting a thousand hardships and dangers, arrived at the head-quarters of Alvinzi, at Bassano, on the 4th January, the day after the conferences at Vicenza were broken up. Great destinies awaited this enterprising officer (1). He was Colonel Graham, afterwards victor at Barrosa, and the first British general who planted the English standard on the soil of France.

They make a fourth effort to relieve Mantua. The Austrian plan of attack on this occasion was materially different from what it had formerly been. Adhering still to their favourite system of dividing their forces, and being masters of the course of the Brenta from Bassano to Roveredo, they transferred the bulk of their troops to the Upper Adige, where Alvinzi himself took the command of thirty-five thousand men. A subordinate force of fifteen thousand was destined to advance by the plain of Padua to Mantua, with a view to raise the siege, extricate Wurmser, and push on to the Ecclesiastical States, where the Pope had recently been making great preparations, and from whose levies it was hoped the numerous staff and dismounted dragoons of the veteran marshal would form an efficient force. This project had every appearance of success; but, unfortunately, it became known to the French general, from the despatches which announced it to Wurmser falling into his hands, as the messenger who bore them was on the point of clearing the last lines of the blockade of Mantua (2).

12th Jan. 1797. They advance to. On the 12th January, 1797, the advanced guard of Alvinzi attacked the Republican posts on the Montebaldo, and forced them back to the plateau of Rivoli; while, on the same day, the troops in the plain pushed forward, drove in all the French videttes towards Porto Legnago, and maintained a desultory fire along the whole line of the lower Adige. For some time Napoléon was uncertain on which side the principal attack would be made, but soon the alarming accounts of the great display of force on the upper part of the river, and the secret intelligence which he received from treachery at the Austrian headquarters, left no doubt that the enemy's principal forces were accumulated near Rivoli; and accordingly he set out with the whole centre of his army to support Joubert, who was there struggling with immensely superior forces. He arrived at two in the morning on the plateau of Rivoli; the weather was clear and beautiful; an unclouded moon silvered the fir-clad precipices of the mountains; but the horizon to the northward was illuminated by the fires of innumerable bivouacs, and from the neighbouring heights his experienced eye could discover the lights of nearly forty thousand men. This great force was divided into five columns, which filled the whole space between the Adige and the lake of Guarda: the principal one, under Quasdanowich, composed of all the artillery, cavalry, and a strong body of grenadiers, followed the high-road on the right, and was destined to ascend the plateau by the zigzag and steep

(1) *Hard.* iv. 153, 154.(2) *Nap.* iii. 408, 409.



ascent which led to its summit. Three other corps of infantry received orders to climb the amphitheatre of mountains which surrounded it in front, and, when the action was engaged on the high-road, descend upon the French army; while a fifth, under Lusignan, was directed to wind round the base of the plateau, gain the high-road in their rear, and cut off their retreat to Verona. The plan was ably conceived, and had nearly succeeded (1): with a general of inferior ability to Napoléon, and troops of less resolution than his army, it unquestionably would have done so.

To oppose this great force, Napoléon had only thirty thousand men, but he had the advantage of being in position on a plain, elevated among the mountains, while his adversaries must necessarily be fatigued in endeavouring to reach it; and he had sixty pieces of cannon, and a numerous body of cavalry, in excellent condition. He immediately perceived that it was necessary, at all hazards, to keep his ground on the plateau; and, by so doing, he hoped to prevent the junction of the enemy's masses, and overthrow them separately. Before daybreak he moved forward the tirailleurs of Joubert to drive back the advanced posts of the Imperialists, who had already ascended to the plateau, and, by the light of the moon, arranged his whole force with admirable precision on its summit (2).

14th Jan.  
Battle of  
Rivoli.

The action began at nine o'clock, by the Austrian columns, which descended from the semicircular heights of the Montebaldo, attacking the French left. After a desperate resistance, the regiments stationed there were broken, and fled in disorder; upon which Napoléon galloped to the village of Rivoli, where the division of Masséna, which had marched all night, was reposing from its fatigues, led it to the front, and, by a vigorous charge, restored the combat in that quarter. This check, however, had forced Joubert on the right to give ground; the divisions in front pressed down upon the plateau, while at the same instant the head of the column of the Imperial grenadiers appeared at the top of the zigzag windings of the high-road, having, by incredible efforts of valour, forced that perilous ascent, and their cavalry and artillery began to debouche upon the level surface at its summit. Meanwhile, the division of Lusignan, which had wound unperceived round the flanks of the Republicans, appeared directly in their rear, and the Imperial soldiers, deeming the destruction of the French army certain, gave loud cheers on all sides, which re-echoed from the surrounding cliffs, and clapped their hands, as they successively took up their ground. The Republicans, attacked in front, flank, and rear at the same time, saw their retreat cut off, and no resource from the bayonets of the Austrians but in the precipices of the Alps (3).

At this perilous moment, the presence of mind of Napoléon did not forsake him. He instantly, in order to gain time, sent a flag of truce to Alvinzi, proposing a suspension of arms for half an hour, as he had some propositions to make in consequence of the arrival of a courier with despatches from Paris. The Austrian general, ever impressed with the idea that military were to be subordinate to diplomatic operations, fell into the snare; the suspension, at the critical moment, was agreed to; and the march of the Austrians was suspended at the very moment when the soldiers, with loud shouts were exclaiming—"We have them; we have them." Junot repaired to the Austrian headquarters, from whence, after a conference of an hour, he returned, as

(1) Th. viii. 513. Nap. iii. 414. Jom. ix. 275.

(2) Th. viii. 514. Nap. iii. 414. Jom. ix. 276.

(3) Nap. iii. 416. Th. viii. 516. Jom. viii. 279.



might have been expected, without having come to any accommodation; but meanwhile the critical period had passed; Napoléon had gained time to face the danger, and made the movements requisite to repel these numerous attacks. Joubert, with the light infantry, was ordered to face about on the extreme right to oppose Quasdanowich, while Leclerc and Lasalle, with the light cavalry and flying artillery, flew to the menaced point; and a regiment of infantry was directed to the heights of Tiffaro, to make head against the corps of Lusignan. Far from being disconcerted by the appearance of the troops in his rear, he exclaimed, pointing to them, "These are already our prisoners;" and the confident tone in which he spoke soon communicated itself to the soldiers, who repeated the cheering expression. The head of Quasdanowich's division, which had so bravely won the ascent, received in front by a terrible fire of grape-shot, charged on one flank by Lasalle's horse, and exposed on the other to a close discharge of musketry from Joubert, broke and staggered backwards down the steep. The fugitives, rushing headlong through the column which was toiling up, soon threw the whole into inextricable confusion; horse, foot, and cannon struggled together, under a plunging fire from the French batteries, which blew up some ammunition-waggon, and produced a scene of frightful disorder. No sooner was the plateau delivered from this flank attack, than Napoléon accumulated his forces on the troops which had descended from the semicircle of the Montebaldo, and that gallant band, destitute of artillery, and deprived now of the expected aid from the corps in flank, soon gave way, and fled in confusion to the mountains, where great numbers were made prisoners (1).

During these decisive successes, the division of Lusignan had gained ground on the troops opposed to it, and came to the heights in rear of the army, in time to witness the destruction of the three divisions in the mountains. From that moment they foresaw their own fate. The victorious troops were speedily directed against this brave division, now insulated from all support, and depressed by the ruin which it had witnessed in the other parts of the army.

Decisive Victory of Napoleon. For some time they stood firm; but the fire of fifteen pieces of heavy artillery, to which they had nothing to oppose, at length compelled them to retreat; and, before they had receded far, they met the division of Rey, the reserve of Masséna, which was approaching. Such was the consternation produced by this unexpected apparition, that the whole division laid down its arms; while Quasdanowich, now left to his own resources, retired up the valley of the Adige, and the broken remains of the centre divisions sought refuge behind the rocky stream of the Tasso (2).

He hastens to the Lower Adige. Not content with these splendid triumphs, Napoléon, on the very night in which they were gained, flew to the assistance of the troops on the Lower Adige, with part of the division of Masséna, which had marched all the preceding night, and fought on the following day. It was full time that he should do so, for on the very day on which the battle of Rivoli was fought, Provera had forced the passage of the Adige at Anghiari, and marched between Angereau and the blockading force by Sanguenetto to the neighbourhood of Mantua, of which he threatened to raise the siege on the following morning. Angereau, it is true, had collected his forces, attacked the rear-guard of the Austrians during their march, and taken fifteen hundred prisoners and fourteen pieces of cannon; but still the danger was imminent that

(1) *Jom. viii. 282, 283. Th. viii. 518. Nap. iii. 416.*

(2) *Th. 518, 519. Jom. viii. 283, 284. Nap. iii. 417.*

15th Jan. the main body of Provera's forces would gain the fort of St.-George and put the blockading force between two fires. Fully aware of the danger (1), Napoléon marched all night and the whole of the following day, and arrived in the evening in the neighbourhood of Mantua.

Meanwhile the hussars of Hohenzollern presented themselves, at sunrise on the 15th, at the gate of St.-George, and being dressed in white cloaks, were nearly mistaken for a regiment of French, and admitted within the walls. But the error having been discovered by an old sergeant who was cutting wood near the gate, the drawbridge was suddenly drawn up, and the alarm communicated to the garrison. Hohenzollern advanced at the gallop, but before he could get in, the gates were closed, and a discharge of grape-shot repulsed the assailants. All that day, the garrison under Miollis combated on the ramparts, and gave time for the succours from Rivoli to arrive. Pro-

Operations  
of Provera  
there—who  
is forced to  
surrender.

vera sent a bark across the lake to warn Wurmser of his approach and concert a general attack, on the next day, upon the blockading force; and in pursuance of the summons, the brave veteran presented himself at the trenches on the following morning with a large part of the garrison. But the arrival of Napoléon not only frustrated all

16th Jan. these preparations, but proved fatal to Provera's division. During the night he pushed forward four regiments, which he had brought with him, between the fort of Favorite and St.-George, so as to prevent Wurmser from effecting a junction with the Austrians, who approached to raise the siege, and strengthened Serrurier at the former point, in order to enable him to repel any attack from the garrison. At day-break, the battle commenced at all points. Wurmser, after an obstinate conflict, was thrown back into the fortress; while Provera, surrounded by superior forces, and tracked in all his doublings, like a furious stag by ruthless hunters (2), was compelled to lay down his arms, with six thousand men. In this engagement the 57th regiment acquired the surname of the *Terrible*, from the fury with which it threw itself on the Austrian line. It was commanded by Victor, afterwards Duke of Belluno.

Results of  
those bat-  
tles.

Thus in three days, by his admirable dispositions, and the extraordinary activity of his troops, did Napoléon not only defeat two Austrian armies of much greater force, taken together, than his own, but took from them eighteen thousand prisoners, twenty-four standards, and sixty pieces of cannon. Such was the loss of the enemy besides, in killed and wounded, that the Austrians were totally disabled from keeping the field, and the French left in undisputed possession of the whole peninsula. History has few examples to exhibit of successes so decisive, achieved by forces so inconsiderable (3).

This was the last effort of which Austria was capable, and the immediate consequence of its defeat, the complete subjugation of the peninsula. The

(1) Jom. viii. 290. Th. viii. 520.

(2) Th. viii. 521. Nap. iii. 421. Jom. viii. 290, 293.

(3) Jom. viii. 294. Nap. iii. 422.

In their report on these disasters, the Aulic Council generously threw no blame on Alvinzi, but openly avowed the treachery at their headquarters, which made all their designs known before they were carried into execution. "The chief fatality," said they, "consisted in this, that our designs were constantly made known to the enemy before they were acted upon. Treachery rendered abortive the combinations of Marshal Wurmser for the relief of Mantua: Treachery plunged Alvinzi into all his

misfortunes. General Bonaparte himself says in his report, that from different sources he had become acquainted with the designs of the enemy before their execution; and, on the last occasion, it was only on the 4th January that Alvinzi received his instructions for the attack, and on the 2d of January it was published by Bonaparte in the Gazette of Milan." Alvinzi, notwithstanding his disasters, was continued in favour; but Provera was exiled to his estates in Carinthia, upon the ground, that he had transgressed his orders in advancing against Mantua before he had received intelligence of the progress of Alvinzi.—HARDENBERG, iv. 164. 167.

remains of Alvinzi's corps retired in opposite directions; one part towards Trent, and another towards Bassano. Napoléon, whose genius never appeared so strongly as in pursuing the remains of a beaten army, followed them up without intermission. Loudon, who had taken post at Roveredo with eight thousand men, in order to defend as long as possible the valley of the Upper Adige, was driven by Joubert successively from that town and Trent, with the loss of five hundred prisoners, while Masséna, by a rapid march over the mountains, made himself master of Primolano, descended into the gorges of the Val Sugana, turned the position of Bassano, and drove the Austrians, with the loss of a thousand prisoners, through Treviso to the opposite bank of the Tagliamento; where Alvinzi at length, by the valley of the Drave, reunited the remnant of his scattered forces (1).

Notwithstanding these disasters, the public spirit of the Austrian monarchy remained unsubdued, and the cabinet of Vienna continued unshaken in its resolution to prosecute the war with vigour. On the other hand, the Directory were so much impressed with the imminent risk which the Italian army had run, both at Arcola and Rivoli, and the evident peril to the Republic, from the rising fame and domineering character of Napoléon, that they were very desirous of peace, and authorized Clarke to sign it, on condition that Belgium and the frontier of the Rhine were given to France, an indemnity secured to the Stadtholder in Germany, and all its possessions restored to Austria in Italy. But Napoléon again resolutely opposed these instructions, and would not permit Clarke to open the proposed negotiations. "Before Mantua falls," said he, "every negotiation is premature, and Mantua will be in our hands in fifteen days. These conditions will never meet with my approbation. The Republic is entitled, besides the frontier of the Rhine, to insist for the establishment of a state in Italy, which may secure the French influence there, and retain in its subjection Genoa, Sardinia and the Pope. Without that, Venice, enlightened at last as to its real dangers, will unite with the Emperor, and restrain the growth of democratic principles in its Italian possessions." The influence of Napoléon again prevailed; the proposed negotiation never was opened, and Clarke remained at Milan, occupied with his subordinate duty of investigating the rapacity of the commissaries of the army (2).

Surrender of Mantua. Mantua did not long hold out after the destruction of the last army destined for its relief. The half of its once numerous garrison was in the hospital; they had consumed all their horses, and the troops, placed for months on half rations, had nearly exhausted all their provisions. In this extremity Wurmser proposed to Serrurier to capitulate: the French commander stated that he could give no definitive answer till the arrival of the general-in-chief. Napoléon in consequence hastened to Roverbella, where he found Klenau, the Austrian aide-de-camp, expatiating on the powerful means of resistance which Wurmser enjoyed, and the great stores of provisions which still remained in the magazines. Wrapped in his cloak near the fire, he overheard the conversation without taking any part in it, or making himself known; when it was concluded, he approached the table, took up the pen, and wrote on the margin his answer to all the propositions of Wurmser, and when it was finished said to Klenau, "If Wurmser had only provisions for eighteen or twenty days, and he spoke of surrendering, he would have merited no favourable terms; but I respect the age, the valour,

(1) *Jom.* viii. 302, 304. *Nap.* iii. 421-422.(2) *Hard.* iv. 170, 174.

and the misfortunes of the marshal; here are the conditions which I offer him, if he surrender to-morrow; should he delay a fortnight, a month, or two months, he shall have the same conditions; he may wait till he has consumed his last morsel of bread. I am now about to cross the Po to march upon Rome: return and communicate my intentions to your general." The aide-de-camp, who now perceived that he was in presence of Napoléon, was penetrated with gratitude for the generosity of the conqueror; and finding that it was useless longer to dissemble; confessed that they had only provisions left for three days. The terms of capitulation were immediately agreed on; Napoléon set out himself to Florence to conduct the expedition against Rome, and Serrurier had the honour of seeing the marshal with all his staff defile before him. Napoléon had too much grandeur of mind to insult the vanquished veteran by his own presence on the occasion; his delicacy was observed by all Europe; and, like the statues of Brutus and Cassius at the funeral of Junia, was the more present to the mind because he was withdrawn from the sight (1).

By this capitulation, Wurmser was allowed to retire to Austria with all his staff and five hundred men; the remainder of the garrison, which, including the sick, was still eighteen thousand strong, surrendered their arms, and was conveyed to Trieste to be exchanged. Fifty standards, a bridge equipage, and above five hundred pieces of artillery, comprising all those captured at the raising of the first siege, fell into the hands of the conqueror (2).

Napoléon  
marches  
towards  
Rome.

Having achieved this great conquest, Napoléon directed his arms against Rome. The power which had vanquished, after so desperate a struggle, the strength of Austria, was not long of crushing the feeble forces of the Church. During the strife on the Adige, the Pope had refused to ratify the treaty of Bologna, and had openly engaged in hostile measures at the conclusion of the campaign, in conjunction with the forces of Austria. The French troops, in consequence, crossed the Apennines; and during the march Wurmser had an opportunity of returning the generous conduct of his adversary, by putting him on his guard against a conspiracy which had been formed against his life, and which was the means of causing it to be frustrated. The papal troops were routed on the banks of Senio: like the other Italian armies, they fled on the first onset, and Junot, after two hours' hard riding, found it impossible to make up with their cavalry. Ancona was speedily taken, with twelve hundred men, and one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, while a small column on the other side of the Apennines pushed as far as Foligno, and threatened Rome itself. Nothing remained to the Vatican but submission; and peace was concluded at Tolentino, on the 19th February, on terms the most humiliating to the Holy See. The Pope engaged to close his ports against the Allies, to cede Avignon and the Venaisin to France; to abandon Bologna, Ferrara, and the whole of Romagna to its allies in the Milanese; to admit a garrison of French troops into Ancona, till the conclusion of a general peace; and to pay a contribution of thirty millions of francs to the victorious Republic. Besides this, he was obliged to surrender a hundred of his principal works of art to the French commissioners: the trophies of ancient and modern genius were seized on with merciless rapacity; and

19th Feb.  
Treaty of  
Tolentino  
between  
France and the  
Pope.

(1) Nap. iii. 423, 425. Th. viii. 523, 524. O'Meara, i. 126.

(2) Nap. iii. 425. Jom. viii. 305.

in a short time the noblest specimens of the fine arts which existed in the world, the Apollo Belvidere, the Laocoon, the Transfiguration of Raphael, the Madonna del Foligno and the St.-Jérôme of Dominichino, were placed on the banks of the Seine (1).

Retrospect of the campaign. Such was the campaign of 1796—glorious to the French arms, memorable in the history of the world. Certainly on no former occasion had successes so great been achieved in so short a time, or powers so vast been vanquished by forces so inconsiderable. From maintaining a painful contest on the mountain ridges of their own frontier, from defending the Var and the Maritime Alps, the Republicans found themselves transported to the Tyrol and the Tagliamento, threatening the hereditary states of Austria, and subduing the whole southern powers of Italy. An army which never mustered fifty thousand men in the field, though maintained by successive reinforcements nearly at that amount, had not only broken through the barrier of the Alps, subdued Piedmont, conquered Lombardy, humbled the whole Italian states, but defeated, and almost destroyed, four powerful armies which Austria raised to defend her possessions, and wrenched the keys of Mantua from her grasp, under the eyes of the greatest array of armed men she had ever sent into the field. Successes so immense, gained against forces so vast, and efforts so indefatigable, may almost be pronounced unparalleled in the annals of war (2).

But although its victories in the field had been so brilliant, the internal situation of the Republic was in the highest degree discouraging; and it was more than doubtful whether it would continue for any length of time even so glorious a contest. Its condition is clearly depicted in a secret report, presented, by order of the Directory, on 20th December, 1796, by General Clarke to Napoléon:—"The lassitude of war is experienced in all parts of the Republic. The people ardently desire peace; their murmurs are loud that it is not already concluded. The legislature desires it, commands it, no matter at what price; and its continued refusal to furnish to the Directory the necessary funds to carry on the contest, is the best proof of that fact. The finances are ruined; agriculture in vain demands the arms which are required for cultivation. The war is become so universal, as to threaten to overturn the Republic; all parties, worn out with anxiety, desire the termination of the Revolution. Should our internal misery continue, the people, exhausted by suffering, having found none of the benefits which

(1) *Jour. viii.* 312, 313. *Nap. iii.* 425. O'Meara, *ii.* 127.

This treaty was concluded by the French under the idea that it would eventually prove fatal to the Holy See. Napoléon proposed to overturn at once the papal government:—"Can we not," said he, "unite Modena, Ferrara, and Romagna, and so form a powerful Republic? May we not give Rome to the King of Spain, on condition that he recognises the new Republic? I will give peace to the Pope on condition that he gives us 3,000,000 of the treasure at Loretta, and pays the 15,000,000 which remain for the armistice. Rome cannot long exist deprived of its richest possessions; a revolution will speedily break out there." [*Corres. Secrète de Nap. ii.* 543. *Hard, iv.* 181.]—On their side, the Directory wrote as follows to Napoléon: "Your habits of reflection, general, must have taught you, that the Roman Catholic religion is the irreconcilable enemy of the Republic. The Directory, therefore, invite you to do every thing in your power to destroy the papal government, without in any degree compromising

the fate of your army,—either by subjecting Rome to another power, or, what would be better still, by establishing in its interior such a government as may render the rule of the priests odious and contemptible, secure the grand object, that the Pope and the cardinals shall lose all hope of remaining at Rome, and may be compelled to seek an asylum in some foreign state, where they may be entirely stripped of temporal power."—*Corres. Conf. de Napoléon, ii.* 349. *Hard, iv.* 181, 182.

(2) In his Confidential Despatch to the Directory of 28th December, 1796, Napoléon states the force with which he commenced the campaign at thirty-eight thousand five hundred men, the subsequent reinforcements at twelve thousand six hundred, and the losses by death and incurable wounds at seven thousand. There can be no doubt that he enormously diminished his losses and reinforcements; for the Directory maintained he had received reinforcements to the amount of fifty-seven thousand men—*Corres. Conf. ii.* 312.



they expected, will establish a new order of things, which will in its turn generate fresh revolutions, and we shall undergo, for twenty or thirty years, all the agonies consequent on such convulsions (1).

Extraordi-  
nary com-  
position of  
the French  
army.

Much of Napoléon's success was no doubt owing to the admirable character, unwearied energy, and indomitable courage of the troops which composed the French army. The world had never seen an array framed of such materials. The terrible whirlwind which had overthrown the fabric of society in France, the patriotic spirit which had brought its whole population into the field, the grinding misery which had forced all its activity into war, had formed a union of intelligence, skill, and ability, among the private soldiers, such as had never before been witnessed in modern warfare. The middling—even the higher ranks—were to be seen with a musket on their shoulders; the great levies of 1793 had spared neither high nor low; the career of glory and ambition could be entered only through the humble portals of the bivouac. Hence it was that the spirit which animated them was so fervent, and their intelligence so remarkable, that the humblest grenadiers anticipated all the designs of their commanders, and knew of themselves, in every situation of danger and difficulty, what should be done. When Napoléon spoke to them, in his proclamations, of Brutus, Scipio, and Tarquin, he was addressing men whose hearts thrilled at the recollections which these names awaken; and when he led them into action after a night-march of ten leagues, he commanded those who felt as thoroughly as himself the inestimable importance of time in war. With truth might Napoléon say that his soldiers had surpassed the far famed celerity of Cæsar's legions (2).

Great  
genius of  
Napoléon.  
His system  
of war.

But much as was owing to the troops who obeyed, still more was to be ascribed to the general who commanded in this memorable campaign. In this struggle is to be seen the commencement of the new system of tactics which Napoléon brought to such perfection; that of accumulating forces in a central situation, striking with the whole mass the detached wings of the enemy, separating them from each other, and compensating by rapidity of movement for inferiority of numbers. All his triumphs were achieved by the steady and skilful application of this principle. At Montenotte he broke into the centre of the Austro-Sardinian army, when it was executing a difficult movement through the mountains, separated the Piedmontese from the Imperialists, accumulated an overwhelming force against the latter at Dego, and routed the former when detached from their allies at Mondovi. When Wurmser approached Verona, with his army divided into parts separated from each other by a lake, Napoléon was on the brink of ruin; but he retrieved his affairs by sacrificing the siege of Mantua, and falling with superior numbers, first on Quasdanowich at Lonato, and then on Wurmser at Castiglione. When the second irruption of the Germans took place, and Wurmser still continued the system of dividing his troops, it was by a skilful use of his central position that Napoléon defeated these efforts; first assailing with a superior force the subsidiary body at Roveredo, and then pursuing with the rapidity of lightning the main body of the invaders through the gorges of the Brenta. When Alvinzi assumed the command, and Vaubois was routed in the Tyrol, the affairs of the French were all but desperate; but the central positions and rapid movements of Napoléon again

(1) Report by Clarke. *Corresp. Conf. de Nap.* ii.  
426.

(2) *Tb.* viii. 522.



restored the balance; checking, in the first instance, the advance of Davidovich on the plateau of Rivoli, and next engaging in a mortal strife with Alvinzi in the marshes of Arcola. When Austria made her final effort, and Alvinzi surrounded Joubert at Rivoli, it was only by the most rapid movements, and almost incredible activity, that the double attack was defeated; the same troops crushing the main body of the Austrians on the steeps of the Montebaldo, who afterwards surrounded Provera on the lake of Mantua. The same system was afterwards pursued with the greatest success by Wellington in Portugal, and Napoléon himself at Dresden, and in the plains of Champagne.

But it will  
not succeed  
against  
troops  
equally  
brave and  
skilful.

But towards the success of such a system of operations it is indispensable that the troops who undertake it should be superior in bodily activity and moral courage to their adversaries, and that the general-in-chief can securely leave a slender force to cope with the enemy in one quarter, while he is accumulating his masses to overwhelm them in another. Unless this is the case, the commander who throws himself at the head of an inconsiderable body into the midst of the enemy, will be certain of meeting instead of inflicting disaster. Without such a degree of courage and activity as enables him to calculate with certainty upon hours, and sometimes minutes, it is impossible to expect success from such a hazardous system. Of this a signal proof occurred in Bohemia in 1813, when the French, encouraged by their great triumph before Dresden, threw themselves inconsiderately into the midst of the Allies in the mountains of Toplitz; but, meeting there with the undaunted Russian and Prussian forces, they experienced the most dreadful reverses, and in a few days lost the whole fruit of a mighty victory.

Causes of  
the dis-  
asters of the  
Austrians.

The disasters of the Austrians were mainly owing to the injudicious system which they so perseveringly adopted, of dividing their force into separate bodies, and commencing an attack at the same time at stations so far distant that the attacking columns could render little assistance to each other. This system may succeed very well against ordinary troops, or timorous generals, who, the moment they hear of their flank being turned, or their communications menaced, lay down their arms, or fall back; but against intrepid soldiers, and a resolute commander, who turn fiercely on every side, and bring a preponderating mass first against one assailant, and then another, it is almost sure of leading to disasters. The Aulic Council were not to blame for adopting this system, in the first instance, against the French armies, because it might have been expected to succeed against ordinary troops, and had done so in many previous instances; but they were inexcusable for continuing it so long, after the character of the opponents with whom they had to deal had so fully displayed itself. The system of concentric attacks rarely succeeds against an able and determined enemy, because the chances which the force in the centre has of beating first one column and then another, are so considerable. When it does, it is only when the different masses of the attacking party, as at Leipsic and Dresden, are so immense, that each can stand a separate encounter for itself, or can fall back, in the event of being outnumbered, without seriously endangering, by such a retreat, the safety of the other assailing columns.

General  
Reflections  
on the  
campaign.

The Italian campaign demonstrates, in the most signal manner, the vast importance of fortresses in war, and the vital consequence of such a barrier to arrest the course of military conquest. The surrender of the fortresses of Coni, Alexandria, and Tortona, by giving the

French a secure base for their operations, speedily made them masters of the whole of Lombardy, while the single fortress of Mantua arrested their victorious arms for six months, and gave time to Austria to collect no less than four powerful armies for its deliverance. No man understood this better than Napoléon; and accordingly, without troubling himself with the projects so earnestly pressed upon him of revolutionizing Piedmont, he grasped the fortresses and thereby laid the foundation for all his subsequent conquests. Without the surrender of the Piedmontese citadels, he would not have been able to push his advantages in Italy beyond the Po; but for the bastions of Mantua, he might have carried them, as in the succeeding campaign, to the Danube.

It is melancholy to reflect on the degraded state of the Italian powers during this terrible struggle. An invasion, which brought on all her people unheard-of calamities, which overspread her plains with bloodshed, and exposed her cities to rapine, was unable to excite the spirit of her pacific inhabitants; and neither of the contending powers deemed it worth their while to bestow a serious thought on the dispositions or assistance of the twenty millions of men who were to be the reward of the strife. The country of Cæsar and Scipio, of Cato and Brutus, beheld in silent dismay the protracted contest of two provinces of its ancient empire, and prepared to bow the neck in abject submission to either of its former vassals which might prove victorious in the strife. A division of the French army was sufficient to disperse the levies of the Roman people. Such is the consequence of political divisions and long-continued prosperity, even in the richest and most favoured countries; and of that fatal policy which withers the spirits of men, by habituating them to degrading occupations, and renders them incapable of asserting their national independence, by destroying the warlike spirit by which alone it can be permanently secured.

Unconquer-  
able tenacity  
of the  
Austrians. Finally, this campaign evinced, in the most signal manner, the persevering character and patriotic spirit of the Austrian people, and the prodigious efforts of which its monarchy is capable, when roused by real danger to vigorous exertion. It is impossible to contemplate, without admiration, the vast armies which they successively sent into the field, and the unconquerable courage with which they returned to a contest where so many thousands of their countrymen had perished before them. Had they been guided by greater, or opposed by less ability, they unquestionably would have been successful; and even against the soldiers of the Italian army, and the genius of Napoléon, the scales of fortune repeatedly hung equal. A nation, capable of such sacrifices, can hardly ever be permanently subdued; a government, actuated by such steady principles, must ultimately be triumphant. Such, accordingly, has been the case in the present instance: aristocratic firmness in the end asserted its wonted superiority over democratic vigour; the dreams of Republican equality have been forgotten, but the Austrian government remains unchanged; the French eagles have retired over the Alps; and Italy, the theatre of so much bloodshed, has finally remained to the successors of the Cæsars.

## CHAPTER XXI.

## CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN GERMANY.

## ARGUMENT.

Great Difficulties of the French Government at the commencement of this year—But her Foreign Relations had signally improved—Triple Alliance of Austria, Russia, and England—Painful division of Opinion in England on the War—Violence of the parties in the close of 1795—Attack on the King when going to Parliament—Arguments of the Opposition on the War—Answer of the Government—Real objects in view by the different Parties—Supplies voted by Parliament—Bills against Public Meetings—Arguments against and for them—They pass into Laws—Reflections on these Statutes—Proposals for Peace by the British government, which are rejected by the Directory—Operations of Hoche in la Vendée—Previous Successes of Charette and Stofflet during the Winter—Death of Stofflet—Heroic conduct of Charette—But he is at length taken and Shot—His Death and Character—Fine Observations of Napoléon upon him—Termination of the war in la Vendée—Preparations of the Austrians—Archduke Charles put at the head of the Army in Germany—Forces of the contending Parties on the Rhine—Designs of the Aulic Council—Plan of the Republicans—They cross the Lower-Rhine, and gain some Success—But are driven back across that River by the Archduke—Operations of Moreau on the Upper-Rhine—His Origin and Character—Organization of his Army—Passage of the Rhine by Moreau—Admirable skill shown in that Operation—Cautious Movements of Moreau—He advances towards the Black Forest—The Archduke hastens to the scene of Danger—Indecisive Action on the Rhine—The French gain Success on the Imperial Right—The Archduke resolves to Retreat into Bavaria—Operations on the Lower-Rhine—Erroneous Plan of the Campaign by the Directory—Admirable Plan of the Archduke to counteract it—He retires through the Black Forest—Indecisive Action at Neresheim—Operations of Jourdan—He advances into Franconia—The Archduke joins Wartensleben, and falls with their united Force on Jourdan—Who is defeated at Amberg—He is again routed near Wurtzburg—Great effects of this Victory—Continued and disastrous Retreat of Jourdan—Archduke again defeats him, and drives him across the Rhine—Severe struggle of Latour with Moreau on the Danube—Archduke threatens Moreau's retreat at Kehl—Moreau resolves to retreat, which he does in the most firm and methodical manner—Defeats Latour at Biberach—And retires leisurely through the Black Forest—Battle of Emmendingen, between Moreau and the Archduke—Retreat of Moreau—Austrians refuse an Armistice on the Rhine—Long and bloody siege of Kehl—Fall of the Tête-de-pont at Hungingen—Reflections on this Campaign—Prodigious Contributions levied by the Republicans in Germany—Disgust consequently excited there—Noble and patriotic spirit of the Austrian people—New Convention between France and Prussia—Deplorable State of the French Marine—Successes of the English in the East and West Indies—Capture of Ceylon—General joy which these Conquests diffuse in England—Continued Deplorable State of St.-Domingo—Treaty of Alliance between France and Spain—Overtures for a General Peace made by Great-Britain—which prove unsuccessful—alarming State of Ireland—Designs of the Directory, and Hoche, against that Country—The Expedition sets Sail—It is dispersed by Tempests—And regains Brest—Reflections on the Failure of this Expedition—Death of the Empress Catharine—Her Character—Retirement of Washington from Public Life—His perfect Character, and admirable Valedictory Address to his Countrymen.

Great difficulties of the French Government at the commencement of this year. WHEN the Directory were called, by the suppression of the insurrection of the Sections, and the establishment of the new constitution, to the helm of the state, they found the Republic in a very critical situation, and its affairs externally and internally involved in almost insurmountable difficulties. The finances were in a state of increasing and inextricable confusion; the assignats, which had for long constituted the sole resource of government, had fallen almost to nothing; ten thousand francs in paper were hardly worth twenty francs in specie, and the

unbounded fall of that paper seemed to render the establishment of any other circulating medium of the same description impossible. The taxes for many years back had been so ill paid, that Ramel, the minister of finance, estimated the arrears in his department at fifteen hundred millions in specie, or above L.60,000,000 sterling. The armies, destitute of pay, ill equipped, worse clothed, were discontented, and the recent disasters on the Rhine had completely broken the susceptible spirit of the French soldiers. The artillery and cavalry were without horses; the infantry, depressed by suffering and dejected by defeat, were deserting in great numbers, and seeking a refuge in their homes from the toils and the miseries of war. The contest in la Vendée was still unextinguished; the Republican armies had been driven with disgrace behind the Rhine, and the troops in the Maritime Alps, worn out with privations, could not be relied on with certainty for offensive operations (1).

But her  
foreign rela-  
tions had  
greatly im-  
proved.

But, on the other hand, the external relations of the Republic had eminently improved, and the vast exertions of 1794, even though succeeded by the lassitude and weakness of 1795, had produced a most important effect on the relative situation of the belligerent powers. Spain, defeated and humiliated, had sued for peace; and the treaty of Bale, by liberating the armies of the Eastern and Western Pyrenees, had both enabled the French government to reinforce the armies of la Vendée, and to afford means to the young Conqueror of the Sections, of carrying the Republican standards into the plains of Lombardy. Prussia had retired without either honour or advantage from the struggle; the Low Countries were not only subdued, but their resources turned against the Allied powers; and the whole weight of the contest on the Rhine, it was plain, must now fall on the Austrian monarchy. England, baffled and disgraced on the continent, was not likely to take any effective part in military warfare, and there seemed little doubt that the power which had recently defeated all the coalesced armies of Europe, would be able to subdue the brave but now unaided forces of the Imperialists.

27th Sept.  
1795.

Triple al-  
liance of  
England,  
Russia, and  
Austria.

Aware of the coming danger, Mr. Pitt had in the September preceding, concluded a triple alliance between Great Britain, Austria, and Russia: but the forces of Russia were too far distant, and the danger to its possessions too remote, to permit any material aid to be early acquired from its immense resources. It was not till a later period, and till the fire had consumed its own vitals, that the might of this gigantic power was effectually roused, and the legions of the North brought to reassert their wonted superiority over the forces of Southern Europe (2).

Painful di-  
vision of  
opinion in  
England on  
the war.

The condition of England, in the close of 1795 and the beginning of 1796, was nearly as distracted, so far as opinion went, as that of France. The continued disasters of the war, the pressure of new and increasing taxation, the apparent hopelessness of continuing the struggle with a military power, whom all the armies of Europe had proved unable to subdue, not only gave new strength and vigour to the Whig party, who had all along opposed hostilities, but induced many thoughtful men, who had concurred at first in the necessity of combating the revolutionary mania, to hesitate as to any further continuance of the contest. So violent had party spirit become, and so completely had it usurped the place of patriotism or reason, that many of the popular leaders had come to wish anxiously for the triumph of their enemies. It was no longer a simple disapprobation of the

(1) *Journ. viii. 22. Tent. vi. 8.*

(2) *Journ. viii. 4. Ann. Reg. 1796, 1798.*

war which they felt, but a fervent desire that it might terminate to the disadvantage of their country, and that the Republican might triumph over the British arms. They thought that there was no chance of parliamentary reform being carried, or any considerable addition to democratic power acquired, unless the ministry was dispossessed; and to accomplish this object, they hesitated not to betray their wish for the success of this inveterate enemy of their country. These animosities produced their usual effect of rendering the moderate or rational equally odious to both parties; whoever deplored the war, was reputed a foe to his country (1); whoever pronounced it necessary, was deemed a conspirator against its liberty, and an abettor of arbitrary power.

Violence of the parties in the close of 1795. These ill humours, which were afloat during the whole of the summer of 1795, broke out into acts of open violence in the autumn of that year. The associations for the purpose of obtaining parliamentary reform increased in boldness and activity: among them were many emissaries of the French government, and numbers of natives of this country, who had thrown off all connexion with it in their hearts, and were become its most violent and rancorous enemies. They deluded immense bodies of men by the seducing language of freedom which they used, and the alluring prospect of peace which they held forth; and, under the banner of reform, succeeded in assembling, in every quarter, all that ambition had which was reckless, with all that indigence could collect which was desperate. These causes of discontent were increased by the high price of provisions, the natural consequence of the increased consumption and enlarged circulating medium required in the war, but which the lower orders, under the instigation of their demagogues, ascribed entirely to the Ministry, and the crusade which they had undertaken against the liberties of mankind (2).

Attack on the King when going to Parliament. On occasion of the King's going to Parliament, at its opening, on 29th October, 1795, these discontents broke out into open outrages of the most disgraceful kind. The royal carriage was surrounded by an immense crowd of turbulent persons, loudly demanding peace, and the dismissal of Mr. Pitt. One of the windows was broken by a stone, or bullet from an air-gun; showers of stones were thrown at the state coach, both going and returning from Parliament; and the monarch narrowly escaped the fury of the populace, in his way from St.-James's Palace to Buckingham House. These outrages, however, tended only to strengthen the hands of government, by demonstrating to all reasonable men to what excesses the populace would speedily be driven, if not restrained by a firm hand, and how thin was the partition which separated this country from the horrors of the French Revolution.

Arguments of the Opposition on the war. In debating on the address, Mr. Fox maintained that the representations of ministers were flattering and delusive; that L.100,000,000 had already been added to the national debt, and L.4,000,000 a-year to the permanent taxes; that the coalition had been every where defeated, and the French were preparing to invade Italy with a powerful army; that the example of America proved how fallacious was the hope, that a nation resolved to be free could be reduced to extremity, by the mere failure of pecuniary resources; that the alleged danger of concluding peace with a revolutionary power had been surmounted by the despotic governments of Spain and Prussia, and if so, what peril could arise from it to the constitu-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1795-6-7.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1796, 1797.

tional monarchy of England? that we had in truth no allies, but a mere set of mercenary associates, who would leave our interests the moment that it suited their own conveniency; and that the severe scarcity, which now desolated all Europe, seemed to be the consequence of the obstacles to cultivation, which the ravages of war occasioned, and could not be expected to terminate while they continued (1).

Answer of  
Govern-  
ment.

On the other hand, it was urged by Mr. Pitt, that every consideration, both of justice and policy, called upon us for a vigorous prosecution of the contest; that notwithstanding his successes in the field, the enemy now began to feel his debility, and had in consequence evinced a disposition to accommodate, which he had never before done; that the French paper was now at little more than a hundredth part of its nominal value; and though the enormous sum of L.750,000,000 worth of assignats had been created, this quantity was hourly on the increase. That it was incredible that a nation reduced to such straits could long support a contest with the formidable enemies who were preparing to assail it by land and sea; and that the system of maintaining war by the heinous method of confiscations and a forced paper currency, however successful for the time, must lead in the end to ruin. That the numbers of the French armies, and the desperate spirit by which they were animated, arose from the misery of the country, the stagnation of industry, and the impossibility of finding subsistence in pacific employments; but that this system, however successful, when a war of invasion and plunder was carried on, could not be maintained for any length of time, when the French armies were repelled to their own frontiers, and compelled to subsist on their own resources. That now, therefore, was the time, when the enemy's breath was so evidently failing, to press him hard on every side, and reduce him to such a peace as might protect Europe from Gallic aggression, and England from Republican innovation (2).

Real objects  
in view by  
the different  
parties.

Such were the arguments urged in public, both in the House of Lords and Commons, on the policy of continuing the war; and both Houses, by a great majority, supported the administration; the numbers being in the Lower House 240 to 59. But the real motives which influenced both sides were materially different. It was a domestic war which was really waged; it was the contest between aristocratic ascendancy and democratic ambition, which at bottom divided the country, and excited the fierce and implacable passions by which all classes were actuated. The popular party perceived that their chance of success was altogether nugatory, while the firm hand which now held the reins continued at the head of affairs, and that while the national spirit was excited by the war with France, the ascendancy of the conservative party might be looked upon as certain; while the adherents to ancient institutions felt that the continuance of the contest at any price was preferable to the flood of democracy with which they would be deluged at its close; and that, till the excitement created by the French Revolution had subsided, no passion but that for war could be relied on to counteract its effects. Thus, though the ground on which the parties engaged was the expedience of continuing the strife, the object which both parties had really in view was the form of domestic government, and the passions which actuated them, in truth, the same as those which distracted France and agitated Europe.

(1) Ann. Reg. 1796, 12. Parl. Hist. xxxii. 1012, 1016.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1796, 12. Parl. Hist. xxxii. 1030, 1048.



Supplies voted by Parliament. To enable government to carry on the war, Parliament voted supplies to the amount of L.27,500,000, exclusive of the interest of the debt; and in this was included the enormous sum of L.18,000,000 contracted by loan, the annual charge of which was L.1,100,000, which was provided for by a considerable addition to the assessed taxes. But the total expenditure of the year amounted to L.37,500,000, and the remainder was raised, in spring, 1796, by exchequer bills and annuities, to the amount of L.13,500,000, which made the total loan of that year L.31,500,000. Mr. Pitt stated it as a most remarkable circumstance, that in the fourth year of so expensive a war, this large loan was obtained at so low a rate as four and a-half per cent; and, without doubt, it was a signal proof of the profusion of capital and confidence in government which prevailed in Britain. But he forgot the ruinous terms on which the loan was contracted for future years; that a bond of L.100 was given for every L.60 advanced, and posterity saddled with the payment of an immense debt which the nation had never received. This observation, how obvious soever, was not then perceived by the ablest persons even of practical habits; no one looked forward to the repayment of the debt, and the nation reposed in fancied security on the moderate annual charge which the loan imposed on the country (1).

Bills against public meetings. Another matter of the highest importance gave rise to the most vehement debates both in the legislature and the country: this was the bills which government brought forward for additional security to the King's person, and the prevention of seditious meetings (2). No measure had been brought forward by government since the Revolution which excited such vehement opposition both in the legislature and the country as these celebrated statutes, which were stigmatized by the popular party as the Pitt and Grenville acts, in order that they might for ever be held in execration by the country. By the latter, it was required that notice should be given to the magistrate, of any public meeting to be held on political subjects; he was authorized to be present, and empowered to seize those guilty of sedition on the spot; and a second offence against the act was punishable with transportation. On the part of the Opposition it was urged, that meetings held under such restrictions, and with the dread of imprisonment hanging over the head of the speakers for any word which might escape from them in the heat of debate, could never be considered as the free and unbiassed meetings of Englishmen; that so violent an infringement had never been attempted on the liberties of the people since the days of the Tudors; that if the times were so far changed that Englishmen could no longer meet and deliberate on public affairs without endangering the state, it would be better at once to surrender their liberties, as in Denmark, into the hands of a despotic sovereign; that it was evident, however, that there really was no such danger as was apprehended, but the alarm for it was only a pretence to justify the adoption of arbitrary measures; that it was in vain to appeal to the example of France, as vindicating the necessity of such rigorous enactments; every body knew that the revolution in that country was not owing to Jacobin clubs, or the meetings of the people, but to the corruptions of the court, and the vices of the political system, and if this bill should pass, the people of this country, rendered desperate by the imposition of similar fetters, would, without all doubt, break, in their own defence, into similar excesses (3).

(1) Ann. Reg. 1796, 53, 64. App. 108.

(2) 36 Geo. III. c. 18 and 36.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1796, 22, 27. Parl. Hist. 1796, 24, 37.

On the other hand, it was argued by the Administration, that it was necessary to consider the bill attentively before representing it in such odious colours; that it imposed restrictions only on public assemblies, and left unfettered the press, the great palladium of liberty in every representative monarchy; that public meetings required to be narrowly watched in turbulent times, because it was in such great assemblages that the passions took fire, and men were precipitated, by mutual applause, into violent measures; that the great danger of such meetings was, that only one side was heard, and extravagant sentiments were always those which gained most applause; that the object of the meetings against which these enactments were levelled, was notorious, being nothing less than the overthrow of the monarchy, and the formation of a republican constitution similar to that established with such disastrous effects in France; that the proposed enactments were certainly a novelty in this country, but so also was the democratic spirit against which it was levelled, and extraordinary times required extraordinary remedies; and that no danger was to be apprehended to public freedom, as long as the press was unfettered, and juries regarded with so much jealousy, as they now did, all the measures which emanated from the authority of government. The bill passed the House of Commons by a majority of two hundred and fourteen to forty-two, and the House of Lords by sixty-six to seven (1).

Bills pass  
into laws.

Opposition  
withdraw in  
disgust.

So exasperated were the Opposition with the success of Ministers on this occasion, that Mr. Fox, and a large part of the minority, withdrew altogether for a considerable time from the House; a ruinous measure, dictated by spite and disappointment, and which should never, on any similar occasion, be repeated by true patriots. The bill was limited in its duration to three years; and, after passing both Houses, received the royal assent (2).

On coolly reviewing the subject of such vehement contention in the Parliament and the nation, it is impossible to deny that it is beset with difficulties; and that nothing but the manifest danger of the times could have furnished an excuse for so wide a deviation from the principles of British freedom. At the same time, it is manifest that the bills, limited as they were in their duration, and partial in their operation, were not calculated to produce the mischiefs which their opponents so confidently predicted. The proof of this is decisive: the bills were passed, and the liberties of England not only remained entire, but have since that time continually gone on increasing. In truth, the management of a country which has become infected with the contagion of democratic ambition, is one of the most difficult matters in government, and of which the principles are only now beginning to be understood. It is always to be recollected, that the formidable thing in periods of agitation, and against which governments are, in an especial manner, called to oppose a barrier, is not the discontent arising from real grievance, but the passion springing from popular ambition. The first, being founded in reason and justice, is easily dealt with: it subsides with the removal of the causes from which it arose, and strong measures are never either required or justifiable for its suppression. The second, being a vehement passion, arising from no real evil, but awakened by the anticipation of power, is insatiable; it increases with every gratification it receives, and

Reflections  
on these  
statutes.

(1) Ann. Reg. 1796, 23, 32. Parl. Hist. xxlii. 49, 62.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1796, 46.

conducts the nation, through blood and suffering, by a sure and rapid process, to military despotism. The same danger to freedom is to be apprehended from the prevention of the expression of real suffering, as from the concession of fuel to democratic ambition. Reform and redress are the remedies suited to the former; resistance and firmness the regimen adapted to the latter. In considering, therefore, whether the measures of Mr. Pitt at that period were justifiable or not, the question is, did the public discontents arise from the experience of real evils, or the contagion of democratic ambition? and when it is recollected from what example, in the neighbouring kingdom, these passions were excited, how much the liberties of England have subsequently augmented, and what a career of splendour and prosperity has since been opened, it is evident that no rational doubt can be entertained on the subject. And the event has proved, that more danger to freedom is to be apprehended from concession than resistance in such circumstances; for British liberty has since that time steadily increased, under all the coercion applied by a firm government to its excesses; while French enthusiasm has led to no practical protection of the people; and the nation has perpetually laboured under a succession of despots, in the vain endeavour to establish a chimerical equality.

8th March, 1796.  
Proposals for peace by the British government—which are rejected by the Directory. Previous to the opening of the campaign of 1796, the British government, in order to bring the French Directory to the test, authorized their agent in Switzerland, Mr. Wickham, to make advances to their minister on the subject of a general peace. The Directory replied, that they could only treat on the footing of the constitution; in other words, that they must insist on retaining the Low-Countries. This at once brought matters to an issue, for neither Austria nor England was as yet sufficiently humbled to consent to such terms. The declaration of this resolution, however, on the part of the Directory, was of great service to the English cabinet, by demonstrating the impossibility of treating without abandoning all the objects of the war, and putting France permanently in possession of a salient angle, from which it threatened the liberties of all Europe, and which experience has proved cannot be left in its hands, without exposing them to imminent hazard. Mr. Pitt accordingly Feb. 13 and April 19, 1796. announced the resolution of the Directory to the British Parliament, and immediately obtained further supplies for carrying on the war,—an additional loan of L.7,500,000 was negotiated, upon as favourable terms as the former, and exchequer bills, to the amount of L.6,000,000 more, put at the disposal of government, out of which L.3,000,000 was granted to Austria (1).

Operations of Hoche in la Vendée. The first active operations of this memorable year took place in la Vendée, where the Republican general, Hoche, commanded an army of 100,000 men. This vast force, the greatest which the Republic had on foot, composed of all the troops in the west of France, and those drawn from Biscay and the western Pyrenees, was intrusted to a general of twenty-seven years of age, whose absolute power extended over all the insurgent provinces. He was every way qualified for the important but difficult duty with which he was charged. Endowed by nature with a clear judgment, an intrepid character, and an unconquerable resolution; firm, sagacious, and humane, he was eminently fitted for that mixture of gentleness and resolution which is necessary to heal the wounds and subdue the passions of civil war. This rare combination of civil and military qualities might have ren-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1796. App. 106. Th. viii. 200, 201. Jom. viii. 8.

dered him a formidable rival of Napoléon, and possibly endangered the public peace, had he not united to these shining parts a patriotic heart, and a love of liberty which rendered him superior to all temptation; and more likely, had he lived, to have followed the example of Washington, than the footsteps of Cæsar or Cromwell (1).

Hoche's plan, which was approved of by the Directory, was to reduce la Vendée, and all the provinces to the south of the Loire, before making any attempt upon Brittany, or the departments to the north of that river. All the towns in the insurgent district were declared in a state of siege; the Republican army was authorized to maintain itself in the country where hostilities were continued, and to levy the necessary requisitions from the peasantry; and the towns which fell into the possession of the Republicans were to be protected and provided for, like captured fortresses. Pardon was proclaimed to all the chiefs who should lay down their arms, while those who continued the contest were ordered to be shot (2).

Successes of Charette and Stofflet during the winter. During the absence of Hoche at Paris, in the depth of winter, when arranging this plan with the Directory, the Royalist chiefs, in particular Charette and Stofflet, gained considerable successes; the project of disarming the insurgent provinces had made little progress; and the former of these chiefs, having broken through the line, had appeared in the rear of the Republicans. But the arrival of the general-in-chief restored vigour and unanimity to their operations. Charette was closely pursued by several columns, under the command of General Travot; while Stofflet, cut off from all communication with the other Royalists, was driven back upon the shores of the ocean. As a last resource, Charette collected all his forces, and attacked his antagonist at the passage of La Vie. The Royalists, seized with a sudden panic, did not combat with their accustomed vigour; their ranks were speedily broken; their artillery, ammunition, and sacred standard, all fell into the hands of the enemy; Charette himself with difficulty made his escape, with forty or fifty followers; and, wandering through forests and marshes, owed his safety to the incorruptible fidelity of the peasants of the Marais. In vain he endeavoured to elude his pursuers and join Stofflet; that intrepid chief, himself pressed by the forces of the Republic, after escaping a thousand perils, was betrayed by one of his followers at the farm of Pegrimaud, where he was seized, gagged, and conducted to Angers. He there met death with the same resolution which had distinguished his life (3).

Charette is defeated.

Death of Stofflet.

This great success was necessary to establish the credit of the young general, who, accused equally by both parties—by the Royalists of severity, and by the Republicans of moderation—was so beset with difficulties and so much disgusted with his situation, that he formally demanded his dismissal from the command. But Carnot, aware of his abilities, instead of accepting his resignation, confirmed him in his appointments; and, as a mark of the esteem of government, sent him two fine horses; a present not only highly acceptable, but absolutely necessary to the young general. For though at the head of one hundred thousand men, and master of a quarter of France, he was reduced to such straits by the fall of the paper in which the whole pay of the army was received, that he was absolutely without horses, or equipage of any kind, and was glad to supply his immediate necessities by taking half-a-

(1) Th. viii. 206.  
(2) Th. viii. 207.

(3) Jom. viii. 26. Th. viii. 212.

dozen bridles and saddles, and a few bottles of rum, from the stores left by the English in Quiberon bay (1).

Heroic conduct of Charette. Charette was now the only remaining obstacle to the entire subjugation of the country; for as long as he lived, it never could be considered as pacified. Anxious to get quit of so formidable an enemy on any terms, the Directory offered him a safe retreat into England with his family and such of his followers as he might select, and a million of francs for his own maintenance. Charette replied—"I am ready to die with arms in my hands; but not to fly and abandon my companions in misfortune. All the vessels of the Republic would not be sufficient to transport my brave soldiers in England. Far from fearing your menaces, I will myself come to seek you in your own camp." The Royalist officers, who perceived that further resistance had become hopeless, urged him to retire to Britain, and await a more favourable opportunity of renewing the contest at the head of the princes and nobility of France. "Gentlemen," said he, with a severe air, "I am not here to judge of the orders which my sovereign has given me: I know them; they are the same which I myself have solicited. Preserve towards them the same fidelity which I shall do; nothing shall shake me in the discharge of my duty (2)."

He is at length taken prisoner, and shot. This indomitable chief, however, could not long withstand the immense bodies which were now directed against him. His band was gradually reduced from seven hundred to fifty, and at last, ten followers. With this handful of heroes he long kept at bay the Republican forces; but at length, pursued on every side, and tracked out like a wild-beast by blood-hounds, he was seized, after a furious combat, and conducted, bleeding and mutilated, but unsubdued, to the Republican headquarters.

General Travot, with the consideration due to illustrious misfortune, treated him with respect and kindness, but could not avert his fate. He was conducted to Angers, where he was far from experiencing from others the generous treatment of this brave Republican general. Maltreated by the brutal soldiery, conducted along, yet dripping with blood from his wounds, before the populace of the town, weakened by loss of blood, he had need of all his fortitude of mind to sustain his courage; but, even in this extremity, his firmness never deserted him. On the 27th March he was removed from the prison of Angers to that of Nantes. He entered into the latter town, preceded by a numerous escort, closely guarded by gendarmes and generals glittering in gold and plumes; himself on foot, with his clothes torn and bloody, pale and extenuated; yet more an object of interest than all the splendid throng by whom he was surrounded. Such was his exhaustion from loss of blood, that the undaunted chief fainted on leaving the Quarter of Commerce; but no sooner was his strength revived by a glass of water, than he marched on, enduring for two hours, with heroic constancy, the abuse and imprecations of the populace. He was immediately conducted to the military commission. His examination lasted two hours; but his answers were all clear, consistent, and dignified; openly avowing his Royalist principles, and resolution to maintain them to the last. Upon hearing the sentence of death, he calmly asked for the succours of religion, which were granted him, and slept peaceably the night before his execution (3).

(1) Th. viii. 214.

(2) Lac. xiii. 73, 75.

(3) Beau. iv. 201, 202.



On the following morning he was brought out to the scaffold. The rolling of drums, the assembly of all the troops and national guard, a countless multitude of spectators, announced the great event which was approaching. At length the hero appeared, descended with a firm step the stairs of the prison, and walked to the Place des Agriculteurs (1), where the execution was to take place. A breathless silence prevailed. Charette advanced to the appointed place, bared his breast, took his yet bloody arm out of the scarf, and, without permitting his eyes to be bandaged, himself gave the command, uttering, with his last breath, the words—"Vive le Roi!"

His death  
and character.

Thus perished Charette, the last and most indomitable of the Vendean chiefs. Though the early massacres which stained the Royalist cause at Machecoul were perpetrated without his orders, yet he had not the romantic generosity, or humane turn of mind, which formed the glorious characteristics of Lescure, Larochejaquelein, and Bonchamps. His mind, cast in a rougher mould, was steeped in deeper colours; and in the later stages of the contest, he executed, without scruple, all the severities which the terrible war in which he was engaged called forth on both sides. If his jealousy of others was sometimes injurious to the Royal cause, his unconquerable firmness prolonged it after every other chance of success was hopeless; his single arm supported the struggle when the bravest of his followers were sinking in despair; and he has left behind him the glorious reputation of being alike invincible in resolution, inexhaustible in resources, and unsubdued in disaster (2).

The death of Charette terminated the war in the west of France, and gave more joy to the Republicans than the most brilliant victory over the Austrians. The vast army of Hoche spread over the whole country from the Loire to the British Channel, gradually pressed upon the insurgent provinces, and drove the peasantry back towards the shores of the ocean. The policy pursued by the Republican general on this occasion was a model of wisdom; he took the utmost pains to conciliate the parish priests, who had so powerful an influence over the minds of the people; and as his columns advanced, seized the cattle and grain of the peasantry, leaving at their dwellings a notice that they would be restored to them when they gave up their weapons, but not till then. The consequence was, that the poor people, threatened with famine, if these their only resources were withheld, were compelled universally to surrender their arms. The army, advancing slowly, completed in this way the disarming of the peasantry as they proceeded, and left nothing in their rear from which danger was to be apprehended. At length they reached the ocean; and though the most resolute of the insurgent bands fought with the courage of despair when they found themselves

Termination  
of the war in  
la Vendée.

(1) Beau. 201, 202. Lac. xiii. 78, 79. Jom. viii. 39. Th. viii. 216.

(2) Th. viii. 217. Lac. xiii. 79. Beau. iv. 203.

Fine observations of Napoleon on him. The character of this illustrious chief cannot be better given than in the words of Napoléon:—"Charette," said he, "was a great character: the true hero of that interesting period of our Revolution, which, if it presents great misfortunes, has at least not injured our glory.—He left on me the impression of real grandeur of mind; the traces of no common energy and audacity, the sparks of genius, are apparent in his actions." Las Cases recounted an anecdote of him when in command of a small vessel early in life. Though regarded as a person of mere ordinary capacity, he, on one occasion, gave proof of the

native energy of his mind. While still a youth, he sailed from Brest in his cutter, which, having lost its mast, was exposed to the most imminent danger; the sailors, on their knees, were praying to the Virgin, and totally incapable of making any exertion, till Charette, by killing one, succeeded in bringing the others to a sense of their duty, and thereby saved the vessel. "There," said Napoléon, "the true character always appears in great circumstances; that was a spark which spoke the future hero of la Vendée. We must not always judge of a character from present appearances; there are slumberers whose rousing is terrible. Kleber was one of them; but his waking was that of the lion."—LAS CASES, vii. 104, 105.



driven back to the sea-coast, yet the great work was at length accomplished, the country universally disarmed, and the soldiers put into cantonments in the conquered district. The people, weary of a contest from which no hope could now be entertained, at length every where surrendered their arms, and resumed their pacific occupations; the Republicans, cantoned in the villages, lived on terms of friendship with their former enemies, mutual exasperation subsided, the clergy communicated openly with a leader who had first treated them with sincerity and kindness, and before the end of the summer, Hoche, instead of requiring new troops, was able to send great reinforcements to the Directory for the support of the armies on the Rhine and in Italy (1).

Preparations of the Austrians. Archduke Charles put at the head of the army in Germany. Meanwhile, the cabinet of Vienna, encouraged by the brilliant achievements of Clairfait at the conclusion of the last campaign, and aware, from the incorporation of Flanders with the French Republic, that no accommodation was to be hoped for, was making the utmost efforts to prosecute the war with effect. A new levy of twenty-five thousand men took place in the hereditary states; the regiments were universally raised to their full complement; and every effort was made to turn to advantage the military spirit and numerous population of the newly acquired province of Galicia. Clairfait, the conqueror of the lines of Mayence, made a triumphal entry into Vienna with unprecedented splendour; but the Aulic Council rewarded his achievements by the appointment of the Archduke Charles to the command of the armies on the Rhine; a step which, however ill deserved by his gallant predecessor, was soon justified by the great military abilities of the young prince (2).

The character of this illustrious chief cannot be better given than in the words of his great antagonist. "Prince Charles," said Napoléon, "is a man whose conduct can never attract blame. His soul belongs to the heroic age, but his heart to that of gold. More than all, he is a good man; and that includes every thing when said of a prince (3)."

Forces of the contending parties on the Rhine. The forces of the contending parties on the Rhine were nearly equal; but the Imperialists had a great superiority in the number and quality of their cavalry. On the Upper Rhine, Moreau commanded 71,000 infantry and 6,500 cavalry; while Wurmser, who was opposed to him, was at the head of 62,000 foot and 22,000 horse; but, before the campaign was far advanced, 30,000 men were detached from this army to reinforce the broken troops of Beaulieu in Italy. On the Lower Rhine, the Archduke was at the head of 71,000 infantry and 21,000 cavalry; while the army of the Sambre and Meuse, under Jourdan, numbered 63,000 of the former arm, and 11,000 of the latter. The disproportion between the numerical strength on the opposite sides, therefore, was not considerable; but the superiority of the Germans in the number and quality of their cavalry gave them a great advantage in an open country, both in profiting by success and arresting disaster. But, on the other hand, the French were in possession of the fortresses of Luxemburg, Thionville, Metz, and Sarelois, which rendered the centre of their position almost unassailable; their right was covered by Huningen, new Brisach, and the fortresses of Alsace, and their left by Maestricht, Juliers, and the iron barrier of the Netherlands; while the Austrians had no fortified point whatever to support either of

(1) Th. viii. 218. Jom. viii. 41, 49.

(2) Jom. viii. 51. Th. viii. 307.

(3) D'Abr. iv. 384.

their wings. This want, in a war of invasion, is of incalculable importance (1); and the event soon proved, that the fortresses of the Rhine are as valuable as a base for offensive, as a barrier to support defensive operations.

Plans of the Austrians. The plan of the Aulic Council was, in the north to force the passage of the Moselle, carry the war into Flanders, and rescue that flourishing province from the grasp of the Republicans; and for this purpose they had brought the greater mass of their forces to the Lower Rhine. On the Upper, they proposed to lay siege to Landau, and, having driven the Republicans over the mountains on the west of the valley of the Rhine, blockade Strasburg. But for some reason which has never been divulged, they remained in a state of inactivity until the end of May, while Beaulieu with fifty thousand men was striving in vain to resist the torrent of Napoléon's conquests in Lombardy. The consequences of this delay proved fatal to the whole campaign. Hardly was the armistice denounced in the end of 31st May, 1796. May, when an order arrived to Wurmser to detach twenty-five thousand of his best troops by the Tyrolese Alps into Italy; a deduction which, by necessarily reducing the Imperialists on the Upper Rhine to the defensive, rendered it hardly possible for the Archduke to push forward the other army towards the Moselle. There still remained, however, one hundred and fifty thousand Imperialists on the frontiers of Germany, including above forty thousand superb cavalry; a force which, if earlier brought into action, and placed under one leader, might have changed the fate of the war. The French inferiority in horse was compensated by a superiority of twenty thousand foot soldiers. The Austrians had the immense advantage of possessing two fortified places, Mayence and Mannheim on the Rhine, which gave them the means of debouching with equal facility on either side of that stream (2), while the Republicans only held a *tête-de-pont* at Dusseldorf, so far removed to the north as to be of little service in commencing operations.

The events of this struggle demonstrate in the most striking manner the great importance of early success in war, and by what a necessary chain of consequences an inconsiderable advantage at first often determines the fate of a campaign. A single victory gained by the Austrians on the Sarre or the Moselle would have compelled the French armies to dissolve themselves in order to garrison the frontier towns; and the Directory, to defend its own territories, would have been obliged to arrest the career of Napoléon in the Italian plains; while, by taking the initiative, and carrying the war into Germany, they were enabled to leave their fortresses defenceless, and swell, by their garrisons, the invading force, which soon proved so perilous to the Austrian monarchy (3).

Plan of the Republicans. The plan of the Republicans was to move forward the army of the Sambre and Meuse by Dusseldorf, to the right bank of the Rhine, in order to threaten the communication of the Archduke with Germany, induce him to recross it, and facilitate the passage of the upper part of the stream by Moreau. In conformity with this design, Kleber, on the 30th May, crossed the Rhine at Dusseldorf, and, with twenty-five thousand men, began to press the Austrians on the Sieg, where the Archduke had only twenty thousand, the great bulk of his army, sixty thousand strong, being on the right bank, in front of Mayence. The Republicans succeeded in

(1) Archduke, ii. 10, 12. Jom. viii. 170. Th. viii. 306, 307.

(2) Archduke Charles, ii. 201.

(3) Jom. viii. 173.

June 4.  
They cross  
the Lower  
Rhine and  
gain some  
success.

defeating the advanced posts of the Imperialists, crossed the Sieg, turned the position of Ukerath, and drove them back to Altenkirchen. There the Austrians stood firm, and a severe action took place. General NEY, with a body of light troops, turned their left, and threatened their communications; while Kleber, having advanced through the hills of Weyersbusch, assailed their front; and SOULT menaced their reserve at Kropach. The result of these movements was, that the Austrians were driven behind the Lahn at Limburg, with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners, and twelve pieces of cannon (1).

They are  
driven back  
across the  
Rhine by  
the Arch-  
duke.

5th June.

This victory produced the desired effect, by drawing the Archduke, with the greater part of his forces, across the Rhine, to succour the menaced points. On the 10th, he passed that river with thirty-two battalions and eighty squadrons, arrived in the neighbourhood of Limburg four days after, and moved, with forty-five thousand infantry and eighteen thousand cavalry, against the Republicans on the German side. Jourdan, upon this, leaving Marceau with twenty thousand men near Mayence, crossed the Rhine at Neuwied, with the bulk of his forces, to support Kleber. His intention was to cover the investment of Ehrenbreitzen, and, for this purpose, cross the Lahn and attack Wartensleben, who commanded the advanced guard of the Imperialists; but the Archduke, resolved to take the initiative, anticipated him by a day, and commenced an attack with all his forces. The position of the Republicans was in the highest degree critical, as they were compelled to fight with the Rhine on their right flank, and between them and France, which would have exposed them to utter ruin in case of a serious reverse. The Archduke judiciously brought the mass of his forces against the French left, and, having overwhelmed it, Jourdan was compelled to draw back all his troops, to avoid being driven into the river, and completely destroyed amidst its precipitous banks. He accordingly retired to Neuwied, and recrossed the Rhine, while Kleber, received orders to retire to Dusseldorf, and regain the left bank. Kray pursued him with the right wing of the Austrians, and a bloody and furious action ensued at Ukerath, which at length terminated to the disadvantage of the French, in consequence of the impetuous charges of the Imperial cavalry. Kleber indignantly continued his retreat, and regained the intrenched camp around the *tête-de-pont* at Dusseldorf (2).

Operations  
of Moreau  
on the Up-  
per Rhine.  
His origin  
and charac-  
ter.

Meanwhile the army on the Upper Rhine, under the command of MOREAU, had commenced offensive operations. This great general, born in 1763, at Morlaix in Brittany, had been originally bred to the bar, but, during the public dangers of 1793, having been called to the profession of arms, he rapidly rose to the rank of general of division. His talents, his virtues, and his misfortunes, have secured him a distinguished place in the page of history. Gifted with rare sagacity, an imperturbable coolness in presence of danger, and a rapid *coup d'œil* in the field of battle, he was eminently qualified for military success; but his modesty, moral indecision, and retiring habits, rendered him unfit to cope in political life with the energy and ambition of Napoléon. He was, accordingly, illustrious as a general, but unfortunate as a statesman; a sincere Republican, he disdained to accept elevation at the expense of the public freedom;

(1) Jom. viii. 182, and Pièces Just. No. 12. Th. viii. 209. Ney, i. 156, 177. Arch. Ch. ii. 64, 74.

(2) Arch. Ch. ii. 74, 92. Jom. viii. 186, 194. Th. viii. 209. Ney, 180, 197.

and, after vanquishing the Imperialists at Hohenlinden, sunk before the audacity and fortune of his younger and less scrupulous rival (1).

Organiza-  
tion of his  
army.

On arriving at the command, after the dismissal of Pichegru, he applied himself assiduously, with the aid of Regnier to reorganize and restore the army, whose spirit the disasters of the preceding campaign had considerably weakened. The French centre, thirty thousand strong, cantoned at the foot of the Vosges mountains, was placed under the orders of DESAIX (2); the left wing, under St.-Cyr, had its headquarters at Deuxponts; while the right, under Moreau in person, occupied Strasburg and Huningen. The Austrians, in like manner, were in three divisions; the right wing, twenty-two thousand strong, was encamped in the neighbourhood of Kayserslautern, and communicated with the Archduke Charles; the centre, under the orders of Starray, amounting to twenty-three thousand infantry and nine thousand horse, was at Muschbach and Mannheim, while the left wing, comprehending twenty-four thousand infantry and seven thousand cavalry, extended along the course of the Rhine from Philipsburg to Bale. Thus, notwithstanding all their misfortunes, the Imperialists still adhered to the ruinous system of extending their forces; a plan of operations destined to bring about all but the ruin of the monarchy (3).

Passage of  
the Rhine  
by Moreau.

Moreau resolved to pass the Rhine at Strasburg, as that powerful fortress was an excellent point of departure, while the numerous wooded islands which there interrupted the course of the river, afforded every facility for the concealment of the project. The fortress of Kehl on the opposite shore, being negligently guarded, lay open to surprise, and, once secured, promised the means of a safe passage to the whole army. The Austrians on the Upper Rhine were, from the very beginning of the campaign, reduced to the defensive, in consequence of the large detachment made under Wurmser to the Tyrol; while the invasion of Germany by the army of Jourdan, spread the belief that it was in that quarter that the serious attack of the Republicans was to be made. To mislead the Imperialists still further from his real design, Moreau made a general attack on their intrenchments at Mannheim, which had the effect of inducing them to withdraw the greater part of their forces to the right bank, leaving only fifteen battalions to guard the *tête-de-pont* on the French side. Meanwhile, Wurmser having departed at the head of twenty-eight thousand choice troops for Italy, the command of both armies devolved on the Archduke. Moreau deemed this juncture favourable for the execution of his design upon Kehl, and accordingly, on 23d June. the evening of the 23d, the gates of Strasburg were suddenly closed, all intercourse with the German shore was rigidly prohibited, and columns of troops marched in all directions towards the point of embarkation (4).

The points selected for this hazardous operation were Gambsheim and Kehl. Twelve thousand men were collected at the first point, and sixteen thousand at the second, both detachments being under the orders of Desaix, while the forces of the Imperialists were so scattered, that they could not

(1) Th. viii. 307, 310, Jom. viii. 159, 195. Arch. Ch. ii. 19.

(2) "Of all the generals I ever had under me," said Napoleon, "Desaix and Kleber possessed the greatest talents, especially Desaix, as Kleber only loved war as it was the means of procuring him riches and pleasures, whereas Desaix loved glory for itself, and despised every thing else. Desaix was wholly wrapt up in war and glory. To him riches and pleasures were valueless, nor did he give them

a moment's thought. He despised comfort and convenience; wrapt in a cloak, he threw himself under a gun, and slept as contentedly as in a palace. Upright and honest in all his proceedings, he was called by the Arabs the Just Sultan. Kleber and Desaix were an irreparable loss to the French army." — O'MEARA, i. 237, 238.

(3) Arch. Ch. ii. 24. Jom. viii. 196, 197. St.-Cyr, iii. 33, 37.

(4) Th. viii. 310, 311. Jom. viii. 199, 206.

assemble above seventeen thousand men in forty-eight hours in any quarter that might be menaced. At midnight, the troops defiled in different columns and profound silence towards the stations of embarkation; while false attacks, attended with much noise and constant discharges of artillery, were

Admirable skill shown in the passage. made at other places, to distract the attention of the enemy. At half-past one Desaix gave the signal for departure; two thousand five hundred men embarked in silence, and rowed across the arm

of the Rhine to the island of Ehslar Rhin, which was occupied by the Imperialists. They fell, without firing a shot, with so much impetuosity upon their videttes, that the Germans fled in disorder to the right bank, without thinking of cutting the bridges of boats which connected the island with the shore. Thither they were speedily followed by the Republicans, who, although unsupported by cavalry or artillery, ventured to advance into the plain, and approach the ramparts of Kehl. With heroic resolution, but the most prudent in such circumstances, the commander sent back the boats instantly to the French side, to bring over reinforcements, leaving this little band alone and unsupported, in the midst of the enemy's army. Their advanced guard was speedily assailed by the Swabian contingent, greatly superior in numbers, which were encamped in that neighbourhood; but they were repulsed by the steadiness of the French infantry, supported by two pieces of artillery, which they had captured on first landing on the shore.

Which proves successful. Before six o'clock in the morning, a new detachment of equal strength arrived, a flying bridge was established between the island and the left bank, and the Republicans found themselves in such strength, that they advanced to the attack of the intrenchments of Kehl, which were carried at the point of the bayonet, the troops of Swabia, intrusted with the defence, flying with such precipitation, that they lost thirteen pieces of cannon and seven hundred men (1). On the following day, a bridge of boats was established between Strasburg and Kehl, and the whole army passed over in safety.

Such was the passage of the Rhine at Kehl, which at the time was celebrated as an exploit of the most glorious character. Without doubt, the secrecy, rapidity, and decision with which it was carried into effect, merit the highest eulogium. But the weakness and dispersion of the enemy's forces rendered it an enterprise of comparatively little hazard; and it was greatly inferior, both in point of difficulty and danger, to the passage of the same river in the following campaign at Dursheim, or the passages of the Danube at Wagram, and of the Berezina at Studenki by Napoléon (2).

Cautious movements of Moreau. Moreau had now the fairest opportunity of destroying the Austrian army on the Upper Rhine, by a series of diverging attacks, similar to those by which Napoléon had discomfited the army of Beaulieu in Piedmont. He had effected a passage, with a superior force, into the centre of the enemy's line; and, by rapid movements, might have struck right and left as weighty blows as that great captain dealt out at Dego and Montenotte. But the French general, however consummate a commander, had not the fire or energy by which his younger rival was actuated, and trusted for success rather to skilful combinations or methodical arrangements, than those master-strokes which are attended with peril, but frequently domineer over fortune by the intensity of the passions which they awaken among mankind (3).

(1) Th. viii. 342. Jom. viii. 209, 211. St.-Cyr, iii. 33, 46. Arch. Ch. ii. 102, 110.

(2) Jom. viii. 211. Th. viii. 313.

(3) St.-Cyr, iii. 54, 55. Th. viii. 314. Jom. viii. 212. Arch. Ch. ii. 121.



He advances  
towards  
the Black  
Forest.

Having at length collected all his divisions on the right bank, Moreau, at the end of June, advanced to the foot of the mountains of the Black Forest, at the head of seventy-one thousand men. This celebrated chain forms a mass of rocky hills covered with fir, separating the valley of the Rhine from that of the Neckar. The Swabian contingent, ten thousand strong, was already posted at Renchen, once so famous in the wars of Turenne, occupying the entrance of the defiles which lead through the mountains. They were there attacked by the Republicans, and driven from their position with the loss of ten pieces of cannon, and eight hundred men (1).

Archduke  
hastens to  
the scene  
of danger.

Meanwhile, the Imperialists were collecting their scattered forces with the utmost haste, to make head against the formidable enemy who had thus burst into the centre of their line. The Archduke Charles had no sooner received the intelligence, than he resolved to hasten in person, to arrest the advance of an army threatening to fall upon his line of communications, and possibly get the start of him on the Danube. For this purpose he set off on the 26th, with twenty-four battalions and thirty-nine squadrons, from the banks of the Lahn, and advanced by forced marches towards the Black Forest, while the scattered divisions of Wurmser's army were converging towards the menaced point (2).

Moreau's plan was to descend the valley of the Rhine, with his centre and left wing, under the command of Desaix and St.-Cyr, while his right, under Ferino, attacked and carried the defiles of the Black Forest, and pushed to the banks of the Neckar. The Austrians on the Upper Rhine and the Murg were about forty-eight thousand strong; while the Archduke was hastening with half that number to their support. Previous to advancing to the northward, Moreau detached some brigades from his centre to clear the right flank of the army, and drive the enemy from the heights of the Black Forest, which was successfully accomplished. Meanwhile, the left wing continuing to descend the valley of the Danube, through a broken country intersected with woods

Indecisive  
actions on  
the Murg.

and ravines, approached the corps of Latour, who defended the banks of the Murg with twenty-seven thousand men. He was attacked there by the centre of the Republicans, with nearly the same force, the left under St.-Cyr, not having yet arrived, and after an indecisive engagement, the Austrians retired in the best order, covered by their numerous cavalry, leaving to their antagonists no other advantage but the possession of the field of battle. Important reinforcements speedily came up on both sides; the Archduke arrived with twenty-four thousand men to the support of the Imperialists, while Moreau counterbalanced the acquisition, by bringing up St.-Cyr, with his whole left wing, to his aid. The forces on the two sides were now nearly equal, amounting on either to about fifty thousand men; and their situation was nearly the same, both being at right angles to the Rhine, and extending from that stream through a marshy and wooded plain, to the mountains of the Black Forest (3).

The French  
gain success  
on the Im-  
perial right.

The Archduke, who felt the value of time, and was apprehensive of being speedily recalled to the defence of the Lower Rhine, resolved to commence the attack, and, in order to render his numerous cavalry of service, to engage as much as possible in the plain. For

(1) Jom. viii. 218. Th. viii. 315. Arch. Ch. ii. 116.

(2) Arch. Ch. ii. 125. St.-Cyr, iii. 50, 71. Jom. viii. 218.

(3) Th. viii. 318. Arch. Ch. ii. 134, 138. Jom. viii. 220, 225.



this purpose he advanced the Saxons on his left to turn the French right in the mountains, and threatened their rear, strengthened the plateau of Rothen-sol, where his left centre rested, advanced his centre to Malsch, and arranged his formidable cavalry, supported by ten battalions, so as to press the left of the Republicans in the plain of the Rhine. His attack was fixed for the 10th July; but Moreau, who deemed it hazardous to remain on the defensive, anticipated him by a general attack on the preceding day. Wisely judging that it was of importance to avoid the plain, where the numerous cavalry of the Austrians promised to be of such advantage, he entirely drew back his own left, and directed the weight of his force by his right against the Austrian position in the mountains. St.-Cyr, who commanded the Republicans in that quarter, was charged with the assault of the plateau of the Rothensol, an elevated plain in the midst of the rocky ridges of the Black Forest, the approaches to which were entangled with shrubs, scaurs, and underwood, and which was occupied by six Austrian battalions. These brave troops repulsed successive attacks of the French columns; but, having on the defeat of the last, pursued the assailants into the rugged and woody ground on the declivity of the heights, their ranks became broken, and St.-Cyr, returning to the charge, routed the Imperialists, carried the position, and drove back their left towards Pforzheim. Meanwhile Desaix, with the French centre, commenced a furious attack on the village of Malsch, which, after being taken and retaken several times, finally remained in the power of the Austrians. Their numerous cavalry now deployed in the plain; but the French kept cautiously under cover of the woods and thickets with which the country abounded; and the Austrians, notwithstanding their great superiority in horse, were unable to obtain any further success than repulsing the attacks on their centre and right, towards the banks of the Rhine (1).

The Arch-  
duke re-  
solves to  
retreat.

The relative situation of the contending parties was now very singular. Moreau had dislodged the Imperialists from the mountains, and by throwing forward his right, he had it in his power to cut them off from the line of communication with the Hereditary States, and menace their retreat to the valley of the Danube. On the other hand, by so doing, he was himself exposed to the danger of being separated from his base in the valley of the Rhine, seeing Desaix crushed by the victorious centre and numerous cavalry of the Austrians, and St.-Cyr isolated and endangered in the mountains. A general of Napoléon's resolution and ability would possibly have derived from this combination of circumstances, the means of achieving the most splendid successes; but the Archduke was prevented from following so energetic a course by the critical circumstances of the Austrian dominions, which lay exposed and unprotected to the attacks of the enemy, and the perilous situation in which he might be placed in case of disaster, with a hostile army on one side, and a great river lined with enemy's fortresses on the other. For these reasons he resolved to forego the splendid to pursue the prudent course; to retire from the frontier to the interior of Germany, and to regain by the valleys of the Maine and the Neckar the plain of the Danube, which river, supported by the fortresses of Ulm and Ratisbon, was the true frontier of Austria, and brought him as much nearer his own, as it withdrew the enemy from their resources. With this view he retired, by a forced march, in the evening, to Pforzheim, without being disquieted in his movement; and, after throwing garrisons into Philipsburg and Mannheim, prepared

(1) Th. viii. 320. Jom. viii. 227, 233. Arch. Ch. ii. 138, 149. St.-Cyr, iii. 68, 69.

to abandon the valley of the Rhine, and retreat by the Neckar into the Bavarian plains (1).

14th to 28th July. Agreeably to this plan, the Imperialists broke up on the 14th from Pforzheim, and retired slowly and in the best order, towards Stuttgardt and the right bank of the Neckar. By so doing, they drew nearer to the army of Wartensleben, and gained the great object of obtaining a central and interior line of communication, from which the Archduke soon derived the most brilliant advantages. Meanwhile Moreau advanced his right centre under St.-Cyr, through the mountains to Pforzheim, while the right wing, under Ferino, spread itself through the Black Forest to the frontiers of 27th July. Switzerland. The result was, that by the middle of July, the Republican army covered a space fifty leagues broad, from Stuttgardt to the Lake of Constance (2).

Operations on the Lower Rhine. 31st July. Meanwhile important operations had taken place on the Lower Rhine. No sooner was Jourdan informed of the passage of the Rhine at Kehl, and the departure of the Archduke to reinforce the army of Wurmser, than he hastened to recross the same river at Dusseldorf and Neuwied, advancing, as he had always before done, towards the Lahn, with a view to debouche into the valley of the Maine. The Imperialists, under Wartensleben, now consisted of only twenty-five thousand infantry and eleven thousand cavalry; a force totally inadequate to make head against the Republicans, who amounted, even after the necessary deductions to blockade Mayence, Cassel, and Ehrenbreitzen, to fifty thousand men. At the period of the passage of the river, the Austrian army was scattered over a long line, and might have been easily beaten in detail by an enterprising enemy; but Jourdan allowed them to concentrate their troops behind the Lahn, without 20th July. deriving any advantage from his superiority of force. After some inconsiderable skirmishing, the Republicans crossed that river; and the Austrians having stood firm in the position of Friedberg, a partial action ensued, which terminated to the disadvantage of the latter, who, after a vigorous resistance, finding their right flank turned by Lefebvre, retreated with the loss of two pieces of cannon and twelve hundred men. After this success, Jourdan advanced to the banks of the Maine, and by a bombardment of two days, compelled his adversaries to evacuate the great city of Frankfort, and retire altogether to the right bank of that river. The Austrians now drew all their disposable troops out of the fortress of Mayence, and raised their force under Wartensleben to thirty thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry, while Jourdan's army on the right bank of the Maine was swelled by the addition of some of the blockading corps to forty-six thousand of the former arm, and eight thousand of the latter (3).

Erroneous plan of the campaign by the Directory. The Directory, in prescribing the conduct of the campaign to the generals, were constantly influenced by the desire to turn at once both flanks of the enemy: an injudicious design, which, by giving an eccentric direction to their forces, and preventing them from communicating with or assisting each other, led to all the disasters which signalized the conclusion of the campaign; while the Archduke, by giving a concentric direction to his forces in their retreat, and ultimately arriving at a point where he could fall, with an overwhelming force, on either adversary, ably prepared all the triumphs which effaced its early disasters. In conformity

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 148, 149. Jom. viii. 234. Th. viii. 322, 326. St.-Cyr, ii. 54, 59. (3) Th. viii. 323. Jom. viii. 264, 276. Arch. Ch. ii. 150, 175. St.-Cyr, iii. 89, 92.

(2) Jom. viii. 237. Arch. Ch. ii. 175.

with these different plans—while Moreau was extending his right wing to the foot of the Alps, pressing through the defiles of the Albis and the Black Forest into the valley of the Danube, and Jourdan was slowly advancing up the shores of the Maine towards Bohemia—the Archduke regained the right bank of the Neckar, and Wartensleben the left bank of the Maine; movements which, by bringing them into close proximity with each other, rendered unavailing all the superiority of their enemies. In truth, nothing but this able direction of the retreating, and injudicious dispersion of the advancing force, could have enabled the Imperialists at all to make head against their enemies: for, independent of the deduction of twenty-eight thousand men dispatched under Wurmser into Italy, the Austrians were weakened by thirty thousand men, whom the Archduke was obliged to leave in the different garrisons on the Rhine; so that the force under his immediate com-

Admirable  
plan of the  
Archduke to  
counteract it.  
He returns  
through the  
Black Forest.

mand consisted only of forty thousand infantry, and eighteen thousand cavalry, while Moreau was at the head of sixty-five thousand of the former force, and six thousand of the latter. But the admirable plan of operations which that able general sketched out at Pforzheim, “to retreat slowly, and disputing every inch of ground, without hazarding a general engagement, until the two retiring armies were so near, that he could fall with a superior force upon one or other of his adversaries,” ultimately rendered abortive all this great superiority, and brought back the French forces with disgrace and disaster to the Rhine (1).

16th July. Having assembled all his parks of artillery, and thrown provisions  
17th, 22d, and 27th July. into the fortresses, which were to be left to their own resources during his short stay at Pforzheim, the Archduke commenced his retreat, during which his force was still further weakened by the withdrawing of the Saxon and Swabian contingents, amounting to ten thousand men, the government of whose states, alarmed by the advance of the Republicans, now hastened to make their separate submissions to the conquerors. By the 25th July, the Austrian forces were concentrated on the right bank of the Neckar, betwixt Cronstadt and Esslingen. They were there attacked, on the following morning, by Moreau, with his whole centre and left wing; and after an obstinate engagement, both parties remained on the field of battle. Next day, the Imperialists retired in two columns, under the Archduke and Hotze, through the mountains of Alb, which separate the valley of the Neckar from that of the Danube. The one followed the valley of the Rems and the route of Schorndorf, the other the valley of the Filz. Their united force did not now exceed twenty-five thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry. Moreau followed them nearly in a parallel march; and on the 23d debouched into the plains near the sources of the Danube, and the upper extremity of the valley of Rems (2).

The Archduke took a position at the top of the long ridge of Bœminkirch, with the design of falling upon the heads of the enemy's columns, as they issued from the valleys into the plain, and to gain time for the evacuation of the magazines of Ulm; and the formidable nature of his position, compelled Moreau to halt for several days to concentrate his forces. Six days afterwards, he resumed his retreat, which was continued with uncommon firmness, and in the best order till he reached the Danube, where he prepared to resume the offensive. He there found himself in communication with his left wing,

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 176, 179. Jom. viii. 282, 283. St.-Cyr, iii. 93, 100.

(2) Jom. viii. 238, 241. Archduke, iii. 191. St.-Cyr, iii. 105, 113.

under Frœlich, which had retired through the Black Forest, and amounted to fourteen thousand infantry, and four thousand cavalry, while the corresponding wing of the Republicans, under Ferino, approached Moreau, and raised his force to fifty-eight thousand infantry and seven thousand horse. He advanced in order of battle to Neresheim, but the left wing, under Frœlich, did not arrive in time to take any part in the action which there ensued. His design in so doing, was to gain time for the evacuation of his magazines at Ulm, and be enabled to continue his retreat with more leisure towards Wartensleben, who was now falling back towards the Naab; but as he gave battle with his rear to the river, he ran the risk of total destruction in case of defeat. By a rapid movement, he succeeded in forcing back and turning the right of Moreau, and pressing forward with his left wing, got into his rear, and caused such an alarm, that all the parks of ammunition retreated in haste from the field of battle. But the centre, under St.-Cyr,

stood firm; and the Austrian force being disseminated into several columns, over a space of ten leagues, the Archduke was unable to take advantage from his success, so as to gain a decisive victory. Meanwhile Moreau, nowise intimidated by the defeat of his right wing, or the alarm in his rear, strengthened his centre by his reserve, and vigorously repulsed all the attacks of the enemy; and at two o'clock in the afternoon the firing ceased at all points, without any decisive success having been gained by either party, both of whom had to lament a loss of three thousand men (1).

On the day following, the Imperialists recrossed the Danube without being disquieted by the enemy, and broke down all the bridges over that river as far as Donawerth. Meanwhile, Frœlich retreated through the Black Forest, followed by Ferino, between whose forces several bloody but indecisive actions took place (2). But more important events were now approaching, and those decisive strokes about to be struck, which saved Germany, and determined the fate of the campaign.

Jourdan, after having remained a few days at Frankfort, and levied a heavy contribution on that flourishing city, prepared to resume his march, in order to co-operate with Moreau in the advance into the empire. He commenced his march with forty-seven thousand men, up the valley of the Maine, on the great road to Wurtzbourg; while Wartensleben retired, with a force somewhat inferior, through the forest of Spessart, to the neighbourhood of that town. Wurtzbourg soon after surrendered to the invaders, and the latter general retired successively to Zeil, Bamberg and Forcheim, when a sharp action ensued between the cavalry of the two armies, in which the French honourably resisted a superior force. From thence he continued his retreat towards the Naab; and after bloody actions at Neukirchen, Sulzbach, and Wolfering, in which no decisive success was obtained by either party, crossed that river, and put a final period to his retrograde movement on the 10th August. The converging direction of the retiring columns of the two Austrian armies might have apprised so experienced an officer as Jourdan of the object of the Archduke, and the danger which he ran by continuing any further his advance; but he did not conceive himself at liberty to deviate from the orders of the Directory; and instead of interposing between their approaching armies, continued his eccentric movement to turn their outermost flank (3).

(1) Th. viii. 387. Arch. Ch. ii. 218, 279. Jom. viii. 220, 255. St.-Cyr, iii. 144, 174. (3) Arch. Ch. ii. 260, 265. Jom. viii. 283, 301. Jourdan, 50, 89.

(2) Jom. viii. 359, 360. Arch. Ch. ii. 281.

The time had now arrived when the Archduke deemed it safe to put in practice his long meditated movement for the relief of Wartensleben. In the middle of August he set out from the environs of Neuburg on the Danube, with twenty-eight thousand men, and moved northward towards the Naab, leaving General Latour with thirty-five thousand to make head during his absence against Moreau. He arrived on that river on the 20th, and orders were immediately given for attacking the enemy. By the junction of the corps under the Archduke with that under Wartensleben, their united force was raised to sixty-three thousand men, while the troops of Jourdan's army, opposed to them, did not exceed, after the losses it had sustained, above forty-five thousand. Thus this young prince had solved the most difficult and important problem in war, that of accumulating, with forces upon the whole inferior, a decided superiority at the decisive point (1).

Bernadotte, who commanded the advanced guard of Jourdan's army, which had crossed the ridge of hills which forms the northern boundary of the valley of the Danube, had taken post at Teining. He was there attacked by the Archduke, and after an obstinate resistance, driven back into the mountains he had recently passed, which separate the valley of the Maine from that of the Danube; while Hotze, who came up towards the close of the action, pursued his discomfited troops to the gates of Neumark. Early on the following morning the Austrians resumed the pursuit, and drove the Republicans from that town, so far back that they found themselves on the flank of Jourdan's army on the Naab, which was no sooner informed of these disasters, than it retired to Amberg. Leaving Hotze to pursue the remains of Bernadotte's army towards Altdorf, the Archduke turned with the bulk of his forces upon Jourdan; and having put himself in communication with Wartensleben, concerted with him a general attack upon the main body of the Republicans at Amberg. The Austrians, under the Archduke, advanced in three columns; and when the soldiers perceived, far distant on the horizon to the northward, the fire of Wartensleben's lines, the importance of whose co-operation the whole army understood, opening on the enemy's flank, nothing could restrain their impetuosity, and loud shouts announced the arrival of the long wished-for moment of victory. The French made but a feeble resistance; assailed at once in front and flank, they fell back to the plateau in the rear of their position, and owed their safety to the firmness with which General Ney sustained the attacks of the enemy with the rearguard (2).

The situation of Jourdan was now in the highest degree critical. By this success at Amberg, the Archduke had got upon his direct road to Nuremberg, through which his retreat necessarily lay, and he was in consequence compelled to fall back through the mountains which separate the Naab from the Maine by cross roads, with all his baggage and parks of artillery. During this critical operation, the firmness and discipline of the French troops alone saved them from the greatest disasters. Ney with the rearguard, continued to make head against the numerous cavalry of the enemy, and after a painful passage of six days, during which they were pressed with the utmost vigour, and incurred great dangers, they at length extricated themselves from the mountains, and reached Schweinfurt on the

(1) Arch. Ch. iii. 2, 23. Jom. ix. 11, 12.

(2) Arch. Ch. ii. 26, 43. Jom. ix. 16, 17. Jour. Jan. 90, 110.



**1st Sept.** Maine, in the deepest dejection, at the end of August. Hotze passed that river on the 1st September, and soon after his advanced guard made itself master of Wurtzburg; while the Archduke conducted the bulk of his forces to the right bank of the river. Jourdan, deeming an action indispensable in order to obtain some respite for his retreating columns, prepared himself for a general attack on his pursuers, at the same time that the Archduke was collecting his forces for an action on his own part. The courage and vivacity of the Republican soldiers appeared again when they faced the enemy, and they prepared with the utmost alacrity to occupy all the positions which were deemed necessary before commencing the battle. On the 2d September both parties were engaged in completing this preparation, and on the third the engagement took place (1).

He is again routed near Wurtzburg. The French army was drawn up on the right bank of the Maine, from Wurtzburg to Schweinfurt; partly on a series of heights which formed the northern barrier of the valley, and partly on the plains which extended from their foot to the shores of the river. Jourdan imagined that he had only to contend with a part of the Austrian force, and that the Archduke had returned in person to make head against the Republicans on the Danube; but instead of that, he had rapidly brought his columns to the right bank, and was prepared to combat his antagonist with superior forces. A thick fog, which concealed the armies from each other, favoured the motions of the Imperialists, and when the sun broke through the clouds at eleven o'clock, it glittered on the numerous squadrons of the Austrians, drawn up in double lines on the meadows adjoining the river. The action commenced by Kray attacking the left flank of the French, while Lichtenstein spread himself out in the plain, followed by Wartensleben, who threw himself at the head of the cavalry into the river, and followed close after the infantry, who had defiled along the bridge. The French general, Grenier, who was stationed at the menaced point, made a vigorous resistance with the Republican cavalry and light infantry; but the reserve of the Austrian cuirassiers having been brought up, Jourdan was obliged to support the line by his reserve of cavalry; and a desperate charge of horse took place, in which the Imperialists were at first repulsed, but the reserve of Austrian cuirassiers having assailed the Republican squadrons, when disordered by success, they were broken, thrown into confusion, and driven behind the lines of their infantry. Meanwhile the grenadiers of Werneck, united to the corps under Starray, routed the French centre, and Kray drove the division of Grenier entirely off the field into the wood of Gramchatz. Victory declared for the Imperialists at all points; and Jourdan esteemed himself fortunate in being able to reach the forests which stretched from Gramchatz to Arnheim, without being broken by the redoubtable Austrian squadrons (2).

Great effects of this victory. Such was the battle of Wurtzburg, which delivered Germany and determined the fate of the campaign. The trophies of the victors were by no means commensurate to these momentous results, amounting only to seven pieces of cannon, and a few prisoners. But it produced a most important effect upon the spirit of the two armies, elevating the Imperial as much as it depressed the Republican forces, and procuring for the Archduke the possession of the direct line of communication from the Maine to the Rhine. Disastrous as it was in its consequences, the battle itself was highly

(1) Th. viii. 390, 408. Arch. Ch. iii. 43, 106. Jourdan, 130, 146. Ney, i. 208, 239. Jom. ix. 19.

(2) Jom. ix. 36. Arch. Ch. iii. 99, 116. Th. viii. 409, 410. Jourdan, 160, 172. Ney, i. 216.



honourable to the defeated army; for they had to contend with thirty thousand men of all arms, against thirty-one thousand infantry, and thirteen thousand splendid cavalry (1).

Continued  
and dis-  
cusses retreat  
of Jourdan. After this disaster, Jourdan had no alternative but to retire behind the Lahn, a position in which he might rally round his standards the force under Marceau, which blockaded Mayence, and the reinforcements which were expected from the north. In doing this, however, he was obliged to retreat through the mountains of Fulda, the roads of which are as bad as the country is rugged and inhospitable. At the same time, Marceau received orders to raise the blockade of Mayence, and make all haste to join the Republican commander-in-chief, behind the Lahn. The Archduke, nothing intimidated by the menacing advance of Moreau into Bavaria, wisely resolved to pursue his beaten enemy to the Rhine; but, instead of following him through the defiles of the mountains, where a resolute rearguard might have arrested an army, he determined to advance straight to the Lahn by the great road of Aschaffenburg. The losses sustained by the Republicans in their retreat were very great. The citadel of Wurtzburg soon surrendered with eight hundred men; 122 pieces of cannon, taken by them during their advance, were abandoned at Schweinfurt; sixty pieces, and an immense quantity of ammunition, at Freudenberg; and eighty-three pieces at Flushing. The peasants, supported by the Austrian light troops, who were detached in pursuit of the enemy, fell upon the flanks and rear of the retreating army, and cut off vast numbers of the stragglers who issued from their ranks (2).

The Republicans reached the Lahn in the most disorganized and miserable state on the 9th September, and four days afterwards they were joined by the blockading force from Mayence, under Marceau, fifteen thousand strong, and a division of ten thousand from the army of the north, which in some

9th Sept. degree restored the balance of the two armies. The young prince, having concentrated his forces at Aschaffenburg, resolved to attack them in this position, and drive them behind the Rhine. The action took place on the 16th. The Austrians advanced in three columns, amounting to thirty-eight thousand infantry, and twelve thousand cavalry, having received some reinforcements from the garrison of Mayence.

Archduke  
again defeats  
them, and  
drives them  
across the  
Rhine. Under cover of a powerful fire of artillery, they forced the bridges of the Lahn, after an obstinate engagement, made themselves masters of Limburg and Dietz, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of heroism on the part of General Marceau, and defeated the enemy at all points. During the night, the Republicans beat a retreat, under cover of a thick fog, which long concealed their movements from the Imperialists; and when it cleared away on the following morning, they found all their positions abandoned. The pursuit was continued with the utmost vigour during the two following days; and, on the 19th, a serious engagement took place with the rearguard at Altenkirchen, where General Marceau was severely wounded, and fell into the hands of the Imperialists. The Archduke, who admired his great military qualities, paid him the most unremitting attention, but in spite of all his

(1) Arch. Ch. iii. 116, 117. Jom ix. 36, 37.

(2) Arch. Ch. iii. 128, 130. Hard iii. 467, 468. Jom ix. 37, 38. Jourdan, 187.

The French themselves admit that it was the hatred inspired by their exactions which occasioned the popular exasperation against them. "The animosity of the Germans," said Carnot, in his

confidential letter announcing these disasters to Napoleon, "and the unhappy consequences which have flowed from it, are a fresh and painful warning to us, how speedily the relaxation of discipline becomes fatal to an army." [Confid. Corresp iii. 147.]—Letter Confid. of 20th September.

care he died a few days after, and was buried with military honours amidst the tears of his generous enemies (1).

Such was the demoralized and disjointed state of the Republican army, that notwithstanding the great reinforcements which they had received, they were totally unable to make head against the enemy. They recrossed the Rhine on the 20th at Bonn and Neuwied, and were reduced to a state of total inactivity for the remainder of the campaign, having lost not less than twenty thousand men since they left the frontiers of Bohemia, by the sword, sickness, and desertion (2).

While the Austrian prince was pursuing this splendid career of victory on the banks of the Maine, the corps left under the command of Latour to oppose Moreau, which did not exceed thirty-four thousand men of every arm, even including the detachment of Frœlich, was sustaining an unequal conflict on the banks of the Danube. Had the French general, the moment that he received intelligence of the departure of the Archduke, followed him with the bulk of his forces, the Imperialists, placed between two fires, would have been exposed to imminent danger, and the very catastrophe which they were most anxious to avert, viz. the junction of the Republican armies in the centre of Germany, been rendered inevitable. Fortunately for the Austrians, instead of adopting so decisive a course, he resolved to advance into Bavaria, hoping thereby to effect a diversion in favour of his colleague; a fatal resolution which, though in some degree justified by the order of the Directory to detach fifteen thousand men at the same time into the Tyrol, utterly ruined the campaign, by increasing the great distance which already separated the Republican armies. After remaining several days in a state of inactivity, he collected an imposing body, fifty-three thousand men, on the banks of the Lech, and forced the fords of that river on the very day of the battle of Amberg. Latour, who had extended his small army too much, in his anxiety to cover a great extent of country, found his rearguard assailed at Friedberg, and defeated, with the loss of seventeen hundred men, and fourteen pieces of cannon. After this disaster he retreated behind the Iser, in the direction of Landshut; his centre fell back to the neighbourhood of Munich, while the left wing stretched to the foot of the mountains of Tyrol. Moreau continued for three weeks occupied in inconsiderable movements in Bavaria; during which a severe combat took place at Langenberg, between four thousand Austrian horse and Desaix's division, in which, after the French troops had been at first broken, they ultimately succeeded by heroic efforts in repulsing the enemy. The Archduke was nothing moved by these disasters, but resolutely continued his pursuit of Jourdan. "Let Moreau advance to Vienna," said he, on parting with Latour; "it is of no moment, provided I beat Jourdan." — Memorable words! indicating at once the firmness of a great man, and the just eye of a consummate general (3).

This resolute conduct had the desired effect.—After the battle of Wurtzburg, the Archduke detached Murferd with a small division to join the garrison of Mannheim, and combine an attack on the *tête-de-pont* at Kehl. The French were driven into the works, which were assaulted with great bravery by the Imperialists; and though the attack was repulsed,

(1) Jom. ix. 40, 166. Th. viii. 410. Arch. Ch. iii. 149, 173. Jourdan, 189, 210. Ney, i. 228, 229.

(2) Jom. ix. 45. Arch. Ch. iii. 178, 180. Jourdan, 212, 220.

(3) Arch. Ch. iii. 52, 59. Jom. ix. 50, 56. St. Cyr, iii. 188, 222.

it spread great consternation through the French army, who saw how nearly they had lost their principal communication with their own country. Moreau, who began to be apprehensive that he might be involved in disaster if he advanced further into Germany, proceeded with great circumspection, and <sup>24th Sept.</sup> arrived on the Iser on the 24th September. Being there informed of the disasters of Jourdan, and that a part of Latour's corps, under Nauendorf, was advancing rapidly upon Ulm to turn his left flank, he halted his army, and next day began his retreat (1).

<sup>Moreau resolves to retreat.</sup> Moreau's situation was now in the highest degree critical. Advanced into the heart of Bavaria, with the defiles of the Black Forest in his rear, at the distance of 200 miles from the Rhine, with Latour with forty thousand men pressing the one flank, and the Archduke and Nauendorf with twenty-five thousand ready to fall on the other, he might anticipate even greater disasters than Jourdan before he regained the frontiers of the Republic. But on the other hand, he was at the head of a superb army of seventy thousand men, whose courage had not been weakened by any disaster, and who possessed the most unlimited confidence, both in their own strength and the resources of their commander. There was no force in Germany capable of arresting so great a mass. It is not with detached columns, or by menacing communications that the retreat of such a body is to be prevented (2).

<sup>Which he does in the most firm and methodical manner.</sup> Fully appreciating these great advantages, and aware that nothing is so likely to produce disaster in a retreat as any symptoms of apprehension of it in the general, he resolved to continue his retrograde movements with the utmost regularity, and to dispute every inch of ground with the enemy when they threatened to press upon his forces. The Austrian armies likely to assail him were as follows:—Nauendorf, with 9500 men, was on the Danube, ready to turn his left flank; Latour, with 24,000, in Bavaria, directly in his rear; Frélich, with 14,000, on the Upper Iller and in Tyrol; while the Archduke, with 16,000 or 18,000, might be expected to abandon the Lahn, and hasten to the scene of decisive operations on the Upper Rhine. It was by maintaining a firm front, and keeping his forces together in masses, that the junction or co-operation of these considerable forces would alone be prevented (3).

Aware that the Archduke might probably block up the line of retreat by the Neckar, Moreau retired by the valley of the Danube and the Black Forest. Resting one of his wings on that stream, he sent forward his parks, his baggage, and his ammunition, before the army, and covering his retreat by a powerful rearguard, succeeded both in repulsing all the attacks of the enemy, and in enabling the body of his army to continue their march without fatigue or interruption. Want of concert in the Austrian generals at first eminently favoured his movements. Having retired behind the lake of Federsee, he found that Latour was isolated from Nauendorf, who was considerably in advance on the Danube, and the opportunity therefore appeared favourable for striking with superior forces a blow upon his weakened adversary. This was the more necessary, as he was approaching the entrance of the defiles of the Black Forest, which were occupied by the enemy, and it was of the last importance that his movement should not be impeded in <sup>2d Oct.</sup> traversing those long and difficult passages. Turning, therefore fiercely upon his pursuers, he assailed Latour near Biberach. The Austrian

(1) Jom. ix. 63, 65. Arch. Ch. iii. 186, 206. St.-Cyr. iii. 222, 238.

(2) Th. viii. 412.

(3) Jom. ix. 65, St.-Cyr. iii. 240, 258. Arch. Ch. iii. 213, 242.

And defeats  
Latour at  
Biberach

general, believing that a part only of the enemy's force was in the front, gave battle in a strong position, extending along a series of wooded heights, lined by a formidable artillery. The action was for a long time fiercely contested; but at length the superior forces and abler manœuvres of the Republicans prevailed (1). Desaix broke their right, while St.-Cyr turned their left, and a complete victory crowned the efforts of the French, which cost the Austrians four thousand prisoners, and eighteen pieces of cannon.

After this decisive blow, Moreau proceeded leisurely towards the Black Forest, directing his steps towards the Valley of Hell, in hopes of being able to debouche by Friburg, before the Archduke arrived to interrupt his progress. He had already passed the separation of the road by the Neckar, and Nauendorf occupied that which passes by the Valley of Kinzig. He therefore directed his centre towards the entrance of the Valley of Hell, under the command of St.-Cyr, while he stationed Desaix and Ferino on the right and left, to protect the motions of the principal body. The Austrian detachments in the mountains were too weak to oppose any effectual resistance to the

Retires lei-  
suredly through  
the Black Fo-  
rest.

passage of the French army. St.-Cyr speedily dissipated the clouds of light troops which infested the pine-clad mountains of the Valley of Hell, and Latour, rendered cautious by disaster, without attempting to harass his retreat, moved by Homberg to unite himself to the Archduke. So ably were the measures of the French general concerted, that he not only passed the defiles without either confusion or loss, but debouched into the valley of the Rhine, rather in the attitude of a conqueror than that of a fugitive (2).

15th Oct.

Meanwhile the Archduke Charles being now assured of the direction which Moreau had taken, directed Latour and the detached parties to join him by the valley of Kinzig, while Nauendorf covered their movements by advancing between them and the French columns. The greater part of the Austrian forces were thus collected in the valley of the Rhine in the middle of October, and though still inferior to the enemy, he resolved to lose no time in attacking, and compelling them to recross that river. Moreau, on his part, was not less desirous of the combat, as he intended to advance to Kehl, and either maintain himself at the *tête-de-pont* there, or cross leisurely over to Strasbourg. The action took place at Emmendingen, on the slopes where the mountains melt into the plain; and afforded an example of the truth of the military principle, that in tactics, or the operations of actual combat, the possession of the mountains in general secures that of the valleys which lie at their feet. Waldkirch was felt by both parties to be the decisive point, from the command which it gave over the neighbouring valleys, and accordingly each general strove to reach it before his adversary; but the French, having the advantage of better roads,

16th Oct.  
Battle of  
Emmendingen  
between  
Moreau and  
the Arch-  
duke.

19th Oct.

were the first to arrive. They were there attacked, however, by Nauendorf, who descended from the heights of the Black Forest, and after a bloody action drove St.-Cyr, who commanded the Republicans, out of the town with severe loss. Meanwhile the success of the Austrians was not less decisive at other points; the Austrian columns having at length surmounted the difficulties of the roads, attacked and carried the village of Matterdingen, while their centre drove them back from Emmendingen, and at length

(1) Jom. ix. 71. Arch. Ch. iii. 216, 230. Th. viii. 414. St.-Cyr, iii. 259, 310.

(2) Arch. Ch. iii. 240. Jom. ix. 74. St.-Cyr, iii. 311, 333.

Moreau, defeated at all points, retired into the forest of Nemburg, behind the Elz, with the loss of two thousand men (1).

20th Oct.  
Retreat of  
Moreau.

The Archduke made preparations on the following morning for re-establishing the bridges over the Elz, and renewing the combat; but Moreau retreated in the night, and commenced the passage of the Rhine, Desaix passed that river at Old Brisach, while the general-in-chief took post in the strong position of Schliengen, determined to accept battle, in order to gain time to defile in tranquillity by the bridge of Huningen. The valley of the Rhine is there cut at right angles by a barrier of rocky eminences, which stretches from the mountains of Hohenblau to the margin of the stream.

His last  
stand at  
Hohenblau;  
but is driven  
across the  
Rhine.

It was on this formidable rampart that Moreau made his last stand, his left resting on the Rhine, his centre on a pile of almost inaccessible rocks, his right on the cliffs of Sizenkirch. The Archduke divided his army into four columns. The Prince of Condé on the right drove in the Republican advanced posts, but made no serious impression; but Latour in the centre, and Nauendorf on the left, gallantly scaled the precipices, drove the Republicans from their positions, and chasing them from height to height, from wood to wood, threw them before nightfall into such confusion, that nothing but the broken nature of the ground, which prevented cavalry from acting, and a violent storm which arose in the evening, saved them from a complete overthrow. Moreau retreated during the night, and on the following day commenced the passage of the Rhine, which was effected without molestation from the Imperialists (2).

After having thus effected the deliverance of Germany from both its invaders, the Archduke proposed to the Aulic Council to detach a powerful reinforcement by the Tyrol into Italy, in order to strengthen the army of Alvinzi, and effect the liberation of Wurmser in Mantua—a measure based on true military principles, and which, if adopted by the Imperial government,

Austrians  
refuse an  
armistice on  
the Rhine.

would probably have changed the fate of the campaign. Moreau, on his side, proposed an armistice to the Austrians, on condition that the Rhine should separate the two armies, and the Republicans retain the *tête-de-pont* of Huningen and Kehl; a proposal which the Archduke received with secret satisfaction, as it promised him the means of securely carrying into effect his meditated designs for the deliverance of Italy. But the Austrian government, intent upon the expulsion of the French from Germany, and deeming the forces put at the disposal of Alvinzi adequate for the relief of Mantua, declined both propositions, and sent positive orders for the immediate attack of the fortified posts possessed by the Republicans on the right bank of the Rhine (3).

Long and  
bloody siege  
of Kehl.

The conduct of the siege of Kehl, during the depth of winter, and with an open communication between the besieged and the great army on the opposite bank, presented obstacles of no ordinary kind; but the perseverance and energy of the Austrians ultimately triumphed over all obstacles. Thirty thousand men, under the command of Desaix and St.-Cyr, were destined for the defence of the works, while a powerful reserve was stationed in the islands of the Rhine; and the troops engaged in the defence were changed every three days, to prevent their being overwhelmed with the fatigues of the service. Forty thousand Austrians, under Latour, formed the besieging force, while the remainder of the army was cantoned in the

(1) St.-Cyr, iv. 10, 26. Arch. Ch. iii. 248, 260.  
Jom. ix. 78, 80.

(2) Jom. ix. 84, 89. Arch. Ch. iii. 272, 280. St.-Cyr, iv. 27, 40.

(3) Arch. Ch. ii. 290. Jom. ix. 238.



valley of the Rhine. Though the fort was invested on the 9th October, no material progress was made in the siege, from the extreme difficulty of bringing up the battering train and heavy stores, till the end of November. This long delay gave time to the indefatigable Desaix to complete the works, which, when the Imperialists first sat down before the place, were in a very unfinished state. The trenches were opened on the 21st November; and about the same time a grand sortie was attempted, under the command of Moreau in person, to destroy the works, and gain possession of the Austrian park of artillery. This attack was at first successful: the Republicans carried the intrenchments of Sundheim, and had nearly penetrated to the magazines and parks; but the Archduke and Latour having come up with reinforcements to the menaced point, they were at length repulsed, with severe loss, carrying with them nine pieces of cannon, which they had captured during the affray, Moreau and Desaix exposed themselves to the hottest of the fire, and were both slightly wounded. After this repulse, the labours of the siege were continued without any other interruption, than that arising from the excessive severity of the weather, and the torrents of rain which, for weeks together, filled the trenches with water. On the night of January 1, the Imperialists carried by assault the first line of intrenchments round the Republican camp, and a few days afterwards the second line was also stormed after a bloody resistance. Kehl was now no longer defensible; above 100,000 cannon-balls, and 25,000 bombs, projected from forty batteries, had riddled all its defences. The Imperialists, masters of the intrenched camp, enveloped the fort on every side; and the Republicans, after a glorious defence, which does honour to the memory of Desaix and St.-Cyr, evacuated the place by capitulation on the 9th January (1).

Fall of the tête-de-pont at Huningen. During the siege of Kehl, the Imperialists remained in observation before the *tête-de-pont* of Huningen; but no sooner were they at liberty, by the surrender of the former place, than they prosecuted the siege of the latter with extraordinary vigour. Ferino had been left with the right wing of the French to superintend the defence of that important post, but notwithstanding all his exertions he was unable to retard their advances; the trenches were opened in form on the 25th of January, and a sortie having been repulsed on the night of the 31st, the place was evacuated by capitulation on the 1st of February, and the victors found themselves masters only of a heap of ruins (2).

Reflections on this campaign. This last success terminated the campaign of 1796 in Germany; the most remarkable, in a military point of view, which had occurred, with the exception of that of Napoléon in the same year in Italy, since the commencement of the war. The conquerors in both triumphed, by the application of the same principles, over superior forces—viz. the skilful use of a central position, and interior line of communication, and the rapid accumulation of superior forces against one of the assailing armies, at a time when it was so situated that it could not receive any assistance from the other. The movements of the Archduke between the armies of Moreau and Jourdan, and the skill with which, by bringing a preponderating force against the decisive point, he compelled their vast armies to undertake a disastrous retreat, are precisely parallel to the blows struck by Napoléon from the interior line of the Adige, on the converging forces of Quasdanowich and Wurm-

(1) Jom. ix. 215, 243. Arch. Ch. iii. 298, 310. St.-Cyr, iv. 96, 104, 120.

(2) Jom. ix. 221. Arch. Ch. iii. 315, 323. St. Cyr, iv. 127, 138.



ser on the opposite sides of the lake of Guarda; and of Alvinzi and Provera, on the plateau of Rivoli and the shores of the Mincio. The difference only lies in the superior energy and activity with which the Republican general flew from one menaced point to another, the accurate calculation of time on which he rested, and the greater difficulties with which he had to struggle from the closer proximity of the attacking forces to each other.

The results of this campaign proved the justice of the observation of Napoléon, that the decisive blows were to be struck against Austria in the Valley of the Danube; and that Carnot's plan of turning both flanks of the Imperialists at once, along the vast line from the Maine to the Alps, was essentially defective, and offered the fairest opportunity to an enterprising general, aware of the importance of time and rapid movement in war, to fall with a preponderating force first on the one and then on the other. If, instead of dispersing the invading host into two armies, separated from each other by above 100 miles, and acting without concert, he had united them into one mass, or moved them by converging lines towards Ulm, the catastrophe of 1805, to Austria, at that place, or of Leipsic, in 1813, to France, might have been anticipated with decisive effect upon the issue of the war. And after giving all due praise to the just views and intrepid conduct of the Austrian hero, the deliverer of Germany, it must be admitted that he did not carry his enlightened principles into practice with such vigour as might have been done; and that had Napoléon been in his place on the Murg and at Amberg, he would have struck as decisive blows as at Rivoli and Castiglione (1).

Prodigious contributions levied by the Republicans in Germany. The unsuccessful irruption of the French into Germany was attended with one important consequence, from the effectual manner in which it withdrew the veil from the eyes of the lower classes as to the real nature of democratic ambition, and the consequences with which it was attended to the inhabitants of the vanquished states. The Republicans, being destitute of every thing, and in an especial manner denuded of money, when they crossed the Rhine, immediately put in practice their established principle of making war support war, and oppressed the vanquished people by the most enormous contributions. The lesser German states only purchased neutrality by the most enormous sacrifices (2). The people contrasted these cruel exactions with the seductive promises of war to the palace and peace to the cottage, and all learned at length, from bitter experience, the melancholy truth, that military violence, under whatever names it may be veiled, is the same in all ages; and that none are such inexorable tyrants to the poor as those who have recently revolted against authority in their own country. Although, therefore, the terror of the Republican arms at first superseded every other consideration, and detached all the states whose territory had been overrun from the Austrian alliance, yet this was merely the effect of necessity; the hearts of the people remained faithful to the cause of Germany, their exasperation broke out in unmeasured acts of violence against the retreating forces of

(1) Nap. iii. 314, 339. Th. viii. 419. Arch. Ch. iii. 313, 314.

(2) The Duke of Wirtemberg was assessed at 4,000,000 francs, or nearly L. 200,000 sterling; the circle of Swabia, 12,000,000, or nearly L. 600,000, besides 8000 horses, 5000 oxen, 150,000 quintals of corn, and 100,000 pairs of shoes. No less than 8,000,000 or L. 400,000, was demanded from the

circle of Franconia, besides 6000 horses; and immense contributions from Frankfort, Wurtzburg, Bamberg, Nuremburg, and all the towns through which they passed. These enormous exactions, which amounted in all to 25,000,000 francs (i. e. 1,000,000), 12,000 horses, 12,000 oxen, 500,000 quintals of wheat, and 200,000 pairs of shoes excited an universal alarm.

Jourdan, and they looked only for the first opportunity to resume their ancient attachment to the Imperial standards (1).

Noble and  
patriotic  
spirit of the  
Austrian  
people.

The same causes which thus weakened the predilection of the lower orders in Germany for French principles, operated most powerfully in rousing the ancient and hereditary loyalty of the Austrian people to their own sovereigns. When the Republicans approached Bohemia, and had well-nigh penetrated through Bavaria to the hereditary States, the Emperor issued an animating appeal to his subjects in the threatened provinces, and, with the spirit of Maria Theresa, called on them to repel the renewed Gallic aggression. Austria, in this trying emergency, relied on the constant success which has so long attended its house through all the vicissitudes of fortune, and unsubdued by defeat, maintained that unconquerable spirit which has always characterised its race, and so often is found to triumph over the greatest reverses. The people nobly answered the appeal. The peasants flew to arms; new levies were speedily raised; contributions of stores of every kind were voted by the nobility (2); and from the first invasion of France may be dated the growth of that patriotic spirit which was destined ultimately to rescue Germany from foreign subjugation.

New Con-  
vention  
between  
France and  
Prussia.

This year witnessed the still closer contracting of the unhappy bands which united Prussia to France, and so long perpetuated on the continent the overwhelming influence of Gallic power. Hardenberg and Haugwitz, who directed the cabinet of Berlin, and who, notwithstanding their differences on many other points, were cordially united in all measures calculated to augment the influence of Prussia in the north of Germany, had laboured assiduously all the summer to form a federal union for the protection of the states in that portion of the empire; and they had succeeded in obtaining a convocation of the circle of Lower Saxony and of Westphalia on the 20th June, to arrange the formation of a formidable army of observation, of which Prussia was the head, to cause their neutrality to be respected by the belligerent powers. The French minister at Berlin, artfully improving upon the terrors produced by Napoléon's successes in Italy, and Jourdan's irruption into Franconia, easily persuaded Haugwitz that the period had now arrived when the interests of Prussia indispensably required the breaking up of the old Germanic Empire, and the

5th Aug. recognition of the left bank of the Rhine to France; and in consequence, two conventions, one public, the other secret, were signed at Berlin on the 5th August. By the first, which alone at that time was published, the line of demarcation, beyond which hostilities were not to pass, was extended, and made to run from Wesel on the Rhine, following the frontiers of the mountains of Thuringia, extending along the North Sea, including the mouths of the Elbe, the Weser, and the Ems, and so round by the frontiers of Holland to Wesel again. Beyond this, in addition to the line already agreed to by the treaty of Bâle, the Directory agreed not to push their military operations. By the second, which was kept secret, Prussia recognised the extension of France to the Rhine; and the principle, that the dispossessed German princes were to be indemnified at the expense of the ecclesiastical princes of the empire. The third article provided an indemnity to the Prince of Orange, now evidently and apparently finally expelled from his dominions; and Prussia engaged to endeavour for this purpose to procure

(1) Ann. Reg. 1796, 135, 143. Hard. iii. 393.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1796, 134, 135.

the secularization of the Bishoprics of Bamberg and Wurtzburg. "Such was the Secret Convention," says Hardenberg, "which in a manner put the cabinet of Berlin at the mercy of France in the affairs of Germany (1):" It may be added, such was the commencement of that atrocious system of indemnifying the greater powers at the expense of the lesser, and providing for the rapacity of temporal powers by the sacrifice of the Church, which soon after not only shook to its foundation the constitution of the Germanic empire, but totally overturned the whole balance of power and system of public rights in Europe.

While these important transactions were in progress in the heart of Europe, events of another kind but not less important in their future effects upon the fate of the war, were preparing upon another element.

Naval operations of the year. Three years of continued success had rendered the British flag omnipotent upon the ocean. Britannia literally ruled the waves; the French colonies successively fell beneath her strokes; and her fleets, blockaded in their harbours, were equally unable to protect the commerce of the Republic, or acquire the experience requisite for maritime success. The minister of the marine, Truguet, in proposing a new system for the regulation of the navy, gave a gloomy but faithful picture of its present condition. "The deplorable state of our marine," said he, "is well known to our enemies, who insult us in our very harbours. Our fleets are humiliated, defeated, blockaded in their ports; destitute of provisions and naval equipments; torn by internal faction, weakened by ignorance, ruined by desertion: such is the state in which the men to whom you have intrusted its direction, have found the French marine (2)."

The ruin of the French navy was not the consequence merely of the superior skill and experience of the English sailors; it arose necessarily from the confusion of finances, loss of colonies, and failure of resources, which was the result of the revolutionary convulsion. Fleets cannot be equipped without naval stores, nor navigated but by a body of experienced seamen; it is impossible, therefore, to become a powerful maritime state without a regular revenue and an extensive commerce, both of which had disappeared during the distractions of the revolution. Severe internal distress, by filling the ranks of the army, may form a formidable military power, and destitute battalions may issue from a revolutionary furnace, to plunder and oppress the adjoining states; but a similar system will never equip a fleet, nor enable a revolutionary to contend with a regular government on the ocean. From the very elements by which the contest was carried on, it was already evident, that, though France might defeat the land forces of Europe, England would acquire the dominion of the waves.

Successes of the English in the West and East Indies. The hostilities carried on by the naval and military forces of Great Britain in the West and East Indies, were attended with the most decisive success. The Island of Grenada which had long been in a state of revolt, yielded to the perseverance and ability of General Nicols: St.-Lucie was reduced in May by General Abercromby, and Essequibo and Demerara by General White, while the French could only set off against these losses the destruction of the merchandise and shipping at Newfoundland by Admiral Richery. In the Indian seas, the successes of the British were still more important. A Dutch squadron of three ships of the line,

(1) Hard. iii. 374, 394, 398.

(2) Jom. ix. 225.

three frigates, and many vessels of inferior size, having on board two thousand land troops, destined to retake the Cape of Good Hope, was captured Aug. 1796. by Admiral Elphinstone in the Bay of Saldanha, while the Batavian settlements of Ceylon, the Malaccas, and Cochin, with the important harbour of Trincomalee, were, early in the year, taken possession of by the British forces (1).

General joy which these successes diffused in England. These important successes, particularly the reduction of the Cape, Ceylon, and the Malaccas, diffused the most general joy through the British nation. It was justly observed, that the former was a half-way-house to India, and indispensable to the mighty empire which we had acquired in the plains of Hindostan, while the latter secured the emporium of the China trade, and opened up the vast commerce of the Indian Archipelago. The attention of the people, by these great acquisitions, began to be turned towards the probable result and final issue of the war: they looked to the conquests of the British at sea as likely to counterbalance the acquisitions of the Republicans at land: they observed that Rhodes long maintained a doubtful contest with Rome after its land forces had subdued Spain, Carthage, and part of Gaul; and that in a similar contest Great Britain would have incomparably greater chances of success than the Grecian commonwealth, from the superior internal strength which the population of its own islands afforded, and the far more extensive commerce which enriched it from every quarter of the globe. "Athens," said Xenophon, "would have prevailed over Lacedemon, if Attica had been an island inaccessible save by water to the land forces of its opponent;" and it was impossible not to see that nature had given that advantage to the European, which she had denied to the Grecian maritime power. The formation of a great colonial empire, embracing all the quarters of the globe, held together and united by the naval power of England, and enriching the parent state by their commerce, and the market they would open for its manufactures, began to engage the thoughts not only of statesmen, but of practical men, and the Cape and Ceylon to be spoken of as acquisitions which should never be abandoned (2).

Continued deplorable state of St. Domingo. St.-Domingo still continued in the distracted and unfortunate state into which it had been thrown by the visionary dreams of the French Republicans, and the frightful flames of a servile war which had been lighted up by their extravagant philanthropists. All the efforts, both of the French and English, to restore any thing like order to its furious and savage population, proved unsuccessful. The latter had never been in sufficient force to make any serious impression on its numerous and frantic inhabitants; and the former were hardly able to retain a scanty footing in the northern part of the island, without attempting to regain the splendid and prosperous colony which they had lost. The blacks, taught by experience, perfectly acquainted with the country, and comparatively inaccessible to its deadly climate, maintained a successful contest with European forces, who melted away more rapidly under its fatal evening gales, than either by the ravages of famine or the sword of the enemy. Toussaint had already risen to eminence in the command of these desultory forces, and was taken into the French service with the division he had organized (3), in the vain attempt to re-establish the sinking authority of the Republican commissioners.

Notwithstanding the disastrous state of her principal colony, and the great

(1) Ann. Reg. 1796, 194. Jom. ix. 240.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1796, 195, Jom. ix. 241.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1796, 192, 193. Jom. 230, 240.

Treaty of  
alliance  
between  
France and  
Spain.

losses which she had sustained in her maritime possessions, Great Britain showed herself disposed during this year to make great sacrifices to France to obtain a general peace. In truth, notwithstanding her naval successes, the situation of England, from the disasters of her allies, had become sufficiently alarming. Spain, detached by the treaty of Bale from all connexion with the Allies, had lately fallen under the Republican influence, and given way to that jealousy of the British naval power, which is so easily excited among the European states. The Directory, artfully improving these advantages, had fanned the Spanish discontents into a flame, by holding out the hopes of some acquisitions in Italy, won by the sword of Napoléon, in case they joined the Republican alliance. Influenced by these considerations, the Spaniards fell into the snare, from which they were des-

19th Aug.  
At St.-Dés-  
font.

19th August concluded a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with France, on the footing of the family compact. By this treaty, the powers mutually guaranteed to each other their dominions both in the Old and the New World, and engaged to assist each other, in case of attack, with twenty-four thousand land troops, thirty ships of the line, and six frigates. This was

2d Oct. followed, in the beginning of October, by a formal declaration of war on the part of Spain against Great Britain. Thus England, which had commenced the war with so many confederates, saw herself not only deprived of all her maritime allies, but the whole coasts of Europe, from the Texel to Gibraltar, arrayed in fierce hostility against her (1).

(1) Th. viii. 251, 352. Ann. Reg. 1797, 2.

5th Oct. Many grounds of complaint were assigned in the Spanish manifesto on this occasion; but they met with a decisive refutation from the British cabinet, in an able state paper, drawn by Mr. Canning. It was urged by the Spanish court that the conduct of the English during the war, but especially at the siege of Toulon, and in the expedition of Toulon, had determined the cabinet of Madrid to make peace with France as soon as it could be done with safety to the monarchy; that the bad faith of the English government further appeared in the treaty of 19th Nov. 1794, concluded, without regard to the rights of Spain, with the United States, in the injustice with which they seized the St Jago, at first taken by the French, but afterwards retaken by the English, which, by the subsisting convention, ought to have been restored, and in the intercepting of ammunition for the Spanish squadrons; that the crews of her ships had frequently landed on the coast of Chili, and carried on a contraband trade, as well as reconnoitred these valuable possessions, and had evinced a clear intention of seizing part of the Spanish colonial territories, by sending a considerable force to the Antilles and St Domingo, and her recent acquisition of the Dutch settlement of Demerara; that frequent insults and acts of violence had been committed by the English cruisers upon Spanish vessels in the Mediterranean; that the Spanish territory had been violated by descents of English ships on the coast of Galicia and at Trinidad; and, finally, that the majesty of Spain had been insulted by the decrees of a court in London, authorizing the arrest of its ambassador for a small sum. "By all these insults," it concluded, "equally deep and unparalleled, that nation has proved to the universe, that she recognizes no other laws, than the aggrandizement of her commerce, and by her despotism, which has exhausted our patience and moderation, has rendered a declaration of war unavoidable." [Ann. Reg. xxviii. 196. State Papers.]

To this manifesto, the acrimonious style of which

too clearly betrayed the quarter from which it had proceeded, it was replied by the British government, that "the unprovoked declaration of war on the part of Spain had at length compelled the King of England to take measures to assert the dignity of his crown; that a simple reference to the Spanish declaration, and a bare enumeration of the frivolous charges which it contains, must be sufficient to satisfy every reasonable and impartial person that no part of the conduct of Great Britain towards Spain has afforded the smallest ground of complaint. The acts of hostility attributed to England, consist either of matters perfectly innocent, or of imputed opinions and intentions, of which no proof is adduced, nor effect alleged, or of complaints of the misconduct of unauthorized individuals, concerning which his Majesty has always professed his willingness to institute enquiry, and grant redress, where it was really due. The charge of misconduct on the part of the British admiral at Toulon is unprecedented and absurd, and this is perhaps the first instance that it has been imputed as a crime to one of the commanding officers of two powers, acting in alliance, and making a common cause in war, that he did more than his proportion of mischief to the common enemy. The treaty with America did nothing more than what every independent power has a right to do, or than his Spanish Majesty has since that time himself done; and inflicted no injury whatever on the subjects of that monarchy. The claims of all parties in regard to the condemnation of the St.-Jago, captured by his Majesty's forces, were fully heard before the only competent tribunal, and one whose impartiality is above all suspicion. The alleged misconduct of some merchant ships in landing their crews on the coasts of Chili and Peru, forms no legitimate ground of complaint against the British government; and even if some irregularities had been committed, they might have been punished on the spot, or the courts of London were always ready to receive and redress complaints of that description.

"In regard to the expedition to St Domingo and



Overture  
for a general  
peace  
made by  
Great-Bri-  
tain.

Impressed with these dangers, and desirous also of disarming the numerous and powerful party in Great Britain who contended against the war, as both unnecessary and impolitic, Mr. Pitt, in the close of this year, made overtures for a general peace to the French government. Lord Malmesbury was dispatched to Paris to open the negotiations; but it is probable that no great hopes of their success were entertained, as nearly at the same time an alliance was concluded with Russia, for the aid of sixty thousand auxiliary troops to the Austrian forces (1). The British envoy arrived at Paris on the 22d October, amidst the acclamations of the inhabitants, and proposals of peace were immediately made by the

Which proves  
unsuccessful.

English government. These were, the recognition of the Republic by the British government, and the restitution of all the colonies to France and Holland which had been conquered since the commencement of the war. In return for these concessions, they insisted that the French should restore the Low Countries to the Emperor, Holland to the Stadtholder, and evacuate all their conquests in Italy, but they were to retain Luxemburg, Namur, Nice, and Savoy (2). It was hardly to be expected that the Republican government, engaged in so dazzling a career of victory, and so entirely dependent on popular favour, would consent to these terms, or that they could have maintained their place at the head of affairs, if they had submitted to such reasonable propositions; and, accordingly, after the negotiations had been continued for two months, they were abruptly broken off, by the Directory ordering Lord Malmesbury to quit Paris in twenty-four

27th Dec.  
1796.

hours, and he immediately returned to his own country (3). But it must ever be a matter of pride to the British historian, that the power which had been uniformly victorious on its own element should have offered to treat on terms of equality with that from which it had so little to dread, and that England, to procure favourable terms for her allies, was willing to have abandoned all her own acquisitions.

While these negotiations were yet pending, a measure was undertaken by the French government, which placed England in the utmost peril, and from which she was saved rather by the winds of heaven than any exertions of

Demerara, with all the regard which he feels to the rights of neutral powers, it is a new and unheard of extension of neutral rights which is to be restricted by no limits, and is to attach not to the territories of a neutral power itself, but to whatever may once have belonged to it, and to whatever may be situated in its neighbourhood, though in the actual possession of an enemy. The complaint in regard to St Domingo is peculiarly unfortunate, as the cession of part of that island by the recent treaty from Spain to France, is a breach of that solemn treaty under which alone the crown of Spain holds any part of its American possessions. Such an act would at once have justified any measures of retaliation on the part of the British government; but so earnest was their desire to maintain peace, that they repeatedly endeavoured to ascertain when the Spanish right to the ceded territory was to terminate. In order that their efforts might be directed against the French alone. Some irregularities in the course of so long and vast a contest may have been committed by the British cruisers in the exercise of the undoubted right of search enjoyed by every belligerent state; but to the readiness of the British government to grant redress in every case where an injury has been committed, even Spain herself can bear testimony. The complaint regarding the alleged decree against the Spanish ambassador, is, if possible, still more frivo-

lous, that being nothing more than a simple citation to answer for a debt demanded, the mistaken act of an individual who was immediately disavowed and prosecuted by the government, and made repeated but vain submissive applications to the Spanish ambassador for forgiveness, such as in all former cases had been deemed satisfactory.

"It will be plain to posterity, it is now notorious to Europe, that neither to the genuine wishes, nor even the mistaken policy of Spain, is her present conduct to be attributed; that not from enmity towards Great Britain, not from any resentment of past, or apprehension of future injuries, but from a blind subservience to the views of his Majesty's enemies; from the dominion usurped over her councils and actions by her new allies, she has been compelled to act in a quarrel, and for interests, not her own; to take up arms against one of those powers in whose cause she had professed to feel the strongest interest, and to menace with hostility another, against whom no cause of complaint is pretended, but an honourable adherence to its engagements."

—*Ann. Reg.* 1796, 147; *State Papers*.

(1) *Jom.* ix. 246.

(2) *Jom.* ix. 246. *Th.* viii. 482. *Ann. Reg.* 1796, 190, and *State Papers*, 147, 177. *Hard.* iv. 85, 86.

(3) *Jom.* ix. 149. *Ann. Reg.* 1796, 191, and *State Papers*, 176, 177. *Hard.* iv. 106, 110.



her own. It was the extravagant expectations they had formed of success from this operation, which led to the long delay and final rupture of the negotiation (1).

Aborning  
state of  
Ireland

Ireland, long the victim of oppressive government, and now of popular passion, was at this period in a state of unusual excitation. The successful issue of the French Revolution had stimulated the numerous needy and ardent characters in that distracted nation to project a similar revolt against the authority of England, and above two hundred thousand men, in all parts of the country, were engaged in a vast conspiracy for overturning the established government, and erecting a republic, after the model of France, in its stead. Overlooking the grinding misery which the convulsions of the Republic had occasioned to its inhabitants, without considering how an insular power, detached from the continent, was to maintain itself against the naval forces of England, the patriots of Ireland rushed blindly into the project, with that ardent but inconsiderate zeal for which the people of that generous country have always been distinguished. The malcontents were enrolled under generals, colonels, and officers, in all the counties; arms were secretly provided, and nothing was wanting but the arrival of the French troops to proclaim the insurrection in every part of the country. With such secrecy were the preparations made, that the British government had but an imperfect account of their danger, while the French Directory, accurately informed by their emissaries of what was going forward, were fully prepared to turn it to the best account (2).

(1) Hard. iv. 107.

(2) Hard. ii. 187, 189. Th. viii. 352, 486. Moore's *Fitz-Gerald*, i: 275. 300.

The intentions of the Irish revolutionists, and the length to which they had in secret carried their preparations for the formation of an Hibernian Republic, will be best understood from the following passages, in a memorial presented by Wolfe Tone, one of their principal leaders, to the French Directory.

"The Catholics of Ireland are 3,150,000, all trained from their infancy in an hereditary hatred and abhorrence of the English name. For these five years they have fixed their eyes most earnestly on France, whom they look upon, with great justice, as fighting their battles, as well as those of all mankind who are oppressed. Of this class, I will stake my head, there are 500,000 men, who would fly to the standard of the Republic, if they saw it once displayed in the cause of liberty and their country.

"The Republic may also rely with confidence on the support of the Dissenters, actuated by reason and reflection, as well as the Catholics, impelled by misery, and inflamed by detestation of the English name. In the year 1791, the Dissenters of Belfast first formed the club of United Irishmen, so called, because in that club, for the first time, Dissenters and Catholics were seen together in harmony and union. Corresponding clubs were rapidly formed, the object of which was to subvert the tyranny of England, *establish the independance of Ireland, and frame a free Republic on the broad basis of liberty and equality*. These clubs were rapidly filled and extended in June last over two-thirds of that province. Their members are all bound by an oath of secrecy, and could, I have not the smallest doubt, on a proper occasion, raise the entire force of the province of Ulster, the most populous, warlike, and best informed in the nation.

"The Catholics also have an organization commencing about the same time with the clubs last mentioned, but composed of Catholics only. Until within these few months this organization baffled

the utmost vigilance of the Irish government, unsuccessfully applied to discover its principles; and to this hour they are, I believe, unapprized of its extent. The fact is, that in June last, it embraced the whole peasantry of the provinces of Ulster, Leinster, and Connaught, three-fourths of the nation, and I have little doubt that it has since extended into Munster, the remaining province. These men, who are called defenders, are completely organized on a military plan, divided according to their respective districts, and officered by men chosen by themselves; the principle of their union is implicit obedience to the orders of those whom they have elected as their generals, and whose object is the emancipation of their country, the subversion of English usurpation, and the bettering the condition of the wretched peasantry of Ireland. The eyes of this whole body, which may be said almost without a figure to be the people of Ireland, are turned with the most anxious expectation to France for assistance and support. The oath of their union recites, 'that they will be faithful to the *united nations of France and Ireland*,' and several of them have already sealed it with their blood. I suppose there is no conspiracy, if a whole people can be said to conspire, which has continued for so many years as this has done, where the secret has been so religiously kept, and where in so vast a number so few traitors are to be found.

"There is also a further organization of the Catholics, which is called the General Committee, a representative body chosen by the Catholics at large, which decides the movements of the City of Dublin, and possesses a very great influence on the minds of the Catholics throughout the nation. I can add, from my personal knowledge, that a great majority of the able and honest men who compose it are sincere Republicans, warmly attached to the cause of France, and as Irishmen, and as Catholics, doubly bound to detest the tyranny and domination of England, which has often deluged the country with their best blood.

"The militia are about eighteen thousand strong,

Hoche, at the head of a hundred thousand men, on the shores of the ocean, in la Vendée and Brittany, burned with the desire to eclipse the great exploits of Napoléon and Moreau against the Imperial forces, Ireland offered a theatre worthy of his army and his reputation, and by striking a decisive blow against the English power in that quarter, he had an opportunity of crippling the ancient rival of France, and achieving greater benefits for his country than either the victory of Fleurus or the triumphs of Rivoli. Truguet, the minister of marine, seconded him warmly with all his influence, and by their joint exertions an expedition was shortly prepared at Brest, more formidable than could have been anticipated from the dilapidated state of the French navy. It consisted of fifteen ships of the line, on board each of which were embarked six hundred soldiers, twelve frigates and six corvettes, each carrying two hundred and fifty men, and of transports and other vessels, conveying in all twenty-five thousand land forces. This armament was to be joined by seven ships of the line, under Richery, from the harbour of Rochefort. The troops were the best in Hoche's army; the general-in-chief was sanguine of success; and such were the hopes entertained of the result of the expedition, that the Directory transmitted orders for it to sail several weeks before Lord Malmesbury left Paris, and their expectations of its consequences were the principal motive for breaking off the negotiation (1).

To distract the attention of the enemy, the most inconsistent accounts were spread of the object of the expedition; sometimes, that it was destined for the West Indies; at others, for the shores of Portugal; but, notwithstanding these artifices, the British government readily discerned where the blow was really intended to be struck. Orders were transmitted to Ireland to have the militia in readiness; a vigilant watch kept up on the coasts; and, in the event of a descent being effected, all the cattle and provisions driven into the interior; precautions which in the end proved unnecessary, but were dictated by a prudent foresight, and gave the French government an idea of the species of resistance which they might expect in the event of such an invasion being really effected (2).

The expedi-  
tion sets  
sail.  
15th Dec.

The expedition set sail in the middle of December, two days before the negotiation was broken off at Paris; but it encountered disasters from the very moment of its leaving the harbour. A violent tempest arose immediately after its departure; and though the mist with

as fine men as any in Europe. Of these sixteen thousand are Catholics, and of those a very great proportion are sworn defenders, I have not a shadow of doubt that the militia would, in cases of emergency, to a man, join their countrymen in throwing off the yoke of England."—*First Memorial delivered to the French Directory, Feb. 1796, by Wolfe Tone.*—WOLFE TONE, ii. 187-188-191.

"It would be just as easy, in a month's time, to have an army in Ireland of two hundred thousand men as ten thousand. The peasantry would flock to the Republican standard in such numbers as to embarrass the general-in-chief. A proclamation should instantly be issued, containing an invitation to the people to join the Republican standard, organize themselves, and form a National Convention for the purpose of framing a Government, and administering the affairs of Ireland till it was put in activity.

"The first act of the Convention thus constituted should be to declare themselves the Representatives of the Irish people, free and independent, and in that capacity to form an alliance, offensive and defen-

sive, with the French Republic, stipulating that neither party should make peace with England till the two Republics were acknowledged.

"The Convention should next publish a proclamation, notifying their independance and their alliance with the French Republic, forbidding all adherence to the British government under the penalty of high treason, ordering all taxes and contributions to be paid only to such persons as should be appointed by the provisional government. Another to the militia, recalling them to the standard of their country; and another to the Irishmen in the navy, recalling them directly from that service; and this should be followed by another, confiscating every shilling of English property in Ireland of every species, movable or fixed, and appropriating it to the national service."—WOLFE TONE, *Second Memorial addressed to the French Directory*, ii. 197-201.

(1) Ann. Reg. 1796, 198. Th. viii. 353, 486, 487. Journ. ix. 250. Hard. iv. 107.

(2) Journ. ix. 253. Th. viii. 485. Ann. Reg. 1796, 198, 199.

which it was accompanied enabled the French admiral to elude the vigilance of the British squadron, yet one ship of the line struck on the rocks near the isle of Ushant and perished; several were damaged, and the fleet totally dispersed. This tempestuous weather continued the whole time the fleet was at sea. Hoche himself, who was on board a frigate, was separated from the remainder of his squadron; and after a stormy passage, a part of the expedition reached the point of rendezvous, in Bantry bay, eight days after its

26th Dec. departure from the French harbour. Admiral Bouvet, the second in command, resolved to land the troops, although only eight ships of the line, and some of the transports, were assembled, having on board six thou-

It is dispersed by the tempest, and remains Brest. sand land forces; but the violence of the tempest, and the prodigious swell of the sea on that iron-bound coast, rendered that impossible, and the crew of a boat, which was sent through the surf

to reconnoitre, were speedily made prisoners by the numerous bodies of armed men who appeared on the coast to oppose a landing. Dispirited by such a succession of disasters, unwilling to undertake the responsibility of hazarding a part only of the land forces in the absence of the general-in-chief, and apprehensive that provisions for the crews of the vessels would fail, from the long time that they had been at sea, Bouvet resolved to make the best of his way back to the French harbours. He set sail accordingly, and

31st Dec. had the good fortune to reach Brest on the last day of December, whither he was soon followed by the scattered divisions of his fleet, after two ships of the line, and three frigates, had been lost; one of the former by the violence of the elements, and the other by the attacks of the English. Hoche himself, after escaping a thousand perils, was landed on the island of Rhe; and the Directory, abandoning the expedition for the present, moved the greater part of his forces to the Rhine, to replace the losses of Jourdan's army, to the command of which they destined that able general (1).

Reflections on the failure of this expedition. Such was the issue of this expedition, which had so long kept Great Britain in suspense, and revealed to its enemies the vulnerable quarter in which it might be attacked with the greatest chance of success. Its result was pregnant with important instructions to the rulers of both countries. To the French, as demonstrating the extraordinary risks which attend a maritime expedition in comparison with a land campaign; the small number of forces which can be embarked on board even a great fleet, and the unforeseen disasters which frequently on that element defeat the best concerted enterprises; to the English, as showing that the empire of the seas does not always afford security against invasion; that in the face of superior maritime forces, her possessions were for sixteen days at the mercy of the enemy, and that neither the skill of her sailors, nor the valour of her armies, but the fury of the elements, saved them from danger in the most vulnerable part of their dominions. While these considerations are fitted to abate the confidence of invasion, they are calculated at the same time to weaken an overweening confidence on naval superiority, and to demonstrate, that the only basis on which certain reliance can be placed, even by an insular power, is a well-disciplined army, and the patriotism of its own subjects.

It is a curious subject for speculation, what might have been the result had Hoche succeeded in landing with sixteen thousand of his best troops on the Irish shores. To those who consider, indeed, the patriotic spirit, indomi-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1796, 1798. Th. viii. 480-490. Jom. ix. 252.

table valour, and persevering character of the English people, and the complete command they had of the sea, the final issue of such a contest cannot appear doubtful; but it is equally evident that the addition of such a force, and so able a commander, to the numerous bodies of Irish malecontents, would have engendered a dreadful domestic war, and that the whole energies of the empire might for a very long period have been employed in saving itself from dismemberment. When it is considered, also, how widely the spirit of discontent was diffused even through the population of Great Britain at that period, in what a formidable manner it soon after broke out in the mutiny at the Nore, and what serious financial embarrassments were already pressing upon the treasury, and preparing the dreadful catastrophe which led to the suspension of cash payments in the following spring, it must be admitted that the nation then stood upon the edge of an abyss; and that, if ever Providence interferes in human affairs otherwise than by the energy which it infuses into the cause of justice, and the moral laws to which the deeds of free agents are rendered subservient, its protection never appeared in so remarkable a manner to the British islands since the winds dispersed the Spanish Armada.

10th Nov.  
Death of the  
Empress  
Catharine. The close of this year was marked by the death of the Empress Catharine, and the accession of the Emperor Paul to the Russian throne; an event of no small importance to the future fate of the war and destiny of the world. Shortly before her death, she had by art and flattery contrived to add Courland to her immense dominions: She had recently made herself mistress of Derbent in Persia; and the alliance with Great Britain and Austria secured to her the concurrence of these powers in her favourite project of dismembering the Turkish dominions, and placing her youngest son on the throne of Constantine. She thus seemed to be fast approaching the grand object of her ambition, and might have lived to see the cross planted on the domes of St.-Sophia, when death interrupted all her schemes of ambition, in the sixty-seventh year of her age, and the thirty-sixth of her reign. Her latest project was the formation of a powerful confederacy for the defence of Europe against the French Republic; and she had given orders for the levy of 150,000 men, destined to take a part in the German campaigns; a design, which, if carried into effect by her firm and intrepid hand, might have accelerated by nearly twenty years the catastrophe which closed the war (1).

Her character. Few sovereigns will occupy a more conspicuous place in the page of history, or have left in their conduct on the throne a more exalted reputation. Prudent in council, and intrepid in conduct; cautious in forming resolutions, but vigorous in carrying them into execution; ambitious, but of great and splendid objects only; passionately fond of glory, without the alloy, at least in public affairs, of sordid or vulgar inclinations; discerning in the choice of her counsellors, and swayed in matters of state only by lofty intellects; munificent in public, liberal in private, firm in resolution, she dignified a despotic throne by the magnanimity and patriotism of a more virtuous age. But these great qualities were counterbalanced by as remarkable vices—and more truly, perhaps of her than of the Virgin Queen of England, it might be said, in Burleigh's words, "that if to-day she was more than man, to-morrow she would be less than woman." Vehement, sensual, and capricious in private life, she seemed, as a woman, to live only for

(1) Ann. Reg. 1796, 200, 202.

the gratification of her passions; tyrannical, overbearing, and sometimes cruel in her administration, she filled her subjects with unbounded awe for her authority. In the lustre of her administration, however, the career of her victories, and the rapid progress of her subjects under so able a government, mankind overlooked her dissolute manners, the occasional elevation of unworthy favourites, frequent acts of tyranny, and the dark transaction which signalized her accession to the throne; they overlooked the frailties of the woman in the dignity of the princess; and paid to the abilities and splendour of the Semiramis of the North that involuntary homage which commanding qualities on the throne never fail to acquire, even when stained by irregularities in private life.

Retirement  
of Washing-  
ton from  
public life.  
His perfect  
character,  
and admira-  
ble valour.  
His address  
to his coun-  
trymen.

The end of the same year witnessed the resignation of the presidency of the United States of America by General Washington, and his voluntary retirement into private life. Modern history has not so spotless a character to commemorate. Invincible in resolution, firm in conduct, incorruptible in integrity, he brought to the helm of a victorious republic the simplicity and innocence of rural life; he was forced into greatness by circumstances, rather than led into it by inclination, and prevailed over his enemies rather by the wisdom of his designs, and the perseverance of his character, than any extraordinary genius for the art of war. A soldier from necessity and patriotism, rather than disposition, he was the first to recommend a return to pacific councils when the independence of his country was secured; and bequeathed to his countrymen an address on leaving their government, to which there is no composition of uninspired wisdom which can bear a comparison (1). He was modest without diffidence; sensible to the voice of fame without vanity; independent and dignified without either asperity or pride. He was a friend to liberty, but not licentiousness; not to the dreams of enthusiasts, but to those practical ideas which America had inherited from her English descent, and which were opposed to nothing so much as the extravagant love of power in the French democracy. Accordingly, after having signalized his life by

(1) See Ann. Reg. 1796. State Papers, 293.

This great man observes, in that admirable composition: "Towards the preservation of your government, and the permanence of your present happy state, it is requisite not only that you discountenance irregular oppositions to its acknowledged authority, but also that you resist with care the spirit of innovation upon its principles, however specious the pretexts. One method of assault may be to effect in the forms of the constitution alterations which will impair the energy of the system, and thus to undermine what cannot be directly overthrown. In all the changes to which you may be invited, remember that time and habit are at least as necessary to fix the true character of governments, as of other human institutions; that experiment is the surest standard by which to test the real tendency of the existing constitution of a country; that facility in changes, upon the mere credit of hypothesis and opinion, exposes to perpetual change, from the endless variety of hypothesis and opinion; and remember especially, that for the efficient management of your common interests, in a country so extensive as ours, a government of as much vigour as is consistent with the perfect security of liberty is indispensable. Liberty itself will find in such a government, with powers properly distributed and adjusted, its surest guardian. It is indeed little else than a name, where the government is too feeble to withstand the enterprises of faction, to confine each

member of the society within the limits prescribed by the laws, and to maintain all in the secure and tranquil enjoyment of the rights of person and property.

"Let me now warn you, in the most solemn manner, against the baneful effects of the spirit of party generally. It is unfortunately inseparable from our nature, having its roots in the strongest passions of the human mind. It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or less stifled, controlled, or oppressed, but in those of the popular form it is seen in its greatest rankness, and it is truly their worst enemy. The alternate dominion of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a most horrid despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries which result, gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of a single individual; and sooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction, more able, or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this despotism to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of public liberty." What words, to be spoken by the founder of the American Republic, the refuser of the American crown, at a time when the career of Napoleon had hardly commenced in Europe!—See Ann. Reg. xxxviii. 298; State Papers.

successful resistance to English oppression, he closed it by the warmest advice to cultivate the friendship of Great Britain; and by his casting vote, shortly before his resignation, ratified a treaty of friendly and commercial intercourse between the mother country and its emancipated offspring. He was a Cromwell without his ambition; a Sylla without his crimes: and after having raised his country, by his exertions, to the rank of an independent state, closed his career by a voluntary relinquishment of the power which a grateful people had bestowed. If it is the highest glory of England to have given birth, even amidst Transatlantic wilds, to such a man; and if she cannot number him among those who have extended her provinces or augmented her dominions, she may at least feel a legitimate pride in the victories which he achieved, and the great qualities which he exhibited, in the contest with herself; and indulge with satisfaction in the reflection, that that vast empire which neither the ambition of Louis XIV nor the power of Napoléon, could dismember, received its first rude shock from the courage which she had communicated to her own offspring; and that, amidst the convulsions and revolutions of other states, real liberty has arisen in that country alone, which inherited in its veins the genuine principles of British freedom.

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## CHAPTER XXII.

## INTERNAL TRANSACTIONS AND NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF GREAT BRITAIN IN 1797.

## ARGUMENT.

Gloomy Aspect of Public Affairs in England in the beginning of 1797—Crisis of the Bank—Important Order in Council suspending Cash Payments—Debates on the subject in Parliament—Bill perpetuating this Suspension brought in and carried by Mr. Pitt; at first temporary, then till the Conclusion of the War—Immense Consequence of this Change—Double Set of Causes which affect the Value of Government Paper—Parliamentary Reform is brought forward by Mr. Grey—His Plan of Reform, and Arguments in support of it—Arguments on the other side by Mr. Pitt—It is rejected by Parliament—Reflections on this Subject—Arguments for and against a Continuance of the War—Supplies voted for the Year—Naval Preparations of France and Spain—Mutiny in the Fleet—Origin of the Discontents in the Navy—First breaks out in the Channel Fleet—Perfect Order maintained by the Insurgents—The demands of the Fleet are granted by Government, and Lord Howe at length succeeds in restoring Discipline—Alarming Mutiny at the Nore—Dreadful Consternation in London—Firmness of the King and Government—Noble Conduct of Parliament—Bill against the Mutineers passes by a great majority—The Insurgents become divided—Patriotic Conduct of the Channel Fleet—The mutineers at length submit—Parker is tried and executed—Admirable Conduct of Mr. Pitt on the occasion—Glorious Firmness of Admiral Duncan at this Crisis—The Mutiny was totally unconnected with France—Battle of St.-Vincent's—First appearance of Nelson and Collingwood—Great effect produced in Europe by this Victory—Birth and Parentage of Nelson—His Character—Battle of Camperdown—Immense Effect of this Victory—Honours bestowed on Admiral Duncan and Sir John Jarvis—Abortive descent in Pembroke Bay—Capture of Trinidad—Death of Mr. Burke—His Character.

ALTHOUGH the war had now continued four years, and it was obvious to all the world that England and France were the principals in the contest, yet these two states had not as yet come into immediate and violent collision. Inferior powers required to be struck down, weaker states to be removed from the combat, before the leaders of the fight dealt their blows at each other; like the champions of chivalry, who were separated in the commencement of the affray by subordinate knights, and did not engage in mortal conflict till the field was cleared of the dead and the dying.

The period, however, was now approaching, when this could no longer continue, and the successes of France had been such as to compel Britain to fight, not merely for victory, but existence. All the allies with whom, and for whose protection she had engaged in the contest, were either struggling in the extremity of disaster, or openly arrayed under the banners of her enemies. Austria, after a desperate and heroic resistance in Italy, was preparing for the defence of her last barriers in the passes of the Alps. Holland was virtually incorporated with the conquering Republic. Spain had recently joined its forces; the whole continent, from the Texel to Gibraltar, was arrayed against Great Britain, and all men were sensible that, in spite of her maritime superiority, she had in the preceding winter narrowly escaped invasion in the most vulnerable quarter, and owed to the winds and the waves her exemption from the horrors of civil war.

The aspect of public affairs in Britain had never been so clouded since the commencement of the war, nor indeed during the whole of the 19th cen-

Gloomy  
aspect of  
public affairs  
in England  
in the be-  
ginning of  
1797.

ture, as they were at the opening of the year 1797. The return of Lord Malmesbury from Paris had closed every hope of terminating a contest, in which the national burdens were daily increasing, while the prospect of success was continually diminishing. Party spirit raged with uncommon violence in every part of the empire. Insurrections prevailed in many districts of Ireland, discontents and suffering in all, commercial embarrassments were rapidly increasing, and the continued pressure on the bank threatened a total dissolution of public credit. The consequence of this accumulation of disasters was a rapid fall of the public securities; the three per cents were sold as low as 51, having fallen to that from 98, at which they stood at the commencement of the contest; petitions for a change of ministers and an alteration of government were presented from almost every city of note in the empire, and that general distrust and depression prevailed which is at once the cause and the effect of public misfortune (1).

Crisis of the  
Bank.

The first of these disasters was one which, in a despotic state unacquainted with the unlimited confidence in government that, in a free state, results from long-continued fidelity in the discharge of its engagements, would have proved fatal to the credit of government. For a long period the bank had experienced a pressure for money, owing partly to the demand for gold and silver, which resulted from the distresses of commerce, and partly to the great drains upon the specie of the country, which the extensive loans to the Imperial government had occasioned. So early as January 1795, the influence of these causes was so severely felt, that the bank directors informed the Chancellor of the Exchequer that it was their wish that he would so arrange his finances as not to depend on any further assistance from them; and during the whole of that and the following year the peril of the continued advances for the Imperial loans was strongly and earnestly represented to government. The pressure arising from these causes, severely experienced through the whole of 1796, was brought to a crisis in the close of that year, by the run upon the country banks, which arose from the dread of invasion, and the anxiety of every man to convert his paper into cash in the troubled times which seemed to be approaching. These banks, as the only means of averting bankruptcy, applied from all quarters to the bank of England; the panic speedily gained the metropolis, and such was the run upon that establishment that they were reduced to payment in sixpences, and were on the verge of insolvency, when an order in Council was interposed for their relief, suspending all payments in cash, until the sense of Parliament could be taken upon the best means of restoring the circulation, and supporting the public and commercial credit of the country (2).

Important  
Order in  
Council  
suspending  
cash payments  
26th Feb.  
1797.

Debates on  
this subject  
in Parlia-  
ment.

This great and momentous measure, fraught with such lasting and important consequences to the prosperity and fabric of society in Great Britain, was immediately made the subject of anxious and vehement debate in both Houses of Parliament. On the one hand, it was urged that this suspension of credit was not owing to any temporary disasters, but to deep, progressive, and accumulating causes; which all thinking men had long deplored, and which had grown to a head under the unhappy confidence which the House had reposed in the King's ministers; that the real cause of this calamity was to be found in the excessive and extravagant expenditure in all departments of government, and the enormous loans to

(1) Ann. Reg. 1797, 118, 149.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1797, 179-180.

foreign states; that the consequences of this measure were certain, and might be seen as in a mirror in the adjoining Republic of France; a constant fall in the value of bank-notes, a rise in the price of all the articles of human consumption, augmented expenditure, and a continuance of the frantic and costly expeditions, from which both the national honour and security had already so severely suffered. On the other hand, it was contended by the friends of administration, that it never was the intention of government to make bank-notes a legal tender; that the measure adopted was not a permanent regulation, but a temporary expedient to enable the bank to gain time to meet the heavy demands which unexpected circumstances had brought upon it; that the bank was perfectly able ultimately to make good all its engagements, and so the public had already become convinced, in the short interval which had elapsed since the Order in Council was issued; that it was indispensable, however, that Parliament should be satisfied of this solvency, and the necessity which existed for the measure which was adopted, and therefore that the matter should be referred to a secret committee, to report on the funds and engagements of the bank of England, and the measures to be taken for its ultimate regulation(1).

Bill, perpetuating this suspension, at first temporary. This measure having been carried by Mr. Pitt, a committee was appointed, which reported shortly after that the funds of the Bank were L.17,597,000; while its debts were only L.13,770,000, leaving a balance of L.3,800,000 in favour of the establishment; but that it was necessary, for a limited time, to suspend the cash payments. Upon this, a bill for the restriction of payments in specie was introduced, which provided, that bank-notes should be received as a legal tender by the collectors of taxes, and have the effect of stopping the issuing of arrest on mesne process for payment of debt between man and man. The bill was limited in its operation to the 24th June; but it was afterwards renewed from time to time; and, in November 1797, continued till the conclusion of a general peace (2); and the obligation on the bank to pay in specie was never again imposed till Mr. Peel's act in 1849.

At length, till the conclusion of the war. Such was the commencement of the paper system in Great Britain, which ultimately produced such astonishing effects; which enabled the empire to carry on for so long a period so costly a war, and to maintain for years armaments greater than had been raised by the Roman people in the zenith of their power; which brought the struggle at length to a triumphant issue, and arrayed all the forces of Eastern Europe, in English pay, against France, on the banks of the Rhine. To the same system must be ascribed ultimate effects as disastrous, as the immediate were beneficial and glorious; the continued and progressive rise of rents, and fall in the value of money; increased expenditure, the growth of sanguine ideas and extravagant habits in all classes of society: unbounded speculation, prodigious profits, and frequent disasters among the commercial rich: increased wages, general prosperity, and occasional depression among the labouring poor: a vacillation of prices, unparalleled in any age of the world, a creation of property in some, and destruction of it in others, which equalled, in its ultimate consequences, all but the disasters of a revolution.

When government paper is made, either directly, or by implication, a legal tender in all the transactions of life, two different causes may conspire,

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxiii. 294, 394.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1797, 192, 206. Parl. Hist. xxxiii. 294, 394, and 1028.

Double set of causes which affect the value of Government paper. to affect prices, tending to the same effect, but in very different degrees. The first is the general fall in the value of money, and consequent rise in the price of every article of life, which results from the unrestrained issue of paper; and this effect takes place without any distrust in government, from the mere increase in the circulating medium, when compared with the commodities in the general market of the nation which it represents, or is destined in its transmission from hand to hand to purchase. This change of prices proceeds on the same principles, and arises from the same causes, as the fall in the money price of grain or cattle, from an excess in the supply of these articles in the market. The second is the far greater, and sometimes unbounded depreciation, which arises from distrust in the ultimate solvency of government, or the means which the nation possesses of making good its engagements. To this fall no limits can be assigned, because government may not be deemed capable of discharging a hundredth part of its debts: whereas, the variation of prices arising from the former, seldom exceeds a duplication of their wonted amount: an effect, however, which is perfectly sufficient, if continued for any considerable time, to make one-half of the property of the kingdom change hands.

The true test of the former effect is to be found in a general rise in the prices of every commodity, but without any difference between the money value when paid in specie and when paid in paper; the mark of the latter is, not only a rise in prices, even when paid in gold or silver, but an extraordinary difference between prices when discharged in a paper and a metallic currency. Notwithstanding all that the spirit of party may have alleged, there does not appear to have ever been any traces of the latter effect in this country; or that at any period a higher price was exacted for articles when paid in bank-notes than in gold; whereas, in France, when the credit of government was almost extinct, a dinner which, when paid in gold, cost a louis (1), could only be discharged in assignats for twenty-eight thousand francs. But the former consequences prevailed long, and with the most wide-spread effects, in this country. Every article of life was speedily doubled in price, and continued above twenty years at that high standard; and, upon the recurrence to a metallic currency in 1819, the distress and suffering among the industrious classes long exceeded any thing ever before witnessed in our history.

Parliamentary Reform brought forward by Mr. Grey. The Opposition deemed this a favourable opportunity to bring forward their favourite project of Parliamentary Reform; as the disasters of the war, the suspension of cash payments by the bank, the mutiny of the fleet, which will be immediately noticed, and the failure of the attempt to negotiate with France, had filled all men's minds with consternation, and disposed many true patriots to doubt the possibility of continuing the present system. On the 26th May, Mr., afterwards Earl, Grey, brought forward his promised motion for a change in the system of representation, which is chiefly remarkable as containing the outlines of that vast scheme which convulsed the nation when he was at the head of affairs in 1831, and subsequently made so great a change on the British constitution. He proposed that the qualification for county electors should remain as it was, but that the members they returned should be increased from 92 to 112; that the franchise should be extended to copyholders, and lease-holders holding leases for a certain dura-

His plan of reform, and arguments in support of it.

tion; and that the whole remainder of the members, 400 in number, should be returned by one description of persons alone, namely householders. He proposed further, that the elections should be taken over the whole kingdom at once, and a large portion of the smaller boroughs be disfranchised. By this scheme, he contended, the landowners, the merchants, and all the respectable classes of the community, would be adequately represented; and those only excluded whom no man would wish to see retain their place in the legislature, namely, the nominees of great families, who obtained seats not for the public good, but their private advantage. Mr. Erskine, who seconded the motion, further argued, in an eloquent speech, that, from the gradual and growing influence of the crown, the House of Commons had become perverted from its original office, which was that of watching with jealous care over the other branches of the legislature, into the ready instrument of their abuses and encroachments; that there was now a deep and wide-spread spirit of disaffection prevalent in the minds of the people, which rendered it absolutely indispensable that their just demands should be conceded in time; that further resistance would drive them into republicanism and revolution; that the head of the government itself had once declared, that no upright or useful administration could exist while the House was constituted as it then was; that the voice of complaint could not be silenced by a sullen refusal to remedy the grievance, and though this road might be pursued for a season, that the end of these things was death. "Give, on the other hand," said he, "to the people the blessings of the constitution, and they will join with ardour in its defence; and the power of the disaffected be permanently crippled, by severing from them all the rational and virtuous of the community."

Arguments  
against it by  
Mr. Pitt.

On the other hand, it was contended by Mr. Pitt, that the real question was not whether some alteration in the system of representation might not be attended with advantage, but whether the degree of benefit was worth the chance of the mischief it might possibly, or would probably induce. That it was clearly not prudent to give an opening to principles which would never be satisfied with any concession, but would make every acquisition the means of demanding with greater effect still more extensive acquisitions; that the fortress of the constitution was now beleaguered on all sides, and to surrender the outworks would only render it soon impossible to maintain the defence of the body of the place; that he had himself at one period been a reformer, and he would have been so still, had men's minds been in a calm and settled state, and had he been secure that they would rest content with the redress of real grievances; but since the commencement of the French Revolution, it was too plain that this was very far indeed from being the case. That it was impossible to believe that the men who remained unmoved by the dismal spectacle which their principles had produced in a neighbouring state,—who, on the contrary, rose and fell with the success or decline of Jacobinism in every country of Europe,—were actuated by similar views with those who prosecuted the cause of reform as a practical advantage, and maintained it on constitutional views; and he could never give credit to the assertion, that the temper of moderate reformers would induce them to make common cause with the irreconcilable enemies of the constitution. That reform was only a disguise assumed to conceal the approaches of revolution; and that rapine, conflagration, and murder were the necessary attendants on any innovation since the era of the French Revolution, which had entirely altered the grounds on which the



It is rejected  
by Parlia-  
ment.

question of reform was rested, and the class of men by whom it was espoused. That these objections applied to any alteration of the government in the present heated state of men's minds; but, in addition to that, the specific plan, now brought forward, was both highly exceptionable in theory and unsupported by experience. On a division, Mr. Grey's motion was lost by a majority of 258 against 93 (1).

Reflections  
on this  
subject.

In deciding on the difficult question of Parliamentary Reform, which has so long divided, and still divides so many able men in the country, one important consideration, to be always kept in mind, is the double effect which any change in the constitution of government must always produce, and the opposite consequences with which, according to the temper of the times, it is likely to be followed. In so far as it remedies any experienced grievance, or supplies a practical defect, or concedes powers to the people essential to the preservation of freedom, it necessarily does good; in so far as it excites democratic ambition, confers inordinate power, and awakens or fosters passions inconsistent with public tranquillity, it necessarily does mischief, and may lead to the dissolution of society. The expedience of making any considerable change, therefore, depends on the proportions in which these opposite ingredients are mingled in the proposed measure, and on the temper of the people among whom it is to take place. If the real grievance is great, and the public disposition unruffled, save by its continuance, unalloyed good may be expected from its removal, and serious peril from a denial of change: if the evil is inconsiderable or imaginary, and the people in a state of excitement from other causes, concession to their demands will probably lead to nothing but increased confusion, and more extravagant expectations. Examples exist on both sides of the rule; the gradual relaxation of the fetters of feudal tyranny, and the emancipation of the boroughs, led to the glories of European civilisation; while the concession of Charles I, extorted by the vehemence of the Long Parliament, brought that unhappy monarch to the block; the submission of Louis to all the demands of the States-General, did not avert his tragic fate: and the granting of emancipation to the fierce outcry of the Irish Catholics, instead of peace and tranquillity, brought only increased agitation and more vehement passions to the peopled shores of the Emerald Isle.

Applying these principles to the question of Parliamentary Reform, as it was then agitated, there seems no doubt that the changes which were so loudly demanded could not have redressed any considerable real grievance, or removed any prolific source of discontent; because they could not have diminished in any great degree the public burdens without stopping the war, and experience has proved in every age, that the most democratic states, so far from being pacific, are the most ambitious of military renown. From a greater infusion of popular power into the legislature, nothing but fiercer wars and additional expenses could have been anticipated. The concession, if granted, therefore, would neither have been to impatience of suffering, nor to the necessities of freedom, but to the desire of power in circumstances where it was not called for; and such a concession is only throwing fuel on the flame. And the event has proved the truth of these principles; reform was refused by the Commons in 1797, and so far from being either enslaved or thrown into confusion, the nation became daily freer and more united, and soon entered on a splendid and unrivalled career of glory; it was con-

(1) Parl. Hist. vol. xxxiii. 646, 734. May 26, 1797. Ann. Reg. 1797, 253, 261.



ceded by the Commons, in a period of comparative tranquillity, in 1831, and a century will not develop the ultimate effects of the change, which, hitherto at least, has done any thing rather than augment the securities of durable liberty. Still less was it called for as a safeguard to real freedom, because, though it was constantly refused for four-and-thirty years afterwards, the power of the people steadily increased during that period, and at length effected a great democratic alteration in the constitution.

Arguments  
for and  
against  
continuing  
the war.

The question of continuing the war again occupied a prominent place in the debates of the British Parliament. On the side of the Opposition, it was contended that, after four years of war, the addition of 200,000,000 to the national debt, and 9,000,000 annually to the taxes, the nation was farther than ever from achieving the objects for which it had been undertaken; that Holland and Flanders had successively yielded to the arms of the Republic, which, like Antæus, had risen stronger from every fall; that all the predictions of failure in its resources had only been answered by increased conquests and more splendid victories; that the minister was not sincere in his desire for a negotiation, or he would have proposed very different terms from those actually offered, and to which it was impossible to expect that a victorious enemy would accede; that the real object, it was evident, was only to gain time, to put France apparently in the wrong, and throw upon its government the blame of continuing hostilities (1), which had been unfortunately gained through the diplomatic skill evinced by the British ministers in the course of a negotiation begun with the most hollow intentions.

Mr. Pitt lamented the sudden and unforeseen stop put to the negotiations, by which he had fondly hoped that a termination would be put to a contest into which we had been unwillingly dragged. This failure was a subject of regret and disappointment, but it was regret without despondency, and disappointment without despair. "We wish for peace," said he, "but on such terms as will secure its real blessings, and not serve as a cover merely to secret preparations for renewed hostilities; we may expect to see, as the result of the conduct we have pursued, England united and France divided; we have offered peace on the condition of giving up all our conquests to obtain better terms for our allies; but our offers have been rejected, our ambassador insulted, and not even the semblance of terms offered in return. In these circumstances, then, are we to persevere in the war with a spirit and energy worthy of the English name, or to prostrate ourselves at the feet of a haughty and supercilious republic, to do what they require, and submit to all they shall impose? I hope there is not a hand in his Majesty's councils which would sign the proposals, that there is not a heart in the House that would sanction the measure, nor an individual in the British dominions who would serve as courier on the occasion (2)."

Supplies  
voted for  
the year.

Parliament having determined, by a great majority in both Houses, to continue the contest with vigour, supplies were voted proportioned to the magnitude of the armaments which were required. The sums for the expenses of the war, in two successive budgets, amounted, exclusive of the interest of the debt, to L.42,800,000. In this immense aggregate were included two loans, one of L.18,000,000 and another of L.16,000,000 besides an Imperial loan of L.2,500,000, guaranteed by the British govern-

(1) Parl. Hist. vol. xxxii. 30th Dec. 1796. Ann. Reg. 1797, 152.

(2) Parl. Hist. vol. xxxii. 1796. Dec. 30. Ann. Reg. 1797, 153.

ment. To defray the interest of these loans, new taxes, to the amount of L.2,400,000, were imposed. The land forces voted for the year, were 195,000 men, of whom 61,000 were in the British islands, and the remainder in the colonial dependencies of the empire. The ships in commission were 124 of the line, eighteen of fifty guns, 180 frigates, and 184 sloops. This great force, however, being scattered over the whole globe, could hardly be assembled in considerable strength at any particular point; and hence, notwithstanding the magnitude of the British navy upon the whole, they were generally inferior to their enemies in every engagement (1).

Naval preparations of France and Spain.

On the other hand, the naval forces of France and her allies had now become very considerable. Nowise discouraged by the unfortunate issue of the previous attempt against Ireland, the indefatigable Truguet was combining the means of bringing an overwhelming force into the Channel. Twenty-seven ships of the line were to proceed from the Spanish shores, raise the blockade of all the French harbours, and unite with the Dutch fleet from the Texel, in the Channel, where they expected to assemble sixty-five or seventy ships of the line; a force much greater than any which England could oppose to them in that quarter. To frustrate these designs, she had only eighteen ships of the line, under Lord Bridport, in the Channel, fifteen under Admiral Jarvis, off Corunna, and sixteen under Admiral Duncan, off the Texel; in all forty-nine: a force greatly inferior to those of the enemy, if they had been all joined together, and sufficient to demonstrate by what a slender thread the naval supremacy of England was held, when the victories of France enabled her to combine against these islands all the maritime forces of Europe (2).

Mutiny in the fleet.

But great as this peril was, it was rendered incomparably more alarming, by a calamity of a kind and in a quarter where it was least expected. This was the famous *Mutiny in the Fleet*, which, at the very time that the enemies of England were most formidable, and her finances most embarrassed, threatened to deprive her of her most trusty defenders, and brought the state to the very verge of destruction (3).

Unknown to government, or at least without their having taken it into serious consideration, a feeling of discontent had for a very long period prevailed in the British navy. This was, no doubt, partly brought to maturity by the democratic and turbulent spirit which had spread from France through the adjoining states; but it had its origin in a variety of real grievances which existed, and must, if unredressed, have sooner or later, brought on an explosion. The sailors complained with reason, that while all the articles of life had more than doubled in price, their pay had not been augmented since the reign of Charles II; that prize-money was unequally distributed, and an undue proportion given to the officers; that discipline was maintained with excessive and undue severity, and that the conduct of the officers towards the men was harsh and revolting. These evils, long complained of, were rendered more exasperating by the inflammatory acts of a number of persons of superior station, whom the general distress arising from commercial embarrassment had driven into the navy, and who persuaded the sailors, that, by acting unanimously and decidedly, they would speedily obtain redress of their grievances. The influence of these new entrants appeared in the secrecy and ability with which the measures of the

Origin of the discontents in the navy.

(1) Ann. Reg. 1797, 128, 132. Chron. 3.  
(2) Ann. Reg. 1797, 94, 95. Jour. x. 195.

(3) Ibid. Jour. x. 196, 197.

malcontents were taken, and the general extension of the conspiracy, before its existence was known to the officers of the fleet (1).

First breaks out in the Channel Fleet. The prevalence of these discontents was made known to Lord Howe and the Lords of the Admiralty, by a variety of anonymous communications, during the whole spring of 1797; but they met with no attention; and, upon enquiry at the captains of vessels, they all declared, that no mutinous disposition existed on board of their respective ships. Meanwhile, however, a vast conspiracy, unknown to them, was already organized, which was brought to maturity on the return of the Channel fleet to 1st April. port in the beginning of April; and on the signal being made from the Queen Charlotte, by Lord Bridport, to weigh anchor, on the 15th of that month, instead of obeying, its crew gave three cheers, which were returned by every vessel in the fleet, and the red flag of mutiny was hoisted on every masthead (2).

Perfect order maintained by the insurgents. In this perilous crisis, the officers of the fleet exerted themselves to the utmost to bring back their crews to a state of obedience, but all their efforts were in vain. Meanwhile, the fleet being completely in possession of the insurgents, they used their power firmly, but with humanity and moderation; order and discipline were universally observed; the most scrupulous attention was paid to the officers; those most obnoxious were sent ashore without molestation; delegates were appointed from all the ships to meet in Lord Howe's cabin, an oath to support the common cause administered to every man in the fleet, and ropes reeved to the yard-arm of every vessel as a signal of the punishment that would be inflicted on those 1st April. that betrayed it. Three days afterwards two petitions were forwarded, one to the Admiralty, and one to the House of Commons, drawn up in the most respectful, and even touching terms, declaring their unshaken loyalty to their king and country, but detailing the grievances of which they complained; that their pay had not been augmented since the reign of Charles II., though every article of life had advanced at least one-third in value; that the pensions of Chelsea were L.13, while those of Greenwich still remained at L.7; that their allowance of provisions was insufficient, and that the pay of wounded seamen was not continued till they were cured or discharged (3).

The demands of the fleet are granted by the government. This unexpected mutiny produced the utmost alarm both in the country and the government; and the Board of Admiralty was immediately transferred to Portsmouth to endeavour to appease it. Earl Spenser hastened to the spot, and after some negotiation, the demands of the fleet were acceded to by the Admiralty, it being agreed that the pay of able-bodied seamen should be raised to a shilling a-day; that of petty officers and ordinary seamen in the same proportion, and the Greenwich pension augmented to ten pounds. This, however, the seamen refused to 7th May. accept, unless it was ratified by royal proclamation and act of Parliament; the red flag, which had been struck, was rehoisted, and the fleet, after subordination had been in some degree restored, again broke out into open mutiny. Government, upon this, sent down Lord Howe to reassure the mutineers, and convince them of the good faith with which they were animated. The personal weight of this illustrious man, the many years he had commanded the Channel fleet, the recollection of his glorious victory at its

(1) Ann. Reg. 1797, 207, 208, 209. Jom. x. 202.  
(2) Ibid. 200, 209.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1797, 209.

And Lord  
Howe at  
length  
succeeded in  
restoring  
subordina-  
tion.

head, all conspired to induce the sailors to listen to his representations; and in consequence of his assurance that government would faithfully keep its promises, and grant an unlimited amnesty for the past, the whole fleet returned to its duty, and a few days afterwards put to sea, amounting to twenty-one ships of the line, to resume the blockade of Brest harbour (1).

Alarming  
mutiny at  
the Nore.

The bloodless termination of this revolt, and the concession to the seamen of what all felt to be their just demands, diffused a general joy throughout the nation; but this satisfaction was of short duration. On the 22d May, the fleet at the Nore, forming part of Lord Duncan's

22d May.  
6th June.

squadron, broke out into open mutiny, and on the 6th June they were joined by all the vessels of that fleet, from the blockading station off the Texel, excepting his own line-of-battle ship and two frigates. These ships drew themselves up in order of battle across the Thames, stopped all vessels going up or down the river, appointed delegates and a provisional government for the fleet, and compelled the ships, whose crews were thought to be wavering, to take their station in the middle of the formidable array. At the head of the insurrection was a man of the name of Parker, a seaman on board the Sandwich, who assumed the title of President of the Floating Republic, and was distinguished by undaunted resolution and no small share of ability. Their demands related chiefly to the unequal distribution of prize-money, which had been overlooked by the Channel mutineers (2); but they went so far in other respects, and were couched in such a menacing strain, as to be deemed totally inadmissible by government.

Dreadful  
consterna-  
tion in  
London.

At the intelligence of this alarming insurrection, the utmost consternation seized all classes in the nation. Every thing seemed to be failing at once; their armies had been defeated, the bank had suspended payment, and now the fleet, the pride and glory of England, seemed on the point of deserting the national colours. The citizens of London dreaded a stoppage of the colliers, and all the usual supplies of the metropolis; the public creditors apprehended the speedy dissolution of government, and the cessation of their wonted payments from the treasury. Despair seized upon the firmest hearts; and such was the general panic, that the three per cents were sold as low as forty-five, after having been nearly 100 before the commencement of the war. Never, during the whole contest, was the consternation so great, and never was England placed so near the verge of destruction (3).

Firmness  
of the King  
and govern-  
ment.

Fortunately for Great Britain, and the cause of freedom throughout the world, a monarch was on the throne whose firmness no danger could shake, and a minister at the helm whose capacity was equal to any emergency. Perceiving that the success of the mutineers in the Channel fleet had augmented the audacity of the sailors, and given rise to the present formidable insurrection, and conscious that the chief real grievances had been redressed, government resolved to make a stand, and adopted the most energetic measures to face the danger. All the buoys at the mouth of the Thames were removed; Sheerness, which was menaced with a bombardment from the insurgent ships, was garrisoned with four thousand men; red-hot balls were kept in constant readiness; the fort of Tilbury was armed with 100 pieces of heavy cannon; and a chain of gun-boats sunk to debar the ac-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1797, 211. Jom. x. 203, 204.  
(2) Ann. Reg. 1797, 214, 215. Jom. x. 205.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1797, 215, 217.

cess to the harbour. These energetic measures restored the public confidence; the nation rallied round a monarch and an administration who were not wanting to themselves in this extremity; and all the armed men, sailors, and merchants in London, voluntarily took an oath to stand by their country, in this eventful crisis (1).

Noble conduct of Parliament. The conduct of Parliament, on this trying occasion, was worthy of its glorious history. The revolt of the fleet was formally communicated to both Houses by the King on the 1st June, and immediately taken into consideration. The greater part of the Opposition, and especially Mr. Fox, at first held back, and seemed rather disposed to turn the public danger into the means of overturning the administration; but Mr. Sheridan came nobly forward, and threw the weight of his great name and thrilling eloquence into the balance in favour of his country. "Shall we yield," said he, "to mutinous sailors? Never, for in one moment we should extinguish three centuries of glory (2)." Awakened by this splendid example to more worthy feelings, the Opposition at length joined the administration, and a bill for the suppression of the mutiny passed by a great majority, through both Houses of Parliament. By this act, it was declared death for any person to hold communication with the sailors in mutiny after the revolt had been declared by proclamation; and all persons who should endeavour to seduce either soldiers or sailors from their duty were liable to the same punishment. This bill was opposed by Sir Francis Burdett, and a few of the most violent of the Opposition, upon the ground that conciliation and concession were the only course which could ensure speedy submission. But Mr. Pitt's reply,—that the tender feelings of these brave but misguided men were the sole avenue which remained open to recall them to their duty, and that a separation from their wives, their children, and their country, would probably induce the return to duty which could alone obtain a revival of these affections,—was justly deemed conclusive, and the bill accordingly passed (3).

The insurgents are divided. Meanwhile a negotiation was conducted by the Admiralty, who repaired on the first alarm to Sheerness, and received a deputation from the mutineers; but their demands were so unreasonable, and urged in so threatening a manner, that they had the appearance of having been brought forward to exclude all accommodation, and justify, by their refusal, the immediate recurrence to extreme measures. These parleys, however, gave government time to sow dissension among the insurgents, by representing the hopeless nature of the contest with the whole nation in which they were engaged, and the unreasonable nature of the demands on which they insisted. By degrees they became sensible that they had engaged in a desperate enterprise; the whole sailors on board the Channel fleet gave a splendid proof of genuine patriotism, by reprobating their proceedings, and earnestly imploring them to return to their duty. This remonstrance, coupled with the energetic conduct of both Parliament and government, and the general disapprobation of the nation, gradually checked the spirit of insubordination. On the 9th June, two ships of the line slipped their cables and abandoned the insurgents, amidst a heavy fire from the whole line; on the 13th, three other sail of the line and two frigates openly left them, and

(1) Ann. Reg. 1797, 216, 217. Journ. x. 206.  
(2) Parl. Debates, xxxiii, 802, 803.

(3) Parl. Deb. xxxiii. 816, 817. Ann. Reg. 218, 219.



took refuge under the cannon of Sheerness; on the following day, several others followed their example; and at length, on the 15th, the whole remaining ships struck the red flag of mutiny, and the communication between the ocean and the metropolis was restored. Parker, the leader of the insurrection, was seized on board his own ship, and, after a solemn trial, condemned to death; which he underwent with great firmness, acknowledging the justice of his sentence, and hoping only that mercy would be extended to his associates. Several of the other leaders of the revolt were found guilty and executed; but some escaped from on board the prison-ship, and got safe to Calais, and a large number, still under sentence of death, were pardoned, by royal proclamation, after the glorious victory of Camperdown (1).

The mutineers at length submit. Parker is tried and executed.

The suppression of this dangerous revolt with so little bloodshed, and the extrication of the nation from the greatest peril in which it had been placed since the Spanish Armada, is the most glorious event in the reign of George III and in the administration of Pitt (2). The conduct adopted towards the insurgents may be regarded as a masterpiece of political wisdom; and the happiest example of that union of firmness and humanity, of justice and concession, which can alone bring a government safely through such a crisis. By at once conceding all the just demands of the Channel fleet, and proclaiming a general pardon for a revolt which had too much ground for its justification, they deprived the disaffected of all real causes of complaint, and detached from their cause all the patriotic portion of the navy; while by resolutely withstanding the audacious demands of the Nore mutineers, they checked the spirit of democracy which had arisen out of those very concessions themselves. For such is the singular combination of good and bad principles in human nature, and such the disposition of man, on the least opening being afforded, to run riot, that not only do our virtues border upon vices, but even from acts of justice the most deplorable consequences frequently flow; and unless a due display of firmness accompany concessions, dictated by a spirit of humanity, they too often are imputed to fear, and increase the very turbulent spirit they were intended to remove.

Glorious firmness of Admiral Duncan at this crisis.

Admiral Duncan's conduct at this critical juncture was above all praise. He was with his fleet, blockading the Texel, when intelligence of the insurrection was received, and immediately four ships of the line deserted to the mutineers, leaving him with an inferior force in presence of the enemy. They were speedily followed by several others; and at length the admiral, in his own ship, with two frigates, was left alone on the station. In this extremity his firmness did not forsake him: he called his crew on deck, and addressed them in one of those speeches of touching and manly eloquence, so well known in antiquity, which at once melts the human heart (3). His crew were dissolved in tears, and declared, in the

(1) Ann. Reg. 1797, 216, 217. Jom. x. 207, 208.

(2) The magnanimous conduct of the British government on this occasion was fully appreciated on the Continent. "Let us figure to ourselves," says Prince Hardenberg, "Richard Parker, a common sailor, the leader of the revolt, taking, at Sheerness, the title of Admiral of the Fleet, and the fleet itself, consisting of eleven sail of the line and four frigates, assuming the title of the Floating Republic; and, nevertheless, recollect, that the English, but recently recovered from a financial crisis, remained undaunted in presence of such a revolt, and did not withdraw one vessel from the blockade of Brest,

Cadiz, or the Texel! It was the firmness of ancient Rome."—HARD. iv. 432.

(3) "My Lads,—I once more call you together, with a sorrowful heart, from what I have lately seen of the disaffection of the fleets; I call it disaffection, for they have no grievances. To be deserted by my fleet, in the face of the enemy, is a disgrace which, I believe, never before happened to a British admiral, nor could I have supposed it possible. My greatest comfort, under God, is, that I have been supported by the officers, seamen, and marines of this ship, for which, with a heart overflowing with gratitude, I request you to accept my sincere thanks.



most energetic manner, their unshaken loyalty, and resolution to abide by him in life or death. Encouraged by this heroic conduct, he declared his determination to maintain the blockade, and, undismayed by the defection of so large a part of his squadron, remained off the Texel with his little but faithful remnant. By stationing one of the ships in the offing, and frequently making signals, as if to the remainder of the fleet, he succeeded in deceiving the Dutch admiral, who imagined that the vessels in sight were only the inshore squadron, and kept his station until the remainder of his ships joined him after the suppression of the insurrection (1).

The mutiny was totally unconnected with France. It was naturally imagined at the time that this formidable mutiny was instigated by the arts of the French government. But though they were naturally highly elated at this unexpected piece of good fortune, and anxious to turn it to the best advantage, and though the revolutionary spirit which was abroad was unquestionably one cause of the commotion, there is no reason to believe that it arose from the instigation of the Directory, or was at all connected with any treasonable or seditious projects. On the contrary, after the minutest investigation, it appeared that the grievances complained of were entirely of a domestic character, that the hearts of the sailors were throughout true to their country, and that, at the very time when they were blockading the Thames in so menacing a manner, they would have fought the French fleet with the same spirit, as was afterwards evinced in the glorious victory of Camperdown (2).

The ultimate consequences of this insurrection, as of most other popular commotions which originate in real grievances, and are candidly but firmly met by government, were highly beneficial. The attention of the cabinet was forcibly turned to the sources of discontent in the navy, and from that to the corresponding causes and grievances in the army, and the result was a series of changes which, in a very great degree, improved the condition of officers and men in both services. The pay of the common soldiers was raised to their present standard of a shilling a-day (3); and those admirable regulations were soon after adopted in regard to pensions, prize-money, and retired allowances, which have justly endeared the memory of the Duke of York and Lord Melville to the privates of the army and navy.

Battle of Cape St. Vincent. But whatever may have been the internal dissensions of the British fleet, never did it appear more terrible and irresistible to its foreign enemies than during this eventful year. Early in February, the Spanish fleet, consisting of twenty-seven ships of the line, and twelve frigates,

I flatter myself, much good may result from your example, by bringing those deluded people to a sense of their duty, which they owe not only to their king and country, but to themselves.

"The British navy has ever been the support of that liberty which has been handed down to us from our ancestors, and which, I trust, we shall maintain to the latest posterity; and that can only be done by unanimity and obedience. This ship's company, and others, who have distinguished themselves by their loyalty and good order, deserve to be, and doubtless will be, the favourites of a grateful nation. They will also have from their inward feelings a comfort which will be lasting, and not like the fleeting and false confidence of those who have served from their duty.

"It has been often my pride with you to look into the Texel, and see a foe which dreaded coming out to meet us. My pride is now humbled indeed!—my feelings cannot easily be expressed. Our cup

has overflowed, and made us wanton. The allwise Providence has given us this check as a warning, and I hope we shall improve by it. On Him, then, let us trust, where our only security is to be found. I find there are many good men among us: for my own part, I have had full confidence in all in this ship, and once more beg to express my approbation of your conduct.

May God, who has thus far conducted you, continue to do so; and may the British navy, the glory and support of our country, be restored to its wonted splendour, and be not only the bulwark of Britain, but the terror of the world. But this can only be effected by a strict adherence to our duty and obedience; and let us pray that the Almighty God may keep us all in the right way of thinking—God bless you all!"—*Ann. Reg.* 1797, 214.

(1) *Ann. Reg.* 1797, 214. *Jom.* x. 211.

(2) *Ibid.* 1797, 219, 221. *Jom.* x. 220.

(3) *Ann. Reg.* 1797, 222; and *State Papers*, 242.

put to sea, with the design of steering for Brest, raising the blockade of that harbour, forming a junction with the Dutch fleet, and clearing the Channel of the British squadron. This design, the same as that which Napoléon afterwards adopted in 1805, was defeated by one of the most memorable victories ever recorded even in the splendid annals of the English navy. Admiral Jarvis, who was stationed off the coast of Portugal, had by the greatest efforts, repaired various losses which his fleet had sustained during the storms of winter, and at this period lay in the Tagus with fifteen sail of the line, and six frigates. The moment he heard of the enemy's having sailed, he instantly put to sea, and was cruising off CAPE ST.-VINCENTS, when he received intelligence of their approach, and immediately prepared for battle.

He drew up his fleet in two lines, and bearing down before the wind, succeeded in engaging the enemy, who were very loosely scattered, and yet straggling in disorderly array, in close combat, before they had time to form in regular order of battle. Passing boldly through the centre of their fleet, the British admiral doubled with his whole force upon nine of the Spanish ships, and by a vigorous cannonade, drove them to leeward, so as to prevent their taking any part in the engagement which followed. The Spanish

First appearance of Nelson and Collingwood.

admiral upon this, endeavoured to regain the lost part of his fleet, and was wearing round the rear of the British lines, when Commodore NELSON, who was in the sternmost ship, perceiving his design, disregarded his orders, stood directly towards him, and precipitated himself into the very middle of the hostile squadron. Bravely seconded by Captains COLLINGWOOD and Troubridge, he ran his ship, the Captain, of seventy-four guns, between two Spanish three-deckers, the Santissima Trinidad, of 136 guns, commanded by Admiral Cordova, and the San José, of 112, and succeeded, by a tremendous fire to the right and left, in compelling the former to strike, although it escaped in consequence of Nelson not being able, in the confusion of so close a fight, to take possession of his noble prize. The action, on the part of these gallant men, continued for nearly an hour with the utmost fury against fearful odds, which were more than compensated by the skill of the British sailors and the rapidity of their fire. Meanwhile, Collingwood engaged the Salvador del Mundo of 112 guns; the action began when the two ships were not more than fifty yards apart, but such was the tremendous effect of the Englishman's broadsides, that in a quarter of an hour the Spanish three-decker struck her colours, and her firing ceased; upon which that noble officer, disdaining to take possession of beaten enemies, and seeing his old messmate, Nelson, a-head and hard pressed by greatly superior forces, passed on, and the Salvador, relieved from her antagonist, again hoisted her colours, and recommenced the action, but she was again compelled to strike, and finally taken possession of by one of the ships which followed (1). Collingwood immediately came alongside the San Isidro, seventy-four, so close, that a man might leap from the one to the other, the two vessels engaging thus at the muzzles of their guns. The combat was not of long duration; in ten minutes the Spaniard struck, and was taken possession of by the Lively frigate, to whom the Admiral made signal to secure the prize.

Though Collingwood had thus already forced two Spanish line-of-battle ships, one of which was a three-decker, to strike to him, with seventy-four

(1) Nelson's Narrative. Collingwood, i. 53. Collingwood's Mem. i. 47, 48. Brenton, i. 240, 241. Southey's Nelson, i. 170, 174.

guns only, yet he was not contented with his achievement, but pushed on to relieve Nelson, who was now engaged with the San Nicholas and San Josef on one side, and the Santissima Trinidad, a huge four-decker of 136 guns, on the other. So close did he approach the former of these vessels, that, to use his own words, you "could not put a bodkin between them," and the shot from the English ship passed through both the Spanish vessels, and actually struck Nelson's balls from the other side. After a short engagement, the Spaniard's fire ceased on that quarter; and Collingwood, seeing Nelson's ship effectually succoured, passed on, and engaged the Santissima Trinidad, which already had been assailed by several British ships in succession. No sooner was Nelson relieved by Collingwood's fire, than resuming his wonted energy, he boarded the San Nicholas, of seventy-four guns, and speedily hoisted the British colours on the poop; and finding that the prize was severely galled by a fire from the San Josef, of 112 guns, pushed on across it to its gigantic neighbour, himself leading the way, and exclaiming, "Westminster Abbey, or victory!" Nothing could resist such enthusiastic courage; the Spanish admiral speedily hauled down his colours, presenting his sword to Nelson on his own quarter-deck (1), while the English ship lay a perfect wreck beside its two noble prizes.

While Nelson and Collingwood were thus precipitating themselves with unexampled hardihood into the centre of the enemy's squadron on the larboard, the other column of the fleet, headed by Sir John Jarvis in the Victory of 100 guns was also engaged in the most gallant and successful manner; though from being the one on the starboard tack, by which the enemy's line was pierced, they were the rear on the larboard, where Nelson had begun his furious attack. The Victory, passing under the stern of the Salvador del Mundo, followed by the Barfleur, Admiral Waldgrave, poured the most destructive broadsides into that huge three decker; and passing on engaged in succession the Santissima Trinidad, whose tremendous fire from her four decks seemed to threaten destruction to every lesser opponent which approached her. At length, after having been most gallantly fought by Jarvis and Collingwood, she struck to Captain, now Lord de Saumarez, in the Orion; but that intrepid officer being intent on still greater achievements did not heave to, in order to take possession; but thinking it sufficient that she had hoisted the white flag on her quarter and the British union jack over it, passed it, leaving to the ship astern the easy task of taking possession. Unfortunately, in the smoke, this vessel did not perceive the token of surrender; but moved on a-head of the Santissima Trinidad after the admiral, so that the captured Spaniard was encouraged, though dismantled, to try to get off, and ultimately effected her escape. The remainder of the Spanish fleet now rapidly closed in and deprived Captain Saumarez of his magnificent prize (2): but the British squadron kept possession of the San Josef and Salvador, each of 112 guns, and the San Nicholas and San Isidro of 74 each. Towards evening the detached part of the Spanish fleet rejoined the main body, and thereby formed a force still greatly superior to the British squadron, yet such was the consternation produced by the losses they had experienced, and the imposing aspect of the English fleet, that they made no attempt to regain their lost vessels, but, after a distant cannonade, retreated in the night towards

(1) Nelson's Narrative. Collingwood, i, 53. Collingwood, i. 48, 49. Southey's Nelson, i. 170. James, ii. 46, 63.

(2) James, ii. 48, 64. Ann. Reg. 1797, 94, 95. App.

to Chron. 74. James, ii. 46, 63. De Saumarez's Life, i. 171, 175. Brenton, i. 341, 342.

Cadiz, whither they were immediately followed and blockaded by the victors.

This important victory, which delivered England from all fears of invasion, by preventing the threatened junction of the hostile fleets, was achieved with the loss of only three hundred men, of whom nearly one-half were on board Nelson's ship, while above five hundred were lost on board the Spanish ships which struck alone; a signal proof how much less bloody sea-fights are than those between land forces, and a striking example of the great effects which sometimes follow an inconsiderable expenditure of human life on that element, compared to the trifling results which attend fields of carnage in military warfare (1).

Great effect produced by this victory. Admiral Jarvis followed the beaten fleet to Cadiz, whither they had retired in the deepest dejection, and with tarnished honour. The defeat of so great an armament by little more than half their number, and the evident superiority of skill and seamanship which it evinced in the British navy, filled all Europe with astonishment, and demonstrated on what doubtful grounds the Republicans rested their hopes of subduing this island. The decisive nature of the victory was speedily evinced by the bombardment of Cadiz on three different occasions, under the direction of Commodore Nelson (2); and although these attacks were more insulting than hurtful to the Spanish ships, yet they evinced the magnitude of the disaster which they had sustained, and inflicted a grievous wound on the pride of the Castilians.

Birth and parentage of Nelson. Horatio Nelson, who bore so glorious a part in these engagements, and was destined to leave a name immortal in the rolls of fame, was born at Birnam Thorpe, in the county of Norfolk, on the 29th September, 1758. He early evinced so decided a partiality for a sea life, that, though of a feeble constitution, he was sent on shipboard at the age of thirteen. Subsequently he went on a voyage to the Greenland seas, and distinguished himself as a subaltern in various actions during the American war. Early in the revolutionary contest, he was employed in the siege of Bastia in the island of Corsica, which he reduced; a singular coincidence, that the greatest leaders both at land and sea in that struggle should have first signalized themselves on the same island. After the battle of St.-Vincent, and the bombardment of Cadiz, he was sent on an expedition against the island of Teneriffe; but though the attack, conducted with his wonted courage and skill, was at first successful, and the town for a short time was in the hands of the assailants, they were ultimately repulsed, with the loss of seven hundred men and Nelson's right arm (3).

His character. Gifted by nature with undaunted courage, indomitable resolution, and undecaying energy, Nelson was also possessed of the eagle glance, the quick determination, and coolness in danger, which constitute the rarest qualities of a consummate commander. Generous, open-hearted, and enthusiastic, the whole energies of his soul were concentrated in the love of his country; like the youth in Tacitus, he loved danger itself, not the rewards of courage; and was incessantly consumed by that passion for great achievements, that sacred fire, which is the invariable characteristic of heroic minds. His soul was constantly striving for great exploits; generosity and magnanimity in danger were so natural to him, that they arose unbidden on every occasion calculated to call them forth. On one occasion, during a violent

(1) James, ii. 63.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1797, 96. Jom. x. 200, July, 1797.

(3) Southey's Nelson, i. 195. Ann. Reg. 1797, 98.

storm off Minorca, Nelson's ship was disabled and Captain Ball took his vessel in tow. Nelson thought, however, that Ball's ship would be lost if she kept her hold, and deeming his own case desperate, he seized the speaking trumpet, and with passionate threats ordered Ball to set him loose. But Ball took his own trumpet, and in a solemn voice replied, "I feel confident I can bring you in safe: I therefore must not, and, by the help of Almighty God, I will not leave you." What he promised he performed, and on arriving in harbour, Nelson embraced him as his deliverer, and commenced a friendship which continued for life (1).

His whole life was spent in the service of his country; his prejudices, and he had many, were all owing to the excess of patriotic feeling; he annihilated the French navy, by fearlessly following up the new system of tactics, plunging headlong into the enemy's fleet, and doubling upon a part of their line, in the same manner as Napoléon practised in battles at land. The history of the world has seldom characters so illustrious to exhibit, and few achievements as momentous to commemorate. But it is to his public conduct, and genius afloat, only, that this transcendent praise is due; on shore he appears in a less favourable light. Vain, undiscerning, impetuous, he was regardless of his domestic duties; an ardent lover, he was a faithless husband. He was perpetually liable to the delusion of art, and sometimes seduced by the fascination of wickedness. These weaknesses, indeed, were owing to the ardent temperament of his mind; they arose from passions nearly allied to virtue, and to which, heroic characters in all ages have, in a peculiar manner, been subject. In one unhappy instance, however, he was betrayed into more serious delinquencies. If a veil could be drawn over the transactions at Naples, history would dwell upon him as a spotless hero; but justice requires that cruelty should never be palliated, and the rival of Napoléon shielded from none of the obloquy consequent on the fascination of female wickedness.

Character of Lord St.-Vincent. Sir John Jarvis, afterwards created Earl St.-Vincent, one of the greatest and most renowned admirals that ever appeared in the British navy, possessed qualities which, if not so brilliant as those of his illustrious rival, were not less calculated for great and glorious achievements. He early distinguished himself in his profession, and was engaged with Wolfe in the glorious operations which terminated in the capture of Quebec in the Seven Year's War. An action which he soon after fought with the Foudroyant of eighty-four guns, was one of the most extraordinary displays of valour and skill even in that war so fertile in great exploits. The mutiny which broke out with such violence in the Channel fleet and at the Nore in 1797, had also its ramifications in the fleet under his command, off the Spanish coast: and by the mingled firmness and clemency of his conduct, he succeeded in reducing the most mutinous vessels to obedience with a singularly small effusion of human blood. A severe disciplinarian, strict in his own duties, rigorous in the exaction of them from others, he yet secured the affections both of his officers and men by the impartiality of his decisions, the energy of his conduct, and the perfect nautical skill which he was known to possess. It is doubtful if even Nelson would have been equal to the extraordinary exertion of vigour and capacity with which, in a period of time so short as to be deemed impossible by all but himself, he succeeded in fitting out his squadron from the Tagus in February 1797, in sufficient time to intercept

(1) Coleridge's French Essay, iv. iii. 249.



and defeat the Spanish fleet. In the high official duties as first Lord of the Admiralty, with which he was entrusted in 1802, he exhibited a most praiseworthy zeal and anxiety for the detection of abuses, and he succeeded in rooting out many lucrative corruptions which had fastened themselves upon that important branch of the public service; although he yielded with too much facility to that unhappy mania for reducing our establishments, which invariably seizes the English on the return of peace, and has so often exposed to the utmost danger the naval supremacy of Great Britain. But in nothing, perhaps, was his energy and disinterested character more clearly evinced than in his conduct in 1798, when he despatched Nelson to the Mediterranean at the head of the best ships in his own fleet, and furnished him with the means of striking a blow destined to eclipse even his own well earned fame. But these two great men had no jealousy of each other: their whole emulation consisted in mutual efforts to serve their country, and none was more willing to concede the highest meed of praise to each other. The mind of the historian, as it has been well observed, "weary with recounting the deeds of human baseness, and mortified with contemplating the frailty of illustrious men, gathers a soothing refreshment from such scenes as these; where kindred genius, exciting only mutual admiration and honest rivalry, gives birth to no feeling of jealousy or envy, and the character which stamps real greatness, is found in the genuine value of the man, as well as in the outward splendour of the deed; the highest talents sustained by the purest virtue; the capacity of the statesman, and the valour of the hero, outshone by the magnanimous heart which beats only to the measures of generosity and justice (1)."

Of Earl Howe. Differing in many essential particulars from both of these illustrious men, Earl Howe was one of the most distinguished men which the English navy ever produced. Of him, perhaps, more truly than any other of its illustrious chiefs may it be said, as of the Chevalier Bayard, that he lived without fear and without reproach. He had the enterprise and gallant bearing so general in all officers in the naval service of Great Britain; but these qualities in him were combined with coolness, firmness, and systematic arrangement, with an habitual self-command and humanity to others, almost unrivalled in those intrusted with supreme command. In early life he contracted an intimate friendship with general Wolfe, and was employed with him in the expedition against the Isle d'Aix in Basque Roads in 1757. "Their friendship," says Walpole, "was like the union of cannon and gunpowder. Howe strong in mind, solid in judgment, firm of purpose; Wolfe quick in conception, prompt in execution, impetuous in action." His coolness in danger may be judged of from one anecdote. When in command of the Channel fleet, after a dark and boisterous night, when the ships were in considerable danger of running foul, Lord Gardner, then third in command, a most intrepid officer, next day went on board the Queen Charlotte, and inquired of Howe, how he had slept, for that he himself had not been able to get any rest from anxiety of mind. Lord Howe replied that he had slept perfectly well, for as he had taken every possible precaution before it was dark, for the safety of the ship and crew, this conviction set his mind perfectly at ease. In person he was tall and well-proportioned, his countenance of a serious cast and dark, but relaxing at times into a sweet smile, which bespoke the mildness and humanity of his disposition. No one ever con-

(1) Lord Brougham's *Sketches of Public Characters*, 2d series.



deducted the stern duties of war with more consideration for the sufferings both of his own men and his adversaries, or mingled its heroic courage with a larger share of benevolent feeling. Disinterested in the extreme, his private charities were unbounded, and in 1798, when government received voluntary gifts for the expenses of the war, he sent his whole annual income, amounting to eighteen hundred pounds, to the bank, as his contribution. Such was his humanity and consideration for the seamen under his command, that it was more by the attachment which they bore to him, than by any exertion of authority, that he succeeded in suppressing, without effusion of blood, the formidable mutiny in the Channel fleet. He was the first of the great school of English admirals, and by his profound nautical skill, and long attention to the subject, he first succeeded in reducing to practice, that admirable system of tactics to which the unexampled triumphs of the war were afterwards owing. A disinterested lover of his country, he was entirely exempt from ambition of every kind, and received the rewards with which his Sovereign loaded him, with gratitude, but without desire (1): the only complaints he ever made, of Government, were for their neglect of the inferior naval officers who had served in his naval exploits.

Great preparations of the Dutch. The great victory of St.-Vincent's entirely disconcerted the well-conceived designs of Turguet for the naval campaign; but later in the season, another effort, with an inferior fleet, but more experienced seamen, was made by the Dutch Republic. For a very long period the naval preparations in Holland had been most extraordinary, and far surpassed any thing attempted by the United Provinces for above a century past. The stoppage of the commerce of the Republic had enabled the government to man their vessels with a choice selection both of officers and men; and from the well-known courage of the sailors, it was anticipated that the contest with the English fleet would be more obstinate and bloody than any which had yet occurred from the commencement of the war. De Winter, who commanded the armament, was a staunch Republican, and a man of tried courage and experience. Nevertheless, being encumbered with land forces, destined for the invasion of Ireland, he did not attempt to leave the Texel till the beginning of October, when the English fleet having been driven to Yarmouth roads by stress of weather, the Dutch Government gave orders for the troops the troops to be disembarked, and the fleet to set sail, and make the best of its way to the harbour of Brest, in order to co-operate in the long-projected expedition against that island, now fermenting with discontent, and containing at least two hundred thousand men, organized, and ready for immediate rebellion (2).

Battle of Lampyris. Admiral Duncan was no-sooner apprized by the signals of his cruizers that the Dutch fleet was at sea, than he weighed anchor with all imaginable haste, and stretched across the German Ocean, with so much expedition, that he got near the hostile squadron before it was out of sight of the shore of Holland. The Dutch fleet consisted of fifteen ships of the line and eleven frigates; the English, of sixteen ships of the line and three frigates. Duncan's first care was to station his fleet in such a manner as to prevent the enemy from returning to the Texel; and having done this, he bore down upon his opponents, and hove in sight of them, on the following morning, drawn up in order of battle at the distance of nine miles from the

(1) Barrow's Life of Howe, chap. xii. 432.

(2) Vict. et Conq. viii. 271, 274. Wolfe Tone, ii. 197, 201.

coast between CAMPERDOWN and Egmont. With the same instinctive genius, which afterwards inspired a similar resolution to Nelson at Aboukir he gave the signal to break the line, and get between the enemy and the shore—a movement which was immediately and skilfully executed in two lines of attack, and proved the principal cause of the glorious success which followed, by preventing their withdrawing into the shallows, out of the reach of the British vessels, which, for the most part, drew more water than their antagonists. Admiral Onslow first broke the line, and commenced a close combat. As he approached the Dutch line, his captain observed, the enemy were lying so close that they could not penetrate. “The Monarch will make a passage,” replied Onslow, and held on undaunted. The Dutch ship opposite gave way to let him pass, and he entered the close-set line. In passing through, he poured one broadside with tremendous effect into the starboard ship’s stern, and the other with not less into the vice-admiral’s bows, whom he immediately lay alongside, and engaged at three yards’ distance. He was soon followed by Duncan himself, at the head of the second line (1), who pierced the centre and laid himself alongside of De Winter’s flag-ship, and shortly the action became general, each English ship engaging its adversary, but still between them and the lee-shore.

De Winter, perceiving the design of the enemy, gave the signal for his fleet to unite in close order; but from the thickness of the smoke, his order was not generally perceived, and but partially obeyed. Notwithstanding the utmost efforts of valour on the part of the Dutch, the superiority of English skill and discipline soon appeared in the engagement, yard-arm to yard-arm, which followed. For three hours, Admiral Duncan and De Winter fought within pistol-shot; but by degrees the Dutchman’s fire slackened; his masts fell one by one overboard, amidst the loud cheers of the British sailors; and at length he struck his flag, after half his crew were killed or wounded, and his ship incapable of making any farther resistance. De Winter was the only man on his quarter-deck who was not either killed or wounded; he lamented that, in the midst of the carnage which literally floated the deck of his noble ship, he alone should have been spared (2). The Dutch vice-admiral soon after struck to Admiral Onslow, and by four o’clock, eight ships of the line, two of fifty-six guns, and two frigates, were in the hands of the victors. Twelve sail of the line had struck their colours, but owing to the bad weather which succeeded, nine only were secured (3). No less skilful than brave, Admiral Duncan now gave the signal for the combat to cease, and the prizes to be secured, which was done with no little difficulty, as, during the battle, both fleets had drifted before a tempestuous wind to within five miles of the shore, and were now lying in nine fathoms water.

It was owing to this circumstance alone that any of the Dutch squadron escaped; but when the English withdrew into deeper water, Admiral Story collected the scattered remains of his fleet, and sought refuge in the Texel, while Duncan returned with his prizes to Yarmouth roads. The battle was seen distinctly from the shore, where a vast multitude was assembled, who beheld in silent despair the ruin of the armament on which the national

(1) Lord Duncan’s Act. 16th Oct. 1797. Ann. Reg. 1797, 100. Jom. x. 213, 214. Brenton, i. 347, 348. James, ii. 69, 70. Vict. et Conq. viii. 271, 275.

(2) De Winter and Admiral Duncan dined together in the latter’s ship on the day of the battle, in the most friendly manner. In the evening, they played a rubber at whist; and De Winter was the

loser—upon which he good-humouredly observed, it was rather hard to be beaten twice in one day by the same opponent.—BANKTON, *ut Supra*, and *Personal Knowledge*.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1797, 100, 101. Jom. x. 213, 214. Toul. vi. 242, 243. James, ii. 71, 73. Brenton, i. 348.

hopes had been so long rested. Towards the conclusion of the action the *Hercules*, one of the Dutch ships, was found to be on fire, but it was soon extinguished by the coolness and presence of mind of the crew on board the *Triumph*, to which she had struck. During the two days of tempestuous weather which ensued, two of the prizes mutinied against the English guard on board, and escaped into the Texel; and the *Delft*, a seventy-four, went down, astern of the ship which had her in tow. But eight line-of-battle ships, and two of fifty-six guns, were brought into Yarmouth roads, amidst the cheers of innumerable spectators, and the transports of a whole nation (1).

Immense effects of this victory. This action was one of the most important fought at sea during the revolutionary war, not only from the valour displayed on both sides during the engagement, but the important consequences with which it was attended. The Dutch fought with a courage worthy of the descendants of Van Tromp and De Ruyter; as was evinced by the loss on either part, which, in the British, was one thousand and forty men, and in the Batavian, one thousand one hundred and sixty, besides the crews of the prizes, who amounted to above six thousand. The appearance of the British ships, at the close of the action, was very different from what it usually is after naval engagements; no masts were down, little damage done to the sails or rigging; like their worthy adversaries, the Dutch fired at the hull of their enemies, which accounts for the great loss in killed and wounded in this well-fought engagement (2). The Dutch were all either dismasted, or so riddled with shot, as to be altogether unserviceable. On every side marks of a desperate conflict were visible. But the contest was no longer equal; England had quadrupled in strength since the days of Charles II, while the United Provinces had declined both in vigour and resources. Britain was now as equal to a contest with the united navies of Europe, as she was then to a war with the fleets of an inconsiderable Republic.

But the effects of this victory, both upon the security and the public spirit of Britain, were in the highest degree important. Achieved as it had been by the fleet which had recently struck such terror into every class by the mutiny at the Nore, and coming so soon after that formidable event, it both elevated the national spirit by the demonstration it afforded how true the patriotism of the seamen still was, and the deliverance from the immediate peril of invasion which it effected. A subscription was immediately entered into for the widows and orphans of those who had fallen in this battle, and it soon amounted to L.52,000. The northern courts, whose conduct had been dubious previous to this great event, were struck with terror; and all thoughts of reviving the principles of the armed neutrality were laid aside. But great as were the external results, it was in its internal effects that the vast importance of this victory was chiefly made manifest. Despondency was no longer felt; the threatened invasion of Ireland was laid aside; Britain was secure. England now learned to regard without dismay the victories of the French at land, and, secure in her sea-girt isle, to trust in those defenders

“ Whose march is o’er the mountain wave,  
Whose home is on the deep.”

The joy, accordingly, upon the intelligence of this victory, was heartfelt and unexampled, from the sovereign on the throne, to the beggar in the hovel. Bonfires and illuminations were universal; the enthusiasm spread to

(1) *Beaut. i.* 354-5 *James.*

(2) *James, ii.* 70, 71, *Ann. Reg.* 1797, 101.

every breast; the fire gained every heart, and amidst the roar of artillery and the festive light of cities, faction disappeared, and discontents sunk into neglect. Numbers date from the rejoicings consequent on this achievement their first acquaintance with the events of life, among whom may be reckoned the author, then residing under his paternal roof, in a remote parish of Shropshire, whose earliest recollection is of the sheep-roasting and rural festivities which took place on the joyful intelligence being received in that secluded district.

Honours  
bestowed on  
Admirals  
Duncan and  
Sir John  
Jarvis.

The national gratitude was liberally bestowed on the leaders in these glorious achievements. Sir John Jarvis received the title of Earl St.-Vincent; Admiral Duncan that of Viscount Duncan of Camperdown, and Commodore Nelson that of Sir Horatio Nelson. From these victories may be dated the commencement of that concord among all classes, and that resolute British spirit, which never afterwards deserted this country. Her subsequent victories were for conquest, these were for existence; from the deepest dejection, and an unexampled accumulation of disasters, she arose at once into security and renown; the democratic spirit gradually subsided, from the excitation of new passions, and the force of more ennobling recollections; and the rising generation, who began to mingle in public affairs, now sensibly influenced national thought, by the display of the patriotic spirit which had been nursed amidst the dangers and the glories of their infant years.

Abortive  
descent in  
Pembroke  
Bay.

The remaining maritime operations of this year are hardly deserving of notice. A descent of fourteen hundred men, chiefly composed of deserters and banditti, in the bay of Pembroke, in February, intended to distract the attention of the British government from Ireland, the real point of attack, met with the result which might have been anticipated, by all the party being taken prisoners. Early in spring, an expedition, under General Abercromby, captured the island of Trinidad, with a garrison of seventeen hundred men, and a ship of the line in the harbour; but two months after, the same force failed in an attack on Porto Rico; notwithstanding which, however, the superiority of the British over the navy of their combined enemies, was eminently conspicuous during the whole year, both in the Atlantic and Indian oceans (1).

Death of  
Mr. Burke.

It was just permitted to the illustrious statesman, to whose genius and foresight the development of the dauntless spirit which led to these glorious consequences is mainly, under Providence, to be ascribed, to witness its results. Mr. Burke, whose health had been irretrievably broken by the death of his son, and who had long laboured under severe and increasing weakness, at length breathed his last at his country-seat of Beaconsfield, on the 9th July, 1797. His counsels on English politics during his last eventful moments, were of the same direct, lofty, and uncompromising spirit which had made his voice sound as the note of a trumpet to the heart of England. His last work, the Letters on a Regicide Peace, published a few months before his death, is distinguished by the same fervent eloquence, profound wisdom, and far-seeing sagacity, which characterised his earlier productions on the French Revolution. As his end approached, the vigour of his spirit, if possible, increased; and his prophetic eye anticipated, from the bed of death, those glorious triumphs which were destined to immortalize the close of the conflict. "Never," exclaimed he, in his last hours, "never suc-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1797, 93, 94. Jom. x. 218.

cumb. It is a struggle for your existence as a nation. If you must die, die with the sword in your hand. But I have no fears whatever for the result. There is a salient living principle of energy in the public mind of England, which only requires proper direction to enable her to withstand this, or any other ferocious foe. Persevere, therefore, till this tyranny be overpast (1)."

His character. Thus departed this life, if not in the maturity of years, at least in the fulness of glory, Edmund Burke. The history of England, prodigal as it is of great men, has no such philosophic statesman to boast; the annals of Ireland, graced though they be with splendid characters, have no such shining name to exhibit. His was not the mere force of intellect, the ardour of imagination, the richness of genius; it was a combination of the three, unrivalled, perhaps, in any other age or country. Endowed by nature with a powerful understanding, an inventive fancy, a burning eloquence, he exhibited the rare combination of these great qualities with deep thought, patient investigation, boundless research. His speeches in Parliament were not so impressive as those of Mirabeau in the National Assembly, only because they were more profound; he did not address himself with equal felicity to the prevailing feeling of the majority. He was ever in advance of his age, and left to posterity the difficult task of reaching, through pain and suffering, the elevation to which he was at once borne on the wings of prophetic genius. Great, accordingly, and deserved, as was his reputation in the age in which he lived, it was not so great as it has since become; and strongly as subsequent times have felt the truth of his principles, they are destined to rise into still more general celebrity in the future ages of mankind.

Like all men of a sound intellect, and ardent disposition, and a feeling heart, Mr. Burke was strongly attached to the principles of freedom, and, during the American war, when those principles appeared to be endangered by the conduct of the English government, he stood forth as an uncompromising leader of the Opposition in Parliament. He was, from the outset, however, the friend of freedom only in conjunction with its indispensable allies, order and property; and the severing of the United States from the British empire, and the establishment of a pure Republic beyond the Atlantic, appears to have given the first rude shock to his visions of the elevation and improvement of the species, and suggested the painful doubt, whether the cause of liberty might not, in the end, be more endangered by the extravagance of its supporters than by the efforts of its enemies. These doubts were confirmed by the first aspect of the French Revolution; and while many of the greatest men of his age were dazzled by the brightness of its morning light, he at once discerned, amidst the deceitful blaze, the small black cloud which was to cover the universe with darkness. With the characteristic ardour of his disposition, he instantly espoused the opposite side; and, in the prosecution of his efforts in defence of order, he was led to profounder principles of political wisdom than any intellect, save that of Bacon, had reached, and which are yet far in advance of the general understanding of mankind. His was not the instinctive horror at revolution which arises from the possession of power, the prejudices of birth, or the selfishness of wealth; on the contrary, he brought to the consideration of the great questions which then divided society, prepossessions only on the other side, a heart long

(1) Regicide Peace, *ad fin.*

warmed by the feelings of liberty, a disposition enthusiastic in its support, a lifetime spent in its service. He was led to combat the principles of Jacobinism from an early and clear perception of their consequences; from foreseeing that they would infallibly, if successful, destroy the elements of freedom; and, in the end, leave to society, bereft of all its bulwarks, only an old age of slavery and decline. It was not as the enemy, but the friend of liberty, that he was the determined opponent of the revolution; and such will ever be the foundation in character on which the most resolute, because the most enlightened and the least selfish, resistance to democratic ascendancy will be founded.

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## CHAPTER XXIII.

## CAMPAIGN OF 1797—FALL OF VENICE.

## ARGUMENT.

Russia recedes from the contemplated Measures of Catharine—Plans of the Directory—Bernadotte's and Delmas's Divisions join Napoléon—Disposition of his Forces—Preparations of the Imperialists—Great Spirit in the Hereditary States—Napoléon anticipates the Arrival of the Austrian Veterans—Danger of that Plan—Description of the Theatre of War—Its Roads and Rivers—Napoléon resolves to turn the Austrian left—His proclamation to his Soldiers—Great Interest excited in Europe by the approaching Contest—Operations of Masséna on the left—Passage of the Isonzo by Bernadotte—Masséna makes himself Master of the Col-de-Tarwis—Desperate Actions there—It is finally won by the Republicans—Bayalitch's Division is Surrounded, and made Prisoners—Napoléon crosses the Ridge of the Alps—Occupies Klagenfurth—Successful Operations of Joubert in the Tyrol—Desperate Action at the Pass of Clausen, which is at length carried—Joubert Advances to Sterzing—General Alarm in the Tyrol—He marches across to join Napoléon at Klagenfurth—Results of these Actions—Perilous Condition notwithstanding of Napoléon—He in consequence makes Proposals of Peace to the Archduke, and at the same time severely presses the retreating Imperialists—They are Defeated at the Gorge of Neumarkt—Napoléon pushes on to Judenburg, and the Archduke retires towards Vienna—Terror excited there by these Disasters—Preliminaries are agreed to at Leoben—Disastrous State of the French in Croatia and Tyrol—Extreme Danger of Napoléon—Conditions of the Preliminaries—Enormous Injustice of this Treaty as far as regards Venice—State of Venice at this period—Its long-continued Decline—Rapid Progress of Democratic Ideas in the Cities of the Venetian Territory, which are secretly encouraged by Napoléon—Democratic Insurrection breaks out in the Venetian Provinces, which soon spreads to all the chief Towns—Consternation at Venice—The Senate send Deputies to Napoléon—His Duplicity, and refusal to act against the Insurgents, or let the Venetians do so—Venetians at last resolve to crush the Insurrection—Hostilities break out between the two Parties—The Counter-Insurrection spreads immensely—Continued Indecision of the Venetian Senate in regard to France—Affected anger of Napoléon—Massacre at Verona, which is speedily suppressed by the French Troops—Massacre at Lido—Efforts of the Venetian Senate to avert the storm—Resources still at the command of Venice—War declared by Napoléon against Venice—Manifestoes on both sides—Universal Revolt of the Continental Towns of the Venetian Territory—Anarchy in Venice itself—The Senate abdicate their authority—The Populace still endeavour to resist the Subjugation of the State—But Venice falls—Joy of the Democratic Party—Treaty of 17th May between Napoléon and Venice—State of the Armies on the Rhine—Passage of that River at Diersheim, and Defeat of the Austrians—Operations cut short by the armistice of Leoben—Commencement of operations by Hoche on the Lower Rhine—Passage of that River forced at Neuwied—Defeat of the Austrians—Hostilities stopped by the armistice of Leoben—State of Prussia during this year—Its Policy—Death of the King—His Character—Accession of Frederick William III—His Character—Early Measures and Policy—Retrospect of the Astonishing Successes of Napoléon—Commencement of the Negotiations at Udina in Italy—Splendour of Napoléon's Court there—Revolution at Genoa brought about by the French—The Senate defeat the Insurgents—The French then Interfere—and vigorously support the Democratic Party—Senate upon this Submit—Violent Passions of the People—Rural Insurrection breaks out—which is suppressed—Deplorable Humiliation of Piedmont—Negotiations between England and France opened at Lisle—Moderation of England—They are broken off by the vehemence and arrogance of France—Progress of the Negotiations at Udina—Terms are at length agreed to—Simulated arrogance and real fears of Napoléon—His Secret Motives for Signing this Treaty—The Directory had forbid the Spoliation of Venice—Its Infamy rests exclusively on Napoléon—Terms of the Treaty of Campo Formio—Its Secret Articles—Horror excited at Venice by the Publication of the Treaty—Great Sensation excited by this event in Europe—Infamous Conduct of Napoléon in this transaction—Important light which it throws upon his Character—Atrocious Conduct of Austria—Weakness of the Venetian Aristocracy—Insanity of the Democratic Party—Striking Contrast exhibited at the same period by the Nobility and People of England.

THE year 1797 was far from realizing the brilliant prospects which Mr. Pitt had formed for the campaign, and which the recent alliance with the

Russia  
receded from  
the con-  
templated  
measures of  
Catharine.

Empress Catharine had rendered so likely to be fulfilled. The death of that great princess, who, alone with the British statesman, appreciated the full extent of the danger, and the necessity of vigorous measures to counteract it, dissolved all the projected armaments. The Emperor Paul, who succeeded her, countermanded the great levy of 150,000 men, which she had ordered for the French war; and so far from evincing any disposition to mingle in the contentions of Southern Europe, seemed absorbed only in the domestic concerns of his vast empire. Prussia was still neutral, and it was ascertained that a considerable time must elapse before the veterans of the Archduke could be drawn from the Upper Rhine to defend the Alpine frontier of the Hereditary States. Every thing, therefore, conspired to indicate, that by an early and vigorous effort, a fatal blow might be struck at the heart of the Austrian power, before the resources of the monarchy could be collected to repel it (1).

Plans of the  
Directory.

Aware of the necessity of commencing operations early in spring, Napoléon had in the beginning of the preceding winter urged the Directory to send him powerful reinforcements, and put forth the strength of the Republic in a quarter where the barriers of the Imperial dominions were already in a great measure overcome. Every thing indicated that that was the most vulnerable side on which the enemy could be assailed, but the jealousy of the government prevented them from placing the major part of their forces at the disposal of so ambitious and enterprising a general as the Italian conqueror. Obstinate adhering to the plan of Carnot, which all the disasters of the preceding campaign had not taught them to distrust, they directed Hoche to send his forces to the army of the Sambre and Meuse, of which he received the command, while large reinforcements were also dispatched to the army of the Rhine; the plan being to open the campaign with two armies of eighty thousand each in Germany, acting independent of each other, and on a parallel and far distant line of operations. The divisions of Bernadotte and Delmas, above twenty thousand strong, were sent from the Rhine to strengthen the Army of Italy. These brave men crossed the Alps in the depth of winter (2). In ascending Mont Cenis, a violent snow-storm arose, and the guides recommended a halt; but the officers ordered the drums to beat and the charge to sound, and they faced the tempest as they would have rushed upon the enemy.

Bernadotte  
and Del-  
mas's divi-  
sions join  
Napoléon.

The arrival of these troops raised the army immediately under the command of Napoléon to sixty-one thousand men, independent of sixteen thousand who were scattered from Ancona to Milan, and employed in overawing the Pope, and securing the rear and communications of the army. Four divisions, destined for immediate operations, were assembled in the Trevisane March in the end of February; viz. that of Masséna at Bassano, Serrurier at Castelbranco, Augereau at Treviso, and Bernadotte at Padua. Joubert, with his own division, reinforced by those of Delmas and Baraguay D'Hilliers, was stationed in Tyrol, to make head against the formidable forces which the Imperialists were assembling in that warlike province (3).

Disposition  
of his forces.

Meanwhile the Austrian government had been actively employed during the winter in taking measures to repair the losses of the campaign, and make head against the redoubtable enemy who threatened

(1) Th. ix. Jom. x. 12.

(2) Jom. x. 20, 24. Th. 49, 51.

(3) Jom. x. 26. Th. ix. 61.

them on the Carinthian frontiers. The great successes of the Archduke in Germany had filled them with the strongest hopes that the talents and influence of that youthful general would succeed in stemming the torrent of invasion from the Italian plains. As their veteran forces in Italy had almost all perished in the disastrous campaign of 1796, they resolved to bring thirty thousand men, under the Archduke in person, from the Upper Rhine, to oppose Napoléon, leaving only one corps there under Latour, and another under Werneck on the lower part of the river, to make head against the Republican armies. Fresh levies of men were made in Bohemia, Illyria, and Galicia; the contingents of Tyrol were quadrupled; and the Hungarian nobility, imitating the example of their ancestors in the time of Maria Theresa, voted twenty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry, besides immense stores of provisions and forage, for the ensuing campaign. These forces, and Nov. Great spirit in the Revolutionary States. speedily raised, were animated with that firm and persevering spirit which has always characterised the Austrian nation; the enthusiasm of the people, awakened by the near approach of danger, rose to the highest pitch; and the recruits, hastily moved forward, soon filled the shattered battalions on the banks of the Tagliamento. But new levies, however brave, do not at once form soldiers; the young recruits were no match for the veterans of Napoléon; and by an inexplicable tardiness, attended with the most disastrous effects, the experienced soldiers from the army of the Rhine were not brought up till it was too late for them to be of any service in the issue of the campaign (1).

Napoléon anticipates the arrival of the Austrian veterans. Anxious to strike a decisive blow before this great reinforcement arrived, Napoléon commenced operations on the 10th March, when the Archduke had only assembled thirty thousand men on the Tagliamento, and when three weeks must yet elapse before the like number of veteran troops could even begin to arrive from the Rhine. Nothing demonstrates more clearly the vital importance of time in war; to this fatal delay all the disasters of the campaign were immediately owing. What could the Archduke do with half the forces opposed to him in arresting the progress of the conqueror of Italy? The summits of the Alps were still resplendent with snow and ice, but this only inflamed the ambition of the youthful hero (2).

Dangers of that plan In commencing operations thus early, however, the French general incurred a fearful risk. The armies of the Republic on the Rhine were not in a condition to take the field for a month afterwards, and Napoléon was about to precipitate himself into the midst of the Austrian monarchy without any other support than what he could derive from his own forces. Had the Archduke been permitted to collect his army in the Tyrol, instead of Carinthia, there summoned to his standard the enthusiastic peasantry of that province, and fallen back, in case of need, on his reinforcements coming up from the Rhine, he would have covered Vienna just as effectually as on the direct road, accelerated by three weeks the junction with these forces, and probably totally changed the fate of the campaign. But it is hard to say whether the Aulic council or the Directory did most to ruin the designs of their victorious generals; for the former obliged the Archduke to assemble his army on the Tagliamento, instead of the Adige; while the latter refused to ratify the treaty with the King of Sardinia, by which Napoléon had calculated on a subsidiary force of ten thousand men, to protect the

(1) *Jom.* i. 9. 27, 28.(2) *Th.* ix. 63, 65. *Jom.* x. 27. *Nap.* iv. 68.

rear and maintain the communications of his army. To compensate this loss, he had laboured all the winter to conclude an alliance with the Venetian republic; but its haughty, yet timid aristocracy, worn out with the French exactions, not only declined his overtures, but manifested some symptoms of alienation from the Republican interest, which obliged the French general to leave a considerable force in the neighbourhood of Verona, to overawe their vacillating councils. Thus Napoléon was left alone to hazard an irruption into the Austrian states, and scale the Noric and Julian Alps with sixty thousand men, leaving on his left the warlike province of Tyrol, by which his communications with the Adige might be cut off, and on his right Croatia and the Venetian states, the first of which was warmly attached to the house of Austria, while the last might be expected, on the least reverse, to join the same standard (1).

Description  
of the  
theatre of  
war.

Three great roads lead from Verona across the Alps to Vienna; that of Tyrol, that of Carinthia, and that of Carniola. The first, following the line of the Adige by Bolzano and Brixen, crosses the ridge of the Brenner into the valley of the Inn, from whence it passes by Salzbουργ into that of the Danube, and descends to Vienna after passing the Ens. The second traverses the Vicentine and Trevisane Marches, crosses the Piave and the Tagliamento, surmounts the Alps by the Col-de-Tarwis, descends into Carinthia, crosses the Drave at Villach, and, by Klagenfurth and the course of the Muer, mounts the Simmering, from whence it descends into the plain of Vienna. The third by Carinthia, passes the Isonzo at Gradisca, goes through Laybach, crosses the Save and the Drave, enters Styria, passes Gratz, the capital of that province, and joins the immediately preceding road at Bruck. Five lateral roads lead from the chaussée of Tyrol to that of Carinthia; the first, branching off from Brixen, joins the other at Villach; the second, from Salzbουργ, leads to Spital; the third, from Lintz, traverses a lofty ridge to Judembourg; the fourth, from Ens, crosses to Leoben; the fifth, from Pollen, to Bruck. Three cross-roads unite the chaussée of Carinthia with that of Carniola; the first branches off from Gonzia, and following the course of the Isonzo, joins, at Tarwis, the route of Carinthia (2); the second connects Laybach and Klagenfurth; the third, setting out from Marburg, also terminates at Klagenfurth.

And rivers. The rivers which descend from this chain of mountains into the Adriatic sea, did not present any formidable obstacles. The Piave and the Tagliamento were hardly defensible; and although the line of the Isonzo was far stronger, yet it was susceptible of being turned by the Col-de-Tarwis. By accumulating the mass of his forces on his own left, and penetrating through the higher ridges, Napoléon perceived that he would overcome all the obstacles which nature had opposed to his advance, and turn all the Austrian positions by the Alps which commanded them. He directed Masséna, accordingly, to turn the right flank of the enemy with his powerful division, while the three others attacked them in front at the same time. Joubert, with seventeen thousand men, received orders to force the passes of the Italian Tyrol, and drive the enemy over the Brenner; and Victor, who was still on the Apennines, was destined to move forward with his division, which successive additions would raise to twenty thousand men, to the Adige, to keep in check the Venetian levies, and secure the com-

Napoléon  
resolves to  
turn the  
Austrian  
right.

(1) *Jom.* x. 28. *Nap.* iv. 69, 73. *Th.* ix. 63, 64.

(2) *Nap.* iv. 71, 72. *Jom.* x. 29, 30. *Th.* ix. 64, 65.

munications of the army. Thirty-five thousand of the Austrian forces, under the Archduke in person, were assembled on the left bank of the Tagliamento; the remainder of his army, fifteen thousand strong, were in Tyrol at Bolzano, while thirty thousand of his best troops were only beginning their march from the Upper Rhine (1).

Napoléon's  
proclama-  
tion to his  
soldiers.

Napoléon moved his headquarters to Bassano on the 9th March, and addressed the following order of the day to his army : —“ Soldiers ! The fall of Mantua has terminated the war in Italy, which has given you eternal titles to the gratitude of your country. You have been victorious in fourteen pitched battles and seventy combats : you have made 100,000 prisoners, taken 500 pieces of field artillery, 2,000 of heavy calibre, and four sets of pontoons. The contributions you have levied on the vanquished countries have clothed, fed, and paid the army, and you have, besides, sent 30,000,000 of francs to the public treasury. You have enriched the Museum of Paris with 300 *chefs-d'œuvre* of art, the produce of thirty centuries. You have conquered the finest countries in Europe for the Republic; the Transpadane and Cispadane Republics owe to you their freedom. The French colours now fly, for the first time, on the shores of the Adriatic, in front, and within twenty-four hours sail of the country of Alexander ! The Kings of Sardinia, of Naples, the Pope, the Duke of Parma, have been detached from the coalition. You have chased the English from Leghorn, Genoa, Corsica ; and now still higher destinies await you : you will show yourselves worthy of them ! of all the enemies who were leagued against the Republic, the Emperor alone maintains the contest ; but he is blindly led by that perfidious cabinet, which, a stranger to the evils of war, smiles at the sufferings of the Continent. Peace can no longer be found but in the heart of the Hereditary States : in seeking it there, you will respect the religion, the manners, the property of a brave people : you will bring freedom to the valiant Hungarian nation (2).

Great inter-  
est excited  
in Europe  
by the  
approaching  
contest.

The approaching contest between the Archduke Charles and Napoléon excited the utmost interest throughout Europe, both from the magnitude of the cause with they respectively bore upon their swords, and the great deeds which, on different theatres, they had severally achieved. The one appeared resplendent, from the conquest of Italy ; the other illustrious, from the deliverance of Germany : the age of both was the same ; their courage equal, their mutual respect reciprocal. But their dispositions were extremely different, and the resources on which they had to rely in the contest which was approaching, as various as the causes which they supported. The one was audacious and impetuous ; the other, calm and judicious : the first was at the head of troops hitherto unconquered ; the last, of soldiers dispirited by disaster : the former combated not with arms alone, but the newly-roused passions ; the latter with the weapons only of the ancient faith : the Republican army was the more numerous ; the Imperial the more fully equipped : on the victory of Napoléon depended the maintenance of the Republican sway in Italy ; on the success of the Archduke, the existence of the empire of the Cæsars in Germany. On the other hand, the people of the provinces, around and behind the theatre of war, were attached to the Austrians, and hostile to the French ; retreat, therefore, was the policy of the former, impetuous advance of the latter ; victory by the one was to be won by rapidity of attack ; success could be hoped

(1) *Jour. i. 33. Nap. iv. 72, 73. Tb. ix. 67.*

(2) *Nap. iv. 76.*



for by the other only by protracting the contest. Great reinforcements were hastening to the Archduke from the Rhine, the Hereditary States, and Hungary, while his adversary could expect no assistance, beyond what he at first brought into action. Success at first, therefore, seemed within the grasp of Napoléon; but if the contest could be protracted, it might be expected to desert the Republican for the Imperial banners (1).

Passage of  
the Tagliamento.

On the 10th March all the columns of the army were in motion, though the weather was still rigorous, and snow to the depth of several feet encumbered the higher passes of the mountains. Masséna's advanced guard first came into action; he set out from Bassano, crossed the Piave in the mountains, came up with the division of Lusignan, which he defeated, with the loss of 500 prisoners, among whom was that general himself. By pressing forward through the higher Alps, he compelled the Archduke, to avoid his right flank being turned, to fall back from the Piave to the Tagliamento, and concentrate his army behind the latter stream. On the 16th March, at nine o'clock in the morning, the three divisions of the French army, destined to act under Napoléon in person, were drawn up in front of the Austrian force, on the right bank of the Tagliamento. This stream, after descending from the mountains, separates into several branches, all of which are fordable, and covers the ground for a great extent between them with stones and gravel. The Imperial squadrons, numerous and magnificently appointed, were drawn up on the opposite shore, ready to fall on the French infantry the moment that they crossed the stream; and a vast array of artillery already scattered its balls among its numerous branches. Napoléon, seeing the enemy so well prepared, had recourse to a stratagem: he ordered the troops to retire without the reach of the enemy's fire, establish a bivouac, and begin to cook their victuals; the Archduke, conceiving all chance of attack over for the day, withdrew his forces into their camp in the rear. When all was quiet, the signal was given by the French general: the soldiers ran to arms, and, forming with inconceivable rapidity, advanced quickly in columns by echelon, flanking each other in the finest order, and precipitated themselves into the river. The precision, the beauty of the movements, resembled the exercise of a field-day; never did an army advance upon the enemy in a more majestic or imposing manner. The troops vied with each other in the regularity and firmness of their advance. "Soldiers of the Rhine," exclaimed Bernadotte, "the army of Italy is watching your conduct." The rival divisions reached the stream at the same time, and, fearlessly plunging into the water, soon gained the opposite shore. The Austrian cavalry, hastening to the spot, charged the French infantry on the edge of the water, but it was too late; they were already established in battle array on the left bank. Soon the firing became general along the whole line; but the Archduke, seeing the passage achieved, his flank turned, and being unwilling to engage in a decisive action before the arrival of his divisions from the Rhine, ordered a retreat; and the French light troops pursued him four miles from the field of battle. In this action the Imperialists lost six pieces of cannon and 500 men: and, what was of more importance, the prestige of a first success. In truth, the Archduke never regained the confidence of his soldiers in contending with the conqueror of Italy (2).

Operations  
of Masséna  
on the left.

Meanwhile Masséna, on the central road, had effected his passage at St.-Daniel. Soon after, he made himself master of Osopo, the key

(1) Bot. ii. 172. 173.

(2) Nap. iv. 70, 79. Th. ix. 67, 71. Jom. x. 33.



of the *chaussée* of the Ponteba, which was not occupied in force, pushed on to the Venetian *chiusa*, a narrow gorge, rudely fortified, which he also carried, and drove the Austrian division of Ocksay before him to the ridge of Tarwis (1).

The occupation of the Ponteba by Masséna, prevented the Archduke from continuing his retreat by the direct road to Carinthia; he resolved, therefore, to regain it by the cross-road, which follows the blue and glittering waters of the Isonzo, because the Carinthian road, being the most direct, was the one which Napoléon would probably follow in his advance upon Vienna. For this purpose he dispatched his parks of artillery, and the division of Bayalitch, by the Isonzo towards Tarwis, while the remainder of his forces retired by the

17th March. Lower Isonzo. The day after the battle of the Tagliamento, Napoléon occupied Palma Nuova, where he found immense magazines, and soon after pushed on to Gradisca, situated on the Lower Isonzo, and garrisoned by

19th March. three thousand men. Bernadotte's division arrived first before the place, and instantly plunging into the torrent, which at that time was uncommonly low, notwithstanding a shower of balls from two thousand Croa-

Passage of the Isonzo by Bernadotte. tians stationed on the opposite shore, succeeded in forcing the passage, from whence he rashly advanced to assault the place. A terrible fire of

grape and musketry, which swept off 500 men, speedily repulsed this attack; but while the Imperialists were congratulating themselves upon their success, the division of Serrurier, which had crossed in another

quarter, appeared on the heights in the rear, upon which they laid down their arms, in number 2000, with ten pieces of artillery, and eight standards. This success had most important consequences: the division of

Bernadotte marched upon and took possession of Laybach, while a thousand horse occupied Trieste, the greatest harbour of the Austrian monarchy; and

22d March. Serrurier ascended the course of the Isonzo, by Caporetto, and the Austrian *chiusa*, to regain at Tarwis the route of Carinthia (2).

Meanwhile Masséna, pursuing the broken remains of Ocksay's division, made himself master of the important Col-de-Tarwis, the

crest of the Alps, commanding both the valleys descending to Carinthia and Dalmatia. The Archduke immediately foresaw the

danger which the division of Bayalitch would incur, pressed in rear by the victorious troops which followed it up the Isonzo, and blocked

up in front by the division of Masséna, at the upper end of the defile, on the ridge of Tarwis. He resolved, therefore, at all hazards, to retake that impor-

tant station; and for this purpose, hastened in person to Klagenfurth, on the northern side of the great chain of the Alps, and put himself at the head of a

division of five thousand grenadiers, who had arrived at that place the day before from the Rhine, and with these veteran troops advanced to retake the

passage. He was at first successful; and after a sharp action, established himself on the summit with the grenadiers and the division of Ocksay. But Mas-

22d March. séna, who was well aware of the importance of this post, upon the possession of which the fate of the Austrian division coming up the Isonzo, and the issue of the campaign depended, made the most vigorous efforts to regain his

ground. The troops on both sides fought with the utmost resolution, and both commanders exposed their persons like the meanest of the soldiers; the can-

(1) Th. ix. 72. Nap. iv. 79.

(2) Nap. iv. 81, 83. Th. ix. 72, 73. Join, x. 39, 41.

It is finally won by the Republicans. ice; the infantry struggled through drifts of snow. At length the obstinate courage of Masséna prevailed over the persevering resolution of his adversary; and the Archduke, after having exhausted his last reserve, was compelled to give way, and yield the possession of the blood-stained snows of Tarwis to the Republican soldiers (1).

No sooner had the French general established himself on this important station, than he occupied in force both the defiles leading to Villach, whither the Archduke had retired, and those descending to the Austrian chiusa, where Bayalitch's division was expected soon to appear. Meanwhile, that general, encumbered with artillery and ammunition-waggons, was slowly ascending the vine-clad course of the Isonzo, and, having at length passed the gates of the Austrian chiusa, he deemed himself secure, under the shelter of that almost impregnable barrier. But nothing could withstand the attack of the French. The fourth regiment, surnamed "the Impetuous," scaled, with infinite difficulty, the rocks which overhung the left of the position, while a column of infantry assailed it in front; and the Austrian detachment, finding itself thus turned, laid down its arms. No resource now remained to Bayalitch; shut up in a narrow valley, between impassable mountains, he was pressed in rear by the victorious troops of Serurier, and in front found his advance stopped by the vanguard of Masséna on the slopes of the Tarwis. A number of Croats escaped over the mountains by throwing away their arms, but the greater part of the division, consisting of the general himself, 3500 men, twenty-five pieces of cannon, and 400 artillery or baggage-waggons, fell into the hands of the Republicans (2).

Bayalitch's division is surrounded and made prisoners. Napoléon had now gained the crest of the Alps; headquarters were successively transferred to Caporetto, Tarwis, Villach, and Klagenfurth; the army passed the Drave on the bridge of Villach, which the Imperialists had not time to burn; and found itself on the streams which descend to the Danube. The Alps were passed; the scenery, the manners, the houses, the cultivation, all bore the character of Germany. The soldiers admired the good-humour and honesty of the peasants, the invariable characteristic of the Gothic race; the quantity of vegetables, of horses and chariots, proved of the utmost service to the army. Klagenfurth, surrounded by a ruined rampart, was slightly defended: the French had no sooner made themselves masters of that town, than they restored the fortifications, and established magazines of stores and provisions; while the whole English merchandise found in Trieste, was, according to the usual custom of the Republicans, confiscated for their use (3).

Napoléon crosses the ridge of the Alps. Occupies Klagenfurth. While these important operations were going forward in Carinthia, Joubert had gained decisive successes in the Italian Tyrol. No sooner had the battle of the Tagliamento expelled the Imperialists from Italy, than that general received orders to avail himself of his numerical superiority, and drive the Austrians over the Brenner. He commenced the attack, accordingly, on the 20th March. The Imperialists were in two divisions, one under Kerpen, on the Lavis, in the valley of the Adige; the other under Laudon, in the mountains near Neumarkt. The former, encamped on the plateau of Cembra, on the river Lavis, were assailed by Joubert with superior forces, and, after a short action, driven back to Bolsano with the loss of two thousand five hundred prisoners, and seven pieces of cannon. The

(1) Nap. iv. 80, 81. Th. ix. 74, 75.

(2) Nap. iv. 83, 84. Jom. x. 46, 47. Th. ix. 75.

(3) Nap. iv. 84, 86.

French, after this success, separated into two divisions; the first, under Baguay D'Hilliers, pursued the broken remains of Kerpen's forces on the great road to Bolsano, while the second, composed of the *élite* of the troops under Joubert in person, advanced against Laudon, who had come up to Neumarkt, in the endeavour to re-establish his communication with Kerpen. The Imperialists, attacked by superior forces, were routed, with the loss of several pieces of cannon and a thousand prisoners; while, on the same day, the other division of the army entered Bolsano without opposition, and made itself master of all the magazines it contained (1).

Desperate action at the Pass of Clausen. Bolsano is situated at the junction of the valleys of the Adige and the Eisach. To command both, Joubert left Delmas, with five thousand men, in that town, and himself advanced in person with the remainder of his forces up the narrow and rocky defile which leads by the banks of the Eisach to Brixten. Kerpen awaited him in the position of Clausen—a romantic and seemingly impregnable pass, three miles above Bolsano, where the mountains approach each other so closely, as to leave only the bed of the stream and the breadth of the road between their frowning brows. An inaccessible precipice shuts in the pass on the southern side, while on the northern a succession of wooded and rocky peaks rises in wild variety from the raging torrent to the naked cliffs, three thousand feet above. 24th March. Early in the morning, the French presented themselves at the jaws of this formidable defile; but the Austrian and Tyrolean marksmen, perched on the cliffs and in the woods, kept up so terrible a fire upon the road, that column after column, which advanced to the attack, was swept away. For the whole day the action continued, without the Republicans gaining any Which is at length carried. advantage; but towards evening, their active light infantry succeeded in scaling the rocky heights on the right of the Imperialists, and rolled down great blocks of stone, which rendered the pass no longer tenable (2). Joubert, at the same time, charged rapidly in front, at the head of two regiments formed in close column; and the Austrians, unable to withstand this combined effort, fell back towards Brixen, which was soon after occupied by their indefatigable pursuers.

The invasion of Tyrol, so far from daunting, tended only to animate the spirit of the peasantry in that populous and warlike district. Kerpen, as he fell back, distributed numerous proclamations, which soon brought crowds 24th March. of expert and dauntless marksmen to his standard; and, reinforced by these, he took post at Mittenwald, hoping to cover both the great road over Mount Brenner, and the lateral one which ascended the Pusterthal. But he was attacked with such vigour by General Belliard, at the head of the French infantry in close column, that he was unable to maintain his ground, and driven from the castellated heights of Sterzing to take post on the summit of the Brenner, the last barrier of Innspruck, still covered with the snows of winter. The alarm spread through the whole of Tyrol; an attack on its capital was hourly expected; and it was thought the enemy intended to penetrate across the valley of the Inn, and join the invading force on the Rhine (3).

But Joubert, notwithstanding his successes, was now in a dangerous position. The accounts he received from Bolsano depicted in glowing colours the progress of the levy *en masse*; and although he was at the head of twelve

(1) Nap. iv. 89. Jom. x. 51, 52.  
(2) Jom. x. 53. Nap. iv. 89, 90.

(3) Jom. x. 54, 55. Nap. iv. 89, 90. Th. ix. 76.

4th April.  
He marches  
across  
to join  
Napoléon at  
Klagenfurth.

thousand men, it was evidently highly dangerous either to remain where he was, in the midst of a warlike province in a state of insurrection, or advance unsupported over the higher Alps into the valley of the Inn. There was no alternative, therefore, but to retrace his steps down the Adige, or join Napoléon by the cross-road from Brixen, through the Pusterthal, to Klagenfurth. He preferred the latter; brought up Delmas with his division from Bolsano, and, setting out in the beginning of April, joined the main army in Carinthia with all his forces and five thousand prisoners, leaving Servier to make head as he best could against the formidable force which Laudon was organizing in the valley of the Upper Adige (1).

Results  
of these  
actions.

Thus, in twenty days after the campaign opened, the army of the Archduke was driven over the Julian Alps; the French occupied Carniola, Carinthia, Trieste, Fiume, and the Italian Tyrol; and a formidable force of forty-five thousand men, flushed with victory, was on the northern declivity of the Alps, within sixty leagues of Vienna. On the other hand, the Austrians, dispirited by disaster, and weakened by defeat, had lost a fourth of their number in the different actions which had occurred, while the forces on the Rhine were at so great a distance as to be unable to take any part in the defence of the capital (2).

Perilous  
condition,  
notwith-  
standing, of  
Napoléon.

But notwithstanding all this, the situation of the Republican armies, in many respects, was highly perilous. An insurrection was breaking out in the Venetian provinces, which it was easy to see would ultimately involve that power in hostilities with the French government; Laudon was advancing by rapid strides in the valley of the Adige, with no adequate force to check his operation; and the armies of the Rhine were so far from being in a condition to afford any effectual assistance, that they had not yet crossed that frontier river. The French army could not descend unsupported into the valley of the Danube, for it had not cavalry sufficient to meet the numerous and powerful squadrons of the Imperialists; and what were forty-five thousand men in the heart of the Austrian empire? These considerations, which long had weighed with Napoléon, became doubly cogent, from a despatch received on the 31st March, at Klagenfurth, which announced that Moreau's troops could not enter upon the campaign for want of boats to cross the Rhine, and that the army of Italy must reckon upon no support from the other forces of the Republic. It is evident, notwithstanding the extreme pecuniary distress of the government, that there was something designed in this dilatory conduct, which endangered the bravest army and all the conquests of the Republic; but they had already conceived that jealousy of their victorious general, which subsequent events so fully justified, and apprehended less danger from a retreat before the Imperial forces, than a junction of their greatest armies under such an aspiring leader (3).

He, in con-  
sequence,  
makes pro-  
posals of  
peace to the  
Archduke.

Deprived of all prospect of that co-operation on which he had relied in crossing the Alps, Napoléon wisely determined to forego all thoughts of dictating peace under the walls of Vienna, and contented himself with making the most of his recent successes, by obtaining advantageous terms from the Austrian government. A few hours, accordingly, after receiving the despatch of the Directory, he addressed to the Archduke Charles one of those memorable letters, which, almost as much as his campaigns, bear the stamp of his powerful and impassioned mind:

(1) Jom. x. Nap. iv. 90-91.  
(2) Jom. x. 53. Nap. iv. 91.

(3) Nap. iv. 93, 94. Jom. x. 60, 61. Th. ix. 22.

3rd March. —“General-in-chief,—Brave soldiers make war, and desire peace. Has not this war already continued six years? Have we not slain enough of our fellow-creatures, and inflicted a sufficiency of woes on suffering humanity? It demands repose on all sides. Europe, which took up arms against the French Republic, has laid them aside. Your nation alone remains, and yet blood is about to flow in as great profusion as ever. This sixth campaign has commenced with sinister omens; but whatever may be its issue, we shall kill, on one side and the other, many thousand men, and, nevertheless, at last come to an accommodation, for every thing has a termination, even the passions of hatred. The Directory has already evinced to the Imperial government its anxious wish to put a period to hostilities; the Court of London alone broke off the negotiation. But you, general-in-chief, who, by your birth, approach so near the throne, and are above all the little passions which too often govern ministers and governments, are you resolved to deserve the title of benefactor of humanity, and of the real saviour of Germany? Do not imagine, general, from this, that I conceive that you are not in a situation to save it by force of arms; but even in such an event, Germany will not be the less ravaged. As for myself, if the overture which I have the honour to make, shall be the means of saving a single life, I shall be more proud of the civic crown, which I shall be conscious of having deserved, than of the melancholy glory attending military success.” The Archduke returned

2d April. a polite and dignified answer, in these terms:—“In the duty which is assigned to me there is no power either to scrutinize the causes, nor terminate the duration of the war; and, as I am not invested with any powers in that respect, you will easily conceive that I can enter into no negotiation without express authority from the Imperial government.” It is remarkable how much more Napoléon, a Republican general, here assumed the language and exercised the power of an independent sovereign, than his illustrious opponent (1); a signal proof how early he contemplated that supreme authority which his extraordinary abilities so well qualified him to attain.

2d April. To support his negotiations, the French general pressed the Imperialists with all his might in their retreat. Early on the 1st  
 And at the same time severely pressed the retreating Imperialists. April, Masséna came up with the Austrian rear-guard in advance of Freisach; they were instantly attacked, routed, and driven into the town pell-mell with the victors. Next day, Napoléon, continuing his march, found himself in presence of the Archduke in person, who had collected the greater part of his army, reinforced by four divisions recently arrived from the Rhine, to defend the gorge of Neumarkt. This terrific defile, which even a traveller can hardly traverse without a feeling of awe, offered the strongest position to a retreating army; and its mouth, with all the villages in the vicinity, was occupied in force by the Austrian grenadiers. The French general collected his forces; Masséna was directed to assemble all his division on the left of the chaussée; the division of Guieux was placed on the heights on the right, and Serrurier in reserve. At three in the afternoon the attack commenced at all points; the soldiers of the Rhine challenged the veterans of the Italian army to equal the swiftness of their advance; and the rival corps, eagerly watching each other's steps, precipitated themselves with irresistible force upon the enemy. The Austrians, after a short action, fell back in confusion; and the Archduke took advantage of the approach of night to retire to Hundsmark. In this affair the

(1) Nap. iv. 96, 97.



Imperialists lost 1500 men, although the division of Masséna was alone seriously engaged. Napoléon instantly pushed on to Schufing, a military post of great importance, as it was situated at the junction of the cross-road from the Tyrol and the great chaussée to Vienna, which was carried after a rude combat; and on the following day he despatched Guieux down the rugged

3d April. defiles of the Muer in pursuit of the column of Sporck, which, after a sharp action with the French advanced-guard, succeeded in joining the

Napoléon pushes on to Judenberg, and the Archduke retires towards Vienna.

main army of the Imperialists by the route of Rastadt. Two days after, Napoléon pushed on to Judenberg, where headquarters were established on the 6th April, and then halted to collect his scattered forces, while the advanced-guard occupied the village of Leoben. The Archduke now resolved to leave the mountains, and concentrate all his divisions in the neighbourhood of Vienna, where the whole resources of the monarchy were to be collected, and the last battle fought for the independence of Germany (1).

Terror excited by these disasters.

This rapid advance excited the utmost consternation at the Austrian capital. In vain the Aulic Council strove to stem the torrent; in vain the lower orders surrounded the public offices, and demanded with loud cries to be enrolled for the defence of the country; the government yielded to the alarm, and terror froze every heart. The Danube was covered with boats conveying the archives and most precious articles beyond the reach of danger; the young archduke and archduchesses were sent to Hungary, amongst whom was MARIA LOUISA, then hardly six years of age, who afterwards became Empress of France. The old fortifications of Vienna, which had withstood the arms of the Turks, but had since fallen into decay, were hastily put into repair, and the militia directed to the intrenched camp of Marienhalf, to learn the art which might so soon be required for the defence of the capital (2).

7th April. Preliminaries agreed to at Leoben.

The Emperor, although endowed with more than ordinary firmness of mind, at length yielded to the torrent. On the 7th April, the Archduke's chief of the staff, Bellegarde, along with General Meerfeld, presented himself at the outposts, and a suspension of arms was agreed on at LEOBEN for five days. All the mountainous region, as far as the Simmring, was to be occupied by the French troops, as well as Gratz, the capital of Styria. On the 9th, the advanced posts established themselves on that ridge, the last of the Alps, before they sink into the Austrian plain, from whence, in a clear day, the steeples of the capital can be discerned; and on the same day headquarters were established at Leoben to conduct the negotiations. At the same time General Joubert arrived in the valley of the Drave, and Kerpen, by a circuitous route, joined the Archduke. The French army, which lately extended over the whole Alps, from Brixen to Trieste, was concentrated in cantonments in a small space, ready to debouche, in case of need, into the plain of Vienna (3).

Disastrous state of the French in Croatia and Tyrol.

While these decisive events were occurring in the Alps of Carinthia, the prospects of the French in Tyrol, Croatia, and Friuli were rapidly changing for the worse. An insurrection had taken place among the Croatians. Fiume was wrested from the Republicans, and

15th April. nothing but the suspension of arms prevented Trieste from falling  
19th April. into the hands of the insurgents. Such was the panic they occa-

(1) Nap. iv. 84, 100. Jom. x. 61, 65. Th. ix. 96, 97.

(2) Jom. x. 64. Nap. iv. 92, 93.

(3) Jom. x. 67. Th. ix. 98. Nap. iv. 102, 103.



sioned, that the detached parties of the French fled as far as Gorizia, on the Isonzo. Meanwhile Laudon, whose division was raised to twelve thousand by the insurrection in the Tyrol, descended the Adige, driving the inconsiderable division of Servier before him, who was soon compelled to take refuge within the walls of Verona. Thus, at the moment that the French centre, far advanced in the mountains, was about to bear the whole weight of the Austrian monarchy, its two wings were exposed, and an insurrection in progress, which threatened to cut off the remaining communications in its rear (1).

Extreme danger of Napoleon. The perilous situation of the French army cannot be better represented than in the words of Napoléon, in his despatch to the Directory, enclosing the preliminaries of Leoben. "The court had evacuated Vienna: the Archduke and his army were falling back on that of the Rhine; the people of Hungary, and of all the Hereditary States, were rising in mass, and at this moment the heads of their columns are on our flanks. The Rhine is not yet passed by our soldiers; the moment it is, the Emperor will put himself at the head of his armies, and although, if they stood their ground, I would, without doubt, have beat them, yet they could still have fallen back on the armies of the Rhine and overwhelmed me. In such a case retreat would have been difficult, and the loss of the army of Italy would have drawn after it that of the Republic. Impressed with these ideas, I had resolved to levy a contribution in the suburbs of Vienna, and attempt nothing more. I have not four thousand cavalry, and instead of the forty thousand infantry I was to have received, I have never got twenty. Had I insisted, in the commencement of the campaign, upon entering Turin, I would never have crossed the Po; had I agreed to the project of going to Rome, I would have lost the Milanese; had I persisted in advancing to Vienna, I would probably have ruined the Republic (2)."

When such were the views of the victorious party, the negotiation could not be long in coming to a conclusion. Napoléon, though not furnished with any powers to that effect from the Directory, took upon himself to act in the conferences like an independent sovereign. The Austrians attached great importance to the etiquette of the proceedings, and offered to recognise the French Republic if they were allowed the precedence; but Napoléon ordered that article to be withdrawn, "Efface that," said he: "the Republic is like the sun, which shines with its own light; the blind alone cannot see it. In truth," he adds, "such a condition was worse than useless; because, if one day the French people should wish to create a monarchy, the Emperor might object that he had recognised a Republic;" a striking proof how early the ambition of the young general had been fixed upon the throne (3).

Conditions of the preliminaries, 9th April, at Judenberg. As the French plenipotentiaries had not arrived, Napoléon, of his own authority, signed the treaty. Its principal articles were, 1. The cession of Flanders to the Republic, and the extension of its frontier to the Rhine, on condition of a suitable indemnity being provided to the Emperor in some other quarter. 2. The cession of Savoy to the same power, and the extension of its territory to the summit of the Piedmontese Alps. 3. The establishment of the Cisalpine Republic, including Lombardy, with the states of Modena, Cremona, and the Bergamasque. 4. The Oglio was fixed on as the boundary of the Austrian possessions in Italy. 5. The Emperor was to receive, in return for so many sacrifices, the whole

(1) Th. ix. 114. Jom. x. 60. Nap. iv. 104.

(2) Jom. x. 462. Pièces Just.

(3) Th. ix. 100. Nap. iv. 106.

*continental states of Venice*, including Iliria, Istria, Friuli, and the Upper Italy, as far as the Oglio. 6. Venice was to obtain, in return for the loss of its continental possessions, Romagna, Ferrara, and Bologna (1), which the French had wrested from the Pope. 7. The important fortresses of Mantua, Peschiera, Porto-Legnago, and Palma-Nuova, were to be restored to the Emperor, on the conclusion of a general peace, with the city and castles of Verona.

Enormous  
injustice of  
this treaty,  
as far as  
regards  
Venice.

With truth does Napoléon confess, that these arrangements were made “in hatred of Venice (2).” Thus did that daring leader, and the Austrian government, take upon themselves, without any declaration of war, or any actual hostilities with the Venetian government, to partition out the territories of that neutral Republic, for no other reason, than because they lay conveniently for one of the contracting powers, and afforded a plausible pretext for an enormous acquisition of territory by the other. The page of history, stained as it is with acts of oppression and violence, has nothing more iniquitous to present. It is darker in atrocity than the partition of Poland, and has only excited less indignation in subsequent years, because it was attended with no heroism or dignity in the vanquished. It reveals the melancholy truth, that small states have never so much reason to tremble for their independence, as when large ones in their neighbourhood are arranging the terms of peace; nor is it easy to say, whether the injustice of the proceeding is most apparent on the first statement of the spoliation, or on a review of the previous transactions which are referred to in its defence.

Venice, the queen of the Adriatic, seated on her throne of waters, had long sought to veil the weakened strength, and diminished courage of age, under a cautious and reserved neutrality. The oldest state in existence, having survived for nearly fourteen centuries, she had felt the weakness and timidity of declining years, before any serious reverse had been sustained in her fortunes, and was incapable of resisting the slightest attack, while as yet her external aspect exhibited no symptoms of decay. The traveller, as he glided through the palaces, which still rose, in undecaying beauty, from the waters of the Adriatic, no longer wondered at the astonishment with which the stern Crusaders of the north gazed at her marble piles, and felt the rapture of the Roman Emperor, when he approached where, “Venice sat in state, throned on her hundred isles;” but in the weak and pusillanimous crowd which he beheld on all sides, he looked in vain for the descendants of those brave men, who leaped from their galleys on the towers of Constantinople, and stood forth as the bulwark of Christendom against the Ottoman power; and still less, amidst the misery and dejection with which he was surrounded, could he go back in imagination to those days of liberty and valour,

State of  
Venice at  
this period.

—“when Venice once was dear,  
The pleasant place of all Festivity;  
The Revel of the Earth, the Mask of Italy.”

Its long-  
continued  
decline.

In truth, Venice exhibits one of the most curious and instructive instances which is to be found in modern history, of the decline of a state without any rude external shock, from the mere force of internal corruption, and the long-continued direction of the passions to selfish objects.

(1) Jom. x. 68, 69. Nap. iv. 106, 107. Th. ix. 104, 105. (2) Nap. iv. 107.

The league of Cambray, indeed, had shaken its power; the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope had dried up part of its resources, and the augmentation of the strength of the Transalpine monarchies had diminished its relative importance; but still its wealth and population were such as to entitle it to a respectable rank among the European states, and if directed by energy and courage, would have given it a preponderating weight in the issue of this campaign. But centuries of peace had dissolved the courage of the higher orders; ages of corruption had extinguished the patriotism of the people, and the continued pursuits of selfish gratification had rendered all classes incapable of the sacrifices which exertions for their country required. The arsenals were empty; the fortifications decayed; the fleet, which once ruled the Adriatic, was rotting in the Lagunæ; and the army, which formerly faced the banded strength of Europe in the league of Cambray, was drawn entirely from the semi-barbarous provinces on the Turkish frontier (1). With such a population, nothing grand or generous could be attempted; but it was hardly to be expected that the country of Dandolo and Carmagnola should yield without a struggle, and the eldest born of the European commonwealths sink unpitied into the grave of nations.

Rapid  
progress of  
democratic  
ideas in the  
cities of the  
Venetian  
territory.

The proximity of the Venetian continental provinces to those which had recently been revolutionized by the Republican arms, and the sojourning of the French armies among the ardent youth of its principal cities, naturally and inevitably led to the rapid propagation of democratic principles among their inhabitants. This took place more particularly, after the victories of Rivoli and the fall of Mantua had dispelled all dread of the return of the Austrian forces. Every where revolutionary clubs and committees were formed in the towns, who corresponded with the Republican authorities at Milan, and openly expressed a wish to throw off the yoke of the Venetian oligarchy. During the whole winter of 1796, the democratic party, in all the continental states of Venice, were in a state of unceasing agitation; and although Napoléon was far from desirous of involving his rear in hostilities, when actively engaged in the defiles of the Noric Alps, yet he felt anxious to establish a party able to counteract the efforts of the Venetian government, which already began to take umbrage at the menacing language and avowed sedition of their disaffected subjects. For this purpose, he secretly enjoined Captain Landrieux, chief of the staff to the cavalry, to correspond with the malcontents, and give unity and effect to their operations; while, to preserve the appearance of neutrality, he gave orders to General Kelmaine to direct all the officers and soldiers under his command to give neither counsel nor assistance to the disaffected (2).

Which are  
secretly  
encouraged  
by Napoléon.

Landrieux undertook a double part: while, on the one hand, in obedience to Napoléon's commands, and in conjunction with the ardent democrats of the Italian towns, he excited the people to revolt, and organized the means of their resistance; on the other, he entered into a secret correspondence with the Venetian government, and dispatched his agent, Stephani, to Ottolini, the chief magistrate of Bergamo, to detail the nature and extent of the conspiracy which was on foot, and inform him that it went to separate entirely its continental possessions from the Venetian Republic (3). By this

(1) Jom. x. 115.

(2) Corresp. Confid. de Nap. iv. 289. Jom. x. 120, 121. Botta, ii. 189, 190, 191. Nap. iv. 129.

(3) "Landrieux," said Napoléon, in his Secret Despatch to the Directory, "instigated the revolt in

Bergamo and Brescia, and was paid for it; at the same time he revealed the plot to the Venetian Government, and was paid for that also by them." —Corresp. confid. iv. 289.

double perfidy did this hypocritical chief of the staff render inevitable a rupture between France and Venice; for while, on the one hand, he excited the democratic party against the government; on the other, he gave the government too good reason to adopt measures of coercion against the democratic party and their French allies (1).

It is an easy matter to excite the passions of democracy; but it is rarely that the authors of the flame can make it stop short at the point which they desire. The vehement language and enthusiastic conduct of the French soldiers, brought on an explosion in the Venetian territories sooner than was expedient for the interests either of the general or the army. Napoléon's constant object was, by the terror of an insurrection in their continental possessions, to induce the government to unite cordially in a league with France, and make the desired concessions to the popular party; but having failed in his endeavours, he marched for the Tagliamento, leaving the seeds of an insurrection ready to explode in all the provinces in his rear. On the morn-

**Democratic insurrection breaks out in the Venetian provinces.** ing of the 12th March, the revolt broke out at Bergamo, in consequence of the arrest of the leaders of the insurrection; the insurgents declared openly that they were supported by the French, and dispatched couriers to Milan and the principal towns of Lombardy to obtain succour, and besought the Republican commander of the castle to support them with his forces, but he declined to interfere ostensibly in their behalf, though he countenanced their projected union with the Cisalpine Republic. A provisional government was immediately established, which instantly announced to the Cispadane Republic that Bergamo had recovered its liberty, and their desire to be united with that state, and concluded with these words: "Let us live, let us fight, and, if necessary, die together; thus should all free people do; let us then for ever remain united; you, the French, and ourselves (2)."

**Which soon spreads to all the chief towns.** The example speedily spread to other towns. Brescia, under the instigation of Landrieux, openly threw off its allegiance, and disarmed the Venetian troops, in presence of the French soldiers, who neither checked nor supported the insurrection. At Crema, the insurgents were introduced into the gates by a body of French cavalry, and speedily overturned the Venetian authorities, and proclaimed their union with the Cispadane Republic (3).

**Consternation at Venice.** These alarming revolts excited the utmost consternation at Venice; and the Senate, not daring to act openly against insurgents who declared themselves supported by the Republican commanders, wrote to the Directory, and dispatched Pesaro to the headquarters of Napoléon, to complain of the countenance given by his troops to the revolt of their subjects.

**Venetians send deputies to Napoléon. His duplicity.** The Venetian deputies came up with the French general at Gorizia; he feigned surprise at the intelligence, but endeavoured to take advantage of the terror of the Republic to induce them to submit to increased exactions. They represented that the French armies had occupied the principal fortresses and castles of the Republic, and that, having thus obtained the vantage-ground, they were bound either to take some steps to show that they disapproved of the revolt, which was organized in their name, or to cede these places to the Republic, and permit them to exert their own strength in restoring order in their dominions. Napoléon positively declined

(1) Des. Conf. de Nap. Conf. Corr. iv. 289. Hard. iv. 226, 228.

(2) Jom. x. 122. Th. ix. 79, 80. Nap. iv. 130—131. Bott. ii. 192, 194.

(3) Jom. x. 122, 123. Bott. ii. 199, 200.

and refused to act against the insurgents, or let the Venetians do so. to do either of these things; but constantly urged the deputies to throw themselves into the arms of France. "That I should arm against our friends, against those who have received us kindly, and wish to defend us, in favour of our enemies, against those who hate and seek to ruin us, is impossible. Never will I turn my arms against the principles of the Revolution; to them I owe in part all my success. But I offer you, in perfect sincerity, my friendship and my counsels: unite yourselves cordially to France; make the requisite changes in your constitution; and, without employing force with the Italian people, I will induce them to yield to order and peace." They passed from that to the contributions for the use of the army. Hitherto Venice had furnished supplies to the French army, as she had previously done to the Imperial. The Venetian deputies insisted that Napoléon, having now entered the Hereditary States, should cease to be any longer a burden on their resources. This was far from being the French general's intention; for he was desirous of levying no requisitions on the Austrian territories, for fear of rousing a national war among the inhabitants. The commissaries, whom the Venetian government had secretly commissioned to furnish supplies to the French army, had ceased their contributions, and they had, in consequence commenced requisitions in the Venetian territories. "That is a bad mode of proceeding," said Napoléon; "it vexes the inhabitants, and opens the door to innumerable abuses. Give me a *million a-month* as long as the campaign lasts; the Republic will account to you for it, and you will receive more than a million's worth in the cessation of pillage. You have nourished my enemies, you must do the same to me." The envoys answered that their treasury was exhausted. "If you have no money," said he, "take it from the Duke of Modena, or levy it on the property of the Russians, Austrians, and English, which are lying in your dépôts. But beware of proceeding to hostilities. If, while I am engaged in a distant campaign, you light the flames of war in my rear, you have sealed your own ruin. That which might have been overlooked when I was in Italy, becomes an unpardonable offence when I am in Germany." Such was the violence with which this haughty conqueror treated a nation which was not only neutral, but had for nine months furnished gratuitously all the supplies for his army; and such the degradation which this ancient Republic prepared for itself, by the timid policy which hoped to avoid danger by declining to face it (1).

Venetians at last resolve to act against the insurgents. The Venetian government at length saw that they could no longer delay taking a decided part. A formidable insurrection, organized in the name and under the sanction of the Republican authorities, was rapidly spreading in their continental possessions, great part of which had already joined the Cisalpine Republic; and the general-in-chief, instead of taking any steps to quench the flame, had only demanded fresh contributions from a state already exhausted by his exactions. They resolved, therefore, by a large majority, to act vigorously against the insurgents, but without venturing to engage in hostilities with the French forces; an ill-judged step, the result of timidity and irresolution, which exposed them to all the perils of war, without any of its favourable chances; which irritated without endangering the enemy, and allowed the French general to select his own time for wreaking upon the state, alone and unbefriended, the whole weight of Republican vengeance (2).

(1) *Jom.* x. 124, 125. *Bott.* ii. 201. *Th.* ix. 85— (2) *Bott.* ii. 210, 211. *Jom.* x. 125.  
87. *Nap.* iv. 87.



**Hostilities break out between the two parties.** The retreat of the French from the valley of the Adige, and the irruptions of the Croats into Friuli, encouraged the Venetian government to commence hostilities on their refractory subjects. But before that took place tumults and bloodshed had arisen spontaneously and about the same time, in many different parts of the territory, in consequence of the furious passions which were roused by the collision of the aristocracy on the one hand, and the populace on the other. Matters also were precipitated by an unworthy fraud, perpetrated by the Republican agents at Milan. This was the preparation and publishing of an address, purporting to be from Battaglia, Governor of Verona, calling upon the citizens faithful to Venice to rise in arms, to murder the insurgents, and chase the French soldiers from the Venetian territory. This fabrication, which was written at Milan, by a person in the French interest, of the name of Salvador, was extensively diffused by Landrieux, the secret agent of the French general; and though it bore such absurdity on its face as might have detected the forgery, yet, in the agitated state of the country, a spark was sufficient to fire the train; and hostilities, from the excited condition of men's minds, would, in all probability, have been commenced even without this unworthy device. The mountaineers and the inhabitants of the Alpine valleys flew to arms, large bodies of the peasantry collected together, and every thing was prepared for the irruption of a considerable force into the plains of Brescia (1).

**The counter insurrection spreads immensely. 1st April.** The democrats in Brescia, instigated by French agents (2) resolved instantly to commence hostilities. A body of twelve hundred men issued from their gates, accompanied by four pieces of cannon, served by French gunners, to attack Salò, a fortified town, occupied by Venetians, on the western bank of the lake of Garda. The expedition reached the town, and was about to take possession of it, when they were suddenly attacked and routed by a body of mountaineers, who made prisoners two hundred Poles, of the legion of Dombrowski, and so completely surprised the French, that they narrowly escaped the same fate. This success contributed immensely to excite the movements; large bodies of peasants issued from the valleys, and soon ten thousand armed men appeared before the gates of Brescia. The inhabitants, however, prepared for their defence, and **4th April.** soon a severe cannonade commenced on both sides. General Kilmaine, upon this, collected a body of fifteen hundred men, chiefly Poles, under General Lahoz, attacked and defeated the mountaineers, and drove them back to their mountains; they were soon after followed by the French flotilla and land forces, and Salò was taken and sacked (3).

**Continued indecision of the Senate in regard to France.** The intelligence of these events excited the utmost indignation at Venice. The part taken by the French troops in supporting the revolt could no longer be concealed; and the advance of Laudon, at the same time, in Tyrol, produced such apparently well-founded hopes of the approaching downfall of the Republicans, that nothing but the vicinity of Victor's corps prevented the Senate from openly declaring against the French. The Austrian general spread, in the vicinity of Verona, the most extravagant intelligence; that he was advancing at the head of sixty thousand men; that Napoléon had been defeated in the Noric Alps, and that the junction of the corps in his rear would speedily compel him to surrender. These reports excited the most vehement agitation at Verona, where the

(1) *Journ.* 126. x. *Bot.* ii. 211, 215. *Th.* ix, 116.(2) *Journ.* x. 126, 129. *Bot.* ii. 290. *Th.* ix. 99.(3) *Corresp. Confid. de Nap.* iv. 289.



patrician party, from their proximity to the revolutionary cities, were in imminent danger, and a popular insurrection might hourly be expected. The government, however, deeming it too hazardous to come to an open rupture with the French, continued their temporizing policy (1); they even agreed to give the million a-month which the Republican general demanded, and contented themselves with redoubling the vigilance of the police, and arresting such of their own subjects as were most suspected of seditious practices.

Meanwhile Napoléon, having received intelligence of the steps which the Venetian government had adopted to crush the insurrection in their dominions, and the check which the Republican troops, in aiding them, had received at Salò, affected the most violent indignation. Having already concluded his armistice at Leoben, and agreed to abandon the whole continental possessions of Venice to Austria, he foresaw in these events the means of satisfying the avidity of the Imperialists, and procuring advantageous terms for the Republic, at the expense of the helpless state of Venice. He

20th April. Altered copy of Napoléon. therefore sent his aide-de-camp, Junot, with a menacing letter to the Senate, in which he threatened them with the whole weight of the Republican vengeance, if they did not instantly liberate the Polish and French prisoners, surrender to him the authors of the hostilities, and disband all their armaments. Junot was received by the Senate, to whom he read the thundering letter of Napoléon; but they prevailed on him to suspend his threats, and dispatched two senators to the Republican headquarters, to endeavour to bring matters to an accommodation (2).

25th April. Monacre at Verona. But the very day after the deputies set out from Venice for Leoben, an explosion took place on the Adige, which gave the French general too fair a pretext to break off the negotiation. The levy *en masse* of the peasants, to the number of twenty thousand, had assembled in the neighbourhood of Verona; three thousand Venetian troops had been sent into that town by the Senate, and the near approach of the Austrians from the Tyrol promised effectual support. The tocsin sounded; the people flew to arms, and put to death in cold blood four hundred wounded French in the hospitals. Indignant at these atrocious cruelties, General Balland, who commanded the French garrison in the forts, fired on the city with red-hot balls. Conflagrations soon broke out in several quarters, and although various attempts at accommodation were made, they were all rendered abortive by the furious passions of the multitude. The cannonade continued on both sides, the forts were closely invested, the city in many parts was in flames, the French already began to feel the pressure of hunger, and the garrison of Fort Chiusa, which capitulated from want of provisions, was inhumanly put to death, to revenge the ravages of the bombardment (3).

26th April. Which is speedily suppressed by the French troops. But the hour of retribution was at hand; and a terrible reverse awaited the sanguinary excesses of the Venetian insurrection. The day after hostilities commenced, the intelligence of the armistice was received, and the Austrian troops retired into the Tyrol; two days after, the columns of General Chabran appeared round the town, and invested its walls; while, to complete their misfortunes, on the 23d, accounts of the signature of the preliminaries of Leoben arrived. The multitude immediately passed from the highest exaltation to the deepest dejection; and

(1) Th. ix. 112. Nap. iv. 139. Bott. ii. 211.

(2) Bott. ii. 217, 218. Th. ix. 113. Jom. x. 131.

(3) Jom. x. 132, 133. Th. ix. 120. Balland and

Kilmaine's Account. Confid. Corresp. de Nap. iii. 124, 167.

they now sought only to deprecate the wrath of the conqueror, to whom  
 28th April. they had given so much cause of hostility. Submission was immediately made; the authors of the cruelties shot; a general disarming affected among the peasantry; and a contribution of 1,100,000 francs levied on the city. The plains were speedily covered with French troops; the united divisions of Victor and Kilmaine occupied successively Vicenza and Padua, and soon the French standards were discovered from the steeples of Venice on the shores of their Lagunæ (1).

These excesses were the work of popular passion, equally sanguinary and inconstant, when not rightly directed, in all ages and countries; but an event  
 23d April. of the same kind stained the last days of the Venetian government itself. A French vessel of four guns approached the entrance of the harbour of Lido, in opposition to a rule of the Venetian Senate, to which all nations, not excepting the English themselves, were in use to yield obedience. A cannonade ensued between the batteries on shore and the vessel, and  
 Massacre at Lido. the French ship having been captured by the galleys on the station, the captain and four of the crew were massacred, and eleven wounded. Immediately after, a decree of the Senate publicly applauded this cruel and unnecessary act (2).

These sanguinary proceedings sufficiently verify the old observation, that pusillanimity and cruelty are allied to each other; and that none are so truly humane as the brave and the free. They do not in the slightest degree palliate the treachery of the French, or the rapacity of the Imperialists, the former of whom had instigated the revolt of the Venetian democrats, and signed the partition of Venice *before* either of these events took place (3); but they go far to diminish the regret which otherwise would be felt at the success of unprincipled ambition, and the fall of the oldest Republic of the Christian world.

Efforts  
of the  
Venetian  
Senate to  
avert the  
storm.

The Venetian Senate, thunderstruck with the intelligence they had received, did their utmost to appease the wrath of the victors. Their situation had become to the last degree perilous, for they were precipitated into hostilities with the victorious Republic, at the very time when Austria, discomfited, was retiring from the strife, and when their own dominions had become a prey to the most furious discord. The democratic party, following the French standards, had revolted at Vicenza, Treviso, Padua, and all the continental cities, while a vehement faction in the capital itself was threatening with overthrow the constitution of the state. A deputation was sent to Gratz to endeavour to pacify the conqueror, and another to Paris, with ample funds at the command of both, to corrupt

(1) Nap. iv. 141. Jom. x. 140. Bott. ii. 232. Kilmaine's Report. Conf. Corresp. iii. 155, 167.

(2) Bott. ii. 242, 243. Jom. x. 139.

(3) The Massacre at Verona took place on the 17th April, that at Lido on the 23d, while the preliminaries of Leoben, which assigned the whole of the continental Venetian territories to Austria, were agreed to on the 9th, at Judenberg, while the formal treaty was drawn up on the 16th, and signed on the 18th, in Carinthia, before even the first of these events had occurred. Napoléon has given the clearest proof of his sense of the unjustifiable nature of this aggression, by having, in his memoirs on this subject, entirely kept out of view the dates, and made it appear as if his menacing letter by Junot to the Senate was the consequence of the massacre of April 17, at Verona, when, in fact, it was dated the 9th April, at Judenberg, at a time

when, so far from the Venetian Government having given any cause of complaint to the French, they had only suffered aggressions at their hands, in the assistance openly lent to the democratic rebels, and the attack by the Republican forces on Salò. Conflicts, indeed, had taken place between the Venetian insurgents, stimulated by the French, and the aristocratic adherents; but the Government had committed no act of hostility, the monthly supplies were in a course of regular payment, and the French ambassador was still at Venice.—See *Napoléon*, iv. 142. By not attending minutely to this matter, Sir W. Scott has totally misrepresented the transactions which led to the fall of Venice, and drawn them in far too favourable colours for the hero whose life he has so ably delineated.—See *Scott's Napoléon*, iii. 315, 316.

the sources of influence at these places. They succeeded, by the distribution of a very large sum, in gaining over the Directory (1); but all their efforts with Napoléon were fruitless. He was not only a character totally inaccessible to that species of corruption, but was too deeply implicated in the partition of the Venetian territories, which he had just signed, to forego so fortunate a pretext for vindicating it as these excesses had afforded (2).

Resources  
still at the  
command  
Venice.

Venice had still at its command most formidable means of defence, if the spirit of the inhabitants had been equal to the emergency. They had within the city 8000 seamen and 14,000 regular troops, thirty-seven galleys and 160 gun-boats, carrying 800 cannon for the defence of the Lagunæ; and all the approaches to the capital were commanded by powerful batteries. Provisions existed for eight months; fresh water for two, the nearest islands were beyond the reach of cannon-shot from the shore, and with the assistance of the fleets of England, they might have bid defiance to all the armies of France (3). The circumstances of the Republic were not nearly so desperate as they had been in former times, when they extricated themselves with glory from their difficulties; when the league of Cambray had wrested from them all their territorial possessions, or when the Genoese fleet had seized the gates of the Lagunæ and blockaded their fleet at Malmocco. But the men were no longer the same; the poison of democracy had extinguished every feeling of patriotism in the middling, the enjoyments of luxury every desire for independence among the senatorial, classes; ages of prosperity had corrupted the sources of virtue, and the insane passion for equality vainly rose like a passing meteor to illuminate the ruins of a falling state.

3d May,  
1797.

War  
declared by  
Napoléon  
against  
Venice.

On the 3d May, Napoléon published from Palma Nuova his declaration of war against Venice. He there complained that the Senate

had taken advantage of the holy week to organize a furious war against France; that vast bodies of peasantry were armed and

disciplined by troops sent out of the capital; that a crusade against the French was preached in all the churches; their detached bodies murdered, and the

sick in the hospitals massacred; the crew of a French galley slain under the eyes of the Senate, and the authors of the tragedy publicly rewarded for the

atrocious act. To this manifesto the Venetians replied, that the massacres complained of were not the work of government, but of in-

dividuals whom they could not control; that the popular passions had been excited by the ungovernable insolence of the Republican soldiery, and of the

democratic party whom they had roused to open rebellion; that the first acts of aggression were committed by the French commanders, by publicly assist-

ing the rebels in various encounters with the Venetian forces, long before the massacres complained of were committed; and that the only fault which

they had really committed, consisted in their not having earlier divined the ambitious designs of the French general, and joined all their forces to the

Austrian armies when combating for a cause which must sooner or later be that of every independent state (4).

The French general was not long of following up his menaces, and preparing the execution of that unjustifiable partition which had been decided upon

between him and the Imperial cabinet. The French troops, in pursuance of

(1) Two hundred thousand crowns, as a private bribe, were placed at the disposal of Barras.—See *RAMSAY*, v. 19, and *Napoléon in O'MEARA*, ii. 171.

(2) *Nap.* iv. 144. *Jom.* x. 142. *Bott.* ii. 223, 224.

(3) *Th.* ix. 128.

(4) *Bott.* ii. 256. *Nap.* iv. 147, 149.

the treaty of Leoben, rapidly evacuated Carinthia, and returning by forced marches on their steps, soon appeared on the confines of the Lagunæ, within sight of the tower of St.-Mark. As they advanced, the Republic became a prey to the passions, and torn by the factions, which are the general fore-runners of national ruin. At the news of the proclamation of war, all the towns of the continental possessions of Venice revolted against the capital. Every city proclaimed its independence, and appointed a provisional government; Bergamo, Brescia, Padua, Vicenza, Bassano, Udina, constituted so many separate republics, who organized themselves after the model of the French Republic, suppressed the convents, and confiscated their property, abolished all feudal rights, established national guards, and hoisted the tricolor flag (1).

**Universal revolt of all the continental towns of the Venetian territory.** Meanwhile Venice, itself a prey to the most vehement faction, was in a cruel state of perplexity. The senators met at the doge's palace, and endeavoured by untimely concessions, to satisfy the demands and revive the patriotism of the popular party; a vain expedient, founded upon utter ignorance of democratic ambition, which concessions, dictated by fear, can never satisfy, but which, in such a successful course, rushes forward, like an individual plunged in the career of passion, upon its own destruction. The patricians found themselves deprived of all the resources of government; a furious rabble filled the streets, demanding with loud cries the abdication of the Senate, the immediate admission of the French troops, and the establishment of a government formed on a highly democratic basis; a revolutionary committee, formed of the most active of the middling orders, was in open communication with the French army, and rose in audacity with every concession from the government: the sailors of the fleet had manifested symptoms of insubordination; and the fidelity of the Sclavonians, who constituted the strength of the garrison, could not, it was ascertained, be relied on. These elements of anarchy, sufficient to have shaken the courage of the Roman senate, were too powerful for the weak and vacillating councils of the Venetian oligarchy. Yielding to the tempest which they could not withstand, they assembled in mournful silence on the 12th May, and after passing in review the exhausted resources and distracted state of the Republic, voted, amidst the tears of all friends to their country, by a majority of five hundred and twelve to fourteen voices, the abdication of their authority.

**12th May. The Senate abdicate their authority.** Shouts from the giddy multitude rent the sky; the tree of liberty was hoisted on the place of St.-Mark; the democrats entered, amidst bloodshed and plunder, upon the exercise of their new-born sovereignty; and the revolutionary party fondly imagined they were launched into a boundless career of glory. But the real patriots, the men of sense and firmness, lamented the decision of the Senate, and retiring in silence to their homes, exclaimed, with tears, " Venice is no more; St.-Mark has fallen (2)."

**The populace still endeavour to resist the subjugation of the state.** While the revolutionists were thus bartering their country for the vain chimera of democratic equality, and the unworthy descendants of Dandolo and Morosini were surrendering without a struggle the glories and the independence of a thousand years, more generous sentiments burst forth among the labouring classes, often the last depositaries, in a corrupted age, of public virtue. No sooner was the mournful act communicated to the people, than they flocked together from all quarters, and

(1) Nap. iv. 151, 152. Jom. x. 144.

(2) Solkowski's report to Napoleon. Conf. Carr. iii. 285; 241. Bott. ii. 273, 275. Th. ix. 138.

with loud cries demanded the restoration of the standard of St.-Mark, and arms to combat for the independence of their country. Several bloody contests ensued between them and the revolutionary party; but the populace, however ardent, cannot maintain a contest for any length of time when destitute of leaders. The cannon of the republicans dispersed the frantic assemblages; and, amidst the shouts of the insane revolutionists, the French troops were conducted by Venetian boats to the place of St.-Mark, where a foreign standard had not been seen for fifteen hundred years, but where the colours of independence were never again destined to wave (1).

But Venice falls.  
Army of the Democratic party.  
 The French troops were not long of securing to themselves the spoils of their revolutionary allies. The Golden Book, the record of the Senators of Venice, was burnt at the foot of the tree of liberty; and while the democrats were exulting over the destruction of this emblem of their ancient subjection, their allies were depriving them of all the means of future independence. The treasures of the Republic were instantly seized by the French generals; but instead of the vast sums they expected, 1,800,000 francs, belonging to the Duke of Modena, were all that fell into their hands. All that remained in the celebrated harbour of St.-Mark's was made prize; but such was its dilapidated condition, that they with difficulty fitted out two sixty-four gun-ships, and a few frigates, out of the arsenal of the Queen of the Adriatic. The remainder of the fleet, consisting of five sail of the line, six frigates, and eleven galleys, were not in a condition to keep the sea; and Admiral Brueys received orders from the Directory to set sail to secure the fruit of republican fraternization. In the middle of July he arrived at Venice, where his fleet was paid, equipped, and fed at the expense of the infant Republic; a burden which began to open the eyes of the revolutionary party, when too late, to the consequences of their conduct. The bitter fruits of republican alliance were still more poignantly felt

Treaty of 18th May between Napoleon and Venice.  
 when the conditions of the treaty of Milan, signed by Napoléon with the new government of Venice, became known, which stipulated the abolition of the aristocracy; the formation of a popular government; the introduction of a division of French troops into the capital; a contribution of three millions in money, three millions of naval stores, and the surrender of three ships of the line and two frigates; with many illustrious works of art (2). Among the rest, the famous horses, brought in the car of victory from Corinth to Rome, thence to Constantinople, and thence to Venice, were carried off in triumph by the conquering Republic (3).

State of the armies on the Rhine.  
 While these memorable events were going forward on the southern side of the Alps, the war languished on the frontier of the Rhine. Latour commanded the Imperial army on the Upper Rhine; his forces, after the departure of the veteran bands, under the Archduke, did not exceed thirty-four thousand infantry and six thousand horse; while those under the orders of Werneck, in the Lower Rhine, were about thirty thousand, and

(1) *Bott.* ii. 276, 278. *Th.* ix. 138, 139. *Jom.* x. 150. *Solkowski's* report to Napoléon. *Conf. Corr.* iii. 235, 241.

(2) *Jom.* x. 152. *Bott.* ii. 277, 279. *Th.* ix. 140. See the secret articles in *Corresp. Confid. de Nap.* iii. 179.

(3) The seizure of these horses was an act of pure robbery. The Venetians, in the secret articles, agreed to surrender "twenty pictures and five hundred manuscripts," but no statues. Nevertheless, the French carried off the horses, from the place of St.-Mark, and put them on the triumphal

arch in the Tuileries. In like manner, the secret articles only bound the Venetians to furnish three millions' worth of naval stores; but Napoléon ordered the French admiral, Brueys, who was sent to superintend the spoliation, to carry off the *whole* stores to Toulon; and the Directory wrote to Berthier, in these terms: "Que toute l'artillerie, tous les magasins de guerre et de bouche, qui se trouvent à Venise, soient transportés à Corfou, Ancone et Ferrare, de manière que vous rendiez Venise sans une seule pièce de canon."—See *Corresp. Secrète de Napoléon*, iii. 170, and iv. 427.



twenty thousand were shut up within the fortresses on that stream. The French forces were much more numerous; the army of the Rhine and Moselle, under Moreau, being sixty thousand strong; while that of the Sambre and Meuse, cantoned between Dusseldorf and Coblenz, amounted to nearly seventy thousand. The latter was under the command of Hoche, whose vigour and abilities gave every promise of success in the ensuing campaign, while the possession of the *têtes-de-pont* at Dusseldorf and Neuwied afforded a facility for commencing operations, which those on the upper branch of the river did not possess since the loss of Kehl and the *tête-de-pont* at Huningen (1).

The rapidity and energy with which Napoléon commenced operations on the banks of the Tagliamento before the middle of March, inflamed the rivalry of the generals on the Rhine; while the interests of the Republic imperiously required that the campaign should simultaneously be commenced in both quarters, in order that the army most advanced should not find itself engaged alone with the strength of the Austrian monarchy. Nevertheless, such was the exhausted state of the treasury, from the total ruin of the paper system, and the dilapidation of the public revenues during the convulsions of the Revolution, that the Directory was unable to furnish Moreau with the equipage necessary for crossing the Rhine; and he was obliged to go in person to Paris, in the beginning of April, and pledge his private fortune to procure that necessary part of his equipments (2). At length, the obstacles having been overcome, he returned to the Rhine, and completed his preparations for crossing that river.

Passage of that river at Diersheim. The point selected for this important enterprise was Diersheim; the preparations of the enemy in the neighbourhood of Strasburg rendering hazardous any attempt to cross near that town. Seventy barks were collected in the Ill, a small stream which falls into the Rhine, and directed to Diersheim on the night of the 19th April, while two false attacks above and below that place were prepared, to distract the attention of the enemy. Delays unavoidable in the collection of the flotilla having retarded the embarkation of the advanced-guard till six o'clock on the following morning, it was evident that a surprise was impossible, the Austrians having taken the alarm, and appearing in considerable force on the opposite shore. The boats, however, pulled gallantly across the stream, till they came within reach of the grape-shot from the enemy's cannon, when the shower of balls forced them to take shelter behind an island, where they landed, and made prisoners three hundred Croats, who composed its garrison. From this they forded the narrow branch of the Rhine which separates the island from the German shore, and made themselves masters of Diersheim. Towards noon, they were there attacked by the Austrians, who had received a reinforcement of four thousand men from a neighbouring camp, but the attack was gallantly repulsed by Desaix and Davoust, who there gave earnest of that cool intrepidity and sagacious foresight by which his future career was so eminently distinguished. During the whole day, the Imperialists renewed their attacks with great intrepidity, and, in the end, with twelve thousand men; but they were constantly repulsed by the obstinate valour of the Republican infantry. On the following day, the attack was renewed with increased forces, but no better success; and the bridge having, in the meantime, been established, Moreau began to

(1) Jom. x. 71. Th. ix. 110.

(2) Th. ix. 110. Jom. x. 74.



debouche in great strength, upon which the Austrians commenced their retreat; during which they sustained considerable loss from the Republican cavalry. Thus, by a bold and able exertion was the passage of the Rhine secured, and all the fruits of the bloody sieges of Kehl and Huningen lost to the Imperialists. In these actions the loss of the Austrians was 3000 prisoners and twenty pieces of cannon, besides 2000 killed and wounded (1). When it is recollected that this passage was gained not by stratagem but main force, in presence of a considerable part of the Austrian army, and that it undid at once all the advantages gained by them in the preceding winter, it must ever be regarded as a glorious deed of arms, and one of the most memorable military achievements of the revolutionary war.

And defeat of the Austrians. Taught by the disasters of the preceding campaign, Moreau resolved to push the corps of Starray with vigour, and prevent that methodical retreat which had proved so beneficial to the Imperialists in the previous year. For this purpose he pushed his advanced-guard across the Renchen the very day after the passage was completed; and was in the high-road to farther successes, when he was interrupted by the intelligence of the armistice of Leoben which terminated the campaign in that quarter (2).

Operations cut short by the armistice of Leoben. The campaign was in like manner cut short in the midst of opening success on the Lower-Rhine. The army, put there at the disposition of Hoche, was one of the most numerous and well appointed which the Republic ever sent into the field, and particularly remarkable for the numbers and fine condition of the cavalry and artillery. Hoche resolved to effect the passage, with the bulk of his forces, from Neuwied, and to facilitate that purpose by a simultaneous movement at Dusseldorf.

Operations of Hoche on the Lower Rhine. The Austrians were so far deceived by these movements, that they advanced with the greater part of their forces to Altenkirchen, in order to stop the progress of the troops from Dusseldorf, leaving only a small body in front of Neuwied. No sooner did he perceive they had fallen into the snare, than Hoche debouched rapidly from the *tête-de-pont* at that place at the head of thirty-six thousand men. Kray commanded the Imperialists in that quarter; and his position, blocking up the roads leading from the bridge, was strongly fortified, and covered with powerful batteries. The attack of the Republicans was impetuous; but the resistance of the Imperialists, though greatly inferior in number, was not less vigorous, and no advantage was gained by the assailants till the fortified village of Hulsendorf was carried by a concentric attack from several of the French masses, after which the other redoubts, taken in flank, were successively stormed, and the Austrians driven back, with the loss of five thousand men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, twenty-seven pieces of cannon, and sixty caissons. At the same time the left wing of the army crossed the Sieg, advanced to Ukerath and Altenkirchen, which were abandoned as soon as it was known that the bulk of the enemy's forces was advancing from Neuwied, and on the following night they effected their junction with the victors on the field of battle (3).

15th April. After this disaster, Werneck retired to Neukirchen, and united the two divisions of his army; but, finding that he was unable to make head

(1) Jom. x. 77, 85. Th. ix. 111. St.-Cyr, iv. 185, 183.

(3) Jom. x. 95, 96. Th. ix. 110. Ney, i. 271, 276.

(2) Jom. x. 86. Th. ix. 111. St.-Cyr, iv. 184, 190.

against the immense forces of his opponent, which were nearly double his own, fell back behind the Lahn. Thither he was immediately followed by the victorious general; and the Imperialists having continued their retreat towards the Maine, Hoche conceived the design of cutting them off before they crossed that river. For this purpose, he pushed forward his right wing, under Lefebvre, to Frankfort, while the centre and left continued to press the enemy on the high-road, by which they continued their retreat. The advanced-guard of Lefebvre was at the gates of that opulent city, when hostilities were suspended, by the intelligence of the preliminaries of Leoben, to the infinite mortification of the French general, who saw himself thus interrupted, by his more fortunate rival, in a career of success, from which the most glorious effects might have been anticipated to the Republic (1).

21st April.  
Hostilities  
stopped  
by the  
armistice  
of Leoben.

Prussia, during this eventful year, adhered steadily to the system of armed neutrality, inclining rather to France, and supporting the protection of the associated states within the prescribed line, which was begun by the treaty of Bale in 1793, and consolidated by the convention of 5th August 1796. The health of the King had for long been visibly declining, and he at length expired at Berlin, on the 16th November; having, as his last act, bestowed the decoration of the order of the Black Eagle on his favourite minister Haugwitz (2).

State of  
Prussia  
during this  
year. Its  
policy.  
  
Death of  
the King.  
16th Nov.  
1797.

Though neither endowed with shining civil nor remarkable military talents, few monarchs have conferred greater benefits on their country than this sovereign (3). Among the many and valuable territorial acquisitions which he made, is to be reckoned the important commercial city and fortress of Dantzic, which commands the navigation of the Vistula, and holds the keys of Poland. The army also, during his reign, was increased by 25,000 men; and, like his great predecessor, he ever considered that arm as the main foundation of the public strength. Much of this increase is doubtless to be ascribed to a fortunate combination of extraneous things; and it chiefly arose from the monstrous partition of Poland. Yet something also must be admitted to have arisen from the wisdom of the cabinet, which skilfully turned these circumstances to its own advantage, and contrived to reap nothing but profit from a stormy period, deeply chequered to other states by disaster (4). But in the close of his reign, the national jealousy of Austria, and partiality for France, were carried an unreasonable length; and in the unwise desertion of the cause of Europe by this important monarchy, is to be found one of the principal causes of the disasters which subsequently befell itself.

His charac-  
ter.

He was simple and unostentatious in his habits; addicted to conviviality, but rather on account of the pleasures of the table, than any capacity to appreciate the refinements of conversation; good-humoured in general, but subject to occasional and ungovernable fits of passion. Hardly adequate to the consideration of important subjects of policy himself, he at least had the sense to intrust the administration of public affairs to able ministers. He was fond of music, and distinguished by a marked predilection for architecture,

(1) Journ. x. 96, 106. Th. ix. 110.

(2) Hard. v. 33.

(3) During his reign, the territory of the monarchy was augmented by 2200 square (German) miles, and its population by 2,500,000 souls. He

received from his uncle, the Great Frederick, 3600 square miles, and 6,000,000 of inhabitants; and left to his successor 5800 square miles, and 8,500,000 inhabitants.

(4) Hard. v. 35.

which caused his reign to be illustrated by the construction of several noble and imposing edifices. But his facility and passions led him into several irregularities in private life; and the court during his latter years was scandalized by the great ascendancy obtained by his profuse and rapacious mistress, the Countess Lichtenau; who was called to a severe account for her malversations, by his successor (1).

Accession  
of Frederick  
William III.  
His charac-  
ter.

Very different was the character of the youthful sovereign, who now ascended the throne; FREDERICK WILLIAM III, afterwards called to such important destinies on the theatre of Europe. Born on the 3d August 1770, he was twenty-seven years of age when he succeeded to the crown; and his character and habits already presaged the immortal glories of his reign. Severe and regular in private life, he had lived, amidst a dissolute court, a pattern of every domestic virtue; married early to a beautiful and high-spirited princess, he bore to her that faithful attachment which her captivating qualities were so well fitted to excite, and which afterwards attracted the admiration, though they could not relax the policy or melt the sternness, or excite a spark of chivalry in the cold and intellectual breast of Napoléon (2). He entertained a sincere, though undeserved, distrust of his own capacity in judging of state affairs, which, at first, threw him, to an unreasonable degree, under the government of his ministers, but was gradually removed during the difficulties and necessities of the later periods of his reign (3).

Early  
measures  
and policy.

His first acts were in the highest degree popular. On the day of his accession, he wrote a circular to the constituted authorities, informing them that he was aware of the abuses which had crept into various branches of the public service, and was resolved to rectify them; and at the same time, gave an earnest of his sincerity, by abolishing the monopoly of tobacco, which his father had re-established. The public indignation, rather than his own wishes, rendered the trial of the Countess Lichtenau unavoidably necessary: her wealth was known to be enormous, and many of the crown jewels were found in her possession. She was obliged to surrender the greater part of her ill-gotten treasures, and assigned a pension of 15,000 francs; the remainder of her great fortune being settled on the hospital of Berlin. At the same time, the King, under the directions of Hardenberg, declared, in a circular addressed to all the states in the north of Germany, his resolution to continue those measures for the security of that part of the empire which his father had commenced; and in a holograph letter to the Directory, his wish to cultivate the good understanding with the French Republic, which ultimately led to such disastrous effects to Prussia and Europe (4).

Retrospect  
of the  
annihilating  
successes of  
Napoléon.

In concluding the survey of these memorable contests, it is impossible to refuse to the genius of Napoléon that tribute which is justly due to it, not only for the triumphs in Italy, but for those in Germany. When he began his immortal campaign upon the summit of the Maritime Alps, the Imperialists, greatly superior to their antagonists, were preparing to cross the Rhine, and carry the war into the territory of the Republic. It was his brilliant victories in Piedmont and Lombardy, which compelled the Aulic Council to detach Wurmser with thirty thousand men from the Upper Rhine to the valley of the Adige; and thus not only reduced the Austrians to the defensive in Germany, but enabled the Republicans to carry

(1) Hard. v. 34, 37.

(2) Napoléon in Las Cases, ii. 228.

(3) Hard. v. 36.

(4) Hard. v. 36, 43.

the war into the centre of that country. Subsequently, the desperate conflicts round the walls of Mantua, drew off the whole resources of the Austrian monarchy into that quarter, and the advance into the Alps of Carinthia, compelled the draft of thirty thousand of the best troops from Swabia, to defend the Hereditary States. Thus, with an army which, though frequently reinforced, never at one time amounted to sixty thousand men, he not only vanquished six successive armies in Italy and the Julian Alps, but drew upon himself great part of the weight of the German war, and finally, without any other aid than that derived from the valour of his own soldiers, carried hostilities into the Hereditary States, and dictated a glorious peace within sight of the steeples of Vienna.

Commencement of negotiations at Udine, near Milan. Splendour of Napoléon's court there. Meanwhile Napoléon, sheathing, for a time, his victorious sword, established himself at the chateau of Montebello, near Milan; a beautiful summer residence, which overlooked great part of the plain of Lombardy. Negotiations for a final peace were there immediately commenced; before the end of May, the powers of the plenipotentiaries had been verified, and the work of treaties was in progress. There the future Emperor of the West held his court in more than regal splendour; the ambassadors of the Emperor of Germany, of the Pope, of Genoa, Venice, Naples, Piedmont, and the Swiss Republic, assembled to examine the claims of these several states which were the subject of discussion; and there weightier matters were to be determined, and dearer interests were at stake, than had ever been submitted to European diplomacy, since the iron crown was placed on the brows of Charlemagne. Joséphine Bonaparte there received the homage due to the transcendent glories of her youthful husband; Pauline displayed those brilliant charms which afterwards shone with so much lustre at the court of the Tuileries; and the ladies of Italy, captivated by the splendour of the spectacle, hastened to swell the illustrious train, and vied with each other for the admiration of those warriors whose deeds had filled the world with their renown. Already Napoléon acted as a sovereign prince; his power exceeded that of any living monarch; and he had entered on that dazzling existence which afterwards entranced and subdued the world (1).

Revolution at Genoa brought about by the French. The establishment of a republic on a democratic basis on both sides of the Po, the fermentation in the Venetian states, and the general belief of the irresistible power of the French armies, soon excited an extraordinary degree of enthusiasm at Genoa. The government there was vested in an aristocracy, which, although less jealous and exclusive than at Venice, was far more resolute and determined. As in all other old popular constitutions, the influence in the state had, in the progress of time, and from the gradual decay of public spirit, become vested in an inconsiderable number of families; but the principle of government was by no means exclusive, and many plebeians had recently been inscribed in the Golden Book, who had raised themselves to a rank worthy of that distinction. But these gradual changes were far from being sufficient for the fervent spirit of the age. The democratic party, under the secret influence of the French, had long been in activity; and it was calculated by the friends of revolution, that the resistance of the aristocratic senators could not possibly be prolonged beyond the end of August (2).

(1) Th. ix. 144, 145. Nap. iv. 155. Bour. i. 289.

(2) Sismondi, Rep. Ital. Jom. x. 160, 167. Th. ix. 143. Nap. iv. 160.

A treaty had been concluded with the French Directory, by which Genoa purchased its neutrality by the payment of two millions of francs, a loan to the same amount, and the recall of the families exiled for their political opinions. But the vehemence of the revolutionary club, which met at the house of an apothecary of the name of Morandi, soon insisted on far greater concessions. Secretly stimulated by Napoléon, and the numerous agents of the French army (1), they openly announced the assistance and protection of the Directory, and insisted for the immediate formation of the constitution on a new and highly democratic basis; while the Senate, irresolute and divided, did not possess either the moral energy or physical strength to combat the forces with which they were assailed. The arrest of two of the popular party, who had proceeded to acts of sedition, brought matters to a crisis, and the intervention of the French minister, Faypoult, was sought, to procure

their liberation, and prevent the effusion of blood. Instead of calming, he rather increased the effervescence; and the consequence was, that on the following day a general insurrection took place. The troops of the line wavered, the burgher guard could not be trusted, and the senators, reduced to their own resources, were pursued and massacred, and at length took refuge with the French minister, as the only means of appeasing the tumult. Upon this some of the patrician families, finding themselves deserted by their natural leaders, and seeing the dagger at their throats, put themselves at the head of their followers, with loud cries demanded arms from the Senate, and brought in their faithful followers from the country, to

endeavour to stem the torrent. They soon prevailed over their revolutionary antagonists. The posts, which had been seized in the first bursts of the tumult, were regained, the club Morandi dispersed, the Genoese colours again floated on the city, and the tricolor flag, which the democrats had assumed, was torn down from the walls. The firmness of the aristocracy, supported by the courage of the rural population, had prevailed over the fumes of democracy, and the independence of Genoa, but for foreign interference, was preserved (2).

But it was foreign to the system of Republican ambition to allow the revolutionary party to be subdued in any country which the arms of France could reach. In the course of these struggles, some Frenchmen and citizens of the Cisalpine republic, who had taken an active part with the popular side, were wounded, and made prisoners; and Napoléon instantly made this a pretext for throwing the weight of his authority into the scale, in favour of the democracy. The French minister peremptorily demanded their instant liberation; and Napoléon sent his aide-de-camp, Lavallette, to the city to compel the enlargement of the prisoners, the disarming of the counter-revolutionists, and the arrest of all the nobles who had instigated any resistance to the innovators. To support these demands, the French troops advanced to Tortona, while Admiral Brueys, with two sail of the line and two frigates, appeared in the bay. The democratic party, encouraged by this powerful protection, now resumed the ascendancy. In vain the Senate endeavoured, by half measures, to preserve

(1) Bott. ii. 235. Jom. x. 167. Corresp. Secrète de Kap. iii. 170.

"Genoa," said Napoléon, in his confidential despatch to the Directory, on 19th May, 1797, "loudly demands democracy; the Senate has sent deputies to me to sound my intentions. It is more than probable, that, in ten days, the aristocracy of

Genoa will undergo the fate of that of Venice. Then would there be three democratic republics in the north of Italy, which may hereafter be united into one."—*Confid. Despatch, 19th May, 1797, Confid. Corresp. iii. 170.*

(2) Jom. x. 170, 174. Th. ix. 143, 144. Nap. iv. 160, 164. Bot. ii. 284, 292.



in part the constitution of their country ; they found that the revolutionists were insatiable, and the minister of France demanded his passports, if the whole demands of the Republican general and his adherents in Genoa, were not instantly conceded. Terrified by the menaces of the populace, and the

Senate upon  
this sub-  
mits.  
6th June.

threats of their formidable allies, the senators at length yielded to necessity, and nominated a deputation, who were empowered to submit without reserve to the demands of the conqueror. They signed, on the 6th June, a convention at Montebello, which effected a revolution in the government, and put an end to the constitution of Doria. By this deed, the supreme legislative authority was vested in two councils, one of three hundred, the other of one hundred and fifty, members, chosen by all the citizens ; the executive in a senate of twelve, elected by the councils (1).

Violent pas-  
sions of the  
people.

This prodigious change immediately excited the usual passions of democracy. The people assembled in menacing crowds, burnt the Golden Book, and destroyed the statue of Andrea Doria, the restorer of the freedom of Genoa, and greatest hero of its history. This outrage to the memory of so illustrious a man, while it proved how ignorant the people were of the glory of their country, and how unfit to be intrusted with its government, greatly displeased Napoléon, who already began to feel that hatred at democratic principles, by which he was ever after so remarkably distinguished (2). Subsequently, the nobles and priests, finding that they were excluded from all share in the administration of affairs, according to the mode of election which was adopted for carrying the constitution into effect, excited a revolt in the rural districts of the Republic. Many parishes refused to adopt the new constitution ; the tocsin was sounded in the valleys, and ten thousand armed peasants assaulted and carried the line and fortified heights which form the exterior defence of Genoa. General Daphot, however, who commanded the newly organized forces of the infant Republic, having assembled three thousand regular troops, attacked and defeated the insurgents ; movable columns penetrated and exacted hostages from the hostile valleys ; and the new constitution was put in force in the territory of Genoa, which thenceforward lost even the shadow of independence, and became a mere outwork of the French Republic (3).

Rural insur-  
rection,  
which is  
suppressed.  
3d Sept.

6th Sept.

Deplorable  
humiliation  
of Pied-  
mont.

The kingdom of Piedmont, during the course of this summer, experienced the bitter humiliations to which it was subjected from the forced alliance in which it was held by the conqueror of Italy. The Directory, from ulterior views as to the revolutionizing of these domi-  
5th April. nions, had refused to ratify the treaty of alliance which Napoléon had formed with its sovereign : its fortified places were either demolished or in the hands of the French ; the feelings of the nobility and the rural population were outraged by the increasing vehemence of the popular party in the towns ; and the King, exhausted by humiliation, was already beginning to look to Sardinia as the only refuge for the crown, amidst the troubles by which it was surrounded (4).

4th July.  
Negotiations  
between  
France and  
England  
opened at  
Lisle.

The British government made another attempt this summer to open negotiations for peace with the French Directory. Early in July, Lord Malmesbury was sent to Lisle, to renew the attempts at pacification which had failed the year before at Paris ; and as the

(1) Bot. ii. 290, 305. Jom. x. 175, 180. Nap. iv. 164, 166.

(2) Nap. iv. 169.

(3) Bot. ii. 305, 320. Jom. x. 180, 183. Nap. iv. 169, 170.

(4) Nap. iv. 179, 180. Bot. ii. 322, 328.



abandonment of the Low Countries by Austria at Leoben, had removed the principal obstacle to an accommodation, sanguine hopes were entertained of success. The moderation of the demands made by England on this occasion was such as to call forth the commendations even of its adversaries.

*Moderation of England.* They proposed to surrender all their conquests, reserving only

Trinidad from the Spaniards, and the Cape of Good Hope, with Ceylon and its dependencies, from the Dutch. Such proposals, coming from a power which had been uniformly victorious at sea, and had wrested from its enemies almost all their colonial possessions, were an unequivocal proof of moderation, more especially when, by the separate treaty which Austria had made for itself, they were relieved from the necessity of demanding any equivalent in their turn for their continental allies (1). The French plenipotentiaries insisted that the Republic should be recognised, and the title of King of France renounced by the English monarch: a vain formality which had been retained by them since it was first assumed by Edward III. These obstacles would probably have been overcome, and the negotiations might have terminated in a general pacification, had it not been for the revolution of the 18th Fructidor (4th September), to be immediately noticed, and the consequent accession of violence and presumption which it brought to the French government. Immediately after that event, the former plenipotentiaries were recalled and replaced by Treillard and Bonnier, two furious republicans, who, from the very outset, assumed such a tone, that it was evident any accommodation was out of the question. Their first step was to demand from Lord Malmesbury production of authority from the British government to him to surrender all the conquests made by Great Britain during the war, without any equivalent, accompanied by an intimation, that if this was not acceded to within twenty-four hours, he must leave Lisle. This insolent demand, which proved that the new Republican government were as ignorant of the forms of diplomacy, as of their situation in the war with England, was received as it deserved: Lord Malmesbury demanded his passports, and returned to this island, "leaving Europe," says Jomini, "convinced that on this occasion at least, the cabinet of St.-James's had evinced more moderation than a Directory whose proceedings were worthy of the days of Robespierre (2)."

16th Sept.  
Broken off  
by the violence  
and  
arrogance of  
France.

Progress of  
the negotia-  
tion at  
Udine.

Meanwhile the negotiations for a final treaty at Montebello slowly advanced towards their accomplishment. The cabinet of Vienna, aware of the reaction which was going forward in France, and which was only prevented from overturning the Revolutionary government by the events of the 18th Fructidor, took advantage of every circumstance to protract the conferences, in the hopes of a more moderate party obtaining the ascendant in that country, and more reasonable terms of accommodation being in consequence obtained. But when these hopes were annihilated by the result of that disastrous revolution, the negotiations proceeded with greater rapidity, and the destruction of neighbouring states was commenced without mercy. The French had at first flattered the Venetian commissioners that they should obtain Ferrara, Romagna, and perhaps Ancona, as a compensation for the territories which were taken from the state; but ultimately they ceded these provinces to the Cisalpine Republic. The republicans

(1) Ann. Reg. 1798, p. 67. Journ. x. 191.

(2) Jom. x. 248, 249. Ann. Reg. 1798, 12. Parl. Hist. xxxiii. 1003, 1012.

of Venice, in despair, endeavoured to effect a junction with that infant state; but this proposal was instantly rejected. It became evident, in the course of the negotiations, that the high contracting parties had forgot their mutual animosities, and were occupied with no other object but that of arranging their differences at the expense of their neighbours. Exchanges, or rather spoliations, of foreign territories, were proposed without hesitation and accepted without compunction: provinces were offered and demanded, to which the contracting parties had no sort of right: the value of cessions alone was considered, not their legality (1).

But though France and Austria had no sort of difficulty in agreeing upon the spoliation of their neighbours, they found it not so easy a matter to arrange the division of their respective acquisitions in the plain of Lombardy. Mantua, justly regarded as the bulwark of Italy, was the great subject of dispute; the republicans contending for it as the frontier of the Cisalpine Republic, the Imperialists as the bulwark of their German possessions. To support their respective pretensions, great preparations were made on both sides. Thirty regiments, and 200 pieces of cannon, reached the Isonzo from Vienna; while the French added above fifteen thousand men to their armies in Italy. At length Napoléon, irritated by the interminable aspect of the negotiations, declared, that if the ultimatum of the Directory was not signed in twelve hours, he would denounce the truce to the Archduke Charles. The period having expired, he took a vase of porcelain in his hands, which the Austrian ambassador highly valued, as the gift of the Empress Catharine, and said, "The die is then cast, the truce is broken, and war declared: but, mark my words, before the end of autumn, I will break in pieces your monarchy, as I now destroy this porcelain;" and with that he dashed it in pieces on the ground. Bowing then to the ministers, he retired, mounted his carriage, and dispatched, on the spot, a courier to the Archduke to announce that the negotiations were broken off, and he would commence hostilities in twenty-four hours. The Austrian plenipotentiary, thunder-struck, forthwith agreed to the ultimatum of the Directory, and the treaty of CAMPO FORMIO was signed on the following day, at five o'clock (2).

But though Napoléon assumed this arrogant manner to the Austrian ambassadors, he was very far indeed from himself feeling any confidence in the result of hostilities, if actually resumed: and he had on the contrary, the day before, written to the Directory, that "the enemy had, on the frontiers of Carinthia, 90,000 infantry, and 10,000 horse, besides 18,000 Hungarian volunteers, while he had only 48,000 infantry, and 4000 cavalry; and that if they resumed the offensive, every thing would become doubtful." "The war," he adds, "which was national and popular when the enemy was on our frontiers, is now foreign to the French people; it has become a war of governments. In the end, we should necessarily be overthrown (3)." In truth, his resolution to sign the treaty was accelerated from his having observed, when he looked out from his windows, on the 13th October, the summits of the Alps covered with snow; a symptom which too plainly told him that the season for active operations, that year was drawing to a close, and he had no confidence in the ability of France to resume the contest on the following spring. He then shut himself up in his cabinet; and after reviewing his forces, said—"Here are eighty thousand

(1) Daru, Hist. de Venise, v. 428. Jom. iv. 248. Nap. iv. 248.

(2) Nap. iv. 264. Daru, v. 430, 432.

(3) Sec. Des. 18th Sept. and 18th Oct. 1797, iv. 166, 212.

effective men; but I shall not have above sixty thousand in the field. Even if I gain the victory, I shall have twenty thousand killed and wounded; and how, with forty thousand, can I withstand the whole forces of the Austrian monarchy, who will advance to the relief of Vienna? The armies of the Rhine could not arrive to my succour before the middle of November, and before that time arrives, the Alps will be impassable from snow. It is all over; I will sign the peace! *Venice shall pay the expenses of the war and the extension of France to the Rhine; let the government and the lawyers say what they choose* (1)."

Napoléon's secret reasons for signing this treaty. But, in addition to these state reasons, Napoléon had other secret motives for agreeing to the spoliation of Venice, and being desirous of coming to an accommodation with the Imperialists. Although Carnot and a majority of the Directory had at first approved of the destruction of that Republic, and given it a conditional sanction in the June preceding (2), yet after the revolution of 18th Fructidor, they had come to the resolution of not acquiescing in that disgraceful seizure of an independent state, and had sent their ultimatum to Napoléon, enjoining him not to admit its surrender to the Emperor; and declaring that rather than have any share in such a perfidious act, they would see their armies driven over the Alps, and all their Italian conquests wrested from the Republic (3). At the same time, they had declared their intention, in the event of hostilities being resumed, of sending commissioners to relieve Napoléon of his diplomatic cares, and allow him to attend exclusively to his military duties (4). Napoléon, whose jealousy of the revolutionary government, established at Paris by the revolution of 18th Fructidor, had been much increased by the appointment of Augereau in the room of Hoche to the command of the army on the Rhine, was so much disgusted by these restrictions on his authority, that he wrote to Paris on the 25th September, offering to resign the command (5). The Directory, on the 29th September, returned an answer, positively forbidding the cession of Venice to Austria (6); upon which, Napoléon, seeing his authority slipping from his

(1) Bour. i. 310.

(2) Conf. Corr. iv. 229.

(3) Conf. Corr. iv. 233, 234.

(4) Conf. Corr. iv. 233. Hard. iv. 587.

25th Sept. 1797. (5) "It is evident," said he in that letter, "that the government resolved to act to me as they did to Pichegru. I beseech you, citizen, to appoint a successor to me, and accept my resignation. No power on earth shall make me continue to serve a government which has given me such a scandalous proof of ingratitude, which I was far indeed from expecting." [Confid. Despatch. 25th Sept. iv. 169.]

(6) The resolution of the Directory, after the 18th Fructidor, not to spoliage Venice, was repeatedly and strongly expressed. Barras wrote to Napoléon on 8th September: "Conclude a peace, but let it be an honourable one; let Mantua fall to the Cisalpine Republic, but Venice not go to the Emperor. That is the wish of the Directory, and of all true Republicans, and what the glory of the Republic requires." [Barras's Secret Despatch, 8th Sept. 1797.] Napoléon answered, on the 18th September, "If your ultimatum is not to cede Venice to the Emperor, I much fear peace will be impracticable, and yet Venice is the city of Italy most worthy of freedom, and hostilities will be resumed in the course of October." [Secret Despatch, 18th Sept. iv. 164.] The Directory replied, "The government now is desirous of tracing out to you with precision its ultimatum. Austria has long desired to swallow up Italy, and to acquire maritime power. It is the interest of France to prevent both these designs. It is evident that, if the Emperor acquires Venice, with its territorial possessions, he will secure an entrance into the whole of Lombardy. We should be treating as if we had been conquered, independent of the disgrace of abandoning Venice, which you describe as worthy of being free. What would posterity say of us if we surrender that great city with its naval arsenals to the Emperor. Better a hundred times restore to him Lombardy than pay such a price for it. Let us take the worst view of matters; let us suppose, what your genius and the valour of your army forbid us to fear, that we are conquered and driven out of Italy. In such a case, yielding only to force, our honour at least will be safe; we shall still have remained faithful to the true interests of France, and not incurred the disgrace of a perfidy without excuse, as it will induce consequences more disastrous than the most unfavourable results of war. We feel the force of your objection, that you may not be able to resist the forces of the Emperor; but consider that your army would be still less so some months after the peace, so imprudently and shamefully signed. Then would Austria, placed by our own hands in the centre of Italy, indeed take us at a disadvantage."

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hands, and a doubtful campaign about to begin, without hesitation violated his instructions, and signed the treaty fatal to Venice on the 18th October. The whole infamy, therefore, of that proceeding, rests on his head; the French Directory is entirely blameless, except in not having had the courage to disown the treaty to which his signature was affixed (1).

Terms of  
the treaty  
of Campo  
Formio.

By this treaty the Emperor ceded to France, Flanders, and the line of the Rhine; he agreed to the territory of the Republic being extended to the summit of the Maritime Alps; he consented to the establishment of the Cisalpine Republic, comprehending Lombardy, the duchies of Reggio, Modena, Mirandola, Bologna, Ferrara, Romagna, the Valte-line, and the Venetian states, as far as the Adige, comprising the territory of Bergamo, Brescia, Crema, and the Polesine (2). The Ionian Islands, part of the Venetian territory, were ceded to France, which acquired Mantua, on the frontiers of the Imperial states in Italy, and Mayence, the bulwark of the empire on the Rhine.

On the other hand, the Republic ceded to the Emperor, in exchange for the states of Flanders, Istria, Dalmatia, the Venetian isles in the Adriatic, the mouths of the Cattaro, the city of Venice, and its continental possessions as far as the eastern shore of the lake of Guarda, the line of the Adige, and that of the Po. By this arrangement, Verona, Peschiera, and Porto Legnago, fell into the hands of the Austrians, who lost in Flanders and Lombardy provinces, rich, indeed, but distant, inhabited by 3,500,000 souls, and received in the Venetian states a territory of equal riches, with a great seaport, and 3,400,000 souls, lying close to the Hereditary States (3), besides an acquisition of nearly the same amount which they had made during the war, on the side of Poland. The advantages of the treaty, therefore, how great soever to the conquerors, were in some degree, also extended to the vanquished.

Secret arti-  
cles of the  
treaty.

Besides these public, the treaty contained many secret articles of nearly equal importance. The most material of these regarded the cession of Salzburg, with its romantic territory, to Austria, with the important towns of Inviertl and Wasseburg on the Inn, from Bavaria; the free navigation of the Rhine and the Meuse, the abandonment of the Frickthal by Austria to Switzerland, and the providing equivalents to the dispossessed princes on the left bank of the Rhine, on the right of that river. But it was expressly provided that "no acquisition should be proposed *to the advantage of Prussia*." For the arrangement of these complicated objects, a convention was appointed to meet at Rastadt to settle the affairs of the empire. Finally, it was agreed, "that if either of the contracting powers should make acquisitions in Germany, the other should receive equivalents to the same amount (4)."

Thus terminated the Italian campaigns of Napoléon—the most memorable of his military career, and which contributed so powerfully to fix his destinies and immortalize his name. The sufferings of Italy in these contests were extreme, and deeply did its people rue the fatal precipitance with which they had thrown themselves into the arms of Republican ambition (5). Its territory

The whole question comes to this: Shall we give up Italy to the Austrians? The French government neither can nor will do so: it would in preference incur all the hazards of war."—See *Confid. Corresp. de Napoléon*, iv. 233, 235.

(1) Hurd. iv. 529, 586, 890.

(2) Nap. iv. 255, 286. Daru, v. 432.

(3) Jom. ix. 254, 256. Nap. iv. 266. Daru, v. 432, 433.

(4) Jom. x. 254, 255. Nap. iv. 266, 267. Hurd. iv. 591.

(5) The enormous sum of 120,000,000 francs, or

about L. 5,000,000 sterling, was levied on its territory by the conqueror, in specie, in little more than twelve months; a sum equal to L. 12,000,000 in Great Britain; and the total amount extracted from the peninsula, in contributions and supplies, during the two years the war lasted, was no less than 400,000,000 francs, or L. 16,000,000 sterling. This immense burden fell almost exclusively on the states to the north of the Tiber, whose republican ardour had been most decided. [Jom. Vie de Napoléon, i. 256. Nap. iv. 281. Hurd. v. 11.]

was partitioned ; its independence ruined ; its galleries pillaged ; the trophies of art had followed the car of Victory ; and the works of immortal genius, which no wealth could purchase, had been torn from their native seats, and violently transplanted into a foreign soil (1).

Horror in Venice at the publication of that treaty. No words can paint the horror and consternation which the promulgation of this treaty excited in Venice. The democratic party, in particular, who had allied themselves with the French, compelled the government to abdicate in order to make way for a republican *régime*, and received a French garrison within their walls, broke out into the most vehement invectives against their former allies, and discovered, with tears of unavailing anguish, that those who join a foreigner to effect changes in the constitution of their country, hardly ever escape sacrificing its independence. But, whatever may have been the unanimity of feeling which this union of imperial rapacity with republican treachery awakened among the Venetians, it was too late ; with their own hands they had brought the serpent into their bosom, and they were doomed to perish from the effects of their own revolutionary passions. With speechless sorrow they beheld the French, who occupied Venice, lower the standard of St.-Mark, demolish the Bucentaur, pillage the arsenal, remove every vestige of independence, and take down the splendid bronze horses, which, for six hundred years, had stood over the portico of the church of St.-Mark, to commemorate the capture of Constantinople by the Venetian crusaders. When the last Doge appeared before the

12th Jan. 1797. Austrian commissioner to take the oath of homage to the Emperor, his emotion was such that he fell insensible to the ground ; honouring thus, by the extremity of grief, the last act of national independence (2). Yet even in this catastrophe, the fury of party appeared manifest, and a large portion of the people celebrated with transports of joy the victory over the democratic faction, though it was obtained at the expense of the existence of their country.

Great emotion excited by this event in Europe. The fall of the oldest commonwealth in Europe excited a general feeling of commiseration throughout the civilized world. Many voices were raised, even in the legislative body of France, against this flagrant violation of the law of nations. Independently of the feelings of jealousy, which were naturally awakened by the aggrandizement of two bel-

(1) It is remarkable how strongly, even at this early period, the mind of Napoléon was set upon two objects, which formed such memorable features in his future life, the expedition to Egypt, and interminable hostility to Great Britain.

"Why," said he, in his letter to the Directory, of 12th September, 1797, "do we not lay hold of Malta? Admiral Brueys could easily make himself master of it: 400 knights, and, at the utmost, 500 men, compose the whole garrison of La Valette. The inhabitants, who amount to 100,000, are already well disposed towards us, for I have confiscated all the possessions of the order in Italy, and they are dying of famine. With Malta and Corfu, we should soon be masters of the Mediterranean."

"Should we, on making peace with England, be compelled to give up the Cape of Good Hope, it will be absolutely necessary to take possession of Egypt. That country never belonged to any European power; the Venetians even there had only a precarious authority. We might embark from hence, with 25,000 men, escorted by eight or ten ships of the line, or frigates, and take possession of it. Egypt does not belong to the Grand Seignior." — *Letter Confid.* 13th Sept. 1797—*Corresp. Confid.* iv. 175.

His inveterate hostility to England was equally early and strongly expressed. In enumerating the reasons which induced him to sign the treaty of Campo Formio, he concludes:—"Finally, we are still at war with England; that enemy is great enough, without adding another. The Austrians are heavy and avaricious; no people on earth are less active or dangerous, with a view to our military affairs, than they are; the English on the contrary, are generous, intriguing, enterprising. *It is indispensable for our government to destroy the English monarchy; or it will infallibly be overturned by the intrigues, and the corruption of these active islanders.* The present moment offers to our hands a noble enterprise. Let us concentrate all our activity on the marine, and destroy England; that done, Europe is at our feet"—*Letter Confid. to the Directory*, dated Passeriano, 18th October, 1797—*Confid. Corresp. de Napoléon*, iv. 212.

In reality, it was his desire to acquire the harbour and naval resources of Venice, for his projected expedition against Egypt and Great Britain, that was one main inducement with Napoléon to treat with such unexampled severity that unhappy republic.

(2) Daru, v. 442, 443.



ligerent powers at the expense of a neutral state, it was impossible to contemplate without emotion the overthrow of that illustrious Republic, which had contributed in so powerful a manner to the return of civilisation in Europe. No modern state, from so feeble an origin, had risen to such eminence, nor with such limited resources made so glorious a stand against the tide of barbaric invasion. Without enquiring what right either France or Austria had to partition its territories, men contemplated only its long existence, its illustrious deeds, its constancy in misfortune; they beheld its annihilation with a mingled feeling of terror and pity; and sympathized with the sufferings of a people, who, after fourteen hundred years of independence, were doomed to pass irrevocably under a stranger's yoke (1).

In contemplating this memorable event, it is difficult to say whether most indignation is to be felt at the perfidy of France, the cupidity of Austria, the weakness of the Venetian aristocracy, or the insanity of the Venetian people.

For the conduct of Napoléon no possible apology can be found (2). He first

(1) Daru, v. 436, 437.

(2) The French entered the Venetian territory with the declaration—"The French army, to follow the wreck of the Austrian army, must pass over the Republic of Venice; but it will never forget, that ancient friendship unites the two Republics. Religion, government, customs, and property, will be respected. The general-in-chief engages the government to make known these sentiments to the people, in order that confidence may cement that friendship which has so long united the two nations." [Parl. Deb. xxxiv. 1338.] On the 10th March, 1797, after the democratic revolt had broken out in Brescia, Napoléon wrote to the Venetian governor of Verona: "I am truly grieved at the disturbances which have occurred at Verona, but trust that, through the wisdom of your measures, no blood will be shed. The Senate of Venice need be under no sort of inquietude, as they must be thoroughly persuaded of the loyalty and good faith of the French government, and the desire which we have to live in good friendship with your Republic." [Cor. Conf. ii. 475.] On the 24th March, 1797, he wrote to the Directory, after giving an account of the civil war in the Venetian states, "M. Pisaro, chief sage of the Republic of Venice, has just been here, regarding the events in Brescia and Bergamo, the people of which towns have disarmed the Venetian garrisons, and overturned their authorities. I had need of all my prudence; for it is not when we require the whole succours of Friuli, and of the good-will of the Venetian government, to supply us with provisions in the Alpine defiles, that it is expedient to come to a rupture. I told Pisaro, that the Directory would never forget that the Republic of Venice was the ancient ally of France, and that our desire was fixed to protect it to the utmost of our power. I only besought him to spare the effusion of blood. We parted the best of friends. He appeared perfectly satisfied with my reception. *The great point in all this affair is to gain time.*" [Cor. Conf. ii. 549.] On the 5th April, he wrote again to Pisaro: "The French Republic does not pretend to interfere in the internal dissensions of Venice; but the safety of the army requires that I should not overlook any enterprises hostile to its interests." [Ibid. iii. 30.]

Having thus, to the very last moment, kept up the pretended system of friendship for Venice, Napoléon no sooner found himself relieved by the armistice of Leoben, on 8th April, from the weight of the Austrian war, than he threw off the mask. On the day after the armistice was signed, he issued a proclamation to the people of the continental pos-

sessions of Venice, in which he said,—"The government of Venice offers you no security 1797.

either for persons or property; and it has, by indifference to your fate, provoked the just indignation of the French government. If the Venetians rule you by the right of conquest, I will free you; if by usurpation, I will restore your rights." [Ibid. iii. 37.] And having thus roused the whole population of the cities of Venetian *terra firma* to revolt, he next proceeded to hand over all these towns to Austria, by the third clause of the preliminaries of Leoben, which assigned to the Emperor of Austria "the whole Venetian territory situated between the Mincio, the Po, and the Austrian States." [Ibid. iii. 559.]

Nor did the duplicity of Napoléon rest here. On the 16th May, he concluded the treaty with the Venetian Republic, already mentioned, the first article of which was:—"There shall be henceforth peace and good understanding between France and the Venetian Republic." [Cor. Conf. iii. 176.] The object of Napoléon, in signing this treaty, is unfolded in his Secret Despatch to the Directory three days afterwards. "You will receive," says he, "herewith the treaty which I have concluded with the Republic of Venice, in virtue of which, General Baragry-d'Hilliers, with 16,000 men, has taken possession of the city. I have had several objects in view in concluding this treaty. 1. To enter into the town without difficulty, and be in a situation to extract from it whatever we desire, under pretence of executing the secret articles. 2. To be in a situation, if the treaty with the Emperor should not finally be ratified, to apply to our purposes all the resources of the city. 3. To avoid every species of odium in violating the preliminaries relative to the Venetian territory, and, at the same time, to gain pretexts which may facilitate their execution. 4. To calm all that may be said in Europe, since it will appear that our occupation of Venice is but a momentary operation, solicited by the Venetians themselves. The Pope is eighty-three, and alarmingly ill. The moment I heard of that, I pushed forward all the Poles in the army to Bologna, from whence I shall advance them to Ancona." [Conf. Des. iii. 169. 19th May 1797.] His intentions towards Venice were further summed up in these words, in his despatch to the Directory of 25th May:—"Venice must fall to those to whom we give the Italian continent; but meanwhile, we will take its vessels, strip its arsenals, destroy its bank, and keep Corfu and Ancona." [Ibid. 25th May, 1797.]

Still keeping up the feigned appearance of pro-



excited the revolutionary spirit to such a degree in all the Italian possessions of the Republic, at the very time that they were fed and clothed by the bounty of its government, that disturbances became unavoidable, and then aided the rebels, and made the efforts of the government to crush the insurrection the pretext for declaring war against the state. He then excited to the uttermost the democratic spirit in the capital, took advantage of it to paralyse the defences and overturn the government of the country; established a new constitution on a highly popular basis, and signed a treaty on the 16th May at Milan, by which, on payment of a heavy ransom, he agreed to maintain the independence of Venice under its new and Revolu-

Infamous conduct of Napoleon in this transaction.

tion to Venice, Napoléon wrote to the municipality of that town, on the 26th May. "The treaty concluded at Milan may, in the mean time, be signed by the municipality, and the secret articles by three members. In every circumstance, I shall do what lies in my power to give you proofs of my desire to consolidate your liberties, and to see unhappy Italy at length assume the place to which it is entitled in the theatre of the world, free and independent of all strangers." [Ibid. iii. 294.] Soon after, he wrote to General Beraguay-d'Hilliers, 13th June:—"You will, upon the receipt of this, present yourself to the provisional government of Venice, and represent to them, that, in conformity to the principles which now unite the Republic of France to that of Venice, and the immediate protection which the Republic of France gives to that of Venice, it is indispensable that the maritime forces of the Republic be put on a respectable footing. Under this pretext you will take possession of every thing; taking care, at the same time, to live in good intelligence with the Venetians, and to engage in our service all the sailors of the Republic, making use constantly of the Venetian name. In short, you must manage so as to transport all the naval stores and vessels in the harbour of Venice to Toulon. By a secret article of the treaty, the Venetians are bound to furnish to the French Republic three millions worth of stores for the marine of Toulon; but my intention is, to take possession, for the French Republic, of all the Venetian vessels, and all the naval stores, for the use of Toulon." [Conf. Des. iii. 305.]

These orders were too faithfully executed; and when every article of naval and military stores had been swept away from Venice, Napoléon, without hesitation, assigned away his revolutionary allied republic, which he had engaged to defend, to the aristocratic power of Austria. The history of the world contains no blacker page of perfidy and dissimulation.

It is in vain to allege, that the spoliation of Venice was occasioned, and justified, by their attack on the rear of the French army at Verona. The whole continental possessions of the Republic were assigned to Austria by Napoléon at Leoben, four days before that event took place, and when nothing had occurred in the Venetian states, but the contests between the aristocratic and democratic factions, which had been stirred up by the secret emissaries of Napoléon himself.

His conduct throughout this transaction appears to have been governed by one principle, and that was, to secure such pretexts for a rupture with Venice, as might afford a decent ground for making its territories the holocaust which would, at any time, bribe Austria into a peace, and extricate the French army from any peril into which it might have fallen. Twice did the glittering prize answer this purpose; once, when it brought about the armistice of Leoben, and saved Napoléon from the ruin which otherwise must have befallen him, and again at Campo-Formio,

by relieving him from a war, to which he himself confesses his forces were unequal.

When M. Villetort, the secretary of the French legation at Venice, remonstrated with Napoléon upon the abandonment of that Republic, he replied, in words containing, it is to be feared, too faithful a picture of the degradation of modern Italy. "The French Republic is bound by no treaty to sacrifice our interests and advantages to those of Venice. Never has France adopted the maxim of making war for the sake of other nations. I should like to see the principle of philosophy or morality which should command us to sacrifice forty thousand French, contrary alike to the declared wishes of France and its obvious interests. I know well, that it costs nothing to a handful of declaimers, whom I cannot better characterise than by calling them madmen, to rave about the establishment of Republics every where. I wish these gentlemen would make a winter campaign. Besides, the Venetian nation no longer exists. [Letter, 26th Oct. 1797, Conf. Cor. v. 405.] Divided into as many separate interests as it contains cities, effeminated and corrupted, not less cowardly than hypocritical, the people of Italy, but especially the Venetians, are totally unfit for freedom."

The same idea is expressed in a letter about the same period to Talleyrand, "You little know the people of Italy; they are not worth the sacrifice of forty thousand Frenchmen. I see by your letters that you are constantly labouring under a delusion. You suppose that liberty can do great things to a base, cowardly, and superstitious people. You wish me to perform miracles; I have not the art of doing so. Since coming into Italy I have derived little if any support from the love of the Italian people for liberty and equality. I have not in my army a single Italian, excepting fifteen hundred rascals, swept from the streets of its towns, who are good for nothing but pillage. Every thing, excepting what you must say in proclamations and public speeches, is here mere romance."—*Letter to Talleyrand, Passeriano, 7th Oct. 1797; Corresp. Confid. iv. 206.*

It only remains to add to this painful narrative of Italian duplicity, that having no further occasion for the services of Landrieux, whom he had employed to stir up the revolt in the Italian cities, and having discovered evidence that he had been in correspondence with the Venetian government, Napoléon himself denounced him to the Directory. Authentic evidence had been discovered of the double part which he acted in that disgraceful transaction, by the French commissioners, who examined the Venetian Archives, and Napoléon in consequence, on the 15th November, wrote to the Directory,—"Landrieux excited the revolt in Brescia and Bergamo, and was paid for it; but, at the same time, he privately informed the Venetian government of what was going on, and was paid by them too. Perhaps you will think it right to make an example of such a rascal; and, at all events, not to employ him again." [Letter, 15th Nov. 1797. Conf. Cor. iv. 289.]

tionary government. Having thus committed all his supporters in the state irrevocably in the cause of freedom, and got possession of the capital, as that of an allied and friendly power, he plundered it of every thing valuable it possessed; and then united with Austria in partitioning the Republic (1), took possession of one-half of its territories for France and the Cisalpine Republic; and handed over the other half, with the capital, and its burning democrats, to the most aristocratic government in Europe.

These transactions throw as important a light upon the moral as the intellectual character of Napoléon. To find a parallel to the dissimulation and rapacity by which his conduct to Venice was characterised, we must search the annals of Italian treachery; the history of the nations to the north of the Alps abounding as it does in deeds of atrocity, is stained by no similar act of combined duplicity and violence. This opens a new and hitherto unobserved feature in his character, which is in the highest degree important. The French Republican writers uniformly represent his Italian campaigns as the most pure and glorious period of his history, and portray his character, at first almost perfect, as gradually deteriorated by the ambition and passions consequent on the attainment of supreme power. This was in some respects true; but in others the reverse; his character never again appears so perfidious as during his earlier years; and, contrary to the usual case, it was in some particulars improved by the possession of regal power, and to the last moment of his life was progressively throwing off many of the unworthy qualities by which it was at first stained. Extraordinary as this may appear, abundant evidence of it will be found in the sequel of this work. It was the same with Augustus, whose early life, disgraced by the proscriptions and horrors of the triumvirate, was almost overlooked in the wisdom and beneficence of his imperial rule. Nor is it difficult to perceive in what principle of our nature the foundation is laid for so singular an inversion of the causes which usually debase the human mind. It is the terrible effect of revolution, as Madame de Staël has well observed, to obliterate altogether the ideas of right and wrong, and instead of the eternal distinctions of morality and religion, to apply no other test in general estimation to public actions but success (2). It was out of this corrupted atmosphere that the mind of Napoléon, like that of Augustus, at first arose, and it was then tainted by the revolutionary profligacy of the times; but with the possession of supreme power he was called to nobler employments, relieved from the necessity of committing iniquity for the sake of advancement, and brought into contact with men professing and acting on more elevated principles; and in the discharge of such duties, he cast off many of the stains of his early career. This observation is no impeachment of the character of Napoléon; on the contrary, it is its best vindication. His virtues and talents were his own; his vices, in part at least, the fatal bequest of the Revolution.

And of Austria. The conduct of Austria, if less perfidious, was not less a violation of every principle of public right. Venice, though long wavering and irresolute, was at length committed in open hostilities with the French Republic. She had secretly nourished the Imperial as well as the Republican forces; she had given no cause of offence to the Allied powers; she had been dragged, late indeed and unwillingly, but irrevocably, into a contest with the Republican forces; and if she had committed any fault, it was in favour of the cause in which Austria was engaged (3). Generosity in such circum-

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxiv, 1338.

(2) *Rév. Franç.* ii. 264.

(3) Proclamation of the Senate of Venice, 12th April, 1796.

stances would have prompted a noble power to throw the weight of its influence in favour of its unfortunate neighbour. Justice forbade that it should do any thing to aggravate its fate; but to share in its spoliation, to seize upon its capital, and extinguish its existence, is an act of rapacity for which no apology can be offered, and which must for ever form a foul stain on the Austrian annals.

Weakness of the Venetian Aristocracy. Nor can the aristocracy of Venice be absolved from their full share of the blame consequent on the destruction of their country. It was clearly pointed out to them; and they might have known, that the contest in which Europe was engaged with France, was one of such a kind as to admit of no neutrality or compromise; that those who were not with the democratic party were against them; that their exclusive and ancient aristocracy was, in an especial manner, the object of Republican jealousy; and that, if they were fortunate enough to escape destruction at the hands of the French armies, they certainly could not hope to avoid it from their own revolutionary subjects. Often, during the course of the struggle, they held the balance of power in their hands, and might have interposed with decisive effect in behalf of the cause which was ultimately to be their own. Had they put their armies on a war footing, and joined the Austrians when the scales of war hung even at Castiglione, Arcola, or Rivoli, they might have rolled back the tide of revolutionary conquest, and secured to themselves and their country an honoured and independent existence. They did not do so; they pursued that timid policy which is ever the most perilous in presence of danger; they shrunk from a contest which honour and duty alike required, and were, in consequence, assailed by the revolutionary tempest when they had no longer the power to resist it, and doomed to destruction amidst the maledictions of their countrymen, and the contempt of their enemies.

Inimicity of the Democratic party. Last in the catalogue of political delinquency, the popular party are answerable for the indulgence of that insane and unpatriotic spirit of faction which never fails, in the end, to bring ruin upon those who indulge it. Following the phantom of democratic ambition; forgetting all the ties of kindred and country in the pursuit of popular exaltation, they leagued with the stranger against their native land, and paralysed the state in the moment of its utmost peril, by the fatal passions which they introduced into its bosom. With their own hands they tore down the venerable ensign of St.-Mark; with their own oars they ferried the invaders across the Laguna; which no enemy had passed for fourteen hundred years (1); with their own arms they subjugated the Senate of their country, and compelled, in the last extremity, a perilous and disgraceful submission to the enemy. They received in consequence the natural and appropriate reward of such conduct, the contempt of their enemies, the hatred of their friends; the robbery of their trophies, the partition of their territory, the extinction of their liberties, and the annihilation of their country.

What a contrast to this timid and vacillating conduct in the rulers, and these flagitious passions in the people of Venice, does the firmness of the British government, and the spirit of the British people, afford at this juncture! They, too, were counselled to temporize in danger, or yield to the tempter; they,

(1) The last occasion on which the place of St.-Mark had seen the Transalpine soldiers, was when the French crusaders knelt to the Venetian people to implore succour from that opulent republic, in the last crusade, against the infidels in the Holy Land. The unanimous shout of approbation in the as-

sembled multitude—"It is the will of God! It is the will of God!" led to that cordial union of these two powers which overturned the throne of Constantinople.—"Maximus," says Bacon, "innovator temporis."—See GIBSON, Chap. lx.

Striking  
contrast  
exhibited at  
the same  
period by  
the nobility  
and people  
of England.

too, were shaken in credit and paralysed by revolt; they, too, were assailed by democratic ambition, and urged to conciliate and yield as the only means of salvation. The Venetian aristocracy did what the British aristocracy were urged to do. They cautiously abstained from hostilities with the revolutionary power; they did nothing to coerce the spirit of disaffection in their own dominions; they yielded at length to the demands of the populace, and admitted a sudden and portentous change in the internal structure of the constitution. Had the British government done the same, they might have expected similar results to those which there took place; to see the revolutionary spirit acquire irresistible force, the means of national resistance prostrated by the divisions of those who should wield them, and the state become an easy prey to the ambition of those neighbouring powers who had fomented its passions to profit by its weakness. From the glorious result of the firmness of the one, and the miserable consequences of the pusillanimity of the other, a memorable lesson may be learned both by rulers and nations; that courage in danger is often the most prudent as well as the most honourable course; that periods of foreign peril are never those in which considerable internal changes can with safety be adopted; and that, whatever may be the defects of government, they are the worst enemies of their country who league with foreign nations for their redress.

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## CHAPTER XXIV.

INTERNAL GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE, FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DIRECTORY  
TO THE REVOLUTION OF 18th FRUCTIDOR.

## ARGUMENT.

Retrospect of the previous changes of the Revolution—Maximum of Freedom, with Minimum of Democracy, the great object of Civil Government—Provision of Nature against the Evil of Democratic Anarchy—State of the Public Mind and Manners in France in the beginning of 1796—First Proceedings of the New Legislature—Choice of the Directory—Barras, Rewbell, Laréveillière Lépaux—Letourneur—First Measure of the Directory—Extreme Difficulties of their Situation—Liberation of the Duchesse d'Angoulême, who is exchanged for the Deputies delivered up by Dumouriez—Successful Efforts of the Directory to restore order in France—But Irreligion continues triumphant—Theophilanthropists—Singular character, tenets, and worship of this Sect—Renewed Efforts of the Jacobins—Babœuf, his extreme Revolutionary Principles—But they fail now in rousing the People—Renewed Efforts of the Revolutionists—Plans of the Conspirators—The Conspiracy is discovered, and Babœuf arrested—His Partisans break out at Grenelle—But are Defeated and Executed—Trial of the Leaders previously arrested—Abortive attempt of the Royalists—Singular Manners at this period in France—But the Result of the Elections is preparing a Catastrophe—The Royalists prevail in the New Elections—Barthélemy is chosen a Director in lieu of Letourneur, and joins Carnot—Club of Clichy, the great centre of the Royalists—Club of Salm, of the Republicans—General Reaction in favour of Royalist Principles—Measures of the Directory to avert the danger—Camille-Jourdan's Efforts in favour of Religion—General return of the Emigrants and Clergy—Great alarm of the Directory—The Republican majority of the Directory resolve on Decisive Measures—They change all the Ministers, and collect Troops round Paris—Measures of Napoléon—He resolves to Support the Democratic Party, and for that purpose sends Lavalette to Paris in Spring 1797—And Augereau in July—His Proclamation to his Soldiers on 14th July—The Army strongly support the Directory—Extravagant Addresses to them from the Soldiers—Strength of the opposite party consisted only in their Talents and Eloquence—Their defensive Measures, but they decline to commence Hostilities—Slender Military Force at their Command—Re-organization of the National Guard decreed by the Councils—Violent Measures of the Directory—They surround the Tuileries with Troops—And the Guard there join Augereau—Revolution of 18th Fructidor—Passive submission of the People—Address of the Directory to the Councils—Tyrannical Measures of the minority of the Councils—Extinction of the Liberty of the Press—Transportation of the most illustrious Citizens of France—Cruel fate of the Exiles—Escape of Pichegru from Guiana—Vigorous and despotic measures of the Directory—This Revolution had been previously concerted with Napoléon—But he is disgusted with the severe use they make of their Victory—This is the true commencement of Military Despotism in France—Reflections on these Events.

Retrospect of the previous changes of the Revolution. THE different eras of the Revolution, which have hitherto been traced, show the progress of the principles of democracy through their natural stages of public transports, moneyed insecurity, financial embarrassment, arbitrary confiscation, general distress, plebeian insurrection, sanguinary oppression, civil warfare, and military despotism. It remains to examine its progress during the receding tide; to trace the declining and enfeebled efforts of Republican fury during the period when its desolating effects had become generally known, and the public strength refused to lend its aid to the ambition and the illusion of individuals. During this period it is evident that the chief desire of the human mind is for repose; the contentions, the miseries of former years rise up in fearful remembrance to all classes of citizens; the chimera of equality can no longer

seduce—the illusion of power no longer mislead; and men, bitterly suffering under the consequences of former error, eagerly range themselves under any government which promises to save them from “the worst of tyrannies, the tyranny of a multitude of tyrants (1).”

Maximum of freedom, with minimum of democracy, the great object of government. To effect the maximum of freedom, with the minimum of democracy, is the great problem of civil government; just as the chief object of war is to attain the greatest possible national security, at the smallest expenditure of human life. The democratic passion is frequently necessary to sustain the conflicts of freedom, just as the military spirit is often necessary to purchase national independence, and always essential to its security; but it is not a less evil in itself, if not kept under due restraint, than the savage passion for the destruction of the species. When too vehemently excited, it often becomes an evil incomparably greater than the political grievances which awakened its fury. Great national objects sometimes cannot be achieved without the excitation of this passion, because it is desire, and not reason, which ever governs the masses of mankind; but when it becomes the ruling power, the last extremities of suffering are at hand. Like all other passions, however, whether in the individual or society, it cannot be indulged to excess, without inducing evils which speedily terminate its ascendancy, and punish the delinquencies to which it has given rise. The democratic passion is to nations what the desire of licentious freedom is to the individual: it bears the same relation to the principle of genuine liberty, as the chastened attachment of marriage, which “peoples heaven,” does to the wild excesses of lust, which finds inmates for hell. The fleeting enjoyments of guilt are speedily lost in its lasting pains; the extravagance of democratic ambition, if it obtains unresisted sway, invariably terminates, before the expiry of a few years, in universal suffering.

Provision of Nature against the evil of democratic anarchy. Nature never intended that the great body of mankind should be immediately concerned in government, because their intellects and information are unequal to, and their situation inconsistent with, the task. Useful and necessary as a check upon the government of others, they bring about the greatest calamities when they become the governors themselves;—respectable, virtuous, and useful when employed in their proper sphere, they become dangerous and irrational when called to the exercise of duties which do not belong to them. As political passions cannot be indulged by a large portion of mankind, without destroying both their usefulness and their felicity, she has wisely provided for their speedy and effectual extinction, in the necessary consequence of the effects which they produce. The insecurity, privations, and suffering which they induce, unavoidably lead to military despotism. Some democratic states, as Milan, Florence, and Sienna, to terminate their dissensions, have voluntarily submitted to the yoke of a military leader; others have fallen under his dominion at the close of a sanguinary period of domestic strife; all have, in one way or other, expelled the deadly venom from the system; and to shun the horrors of anarchy, shielded themselves under the lasting government of the sword.

State of the public mind and manners in France in the beginning of 1796 The illusions of republicanism were now dispelled in France; men had passed through so many vicissitudes, and lived so long in a few years, that all their pristine ideas were overturned. The rule of the middling class, and of the multitude, had successively passed like a rapid and bloody phantasmagoria. The age was far removed from France

(1) Aristotle.



of the 14th July, 1789, with its enthusiastic feelings, its high resolves, its ardent aspirations, its popular magistrates, and its buoyant population; it was still further removed from France of the 10th August, when a single class had usurped the whole authority of the state, and borne to the seat of government its vulgar manners and sanguinary ideas—its distrust of all above, and its severity to all beneath itself. Society emerged, weakened and disjointed, from the chaos of revolution; and in despair of effecting any real amelioration in the social system, all classes rushed with unbounded vehemence into the enjoyments of private life. The elegancies of opulence, long suspended, were resumed with unprecedented alacrity; balls, festivities, and theatres, frequented with more avidity than in the most corrupted era of the monarchy; it seemed as if the nation, long famished, was quenching its thirst in the enjoyments of existence. Public affairs had an air of tranquillity which singularly contrasted with the disasters of former years: the emigrants returned in crowds, with a confidence which afterwards proved fatal to them. All women were in transports at the auspicious change. Horror at the Jacobins restored the sway of the rich; the recollection of the clubs, the influence of the saloons; female charms resumed their ascendancy with the return of pacific ideas, and the passion for enjoyment, freed from the dread of death and the restraints of religion, was indulged without control. Manners never were more corrupted than under the rule of the Directory—luxury never more prodigal—passion never more unrestrained; society resumed its wonted order, not by repentance for crime, but a change of its direction. This is the natural termination of popular effervescence; the transition is easy from the extravagance of democracy to the corruptions of sensuality, because both proceed from the indulgence of individual passion; it is extremely difficult from either to the love of genuine freedom, because that implies a sacrifice of both to patriotic feeling. The age of Nero soon succeeded the strife of Gracchus; but ages revolved, and a different race of mankind was established before that of Fabricius was restored (1).

First proceedings of the Legislature.

The deputies were regarded with the utmost solicitude by all parties upon the completion of the elections. The third part, who were newly chosen, according to the provision of the constitution, represented with tolerable fidelity the opinions and wishes of the people who had now become influential in France. They consisted not of those extraordinary and intrepid men who shine in the outset of the revolutionary tempest; but of those more moderate characters who, in politics equally as the fine arts, succeed to the vehemence of early passion; who take warning by past error, and are disposed only to turn the existing state of things to the best account for their individual advantage. But their influence was inconsiderable compared with that of the two-thirds who remained from the old Assembly, and who, both from their habits of business and acquired celebrity, continued to have the principal direction of public affairs (2).

Choice of the Directory.

The whole deputies having assembled, according to the directions of the constitution, chose by ballot 250 of their number, all above forty, and married, to form the Council of the Ancients. They afterwards proceeded to the important task of choosing the Directors; and after some hesitation, the choice fell on Barras, Rewbell, Laréveillière-Lépaux, Le-tourneur, and Sièyes; but upon the last declining the proffered honour,

(1) Mignet, ii. 401. Th. viii. 67, 75. D'Abr. ii. 36, 34, 158, 164.

(2) Th. viii. 76, 77. Mlg. ii. 400.

Carnot was chosen in his stead. These five individuals immediately proceeded to the exercise of their new sovereignty (1).

Though placed at the head of so great a state, the situation of the Directors was at first surrounded with difficulties. When they took possession of their apartments in the Luxembourg, they found scarce any furniture in the rooms (2); a single table, an inkstand and paper, and four straw chairs, constituted the whole establishment of those who were about to enter on the management of the greatest Republic in existence. The incredible embarrassment of the finances, the critical state of the armies, the increasing discontents of the people, did not deter them from undertaking the discharge of their perilous duties. They resolved unanimously that they would make head against all the difficulties in which the state was involved, or perish in the attempt.

**Barras. His character.**

Barras was the one of the Directory who was most qualified by his character and previous services to take the lead in the government. Naturally indolent, haughty, and voluptuous; accessible to corruption, profligate, and extravagant; ill qualified for the fatigues and the exertion of ordinary business, he was yet possessed of the firmness, decision, and audacity which fitted him to be a leader of importance in perilous emergencies. His lofty stature, commanding air, and insinuating manners, were calculated to impose upon the vulgar, often ready to be governed in civil dissensions as much by personal qualities as mental superiority; while the eminent services which he had rendered to the Thermidorien party, on the fall of Robespierre, and his distinguished conduct and decisive success on the revolt of the sections, gave him considerable influence with more rational politicians.

**Rewbell.**

Rewbell, an Alsacian by birth, and a lawyer by profession, was destitute of either firmness or eloquence; but he owed his elevation to his habits of business, his knowledge of forms, and the pertinacity with which he represented the feelings of the multitude, often in the close of revolution-

**Larévillière-Lépaux.**

ary convulsions envious of distinguished ability. Larévillière Lépaux, a sincere Republican, who had joined the Girondists on the day of their fall, and preserved, under the proscription of the Jacobins, the same principles which he had embraced during their ascendancy, was blessed by nature with a mild and gentle disposition, which fitted him to be the ornament of private society; but he was weak and irresolute in public conduct, totally destitute of the qualities requisite in a statesman, strongly tinged with the irreligious fanaticism of the age, and perpetually dreaming of establishing the authority of natural religion on the ruins of the Christian

**Letourneur.**

faith. Letourneur, an old officer of artillery, had latterly supplied the place of Carnot in the Committee of Public Safety, but without possessing his abilities; and when Carnot came in place of Sièyes, he received the department of the marine and the colonies (3).

**First measures of the Directory.**

The first object of the Directory was to calm the passions, the fury of which had so long desolated France. This was no easy task; the more especially as, with the exception of Carnot, there was not one of them either a man of genius or of any considerable reputation; the cruel effect of a revolution which in a few years had cut off whole generations of ability, and swept away all, save in the military career, that could either command respect or ensure success. Their principles were republican, and

(1) Th. viii. 78.

(2) Baillet, ii. 275. 281. Examen de Nad. de Staël, sur la Rév. Franç. Mig. i. 401.

(3) Mign. ii. 404, 405, 417. Nap. in Las Cas. iv. 143, 145. Lac. xiii. 4, 5. Th. viii. 78, 79.

they had all voted for the death of the King in the Convention, and consequently their elevation gave great joy to the Democratic party, who had conceived great disquietude from the recent formidable insurrection, and still menacing language of the Royalists. The leaders of that party, defeated, but not humbled, had great influence in the metropolis, and their followers seemed rather proud of the perils they had incurred, than subdued by the defeat they had sustained (1).

Extreme difficulties of their situation. Within and without, they were surrounded by difficulties. The Revolution had left every thing in the most miserable situation. The treasury was empty; the people starving; the armies destitute; the generals discouraged. The progress of the public disorders had induced that extreme abuse of paper money, which seems the engine employed by nature, in revolutionary disorders, to bring salutary suffering home to every individual, even of the humblest rank in society. The revenue had almost ceased to be collected, and the public necessities were provided for merely by a daily issue of paper, which every morning was sent forth from the public treasury, still dripping wet from the manufactory of the preceding night. The sale of all kinds of commodities had ceased from the effect of the law of the maximum and forced contributions; and the subsistence of Paris and the other great towns was obtained merely by compulsory requisitions, for which the unfortunate peasants received only paper, worth not a thousandth part of the value at which they were compelled to accept it. Finally, the armies, destitute of every thing, and unfortunate at the close of the campaign, were discontented and dejected (2).

The brilliant successes by which Napoléon restored the military affairs of the Republic, have been already considered (3). But in the course of their labours, they were successively assailed by the different factions whose strife had brought the country to this miserable condition; and they owed their victory over both, only to the public torpor which recent experience of the suffering they had endured had produced (4).

Liberation of the Duchess d'Angoulême. One of their first acts was a deed of humanity; the liberation of the daughter of Louis XVI from the melancholy prison where she had been confined since her parents' death. This illustrious princess, interesting alike for her unparalleled misfortunes, and the resignation with which she bore them, after having discharged, as long as the barbarity of her persecutors would permit, every filial and sisterly duty,—after having seen her father, her mother, her aunt, and her brother, successively torn from her arms, to be consigned to destruction,—had been detained in solitary confinement since the fall of Robespierre, and was still ignorant of the fate of those she had so tenderly loved. The Directory, yielding at length to the feelings of humanity, agreed to exchange her for the deputies who had been delivered up by Dumouriez to the Imperialists; and Who is exchanged for the deputies delivered up by Dumouriez. on the 19th December, 1795, this remnant of the royal captives left the prison where she had been detained since the 10th August, 1792, and proceeded by rapid journeys to Basle, where she was exchanged for the republican commissioners, and received by the Austrians with the honour due to her rank. Her subsequent restoration and second banishment, will form an interesting episode in the concluding part of this work (5).

The first measure of the Directory for the relief of the finances, was to

(1) Th. viii. 84, 85.

(2) Th. viii. 85. Mign. ii. 402, 403.

(3) 20th and 23d chapters.

(4) Mign. ii. 410.

(5) Th. viii. 126, Lac. xii. 388.

Creation of the distribution of food. obtain a decree authorizing the cessation of the distribution of rations to the people, which were thenceforward to be continued only to the most necessitous classes. This great measure, the first symptom of emancipation from the tyranny of the mob of the metropolis, was boldly adopted; and though the discontents to which it gave rise appeared in the conspiracy of Babœuf, it was successfully carried into effect (1).

Territorial mandates. After various ineffectual attempts to return to a metallic circulation, the government found itself obliged to continue the issue of assignats. The quantity in circulation at length rose in January, 1796 to forty-five milliards, or about L.2,000,000,000 sterling; and the depreciation became so excessive, that a milliard, or a thousand million of francs, produced only a million in metallic currency: in other words, the paper money had fallen to a *thousandth* part of its nominal value. To stop this enormous evil, the government adopted the plan of issuing a new kind of paper money, to be called *territorial mandates*, which were intended to retire the assignats at the rate of thirty for one. This was in truth creating a new kind of assignats, with an inferior denomination, and was meant to conceal from the public the enormous depreciation which the first had undergone. It was immediately acted upon; mandates were declared the currency of the Republic, and became by law a legal tender; the national domains were forthwith exposed to sale, and assigned over to the holder of a mandate without any other formality than a simple *procès verbal*. At the same time the most violent measures were adopted to give this new paper a forced circulation; all payments by and to the government were ordered to be made in it alone; severe penalties were enacted against selling the mandate for less than its nominal value in gold or silver, and, to prevent all speculation on their value, the public exchange was closed (2).

Their transient success. The only advantage possessed by the mandates over the old assignats was, that they entitled the holder to a more summary and effectual process for getting his paper exchanged for land. As soon as this became generally understood, it procured for them an ephemeral degree of public favour; a mandate for 100 francs, rose, soon after it was issued, from fifteen to eighty francs, and their success procured for government a momentary resource: but this relief was of short duration. Two milliards four hundred millions of mandates were issued, secured over an extent of land supposed to be of the same value: but before many months had elapsed they began to decline, and were soon nearly at as great a discount in proportion to their value as the old assignats. By no possible measure of finance could paper money, worth nothing in foreign states, from a distrust of its security, and redundant at home from its excessive issue, be maintained at any thing like an equality with gold and silver. The mandates were, in truth, a reduction of assignats to a thirtieth part of their value; but to be on a par with the precious metals, they should have been issued at one two hundred-and-fiftieth part, being the rate of discount to which the original paper had now fallen (3).

And ultimate fall. Government, therefore, and all the persons who received payment from it, including the public creditors, the army, and the civil servants, were still suffering the most severe privation; but the crisis had passed with the great bulk of individuals in the state. The fall in the value of the assignats had been so excessive, that no one would take either them or

(1) Mig. ii. 406. Th. viii. 162.

(2) Th. viii. 185, 188, 189. Mig. ii. 407.

(3) Th. viii. 33, 191, 335. Mig. ii. 407. Lac. xiii. 40.

their successors in change. Barter, and the actual interchange of one commodity with another, had usurped the place of sale; and all those possessed of any fortune, realized it in the form of the luxuries of life, which were likely to procure a ready sale in the market. The most opulent houses were converted into vast magazines for the storing of silks, velvets, and luxuries of every description, which were retailed sometimes at a profit, and sometimes at a loss, and by which the higher classes were enabled to maintain their families. From the general prevalence of this rude interchange, internal trade and manufactures regained, to a certain degree, their former activity; and though the former opulent quarters were deserted, the Boulevards and Chaussée d'Antin began to exhibit that splendour for which they afterwards became so celebrated under the empire. As the victories of the Republic increased, and gold and silver were obtained from the conquest of Flanders, Italy, and the German states, the government paper entirely ceased to be a medium of exchange; transfers of every description were effected by barter or exchange for the precious metals, and the territorial mandates were nowhere to be seen but in the hands of speculators, who bought them for a twentieth part of their nominal value, and sold them at a small advance to the purchasers of the national domains (1).

Recourse to barter. But while all other classes were thus emerging from this terrible financial crisis, the servants of government, and the public creditors, still paid in mandates at par, were literally dying of famine. Starvation of the fund-holders and all the public functionaries. Employment from government, instead of being solicited, was universally shunned; the persons in every kind of service sent in their resignations; and the soldiers deserted from the armies in as great crowds as they had flocked to it during the Reign of Terror. While the armies of Pichegru and Napoléon, paid in the coin they extracted from the conquered states, were living in luxurious affluence, those on the soil of the Republic, and paid in its depreciated paper, were starving. But most of all, the public creditors, the *rentiers*, were overwhelmed by unprecedented distress. The opulent capitalists who had fanned the first triumphs of the Revolution, the annuitants who had swelled the multitude of its votaries, were now equally crushed under its wheels. Then was seen the unutterable bitterness of private distress, which inevitably follows such a convulsion. The prospect of famine produced many more suicides among that unhappy class, than all the horrors of the Reign of Terror. Many, driven to extremities, had recourse, late in life, to daily labour for their subsistence; others, unable to endure its fatigues, subsisted upon the charity which they obtained from the more fortunate survivors of the Revolution. Under the shadow of night they were to be seen crowding round the doors of the opera and other places of public amusement, of which they had formerly been the principal supporters, and in a disguised voice, or with an averted head, imploring charity from crowds, among whom they were fearful of discovering a former acquaintance or dependant (2).

Deplorable state of the armies from the same cause. The situation of the armies in the interior was not less deplorable. Officers and soldiers, alike unable to procure any thing for their pay, were maintained only by the forced requisitions which, under the law of necessity, were still continued in the departments. The detachments were dispersed, and deserted on the road; even the hospitals were shut up, and the unhappy soldiers who filled them turned adrift upon the

(1) Th. viii. 337. Lac. xiii. 33, 36.

(2) Th. viii. 337, 338. Mig. ii. 402. Lac. xiii. 40.



world, from utter inability to procure them either medicines or provisions. The gendarmerie, or mounted police, were dissolved: the soldiers who composed it, unable to maintain their horses, sold them, and left the service; and the high-roads, infested by numerous brigands, the natural result of the dissolution of society, became the theatre of unheard-of atrocities (1).

Great speculations of foreigners from the public distress.

Strangers profited by the general distress of France to carry on a commerce with its suffering inhabitants, which contributed in a considerable degree to restore the precious metals to circulation.

The Germans, the Swiss, the Russians, and the English, seized the moment when the assignats were lowest, to fall with all the power of metallic riches upon the scattered but splendid movables of France. Wines of the most costly description were bought up by speculators, and sold cheaper at Hamburg than Paris; diamonds and precious stones, concealed during the Reign of Terror, left their place of concealment, and procured for their ruined possessors a transitory relief; and pictures, statues, and furniture of every description, were eagerly purchased for the Russian and English palaces, and by their general dispersion effected a change in the taste for the fine arts over all Europe. A band of speculators, called *la bande Noire*, purchased up an immense number of public and private edifices; which were sold for almost nothing, and reimbursed themselves by selling a part of the materials; and numerous families, whose estates had escaped confiscation, retired to the country, and inhabited the buildings formerly tenanted by their servants, where they lived in seclusion and rustic plenty on the produce of a portion of their estates (2).

16th July, 1796.  
Open abandonment of the paper system.

The excessive fall of the paper, at length made all classes perceive that it was in vain to pursue the chimera of upholding its value. On the 16th July, 1796, the measure, amounting to an open confession of a bankruptcy, which had long existed, was adopted. It was declared that all persons were to be at liberty to transact business in the money which they chose; that the mandates should be taken at their current value, which should be published every day at the Treasury; and that the taxes should be received either in coin or mandates at that rate, with the exception of the department bordering on the seat of war, in which it should still be received in kind.

The publication of the fall of the mandates, rendered it indispensable to make some change as to the purchase of the national domains; for where the mandate had fallen from one hundred francs to five francs, it was impossible that the holder could be allowed to obtain in exchange for it land worth one hundred francs in 1790, and still, notwithstanding the fall of its value, from the insecure tenure of all possessions, deemed worth thirty-five francs (3). It was in consequence determined, on the 18th July, that the undisposed of national domains should be sold for mandates at their current value.

Prodigious transference of fortunes which it had occasioned.

Such was the end of the system of paper credit, six years after it had been originally commenced, and after it had effected a greater change in the fortunes of individuals, than had perhaps ever been accomplished in the same time by any measure of govern-

(1) Th. viii. 338.

(2) Lac. xlii. 37.

(3) Mig. viii. 339. Th. viii. 346, 347. July 18, 1796.



ment. It did more to overthrow the existing wealth, to transfer movable fortunes from one hand to another, than even the confiscation of the emigrant and church estates. All debts were in fact annihilated by the elusory form in which it permitted payment to be made. In its later stages, a debtor with one franc could force a discharge of a debt of two hundred; the public creditors, the government servants, in fact, all the classes who formerly were opulent, were reduced to the last stage of misery. On the other hand, the debtors throughout the whole country found themselves liberated from their engagements; the national domains were purchased almost for nothing by the holders of government paper; and the land, infinitely subdivided, required little of the expenditure of capital (1), and became daily more productive from the number and energy of its new cultivators.

Public  
Bankruptcy  
finally de-  
clared. Deprived of the extraordinary resource of issuing paper, the Directory were compelled to calculate their real revenue, and endeavour to accommodate their expenditure to that standard. They estimated the revenue for 1796 at 4,100,000,000 or L.50,000,000, including an arrear of 300,000,000, or L.13,000,000, of the forced loans, which had never yet been recovered. But the event soon proved that this calculation was fallacious; the revenue proved greatly less, and the expenditure much greater, than had been expected. The land tax had produced only 200 millions, instead of 250; and the 200 millions expected from the sale of the remainder of the national domains had not been half realized, and all the other sources of revenue had failed in the same proportion. Meanwhile, the armies of the Rhine, of the Sambre and Meuse, and of the Interior, were in the most extreme state of penury, and all the national establishments on the point of ruin. In these circumstances, it was no longer possible to avoid a bankruptcy (2).

And two-  
thirds of  
the na-  
tional debt  
contracted.  
Aug. 18,  
1797. The public creditors, as usual in all such extremities, were the first to be sacrificed. After exhausting every expedient of delay and procrastination with the *rentiers*, the Directory at length paid them only a fourth in money, and three-fourths in bills, dischargeable on the national domains, called *Bons des trois Quarts*. The annual charge of the debt was 248 millions of francs, or about L.11,000,000 sterling; so that, by this expedient, the burden was reduced to 62 millions, or L.2,400,000. The bills received for the three-fourths were from the first at a ruinous discount, and soon became altogether unsaleable; and the disorders and partiality consequent on this mode of payment speedily became so excessive, that it could no longer be continued. The income of 1797 was estimated at 616,000,000 francs, or about L.27,000,000, but the expenditure could not be reduced to this, without taking a decisive step in regard to the debt. It was therefore finally resolved to continue the payment of a third only of the debt in specie; and the remaining two-thirds were to be discharged by the payment of a capital in bills, secured on the national domains, at the rate of twenty years' purchase. These bills, like the *Bons des Trois Quarts*, immediately fell to a sixth of their value, and shortly after dwindled away to almost nothing, from the quantity simultaneously thrown into the market. As the great majority of the public creditors were in such circumstances that they could not take land, this was, to all intents, a national bankruptcy, which cut off at one blow two-thirds of their property (3).

(1) Th. viii. 343. Lac. xiii. 38.

(2) Th. viii. 343, 344; ix. 177.

(3) Th. ix. 177, 319, 326. Bris. Hist. Fin. ii. 321.  
327. Lac. xiv. 105.

Successful  
efforts of the  
Directory to  
restore  
order in  
France.

These attempts of the Directory, though long unsuccessful, to restore order to the distracted chaos of revolutionary France, were seconded by the efforts of the great majority of the people, to whom a termination of political contests had become the most imperious of necessities. Such, in truth, is the disposition to right themselves in human affairs when the fever of passion has subsided, that men fall insensibly into order, under any government which saves them from the desolating effect of their own passions. Within a few months after the establishment of the new government, the most frightful evils entailed on France by the revolutionary *régime*, had been removed or alleviated. The odious law of the maximum, which compelled the industry of the country to pay tribute to the idleness of towns, was abolished; the commerce of grain in the interior was free: the assignats were replaced, without any convulsion; by a metallic currency: the press had resumed its independence; the elections had taken place without violence; the guillotine no longer shed the noblest blood in France; the roads were secure; the ancient proprietors lived in peace beside the purchasers of the national domains. Whatever faults they may have afterwards committed, France owes to the Directory, during the first year, the immense obligation of having reconstructed the elements of society out of the fusion of the revolutionary crucible (1).

But irrel-  
igion conti-  
nues still  
triumphant.

In one particular alone, the Directory made no approach towards improvement. Religion still remained prostrated as it had been by the strokes of the Decemvirs; the churches were closed; Sunday abolished; baptism and communion unknown; the priests in exile, or in hiding under the roofs of the faithful remnant of the Christian flock. The youth of both sexes were brought up without the slightest knowledge of the faith of their fathers; a generation was ushered into the world, destitute of the first elements of religious instruction. Subsequently, the immense importance of this deficiency appeared in the clearest manner; it has left a chasm in the social institutions of France, which all the genius of Napoléon, and all the glories of the empire, have not been able to repair; and which, it is to be feared, is destined to prevent the growth of any thing like rational or steady freedom in that distracted country. In vain Laréveillière endeavoured to establish a system of *Theophilanthropy*, and opened temples, published chants, and promulgated a species of liturgy; all these endeavours to supersede the doctrines of revelation speedily failed (2): and Deism alone remained in the few of the revolutionary party who bestowed any thought on religious concerns (3).

Theophilan-  
thropists.

The shock of parties, however, had been too violent, the wounds inflicted

(1) De Staël, ii. 162. Mign. ii. 406.

(2) Mign. ii. 406. Lac. xiii. 2. Lavelette, i. 323, 324.

(3) The tenets and ideas of this singular sect were one of the most curious results of the Revolution. Their principles were, for the most part, contained in the following paragraph:—

Singular character, tenets, and worship of this sect. “We believe in the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul. Worship the Deity; cherish your equals; render yourself useful to your country. Every thing is good which tends to preserve and bring to perfection the human race; every thing which has an opposite tendency is the reverse. Children, honour your fathers and mothers; obey them with affection, support their declining years. Fathers and mothers, instruct your children. Women, behold in your husbands the heads of your houses; husbands, be-

hold in women the mothers of your children, and reciprocally study each other's happiness.”

When men flatter themselves that they are laying the foundations of a new religion, they are, in truth, only dressing up, in a somewhat varied form, the morality of the gospel.

The worship of this sect was very singular. Laréveillière-Lépaux was their high priest; they had four temples in Paris, and on appointed days service was performed. In the middle of the congregation, an immense basket, filled with the most beautiful flowers of the season, was placed, as the symbol of the creation. The high-priest pronounced a discourse, enforcing the moral virtues; “in which,” says the Duchess of Abrantes, “there was frequently so much truth and feeling, that if the Evangelists had not said the same thing much better 1800 years before them, one might have been tempted to em-

too profound, for society to relapse, without further convulsions, into a state of repose. It was from the Jacobins that the first efforts proceeded; and the principles of their leaders at this juncture are singularly instructive as to the extremities to which the doctrines of democracy are necessarily pushed, when they take a deep hold of the body of the people.

Revered efforts of the Jacobins. This terrible faction had never ceased to mourn in secret the ninth Thermidor as the commencement of their bondage. They still hoped to establish absolute equality, notwithstanding the variety of human character; and complete democracy, in spite of the institutions of modern civilisation. They had been driven from the government by the fall of Robespierre; and from all influence in the metropolis by the defeat and disarming of the faubourgs. But the necessities of government, on occasion of the revolt of the sections on the thirteenth Vendémiaire, had compelled it to invoke the aid of their desperate bands, to resist the efforts of the Royalists, and the character of the Directors inspired them with hopes of regaining their influence at the helm of affairs. Flattered by these prospects, the broken faction re-assembled. They instituted a new club, under the splendid dome of the Panthéon, which they trusted would rival the far-famed assemblage of the Jacobins; and there instituted a species of idolatrous worship of Marat and Robespierre, whom they still upheld as objects of imitation to their followers (1).

Isolated. His extreme revolutionary principles. The head of this party was Babœuf, surnamed Gracchus, who aspired to become the chief of the fanatical band. His leading principle was, that the friends of freedom had hitherto failed because they had not ventured to make that use of their power which could alone ensure its lasting success. "Robespierre fell," said he, "because he did not venture to pronounce the word 'Agrarian Law.' He effected the spoliation of a few rich, but without benefiting the poor. The *sans-culottes*, guided by too timid leaders, piqued themselves on their foolish determination to abstain from enriching themselves at others' expense. Real aristocracy consists in the possession of riches, and it matters not whether they are in the hands of a Villiers, a Laborde, a Danton, a Barras, or a Rewbell. Under different names, it is ever the same aristocracy which oppresses the poor, and keeps

these their opinions." (D'Ab. vi. 37, 38.) This sect, like all others founded upon mere Deism and the locution of the moral virtues, was short-lived; and never embraced any considerable body of the people.

Napoléon viewed these enthusiasts, some of whom were still to be found in Paris when he seized the helm of affairs in 1799, in their true light. "They are good actors," said he.—"What!" answered one of the most enthusiastic of their number, "is it in such terms that you stigmatize those whose chiefs are among the most virtuous men in Paris, and whose tenets inculcate only universal benevolence and the moral virtues?"—"What do you mean by that?" replied the First Consul; "all systems of morality are fine. Apart from certain dogmas, more or less absurd, which were necessary to suit the capacity of the people to whom they were addressed, what do you see in the Widhain, the Koran, the Old Testament, or Confucius? Every where pure morality; that is to say, a system inculcating protection to the weak, respect to the laws, gratitude to God. The gospel alone has exhibited a complete assemblage of the principles of morality divested of absurdity. That is what is truly admirable, and not a few commonplace sentences put into bad verse. Do you wish to see what is truly sublime? Repeat

the Lord's Prayer. You and your friends would willingly become martyrs: I shall do them no such honour. No strokes but those of ridicule shall fall upon them; and if I know any thing of the French, they will speedily prove effectual." Napoléon's views soon proved correct. The sect lingered on five years; and two of its members had even the courage to publish short works in its defence, which speedily died a natural death. Their number gradually declined; and they were at length so inconsiderable, that when a decree of government, on the 4th October, 1801, prohibited them from meeting in the four churches which they had hitherto occupied as their temples, they were unable to raise money enough to hire a room to carry on their worship. The extinction of this sect was not owing merely to the irreligious spirit of the French metropolis; it would have undergone the same fate in any other age or country. It is not by flowers and verses, declamations on the beauty of Spring and the goodness of the Deity, that a permanent impression is to be made on a being exposed to the temptations, liable to the misfortunes, and filled with the desires, incident to the human race.—See DECAUX D'ABRANTÈS, vi. 38, 41.

(1) Lac. xiii. 13. Migu. ii. 411.

them perpetually in the condition of the Spartan Helots. The people are excluded from the chief share in the property of France; nevertheless, the people who constitute the whole strength of the state, should be alone invested with it, and that too in equal shares. There is no real equality without an equality of riches. All the great of former times should, in their turn, be reduced to the condition of Helots; without that the Revolution is stopped where it should begin. These are the principles which Lycurgus or Gracchus would have applied to Revolutionary or Republican France; and without their adoption, the benefits of the Revolution are a mere chimera (1)."

But they  
fail now in  
rousing the  
people.

There was a time when plausible doctrines such as these, so well calculated to excite the passions of the squalid multitude in great cities, would in all probability have produced a great effect on the Parisian populace; but time extinguishes passion, and discovers illusions, to a generation as well as an individual. The people were no longer to be deceived by these high-sounding expressions; they knew, by dear-bought experience, that the equality of democracy is only an equality of subjection, and the equal division of property only a pretence for enriching the popular rulers. The lowest of the populace alone, accordingly, were moved by the efforts of the Jacobins; and the Directory, finding their government firmly established 27th Feb. 1796. in the opinions of the better classes, closed the Club at the Panthéon, and seized several numbers of Babœuf's Journal, containing passages tending to overthrow the constitution. To avert the further encroachments of the Jacobin party, they endeavoured to introduce a restriction on the liberty of the press; but the two Councils, after a solemn discussion, refused to sanction any such attempts (2).

Renewed  
efforts of  
the Revolutionists.

Defeated in this attempt, the Jacobins formed an Insurrectional Committee of Public Safety, which communicated, by means of twelve confidential agents, with affiliated societies in every part of Paris. Babœuf was at their head; the chiefs assembled in a place called the *Temple of Reason*, where they sung songs, deploring the death of Robespierre and the slavery of the people. They had some communication with the troops in the camp at Grenelle, and admitted to their secret meetings a captain in that force, named Grizel, whom they considered one of their most important adherents. Their design was to establish the "Public Good," and for that end to divide property of every description, and put at the head of affairs a government, consisting of "true, pure, and absolute democrats." It was unanimously agreed to murder the Directors, disperse the Councils, and put to death their leading members, and erect the sovereignty of the people; but to whom to intrust the supreme authority of the executive, after this was achieved, was a matter of anxious and difficult deliberation. At length they fixed on sixty-eight persons who were esteemed the most pure and absolute democrats, in whom the powers of the state were to be invested until the complete democratic *régime* was established. The day for commencing the

(1) Lac. xiii. 14.

These doctrines of Babœuf, which were nothing more than the maxims of the Revolution pushed to their legitimate consequences, instead of being stopped short when they had served the purpose of a particular party, show how correctly Mr. Burke had, long before, characterised the real Jacobin principles. "Jacobinism" says he, "is the revolt of the enterprising talents of a country against its property. When private men form themselves into associations for the purpose of destroying the laws and institutions of their country; when they secure to themselves an army, by dividing among the

people of no property the estates of the ancient and lawful proprietors; when the state recognises these acts; when it does not make confiscation for crimes, but crimes for confiscations; when it has its principal strength, and all its resources in such a violation of property; when it stands chiefly upon such violation, massacring, by judgments or otherwise, those who make any struggle for their old legal government, and their old legal possessions—I call this Jacobinism by establishment."—*Thoughts on a Regicide Peace*, 97.

(2) Th. viii. 179. Mign. ii. 411. Lac. xiii. 15.

insurrection was fixed, and all the means of carrying it into effect arranged. It was to take place on the 21st May. Placards and banners were prepared, bearing the words, "Liberty, Equality, Constitution of 1793, Common Good;" and others having the inscription, "Those who usurp the sovereignty of the people should be put to death by freemen." The conspirators were to march from different quarters to attack the Directors and the Councils, and make themselves masters of the Luxembourg, the treasury, the telegraph, and the arsenal of artillery at Meudon; a correspondence had been opened with the Jacobins in other quarters, so that the revolt would break out simultaneously in all parts of France. To induce the lower classes to take part in the proceedings, proclamations were immediately to be issued, requiring every citizen of any property to lodge and maintain a man who had joined in the insurrection; and the bakers, butchers, and wine-merchants were to be obliged to furnish the articles in which they dealt to the citizens, at a low price fixed by the government. All soldiers who should join the people were to receive instantly a large sum in money, and their discharge; or, if they preferred remaining by their colours, they were to get the houses of the Royalists to pillage (1).

These desperate and extreme measures, worthy of C  tiline's conspirators, the natural result of a long-continued revolutionary strife, indicated a perfect knowledge of human nature, and might, at an earlier period, have roused the most vehement democratic passions. But, coming as they did at a time when such opinions inspired all men of any property with horror, they failed in producing any considerable effect. The designs of the conspirators were

20th May, 1796. divulged to government by Grizel; and, on the 20th May, the day before the plot was to have been carried into execution, Bab  uf, and all the leaders of the enterprise, were seized at their place of assembly, and with them the documents which indicated the extent of the conspiracy.

The conspiracy is discovered, and Bab  uf arrested. Bab  uf, though in captivity, abated nothing of his haughty bearing, and would only condescend to negotiate with the government on a footing of perfect equality. "Do you consider it beneath you," said he to the Directory, "to treat with me as an independent power? You see of what a vast party I am the centre; you see that it nearly balances your own; you see what immense ramifications it contains. I am well assured that the discovery must have made you tremble. It is nothing to have arrested the chiefs of the conspiracy; it will revive in other bosoms, if theirs are extinct. Abandon the idea of shedding blood in vain; you have not hitherto made much noise about the affair; make no more; treat with the patriots; they recollect that you were once sincere Republicans; they will pardon you, if you concur with them in measures calculated to effect the salvation of the Republic." Instead of acceding to this extravagant proposal, the Directory published the letter, and ordered the trial of the conspirators before the High Court at Vend  me. This act of vigour contributed more than any thing they had yet done, to consolidate the authority of Government (2).

20th Aug. His party was broken out at Grenelle; The partisans of Bab  uf, however, were not discouraged. Some months afterwards, and before the trial of the chiefs had come on, they marched in the night, to the number of six or seven hundred, armed with sabres and pistols, to the camp at Grenelle. They were received by a regiment of dragoons, which, instead of fraternizing with them as they expected, charged and dispersed the motley array. Great numbers were cut

(1) Th. viii. 193, 196; Mign. ii. 412, 413.

(2) Th. viii. 197, 198. Mign. ii. 413.



But are de-  
feated and  
executed.

down in the fight. Of the prisoners taken, thirty-one were condemned and executed by a military commission, and thirty transported. This severe blow extinguished, for a long period, the hopes of the revolutionary party, by cutting off all their leaders of resolution and ability; and though it still inspired terror by the recollection of its former excesses, it ceased from this time forward to have any real power to disturb the tranquillity of the state. Despotism is never so secure as after the miseries of anarchy have been recently experienced (1).

Trial of the  
leaders pre-  
viously ar-  
rested.

The Directory followed up this success by the trial of Babœuf, Amar, Vadier, Darthé, and the other leaders taken on the 29th May, before the Court of Vendôme. Their behaviour on this occasion was that of men who neither feared death, nor were ashamed of the cause in which they were to die. At the commencement and conclusion of each day's proceedings, they sung the Marseillaise hymn; their wives attended them to the court; and Babœuf, at the conclusion of his defence, turned towards them, and said, "that they should follow them to Mount Calvary, because they had no reason to blush for the cause for which they suffered." They were all acquitted except Babœuf and Darthé, who were condemned to death. On hearing the sentence, they mutually stabbed each other with a poniard, and died with the stoicism of ancient Rome (2).

The terror excited by these repeated efforts of the Jacobins was extreme, and totally disproportioned to the real danger with which they were attended. It is the remembrance of the danger which is past, not that which is present, that ever affects the generality of mankind. This feeling encouraged the Royalists to make an effort to regain their ascendancy, in the hope that the troops in the camp at Grenelle, who had so firmly resisted the seductions of the democratic, might be more inclined to aid the exertions of the monarchical party. Their conspiracy, however, destitute of any aid in the legislative bodies, though numerous supported by the population of Paris, proved abortive.

Abortive at-  
tempt of the  
Royalists.

Its leaders were Brottier, an old counsellor in parliament, Laville-Heurnois, and Dunan. They made advances to Malo the captain of dragoons, who had resisted the seductions of the Jacobins; but he was equally inaccessible to the offers of the Royalists, and delivered up their leaders to the Directory. They were handed over to the civil tribunal, who being unwilling to renew the reign of blood, humanely suffered them to escape with a short imprisonment (3).

Singular  
manners of  
this period  
in France.

The manners of 1793 and 1796 were different from any which had yet prevailed in France, and exhibited a singular specimen of the love of order and the spirit of elegance regaining their ascendancy over a nation which had lost its nobility, its religion, and its morals. The total destruction of fortunes of every description during the Revolution, and the complete ruin of paper money, reduced every one to the necessity of doing something for himself, and restored commerce to its pristine form of barter. The saloons of fashion were converted into magazines of stuffs, where ladies of the highest rank engaged, during the day, in the drudgery of trade, to maintain their families or relations, while in the evening the reign of pleasure and amusement was resumed. In the midst of the wreck of ancient opulence, modern wealth began to display its luxury; the faubourg St.-Antoine, the seat of manufactures, the faubourg St.-Germain, the abode of

(1) Th. viii. 369. Mign. ii. 444.

(2) Mign. ii. 415. Th. ix. 35.

(3) Mig. ii. 416. Th. ix. 23.



rank, remained deserted, but in the quarter of the *chaussée d'Antin*, and in the *Boulevard des Italiens*, the riches of the bankers, and of those who had made fortunes in the Revolution, began to shine with unprecedented lustre. Splendid hotels, sumptuously furnished in the Grecian taste, which had now become the fashion, were embellished by magnificent *fêtes*, where all that was left of elegance in France by the Revolution, assembled to indulge the new-born passion for enjoyment. The dresses of the women were carried to extravagance, in the Grecian style; and the excessive nudity which they exhibited, while it proved fatal to many persons of youth and beauty, contributed, by the novel aspect of the charms which were presented to the public eye, to increase the general enchantment. The assemblies of Barras, in particular, were remarkable for their magnificence; but, in the general confusion of ranks and characters which they presented, afforded too clear an indication of the universal destruction of the ancient landmarks, in morals as well as society, which the Revolution had effected (1).

In these assemblies were to be seen the elements out of which the Imperial court was afterwards formed. The young officers who had risen to eminence in the Republican armies, began here to break through the rigid circle of aristocratic etiquette; and the mixture of characters and ideas which the Revolution had produced, rendered the style of conversation incomparably more varied and animating than any thing which had been known under the ancient *régime*. In a few years the world had lived through centuries of knowledge. There was to be seen Hoche, not yet twenty-seven years of age, who had recently extinguished the war in la Vendée, and whose handsome figure, brilliant talents, and rising glory, rendered him the idol of women even of aristocratic habits; while the thoughtful air, energetic conversation, and eagle eye of Napoléon, already, to persons of discernment, foretold no ordinary destinies. The beauty of Madame Tallien was still in its zenith; while the grace of Madame Beaubarnais, and the genius of Madame de Staël, threw a lustre over the reviving society of the capital, which had been unknown since the fall of the monarchy. The illustrious men of the age, for the most part, at this period selected their partners for life from the brilliant circle by which they were surrounded; and never did such destinies depend on the decision or caprice of the moment. Madame Permon, a lady of rank and singular attractions from Corsica, in whose family Napoléon had from infancy been intimate, and whose daughter afterwards became Duchess of Abrantes, refused in one morning the hand of Napoléon for herself, that of his brother Joseph for her daughter, and that of his sister Pauline for her son. She little thought that she was declining for herself the throne of Charlemagne; for her daughter, that of Charles V, and for her son, the most beautiful princess in Europe (2).

But the result of the elections is preparing a catastrophe. But the passions raised were too violent, the wounds inflicted too profound, for society to relapse, without further convulsions, into a state of repose; and France was again destined to undergo the horrors of Jacobin rule, before she settled down under the despotism of the sword. The Directory was essentially democratic; but the first elections having taken place during the excitement produced by the suppression of the revolt of the Sections at Paris, and two-thirds of the Councils being composed of the members of the old Convention, the legislature was, in that

(1) Th. viii. 190. Lac. xiii. 24, 35. D'Abr. ii. 44, 44.

(2) D'Abr. ii. 44, 48. Th. viii. 181, 182.

respect, in harmony with the executive. But the elections of the year 1797, when one-third of both were changed, produced a total alteration in the balance of parties in the state. These elections, for the most part, turned out favourable to the Royalist interest; and, so far did the members of that party carry hostility to the Jacobins, that they questioned all the candidates in many of the provinces as to whether they were holders of the national domains, or had ever been engaged in the Revolution, or in any of the public journals, and instantly rejected all who answered affirmatively to any of these questions. The reaction against the Revolution was soon extremely powerful over the whole departments. The Royalists, perceiving from the turn of the elections that they would acquire a majority, soon gained the energy of victory. The multitude, ever ready to follow the victorious party, ranged themselves on their side, while a hundred journals thundered forth their declamations against the Government, without its venturing to invoke the aid of the sanguinary law, which affixed the punishment of death against all offences tending towards a restoration of royalty. The avowed corruption, profligacy, and unmeasured ambition of Barras, and the majority of the Directory, strongly contributed to increase the reaction throughout the country. The result of the elections was such, that a great majority in both Councils was in the Royalist or anti-conventional interest; and the strength of the republican party lay solely in the Directory and the army (1).

Barthélemy  
is chosen a  
Director in  
lieu of Le-  
gourneur,  
and joins  
Carnot.

The first act of the new Assembly, or rather of the Assembly with its new third of members, was to choose a successor to the director Letourneur, upon whom the lot had fallen of retiring from the government. The choice fell on Barthélemy, the minister who had concluded the peace with Prussia and Spain; a respectable man, of Royalist principles. Pichegru, deputy of the Jura, was, amidst loud acclamations, appointed president of the Council of Five Hundred: Barbé-Marbois, also a Royalist, president of the Council of the Ancients. Almost all the ministry were changed, and the Directory was openly divided into two parties; the majority consisting of Rewbell, Barras, and Laréveillière; the minority of Barthélemy and Carnot (2).

Club of  
Clichy.

The chief strength of the Royalist party lay in the club of Clichy, which acquired as preponderating an influence at this epoch, as that of the Jacobins had done at an earlier stage of the Revolution. Few among their number were in direct communication with the Royalists, but they were all animated with hatred at the Jacobins, and an anxious desire to prevent their regaining their ascendancy in the government. The opposite side assembled at the Club of Salm, where was arrayed the strength of the Republicans, the Directory, and the army. Carnot though a steady Republican, was inclined to join the Royalist party from his love of freedom, and his rooted aversion to violent measures. Steadily pursuing what he conceived to be the public good, he had, during the crisis of the Reign of Terror, supported the dictatorial; and now, when the danger to freedom from foreign subjugation was over, he strove to regain the regal régime. The opposite factions soon became so exasperated, that they mutually aimed at supplanting each other by means of a revolution; a neutral party, headed by Thibaudeau, strove to prevent matters coming to extremities (3);

(1) Mign. ii. 421, 422. Lac. xiv. 16. Nap. iv. 216. Th. ix. 36. D'Abr. i. 120.

(2) Th. ix. 165. Nap. iv. 216.

(3) Mign. ii. 425. Nap. iv. 217, 218. Th. ix. 165, 166.

but, as usual in such circumstances, was unsuccessful, and shared in the ruin of the vanquished.

General reaction in favour of Royalist principles. The reaction in favour of Royalist principles at this juncture was so strong, that out of seventy periodical journals which appeared at Paris, only three or four supported the cause of the Revolution. Lacretelle, the future historian of the Revolution, the Abbé Morellet, La Harpe, Sicard, and all the literary men of the capital, wrote periodically on the Royalist side. Michaud, destined to illustrate and beautify the History of the Crusades, went so far as to publish a direct *éloge* on the princes of the exiled family; an offence which, by the subsisting laws, was punishable with death. He was indicted for the offence, but acquitted by the jury, amidst the general applause of the people. The majority in the Councils supported the liberty of the press, from which their party were reaping such advantages, and, pursuing a cautious but incessant attack upon government, brought them into obloquy by continually exposing the confusion of the finances, which was becoming inextricable, and dwelling on the continuance of the war, which appeared interminable (1).

At this epoch, by a singular but not unnatural train of events, the partisans of royalty were the strongest supporters of the liberty of the press; while the Jacobin government did every thing in their power to stifle its voice. This is the natural course of things when parties have changed places, and the executive authority is in the hands of the popular leaders. Freedom of discussion is the natural resource of liberty, whether menaced by regal, republican, or military violence; it is the insurrection of thought against physical force (2). It may frequently mislead and blind the people, and for years perpetuate the most fatal delusions; but still it is the polar star of freedom, and it alone can restore the light of truth to the generation it has misled. The press is not to be feared in any country where the balance of power is properly maintained, and opposing parties divide the state, because their opposite interests and passions call forth contradictory statements and arguments, which at length extricate truth from their collision: the period of danger from its abuse commences when it is in great part turned to one side either by despotic power, democratic violence, or purely republican institutions. France under Napoléon was an example of the first; Great Britain during the Reform fever in 1831, of the second; America of the third. Wherever one power in the state is overbearing, whether it be that of a sovereign or of the multitude, the press generally becomes the instrument of the most debasing tyranny (3).

Measures of the Directory to avert the danger. To ward off the attacks, the Directory proposed a law for restricting the liberty of the press, and substituting graduated penalties for the odious punishment which the subsisting law authorized, but which could not be carried into effect from its severity. It passed the Five Hundred, but was thrown out in the Ancients, amidst transports of joy in the Royalist party. Encouraged by this success, they attempted to undo the worst parts of the revolutionary fabric: the punishment of imprisonment or transportation, to which the clergy were liable by the revolutionary laws, was repealed, and a proposal made to permit the open use of the ancient worship, allow the use of bells in the churches, the cross on the graves of such as chose to place that emblem there, and relieve the priests

(1) Mign. ii. 422. Lac. xiv. 16, 18.

(2) Mad. de Staël, ii. 183.

(3) Mad. de Staël, ii. 263.

from the necessity of taking the republican oaths. On this occasion Camille-Jordan, deputy from Lyon, whose religious and royalist principles had been strongly confirmed by the atrocities of the Jacobins in that unfortunate city, made an eloquent and powerful speech, which produced a great sensation. He pleaded strongly the great cause of religious toleration, and exposed the iniquity of those laws, which, professing to remove the restrictions on subjects of faith, imposed fetters severer than had ever been known to Catholic superstition. The Council, tired of the faded extravagances on the subject of freedom, were entranced for the moment by a species of eloquence for years unheard in the Assembly, and by the revival of feelings long strangers to their breasts, and listened to the declamations of the young enthusiast as they would have done to the preaching of Peter the Hermit. But the attempt was premature; the principles of infidelity were too deeply seated, to be shaken by transient bursts of genius; and the Council ultimately rejected the proposal by such a majority, as showed that ages of suffering must yet be endured before that fatal poison could be expelled from the social body (1).

General return of the emigrants and clergy. Encouraged by this state of opinion in the capital, the emigrants and the banished priests assembled in crowds from every part of Europe. Fictitious passports were transmitted from Paris to Hamburg and other towns, where they were eagerly purchased by those who longed ardently to revisit their native land. The clergy returned in still greater numbers, and were received with transports of joy by their faithful flocks, especially in the western departments, who for four years had been deprived of all the ordinances and consolations of religion; the infants were anew baptised; the sick visited; the nuptial benediction pronounced by consecrated lips; and the last rites performed over the remains of the faithful. On this, as on other occasions, however, the energy of the Royalists consisted rather in words than in actions; they avowed too openly the extent of their hopes, not to awaken the vigilance of the revolutionary party; and spoke themselves into the belief that their strength was irresistible, while their adversaries were silently preparing the means of overturning it (2).

Great alarm of the Directory. In effect, the rapid march of the Councils, and the declamations of the Royalists, both in the tribune, in the club of Clichy, and in the public journals, awakened an extreme alarm among that numerous body of men, who, from having been implicated in the crimes of the Revolution, or gainers from its excesses, had the strongest interest to prevent its principles from receding. The Directory became alarmed for their own existence, by reason of the decided majority of their antagonists in both Councils, and the certainty that the approaching election of a third would almost totally ruin the Republican party. It had already been ascertained that 190 of the deputies were engaged to restore the exiled family, while the Directory could only reckon upon the support of 130; and the Ancients had resolved, by a large majority, to transfer the seat of the legislature to Rouen, on account of its proximity to the western provinces, whose Royalist principles had always been so decided. The next election, it was expected, would nearly extinguish the Revolutionary party; and the Directory were aware that the transition was easy for regicides, as the greater part of them were, from the Luxembourg to the scaffold (3).

(1) Lac. xiv. 20, 54. Mign. ii. 422, 423. Th. ix. 174.

(2) Th. ix. 191. Mign. ii. 424.

(3) Thibaudeau Mém. ii. 321. Lac xiv. 61. Th. ix. 192.

The Repub-  
lican ma-  
jority of the  
Directory  
resolve on  
decisive  
measures. In this extremity, the majority of the Directory, consisting of Barras, Rewbell, and Laréveillière-Lépaux, resolved upon decisive measures. They could reckon with confidence upon the support of the army, which having been raised during the revolutionary fervour of 1793, and constantly habituated to the intoxication of Republican triumphs, was strongly imbued with democratic principles. This, in the existing state of affairs, was an assistance of immense importance. They, therefore, drew towards Paris a number of regiments, twelve thousand strong, from the army of the Sambre and Meuse, which were known to be most republican in their feelings; and these troops were brought within the circle of twelve leagues round the legislative body, which the constitution forbade the armed force to cross. Barras wrote to Hoche, who was in Holland superintending the preparations for the invasion of Ireland, informing him of the dangers of the Government; and he readily undertook to support them with all his authority. The ministers were changed: Bénézech, minister of the interior; Cochon, minister of police; Petiet, minister of war; Lacroix, minister of foreign affairs; and Truguet, of marine; who were all suspected of inclining to the party of the Councils, were suddenly dismissed. In their place were substituted François de Neufchâteau, in the ministry of the interior; Hoche, in that of war; Lenoir Laroche, in that of the police; and Talleyrand, in that of foreign affairs. The strong sagacity of this last politician, led him to incline, in all the changes of the Revolution, to what was about to prove the victorious side; and his accepting office under the Directory at this crisis, was strongly symptomatic of the chances which were accumulated in their favour (1). Carnot, from this moment, became convinced that his ruin had been determined on by his colleagues. Barras and Laréveillière had long borne him a secret grudge, which sprung from his having signed the warrant, during the Reign of Terror, for the arrest of Danton, who was the leader of their party.

Measures of  
Napoleon.  
He resolves  
to support  
the Repub-  
licans, and  
for that pur-  
pose sends  
Lavalette to  
Paris. Barras and Hoche kept up an active correspondence with Napo-  
léon, whose co-operation was of so much importance to secure the  
success of their enterprise. He was strongly urged by the Directory  
to come to Paris and support the Government; while, on the other  
hand, his intimate friends advised him to proceed there, and pro-  
claim himself Dictator, as he afterwards did on his return from  
Egypt. That he hesitated whether he should not, even at that period, follow  
the footsteps of Cæsar, is avowed by himself; but he judged, probably wisely,  
that the period was not yet arrived for putting such a design in execution,  
and that the miseries of a republic had not yet been sufficiently experienced  
to ensure the success of an enterprise destined for its overthrow. He was  
resolved, however, to support the Directory, both because he was aware that  
the opposite party had determined upon his dismissal, from an apprehension  
of the dangers which he might occasion to public freedom, and because their  
principles, being those of moderation and peace, were little likely to favour  
his ambitious projects. Early, therefore, in spring 1797, he sent his  
aide-de-camp, Lavalette, who afterwards acquired a painful celebrity in the  
history of the restoration, to Paris, to observe the motions of the parties, and  
communicate to him the earliest intelligence; and afterwards dispatched Au-  
gustin July, 1797. gereau, a general of decided character, and known revolutionary  
principles, to that city to support the Government. He declined coming to the

(1) Carnot, 89, et seq. Lac. xiv. 61, 67. Th. ix. 309, 210. Mign. i. 424.



capital himself, being unwilling to sully his hands, and risk his reputation, by a second victory over its inhabitants; but he had made his arrangements so, that, in the event of the Directory being defeated, he should, five days after receiving intelligence of the disaster, make his entry into Lyon at the head of twenty thousand men, and, rallying the Republicans every where to his standard, advance to Paris, passing thus, like another Cæsar, the Rubicon at the head of the popular party (1).

To awaken the republican ardour of his soldiers, Napoléon celebrated the anniversary of the taking of the Bastille on July 14th, by a *fête*, on which occasion he addressed the following order of the day to his troops:—"Soldiers! This is the anniversary of the 14th July. You see before you the names of your companions in arms, who have died on the field of battle for the liberty of their country; they have given you an example; you owe yourselves to your country; you are devoted to the prosperity of thirty millions of Frenchmen, to the glory of that name which has received such additional lustre from your victories. I know that you are profoundly affected at the misfortunes which threaten your country; but it is not in any real danger. The same men who have caused it to triumph over Europe in arms, are ready. Mountains separate us from France. You will cross them with the rapidity of the eagle, if it be necessary, to maintain the constitution, to defend liberty, to protect the government of the Republicans. Soldiers! the Government watches over the sacred deposit of the laws which it has received. From the instant that the Royalists show themselves, they have ceased to exist (2). Have no fears of the result; and swear by the manes of the heroes who have died amongst us in defence of freedom, swear on our standards, eternal war to the enemies of the Republic and of the constitution."

His Proclamation to his soldiers on 14th July.

This proclamation proved extremely serviceable to the Directory. The flame spread from rank to rank; addresses, breathing the most vehement republican spirit, were voted by all the regiments and squadrons of the army, and transmitted to the Directory and the Councils with the signatures attached to them. Many of these productions breathed the whole rancour of the Jacobin spirit. That of the 29th demi-brigade commenced with these words:—"Of all the animals produced by the caprice of nature, the vilest is a king, the most cowardly is a courtier, the worst is a priest. If the scoundrels who disturb France are not crushed by the forces you possess, call to your aid the 29th demi-brigade, it will soon discomfit all your enemies; Chouans, English, all will take to flight. We will pursue our unworthy citizens even into the chambers of their worthy patron George III, and the Club of Clichy will undergo the fate of that of Reney." Augereau brought with him the address of the soldiers of the Italian army. "Tremble, Royalists!" said they; "from the Adige to the Seine is but a step—tremble! Your iniquities are numbered, and their reward is at the point of our bayonets." "It is with indignation," said the staff of the Italian army, "that we have seen the intrigues of royalty menace the fabric of liberty. We have sworn, by the manes of the heroes who died for their country, an implacable war to royalty and royalists. These are our sentiments, these are yours; these are those of the country. Let the Royalists show themselves; they have ceased to live." Other ad-

The army strongly supports the Directory.

Extravagant addresses from the soldiers.

(1) Nap. iv. 226, 227. Bour. i. 228, 232. Las Cas. iv. 157, Lav. i. 272.

(2) Nap. iv. 525.



dresses, in a similar strain, flowed in from the armies of the Rhine and the Moselle; it was soon evident that the people had chosen for themselves their masters, and that under the name of freedom, a military despotism was about to be established. The Directory encouraged and published all these addresses, which produced a powerful impression on the public mind. The Councils loudly exclaimed against these menacing deliberations by armed men; but government, as their only reply, drew still nearer to Paris the twelve thousand men who had been brought from Hoche's army, and placed them at Versailles, Meudon, and Vincennes (1).

Strength of the opposite party consisted only in talent and eloquence. The party against whom these formidable preparations were directed, was strong in numbers and powerful in eloquence, but totally destitute of that reckless hardihood and fearless vigour, which in civil convulsions is usually found to command success. Tronçon-Ducoudray, in the Council of the Ancients, drew, in strong and sombre colours, a picture of the consequences which would ensue to the Directory themselves, their friends, and the people of France, from this blind stifling of the public voice by the threats of the armies. In prophetic strains he announced the commencement of a reign of blood, which would be closed by the despotism of the sword. This discourse, pronounced in an intrepid accent, recalled to mind those periods of feudal tyranny, when the victims of oppression appealed from the kings or pontiffs, who were about to stifle their voice, to the justice of God, and summoned their accusers to answer at that dread tribunal for their earthly injustice. At the Club of Clichy, Jordan, Vaublanc, and Willot, strongly urged the necessity of adopting decisive measures. They proposed to decree the arrest of Barras, Rewbell, and Laréveillière; to summon Carnot and Barthélemy to the legislative body; and if they refused to obey, sound the tocsin, march at the head of the old sectionaries against the Directory, and appoint Pichegru the commander of that legal insurrection. That great general supported this energetic course by his weight and authority; but the majority, overborne, as the friends of order and freedom often are in revolutionary convulsions, by their scruples of conscience, decided against taking the lead in acts of violence, and resolved only to decree the immediate organization of the national guard under the command of Pichegru. "Let us leave to the Directory," said they, "all the odium of beginning violence." Sage advice, if they had been combating an enemy capable of being swayed by considerations of justice, but fatal in presence of enterprising ambition, supported by the weight of military power (2).

Their defenceless merits: but decline to commence hostilities. The actual force at the command of the Councils was extremely small. Their body guard consisted only of fifteen hundred grenadiers, who could not be relied on, as the event soon proved, in a contest with their brethren in arms; the national guard were disbanded, and without a rallying point; the Royalists, scattered, and destitute of organization. They had placed the guard under the orders of their own officers; and on the 17th Fructidor, when both Councils had decreed the organization of the national guard under Pichegru, this was to have been followed on the next day, by a decree, directing the removal of the troops from the neighbourhood of Paris. But a sense of their weakness, in such a strife, filled every breast with gloomy pre-

17th Fructidor, Sept. 3. Re-organization of the National Guard decreed by the Councils.

(1) Mign. ii. 427. Nap. iv. 225. Lac. xiv. 83, 85.

(2) Mign. ii. 427. Lac. xiv. 86, 86.

sentiments. Pichegru alone retained his wonted firmness and serenity of mind (1).

**Violent measures of the Directory.** The Directory, on the other hand, had recourse to immediate violence. They appointed Augereau, remarkable for his democratic principles, decision of character, and rudeness of manners, to the command of the 17th military division, comprehending the environs of Paris, and that city. In the night of the 17th Fructidor (September 3), they moved all the troops in the neighbourhood into the capital, and the inhabitants at midnight beheld, with breathless anxiety, twelve thousand armed men defile in silence over the bridges, with forty pieces of cannon, and occupy all the avenues to the Tuileries (2). Not a sound was to be heard but the marching of the men, and the rolling of the artillery, till the Tuileries were surrounded, when a signal gun was discharged, which made every heart that heard it beat with agitation. Instantly the troops approached the gates, and commanded them to be thrown open. Murmurs arose among the guards of the Councils: "We are not Swiss," exclaimed some; "We were wounded by the Royalists on the 13th Vendémiaire," rejoined others. Ramel, their faithful commander, who had received intelligence of the *coup d'état* which was approaching, had eight hundred men stationed at all the entrances of the palace, and the remainder in order of battle in the court; the railings were closed, and every preparation made for resistance. But no sooner did the staff of Augereau appear at the gates, than the soldiers of Ramel exclaimed, "Vive Augereau! Vive le Directoire!" and seizing their com-

**They surround the Tuileries with troops.**

**And the troops then join Augereau.**

**Revolution of the 18th Fructidor.**

mander, delivered him over to the assailants. Augereau now traversed the garden of the Tuileries, surrounded the hall of the Councils, arrested Pichegru, Willot, and twelve other leaders of the Legislative Assemblies, and conducted them to the Temple. The members of the Councils, who hurried in confusion to the spot, were seized and imprisoned by the soldiers. Those who were previously aware of the plot, met by appointment in the Odéon and the school of Medicine, near the Luxembourg, where they gave themselves out, though a small minority, for the Legislative Assemblies of France. Barthélemy was at the same time arrested by a body of troops dispatched by Augereau, and Carnot narrowly avoided the same fate by making his escape, almost without clothing, by a back door. By six o'clock in the morning all was concluded. Several hundred of the most powerful of the party of the Councils were in prison; and the people, wakening from their sleep, found the streets filled with troops, the walls covered with proclamations, and military despotism established (3).

The first object of the Directory was, to produce an impression on the public mind unfavourable to the majority of the Councils whom they had overturned. For this purpose, they covered the streets of Paris early in the morning with proclamations, in which they announced the discovery and defeat of a Royalist plot, the treason of Pichegru, and many members of the Councils, and that the Luxembourg had been attacked by them during the night. At the same time, they published a letter of General Moreau, in which the correspondence of Pichegru with the emigrant princes was detailed, and a letter from the Prince of Condé to Imbert, one of the Ancients. The streets were filled with crowds, who read in silence the proclamations.

**Passive submission of the people.** Mere spectators of a strife in which they had taken no part, they testified neither joy nor sorrow at the event. A few detached

(1) Lac. xiv. 88, 91. Mig. ii. 427.

(2) Mad. de Staël, *Rév. Franç.* ii. 184, 185.

(3) Mig. ii. 428, 429. Lac. xiv. 90, 93. Th. ix. 290, 293. Bour. i. 230, 245.

groups, issuing from the faubourgs, traversed the streets, exclaiming (1), "Vive la République! A bas les Aristocrates!" But the people, in general, were as passive as in a despotic state.

The minority of the Councils, who were in the interest of the Directory, continued their meetings in the Odéon and the School of Medicine; but their inconsiderable numbers demonstrated so clearly the violence done to the constitution, that they did not venture on any resolution at their first sitting, but one authorizing the continuance of the troops in Paris. On the following day, the Directory sent them a message in these terms:—"The 18th Fructidor should have saved the Republic and its real representatives. Have you not observed yesterday the tranquillity of the people, and their joy? This is the 19th, and the people ask, Where is the Republic; and what has the legislative body done to consolidate it? The eyes of the country are fixed upon you; the decisive moment has come. If you hesitate in the measures you are to adopt, if you delay a minute in declaring yourselves, it is all over both with yourselves and the Republic. The conspirators have watched while you were slumbering; your silence restored their audacity; they misled public opinion by infamous libels, while the journalists of the Bourbons and London never ceased to distribute their poisons. The conspirators already speak of punishing the Republicans for the triumph which they have commenced; and can you hesitate to purge the soil of France of that small body of Royalists, who are only waiting for the moment to tear in pieces the Republic, and to devour yourselves. You are on the edge of a volcano; it is about to swallow you up; you have it in your power to close it, and yet you deliberate! To-morrow it will be too late: the slightest indecision would now ruin the Republic. You will be told of principles, of delays, of the pity due to individuals; but how false would be the principles, how ruinous the delays, how misplaced the pity which should mislead the legislative body from its duty to the Republic! The Directory have devoted themselves to put in your hands the means of saving France; but it was entitled to expect that you would not hesitate to seize them. They believed that you were sincerely attached to freedom and the Republic, and that you would not be afraid of the consequences of that first step. If the friends of kings find in you their protectors,—if slaves excite your sympathy—if you delay an instant—it is all over with the liberty of France; the constitution is overturned, and you may at once proclaim to the friends of their country that the hour of royalty has struck. But if, as they believe, you recoil with horror from that idea, seize the passing moment, become the liberators of your country, and secure for ever its prosperity and glory." This pressing message sufficiently demonstrates the need which the Directory had of some legislative authority to sanction their dictatorial proceedings. The remnant of the Councils yielded to necessity; a council of five was appointed, with instructions to prepare a law of *public safety*; and that proved a decree of ostracism, which condemned to transportation almost all the noblest citizens of France (2).

Following the recommendation of that committee, the Councils, by a stretch of power, annulled the elections of forty-eight departments, which formed a majority of the legislative bodies, and condemned to transportation to Guiana, Carnot, Barthélemy, Pichegru, Camille-

(1) Th. ix. 296. Mign. ii. 429, 430. Lac. xiv. 94, 95.

(2) Th. ix. 298. Lac. xiv. 94, 99. Mign. ii. 430.

Jordan, Tronçon-Ducoudray, Henry Larivière, Imbert, Boissy-d'Anglas, Willot, Cochon, Ramel, Miranda, and fifty other members of the legislative body. Merlin and François de Neufchâteau, were named Directors, in lieu of those who were exiled. The Directory carried on the government thereafter by the mere force of military power, without even the shadow of legal authority; the places of the expelled deputies were not filled up, but the assemblies left in their mutilated state, without either consideration or independence. Three men, without the aid of historical recollections, without the lustre of victory, took upon themselves to govern France on their own account, without either the support of the law, or the concurrence of legal assemblies (1).

Their public acts soon became as violent as the origin of their power had been illegal. The revolutionary laws against the priests and the emigrants were revived, and ere long the whole of those persons who had ruled in the departments since the fall of Robespierre, were either banished or dispossessed of their authority. The Revolution of the 18th Fructidor, was not, like the victory of the 13th Vendémiaire, confined to the capital; it extended to the whole departments, revived every where the Jacobin ascendancy, and subjected the people over all France to the rule of the army, and the revolutionary leaders (2).

Extinction of the liberty of the press. The next step of the dictators was to extinguish the liberty of the press. For this purpose a second proscription was published, which included the authors, editors, printers, and contributors to forty-two journals. As eight or ten persons were included in the devoted number for each journal, this act of despotism embraced nearly four hundred individuals, among whom were to be found all the literary genius of France. La Harpe, Fontanes, and Sicard, though spared by the assassins of the 2d September, were struck by this despotic act, as were Michaud and Lacroix, the latter of whom composed, during a captivity of two years, his admirable history of the religious wars in France. At the same time, the press was subjected to the censorship of the police; while the punishment of exiled priests found in the territory of France, was extended to transportation to Guiana; a penalty worse than death itself (3).

Transportation of the most illustrious citizens of France. From the multitude of their captives, the Directory at first selected fifteen, upon whom the full rigour of transportation should be inflicted. These were Barthélemy, Pichegru and Willot, Rovère, Aubry, Bourdon de l'Oise, Murinais, De Larue, Ramel, Dossonville, Tronçon-Ducoudray, Barbé-Marbois, Lafond-Ladebat (though the three last were sincere Republicans), Brottier, and Laville-Heurnois; their number was augmented to sixteen by the devotion of Letellier, servant of Barthélemy, who insisted upon following his master. Carnot was only saved from the same fate, by having escaped to Geneva. "In the Directory," says he, "I had contributed to save the Republic from many dangers; the proscription of the 18th Fructidor was my reward. I knew well that republics were ungrateful; but I did not know, till I learned it from my own experience, that republicans were so much so as they proved to me (4)."

Cruel fate of the exiles. The transported victims were conveyed, amidst the execrations of the Jacobin mob, to Rochefort, from whence they were sent to Guiana. Before embarking, they received a touching proof of sympathy in the gift of 80,000 francs, by the widow of an illustrious scientific character,

(1) Nap. iv. 235.

(2) Mign. ii. 432. Th. ix. 230, 299. Lac. xiv.

(3) Lac. xiv. 103. Mign. ii. 432.

(4) Carnot's Memoirs, 212. Lav. 14. 70.

who had been one of the earliest victims of the Revolution. On the road they were lodged in the jails as common felons. During the voyage they underwent every species of horror; cooped up in the hold of a small vessel, under a tropical sun, they experienced all the sufferings of a slave-ship. No sooner were they landed, than they were almost all seized with the fevers of the climate, and owed their lives to the heroic devotion of the Sisters of Charity, who, on that pestilential shore, exercised the never-failing beneficence of their religion. Murinais, one of the Council of the Ancients, died shortly after arriving at the place of their settlement at Sinimari. Tronçon-Ducoudray pronounced a funeral oration over his remains, which his fellow-exiles interred with their own hands, from the words, "By the waters of Babylon we sat down and wept." Soon after, the eloquent panegyrist himself expired. He calmly breathed his last, rejoicing on that distant shore that he had been faithful in his duty to the royal family. "It is nothing new to me," said he, "to see suffering, and learn how it can be borne. I have seen the Queen at the Conciergerie." The hardships of the life to which they were there subjected, the diseases of that pestilential climate, and heats of a tropical sun speedily proved fatal to the greater number of the unhappy exiles. Pichegru survived the dangers, and was placed in a hut adjoining that of Billaud-Varennés and Collot-d'Herbois, whom, after the fall of Robespierre, he had arrested by orders of the Convention; a singular instance of the instability of fortune amidst revolutionary changes (1).

Pichegru, Willot, Barthélemy, Aubry, Ramel, and Dossonville, with the faithful Letellier, their voluntary companion in exile, contrived, some months after, to make their escape; and after undergoing extreme hardships, and traversing almost impervious forests, succeeded in reaching the beach, from whence they were conveyed to Surinam in an open canoe. Aubry and Letellier perished, but the remainder reached England in safety. The Abbé Brottier, Bourdon de l'Oise, and Rovère, both illustrious from their services on the 9th Thermidor, sunk under their sufferings at Sinamari. The wife of the latter, a young and beautiful woman, who had signalized herself, like Madame Tallien, by her generous efforts at the fall of Robespierre in behalf of humanity, solicited and obtained from the Directory, permission to join her husband in exile; but before she landed on that pestilential region, he had breathed his last. Several hundreds of the clergy, victims of their fidelity to the faith of their fathers, arrived in these regions of death, but they almost all perished within a few months after their landing, exhibiting the constancy of martyrs on that distant shore; while the hymns of the new worship were sung in France by crowds of abandoned women, and the satellites of Jacobin ferocity. The strong minds and robust frames of Barbé-Marbois, and Lafond-Ladebat, alone survived the sufferings of two years; and these, with eight of the transported priests, were all who were recalled to France by the humane interposition of Napoléon when he assumed the reins of power (2).

Meanwhile the Directory pursued with vigour despotic measures in France. A large proportion of the judges in the supreme courts were dismissed; the institution of juries abolished; and a new and more rigorous law provided for the banishment of the nobles and priests. It was proposed that those who disobeyed or evaded its enactment, should become liable to transportation to Guiana; the wives and daughters of the no-

(1) Lac. xiv. 104, 105, 118, 121. Th. ix. 306.

(2) Lac. xiv. 121, 126. Th. ix. 306.



bles who were married were not exempted from this enactment, unless they divorced their husbands, and married citizens of plebeian birth. But a more lenient law, which only subjected them to additional penalties if they remained, was adopted by the Councils. Two hundred thousand persons at once fell under the lash of these severe enactments; their effect upon France was to the last degree disastrous. The miserable emigrants fled a second time in crowds from the country, of which they were beginning to taste the sweets; and society, which was reviving from the horrors of the Jacobin sway, was again prostrated under its fury. They carried with them to foreign lands that strong and inextinguishable hatred at republican cruelty which their own wrongs had excited, and mingling in society every where, both on the continent and in the British isles, counteracted in the most powerful manner the enthusiasm in favour of democratic principles, and contributed not a little to the formation of that powerful league which ultimately led to their overthrow. Finally, the Councils openly avowed a national bankruptcy; they cut off for ever two-thirds of the national debt of France; closing thus a sanguinary revolution by the extinction of freedom, the banishment of virtue, and the violation of public faith (1).

This revolution was previously concerted with Napoléon.

The Revolution of the 18th Fructidor had been concerted between Napoléon and Barras long before it took place; the former was the real author of this catastrophe, and this is admitted even by his warmest admirers (2). Augereau informed him, a month before, that he had opened to the Directory the designs of the revolutionary party; that he had been named Governor of Paris; and that the dismissal of all the civil and military authorities was fixed. Lavalette made him acquainted daily with the progress of the intrigue in the capital. The former was sent by him to carry it into execution (3). He was accordingly transported with joy when

(1) D'Abr. iii. 324. De Staël, ii. 187. Lac. xiv. 105, 107. Hard. iv. 523, 524. Th. ix. 321.

(2) D'Abr. ii. 148.

(3) See the letters in Bour. i. 234, 263.

On the 24th June, 1797, the majority of the Directory wrote to Napoléon, unknown to Barthélemy and Carnot:—"We have received, citizen-general, with extreme satisfaction, the marked proofs of devotion to the cause of freedom which you have recently given. You may rely on the most entire reciprocity on our parts. We accept with pleasure the offers you have made to fly to the support of the Republic." On the 22d July, Lavalette wrote to Napoléon, "This morning I have seen Barras. He appeared strongly excited at what has passed. He made no attempt to conceal the division in the Directory. We shall hold firm," said he to me; "and if we are denounced by the Councils, then we shall mount on horseback." He frequently repeated that, in their present crisis, money would be of incalculable importance. I made to him your proposition, which he accepted with transport." Barras, on his part, on the 23d July, wrote to Napoléon,—"No delay. Consider well, that it is by the aid of money alone that I can accomplish your generous intentions." Lavalette wrote on the same day to Napoléon, "Your proposition has been brought on the tapis between Barras, Rewbell, and La Réveillière. All are agreed that without money we cannot surmount the crisis. They confidently hope that you will send large sums." On the 28th July, Lavalette again wrote to him, "The minority of the Directory still cling to hopes of an accommodation; the majority will perish rather than make any further concessions. It sees clearly the abyss which is opening beneath its feet. Such, however, is the

fatal destiny of Carnot, or the weakness of his character, that he has now become one of the pillars of the monarchical party, as he was of the Jacobins. He wishes to temporize." On the 3d August, "Every thing here remains in the same state: Great preparations for an attack by the Council of Five Hundred; corresponding measures of defence by the Directory. Barras says openly, 'I am only waiting for the decree of accusation to mount on horseback, and speedily their heads will roll in the gutter.'" On the 16th August, Lavalette wrote to Napoléon these remarkable words: "At last I have torn away the veil this morning from the Directory. Only attend to what Barras told me yesterday evening. The subject was the negotiations in Italy. Carnot pretended that Napoléon was in too advantageous a situation, when he signed the preliminaries, to be obliged to agree to conditions by which he could not abide in the end. Barras defended Bonaparte, and said to Carnot: 'You are nothing but a vile miscreant; you have sold the Republic, and you wish to murder those who defend it, infamous scoundrel!'" Carnot answered, with an embarrassed air—"I despise your insinuations, but one day I shall answer them."

Augereau wrote on the 12th August to Napoléon:—"Things remain much in the same state; the Clichians have resumed their vacillating and uncertain policy; they do not count so much as heretofore on Carnot, and openly complain of the weakness of Pichegru. The agitation of these gentlemen is extreme; for my part, I observe them, and keep incessantly stimulating the Directory, for the decisive moment has evidently arrived, and they see that as well as I do. Nothing is more certain, than that, if the public mind is not secur-



he received intelligence of the success of the enterprise. But these feelings were speedily changed into discontent at the accounts of the use which the government made of their victory. He easily perceived that the excessive severity which they employed, and the indulgence of private spleen which appeared in the choice of their victims, would alienate public opinion, and run an imminent risk of bringing back the odious Jacobin rule. He has expressed in his *Memoirs* the strongest opinion on this subject. "It might have been right," says he, "to deprive Carnot, Barthélemy, and the fifty deputies, of their appointment, and put them under surveillance in some cities in the interior; Pichegru, Willot, Imbert, Colonne, and one or two others, might justly have expiated their treason on the scaffold; but to see men of great talent, such as Portalis, Tronçon-Ducoudray, Fontanes; tried patriots, such as Boissy-d'Anglas, Dumolard, Murinais; supreme magistrates, such as Carnot and Barthélemy, condemned, without either trial or accusation, to perish in the marshes of Sinamari, was frightful. What! to punish with transportation a number of writers of pamphlets, who deserved only contempt and a trifling correction, was to renew the proscriptions of the Roman triumvirs; it was to act more cruelly than Fouquier-Tinville, since he at least put the accused on their trial, and condemned them only to death. All the armies, all the people, were for a Republic; state necessity could not be alleged in favour of so revolting an injustice, so flagrant a violation of the laws and the rights of the citizens (1)."

Independently of the instability of any government which succeeds to so stormy a period as that of the Revolution, the constitution of France under the Directory contained an inherent defect, which must sooner or later have occasioned its fall. This was ably pointed out from its very commencement by Necker (2), and consisted in the complete separation of the executive from the legislative power. In constitutional monarchies, when a difference of opinion on any vital subject arises between the executive and the legislature, the obvious mode of arranging it is by a dissolution of the latter, and a new appeal to the people; and whichever party the electors incline to, becomes victorious in the strife. But the French Councils, being altogether independent of the Directory, and undergoing a change every two years of a third of their members, became shortly at variance with the executive; and the latter, being composed of ambitious men, unwilling to resign the power they had acquired, had no alternative but to invoke military violence for its support. This is a matter of vital importance, and lying at the very foundation of a mixed government: unless the executive possess the power of dissolving, by legal means, the legislature, the time must inevitably come, when it will disperse them by force. This is in an especial manner, to be looked for when a nation is emerging from revolutionary convulsions; as so many in-

tially changed before the approaching elections, every thing is lost, and a civil war remains as our last resource." On the 31st August, Lavalette informed him, "At length the movement, so long expected, is about to take place. To-morrow night the Directory will arrest fifteen or twenty deputies; I presume there will be no resistance." And on the 1st September, Augereau wrote to him,—"At last, general, my mission is accomplished! the promises of the army of Italy have been kept last night. The Directory was at length induced to act with vigour. At midnight I put all the troops in motion; before daybreak all the bridges and principal points in the city were occupied, the legislature surrounded, and the members, whose names are enclosed, arrested

and sent to the Temple. Carnot has disappeared. Paris regards the crisis only as a *fête*; the robust patriotic workmen of the *faubourgs* loudly proclaim the salvation of the Republic." Finally, on the 23d September, 1797, Napoléon wrote in the following terms to Augereau: "The whole army applauds the wisdom and energy which you have displayed in this crisis, and has rejoiced sincerely at the success of the patriots. It is only to be hoped now that moderation and wisdom will guide your steps; that is the most ardent wish of my heart."—BONAPARTE, i. 235, 250, 266, and *HAB.* iv. 503, 518.

(1) *Nap.* iv. 233, 234. *Bour.* i. 235.

(2) Necker, *Histoire de la Révolution*, iv. 232. *Mad. de Staël*, ii. 170, 173.

dividuals are there implicated by their crimes in supporting the revolutionary *régime*, and a return to moderate or legal measures is so much dreaded, from the retribution which they may occasion to past delinquents.

Though France suffered extremely from the usurpation which overthrew its electoral government, and substituted the empire of force for the chimeras of democracy, there seems no reason to believe that a more just or equitable government could at that period have been substituted in its room. The party of the Councils, though formidable from its union and its abilities, was composed of such heterogeneous materials, that it could not by possibility have held together if the external danger of the Directory had been removed. Pichegru, Imbert, Brottier, and others, were in constant correspondence with the exiled princes, and aimed at the restoration of a constitutional throne (1). Carnot, Rovère, Bourdon de l'Oise, and the majority of the Club of Clichy, were sincerely attached to Republican institutions. Dissension was inevitable between parties of such opposite principles, when they had once prevailed over their immediate enemies. The nation was not then in the state to settle down under a constitutional monarchy; it required to be drained of its fiery spirits by bloody wars, and humbled in its pride by national disaster, before it could submit to the coercion of passion, and follow the regular occupations essential to the duration of real freedom.

This is the true commencement of military despotism in France.

The 18th Fructidor is the true era of the commencement of military despotism in France, and as such, it is singularly instructive as to the natural tendency and just punishment of revolutionary passions. The subsequent government of the country was but a succession of illegal usurpations on the part of the depositaries of power, in which the people had no share, and by which their rights were equally invaded, until tranquillity was restored by the vigorous hand of Napoléon (2). The French have not the excuse, in the loss even of the name of freedom to their country, that they yielded to the ascendancy of an extraordinary man, and bent beneath the car which banded Europe was unable to arrest. They were subjected to tyranny in its worst and most degrading form; they yielded, not to the genius of Napoléon, but to the violence of Augereau; they submitted in silence to proscriptions as odious and arbitrary as those of the Roman triumvirate; they bowed for years to the despotism of men so ignoble that history has hardly preserved their names. Such is the consequence, and the never-failing consequence, of the undue ascendancy of democratic power.

The French people did not fall under this penalty from any peculiar fickleness or inconstancy of their own; they incurred it in consequence of the general law of Providence, that guilty passion brings upon itself its own punishment. They fell under the edge of the sword, from the same cause which subjected Rome to the arms of Cæsar, and England to those of Cromwell. "Legal government," says the Republican historian, "is a chimera, at the conclusion of a revolution such as that of France. It is not under shelter of legal authority, that parties whose passions have been so violently excited, can arrange themselves and repose; a more vigorous power is required to restrain them, to fuse their still burning elements, and protect them against foreign violence. That power is the empire of the sword (3)."

A long and terrible retribution awaited the sins of this great and guilty

(1) See Sour. i. Append.

(2) Mad. de Staël, ii. 221, Nap. iv. 235.

(3) Th. ix. 308.

country. Its own passions were made the ministers of the justice of Heaven; its own desires the means of bringing upon itself a righteous punishment. Contemporaneous with the military despotism established by the victory of Augereau, sprang up the foreign conquests of Napoléon :—His triumphant car rolled over the world, crushing generations beneath its wheels ; ploughing, like the chariot of Juggernaut, through human flesh ; exhausting, in the pursuit of glory, the energies of Republican ambition. France was decimated for its cruelty ; the snows of Russia, and the hospitals of Germany, became the winding-sheet and the grave of its blood-stained Revolution. Infidelity may discern in this tetrific progress the march of fatalism and the inevitable course of human affairs : let us discover in it the government of an overruling Providence, punishing the sins of a guilty age, extending to nations with severe, but merciful hand, the consequences of their transgression, and preparing in the chastisement of present iniquity, the future amelioration of the species.

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## CHAPTER XXV.

## EXPEDITION TO EGYPT.

## ARGUMENT.

Great Political and Commercial Importance of Egypt—Its advantages of Situation—and Importance early perceived by Leibnitz—Alexander the Great and Napoléon equally appreciated its value—His ideas are matured at Passeriano—Napoléon's Parting Address to the Italians—His triumphant Journey across Switzerland to Rastadt and Paris—Political Objects of this Journey—Its ominous character for Switzerland—His retired manner of Life at Paris—His Public Reception by the Directory—Talleyrand's Speech—Napoléon's Answer—Successive *Fêtes* given by other Public Bodies—His Private Views in regard to his Future Life—Secret Views of the Directory—Their desire to get quit of Napoléon—Preparations for a Descent on England—Pompous Speech of Barras on giving him the command of the Army destined for its Invasion—Real Views of both Parties—Napoléon's growing Horror at the Revolutionary System—His Journey to the coasts of the Channel—Reasons which determined him against the English Expedition—Defensive Preparations of the British Government—Meanwhile Napoléon persuades the Directory to undertake the Egyptian Enterprise—His Prodigious activity in preparing for that Expedition—The Treasure taken at Berne is sent to Toulon by his orders—Magnificent Preparations for the Expedition—Napoléon is driven to it by necessity—He takes the Command—His first Proclamation to his Soldiers—His last Act in Europe is one of Humanity—At length the Expedition sails—Arrives off Malta, which Capitulates without firing a shot—Its prodigious strength—Napoléon's Conversation during the remainder of the Voyage—Movements of Nelson, who misses the French Fleet—Egypt is Discovered—Napoléon lands, and advances against Alexandria, which is taken—His first Proclamation to his Troops—Description of Egypt—Astonishing Effects of the Inundation of the Nile—Productions of the Country—Its Foreign Commerce—Decay of its Population since Ancient Times—Importance of Alexandria—Account of the Inhabitants of the Country—Mamelukes—Janizaries, or Turks—Arabs, Copts—Ibrahim Bey and Mourad Bey divided the Country between them—Policy of Napoléon on invading Egypt—His Proclamation to the Egyptians—His Arrangements for advancing to Cairo—March of the Advanced-Guard across the Desert—Their Sufferings—Arrive on the Nile—Actions with the Mamelukes—Combat at Chebriss—The army advances towards Cairo—They arrive within sight of the Mameluke forces—Battle of the Pyramids—Lateral Movement of Napoléon—Furious charge of Mourad Bey—He is totally defeated—Ibrahim Bey retires to Syria—Mourad Bey to Upper Egypt—Napoléon enters Cairo—His Pacific Measures—and able and impartial Civil Government—He affects the Mussulman Faith—Growing discontents of the Army—Calamitous Expedition to Salabieh, on the Syrian Frontier—Ibrahim Bey retires across the Desert into Syria—Intrigues of Napoléon with Ali Pacha—Treachery of France towards Turkey—Its Manifesto of War—Naval Operations—Movements of Nelson—He arrives at Alexandria—Brueys' Position—Nelson's Plan of Attack—Relative Forces on the two sides—Battle of the Nile—Dreadful nature of the Action—The *L'Orient* blows up—Glorious Victory in which it terminates—Wound of Nelson—Heroic Deeds on board the French Squadron—Great Results of this Victory—Terrible traces of the Action on shore—Honours bestowed on Nelson—Napoléon's Correspondence with Brueys, as to getting the Fleet into Alexandria—Disastrous consequences of this blow to the French Army—Courage of Napoléon and Kléber—Despair of the inferior Officers and Soldiers—It at once brings on a War between France and Turkey—Passage of the Hellespont by the Russian Fleet—Critical situation of the French Army—Vast Efforts of Napoléon—Expedition of Desaix to Upper Egypt—Bloody Suppression of a Revolt at Cairo—Expedition of Napoléon to the Shores of the Red Sea—He resolves to penetrate into Syria—His vast Designs—Limited extent of his Forces—Passage of the Syrian Desert—Storming of Jaffa—Four Thousand of the Garrison capitulate—Massacre of these Prisoners—Unpardonable Atrocity of this Act—The French advance to Acre—Description of that Fortress—Sir Sidney Smith's preparations for its Defence—Commencement of the Siege—Desperate Conflicts on the Breach—The Ottomans collect Forces for its Relief—The French advance to meet them—Battle of Mount Thabor—Renewal of the Siege at Acre—Desperate Assaults on the Town—Napoléon at length Retreats—Vast Designs which this Defeat frustrated—Disastrous Retreat of the Troops to Egypt—Poisoning of the Sick at Jaffa

—Reflections on that Act—Army retains Egypt—Contests in Egypt during Napoléon's absence—The Angel El Mody—Conquest of Upper Egypt by Desaix—Great Discontents of the Army—Landing of the Turks in Aboukir Bay—Force of the Invaders—Position which the Turks occupied—Napoléon's Dispositions for an Attack—First Line carried—Second Line also forced, after a desperate struggle—Total destruction of the Turks—Napoléon is made acquainted with the Disasters of the Republic in Europe—He secretly sets sail for Europe from Alexandria—And stretches along the Coast of Africa to Sardinia—He lands at Ajaccio in Corsica—Sets sail, and avoids the English Fleet—Proof which the Egyptian Expedition affords of the Superiority of the Arms of Civilisation to those of Savage Life—General Reflections on the probable fate of an Eastern Empire under Napoléon.

“By seizing the isthmus of Darien,” said Sir Walter Raleigh, “you will wrest the keys of the world from Spain.” The observation, worthy of his reach of thought, is still more applicable to the isthmus of Suez and the country of Egypt. It is remarkable that its importance has never been duly appreciated, but by the greatest conquerors of ancient and modern times, Alexander the Great and Napoléon Bonaparte.

Great political and commercial importance of Egypt. The geographical position of this celebrated country has destined it to be the great emporium of the commerce of the world. Placed in the centre between Europe and Asia, on the confines of Eastern wealth and Western civilisation; at the extremity of the African continent; and on the shores of the Mediterranean sea, it is fitted to become the central point of communication for the varied productions of these different regions of the globe. The waters of the Mediterranean bring to it all the fabrics of Europe; the Red Sea wafts to its shores the riches of India and China; while the Nile floats down to its bosom the produce of the vast and unknown regions of Africa. Though it were not one of the most fertile countries in the world,—though the inundations of the Nile did not annually cover its fields with riches, it would still be, from its situation, one of the most favoured spots on the earth. The greatest and most durable monuments of human industry accordingly; the earliest efforts of civilisation, the sublimest works of genius have been raised in this primeval seat of mankind. The temples of Rome have decayed, the arts of Athens have perished; but the Pyramids “still stand erect and unshaken above the floods of the Nile (1).” When, in the revolution of ages, civilisation shall have returned to its ancient cradle, —when the desolation of Mahometan rule shall have ceased, and In situation of situation. the light of religion illumined the land of its birth, Egypt will again become one of the great centres of human industry; the invention of steam will restore the communication with the East to its original channel; and the nation which shall revive the canal of Suez, and open a direct communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, will pour into its bosom those streams of wealth, which in every age have constituted the principal sources of European opulence.

In Europe, since early period by Leibnitz. The great Leibnitz, in the time of Louis XIV, addressed to the French monarch a memorial, which is one of the noblest monuments of political foresight. “Sire,” said he, “it is not at home that you will succeed in subduing the Dutch: you will not cross their dykes, and you will rouse Europe to their assistance. It is in Egypt that the real blow is to be struck. There you will find the true commercial route to India; you will wrest that lucrative commerce from Holland, you will secure the eternal dominion of France in the Levant, you will fill Christianity with joy (2).” These ideas, however, were beyond the age, and they lay dormant till revived by the genius of Napoléon.

(1) Gibbon.

(2) Th. iv. 62.

Alexander  
the Great  
and Napo-  
léon equally  
appreciated  
its value.

The eagle eye of Alexander the Great, which fitted him to have been as great a benefactor as he was a scourge of the species, early discerned the vast capabilities of this country; and to him was owing the foundation of that city, the rival of Memphis and Thebes, which once boasted of three millions of inhabitants, and rivalled Rome in the plenitude of its power, and still bears, amidst ruins and decay, the name of the conqueror of the East. Napoléon was hardly launched into the career of conquest before he perceived the importance of the same situation; and when still struggling in the plains of Italy with the armies of Austria, he was meditating an expedition into those Eastern regions, where alone, in his apprehension, great things could be achieved; where kingdoms lay open to private adventure; and fame, rivalling that of the heroes of antiquity, was to be obtained. From his earliest years he had been influenced by an ardent desire to effect a revolution in the East: he was literally haunted by the idea of the glory which had been there acquired, and firmly convinced that the power of England could never be effectually humbled but by a blow at its Indian possessions. "The Persians," said he, "have blocked up the route of Tamerlane; I will discover another (1)."

It was his favourite opinion through life, that Egypt was the true line of communication with India; that it was there that the English power could alone be seriously affected; that its possession would ensure the dominion of the Mediterranean, and convert that sea into a "French Lake." From that central point armaments might be detached down the Red Sea, to attack the British possessions in India; and an entrepôt established, which would soon turn the commerce of the East into the channels which nature had formed for its reception—the Mediterranean and the Red Sea (2).

His ideas are  
matured at  
Passeriano. It was at Passeriano, however, after the campaign was concluded, and when his energetic mind turned abroad for the theatre of fresh exploits, that the conception of an expedition to Egypt first seriously occupied his thoughts. During his long evening walks in the magnificent park of his mansion, he spoke without intermission of the celebrity of those countries, and the illustrious empires which have there disappeared, after overturning each other, but the memory of which still lives in the recollections of mankind. "Europe," said he, "is no field for glorious exploits; no great empires or revolutions are to be found but in the East, where there are six hundred millions of men." Egypt at once presented itself to his imagination as the point where a decisive impression was to be made; the weak point of the line where a breach could be effected and a permanent lodgment secured, and a path opened to those Eastern regions, where the British power was to be destroyed and immortal renown acquired. So completely had this idea taken possession of his mind, that all the books brought from the Ambrosian library to Paris, after the peace of Campo Formio, which related to Egypt, were submitted for his examination, and many bore extensive marginal notes in his own handwriting, indicating the powerful grasp and indefatigable activity of his mind (3); and in his correspondence with the Directory he had already, more than once, suggested both the importance of an expedition to the banks of the Nile, and the amount of force requisite to insure its success (4).

Before leaving Italy, after the treaty of Campo Formio, he put the last

(1) D'Abr. iv. 203. Bour. ii. 411.

(2) Th. ix. 62.

(3) James's Naval History, ii. 216. Bour. ii. 44.

(4) Corresp. Conf. de Nap. iv. 176. *Fide* *op.* iii. p. 155.



hand to the affairs of the Cisalpine Republic. Venice was delivered over, amidst the tears of all its patriotic citizens, to Austria; the French auxiliary force in the new republic was fixed at thirty thousand men, under the orders of Berthier, to be maintained at the expense of the allied state; and all the republican organization of a directory, legislative assemblies, national guards, and troops of the line, put in full activity. "You are the first people in history," said he, in his parting address to them, "who have become free without factions, without revolutions, without convulsions. We have given you freedom; it is your part to preserve it. You are, after France, the richest, the most populous republic in the world. Your position calls you to take a leading part in the politics of Europe. To be worthy of your destiny, make no laws but what are wise and moderate; but execute them with force and energy (1)." The wealth and population of the beautiful provinces which compose this Republic, embracing 3,500,000 souls, the fortress of Mantua, and the plains of Lombardy, indeed formed the elements of a powerful state; but had Napoléon looked into the book of history, or considered the human mind, he would have perceived that, of all human blessings, liberty is the one which is of the slowest growth; that it must be won, and cannot be conferred; and that the institutions which are suddenly transferred from one country to another, perish as rapidly as the full-grown tree, which is transplanted from the soil of its birth to a distant land.

Napoléon's parting address to the Italians. Napoléon's journey from Italy to Paris was a continual triumph. The Italians, whose national spirit had been in some degree revived by his victories, beheld with regret the disappearance of that brilliant apparition. Every thing he did and said was calculated to increase the public enthusiasm. At Mantua, he combined with a *fête* in honour of Virgil a military procession on the death of General Hoche, who had recently died, after a short illness, in France; and about the same time formed that friendship with Desaix, who had come from the army of the Rhine to visit that of Italy, which mutual esteem was so well calculated to inspire, but which was destined to terminate prematurely on the field of Marengo. The towns of Switzerland received him with transport; triumphal arches and garlands of flowers every where awaited his approach; he passed the fortresses amidst discharges of cannon; and crowds from the neighbouring countries lined the roads to get a glimpse of the hero who had filled the world with his renown (2). His progress, however, was rapid: he lingered on the field of Morat to examine the scene of the terrible defeat of the Burgundian chivalry by the Swiss peasantry. Passing Basle, he arrived at Rastadt, where the congress was established; but, foreseeing nothing worthy of his genius in the minute matters of diplomacy which were there the subject of discussion, he proceeded to Paris, where the public anxiety had arisen to the highest pitch for his return (3).

The successive arrival of Napoléon's lieutenants at Paris with the standards taken from the enemy in his memorable campaigns, the vast conquests he had achieved, the brief but eloquent language of his proclamations, and the immense benefits which had accrued to the Republic from his triumphs, had

(1) Nap. iv. 271.

(2) His words, though few, were all such as were calculated to produce revolution. At Geneva, he boasted that he would democratise England in three months; and that there were, in truth, but two Re-

publics in Switzerland; Geneva, without laws or government; Basle, converted into the workshop of revolution.—HARD. v. 308.

(3) BOUR. ii. 5, 9. TH. ix. 363. NAP. ii. 268. HARD. v. 57, 58.

retired  
net of  
it Paris. raised to the very highest pitch the enthusiasm of the people. The public anxiety, accordingly, to see him was indescribable; but he knew enough of mankind to feel the importance of enhancing the general glory by avoiding its gratification. He lived in his own house in the rue Chanéine, in the most retired manner, went seldom into public, and surrounded himself only by scientific characters, or generals of cultivated minds. Here he wore the costume of the Institute, of which he had recently been elected a member; associated constantly with its leading characters, such as Monge, Laplace, Lagrange, and admitted to his intimate society only Berthier, Desaix, Lefebvre, Caffarelli, Kléber, and a few of the deputies. On the occasion of being presented to Talleyrand, minister of foreign affairs, he singled himself out, amidst the splendid *cortège* of public characters by which he was surrounded, M. Bougainville, and conversed with him on the celebrated voyage which he had performed (1). Such was the profound nature of his ambition, that on every occasion he looked rather to the impression his conduct was to produce on men's minds in future, than the gratification he was to receive from their admiration of the past. He literally "deemed nothing done, while any thing remained to do (2)." Even in the assumption of the dress, and the choice of the society of the Institute, he was guided by motives of ambition, and a profound knowledge of the human heart. "Mankind," said he, "are in the end governed always by superiority of intellectual qualities, and none are more sensible of this than the military profession. When on my return from Italy I assumed the dress of the Institute, I knew what I was doing. I was sure of not being misunderstood by the lowest soldier of the army (3)."

reception  
in state  
the Directory. Shortly after his arrival he was received in state by the Directory, in their now magnificent court of the Luxembourg. The public anxiety was wound up to the highest pitch for this imposing ceremony, on which occasion Joubert was to present the standard of the army of Italy, inscribed with all the great actions it had performed; and the youthful conqueror himself was to lay at the feet of Government the treaty of Campo Formio. Vast galleries were prepared for the accommodation of the public, which were early filled with all that was distinguished in rank, character, and beauty in Paris. He made his entry, accompanied by M. Talleyrand, who was to present him to the Directory as the bearer of the treaty. The aspect of the hero, his thin but graceful figure, the Roman cast of his features, and the fire of his eye, excited universal admiration; the court rang with applause. Talleyrand introduced him in an eloquent speech, in which, after extolling his great actions, he concluded: "For a moment I did feel on his account that disquietude, which, in an infant republic, arises from every thing which seems to destroy the equality of the citizens. But I was wrong; individual grandeur, far from being dangerous to equality, is its best triumph; and on this occasion, every Frenchman must feel himself elevated by the hero of his country. And when I reflect on all that he has done to shroud from envy that light of glory; on that ancient love of simplicity which distinguishes him in his favourite studies; his love for the abstract sciences; on his admiration for that sublime Ossian which seems to detach him from the world; on his well-known contempt for luxury, for pomp, for that which constitutes the pride of ignoble minds, I am convinced that, far from

(1) Th. ix. 363, 364. Nap. iv. 260, 263.  
(2) Tacitus.

(3) Thibaudon Consulat, 78.

dreading his ambition, we shall one day have occasion to rouse it anew to allure him from the sweets of studious retirement; France will never lose its freedom; but perhaps he will not for ever preserve his own (1)."

*Napoleon's answer.*

Napoléon replied in these words: "The French people, to attain their freedom, had kings to combat; to secure a constitution founded on reason, they had eighteen hundred years of prejudices to overcome. Religion, feudality, despotism, have, in their turns, governed Europe; but from the peace now concluded, dates the era of representative governments. You have succeeded in organizing the great nation, whose territory is not circumscribed but because nature herself has imposed it limits. I lay at your feet the treaty of Campo Formio, ratified by the Emperor (2). As soon as the happiness of France is secured by the best *organic laws*, the whole of Europe will be free." The Directory, by the voice of Barras, returned an inflated reply, in which they invited him to strive for the acquisition of fresh laurels, and pointed to the shores of Great Britain as the place where they were to be gathered (3).

*Securities given by other public bodies.*

On this occasion, General Joubert, and the chief of the staff, Andressi, bore the magnificent standard which the Directory had given to the Army of Italy, and which contained an enumeration of triumphs so wonderful, that it would have passed for fabulous in any other age (4). It was sufficient to intoxicate all the youth of France with the passion for military glory. This *fête* was followed by others, given by the legislative body and the minister of foreign affairs. Napoléon appeared at all these, but they were foreign to his disposition; and he retired, as soon as politeness would permit, to his own house. At that given by M. Talleyrand, which was distinguished by the good taste and elegance which prevailed, he was asked by Madame de Staël, in presence of a numerous circle, who was, in his opinion, the greatest woman that ever existed. "She," he replied, "who has had the greatest number of children;" an answer very different from what she anticipated, and singularly characteristic of his opinions on female influence. At the Institute, he was to be seen always seated between Lagrange and Laplace, wholly occupied in appearance with the abstract sciences. To a deputation of that learned body, he returned an answer:—"I am highly honoured with the approbation of the distinguished men who compose the Institute. I know well that I must long be their scholar before I become their equal. The true conquests, the only ones which do not cause a tear, are those which are gained over ignorance. The most honourable, as well as the most useful, occupation of men is, to contribute to the extension of ideas. The true power of the French Republic should henceforth consist

(1) *Rom.* ii. 24.

(2) Napoleon had added these words in this place:—"That peace secures the liberty, the prosperity, and glory of the Republic;" but these words were struck out by order of the Directory: a sufficient proof of their disapproval of his conduct in signing it, and one of the many inducements which led him to turn his face to the East.—See *HAB.* v. 74.

(3) *Th.* ix. 368. *Nap.* iv. 283 384.

(4) He bore these words:—"The army of Italy has made 150,000 prisoners; it has taken 170 standards, 100 pieces of heavy artillery, 600 field pieces, 5 pontoon trains, 9 ships of the line, 12 frigates, 12 cutters, 18 galleys. Armistice with the Kings of Sardinia, Naples, the Dukes of Parma, Modena, and the Pope. Preliminaries of Leoben; Convention of Mantua with Genoa. Treaty of Tolentino. Treaty

of Campo-Formio. It has given freedom to the people of Bologna, Ferrara, Modena, Massa-Carrara, Romagna, Lombardy, Brescia, Bergamo, Mantua, Cremona, a part of the Veronese, Chiavenna, Bormio, and the Valtellina; to the people of Genoa, the Imperial Fiefs, Corcyra, and Ithaca. Sent to Paris the *chefs-d'œuvre* of Michael Angelo, Guercino, Titian, Paul Veronese, Correggio, Albano, the Carracci, Raphael, Leonardo da Vinci, etc. Triumphed in 18 pitched battles; Montenotte, Millesimo, Mondovì, Lodi, Borghetta, Lonato, Castiglione, Roveredo, Bassano, St. George's, Fontana Viva, Caldiero, Arcola, Rivoli, La Favorite, the Tagliamento, Tarvis, Newmarket; and then followed the names of 67 combats or lesser engagements." [*Th.* ix. 369.] The legions of Caesar had not, in so short a time, so splendid a roll of achievements, to exhibit.

in this, that not a single new idea should exist which does not owe its birth to their exertions." But it was only for the approbation of these illustrious men that he appeared solicitous; he was never seen in the streets; went only to a concealed box in the opera (1); and when he assumed the reins of power, after his return from Egypt, his appearance was still unknown to the greater part of the inhabitants of Paris.

Napoléon's  
private  
views in re-  
gard to his  
future life.

But Napoléon's was not a disposition to remain satisfied with past glory: the future—yet higher, achievements filled his mind. He knew well the ephemeral nature of popular applause, and how necessary mystery or a succession of great actions is, to prolong its transports. "They do not long preserve at Paris," said he to his intimate friends, "the remembrance of any thing. If I remain long unemployed, I am undone. The renown of one in this great Babylon speedily supplants that of another. If I am seen three times at the opera, I will no longer be an object of curiosity. You need not talk of the desire of the citizens to see me: crowds at least as great would go to see me led out to the scaffold." He made an effort to obtain a dispensation with the law which required the age of forty for one of the Directory; but failing in that attempt, his whole thoughts and passions centered in the East, the original theatre of his visions of glory. "Bourrienne," said he, "I am determined not to remain in Paris; there is nothing here to be done. It is impossible to fix the attention of the people. If I remain longer inactive, I am undone. Every thing here passes away; my glory is already declining; this little corner of Europe is too small to supply it. We must go to the East; all the great men of the world have there acquired their celebrity. Nevertheless, I am willing to make a tour to the coasts with yourself, Lannes, and Solkowsky. Should the expedition to Britain prove, as I much fear it will, too hazardous, the army of England will become the army of the East, and we will go to Egypt." These words give a just idea of the character of Napoléon. Glory was his ruling passion; nothing appeared impossible where it was to be won. The great names of Alexander, Cæsar, and Hannibal, haunted his imagination; disregarding the lapse of two thousand years, he fixed his rivalry on those classical heroes, whose exploits have shed so imperishable a lustre over the annals of antiquity. While thus sustaining his reputation, and inscribing his name on the eternal monuments of Egyptian grandeur, he hoped to be still within reach of the march of events in Europe, and ready to assume that despotic command, which he already foresaw would be soon called for by the incapacity of the Directory and the never-ending distractions of democratic institutions (2).

Secret views  
of the Di-  
rectory.  
Their desire  
to get quit  
of Napoléon.  
Prepara-  
tions for a  
descent on  
England.

In truth, the Directory, secretly alarmed at the reputation of the Conqueror of Italy, eagerly sought, under the splendid colouring of a descent on England, an opportunity of ridding themselves of so formidable a rival. An extraordinary degree of activity prevailed in all the harbours, not only of France and Holland, but of Spain and Italy; the fleets at Cadiz and Toulon were soon in a condition to put to sea; that at Brest only awaited, to all appearance, their arrival to issue forth, and form a preponderating force in the Channel, where the utmost exertions were making to construct and equip flat-bottomed boats for the conveyance of the land-troops. Means were soon collected in the northern harbours for the transport of sixty thousand men. Meanwhile great part of the armies of the Rhine were brought down to the maritime districts, and

(1) Nap. iv. 285, 286. Savary, i. 32. Bour. ii. 33.

(2) Bour. ii. 32, 35. Lac. xiv. 139.

lined the shores of France and Holland, from Brest to the Texel; nearly one hundred and fifty thousand men were stationed on these coasts, under the name of the Army of England. This immense force might have occasioned great disquietude to the British government, had it been supported by a powerful navy; but the battles of St.-Vincent and Camperdown relieved them of all apprehensions of a descent by these numerous enemies. It does not appear that the Directory then entertained any serious thoughts of carrying the invasion into early execution: although the troops were encamped in the maritime departments, no immediate preparation for embarkation had been made. However, their language breathed nothing but menaces: Napoléon was appointed commander-in-chief of the Army of England, and he was dispatched on a mission to the coasts to superintend the completion of the armament (1).

Pompey  
speech of  
Barras on  
giving him  
the com-  
mand of the  
Army of  
England.

“Crown,” said Barras, “so illustrious a life, by a conquest which the great nation owes to its outraged dignity. Go, and by the punishment of the cabinet of London, strike terror into the hearts of all who would miscalculate the powers of a free people. Let the conquerors of the Po, the Rhine, and the Tiber, march under your banners; the ocean will be proud to bear them; it is a slave still indignant, who blushes for his fetters. He invokes, in a voice of thunder, the wrath of the earth against the oppressor of the waves. Pompey did not esteem it beneath him to wield the power of Rome against the pirates: Go, and chain the monster who presses on the seas; go, and punish in London the injured rights of humanity. Hardly will the tricolor standard wave on the blood-stained shores of the Thames, ere a unanimous cry will bless your arrival, and that generous nation, perceiving the dawn of its felicity, will receive you as liberators, who come not to combat and enslave, but to put a period to its calamities.” Under these high-sounding declamations, however, all parties concealed very different intentions. Immense preparations were made in Italy and the south of France, the whole naval resources of the Mediterranean were put in requisition, the *élite* of the army of Italy moved to Toulon, Genoa, and Civita Vecchia. The Directory were more desirous to see Napoléon engulfed in the sands of Lybia, than conquering on the banks of the Thames; and he dreamt more of the career of Alexander and of Mahomet, than of the descent of Cæsar on the shores of Britain (2).

Real views  
of both  
parties.

Independently of his anxiety to engage in some enterprise which might immortalize his name, Napoléon was desirous to detach himself from the government, from his strong and growing aversion for the Jacobin party, whom the Revolution of the 18th Fructidor had placed at the head of the Republic. Already he had, on more than one occasion, openly expressed his dislike at the violent revolutionary course which the Directory were pursuing, both at home and abroad (3); and in private he gave vent, in the strongest terms, to his horror at that grasping insatiable democratic spirit which, through his subsequent life, he set himself so vigorously to resist. “What,” said he, “would these Jacobins have? France is revolutionized, Holland is revolutionized, Italy is revolutionized, Switzerland is revolutionized, Europe will soon be revolutionized. But this, it seems, will not suffice them. I know well what they want; they want the domination of thirty or forty individuals founded on the massacre

Napoléon's  
growing  
horror of  
the revolu-  
tionary  
system.

(1) Bour. ii. 28. Lac. xiv. 138, 139. Nap. ii. 185.  
(2) Nap. ii. 184. Lac. xiv. 138, 139, 140. Nap.  
iv. 227. Bour. ii. 37.

(3) Nap. iv. 301.



of three or four millions; they want the constitution of 1793, but they shall not have it, and death to him who would demand it (4). For my own part I declare, that if I had only the option between royalty and the system of these gentlemen, I would not hesitate one moment to declare for a king."

In the middle of February, Napoléon proceeded to the coasts, accompanied by Lannes and Bourrienne. He visited, in less than ten days, Boulogne, Calais, Dunkirk, Antwerp, and Flushing, exhibiting every where his usual sagacity and rapidity of apprehension; conversing with, deriving light from, every one possessed of local information, and obtaining in a few weeks what it would have taken others years to acquire. He sat up till midnight at every town, interrogating the sailors, fishermen, and smugglers: to their objections he listened with patient attention; to his own difficulties he drew their consideration. During this brief journey, he acquired an intimate acquaintance with the relative importance of these maritime stations; and to this period is to be assigned the origin of those great conceptions concerning Antwerp, which, under the empire, he carried with so much vigour into execution. At length, having acquired all the information which could be obtained, he made up his mind and returned to Paris. "It is too doubtful a chance," said he; "I will not risk it; I will not hazard, on such a throw, the fate of France (2)." Thenceforward all his energies were turned towards the Egyptian expedition.

10th Feb.  
1798.

His journey  
to the coasts  
of the  
Channel.

It was not the difficulty of transporting sixty or eighty thousand men to the shores of Britain which deterred Napoléon; the impossibility of maintaining a strict blockade of an extensive line of coast, on a tempestuous sea, and the chance of getting over unseen in hazy weather, sufficiently demonstrated that such an attempt, however hazardous, was practicable; it was the obstacles in the way of maintaining them in the country after they were landed, and supporting them by the necessary stores and reinforcements, in presence of a superior naval force, which was the decisive consideration. Supposing the troops landed, a battle gained, and London taken; it was not to be expected that England would submit; and how to maintain the conquests made, and penetrate into the interior of the country, without continual reinforcements, and an uninterrupted communication with the Continent, was the insurmountable difficulty. There appeared no rational prospect at this period of accumulating a superior naval power in the Channel, or effecting an open connexion between the invading force and the shores of France; and this being the case, the Republican army, however successful at first, must, to all appearance, have sunk at last under the multiplied efforts of a brave, numerous, and united people (3). Thence may be seen the importance of the naval battles of St.-Vincent and Camperdown in the preceding year; the fate of the world hung upon their event.

Defensive  
preparations  
of the  
British go-  
vernment.

Meanwhile, the British government, aware of the great preparations which were making at once in so many different quarters, and ignorant where the blow was to fall, made every arrangement which prudence could suggest to ward off the impending danger. They had little apprehension as to the issue of a contest on the shores of Britain; but Ireland was the vulnerable quarter which filled them with disquietude. The unceasing discontents of that country had formed a large party, who were

(1) Wolfe Tone, *Memoirs*, ii. 276.

(2) *Nap.* iv. 287. *Bour.* ii. 38. *Th.* x. 15.

(3) *Th.* x. 13, 14.



in open and ill-disguised communication with the French Directory, and the narrow escape which it had made by the dispersion of Hoche's squadron in Bantry bay, proved that the utmost vigilance, and a decided naval superiority, could not always be able to secure its extensive sea-coast from hostile invasion. In these circumstances, the principal efforts of the Admiralty were directed to strengthen the fleet off Brest and the Spanish coasts, from whence the menaced invasion might chiefly be expected to issue; while, at the same time, a small squadron was detached under Nelson, by Admiral St.-Vincent, from his squadron off Cadiz, which now amounted to eighteen ships of the line, to the Mediterranean, which was afterwards reinforced, by the junction of eight ships of the line under Admiral Curtis, to thirteen line-of-battle ships, and one of fifty guns. The most active preparations for defence were at the same time made on the whole coasts; the vigilance of the cruisers in the Channel was redoubled; and the spirit of the nation, rising with the dangers which threatened it, prepared without dismay to meet the conqueror of Europe on the British shores (1).

Napoléon  
pe suades  
the Direc-  
tory to un-  
dertake the  
Egyptian  
expedition. While all eyes in Europe, however, were turned to the Channel, and the world awaited, in anxious suspense, the terrible conflict which seemed to be approaching between the two powers whose hostility had so long divided mankind, the tempest had turned away in another direction. After considerable difficulty, Napoléon succeeded in persuading the Directory to undertake the expedition to Egypt; in vain they objected that it was to expose forty thousand of the best troops of the Republic to destruction; that the chance was small of escaping the English squadron; and that Austria would not fail to take advantage of the absence of its best general to regain her lost provinces. The ardent mind of Napoléon obviated every objection; and at length the government, dazzled by the splendour of the design, and secretly rejoiced at the prospect of ridding themselves of so formidable a rival, agreed to his proposal, and gave him unlimited powers for carrying it into execution (2).

Prodigious  
activity of  
Napoléon in  
preparing  
for the  
expedition. Napoléon instantly applied himself, with extraordinary activity, to forward the expedition. He himself superintended every thing; instructions succeeded each other with an inconceivable rapidity; night and day he laboured with his secretary, dispatching orders in every direction. The Directory put at his disposal forty thousand of the best troops of the army of Italy; the fleet of Brueys, consisting of thirteen ships of the line and fourteen frigates, was destined to convey the greater part of the army, while above 3,000,000 of francs, of the treasure recently before taken at Berne, were granted by the Directory to meet the expenses of the expedition (3). It is painful to think, that this celebrated undertaking should have been preceded by so flagrant an act of spoliation (4); and that the desire to provide for the charges of the enterprise out of the savings of the

(1) Ann. Reg. 1798. 132, 139, 140. James' Naval. Hist. ii. 215. Th. ix. 73.

(2) Th. ix. 67, 68. Bour. iv. 40, 41, 48.

(3) "Napoléon has thus stated the objects which he had in view in the Egyptian expedition. 1. To establish, on the banks of the Nile, a French colony, which could exist without slaves, and supply the place of St.-Domingo. 2. To open a vent for our manufactures in Africa, Arabia, and Syria, and obtain for our commerce the productions of these countries. 3. To set out from Egypt, as a vast place of arms, to push forward an army of 60,000 men to the Indes, raise the Nabab to a revolt, and ex-

cite against the English the population of these vast countries. Sixty thousand men, half Europeans, half natives, transported on 50,000 camels and 10,000 horses, carrying with them provisions for fifty days, water for six, with 150 pieces of cannon, and double ammunition, would arrive in four months in India. The ocean ceased to be an obstacle when vessels were constructed; the desert became passable the moment you have camels and dromedaries in abundance."—Nap. in Mémorial, ii. 208.

(4) Mém. de Staël, ii. 209. Bour. ii. 41, 42. Th. ix. 52, 53.

Swiss Confederacy during more than two hundred years, should have been one motive for the attack on the independence of that inoffensive republic (1).

**Magnificent preparations for the expedition.** From his headquarters at Paris, Napoléon directed the vast preparations for this armament, which were going forward with the utmost activity in all the ports of Italy and the south of France. Four stations were assigned for the assembly of the convoys and the embarkation of the troops, Toulon, Genoa, Ajaccio, and Civita Vecchia; at the latter harbour, transports were moored alongside of the massy piers of Roman architecture to the bronze rings, still undecayed, which were fixed in their blocks by the emperor Trajan. A numerous artillery, and three thousand cavalry, were assembled at these different stations, destined to be mounted on the incomparable horses of Egypt. The most celebrated generals of the Republic, Desaix and Kléber, as yet strangers to the fortunes of Napoléon, as well as those who had so ably seconded his efforts in Italy, Lannes, Murat, Junot, Régnier, Barraguay-d'Hilliers, Vaubois, Bon, Belliard, and Dommartin, were ranged under his command. Caffarelli commanded the engineers; Berthier, who could hardly tear himself from the fascination of beauty at Paris, the staff; the most illustrious philosophers and artists of the age, Monge, Berthollet, Fourier, Larrey, Desgenettes, Geoffroy St.-Hilaire, and Denon, attended the expedition. Genius, in every department, hastened to range itself under the banners of the youthful hero (2).

The disturbance at Vienna, on account of the *fête* given by Bernadotte, the ambassador of the Republic at the Imperial Court, which will be afterwards mentioned, retarded for fifteen days the departure of the expedition. During that period, Europe awaited with breathless anxiety the course of the storm, which it was well known was now ready to burst. Bourrienne, on this occasion, asked Napoléon, if he was finally determined to risk his fate on the expedition to Egypt.—“Yes,” he replied; “I have tried every thing, but they will have nothing to do with me. If I stayed here, it would be necessary to overturn them, and make myself king; but we must not think of that as yet; the nobles would not consent to it; I have sounded, but I find the time for that has not yet arrived (3); I must first dazzle these gentlemen by my exploits.” In truth, he was convinced, at this period, that he had no chance of escaping destruction, but by persisting in his Oriental expedition (4).

**The treasure at Berne is sent to Toulon by Napoléon's orders.** (1) The partisans of Napoléon are indignant at the imputation of his having recommended or concurred in the invasion of Switzerland, in order to procure in the treasure of Berne funds for the equipment of his Egyptian expedition; but it is certain that, in his journey through Switzerland, he asked an ominous question as to the amount of that ancient store; [Jom. x. 291. Lac. xiv. 195.] and, in his Secret Correspondence, there exists decisive evidence that he participated in the shameful act of robbery which soon afterwards followed, and equipped his fleet out of the funds thus obtained. On the 11th April, 1798, he wrote to Lannes: “I have received, citizen-general, the letter of your aide-de-camp. Three millions have been dispatched, by post, on the 7th of this month, from *Berne for Lyon*. You will find hereunto subjoined, the order from the treasury to its agent at Lyon to forward it forthwith to Toulon. You will for this purpose cause it to be embarked on the Rhone; you will accompany it to Avignon: and from thence convey it, by post, to Toulon. Do not fail to inform me of what different pieces the three millions consist.” On the 17th April, he again writes to Lannes: “From the infor-

mation I have received from Berne, the three millions should arrive, at the very latest, on the 19th at Lyon. Forward them instantly on their arrival; do not go to bed till this is done; get ready in the mean time the boats for their reception; dispatch a courier to me the instant they are fairly on board.” And on the same day he wrote to the authorities charged at Toulon with the preparation of the expedition: “The treasury has given orders that three millions should be forthwith forwarded to Toulon. The sailors of Brueys' squadron must be paid the instant the *three millions arrive from Berne*.” And, on 20th April, he wrote to the Commissioners of the Treasury at Paris: “You have only given orders, citizen-commissioners, for the transmission of such part of the three millions at Lyon, as are in francs and piastres, to Toulon: It is indispensable, however, that we have it all; you will be good enough, therefore, to send orders to your agent at Lyon for the transmission of the whole, of whatever descriptions of coin it is composed.”—*See Correspond. de Napoléon*, v., 74, 85, 86, 87, 102.

(2) Savary, i. 26. Th. ix. 69, 71 Bour. ii. 46.

(3) Bour. li. 48, 54 Th. ix. 73

(4) The intelligence of the tumult at Vienna, and the appearance of approaching hostilities between

Napoléon  
arrives at  
Toulon. His  
proclama-  
tion to the  
soldiers.

Napoléon having completed his preparations, arrived at Toulon on the 9th May, 1798, and immediately took the command of the army. Never had so splendid an armament appeared on the ocean.

The fleet consisted of 13 ships of the line, two of 64 guns, 14 frigates, 72 brigs and cutters, and 400 transports. It bore 36,000 soldiers of all arms, and above 10,000 sailors. Before embarking, the general-in-chief, after his usual custom, addressed the following proclamation to his troops:—"Soldiers! You are one of the wings of the Army of England; you have made war in mountains, plains, and cities; it remains to make it on the ocean. The Roman legions, whom you have often imitated but not yet equalled, combated Carthage, by turns, on the seas and on the plains of Zama. Victory never deserted their standards, because they never ceased to be brave, patient, and united. Soldiers! the eyes of Europe are upon you; you have great destinies to accomplish; battles to fight; dangers and fatigues to overcome; you are about to do more than you have yet done for the prosperity of your country, the happiness of man, and your own glory. The genius of liberty, which has rendered, from its birth, the Republic the arbiter of Europe, has now determined that it should become so of the seas, and of the most distant nations (1)." In such magnificent mystery did this great man envelope his designs, even when on the eve of their execution.

His last act  
was one of  
humanity.

One of the last acts of Napoléon, before embarking, was to issue a humane proclamation to the military commissions of the 9th division, in which Toulon was situated, in which he severely censured the cruel application of one of the harsh laws of the 19th Fructidor to old men above seventy years of age, children in infancy, and women with child, who had been seized and shot for violating that tyrannical edict. This interposition gave universal satisfaction, and added another laurel of a purer colour to those which already encircled the brows of the general (2).

19th May.  
Expedition  
sets sail.

At length, on the 19th May, the fleet set sail in the finest weather, amidst the discharges of cannon, and the acclamations of an immense crowd of inhabitants. The L'Orient grounded at leaving the harbour, by reason of its enormous bulk; it was taken as a sinister omen by the sailors, more alive than any other class of men to superstitious impressions. The fleet sailed in the first instance towards Genoa, and thence to Ajaccio and Civita Castellana, and having effected a junction with the squadron in those harbours, bore away with a fair wind for Malta. In coasting the shores of Italy, they descried from on board the L'Orient the snowy summit of the Alps in the extreme distance. Napoléon gazed with feeling at the mountains which had been the witnesses of his early achievements. "I cannot," said he, "behold without emotion the land of Italy; these mountains command the plains where I have so often led the French to victory. Now we are bound for the east; with them victory is still secure." His conversation was peculiarly animated during the whole voyage; every headland, every promontory,

Austria and France, induced Napoléon to change his plan; and he earnestly represented to the Directory the impolicy of continuing the Egyptian project at such a crisis. But the rulers of France were now thoroughly awakened to the danger they ran from the ascendancy of Napoléon, and the only answer they made to his representation, was a positive order to leave Paris on the 3d May. This led to a warm altercation between him and the Directory, in the course of which he resorted to his former manœuvre of tendering his resignation. But on this occasion it did not succeed. Presenting him with a pen, Rew-

bell said coldly, "You wish to retire from the service, general? If you do, the Republic will doubtless lose a brave and skilful chief; but it has still enough of sons who will not abandon it." Merlin upon this interposed, and put an end to so dangerous an altercation; and Napoléon, devouring the affront, prepared to follow out his Egyptian expedition, saying, in private, to Bourrienne, "The pear is not yet ripe; let us depart, we shall return when the moment is arrived."—HARR. vi. 513, 514.

(1) Bour. ii. 48, 54. Th. ix. 81. Jom. x. 391.

(2) Bour. ii. 59.

recalled some glorious exploit of ancient history ; and his imagination kindled with fresh fire, as the fleet approached the shores of Asia, and the scenes of the greatest deeds which have illustrated the annals of mankind (1).

Arrives off Malta. On the 10th June, after a prosperous voyage, the white cliffs and 16th June. superb fortifications of Malta appeared in dazzling brilliancy above the unruffled sea. The fleet anchored before the harbour which had so gloriously resisted the whole force of the Turks under Solymán the Magnificent; its bastions were stronger, its artillery more numerous, than under the heroic Lavalette; but the spirit of the order was gone : a few hundred chevaliers, lost in effeminacy and indolence intrusted to three thousand feeble mercenaries and as many militia the defence of the place, and its noble works seemed ready to become the prey of any invader who had inherited the ancient spirit of the defenders of Christendom. Before leaving France, the capitulation of the place had been secured by secret intelligence with Which capitulates without firing a shot. the Grand Master and principal officers. Desaix and Savary landed, and advanced without opposition to the foot of the ramparts. Terms of accommodation were speedily agreed on; the town was surrendered on condition that the Grand Master should obtain 600,000 francs, a principality in Germany, or a pension for life of 300,000 francs (2); the French chevaliers were promised a pension of 700 francs a-year each; and the tricolor flag speedily waved on the ancient bulwark of the Christian world.

Its prodigious strength. So strongly were the generals impressed with their good fortune on this occasion, that in passing through the impregnable defences, Caffarelli said to Napoléon, "It is well, general, that there was some one within to open the gates to us; we should have had more trouble in making our way through, if the place had been empty." On entering into the place the French knew not how to congratulate themselves on the address on the one side, and pusillanimity on the other, which had obtained for them, without firing a shot, so immense an acquisition. They were never weary of examining the boundless fortifications and stupendous monuments of perseverance which it contained; the luxury and magnificence of the palaces which the Grand Masters had erected during the many centuries of their inglorious repose, and the incomparable harbour, which allowed the L'Orient to touch the quay, and was capable of containing six hundred sail of the line. In securing and organizing this new colony, Napoléon displayed his wonted activity; its innumerable batteries were speedily armed, and General Vaubois left at the head of three thousand men to superintend its defence. All the Turkish prisoners found in the galleys were set at liberty, and scattered through the fleet, in order to produce a moral influence on the Mahometan population in the countries to which their course was bound (3).

The secret of the easy conquest of this impregnable island by Napoléon, is to be found in the estrangement of the chevaliers of other nations from Baron Hompesch, the Grand Master, whom they disliked on account of his German descent, and the intrigues long before practised among the knights of French and Italian birth by a secret agent of Napoléon. Such was the division produced by the circumstances, that the garrison was incapable of making any resistance; and the leading knights, themselves chiefs in the conspiracy, had so prepared matters, by disarming batteries, providing neither stores nor ammunition, and disposing the troops in disadvantageous situations,

(1) Bour. ii. 62, 72, 74, 76. Th. ix. 82.

(3) Jom. x. 399. Savary, i. 32. Bour. ii. 65, 66.

(2) Th. x. 85. Bour. ii. 65. Savary, i. 30. Jom. Hard. vi. 75. x. 392, 393. Miot, ix. 10.

that resistance was from the first perfectly hopeless. No sooner, however, were the gates delivered up, than these unworthy successors of the defenders of Christendom repented of their weakness. The treasure of St.-John, the accumulation of ages; the silver plate of all the churches, palaces, and hospitals, were seized on with merciless avidity; and all the ships of war, artillery, and arsenals of the order, converted to the uses of the Republic (1).

His recovery during the remainder of the voyage. Having secured this important conquest, and left a sufficient garrison to maintain it for the Republic, Napoléon set sail for Egypt. The voyage was uninterrupted by any accident, and the general, enjoying the beautiful sky of the Mediterranean, remained constantly on deck, conversing with Monge and Bertholet on subjects of science, the age of the world, the probable mode of its destruction, the forms of religion, the decline of the Byzantine empire. These interesting themes were often interrupted, however, by the consideration of what would occur if the fleet were to encounter the squadron of Nelson. Admiral Brueys, forcibly struck by the crowded state of the ships, and the encumbrance which the soldiers would prove in the event of an action, and especially to the L'Orient, which had nearly two thousand men on board, could not conceal his apprehensions of the result of such an engagement. Napoléon, less accustomed to maritime affairs, contemplated the event with more calmness. The soldiers were constantly trained to work the great guns; and, as there were five hundred on board each ship of the line, he flattered himself that in a close action they would succeed by boarding in discomfiting the enemy (2).

Removal of Nelson. Meanwhile Nelson's fleet had arrived on the 20th June before Naples; from thence he hastened to Messina, where he received intelligence of the surrender of Malta, and that the French were steering for Candia. He instantly directed his course for Alexandria, where he arrived on the 29th, and finding no enemy there, set sail for the north, imagining that the expedition was bound for the Dardanelles (3). It is a singular circumstance that on the night of the 22d June, the French and English fleets crossed each other's track, without either party discovering their enemy (4).

The capture of the French fleet. During the night, as the French fleet approached Egypt, the discharge of cannon was heard on the right; it was the signal which Nelson gave to his squadron, which at this moment was not more than *five leagues* distant, steering northward from the coast of Egypt, where he had been vainly seeking the French armament (5). For several hours, the two fleets were within a few leagues of each other. Had he sailed a little farther to the left, or passed during the day, the two squadrons would have met, and an earlier battle of Aboukir changed the fortunes of the world.

Discovery of Egypt. At length on the morning of the 1st July, the shore of Egypt was discovered stretching as far as the eye could reach from east to west. Low sandhills, surmounted by a few scattered palms, presented little of interest to the ordinary eye; but the minarets of Alexandria, the needle of

(1) *Essai*, vi. 70, 76, 77.

As early as 14th November, 1797, Napoleon had commenced his intrigues with the Knights of Malta. On that day he wrote to Talleyrand: "You will receive herewith a copy of the commission I have given to citizen Ponseligne, and my letter to the Council of Malta. The true object of his mission is to put the finishing hand to the projects we have in view on Malta."—*Conf. Desp. Napoléon to Talleyrand*, 14th. Nov. 1797. In the January following,

this agent contrived, by liberal gifts, promises, and entertainments, to seduce from their allegiance all that numerous part of the garrison and knights who were inclined to democratic principles.—*Hard.* v. 457, 460.

(2) *Nap.* ii. 169. *Bour.* ii. 73, 83. *Th.* x. 87.

(3) *Nap.* ii. 167. *Th.* x. 88.

(4) *James's Naval Hist.* ii. 229. *Savary*, i. 35.

(5) *Savary*, i. 35. *Bour.* ii. 84. *Th.* x. 88. *Miot*. 74.



Cleopatra, and the pillar of Pompey, awakened those dreams of ancient grandeur and Oriental conquest, which had long floated in the mind of Napoléon. It was soon learned that the English fleet had only left the roads *two days before*, and had departed for the coasts of Syria in quest of the French expedition. The general immediately pressed the landing of the troops; it was begun on the evening of their arrival, and continued with the utmost expedition through the whole night; and at one in the morning, as the state of the tide permitted the galley on which he stood to approach the shore, he immediately disembarked, and formed three thousand men amidst the sand-hills of the Desert (1).

Napoléon  
lands, and  
advances  
against  
Alexandria,  
which is  
taken.

At daybreak, Napoléon advanced at the head of about five thousand men, being all that were already formed, towards Alexandria. The shouts from the ramparts, and the discharge of some pieces of artillery, left no doubt as to the hostile intentions of the Mamelukes; an assault was immediately ordered; and, in a short time, the French grenadiers reached the top of the walls. Kléber was struck by a ball on the head, and Menou thrown down from the top of the rampart to the bottom; but the ardour of the French soldiers overcame every resistance; and the negligence of the Turks having left one of the principal gates open during the assault, the defenders of the walls were speedily taken in rear by those who rushed in at that entrance, and fled in confusion into the interior of the city (2).

The conquerors were astonished to find a large space filled with ruins between the exterior walls and the inhabited houses; an ordinary feature in Asiatic towns, where the tyranny of the government usually occasions an incessant diminution of population, and ramparts, even of recent formation, are speedily found to be too extensive for the declining numbers of the people. The soldiers, who, notwithstanding their military ardour, did not share the Eastern visions of their chief, were soon dissatisfied with the poverty and wretchedness which they found among the inhabitants; the brilliant anticipations of Oriental luxury gave way to the sad realities of a life of privation; and men, in want of food and lodging, derived little satisfaction from the obelisks of the Ptolemies, or the sarcophagus of Alexander (3).

His first  
proclama-  
tion on  
landing to  
his troops.

Before advancing into the interior of the country, Napoléon issued the following proclamation to his soldiers:—"Soldiers! You are about to undertake a conquest fraught with incalculable effects upon the commerce and civilisation of the world. You will inflict upon England the most grievous stroke she can sustain before receiving her death-blow. The people with whom we are about to live are Mahometans. Their first article of faith is, 'There is but one God, and Mahomet is his prophet.' Contradict them not. Behave to them as you have done to the Jews and the Italians; show the same regard to their Muftis and Imams as you did to their Rabbis and Bishops; manifest for the ceremonies of the Koran the same respect as you have shown to the convents and the synagogues, the religion of Moses and that of Jesus-Christ. The first town we are about to enter was built by Alexander; at every step we shall meet with recollections worthy to excite the emulation of Frenchmen." This address contains a faithful picture of the feeling of the French army on religious subjects at this period. They not only considered the Christian faith as an entire fabrication, but were for the most part ignorant of its very elements. Lavalette has recorded, that hardly one of

(1) Savary, i. 25, 36. Berthier, 3, 4. Th. x, 88.

(2) Berthier, 5, 6. Savary, i. 37, 38.

(3) Savary, i. 38.



them had ever been in a church; and in Palestine, they were ignorant of the names of the holiest places in sacred history (1).

Description of Egypt. Egypt, on which the French army was now fairly landed, which became the theatre of such memorable exploits, is one of the most singular countries in the world, not only from its geographical situation but its physical conformation. It consists entirely of the valley of Nile, which, taking its rise in the mountains of Abyssinia, after traversing for 600 leagues the arid deserts of Africa, and receiving the tributary waters of the Bahr-el-Abiad, precipitates itself by the cataracts of Sennaar into lower valley, 200 leagues long, which forms the country of Egypt. This valley, though of such immense length, is only from one to six leagues breadth, and bounded on either side by the rocky mountains of the desert. The habitable and cultivated portion is entirely confined to that part of the valley which is overflowed by the inundations of the Nile; as far as the water rises, the soil is of extraordinary fertility; beyond it, the glowing desert alone to be seen. At the distance of fifty leagues from the sea, the Nile divides itself into two branches which fall into the Mediterranean, one at Rosetta, the other at Damietta. The triangle having these two branches for its sides, and the sea for its base, is called the Delta, and constitutes the richest and most fertile district of Egypt, being perfectly level, intersected by canals, and covered with the most luxuriant vegetation (2).

The soil of this singular valley was originally as barren as the arid regions which adjoin it; but it has acquired an extraordinary degree of richness from the well-known inundations of the Nile. These floods, arising from the melting of snow in the mountains of Abyssinia, cause the river to gradually, during a period of nearly three months. It begins to swell in the middle of June, and continues to rise till the end of September, when it attains the height of sixteen or eighteen feet. The fertility of the country is just in proportion to the height of the inundation: hence it is watched with the utmost anxiety by the inhabitants, and public rejoicings are ordered when the Nilometer at Cairo indicates a depth of two greater depth of water than usual. It never rains in Egypt. Centuries may elapse without more than a shower of drizzling mist moistening the surface of the soil. Hence cultivation can only be extended beyond the limits to which the water rises by an artificial system of irrigation; and the efforts made in this respect by the ancient inhabitants, constitute, perhaps, the most wonderful of the many monuments of industry which they have left to succeeding ages (3).

During the inundation, the level plain of Egypt is flooded with water; villages, detached from each other, communicate only by boats, and appear like the islands on the Lagoon of Venice, in the midst of the watery waste. No sooner, however, have the floods retired, than the soil, covered to a considerable depth by a rich slime, is cultivated and sown, and the seed, vegetating quickly in that rich mould, and under a tropical sun, springs up, and in three months yields a hundred, and sometimes a hundred and fifty fold. During the whole winter months the soil is covered with the richest harvest, besprinkled with flowers, and dotted by innumerable flocks; but in March, when the great heats begin, the earth cracks from excessive drought, vegetation disappears, and the country is fast relapsing into the sterility of the desert.

(1) Liv. i. 287. Bour. ii. 77, 78. Th. x. 91.

(2) Th. x. 92, 93. Bour. ii. 271, 275. Savary, i.

(3) Nap. in Bour. ii. 270, 275. Th. x. 94, 95.

when the annual floods of the Nile again cover it with their vivifying waters (1).

Productions  
of the coun-  
try.

All the varied productions of the temperate and the torrid zone flourish in this favoured region. Besides all the grains of Europe, Egypt produces the finest crops of rice, maize, sugar, indigo, cotton, and senna. It has no oil, but the opposite coasts of Greece furnish it in abundance; nor coffee, but it is supplied in profusion from the adjoining mountains of Arabia. Hardly any trees are to be seen over its vast extent; a few palms and sycamores, in the villages alone, rise above the luxuriant vegetation of the plain. Its horses are celebrated over all the world for their beauty, their spirit, and their incomparable docility; and it possesses the camel, that wonderful animal, which can support thirst for days together, tread without fatigue the moving sands, and traverse like a living ship the ocean of the desert (2).

Its foreign  
commerce.

Every year, immense caravans arrive at Cairo, from Syria and Arabia on the one side, and the interior of Africa on the other. They bring all that belongs to the regions of the sun, gold, ivory, ostrich feathers, gum, aromatics of all sorts, coffee, tobacco, spices, perfumes, with the numerous slaves which mark the degradation of the human species in those favoured countries. Cairo becomes, at that period, an *entrepôt* for the finest productions of the earth, of those which the genius of the West will never be able to rival, but for which their opulence and luxury afford a never-failing demand. Thus the commerce of Egypt is the only one in the globe which never can decay; but must, under a tolerable government, continue to flourish, as long as the warmth of Asia furnishes articles which the industry and perseverance of Europe are desirous of possessing (3).

Decay of the  
population  
since ancient  
times.

In ancient times, Egypt and Lybia, it is well known, were the granary of Rome; and the masters of the world depended for their subsistence on the floods of the Nile (4). Even at the time of the conquests of the Mahometans, the former is said to have contained twenty millions of souls, including those who dwelt in the adjoining Oases of the desert. This vast population is by no means incredible, if the prodigious fertility of the soil, wherever water can be conveyed, is considered; and the extent to which, under a paternal government, the system of artificial irrigation can be carried. It is to the general decay of all the great establishments for the watering of the country which the industry of antiquity had constructed, that we are to ascribe the present limited extent of agriculture, and the perpetual encroachments which the sands of the desert are making on the region of human cultivation (5).

Importance  
of Alexan-  
dria.

Alexandria, selected by the genius of Alexander the Great to be the capital of his vast empire, is situated at the opening of one of the old mouths of the Nile, but which is now choked with sand, and only covered with water in extraordinary floods. Its harbour, capable of containing all the navies of Europe, is the only safe or accessible port between Carthage and the shores of Palestine. Vessels drawing twenty-one feet of water can enter without difficulty, but those of larger dimensions only when lightened of their guns. Rosetta and Damietta admit only barks, the bar at the entrance of their harbours having only six feet of water (6).

At the period of this expedition to Egypt, the population of the country,

(1) Th. x. 95. Nap. x. 202.

(2) Nap. ii. 200, 205. Th. x. 96, 96.

(3) Th. x. 97.

(4) Tac. Annal. xii. 32.

(5) Nap. ii. 205. Bour. ii. 273, 280.

(6) Nap. ii. 212, 213.

consisting of two millions five hundred thousand souls, was divided into four classes; the Mamelukes or Circassians, the Janizaries, the Arabs, and the Copts or natives of the soil (1).

Account of the Mamelukes. The Mamelukes, who were the actual rulers of the country, consisted of young Circassians, torn in infancy from their parents and transported into Egypt, to form the armed force of that province of the Turkish empire. Bred up in camps, without any knowledge of their country or relations, without either a home or kindred, they prided themselves solely on their horses, their arms, and their military prowess. This singular militia was governed by twenty-four Beys, the least considerable of whom was followed by five or six hundred Mamelukes, whom they maintained and equipped. This body of twelve thousand horsemen, each of whom was attended by two helots or servants, constituted the military strength of the country, and formed the finest body of cavalry in the world (2).

The office of Bey was not hereditary: sometimes it descended to the son, more generally to the favourite officer of the deceased commander. They divided the country among them in feudal sovereignty; nominally equal, but necessarily subject to the ascendant of talent, they exhibited alternately the anarchy of feudal rule, and the severity of military despotism. They seldom have been perpetuated beyond the third or fourth generation on the shores of the Nile; and their numbers are only kept up by annual accessions of active youths from the mountains of Circassia.

The force of the Beys was at one period very considerable, but it had been seriously weakened by the Russian conquests in Georgia, which cut off the source from which their numbers were recruited, and at the time when the French landed in Egypt, they were not a half of what they formerly had been; a circumstance which contributed more than any other to the rapid success with which the invasion of the latter was attended (3).

Janizaries. The Turks or Janizaries, forming the second part of the population, were introduced on occasion of the conquest of Egypt by the Sultans of Constantinople. They were about two hundred thousand in number, almost all inscribed on the books of the Janizaries, to acquire their privileges; but, as usual in the Ottoman empire, with a very few of their number in reality following the standard of the Prophet. Those actually in arms formed the guards of the Pacha, who still maintained a shadow of authority for the Sultan of Constantinople; but the great majority were engaged in trades and handicrafts in the towns, and kept in a state of complete subjection to the haughty rule of the Mamelukes (4).

Arabs. The Arabs constituted the great body of the population—at least two millions out of the two millions and a half of which the inhabitants

(1) Nap. ii. 213. Th. x. 97.

(2) The bits in their horses' mouths are so powerful, that the most fiery steeds are speedily checked, even at full career, by an ordinary hand. Their stirrups are extremely short, and give the rider great power both in commanding his horse, and striking with his stirrup; and the pommel and back part of the saddle are so high, that the horseman, though wounded, can scarcely lose his balance; he can even sleep without falling, as he would do in an armchair. The horse is unburdened by no luggage or provisions, all of which are carried by the rider's servants; while the Mameluke himself, covered with scale and turban, is protected from the strokes of

a sabre. They are all splendidly armed; in their girdle is always to be seen a pair of pistols and a poniard; from the saddle is suspended another pair of pistols and a hatchet; on one side is a sabre, on the other a blunderbuss, and the servant on foot carries a carbine. They seldom parry with the sword, as their fine blades would break in the collision, but avoid the strokes of their adversary by skill in wheeling their horse, while they trust to his impetus to sever his head from his body, without either cut or thrust. Mior. 64, 65.

(3) Hard. vi. 92, 93. Th. x. 100, 101. Nap. ii. 214, 215.

(4) Th. x. 94. Nap. ii. 216.

consist: Their condition was infinitely various; some forming a body of nobles, who were the chief proprietors of the country; others, the doctors of the law and the ministers of religion; a third class, the little proprietors, farmers, and cultivators. The whole instruction of the country, the maintenance of its schools, its mosques, its laws, and religion, were in their hands. A numerous body, living on the borders of the desert, retained the roving propensities and barbaric vices of the Bedouin race. Mounted on camels or horses, driving numerous herds before them, escorting or pillaging the caravans which come to Cairo from Lybia and Arabia, they alternately cultivated their fields on the banks of the Nile; or fled from its shores loaded with the spoils of plundered villages. The indifference or laxity of the Turkish rule almost always suffered their excesses to escape with impunity. Industry languished, and population declined in the districts exposed to their ravages; and the plunderers, retreating into the desert, resumed the wandering life of their forefathers; and re-appeared on the frontiers of civilisation, only, like the moving sands, to devour the traces of human industry. A hundred, or a hundred and twenty thousand of these marauders wandered through the wilderness which bordered on either side the valley of the Nile: they could send into the field twenty thousand men, admirably mounted, and matchless in the skill with which their horses were managed, but destitute of discipline or of the firmness requisite to sustain the attack of regular forces (1).

**Copts.** The Copts constituted the fourth class of the people. They are the descendants of the native inhabitants of the country; of those Egyptians who so early excelled in the arts of civilisation, and have left so many monuments of immortal endurance. Now insulted and degraded, on account of the Christian faith which they still profess, they were cast down to the lowest stage of society; their numbers not exceeding two hundred thousand; and their occupations being of the meanest description. By one of those wonderful revolutions which mark the lapse of ages, the greater part of the slaves in the country were to be found among the descendants of the followers of Sesostris (2).

**Ibrahim Bey and Mourad Bey ruled the country.** At the period of the arrival of the French, two Beys, Ibrahim Bey and Mourad Bey, divided between them the sovereignty of Egypt. The first, rich, sagacious, and powerful, was, by a sort of tacit understanding, invested with the civil government of the country; the latter, young, active, and enterprising, was at the head of its military establishments. His ardour, courage, and brilliant qualities, rendered him the idol of the soldiers, who advanced, confident of victory, under his standard (3).

**Policy of Napoleon in invading Egypt.** The policy of Napoléon in invading a country, uniformly was, to rouse the numerous governed against the few governors; and thus paralyse its means of resistance by arming one part of the population against the other: On approaching Egypt, he at once saw, that, by rousing the Arabs against the domination of the Beys, not only the power of the latter would be awakened, but a numerous and valuable body of auxiliaries might be procured for the invading force. To accomplish this object it was necessary, above all things, to avoid a religious war, which would infallibly have united all ranks of the Mussulmans against the invaders,

(1) Volney, *De l'Egypte*, 137. Th. x. 98, 99. Nap. ii. 219, 220.

(2) Nap. ii. 218. Th. ix. 100, 101.  
(3) Th. ix. 100, 101.

and to gain the affections of the Arabs by flattering their leaders, and indulging their prejudices. For this purpose he left the administration of justice and the affairs of religion exclusively in the hands of the Scheiks and addressed himself to the feelings of the multitude through the medium of their established teachers. For the Mahometan religion and its precepts he professed the highest veneration; for the restoration of Arabian independence the most ardent desire; to the Beys alone he swore eternal uncompromising hostility. In this manner he hoped to awaken in his favour both the national feelings of the most numerous part of the people, and religious enthusiasm which is ever so powerful in the East; and, in the passions of the crusades, to rouse in favour of European conquest the vehemence of Oriental fanaticism (1).

His proclamation to the Egyptian people.

Proceeding on these principles, Napoléon addressed the following singular proclamation to the Egyptian people. "People of Egypt, you will be told by our enemies, that I am come to destroy your religion. Believe them not. Tell them that I am come to restore your rights, punish your usurpers; and revive the true worship of Mahomet, which I esteem more than the Mamelukes. Tell them that all men are equal in the sight of God; that wisdom, talents, and virtue alone constitute the difference between them. And what are the virtues which distinguish the Mamelukes that entitle them to appropriate all the enjoyments of life to themselves? Egypt is their farm; let them show the tenure from God by which they hold it. No! God is just and full of pity to the suffering people. For long a host of slaves, bought in the Caucasus and Georgia, have tyrannized over the fairest part of the world; but God, upon whom every thing depends, has decreed that it should terminate. Cadis, Scheiks, Imams, tell the people that we are true *Mussulmans*. Are we not the men who have destroyed the Pope, and preached eternal war against the *Mussulmans*? Are we not those who have destroyed the chevaliers of Malta, because those madmen believed that they should constantly make war on your faith? Are we not those who have been in every age the friends of the Most High, and the enemies of his enemies? Be happy those who are with us; they will prosper in all their undertakings: woe to those who shall join the Mamelukes to resist us; they shall perish without mercy."

His arrangements for advancing to Cairo.

Napoléon was justly desirous to advance to Cairo, before the inundations of the Nile rendered military operations in the lower country impossible; but for this purpose it was necessary to accelerate his movements, as the season of the rise of the waters was fast approaching. He made, accordingly, the requisite arrangements with extraordinary celerity; left three thousand men in garrison at Alexandria under M. de Meber, with a distinguished officer of engineers to put the works in a posture of defence, established the civil government in the persons of the Scheiks and Imams, gave directions for sounding the harbour, with a view to plac-

(1) Kap. ii. 226, 227. Th. x. 104, 105.

"The French army," says Napoléon, "since the Revolution, had practised no sort of worship; in fact even, the soldiers never went to church; we took advantage of that circumstance to present the army to the *Mussulmans*, as readily disposed to embrace their faith. I had many discussions with the Scheiks on this subject; and after many weeks spent in fruitless discussion, they arrived at the conclusion that circumcision, and the prohibition against wine, might be dispensed with, provided not a tenth, but a fifth of the income, was spent in acts of bene-

ficence." The general-in-chief then traced out a plan of a mosque, which was to exceed that of Jerusalem, and declared it was to be a monument of conversion of the army. In all this, however, he sought only to gain time. Napoléon was, upon this, declared the friend of the Prophet, and placed under his protection. The report spread generally, that before the expiry of a year, the soldiers would wear the turban. This produced the very effect; the people ceased to regard them as idolaters.—*Nap. in Egypt*. ii. 211, 212.

(2) Bour. ii. 96, 98.



a fleet in safety, if the draught of water would permit the entry of the larger vessels; collected a flotilla on the Nile to accompany the troops; and assigned it as a place of rendez-vous Ramanieh, a small town on that river, situated about half way to Cairo, whither he proposed to advance across the desert of manhour (1). While, at the same time, he wrote to the French ambassador at Constantinople to assure the Porte of his anxious desire to remain at peace with the Turkish government (2).

On the 6th July, the army set out on their march, being now received, by the garrisons of Malta and that recently left in Alexandria, to 10,000 men. At the same time, Kléber's division, under the orders of Dugua, is directed to move upon Rosetta, to secure that town, and facilitate the entrance of the flotilla into the Nile. Desaix was at the head of the vanguard; his troops began their march in the evening, and advanced with tolerable cheerfulness during the cool of the night; but when morning dawned, and they found themselves traversing a boundless plain of sand, without water or shade—with a burning sun above their head, and troops of Arabs flitting across the horizon, to cut off the weary or lagglers—they were filled with the most gloomy forebodings. Already the desire for rest had taken possession of their minds; they had flattered themselves that they were to find repose and a terrestrial paradise in Egypt; and when they found themselves, instead, surrounded by a pathless desert, their discontent broke out in loud lamentations. All the wells on the road were either filled up or exhausted; hardly a few drops of muddy and brackish water were to be found to quench their burning thirst. At Damanhour, a few houses afforded shelter at night only to the general's staff; the remainder of the troops bivouacked in squares on the sand, incessantly harassed by the clouds of Arabs who wheeled round their position, and sometimes approached within fifty yards of the videttes. After a rest of two days, the army resumed its march across the sandy wilderness, still observed in the distance by the hostile Bedouins; and soon the suffering from thirst became so excessive, that even Lannes and Murat threw themselves on the sand, and gave way to every expression of despair (3). In the midst of the general depression, a sudden gleam of hope illuminated the countenances of the soldiers; a lake appeared in the arid wilderness, with villages and palm trees clearly reflected in its glassy surface. Instantly the parched troops hastened to the enchanting object, but it receded from their steps; in vain they pressed on with burning impatience; it for ever fled from their approach; and they had at length the mortification of discovering that they had been deceived only by the *mirage* of the desert (4).

(1) Berthier, 9, 11. Th. x. 107, 108.

(2) "The army has arrived; it has disembarked at Alexandria, and carried that town; we are now in a march for Cairo. Use your utmost efforts to convince the Porte of our firm resolution to continue to live on the best terms with his government. An ambassador to Constantinople has just been named for that purpose, who will arrive there without delay."—*Letter to the Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople*, 8th July, 1798; *Corresp. Secrète*, v., 199.

(3) The sufferings of the army are thus vividly pictured in Desaix's despatch to Napoleon: "If all the army does not pass the desert with the rapidity of lightning, it will perish. It does not contain water to quench the thirst of a thousand men. The latter part of what it does is contained in cisterns, which, once emptied, are not replenished by any

perennial fountain. The villages are huts without resources of any kind. For Heaven's sake, do not leave us in this situation; order us rapidly to advance or retire. I am in despair at being obliged to write to you in the language of anxiety; when we are out of our present horrible position, I hope my wonted firmness will return."—*Corresp. Confid. de Napoleon*, v. 217.

(4) M. Monge, who accompanied the expedition, published the following account of this singular illusion. "When the surface of the earth has been during the day thoroughly heated by the rays of the sun, and towards evening it begins to cool, the higher objects of the landscape seem to rise out of a general inundation. The villages appear to rise out of a vast lake; under each is its image inverted, exactly as if it was in the midst of a glassy sheet of



arrive on  
the Nile.

The firmness and resolution of Napoléon, however, triumphed over every obstacle; the approach to the Nile was shortly indicated

by the increasing bodies of Arabs, with a few Mamelukes, who watched the columns; and at length the long wished for stream was seen glittering through the sandhills of the desert. At the joyful sight the ranks were immediately broken (1); men, horses, and camels, rushed simultaneously to the banks, and threw themselves into the stream; all heads were instantly lowered into the water; and, in the transports of delight, the sufferings of the preceding days were speedily forgotten.

Actions  
with the  
Mamelukes.

While the troops were thus assuaging their thirst, an alarm was given that the Mamelukes were approaching: the drums beat to arms, and eight hundred horsemen, clad in glittering armour, soon appeared in sight. Finding, however, the leading division prepared, they passed on, and attacked the division of Desaix, which was coming up; but the troops rapidly forming in squares, with the artillery at the angles, dispersed the assailants by a single discharge of grape-shot. The whole army soon came up, and the flotilla having appeared in sight about the same time, the soldiers rested in plenty for a whole day beside the stream. A severe action had taken place on the Nile, between the French and Egyptian flotillas, but the Asiatics were defeated, and the boats arrived at the destined spot at the precise hour assigned to them. The landscape now totally changed; luxuriant verdure on the banks of the river succeeded to the arid uniformity of the desert; incomparable fertility in the soil promised abundant supplies to the troops, and the shade of palm-trees and sycamores afforded an enjoyment unknown to those who have never traversed an Eastern wilderness (2).

After a day's rest, the army pursued its march along the banks of the Nile, towards Chebreiss. Mourad Bey, with four thousand Mamelukes and Fellahs or foot soldiers, lay on the road, his right resting on the village, and supported by a flotilla of gun-boats on the river. The French flotilla out-stripped the march of the land forces, and engaged in a furious and doubtful combat with the enemy before the arrival of the army. Napoléon immediately formed his army in five divisions, each composed of squares six deep, with the artillery at the angles, and the grenadiers in platoons, to support the

menaced points. The cavalry, who were only two hundred in number, and still extenuated by the fatigues of the voyage, were placed in the centre of the square. No sooner had the troops approached within half a league of the enemy, than the Mamelukes advanced, and, charging at full gallop, assailed their moving squares with loud cries, and the most determined intrepidity. The artillery opened upon them as soon as they approached within point-blank range, and the rolling fire of the infantry soon mowed down those who escaped the grape-shot. Animated by this success, the French deployed and attacked the village, which was speedily carried. The Mamelukes retreated in disorder towards Cairo, with the loss of 600 men, and the flotilla at the same time abandoned the scene of action, and drew off further up the Nile (3).

This action, though by no means decisive, sufficed to familiarize the soldiers with the new species of enemy they had to encounter,

water. As you approach the village it recedes from the view; when you arrive at it, you find it is still in the midst of burning sand, and the deception begins anew with some more distant object. The phenomenon admits of an easy explanation on optical principles.—See Moor, 26, 32.

(1) *Las Cas.* i. 221. *Berthier*, 11, 12, 13. *Th.* x. 109, 110. *Sav.* i. 50. *Miot*, 26, 38, 39.

(2) *Sav.* i. 50. *Berth.* 13. *Th.* x. 110, 111.

(3) *Dam.* ii. 134, 135. *Berth.* 15, 16. *Th.* x. 112.

and to inspire them with a well-founded confidence in the efficacy of their discipline and tactics to repel the assaults of the Arabian cavalry. The troops continued their march for seven days longer towards Cairo; their fatigues were extreme; and, as the villages were all deserted, it was with the utmost difficulty that subsistence could be obtained. The vicinity of the Nile, however, supplied them with water, and the sight of the Arabs, who constantly prowled round the horizon, impressed them with the necessity of keeping their ranks. At length the army arrived within sight of the PYRAMIDS, and the town of Cairo. All eyes were instantly turned upon the oldest monuments in the world, and the sight of those gigantic structures re-animated the spirit of the soldiers, who had been bitterly lamenting the delights of Italy.

They arrive within sight of the Mameluke forces.  
21st July.

Mourad Bey had there collected all his forces, consisting of six thousand Mamelukes, and double that number of Fellahs, Arabs, and Copts. His camp was placed in the village of Embahbeh, on the left bank of the Nile, which was fortified by rude field works and forty pieces of cannon, but the artillery was not mounted on carriages, and consequently could only fire in one direction. Between the camp and the pyramids extended a wide sandy plain, on which were stationed above eight thousand of the finest horsemen in the world, with their right resting on the village, and their left stretching towards the pyramids. A few thousand Arabs, assembled to pillage the vanquished, whoever they should be, filled up the space to the foot of those gigantic monuments (1).

Battle of the Pyramids.

Napoléon no sooner discovered, by means of his telescopes, that the cannon in the intrenched camp were immovable, and could not be turned from the direction in which they were placed, than he resolved to move his army further to the right, towards the pyramids, in order to be beyond the reach, and out of the direction of the guns. The columns accordingly began to march; Desaix, with his division in front, next Regnier, then Dugua, and lastly, Vial and Bon. The sight of the pyramids, and the anxious nature of the moment, inspired the French general with even more than his usual ardour (2); the sun glittered on those immense masses, which seemed to rise in height with every step the soldiers advanced, and the army, sharing his enthusiasm, gazed, as they marched, on the everlasting monuments. "Remember," said he, "that from the summit of those pyramids forty centuries contemplate your actions."

Lateral movement of Napoléon.

With his usual sagacity, the general had taken extraordinary precautions to ensure success against the formidable cavalry of the desert. The divisions were all drawn up as before, in hollow squares six deep, the artillery at the angles, the generals and baggage in the centre. When they were in mass, the two sides advanced in column, those in front and rear moved forward in their ranks, but the moment they were charged, the whole were to halt, and face outwards on every side. When they were themselves to charge, the three front ranks were to break off and form the column of attack, those in rear remaining behind, still in square, but three deep only, to constitute the reserve. Napoléon had no fears for the result, if the infantry were steady; his only apprehension was that his soldiers, accustomed to charge, would yield to their impetuosity too soon, and would

(1) Nap. ii. 234. Jom. xi. 408.

(2) Th. x. 116. Nap. ii. 237. Jom. xi. 410.

not be brought to the immovable firmness which this species of war required (1).

Perfidious charge of Mourad Bey. Mourad Bey no sooner perceived the lateral movement of French army, than, with a promptitude of decision worthy a skilful general, he resolved to attack the columns while in the act of completing it. An extraordinary movement was immediately observed in the Mameluke line, and speedily seven thousand horsemen detached themselves from the remainder of the army and bore down upon the French column. It was a terrible sight, capable of daunting the bravest troops, when an immense body of cavalry approached at full gallop the squares of infantry. The horsemen, admirably mounted, and magnificently dressed, rent the air with their cries. The glitter of spears and scimitars dazzled the sight, while the earth groaned under the repeated and increasing thunder of their fire. The soldiers, impressed but not panic-struck by the sight, stood firm, and anxiously waited, with their pieces ready, the order to fire. Desaix's division, being entangled in a wood of palm-trees, was not completely formed when the swiftest of the Mamelukes came upon them; they were in consequence partially broken; and thirty or forty of the bravest of the assailants penetrated and died in the midst of the square at the feet of the officers; but before the mass arrived, the movement was completed, and a rapid fire of musketry and grape drove them from the front round the sides of the column. With matchless intrepidity, they pierced through the interval between Desaix's and Regnier's divisions, and riding round both squares, strove to find an entrance; but an incessant fire from every front mowed them down as they poured in at the opening. Furious at the unexpected resistance, they dashed their horses against the rampart of bayonets, and threw their pistols at the heads of the grenadiers; while many who had lost their steeds, crawled along the ground, and cut at the legs of the front rank with their scimitars. In vain thousands succeeded, and galloped round the flaming walls of steel. Multitudes perished under the rolling fire which, without intermission, poured from the ranks, and at length the survivors, in despair, fled toward the camp from whence they had issued. Here, however, they were charged in flank by Napoléon at the head of Dugua's division, while those of Viala and Bon on the extreme left, stormed the intrenchments. The most horrible confusion now reigned in the camp; the horsemen, driven in disorder, trampled under foot the infantry, who, panic-struck at the rout of the Mamelukes, on whom all their hopes were placed, abandoned their ranks, and rushed in crowds towards the boats to escape to the other side of the Nile. Numbers saved themselves by swimming, but a great portion perished in the attempt. The Mamelukes, rendered desperate, seeing no possibility of escape in that direction, fell upon the columns who were approaching from the right, with their wings extended in order of attack; but they, forming square again with inconceivable rapidity, repulsed them with great slaughter, and drove them finally off in the direction of the pyramids. The intrenched camp, with all its artillery, stores, and baggage, fell into the hands of the victors. Several thousands of the Mamelukes were drowned or killed; and of the formidable array which had appeared in such splendour in the morning, not more than two thousand five hundred escaped with Mourad Bey into Upper Egypt. The victors hardly lost two hundred men in the action; and several days were occupied after it was over in stripping

(1) Nap. ii. 236, 237. *Mem.* x. 117.

slain of their magnificent appointments; or fishing up the rich spoils which encumbered the banks of the Nile (1).

Ibrahim  
Bey retires  
to Syria:  
Mourad Bey  
to Upper  
Egypt. Na-  
poléon en-  
ters Cairo.

This action decided the fate of Egypt, not only by the destruction of force which it effected, but the dispersion of what remained which it occasioned. Mourad Bey retired to Upper Egypt, leaving Cairo to its fate, while Ibrahim Pacha, who had been a spectator of the combat from the opposite side of the river, set fire to the boats which contained his riches, and retreated to Salahieh, on the frontiers of Arabia, and from thence across the desert into Syria. Two days after the battle, Napoléon entered Cairo, where his soldiers found all the luxuries of the East, which for a time compensated to them for their absence from Europe. The division of Desaix was destined to pursue Mourad Bey into Upper Egypt; the other divisions, dispersed in the environs of Cairo, or advanced towards Syria in pursuit of Ibrahim Pacha, tasted the sweets of repose after their short but fatiguing campaign (2).

Peace mea-  
sures of  
Napoléon.

No sooner was Napoléon established in Cairo, and his officers employed in exploring the Pyramids and City of Tombs, which lay at their feet, than he set himself sedulously to follow up the plan for acquiring the dominion over the country to which his proclamations from Alexandria had originally pointed. He visited the principal Scheiks, flattered them, held out hopes of the speedy re-establishment of the Arabian power, promised ample security for their religion and their customs, and at length completely won their confidence, by a mixture of skilful management with the splendid language which was so well calculated to captivate Eastern imaginations. The great object was to obtain from the Scheiks of the Mosque of Jemilazar, which was held in the highest estimation; a declaration in favour of the French, and by adroitly flattering their ambition, this object was at length gained (3). A species of litany was composed by them, in which they celebrated the overthrow of their Mameluke oppressors by the invincible soldiers of the West. "The Beys," said they, "placed their confidence in their cavalry; they ranged their infantry in order of battle. But the Favourite of Fortune, at the head of the brave men of the West, has destroyed their horses, and confounded their hopes. As the vapours which rise in the morning from the Nile are dispersed by the rays of the sun, so has the army of the Mamelukes been dissipated by the heroes of the West; for the Great Allah is irritated against the Mamelukes, and the soldiers of Europe are the thunders of his right hand (4)."

The Battle of the Pyramids struck terror far into Asia and Africa. The caravans which came to Mecca from the interior of those vast regions, carried back the most dazzling accounts of the victories of the invincible legions of Europe; the destruction of the cavalry which had so long tyrannized over

(1) Nap. ii, 237, 239, 241. Sav. i. 51. Th. x. 119, 121. Lac. xiv. 268

(2) Sav. i. 59. Nap. ii. 246, 249.

(3) "You are not ignorant," said the Scheiks, in this curious proclamation, which evidently bears the marks of the composition of Napoléon, "that the French alone, of all the European nations, have, in every age, been the firm friends of Mussulmans and Mahometism, and the enemies of idolaters and their superstitions. They are the faithful and zealous allies of our sovereign the Sultan, ever ready to give him proofs of their affection, and to fly to his succour; they love those whom he loves, and hate those whom he hates; and that is the cause of their rupture with the Russians, those irreconcilable ene-

mies of the worshippers of the true God, who meditate the capture of Constantinople, and incessantly employ alike violence and artifice to subvert the faith of Mahomet. But the attachment of the French to the Sublime Porte, and the powerful succours which they are about to bring to him, will doubtless confound their impious designs. The Russians desire to get possession of St. Sophia, and the other temples dedicated to the service of the true God, to convert them into churches consecrated to the exercises of their perverse faith; but, by the aid of Heaven, the French will enable the Sultan to conquer their country, and exterminate their impious race."—*Corresp. Confid. de Nap.* v., 407.

(4) Th. x. 123, 127. Dum. ii. 142.

Egypt excited the strongest sentiments of wonder and admiration; and the Orientals, whose imaginations were strongly impressed by the flaming citadels which had dissipated their terrible squadrons, named Napoléon; Sultan Kébir, or the Sultan of Fire (1).

His able and impartial civil government. He affects the Mussulman faith. Napoléon, in addition to the terror inspired by his military exploits, strove to acquire a lasting hold of the affections of the people by the justice and impartiality of his civil government. He made all his troops join with the multitude in celebrating the festival in honour of the inundation of the Nile, which that year rose to an extraordinary height; partook with the Scheiks and Imams in the ceremonies at the Great Mosque; joined in the responses in their litanies like the faithful Mussulmans; and even balanced his body and moved his head in imitation of the Mahometan custom. Nor was it only by an affected regard for their religion that he endeavoured to confirm his civil authority. He permitted justice to be administered by the Scheiks and Imams, enjoining only a scrupulous impartiality in their decisions: established at Cairo a divan, or parliament, to make known the wants of the people; and others, in the different provinces, to send deputies to the Central Assembly; and vigorously repulsed the robbers of the desert, who for centuries had devastated with impunity the frontiers of the cultivated country. Never had Egypt experienced the benefits of regular government so completely as under his administration. One day, when Napoléon was surrounded by the Scheiks, information was received that some Arabs, of the tribe of Osnadis, had slain a Fellah, and carried off the flocks of the village. He instantly ordered that an officer of the staff should take three hundred horsemen, and two hundred camels, to pursue the robbers, and punish the aggressors. "Was the Fellah your cousin," said a Scheik, laughing, "that you are in such a rage at his death?"—"He was more," replied Napoléon; "he was one whose safety Providence had intrusted to my care."—"Wonderful!" replied the Scheik: "You speak like one inspired by the Almighty (2)."

Growing discontent of the army. But while these great designs occupied the commander-in-chief, an extraordinary degree of depression prevailed in the army: Egypt had been held out to the soldiers as the promised land. They expected to find a region flowing with milk and honey, and after a short period of glorious exile, to return with the riches of the East to their native country. A short experience was sufficient to dissipate all these illusions. They found a land illustrious only by the recollections with which it was fraught; filled with the monuments of ancient splendour, but totally destitute of modern comfort; bowed down with tyranny, squalid with poverty, barbarous in manners. When the excitements of the campaign were over, and the troops had leisure to contemplate their situation, a mortal feeling of *ennui* and disquietude took possession of every heart. "They thought," says Bourrienne, "of their country, of their relations, of their amours, of *the opera*;" the prospect of being banished for ever from Europe, on that arid shore, excited the most gloomy presentiments; and at length the discontent reached such a height, that Napoléon was obliged to threaten death to any officer, whatever his rank, who should venture to make known to him the feelings which every one entertained (3).

It is a singular proof of the ascendant which Napoléon had acquired over

(1) Scott, iv. 74.

(3) Bonr. ii. 130, 135. Sav. i. 59, 60. Las Cas. i.

(2) Th. x. 125. Bonr. ii. 124, 128. Dum. ii. 170, 222, 173, Nap. ii. 222. Las Cas. i. 232.



Cassanious  
expedition  
to Salahieh  
on the Syrian  
frontier.  
Ibrahim Bey  
retires into  
Syria.

the minds of the soldiers, that when they were in this state of perilous fermentation, he ventured to proceed in person with the divisions commanded by Dugua and Regnier to extinguish an insurrection which Ibrahim had excited in the eastern part of Egypt, and drive him across the desert into Syria. The French overtook the Mamelukes at Salahieh, on the borders of the desert; and, as their rearguard was heavily laden with baggage, the Arabs who accompanied the cavalry strongly urged them to charge the retiring columns, who were posted near a wood of palm-trees. The disproportion of force was excessive, the Mamelukes being nearly thrice as numerous as the Europeans; nevertheless, Napoléon, confident of success, ordered the attack. But, though the discipline of the Europeans prevailed over the desultory valour of the Mussulmans in a regular engagement, they had no such advantage in an affair of outposts, and on this occasion the skill and courage of the Mamelukes had wellnigh proved fatal to the best part of the French cavalry. The charge, though bravely led by Leclerc and Murat, was as courageously received. The Mamelukes yielded at first, but soon returning, with their wings extended, closed in on every side around their pursuers. In the *mêlée* all the French officers had to sustain desperate personal encounters, and were for the most part severely wounded; nothing but the opportune arrival of the infantry extricated them from their perilous situation. The object, however, of the expedition was gained; Ibrahim crossed the desert into Syria, leaving Mourad Bey alone to maintain the war in Upper Egypt (1).

Intrigues of  
Napoléon  
with Ali  
Pacha.

The success which had attended Napoléon's intrigues with the knights of Malta induced him to extend his views beyond Egypt, for the dismembering of the Turkish empire. With this view, he secretly dispatched his aide-de-camp Lavalette to Ali Pacha, the most powerful of the European vassals of the Porte, to endeavour to stimulate him to revolt. He bore a letter from the French general, in which Napoléon urged him to enter into an immediate concert for measures calculated to subvert the Ottoman empire (2). Lavalette found Ali Pacha with the army on the Danube, but, nevertheless, he contrived means to have it conveyed to him. The crafty Greek, however, did not conceive the power of Napoléon in Egypt sufficiently confirmed to induce him to enter into the proposed alliance, and, accordingly, this attempt to shake the throne of the Grand Seigneur failed of effect (3).

Treachery  
of France  
towards  
Turkey.

While secretly conducting these intrigues, as well as openly assailing one of the most valuable provinces of their empire, both Napoléon and the Directory left nothing untried to prolong the slumber of the Ottoman government, and induce them to believe that the French had no hostile designs whatever against them, and that they were in reality inimical only to the Beys, the common enemy of both. With this view, Napoléon wrote to the Grand Vizier a letter full of assurances of the friendly dispositions both of himself and his government, and the eternal

(1) Sav. i. 63. Bour. ii. 149, 150.

(2) "The occasion appearing to me favourable, I have hastened to write to you a friendly letter, and have intrusted one of my aides-de-camp with its delivery with his own hands. I have charged him also to make certain overtures on my part; and as he does not understand your language, be so kind as to make use of a faithful and confidential interpreter for the conversations which he will have with you. I pray you to give implicit faith to whatever he may

say to you on my part; and to send him back quickly with an answer, written in Turkish with your own hand"—*Corresp. Confid. de Nap.* v., 249. Lavalette's instructions from Napoléon were to tell Ali "that, after having taken possession of Malta, and ruling in the Mediterranean with thirty ships of the line and fifty thousand men, I wish to establish confidential relations with him, and to know if I can rely on his co-operation."—*LAVALLETTE*, i. 358.

(3) *Hard.* vi. 266, 269. *Lav.* i. 358.



alliance of the Republic with the Mussulmans (1); while Talleyrand, who had been appointed ambassador at Constantinople, received instructions to exert himself to the very utmost to perpetuate the same perfidious illusion. Such was the ability of that able diplomatist, and of Ruffin, the envoy at the Turkish capital, that for long the Divan shut their eyes to the obvious indications which were afforded of the real designs of France. Proportionally great was the general indignation, when accounts arrived of the invasion of Egypt, and it became evident how completely they had been deceived by these perfidious representations. Preparations for war were made with the utmost activity; the French chargé d'affaires, Ruffin, was sent to the Seven Towers; and the indignation of the Divan broke forth in one of those eloquent manifestoes, which a sense of perfidious injury seldom fails to produce among the honest, though illiterate, rulers of mankind (2).

But while every thing was thus prospering on land, a desperate reverse awaited Napoléon at sea, brought about by the genius of that illustrious man who seemed to have been the instrument of Providence to balance the destiny of nations, turn from Asiatic wilds to European revolution the chains of military power, and preserve safe, amidst the western waves, the destined ark of European freedom.

After having sought in vain for the French fleet on the coast of Egypt, Nelson returned to Candia, and from thence to Syracuse, where he obtained, with extraordinary rapidity, the supplies of which he stood so much in need. The failure of his pursuit was owing to a singular cause: Nelson had set sail from Sicily on the 24th June, and the French fleet on the 18th; nevertheless, so much more rapidly did his fleet sail than his antagonists', that he passed them on the voyage, and arrived at Alexandria on the 28th, two days before the French squadron. He set sail immediately for Candia, upon not finding them there; and thus, through his activity and zeal, twice missed the fleet of which he was in search. But the time was now approaching when his wishes were to be realized. He set sail from Syracuse for the Morea on the 25th July, steered boldly through that dangerous passage, the straits of Messina, and, having received intelligence in Greece that the French fleet had been seen four weeks before, steering to the south-east from Candia, he determined to return to Alexandria. On the 1st

(1) Napoléon's letter was in these terms: "The French army, which I have the honour to command, having entered Egypt, to punish the Brty for the insults they have committed on the French commerce. Citizen Talleyrand Perigord, minister of foreign affairs in France, has been named, on the part of France, ambassador at Constantinople, and he is furnished with full powers to negotiate and sign the requisite treaties, to remove any difficulties that may arise from the occupation of Egypt by the French army, and to consolidate the ancient and necessary friendship that ought to exist between the two powers. As he may possibly not yet have arrived at Constantinople, I took no time in making known to your excellency the resolution of the French government, not only to remain on terms of its ancient friendship with the Ottoman Porte, but to procure for it a barrier of which it stands so much in need against its natural enemies, who are at this moment joining together for its destruction."—Despatch, 24d August, 1798; *Corresp. Confid. de Nap.* vi. 3, 4.

(2) *Ibid.* vi. 276, 280.

The manifesto of Turkey, which was a most able state paper, bears, "On the one hand, the French ambassadors, resident

at Constantinople, making use of the same dissimulation and treachery which they have every where practised, gave to the Turkish government the strongest marks of friendship, and sought by every art of dissimulation to blind it to their real designs, and induce it to come to a rupture with other and friendly powers; while, on the other, the commanders and generals of the French troops in Italy, with the perfidious design of corrupting the subjects of his highness, have never ceased to send into Rome, the Morea, and the islands of the Archipelago, emissaries known for their perfidy and dissimulation, and to spread every where incendiary publications, tending to excite the inhabitants to revolt. And now, as if to demonstrate to the world, that France makes no distinction between its friends and its enemies, it has, in the midst of a profound peace with Turkey, and while still professing to the Porte the same sentiments of friendship, invaded, without either provocation, complaint, or declaration of war, but after the usage of pirates, Egypt, one of the most valuable provinces of the Ottoman empire, from which, to this hour, it has received only marks of friendship."—See the *Manifesto in Haouzmat*, vi. 483, 493, dated 10th Sept. 1798.

August, about ten in the morning, they came in sight of the Pharos; the port had been vacant and solitary when they last saw it; now it was crowded with ships, and they perceived, with exultation, that the tricolor flag was flying on the walls. The fleet of Brueys was seen lying at anchor in the bay of Aboukir. For many days before, the anxiety of Nelson had been such, that he neither ate nor slept. He now ordered dinner to be prepared, and appeared in the highest spirits. "Before this time to-morrow," said he to his officers, when leaving him to take the command of their vessels, "I shall have gained a peerage or Westminster Abbey (1)."

Brueys' position.

Admiral Brueys having been detained, by Napoléon's orders, at the mouth of the Nile, and being unable to get into the harbour of Alexandria, had drawn up his fleet in order of battle, in a position in the bay of Aboukir so strong, that, in the opinion of his best officers, the English would never venture to attack it. The headmost vessel was close to the shore on the north-west, and the rest of the fleet formed a sort of curve, with its concave side towards the sea, and supported on the right by the batteries on the fort of Aboukir. He had done his utmost to get his ships into the harbour of Alexandria; but finding that the draught of water was too small for the larger vessels, he wisely determined not to adopt a measure which, by dividing his fleet, would have exposed it to certain destruction. After Napoléon was fairly established in Egypt, by the capture of Cairo, he sent orders to the admiral to go to Corfu, if he could not get the ships into the harbour of Alexandria (2); but till that event took place, he was in too precarious a situation to deprive himself of the assistance of his fleet; and it was then too late to escape the danger, as the English were within sight of the ramparts of Alexandria.

Nelson's plan of attack.

No sooner did Nelson perceive the situation of the French fleet, than he resolved to penetrate between them and the shore, and in that way double with his whole force on part of that of the enemy. "Where there is room for the enemy to swing," said he, "there must be room for us to anchor." His plan was to place his fleet half on the outer, and half on the inner side of the French line, and station his ships, so far as practicable, one on the outer bow and another on the outer quarter of each of the enemy's. Captain Berry, his flag captain, when he was made acquainted with the design, exclaimed; with transport, "If we succeed, what will the world say?" "There is no 'If' in the case," replied Nelson; "that we shall succeed is certain; who may live to tell the story is a very different question (3)."

Relative forces on the two sides.

The number of ships of the line on the two sides was equal, but the French had a great advantage in the size of their vessels; their ships carrying 1196 guns, and 11,230 men, while the English had only 1012 guns and 8068 men (4). The British squadron consisted entirely of seventy-fours; whereas the French, besides the noble l'Orient of 120 guns, had two 80-gun ships, the Franklin and Guillaume Tell (5). The battery on Aboukir fort was mounted with four pieces of heavy cannon and two mortars, besides pieces of a lighter calibre.

Battle of the Nile.

The squadron advanced to the attack at three o'clock in the afternoon. Admiral Brueys at first imagined that the battle would be deferred till the following morning; but the gallant bearing and steady

(1) *Dum.* ii. 128. *South.* ii. 218, 224.

(2) On 30th July. See the letter in *Bourrienne*, ii. 329; and *Corr. Conf.* v. 332. *Hour.* ii. 155, 316, 327, 333, 335. *South.* i. 222. *Scott.* iv. 77.

(3) *South.* i. 226. *Jorn.* xi. 416.

(4) *South.* ii. 224. *Journ.* xi. 367. *Ann. Reg.* 1798, 140.

(5) *James* ii. 232.

course of the British ships as they entered the bay soon convinced him that an immediate assault was intended. The moment was felt by the bravest in both fleets; thousands gazed in silence, and with anxious hearts, on each other, who were never destined again to see the sun, and the shore was covered with multitudes of Arabs, anxious to behold a fight on which, to all appearance, the fate of their country would depend. When the English fleet came within range, they were received with a steady fire from the broadsides of all the vessels and the batteries on the island. It fell right on the bows of the leading ships; but, without returning a shot, they bore directly down upon the enemy, the men on board every vessel being employed aloft in furling sails, and below in tending the braces, and making ready for an anchorage. Captain Foley led the way in the *Goliath*, outsailing the *Zealous*, under Captain Hood; which for some time disputed the post of honour with him; and when he reached the van of the enemy's line, he steered between the outermost ship and the shoal, so as to interpose between the French fleet and the shore. In ten minutes he shot away the masts of the *Cocherant*; while the *Zealous*, which immediately followed in the same time totally disabled the *Guerrier*, which was next in line. The other ships in that column followed in their order, still inside the French line, while Nelson, in the vanguard, at the head of five ships, anchored outside of the enemy, within pistol-shot of their third ship, the *Spartiate*. The effect of this manœuvre was to bring an overwhelming force against two-thirds of the enemy's squadron, while the other third, moored at a distance from the scene of danger, could neither aid their friends nor injure their enemies (1).

Nelson had arranged his fleet with such skill, that from the moment that the ships took up their positions, the victory was secure. Five ships had passed the line, and anchored between the first nine of the enemy and the shore, while six had taken their station on the outer side of the same vessels, which were thus placed between two fires, and had no possibility of escape. Another vessel, the *Leander*, was interposed across the line, and cut off the vanguard from all assistance from the rearmost ships of the squadron, while her guns raked right and left those between which she was placed. The *Cuttymer*, which came up sounding after it was dark, ran aground two leagues from the hostile fleets, and, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of her captain and crew, could take no part in the action which followed; but her fate served as a warning to the *Alexander* and *Swiftsure*, which would else have inevitably struck on the shoal and perished. The way in which these ships entered the bay and took up their stations amidst the gloom of night by the light of the increasing cannonade, excited the admiration of all who witnessed it (2).

The British ships, however, had a severe fire to sustain as they successively passed along the enemy's line to take up their appointed stations; and the great size of several of the French squadron rendered them more than a match for any single vessel the English could oppose to them. The *Vanguard*, which bore proudly down, bearing the admiral's flag, and six colours on different parts of the rigging, had every man at the first six guns on the fore-castle killed or wounded in a few minutes, and they were three times swept off before the action closed. The *Bellerophon* dropt her stern anchor close under the bow of the *l'Orient*, and, notwithstanding the

(1) Southey, i. 236, 239. James, ii. 238, 269. Ant. Mag. 476, 143. Dum. ii. 149. Jon. xi. 11, 17.

(2) Dum. ii. 150. South. i. 231. Ann. Reg. 1798.

immense disproportion of force, continued to engage her first rate antagonist, till her own masts had all gone overboard, and every officer was either killed or wounded, when she drifted away with the tide, overwhelmed, but not subdued, a glorious monument of unconquerable valour. As she floated along, she came close to the *Swiftsure*, which was coming into action, and not having the lights at the mizen-peak, which Nelson had ordered as a signal by which his own ships might distinguish each other, she was at first mistaken for an enemy. Fortunately, Captain Hallowell, who commanded that vessel, had the presence of mind to order his men not to fire, till he ascertained whether the hulk was a friend or an enemy, and thus a catastrophe was prevented which might have proved fatal to both of these ships. The station of the *Bellerophon* in combating the *l'Orient* was now taken by the *Swiftsure*, which opened at once a steady fire on the quarter of the *Franklin* and the bows of the French admiral, while the *Alexander* anchored on his larboard quarter, and, with the *Leander*, completed the destruction of their gigantic opponent (1).

The *l'Orient* It was now dark, but both fleets were illuminated by the incessant blows up. discharge of above two thousand pieces of cannon; and the volumes of flame and smoke that rolled away from the bay gave it the appearance as if a terrific volcano had suddenly burst forth in the midst of the sea. Victory, however, soon declared for the British; before nine, three ships of the line had struck, and two were dismasted; and the flames were seen bursting forth from the *l'Orient*, as she still continued, with unabated energy, her heroic defence. They spread with frightful rapidity, the fire of the *Swiftsure* was directed with such fatal precision to the burning part, that all attempts to extinguish it proved ineffectual; and the masts and rigging were soon wrapped in flames, which threw a prodigious light over the heavens, and rendered the situation of every ship in both fleets distinctly visible. The sight redoubled the ardour of the British seamen, by exhibiting the shattered condition and lowered colours of so many of their enemies, and loud cheers from the whole fleet announced every successive flag that was struck. As the fire approached the magazine of the *l'Orient*, many officers and men jumped overboard, and were picked up by the English boats; others were dragged into the ports, holes of the nearest British ships, who for that purpose suspended their firing; but the greater part of the crew, with heroic bravery, stood to their guns to the last, and continued to fire from the lower deck. At ten o'clock she blew up, with an explosion so tremendous, that nothing in ancient or modern war was ever equal to it. Every ship in the hostile fleets was shaken to its centre; the firing by universal consent ceased on both sides, and the tremendous explosion was followed by a silence still more awful, interrupted only, after the lapse of some minutes, by the splash of the shattered masts and yards falling into the water from the vast height to which they had been thrown. The British ships in the vicinity, with admirable coolness had made preparations to avoid the conflagration; all the shrouds and sails were thoroughly wetted, and sailors stationed with buckets of water to extinguish any burning fragments which might fall upon their decks. By these means, although large burning masses fell on the *Swiftsure* and *Alexander*, they were extinguished without doing any serious damage (2).

After a pause of ten minutes, the firing recommenced, and continued

(1) South. i. 230, 232. Ann. Reg. 1798. 145. James, ii. 240, 248. Journ. xi. 417, 418.

Reg. 1798. 146. Miot. Expéd. en Egypte, 272, 273. Gauthier's Report, Cor. Conf. v. 436, 441.

(2) South. i. 236, 238. James, iii. 246, 249. Ann.

Glorious  
victory in  
which it  
terminates.

without intermission till after midnight, when it gradually grew slacker, from the shattered condition of the French ships and the exhaustion of the British sailors, numbers of whom fell asleep beside their guns, the instant a momentary cessation of loading took place. At day-break the magnitude of the victory was apparent; not a vestige of the L'Orient was to be seen; the frigate La Sérieuse was sunk, and the whole French line, with the exception of the Guillaume Tell and Généreux, had struck their colours. These ships having been little engaged in the action, cut their cables, and stood out to sea, followed by the two frigates: they were gallantly pursued by the Zealous, which was rapidly gaining on them; but as there was no other ship of the line in a condition to support her, she was recalled, and these ships escaped. Had the Culloden not struck on the shoal, and the frigates belonging to the squadron been present, not one of the enemy's fleet would have escaped to convey the mournful tidings to France (1).

Wound of  
Nelson.

Early in the battle, the English admiral received a severe wound on the head, from a piece of Langridge shot. Captain Berry caught him in his arms as he was falling. Nelson, and all around him, thought, from the great effusion of blood, that he was killed. When he was carried to the cockpit, the surgeon quitted the seaman whose wounds he was dressing, to attend to the admiral. "No," said Nelson; "I will take my turn with my brave fellows." Nor would he suffer his wound to be examined till every man, who had previously been brought down, was properly attended to. Fully believing that the wound was mortal, and that he was about to die, as he had ever desired, in the moment of victory, he called for the chaplain, and desired him to deliver what he conceived to be his dying remembrance to Lady Nelson; and, seizing a pen, contrived to write a few words, marking his devout sense of the success which had already been obtained. When the surgeon came in due time to inspect the wound—for no entreaties could prevail on him to let it be examined sooner—the most anxious silence prevailed; and the joy of the wounded men, and of the whole crew, when they found the injury was only superficial, gave Nelson deeper pleasure than the unexpected assurance that his own life was in no danger. When the cry rose that the L'Orient was on fire, he contrived to make his way, alone and unassisted, to the quarterdeck, where he instantly gave orders that boats should be dispatched to the relief of the enemy (2).

Heroic  
deeds in the  
French  
squadron.

Nor were heroic deeds confined to the British squadron. Most of the captains of the French fleet were killed or wounded, and they all fought with the enthusiastic courage which is characteristic of their nation. The captain of the Tonnant, Du Petit-Thouars, when both his legs were carried away by a cannon ball, refused to quit the quarterdeck, and made his crew swear not to strike their colours as long as they had a man capable of standing to their guns. Admiral Brueys died the death of the brave on his quarterdeck, exhorting his men to continue the combat to the last extremity. Casa Bianca, captain of the L'Orient, fell mortally wounded, when the flames were devouring that splendid vessel; his son, a boy of ten years of age, was combating beside him when he was struck, and embracing his father, resolutely refused to quit the ship, though a gun-boat was come alongside to bring him off. He contrived to bind his dying parent to the mast, which had fallen into the sea, and floated off with the precious charge (3); he was seen

(1) James, 249, 251. South. i. 238, 240. Ann.  
Reg. 1798, 146, 147.

(2) South, i. 234, 235, 236.

(3) Dum, ii. 151, 152. James, ii. 236, 237.



after the explosion by some of the British squadron who made the utmost efforts to save his life; but, in the agitation of the waves following that dreadful event, both were swallowed up, and seen no more (1).

Great results of the victory.

Such was the battle of the Nile, for which he who gained it felt that victory was too feeble a word; he called it conquest. Of thirteen ships of the line, nine were taken and two burnt; of four frigates, one was sunk and one burnt. The British loss was eight hundred and ninety five in killed and wounded; they had to lament the death of only one commander, Captain Westcott, a brave and able officer. Of the French, five thousand two hundred and twenty-five perished, and three thousand one hundred and five were taken and sent on shore, including the wounded, with all their effects, on their parole not to serve again till regularly exchanged; an act of humanity which was ill requited by Napoléon, who incorporated the whole who were capable of bearing arms into a regiment of his army (2). The annals of the world do not afford an example of so complete an overthrow of so great an armament.

Terrible traces of the action on shore

The Arabs and Egyptians lined the shore during this terrible engagement, and beheld with mingled terror and astonishment the destruction which the Europeans were inflicting on each other. The beach, for an extent of four leagues, was covered with wreck, and innumerable bodies were seen floating in the bay, in spite of the utmost exertions of both fleets to sink them. No sooner, however, was the conquest completed, than a perfect stillness pervaded the whole squadron; it was the moment of the thanksgiving, which, by orders of Nelson, was offered up through all the fleet, for the signal success which the Almighty had vouchsafed to the British arms. The French prisoners remarked that it was no wonder such order was preserved in the English navy, when at such an hour, and after such a victory, their minds could be impressed with such sentiments (3).

Had Nelson possessed a few frigates or bomb-vessels, the whole transports and small craft in the harbour of Alexandria might have been destroyed in a few hours. So severely did he feel the want of them at this period, that in a despatch to the Admiralty, he declared, "Were I to die at this moment, *want of frigates* would be found engraven on my heart!" The want of such light vessels, however, rendered any attack on the shipping in the shoal water of Alexandria perfectly impossible; and it was not without the utmost exer-

(1) Napoléon addressed the following noble letter to Madame Brueys on her husband's death: "Your husband has been killed by a cannon-ball while combating on his quarterdeck. He died without suffering; the death the most easy and the most envied by the brave. I feel warmly for your grief. The moment which separates us from the object which we love is terrible; we feel isolated on the earth; we almost experience the convulsions of the last agony; the faculties of the soul are annihilated; its connexion with the earth is preserved only across a veil which distorts every thing. We feel in such a situation, that there is nothing which yet binds us to life; that it were far better to die; but when, after such first and unavoidable throes, we press our children to our hearts, tears, and more tender sentiments arise; life becomes bearable for their sakes. Yes, madame, they will open the fountains of your heart; you will watch their childhood; educate their youth; you will speak to them of their father, of your present grief, and of the loss which they and the Republic have sustained in his death.

After having resumed the interest in life by the chord of maternal love, you will perhaps feel some consolation from the friendship and warm interest which I shall ever take in the widow of my friend."—*Corres. Conf.* v. 383.

(2) James, ii. 254, 255. South. i. 240. Dum. ii. 152, 153. James, ii. 265. Sav. i. 65.

"The English," says Kleber, "have had the disinterestedness to restore every thing to their prisoners; they would not permit *ouïes* to be taken from them. The consequence was, that they display in Alexandria a luxury and elegance, which exhibit a strange contrast to the destitute condition of the land forces."—*Despatch to Napoléon, 22d Aug. 1798*: BOURBONNE, ii. 160.—The wounded French sent ashore, are stated by Admiral Gauthaume, in his official report, to amount to nearly eight thousand; an astonishing number, if correct considering that the whole French crews in the action did not exceed twelve thousand.—*Voir Gauthaume's Report—Corresp. Confid. de Napoléon*, v. 483.

(3) South. i. 241.



tions and the united co-operation of all the officers and men, that the fleet was refitted so far as to be able to proceed to sea. Having at length, however, overcome every obstacle, and dispatched an overland messenger to Bombay, to acquaint the government there with his success, he set sail from Aboukir bay on the 18th August, leaving three ships of the line to blockade the harbour of Alexandria. Three of the prizes, being perfect wrecks, were burned; the remaining six arrived in safety at Gibraltar (1).

Honours and rewards were showered by a grateful nation upon the heroes of the Nile. Nelson was created Baron Nelson of the Nile, with a pension of L.2000 a-year to himself and his two immediate successors; the Grand Seignor, the Emperor of Russia, the King of Sardinia, the King of Naples, the East India Company, made him magnificent presents; and his name was embalmed for ever in the recollection of his grateful country. With truth did Mr. Pitt observe in Parliament, when reproached for not conferring on him a higher dignity, "Admiral Nelson's fame will be coequal with the British name, and it will be remembered that he gained the greatest naval victory on record, when no man will think of asking whether he had been created a baron, a viscount, or an earl (2)."

(1) James, ii. 266, 267. South. i. 255, 257.

(2) Parl. Hist. xxxiii. p. 1560. South. i. 249.

Napoléon, who never failed to lay every misfortune with which he was connected, upon fortune, destiny, or the faults of others, rather than his own errors, has laboured to exculpate himself from the disaster in Aboukir bay, and declared, in his official despatch to the Directory, that, on July 6, before leaving Alexandria, he wrote to Admiral Brueys, directing him to retire within the harbour of that town, or if that was impossible, make the best of his way to Corfu. [Nap. ii. 170.] and that the catastrophe arose from his disobedience. It is true he sent an order; but it was *conditional*, and as follows:

— "Admiral Brueys will cause the fleet, in the course of to-morrow, to enter the old harbour of Alexandria, if the time permits, and there is sufficient depth of water. If there is not in the harbour sufficient draught, he will take such measures, that during the course of to-morrow, he may have disembarked the artillery and stores, and the individuals belonging to the army, retaining only a hundred soldiers in each ship of the line, and forty in each frigate. The admiral, in the course of to-morrow, will let the general know whether the squadron can get into Alexandria, or can defend itself, while lying in the roads of Aboukir, against a superior enemy; and if it can do neither of these things, it will make the best of its way to Corfu, leaving at Alexandria only the Dubois and Coeuvre, with the Diana, Juno, Alceste, and Arthemise frigates." [Letter, 3d July, 1798.] The order to proceed to Corfu therefore, was *conditional*; to take effect only on failure to get into Alexandria, or find a defensible roadstead; and, from the following letters, it appears that Brueys with the full knowledge of the general-in-chief, proceeded to adopt the prior alternative of taking up a defensive position at Aboukir. The day before, Brueys had written to Napoléon: "All the accounts I have hitherto received are unsatisfactory as to the possibility of getting into the harbour, as the bar has only twenty two feet six inches, which our smallest seventy-fours draw, so that entry is impossible. My present position is untenable, by reason of the rocks with which the bottom of the bay is strewed; and if attacked, I should be infallibly destroyed by the enemy, if I had the misfortune to await them in this place. The only thing that I see practicable is, to

take shelter in the moorings of Beckier (Aboukir), where the bottom is good, and I could take such a position as would render me secure from the enemy." [Letter, 2d July, 1798.] On the 6th July, Brueys wrote to Napoléon, in addition to his letter of the 2d: "I have neglected nothing which might permit the ships of the line to get into the old port; but it is a labour which requires much time and patience. The loss of a single vessel is too considerable to allow any thing to be permitted to hazard; and hitherto it appears that we cannot attempt such a measure without incurring the greatest dangers; that is the opinion of all the most experienced officers on board the fleet. Admiral Villeneuve and Casa Bianca regard it as impossible. When I have sounded the roadstead of Beckier, I will send you a report of that road. Want of provisions is severely felt in the fleet; on board many vessels there is only biscuit for fourteen days." On the 7th July, he again wrote to Napoléon: "I thank you for the precaution you have taken in sending engineer and artillery officers to meet me in the bay of Beckier. I shall concert measures with them as soon as we are moored, and if I am fortunate enough to discover a position where batteries on shore may protect the two extremities of my line, I shall regard the position as impregnable, at least during summer and autumn. It is the more desirable to remain there, because I can set sail *en masse* when I think fit; whereas, even if I could get into the harbour of Alexandria, I should be blockaded by a single vessel of the enemy, and should be unable to contribute any thing to your glory." On the 13th July, he again wrote to Napoléon: "I am fortifying my position, in case of being obliged to combat at anchor. I have demanded two mortars from Alexandria to put on the sand bank; but I am less apprehensive of that than the other extremity of the line, against which the principal efforts of the enemy will in all probability be directed." And, on 26th July, Brueys wrote again to him: "The officers whom I have charged with the sounding of the port, have at length announced that their labours are concluded; I shall forthwith transmit the plan, when I have received it, that you may decide what vessels are to enter." On the 30th, Napoléon wrote in answer: "I have received all your letters. The intelligence which I have received of the soundings, induces me to believe that you are by this time safely in the port;"

**Disastrous effects of this blow to the French army.**

The battle of the Nile was a mortal stroke to Napoléon and the French army. He was too clear-sighted not to perceive the fatal and irremediable nature of the loss there incurred. It had been his design, after the conquest of Egypt was secured, to embark a great proportion of his forces, return to Toulon, and employ them on some other and still greater expedition against the power of England. By this irreparable loss he found these prospects for ever blasted; the army exiled, without hope of return, on an inhospitable shore, all means of preserving his recent conquest frustrated, and himself destined, to all appearance, instead of changing the face of the world, to maintain an inglorious and hopeless struggle in a corner

**Courage of Napoléon and Kléber.**

of the Turkish empire. All his dreams of European conquests and Oriental revolutions appeared at once to vanish, by the destruction of the resources from which they were to be realized; and nothing remained but the painful certainty that he had doomed to a lingering fate the finest army of the Republic, and endangered its independence by the sacrifice of so large a portion of its defenders. But, though in secret overwhelmed by the disaster, he maintained in public the appearance of equanimity, and suffered nothing to escape his lips which could add to the discouragement of his soldiers. "Well," said he, "we must remain here, or issue from it equal in grandeur to the ancients."—"Yes," replied Kléber, "we must do great things. I am preparing my mind to go through them (1)."

**Despair of the inferior officers and soldiers.**

But while the chiefs of the army thus endeavoured to conceal the gloomy presentiments which overwhelmed their minds, the inferior officers and soldiers knew no bounds to the despair with which they were filled. Already, before they reached Cairo, the illusion of the expedition had been dispelled; the riches of the East had given place to poverty and suffering; the promised land had turned out an arid wilderness. But when intelligence arrived of the destruction of the fleet, and with it of all hope of returning to France, except as prisoners of war, they gave vent to such loud complaints, that it required all the firmness of the generals to prevent a sedition breaking out. Many soldiers in despair blew out their brains; others

[Corresp. Conf. v. 192, 194, 200, 201, 222, 237, 266, 332, 404.] and ordered him forthwith to do so, or proceed to Corfu. On the day after this last letter was written, Nelson's fleet attacked Brueys in the bay of Aboukir. Napoléon, therefore, was perfectly aware that the fleet was lying in Aboukir bay; and it was evidently retained there by his orders, or with his approbation, as a support to the army, or a means of retreat in case of disaster. In truth, such was the penury of the country, that the fleet could not lay in provisions at Alexandria to enable it to stand out to sea. [Bour ii. 144.] He was too able a man, besides, to hazard such an army without any means of retreat in an unknown country; and Bourrienne declares, that previous to the taking of Cairo, he often talked with him on re-embarking the army, and laughed himself at the false colours in which he had represented the matter to the Directory. [Ibid. Bour. ii, 144, 155, 315, 336.] It is proved, by indisputable evidence, that the fleet was detained by the orders, or with the concurrence, of Napoléon. "It may perhaps be said," says Admiral Gautheume, the second in command, who survived the defeat, "that it would have been more prudent to have quitted the coast after the debarkation was effected; but, considering the orders of the commander-in-chief, and the incalculable support which the fleet gave to the land-forces, the admiral conceived it to be his duty not to abandon those seas. [Hard, vi, 80.] Brueys

also said to Lavalette, in Aboukir bay, on the 21st July, "Since I could not get into the old harbour of Alexandria, nor retire from the coast of Egypt, without news from the army, I have established myself here in as strong a position as I could." [Lav. i. 274.] The inference to be drawn from these documents is, that neither Napoléon nor Brueys was to blame for the disaster which happened in Aboukir bay; that the former ordered the fleet to enter Alexandria or take a defensible position; and if he could do *neither*, then proceed to Corfu, but that the latter was unable, from the limited draught of water at the bar, to do the one, and, agreeably to his orders, attempted the other; that it lay at Aboukir bay, with the full knowledge of the general-in-chief, and without his being able to prevent it, though his penetration in the outset perceived the danger to which it was exposed in so doing; and that the only real culpability in the case is imputable to Napoléon, in having endeavoured, after Brueys' death, to blacken his character, by representing the disaster to the Directory as exclusively imputable to that officer, and as having arisen from his disobedience of orders, when, in fact, it arose from extraneous circumstances, over which the admiral had no control, having rendered it necessary for him to adopt the second alternative prescribed to him by his commander.

(1) Th. x. 138, 139. Miot, 79. Bour. ii, 133, 135.

threw themselves into the Nile, and perished, with their arms and baggage. When the generals passed by, the cry, "There go the murderers of the French," involuntarily burst from the ranks. By degrees, however, this stunning misfortune, like every other disaster in life, was softened by time. The soldiers, deprived of the possibility of returning, ceased to disquiet themselves about it, and ultimately they resigned themselves with much greater composure to a continued residence in Egypt, than they could have done had the fleet remained to keep alive for ever in their breasts the desire of returning to their native country (1).

It at once brings on a war between France and Turkey. The consequences of the battle of the Nile were, to the last degree, disastrous to France. Its effects in Europe were immense, by re-

viving, as will be detailed hereafter, the coalition against its Republican government; but in the East, it at once brought on the Egyptian army the whole weight of the Ottoman empire. The French ambassador at Constantinople had found great difficulty for long in restraining the indignation of the Sultan; the good sense of the Turks could not easily be persuaded that it was an act of friendship to the Porte to invade one of the most important provinces of the empire, destroy its militia, and subject its inhabitants to the dominion of an European power. No sooner, therefore, was the Divan at liberty to speak their real sentiments, by the destruction of the armament which had so long spread terror through the Levant, than they gave vent to their indignation. War was formally declared against

30th Sept. France, the differences with Russia adjusted, and the formation of an army immediately decreed to restore the authority of the Crescent on the banks of the Nile (2).

Passage of the Hellespont by the Russian fleet. Among the many wonders of this eventful period, not the least surprising was the alliance which the French invasion of Egypt produced between Turkey and Russia, and the suspension of all the ancient animosity between the Christians and Mussulmans, in the pressure of a danger common to both. This soon led to an event so extraordinary, that it produced a profound impression even on the minds of the Mussulman spectators. On the 1st September, a Russian fleet, of ten ships of the line and eight frigates, entered the canal of the Bosphorus, and united at the Golden Horn with the Turkish squadron; from whence the combined force, in presence of an immense concourse of spectators, whose acclamations rent the skies, passed under the walls of the Seraglio, and swept majestically through the classic stream of the Hellespont. The effect of the passage of so vast an armament through the beautiful scenery of the straits, was much enhanced by the brilliancy of the sun, which shone in unclouded splendour on its full-spread sails; the placid surface of the water reflected alike the Russian masts and the Turkish minarets; and the multitude, both European and Mussulman, were never weary of admiring the magnificent spectacle, which so forcibly imprinted upon their minds a sense of the extraordinary alliance which the French Revolution had produced, and the slumber in which it had plunged national antipathies the most violent, and religious discord the most inveterate (3).

The combined squadrons, not being required on the coast of Egypt, steered for the island of Corfu, and immediately established a rigorous blockade of its fortress and noble harbour, which soon began to feel the want of provi-

(1) Bour. ii. 134, 138. Sav. i. 65.

(3) Hard. vi. 298, 299.

(2) Th. x. 143. Dum. ii. 160, 161. Hard. vi. 300. Nap. ii. 172.

sions. Already, without any formal treaty, the courts of St.-Petersburg, London, and Constantinople, acted in concert, and the bases of a triple alliance were laid, and sent to their respective courts for ratification (1).

Critical  
situation of  
the French  
army. Vast  
efforts of  
Napoleon.

The situation of the French army was now in the highest degree critical. Isolated from their country, unable either to obtain succours from home, or to regain it in case of disaster, pressed and blockaded by the fleets of England, in the midst of a hostile population, they were about to be exposed to the formidable forces of the Turkish empire. In these discouraging circumstances, the firmness of Napoléon, so far from forsaking, only prompted him to redouble his efforts to establish his authority firmly in the conquered country. The months which immediately followed the destruction of the fleet were marked by an extraordinary degree of activity in every department. At Alexandria, Rosetta, and Cairo, mills were established, in which flour was ground as finely as at Paris; hospitals were formed, where the sick were treated with the most sedulous care by the distinguished talents of Larrey and Desgenettes; a foundery, where cannon were cast, and a manufactory of gunpowder and saltpetre, rendered the army independent of external aid for its ammunition and artillery. An institute at Cairo, formed on the model of that at Paris, concentrated the labours of the numerous scientific persons who accompanied the army; the geography, antiquities, hieroglyphics, and natural history of Egypt, began to be studied with an accuracy unknown in modern times; the extremities and line of the canal of Suez were explored by Napoléon in person, with the most extraordinary ardour; a flotilla formed on the Nile; printing presses set agoing at Cairo; the cavalry and artillery remounted with the admirable horses of Arabia, the troops equipped in new clothing, manufactured in the country; the fortifications of Rosetta, Damietta, Alexandria, and Salahieh, put in a respectable posture of defence; while the skilful draughtsmen who accompanied the expedition, prepared, amidst the wonders of Upper Egypt, the magnificent work which, under the auspices of Denon, has immortalized the expedition (2).

Expedition  
of Desaix  
to Upper  
Egypt.

As soon as the inundation of the Nile had subsided, Desaix commenced his march to Upper Egypt, to pursue the broken remains of Mourad Bey's corps. On the 7th October, he came up with the enemy, consisting of four thousand Mamelukes and Arabs, and six thousand Fellahs, stationed in the village of Sidiman. The French were not more than two thousand three hundred strong; they formed three squares, and received the charges as at the battle of the Pyramids, of which this action in all its parts was a repetition on a smaller scale. The smallest square, however, was broken by the impetuous shock of the Mamelukes; but the soldiers, with admirable presence of mind, fell on their faces, so that the loss was not so great as might have been expected (3). All the efforts of the cavalry failed against the steady sides of the larger squares; and at length, the Mamelukes being broken and dispersed, the village was stormed with great slaughter, and the soldiers returned to take a severe vengeance on a body of the enemy, who, during the assault, had committed great carnage on those wounded in

(1) Hard. vi. 300.

(2) Dum. ii. 172, 173, 184, 185. Sav. i. 66, 67. Bour. ii. 162, 163. Th. x. 142, 143.

(3) On this, as on other occasions, the scientific characters and draughtsmen who attended the army, were huddled with the baggage into the centre, as the only place of security, the moment that the

enemy appeared. No sooner were the Mameluke horse descried, than the word was given, "Form square; artillery to the angles; asses and camels to the centre;" a command which afforded no small merriment to the soldiers, and made them call the *asses demi-savans*.—Las Casas, i. 225.

the broken square. This action was more bloody than any which had yet occurred in Egypt; the French having lost three hundred and forty men killed, and one hundred and sixty wounded; a great proportion, when every life was precious, and no means of replacing it existed (1). It was decisive, however, of the fate of Upper Egypt. Desaix continued steadily to advance, driving his indefatigable opponents continually before him; the rose-covered fields of Faioum, the Lake Moëris, the City of the Dead, were successively visited; another cloud of Mamelukes was dispersed by the rolling fire of the French at Samanhout; and at length the ruins of Luxor opened to their view, and the astonished soldiers gazed on the avenues of sphinxes, gigantic remains of temples, obelisks, and sepulchral monuments, which are destined to perpetuate to the end of the world the glories of the city of Thebes (2).

Bloody suppression of a revolt at Cairo.

While Desaix was thus extending the French dominion towards the cataracts of the Nile, a dangerous insurrection was extinguished in blood in the centre of Egypt. Notwithstanding all the efforts of

Napoléon to conciliate the Mussulman population, the Beys still retained a considerable influence over them, and the declaration of war by the Porte revived the spirit of religious hostility, which he had been at such pains to allay. In the end of October, the insurrection broke out, at a time when the French were so far from suspecting their danger, that they had very few troops within the town. Dupuis, the commander of the city, who proceeded with a feeble escort to quell the tumult, was slain, with several of his officers; a vast number of insulated Frenchmen were murdered, and the house of General Caffarelli was besieged and forced. The *alarme* was immediately beat in the streets, several battalions in the neighbourhood entered the town, the citadel began to bombard the most populous quarters, and the Turks, driven into the principal mosques, prepared for a desperate resistance. During the night they barricaded their posts, and the Arabs advanced from the desert to support their efforts; but it was all in vain. The French commander drove back the Bedouins into the inundation of the Nile, the mosques were forced, the buildings which sheltered the insurgents battered down or destroyed, and, after the slaughter of above five thousand of the inhabitants, and the conflagration of a considerable part of the city, Cairo submitted to the conqueror. This terrible disaster, with the cruel executions which followed it, struck such a terror into the Mahometan population, that they never after made the smallest attempt to get quit of the French authority (3).

Expedition of Napoléon to the Red Sea.

Meanwhile, Napoléon made an expedition in person to Suez, in order to inspect the line of the Roman canal, which united the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. At Suez he visited the harbour,

and gave orders for the construction of new works, and the formation of an infant marine; and passed the Red Sea, in a dry channel, when the tide was out, on the identical passage which had been traversed three thousand years before, by the children of Israel. Having refreshed himself at the fountains which still bear the name of the Wells of Moses, at the foot of Mount-Sinai, and visited a great reservoir, constructed by the Venetians in the sixteenth century, he returned to recross to the African side. It was dark when he reached the shore; and in crossing the sands, as the tide was flowing, they wandered from the right path, and were for some time exposed to the most

(1) Sav. i. 69, 70. Th. x. 379, 380.

(2) Sav. i. 70, 91. Jom. xi. 422.

(3) Dum. ii. 176, 177. Jom. x. 423, 424. Bour. ii. 182.



imminent danger. Already the water was up to their middle, and still rapidly flowing, when the presence of mind of Napoléon extricated them from their perilous situation. He caused one of his escort to go in every direction, and shout when he found the depth of water increasing, and that he had lost his footing; by this means it was discovered in what quarter the slope of the shore ascended, and the party at length gained the coast of Egypt. "Had I perished in that manner like Pharaoh," and Napoléon, "it would have furnished all the preachers of Christendom with a magnificent text against me (1)."

Extraordi-  
nary procla-  
mation of  
Napoléon.

The suppression of the revolts drew from Napoléon one of those singular proclamations which are so characteristic of the vague ambition of his mind;—"Scheiks, Ulemats, Orators of the Mosque, teach the people, that those who become my enemies shall have no refuge in this world or the next. Is there any one so blind as not to see that I am the Man of Destiny? Make the people understand, that from the beginning of time it was ordained, that, having destroyed the enemies of Islamism, and vanquished the Cross, I should come from the distant parts of the West, to accomplish my destined task. Show them, that in twenty passages of the Koran my coming is foretold. I could demand a reckoning from each of you, of the most secret thoughts of his soul, since to me every thing is known; but the day will come, when all shall know from whom I derived my commission, and that human efforts cannot prevail against me." Thus did Napoléon expect that he was to gain the confidence of the Mussulmans, at the very time when he was executing thirty of their number a-day, and throwing their corpses, in sacks, every night into the Nile (2).

He resolves  
to penetrate  
into Syria.

Being now excluded from all intercourse with Europe, and menaced with a serious attack by land and sea from the Turks, Napoléon resolved to assail his enemies by an expedition into Syria, where the principal army of the Sultan was assembling. Prudence prescribed that he should anticipate the enemy, and not wait till, having assembled their strength, a preponderating force was ready to fall upon the French army. But it was not merely defensive operations that the general contemplated; his ardent mind, now thrown upon its own resources, and deprived of all assistance from Europe, indulged in visions of Oriental conquest. To advance into Syria, with a part of his troops, and rouse the population of that country and Asia Minor against the Turkish rule; assemble an army of fifteen thousand French veterans, and a hundred thousand Asiatic auxiliaries on the Euphrates, and overawe at once Persia, Turkey, and India, formed the splendid project which filled his imagination. His eyes were continually fixed on the deserts which separated Asia Minor from Persia; he had sounded the dispositions of the Persian court, and ascertained that, for a sum of money, they were willing to allow the passage of his army through their territories; and he confidently expected to renew the march of Alexander, from the shores of the Nile to those of the Ganges. Having overrun India, and established a colossal reputation, he projected returning to Europe; attacking Turkey and Austria with the whole forces of the East, and establishing an empire, greater than that of the Romans, in the centre of Eu-

His vast  
designs.

(1) Bour. ii. 195, 196. Las Cas. i. 226. Sav. i. 99.

(2) Mint, 106. Scott, iv. 86. Th. x. 394.

"Every night," said Napoléon, in a letter to Regnier, "we cut off thirty heads, and those of several chiefs; that will teach them, I think, a good lesson." The victims were put to death in prison,

thrust into sacks, and thrown into the Nile. This continued six days after tranquillity was restored. [Bour. ii. 184.] The executions were continued far long after, and under circumstances that will admit of neither extenuation nor apology.



European civilisation. Full of these ideas, he wrote to Tippoo Saib, that "he had arrived on the shores of the Red Sea with an innumerable and invincible army, and inviting him to send a confidential person to Suez, to concert measures for the destruction of the British power in Hindostan (1)."

Limited extent of his forces. The forces, however, which the French general could command for the Syrian expedition, were by no means commensurate to these magnificent projects. They consisted only of thirteen thousand men; for although the army had been recruited by the three thousand prisoners sent back by the British after the battle of the Nile, and almost all the sailors of the transports, yet such were the losses which had been sustained since the period when they landed, by fatigue, sickness, and the sword, that no larger number could be spared from the defence of Egypt. These, with nine hundred cavalry, and forty-nine pieces of cannon, constituted the whole force with which Napoléon expected to change the face of the world; while the reserves left on the banks of the Nile did not exceed in all sixteen thousand men. The artillery destined for the siege of Acre, the capital of the Pacha Djeddar, was put on board three frigates at Alexandria, and orders dispatched to Villeneuve at Malta to endeavour to escape the vigilance of the English cruisers, and come to support the maritime operations (2).

11th Feb. On the 11th February, the army commenced its march over the desert which separates Africa from Asia. The track, otherwise imperceptible amidst the blowing sand, was distinctly marked by innumerable skeletons of men and animals, which had perished on that solitary pathway, the line of communication between Asia and Africa, which from the earliest times had been frequented by the human race. Six days afterwards, Napoléon reached El Arish, where the camp of the Mamelukes was surprised during the night, and after a siege of two days the fort capitulated.

Passage of the Syrian Desert. The sufferings of the troops, however, were extreme in crossing the desert; the excessive heat of the weather, and the want of water, produced the greatest discontent among the soldiers, and Napoléon felt the necessity of bringing his men as rapidly as possible through that perilous district. The garrison were conveyed as prisoners in the rear of the army, which 20th March. augmented their difficulty in obtaining subsistence. Damas was abandoned by the Mussulman forces at the sight of the French squares of infantry, and at length the granite pillars were passed which marked the confines of Asia and Africa; the hitherto clear and glowing sky was streaked by a veil of clouds, some drops of rain refreshed the parched lips of the soldiers, and the suffering troops beheld the green valleys and wood-covered hills of Syria. The soldiers at first mistook them for the *mirage* of the desert, which had so often disappointed their hopes; they hardly ventured to trust their own eyes, when they beheld woods and water, green meadows, and olive groves, and all the features of European scenery; but at length, the appearance of verdant slopes and clear brooks convinced them, that they had passed from the sands of Africa to a land watered by the dew of heaven. But if the days were more refreshing, the nights were far more uncomfortable than on the banks of the Nile; the heavy dews and rains of Syria soon penetrated the thin clothing of the troops, and rendered their situation extremely disagreeable; and, drenched with rain, they soon came to regret, at least for

(1) Bour. ii. 188, 189. Nap. ii. 300, 301, and Corresp. Conf. vi. 192.

(2) Miot, 111. Jom. xi. 397, 400. Dum. ii. 186, 190.

their night bivouacs, the dry sands and star-bespangled firmament of Egypt (1).

*Storming of Jaffa.*

Jaffa, the Joppa of antiquity, was the first considerable town of Palestine which presented itself to the French in the course of their march. It was invested on the 4th of March, and a flag of truce, whom Napoléon sent to summon the town, beheaded on the spot. The breach being declared practicable, the assault took place on the 6th, and success was for some time doubtful; but the grenadiers of Bon's division at length discovered, on the sea-side, an opening left unguarded, by which they entered, and in the confusion occasioned by this unexpected success, the breach was carried, and the Turks driven from the walls (2). A desperate carnage took place, and the town was delivered over to the horrors of war, which never appeared in a more frightful form (3).

*Four thousand of the garrison capitulate.*

During this scene of slaughter, a large part of the garrison, consisting chiefly of Albanians and Arnaouts, had taken refuge in some old caravanseries, where they called out from the windows that they would lay down their arms, provided their lives were spared; but that if not, they would defend themselves to the last extremity. The officers, Eugene Beauharnais and Crosier, his own aides-de-camp, took upon themselves to agree to the proposal, although the garrison had all been devoted by Napoléon to destruction; and they brought them, disarmed, in two bodies, the one consisting of two thousand five hundred men, the other of fifteen hundred, to the general's headquarters. Napoléon received them with a stern and relentless air, and expressed the greatest indignation against his aides-de-camp, for encumbering him with such a body of prisoners in the famished condition of the army. The unhappy wretches were made to sit down, with their hands tied behind their backs, in front of the tents; despair was already painted in their countenances. They uttered no cries, but seemed resigned to death. The French gave them biscuit and water; and a council of war was summoned to deliberate on their fate (4).

*Massacre of these prisoners.*

For two days the terrible question was debated, what was to be done with these captives; and the French officers approached it without any predisposition to cruel measures. But the difficulties were represented as insurmountable on the side of humanity. If they sent them back, it was said, to Egypt, a considerable detachment would be required to guard so large a body of captives, and that could ill be spared from the army in its present situation; if they gave them their liberty, they would forthwith join the garrison of Acre, or the clouds of Arabs who already hung on the flanks of the army; if they were incorporated unarmed in the ranks, the prisoners would add grievously to the number of mouths for whom, already, it was

(1) Bour. ii. 215, 217. Miot, 129. Jom. x. 401. Dum. ii. 190.

(2) Nap. ii. 373. Jom. xi. 403. Dum. ii. 195. Miot, 138, 139.

(3) Though resolved utterly to exterminate, if he could, the Pacha of Acre, Napoléon kept up his usual system of endeavouring to persuade him that he invaded his country with no hostile intentions. On the 9th of March he wrote to him from Jaffa, yet reeking with the blood shed in this terrible assault:—"Since my entry into Egypt, I have sent you several letters expressive of my wish not to be involved in hostilities with you, and that my sole object was to disperse the Mamelukes. The provinces of Gaza and Jaffa are in my power; I have treated with generosity those who surrendered at

discretion, with severity those who violated the laws of war. In a few days I shall march against Acre; but what cause of hostility have I with an old man whom I do not know? What are a few leagues of territory to me? Since God gives me victory, I wish to imitate his clemency, not only towards the people, but their rulers. You have no reason for being my enemy, since you were the foe of the Mamelukes; become again my friend; declare war against the English and the Mamelukes, and I will do you as much good as I have done, and I can do you evil." The Pacha, however, paid no regard to this communication, and continued, without interruption, his preparations of defence.—See *Corresp. Confid. de Napoléon*, vi. 232.

(4) Bour. ii. 221, 223. Jom. xi. 403. Miot, 272.

sufficiently difficult to procure subsistence. No friendly sail appeared in the distance to take off the burden on the side of the ocean; the difficulty of maintaining them became every day more grievous. The committee, to whom the matter was referred, unanimously reported that they should be put to death, and Napoléon, with reluctance, signed the fatal order. It was carried into execution on the 10th March; the melancholy troop were marched down, firmly fettered, to the sandhills on the sea-coast, where they were divided into small squares, and mowed down, amidst shrieks which yet ring in the souls of all who witnessed the scene, by successive discharges of musketry. No separation of the Egyptians from the other prisoners took place; all met the same tragic fate. In vain they appealed to the capitulation by which their lives had been guaranteed; bound as they stood together, they were fired at for hours successively, and such as survived the shot were dispatched with the bayonet. One young man, in an agony of terror, burst his bonds, threw himself among the horses of the French officers, and embracing their knees, passionately implored that his life might be spared; he was sternly refused, and bayoneted at their feet. But with this exception, all the other prisoners received their fate with the fortitude which is the peculiar characteristic of the Mussulman faith; they calmly performed their ablutions in the stagnant pools among which they were placed, and taking each other's hands, after having placed them on their lips and their hearts, in the Mussulman mode of salutation, gave and received an eternal adieu. One old chief, slightly wounded, had strength enough left to excavate with his own hands his grave, where he was interred while yet alive by his followers, themselves sinking into the arms of death. After the massacre had lasted some time, the horrors which surrounded them shook the hearts of many, especially of the younger part of the captives. Several at length broke their bonds, and swam to a ridge of coral rocks out of the reach of shot; the troops made signs to them of peace and forgiveness, and when they came within a short distance, fired at them in the sea, where they perished from the discharge or the waves. The bones of the vast multitude still remain in great heaps amidst the sandhills of the desert (1); the Arab turns from the field of blood, and it remains in solitary horror, a melancholy monument of Christian atrocity.

It would be to little purpose that the great drama of human events were recorded in history, if the judgment of posterity were not strongly pronounced on the scene. Napoléon lived for posthumous celebrity; in this instance he shall have his deserts; the massacre at Jaffa is an eternal and ineffaceable blot on his memory; and so it is considered by the ablest and most impartial of his own military historians (2). The laws of war can never justify the massacre of prisoners in cold blood, three days after the action has ceased; least of all, of those who had laid down their arms on the promise that their lives should be spared; the plea of expedience can never be admitted to extenuate a deed of cruelty. If it were, it would vindicate the massacres in the prisons of Paris, the carnage of Saint-Bartholomew, the burning of Joan of Arc, or any of the other foul deeds with which the page of history is stained. Least of all should Napoléon recur to such an argument, for it justifies at once all the severities of which he so loudly complained, when applied in a much lighter degree to himself at Saint-Helena. If the peril arising from dismissing a few thousand obscure

(1) *Jom.* xi. 404. *Bour.* ii. 225, 227. *Sav.* i. 100.  
*Wat.* 144, 148. *O'Meara*, i. 329. *Nap.* ii. 373.

(2) *Jom.* xi. 404. *Th.* ix. 384.

Albanians justified their indiscriminate massacre, what is to be said against the exile of him who had wrapped the world in flames? Nothing was easier than to have disarmed the captives and sent them away; the Vendéens, in circumstances infinitely more perilous, had given a noble instance of such humanity, when they shaved the heads of eleven thousand of the Republican soldiers, who had been made prisoners, and gave them their liberty. Even if they had all taken refuge in Acre, it would, so far from strengthening, have weakened the defence of that fortress; the deed of mercy would have opened a wider breach than the Republican batteries. In reality, the iniquitous act was as short-sighted as it was atrocious; and, sooner or later, such execrable deeds, even in this world, work out their own punishment. It was despair which gave such resolution to the defenders of the Turkish fortress. Napoléon has said, that Sir Sidney Smith made him miss his destiny, and threw him back from the empire of the East to a solitary island in the Atlantic; in truth, however, it was not the sword of his enemies, but his own cruelty which rendered the battlements of Acre invincible to his arms; if the fate of their comrades at Jaffa had not rendered its garrison desperate, all the bravery of that gallant chevalier would have been exerted in vain; and, instead of perishing by a lingering death on the rock of Saint-Helena, the mighty conqueror might have left to his descendants the throne of Constantinople (1).

The French  
advance to  
Acre. De-  
scription of  
that for-  
tress.

After this hideous massacre, the French army wound round the promontory of Mount Carmel, and, after defeating a large body of horse, under the command of Abdallah Pacha, on the mountains of Naplouse, appeared before ACRE on the 16th March. This town, so celebrated for its long siege, and the heroic exploits of which it was the witness in the holy wars, is situated on a peninsula, which enables the besieged to unite all their means of defence on the isthmus which connects it with the mainland. A single wall, with curtains flanked by square towers, and a wet ditch, constituted its sole means of defence; but these, in the hands of Ottoman soldiers, were not to be despised. The Pacha of Syria, with all his treasures, arms, and artillery, had shut himself up in that stronghold, determined to make the most desperate resistance. But all his efforts would probably have proved unavailing, had it not been for the desperation inspired by the previous massacre at Jaffa, and the courage and activity of an English officer, Sir SIDNEY SMITH, who at that period commanded the squadron in the bay of Acre (2).

Sir Sidney  
Smith's pre-  
parations for  
its defence.

This celebrated man, who had been wrecked on the coast of France, and confined in the Temple, made his escape a few days after Napoléon left Paris to take the command of the Egyptian expedition. After a variety of adventures, which would pass for fabulous, if they had not occurred in real life, he arrived in England, where his enterprise and talents were immediately put in requisition for the command of the squadron in the Archipelago. Having received information from the Pacha of Syria that Acre was to be attacked, he hastened to the scene of danger, and arrived there just two days before the appearance of the French army, with the *Tiger* of eighty-four, and *Theseus* of seventy-four guns, and some smaller vessels. This precious interval was actively employed by

(1) Napoléon, and all his eulogists, admit the massacre, but assert that it was justifiable, because the garrison was partly composed of those who had been taken at El Arish. This is now proved to be false. No part of the garrison at El Arish was in

Jaffa, but it was conveyed in the rear of the French army.—See BOURAÏENNE, ii. 216, and JOMINI, x. 403.—O'MEARA, i. 329.

(2) Jom. xi. 406. Dum. ii. 196, 197. Th. x. 384. 385. Berth. 54, 55.

him in strengthening the works, and making preparations for the defence of the place. On the following day, he was fortunate enough to capture the whole flotilla dispatched from Alexandria with the heavy artillery and stores for the siege of the town, as it was creeping round the head-lands of Mount Carmel; and the guns, forty-four in number, were immediately mounted on the ramparts, and contributed, in the most important manner, to the defence of the place. At the same time, Colonel Philippeaux, a French officer of engineers, expatriated from his country by the Revolution, exerted his talents in repairing and arming the fortifications; and a large body of seamen and marines, headed by Sir Sidney himself, were landed to co-operate in the defence of the works (1).

15th March, 1799.  
Commerce-ment of the city.  
 The irreparable loss sustained by the capture of the flotilla, reduced the battering cannon of the assailants to four bombs, four twelve, and eight eight-pounders. Notwithstanding, however, these slender means, such was the activity and perseverance of the French engineers, that the works of the besiegers advanced with great expedition; a sally of the garrison was vigorously repulsed on the 26th, and a mine having been run under one of the principal towers which had been severely battered, the explosion took place two days after, and a practicable breach was effected. The grenadiers instantly advanced to the assault, and running rapidly forward arrived at the edge of the counterscarp. They were there arrested by a ditch, fifteen feet deep, which was only half filled up with the ruins of the wall. Their ardour, however, speedily overcame this obstacle; they descended into the fosse, and mounting the breach, effected a lodgment in the tower; but the impediment of the counterscarp having prevented them from being adequately supported (2), the Turks returned to the charge, and, after a desperate struggle, succeeded in expelling them from that part of the ramparts, and driving them with great slaughter back into their trenches (3).

This repulse convinced the French that they had to deal with very different foes from those whom they had massacred at Jaffa. A second assault, on the 1st April, having met with no better success, the troops were withdrawn into the works, and the general-in-chief resolved to await the arrival of the heavy artillery from Damietta. Meanwhile the Ottomans were collecting all their forces on the other side of the Jordan, to raise the siege. Napoléon had concluded a sort of alliance with the Druses, a bold and hardy race of Christian mountaineers, who inhabit the heights of Lebanon, and only awaited the capture of Acre to declare openly for his cause, and throw off the yoke of their Mussulman rulers. The Turks, however, on their side, had not been idle. By vast exertions, they had succeeded in rousing the Mahometan population of all the surrounding provinces; the remains of the Mamelukes of Ibrahim Bey, the Janizaries of Aleppo and of Damascus, joined to an innumerable horde of irregular cavalry, formed a vast army, which had already pushed

(1) Jom. xi. 406. Dum. ii. 197, 198. Ann. Reg. 1799, 23.

It is not the least curious fact in that age of wonders, that Philippeaux, whose talents so powerfully contributed, at this crisis, to change the fate of Napoleon, had been his companion at the Military School at Brienne, and passed his examinations with him, previous to joining their respective regiments. [Las Casas, i. 233.]

(2) Miot, 162, 163. Jom. xi. 407. Dum. ii. 200, 202. Ann. Reg. 1799, 29. Th. x 386.

(3) A striking instance of the attachment of the soldiers to Napoléon appeared on this occasion. In the trenches, a bomb, with the fuses burning, fell at his feet; two grenadiers instantly seized him in their arms, and covering him with their bodies, carried him out of danger. They got him out of the reach of the explosion before it took place, and no one was injured.—Las Casas, i. 235.



its advanced posts beyond the Jordan, and threatened soon to envelope the besieging force. The French troops occupied the mountains of Naplouse, Cana in Galilee, and Nazareth; names for ever immortal in holy writ, at which the devout ardour of the Crusaders burned with generous enthusiasm (1), but which were now visited by the descendants of a Christian people without either interest in, or knowledge of, the inestimable benefits which were there conferred upon mankind.

The French advance to meet them. These alarming reports induced Napoléon to send detachments to Tyre and Saffet, and reinforce the troops under the command of Junot at Nazareth. Their arrival was not premature; for the advanced posts of the enemy had already crossed the Jordan, at the bridge of Jacob, and were pressing in vast multitudes towards the mountain-ridge which separates the valley of that river from the maritime coast. Kléber, on his march from the camp at Acre to join Junot, encountered a body of four thousand horse on the heights of Loubi; but they were defeated and driven beyond the Jordan by the same rolling fire which had so often proved fatal to the Mamelukes in Egypt. On the day following, a grand sortie, headed by English officers, and supported by some marines from the fleet, took place from Acre, and obtained at first considerable advantages; but the arrival of reinforcements from the camp at length obliged the assailants to return into the town (2).

Napoléon now saw that he had not a moment to lose in marching to attack the cloud of enemies which were collecting in his rear, and preventing a general concentration of the hostile forces by sea and land against the camp before Acre. For this purpose he ordered Kléber, with his division, to join Junot; Murat, with a thousand infantry, and two squadrons of horse, was stationed at the bridge of Jacob, and he himself set out from the camp before Acre with the division of General Bon, the cavalry, and eight pieces of cannon (3).

Battle of Mount Thabor. Kléber had left Nazareth with all his forces, in order to make an attack on the Turkish camp; but he was anticipated by the enemy who advanced to meet him with fifteen thousand cavalry, and as many infantry, as far as the village of Fouli. Kléber instantly drew up his little army in squares, with the artillery at the angles, and the formation was hardly completed when the immense mass came thundering down, threatening to trample their handful of enemies under their horses' hoofs. The steady aim and rolling fire of the French veterans brought down the foremost of the assailants, and soon formed a rampart of dead bodies of men and horses; behind which they bravely maintained the unequal combat for six hours, until at length Napoléon, with the cavalry and fresh divisions, arrived on the heights which overlooked the field of battle, and amidst the multitudes with which it was covered, distinguished his men by the regular and incessant volleys which issued from their ranks, forming steady flaming spots amidst the moving throng with which they were surrounded. He instantly took his resolution. General Letourq was dispatched, with the cavalry and two pieces of light artillery, against the Mamelukes who were in reserve at the foot of the mountains of Naplouse, while the division of Bon, divided into two squares, advanced to the attack of the flank and rear of the multitude who were surrounding Kléber's division, and Napoléon, with the cannon and

(1) Lav. i. 372.

(2) Jom. xi. 409. Ann. Reg. 1799, 30. Dum. ii.

(3) Jom. x. 410. Dum. ii. 287.



guides, pressed them in front. A twelve-pounder fired from the heights, announced to the wearied band of heroes the joyful intelligence that succour was at hand; the columns all advanced rapidly to the attack, while Kléber, resuming the offensive, extended his ranks, and charged the mass who had so long oppressed him with the bayonet. The immense superiority of European discipline and tactics was then apparent; the Turks, attacked in so many quarters at once, and exposed to a concentric fire from all the squares, were unable to make any resistance; no measures, either to arrest the enemy or secure a retreat, were taken, and the motley throng, mowed down by the discharges of grape-shot, fled in confusion behind Mount-Thabor, and finding the bridge of Jacob seized by Murat, rushed in desperation, in the night, through the Jordan, where great numbers were drowned (1).

This great victory, gained by six thousand veterans over a brave but undisciplined mass of thirty thousand Oriental militia, completely secured the flank and rear of Napoléon's army. The defeat had been complete; the Turkish camp, with all their baggage and ammunition, fell into the hands of the conquerors; the army which the people of the country called "innumerable as the sands of the sea or the stars of heaven," had dispersed, never again to return (2). Kléber occupied in force the bridge of Jacob, the forts of Safet and Tabarieh; and, having stationed patrols along the banks of the Jordan, fixed his headquarters at the village of Nazareth, while Napoléon returned, with the remainder of the army, to the siege of Acre (3).

Journal of the siege of Acre. The French cruisers having at length succeeded in debarking three twenty-four and six eighteen-pounders at Jaffa, they were forthwith brought up to the trenches, and a heavy fire opened upon the tower, which had been the object of such vehement contests. Mines were run under the walls, and all the resources of art exhausted to effect the reduction of the place, but in vain. The defence under Philippeaux was not less determined nor less skilful than the attack; he erected some external works in the fosse, to take the grenadiers in flank as they advanced to the assault; the mines of the besiegers were countermined, and constant sorties made to retard their approaches. In the course of these desperate contests, both Caffarelli, who commanded the engineers of the assailants, and Philippeaux, who directed the operations of the besieged, were slain. The vigour and resolution of the garrison increased with every hour the siege continued. Napoléon, by a desperate effort, for a time succeeded in effecting a lodgment in the ruined tower; but his men were soon driven out with immense loss, and the Turks regained possession of all their fortifications. The trenches had been open and the breach practicable for nearly two months, but no sensible progress as yet made in the reduction of the place (4).

At length, on the evening of the 7th May, a few sails were seen from the towers of Acre, on the farthest verge of the horizon. All eyes were instantly turned in that direction, and the besiegers and besieged equally flattered themselves that succour was at hand. The English cruisers in the bay hastily, and in doubt, stood out to reconnoitre this unknown fleet; but the hearts of the French sank within them when they beheld the two squadrons unite, and

(1) Miot, 176, 182. Jom. xi. 412, 413. Dum. ii. 207, 208.

General Junot commanded one of these squares, which heroically resisted the Ottomans. His valour and steadiness attracted the especial notice of Napoléon, who had the names of the three hundred men of which it was composed, engraved on a splendid

shield, which he presented to that officer, to be preserved among the archives of his family — See DUCHESSE D'ABRANTÈS, xi. 372.

(2) Th. x. 388.

(3) Dum. ii. 208. Miot, 181, 183. Th. x. 389.

(4) Jom. xi. 414, 415. Dum. ii. 212. Th. x. 389. Miot, 190, 193.

the Ottoman crescent, joined to the English pendant, approach the road of Acre. Soon after a fleet of thirty sail entered the bay, with seven thousand men, and abundance of artillery and ammunition, from Rhodes. Napoléon, calculating that this reinforcement could not be disembarked for at least six hours, resolved to anticipate its arrival by an assault during the night. For this the division of Bon, at ten at night, drove the enemy from their exterior works. The artillery took advantage of that circumstance to approach to the counterscarp, and batter the curtain. At daybreak, another breach in the rampart was declared practicable, and an assault ordered. The division of Lannes renewed the attack on the tower, while General Rambaud led the column to the new breach. The grenadiers, advancing with the most heroic intrepidity, made their way to the summit of the rampart, and the morning sun displayed the tricolor flag on the outer angle of the tower. The fire of the place was now sensibly slackened, while the besiegers, redoubling their boldness, were seen intrenching themselves, in the lodgments they had formed, with sand-bags and dead bodies, the points of their bayonets only appearing above the bloody parapet. The troops in the roads were embarked in the boats, and were pulling as hard as they could across the bay; but several hours must still elapse before they could arrive at the menaced point. In this extremity Sir Sidney Smith landed the crews of the ships, and led them, armed with pikes, to the breach. The sight reanimated the courage of the besieged, who were beginning to quail under the prospect of instant death, and they mounted the long-disputed tower, amidst loud shouts from the brave men who still defended its ruins. Immediately a furious contest ensued; the besieged hurled down large stones on the assailants, who fired at them within half pistolshot, the muzzles of the muskets touched each other, and the spearheads of the standards were locked together. At length the desperate daring of the French yielded to the unconquerable firmness of the British and the heroic valour of the Mussulmans; the grenadiers were driven from the tower, and a body of Turks, issuing from the gates, attacked them in flank while they crossed the ditch, and drove them back with great loss to the trenches (1).

But while this success was gained in one quarter, ruin was impending in another. The division headed by Rambaud succeeded in reaching the summit of the rampart, and leaping down into the tower, attained the very garden of the Pacha's seraglio. Every thing seemed lost; but at the critical moment Sir Sidney Smith, at the head of a regiment of Janizaries, disciplined in the European method, rushed to the spot. The progress of the assailants was stopped by a tremendous fire from the house-tops and the barricades which surrounded the seraglio; and at length the French, who had penetrated so far, were cut off from the breach by which they had entered, and driven into a neighbouring mosque, where they owed their lives to the humane intercession of Sir Sidney Smith. In this bloody affair the loss of lives was very great on both sides: Rambaud was killed, and Lannes severely wounded (2).

Notwithstanding this disaster, Napoléon was not yet sufficiently subdued by misfortune to order a retreat (3). "The fate of the East," said he, "is in yonder fort; the fall of Acre is the object of my expedition; Damascus will be its first fruit." Although the troops in the fleet were now landed, and the force in the place greatly increased, he resolved to make a last effort with the division of

(1) Ann. Reg. 1799, 32. Jom. xi. 416. Dum. ii. 213. Miot, 194, 196.

(2) Jom. xi. 416, 417. Dum. ii. 213, 214. Th. x. 390. Ann. Reg. 1799, 32. Miot, 197, 198.

(3) Miot, 194.

Kléber, which had been recalled in haste from its advanced post on the Jordan. Early on the 10th May, he advanced in person to the foot of the breach, and, seeing that it was greatly enlarged by the fire of the preceding days, a new assault was ordered. The summit of the breach was again attained; but the troops were there arrested by the murderous fire which issued from the barricades, and intrenchments, with which the garrison had strengthened the interior of the tower. In the evening, the division of Kléber arrived, and, proud of its triumph at Mount Thabor, eagerly demanded to be led to the assault. "If St.-Jean d'Acre is not taken this evening," said one of the colonels, as he was marching at the head of his regiment to the assault, "be assured Venoux is slain." He kept his word; the fortress held out, but he lay at the foot of the walls (1). A little before sunset, a dark massy column issued from the trenches, and advanced with a firm and solemn step to the breach. The assailants were permitted to ascend unmolested to the summit, and descend into the garden of the Pacha; but no sooner had they reached that point, than they were assailed with irresistible fury by a body of Janizaries, who, with the sabre in one hand, and the dagger in the other, speedily reduced the whole column to headless trunks. In vain other columns, and even the Guides of Napoléon, his last reserve, advanced to the attack; they were all repulsed with dreadful loss. Among the killed in this last encounter was General Bon, and the wounded, Crôsier, aide-de-camp of the general-in-chief, and a large proportion of his staff (2). On this occasion, as in the assault on Schumla in 1808, it was proved that, in a personal struggle, the bayonet of the European is no match for the Turkish scimitar.

<sup>Napoléon at length retreats.</sup> Success being now hopeless, preparations were made for a retreat, after sixty days of open trenches; a proclamation was issued to the troops, announcing that their return was required to withstand a descent which was threatened from the island of Rhodes, and the fire from the trenches kept up with such vigour to the last moment, that the Turks were not aware of the preparations made for a retreat. Meanwhile, the baggage, sick, and field-artillery were silently defiling to the rear, the heavy cannon were buried in the sand, and, on the 20th May, Napoléon, for the first time in his life, ordered a retreat (3).

<sup>Joseph-Alexandre which this defeat from him.</sup> No event, down to the retreat from Moscow, so deeply affected Napoléon as the repulse at Acre. It had cost him 3000 of his bravest troops; slain or dead of their wounds; a still greater number were irrevocably mutilated, or had in them the seeds of the plague, contracted during the stay at Jaffa; and the illusion of his invincibility was dispelled. But these disasters, great as they were to an army situated as his was, were not the real cause of his chagrin. It was the destruction of his dreams of Oriental conquest which cut him to the heart. Standing on the mount which still bears the name of Richard Cœur-de-Lion, on the evening of the fatal assault when Lannes was wounded, he said to his secretary Bourrienne: "Yes, Bourrienne, that miserable fort has indeed cost me dear; but matters have gone too far not to make a last effort. If I succeed, as I trust I shall, I shall find in the town all the treasures of the Pacha, and arms for 300,000 men. I shall raise and arm all Syria, which at this moment unanimously prays for the success of the assault. I will march on Damascus and Aleppo; I will swell my army as I advance with the discontented in every country through which I pass; I

(1) Miot, 199.

(2) Dum. ii. 248. Jom. xl. 417. Th. x. 394.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1799, 33. Jom. x. 417. Dum. ii. Miot, 200.

217. Miot, 199, 200.

will announce to the people the breaking of their chains, and the abolition of the tyranny of the Pachas. Do you not see that the Druses wait only for the fall of Acre to declare themselves? Have I not been already offered the keys of Damascus? I have only lingered under these walls because at present I could derive no advantage from that great town. Acre taken, I will secure Egypt; on the side of Egypt cut off all succour from the Beys, and proclaim Desaix general-in-chief of that country. I will arrive at Constantinople with armed masses; overturn the empire of the Turks, and establish a new one in the East, which will fix my place with posterity; and perhaps I may return to Paris by Adrianople and Vienna, after having annihilated the House of Austria (1)." Boundless as these anticipations were, they were not the result merely of the enthusiasm of the moment, but were deliberately repeated by Napoléon, after the lapse of twenty years, on the rock of St.-Helena. "St.-Jean d'Acre once taken," said he, "the French army would have flown to Aleppo and Damascus; in the twinkling of an eye it would have been on the Euphrates; the Christians of Syria, the Druses, the Christians of Armenia would have joined it; the whole population of the East would have been agitated." Some one said, he would soon have been reinforced by a hundred thousand men; "Say rather six hundred thousand," replied Napoléon, "who can calculate what would have happened (2)? I would have reached Constantinople and the Indies; I would have changed the face of the world." Splendid as his situation afterwards was, he never ceased to regret the throne which he relinquished when he retired from Acre, and repeatedly said of Sir Sidney Smith, "That man made me miss my destiny (3)."

Disastrous  
retreat of  
the troops  
to Egypt.

The army occupied two days in the retreat to Jaffa, and remained there destroying the fortifications for three more. The field-artillery was embarked, in order to avoid the painful passage over the desert, but it all fell into the hands of Sir Sidney Smith, who followed the movements of the army, and harassed them incessantly with the light vessels of his squadron. All the horrors of war were accumulated on the troops and the inhabitants of the unhappy villages which lay on the line of the retreat. A devouring thirst, total want of water, a fatiguing march through burning sands, reduced the soldiers to despair, and shook the firmness even of the bravest officers. The seeds of the plague were in the army, and, independently of the number who were actually the victims of that dreadful

(1) Bour. ii. 243. 244.

(2) Las Cas. i. 384. Th. x. 392. D'Abr. iv. 208. 209.

(3) Napoléon, who had been hitherto accustomed to an uninterrupted career of victory, achieved frequently with inconsiderable means, did not evince the patience requisite for success in this siege; he began it with too slender resources, and wasted the lives of his brave soldiers in assaults, which, against Turkish and English troops, were little better than hopeless. Kléber, whose disposition was entirely different, and who shared in none of the ardour which led him to overlook or undervalue these obstacles, from the beginning predicted that the siege would fail, and loudly expressed, during its progress, his disapprobation of the slovenly, insufficient manner in which the works of the siege were advanced, and the dreadful butchery to which the soldiers were exposed in so many hopeless assaults. [Miot, 209.]

Though grievously mortified by this failure, the French general evinced no small dexterity in the art with which, in his proclamation to his troops, he veiled his defeat:—"Soldiers! You have traversed

the desert which separates Asia and Africa with the rapidity of the Arab horse. The army which was advancing to invade Egypt is destroyed; you have made prisoner its general, its baggage, its camp; you have captured all the forts which guard the wells of the desert; you have dispersed on the field of Mount Thabor the innumerable host which assembled from all parts of Asia to share in the pillage of Egypt. Finally, after having, with a handful of men, maintained the war for three months in the heart of Syria, taken forty pieces of cannon, fifty standards, and six thousand prisoners, razed the fortifications of Gaza, Jaffa, Calfa, and Acre, we are about to re-enter Egypt; the season of debarkation commands it. Yet a few days, and you would have taken the Pacha in the midst of his palace; but at this moment such a prize is not worth a few days' combat; the brave men who would have perished in it are essential for further operations. Soldiers! we have dangers and fatigues to encounter; after having disabled the forces of the East, for the remainder of the campaign we shall perhaps have to repel the attacks of a part of the West."—Miot, 204.

malady, the sick and wounded suffered under the unbounded apprehensions of all who approached them. The dying, laid down by the side of the road, exclaimed with a faltering voice, "I am not sick of the plague, but only wounded;" and to prove the truth of what they said, tore their bandages asunder, and let their wounds bleed afresh. The heavens were darkened during the day by the clouds which rose from the burning villages; the march of the columns was at night illuminated by the flames which followed their steps. On their right was the sea, on their left and rear the wilderness they had made; before them, the desert with all its horrors. In the general suffering, Napoléon set the example of disinterested self-denial; abandoning his horse, and that of all his equipage for the use of the sick, he marched himself at the head of the troops on foot, inspiring all around him with cheerfulness and resolution (1). At Jaffa he visited himself the plague hospital, inviting those who had sufficient strength to rise to raise themselves on their beds, and endeavour to get into the litters prepared for their use (2). He walked through the rooms, affected a careless air, striking his boot with his riding whip, in order to remove the apprehensions which had seized all the soldiers in regard to the contagious nature of the malady (3). Those who could not be removed, were; it is to be feared, poisoned by orders of the general; their numbers did not exceed sixty; and, as the Turks were within an hour's march of the place, their recovery hopeless, and a cruel death awaited them at the hands of those barbarians the moment they arrived, the painful act may perhaps be justified, not only on the ground of necessity but of humanity (4). Napoléon did not expressly admit the fact at St. Helena, but he reasoned in such a manner as plainly implied that it was true. He argued, and argued justly, that, in the circumstances in which he was placed, it could not be considered as a crime. "What man," said he, "would not have preferred immediate death to the horror of being exposed to lingering tortures on the part of these barbarians? If my own son, whom I love as well as any man can love his child, were in such a situation, my advice would be, that he should be treated in the same manner; and if I were so myself, I would implore that the same should be done to me (5)." While history, however, must acquit Napoléon of decided criminality in this matter, the more especially as the Turks murdered all the prisoners and sick who fell into their hands, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the British officers (6), it must record with admiration the answer of the French chief of the medical staff when the proposal was made by Napoléon to him, "My vocation is to prolong life, and not to extinguish it (7)."

(1) Burr. ii. 251, 252. Miot. 215. Dum ii. 219.

(2) Burr. ii. 257. Lea. Cas. viii. 221, 222.

(3) Savary, i. 105.

(4) Burr. ii. 252, 253. Miot, 205. Sir Robert Wilson, 172, Th. x. 393.

Sir Robert Wilson states the number of those poisoned, at 500; Miot says merely, "If we are to trust the reports of the army and the general rumour, which is often the organ of loud truth; which power it is hard to suppress, some of the wounded at Hospital Carmel, and a large part of the sick in the hospital of Jaffa, died of what was administered to them in the form of medicine."—See Wilson; 176; Miot, 205.

(5) Lea. Cas. i. 244. Burr. ii. 254. O'Meara. i. 329, 330.

(6) Ann. Mag. 1799. 33, 34.

(7) Lea. Cas. i. 244. Th. x. 393. O'Meara. i. 330. It is a curious fact, illustrative of the inconceivable effect of such seasons of horror on the human mind, that while the soldiers who were ill of the plague expressed the utmost horror at being left behind, and rose with difficulty from the bed of death to stagger a few steps after their departing comrades, their fate excited little or no commiseration in the more fortunate soldiers who had escaped the pestilence. "Who would not have supposed," says Miot, "that in such an extremity, the comrades of the unhappy sufferers would have done all they could to succour or relieve them. So far from it, they were the objects only of horror and derision. The soldiers avoided the sick as the pestilence with which they were afflicted, and burst into immoderate fits of laughter at the convulsive efforts which they made to rise. 'He has made up his accounts,' said one; 'He will not get on far,' said another; and when the poor wretch fell, for the last time, they exclaimed, 'His lodging is secured.' The ter-



After a painful march over the desert, in the course of which numbers of the sick and wounded perished from heat and suffering, the army reached El-Arish on the 1st June, and at length exchanged the privations and thirst of the desert for the riches and comforts of Egypt. During this march the thermometer rose to 53° of Reaumur, and when the globe of mercury was plunged in the sand, it stood at 48°, corresponding to 92° and 113° of Fahrenheit. The water to be met with in the desert was so salt, that numbers of horses expired shortly after drinking it; and, notwithstanding their frequent experience of the illusion, such was the deceitful appearance of the mirage, which constantly presented itself, that the men frequently rushed to the glassy streams and lakes, which vanished on their approach into air (1).

Though Egypt in general preserved its tranquillity during the absence of Napoléon, disturbances of a threatening character had taken place in the Delta. A chief in Lower Egypt, who had contrived to assemble together a number of Mamelukes and discontented characters, gave himself out for the angel El-Mody, and put to the sword the garrison of Damanhour; and it was not till two different divisions had been sent against him that the insurrection was suppressed, and its leader killed. Meanwhile Desaix, pursuing with indefatigable activity his gallant opponent, had followed the course of the Nile as far as Sleim, the extreme limit of the Roman empire, where he learned that Mourad Bey had ascended beyond the Cataracts, and retired altogether into Nubia. A bloody skirmish afterwards took place near Thebes, between a body of French cavalry and a party of Mamelukes; and Mahommed-Elgi, one of the most enterprising of their officers, sustained so severe a defeat at Souhama, on the banks of the Nile, that out of twelve hundred horse, only a hundred and fifty escaped into the Great Oasis in the desert. This success was counterbalanced by the destruction of the flotilla on the Nile, containing the wounded and ammunition of Desaix's division; and which, when on the point of being taken by the Arabs, was blown up by the officer commanding it. At length Davoust gave a final blow to the incursions of the Arabs by the defeat of a large body at Benyhady, when above two thousand men were slain. After this disaster, Upper Egypt was thoroughly subdued, and the French division took up its cantonments in the villages which formed the southern limits of the Roman empire (2). Such was the wisdom and equity of Desaix's administration in those distant provinces, that it procured for him the appellation of "Sultan the Just (3)."

Napoléon, ever anxious to conceal his reverses, made a sort of triumphal

rible truth must be told; in such a crisis, indifference and egotism are the ruling sentiments of the army; and if you would be well with your comrades you must never need their assistance, and remain in good health." The same facts were most conspicuous during the Russian retreat, and in the Spanish war.—See *Mior*, 220.

(1) *Bour.* ii. 265 *Savary*, i. 56.

(2) *Jom.* xi. 420, 423, 428 *Dum.* ii. 226, 227.

*Tb.* ix. 393.

(3) *Sav.* i. 96.

Perhaps the private correspondence of few conquerors would bear the light: but unhappily the confidential letters and orders of Napoléon at this period, bear evidence of too much and unnecessary cruelty. On the 28th June, 1799, he wrote to General Dugua:—"You will cause to be shot, citizen-general, Joseph, a native of Cherkent, near the Black

Sea, and Selim, a native of Constantinople, both prisoners in the citadel." On the 12th July:—"You will cause to be shot, Hassan, Jousset, Ibrahim, Saleh, Mahomet Bekir, Hadj Saleh, Mustapha Mahomet, all Mamelukes." And on 13th July:—"You will cause to be shot, Lachin and Emir Mahomet, Mamelukes." What crimes these persons had been guilty of towards the French army, does not appear; but from the circumstance of their execution being intimated to the French officers, and not to the civil authorities of the country, there seems no reason to believe that they had done any thing further than taken a share in the effort to liberate their country from the yoke of the French; an attempt which, however much it might authorize measures of hostility in the field, could never justify executions in prison without trial, in cold blood.—*Corresp. Confid. de Nap.* vi. 374, 393, 394.



entry upon his return into Cairo, and published a deceitful proclamation, in which he boasted of having conquered in all his engagements, and ruined the fortifications of the Pacha of Acre. In truth, though he had failed in the principal object of his expedition, he had effectually prevented an invasion from the side of Syria by the terror which his arms had inspired, and the desolation which he had occasioned on the frontiers of the desert; and he had abundant reason to pride himself upon the vast achievements of the inconsiderable body of men whom he led to these hazardous exploits (1).

Great discontent in the army. The discontent of the army increased to the highest degree after the disastrous issue of the Syrian expedition. They did not arise from apprehensions of danger, but the desire to return home, which tormented their minds the farther that it seemed removed from the bounds of probability. Every day some generals or officers demanded, under various pretexts, leave of absence to return to Europe, which was always granted, though with such cutting expressions as rendered the concession the object of dread to every honourable mind. Berthier himself, consumed by a romantic passion for a lady at Paris, twice solicited and obtained his dismissal, and twice relinquished the project, from a sense of honourable shame at abandoning his benefactor. With Kléber the general-in-chief had several warm altercations, and to such a height did the dissatisfaction rise, that the whole army, soldiers and officers, for a time entertained the design of marching from Cairo to Alexandria, to await the first opportunity of returning home; a project which the great personal ascendant of Napoléon alone prevented them from carrying into effect (2).

Landing of the Turks at Aboukir. Influenced by an ardent desire to visit the indestructible monuments of ancient grandeur at Thebes, Napoléon was on the point of setting out for Upper Egypt, when a courier from Marmont, governor of Alexandria, announced the disembarkation of a large body of Turks in Aboukir bay. They had appeared there on the 10th July, and landed, under the protection of the British navy, on the following day. This intelligence was received by him on the evening of the 13th at Cairo; he sat up all night, dictating orders for the direction of all the divisions of his army, and on the 16th, at four in the morning, he was on horseback, and all his troops in full march. On the 23d he arrived at Alexandria with the divisions of Murat, Canclès, and Bon, where he joined the garrison under Marmont, which had not ventured to leave its intrenchments in presence of such formidable enemies. The division of Desaix was at the same time ordered to fall back to Cairo from Upper Egypt, so that, if necessary, the whole French force might be brought to the menaced point. Mourad Bey, in concert with the Turks at Aboukir, descended from Upper Egypt with three thousand horse, intending to cut his way across to the forces which had landed at

(1) *Th. x. 204. Bour. ii. 266; 267.*

(2) *Th. x. 304, 306. Bour. ii. 298, 303.*

It deserves notice, as an indication of the total change of Napoleon and the French army for the Christian religion, that all his proclamations and addresses to the powers or people of Egypt, of the date of this period, set out with the words:—"In the name of the merciful God; there is but one God, and Mahomet is his prophet."—See *Letters to Sultan* *Burck. 30th June, 1799; and 27th July, 1799; to the Scheyk of Mecca, 30th June, 1799; Proclamation to the People of Egypt, 17th July, 1799; and to the Sultan of Morocco and Tripoli, 16th August, 1799.*—See *Corresp. Confid. de Nap. v. 377, 391, 402, 436.* "After all," said he, at St. Helena, "it is by

no means impossible that circumstances might have induced me to embrace Islamism; but I would not have done so till I came to the Euphrates. Henry IV said truly, Paris is worth a mass. Do you think the empire of the East, possibly the subjugation of all Asia, was not worth a turban and trowsers, for, after all, the matter comes to that? The army would undoubtedly have joined in it, and would only have made a joke of its conversion. Consider the consequences; I would have taken Europe in rear; its old institutions would have been beset on all sides; and who, after that, would have thought of interrupting the destinies of France, or the regeneration of the age?"—*Las Casas, iii. 91.*

July 14. Aboukir; but he was met and encountered near the Lake Natron by Murat, at the head of a body of cavalry, and after a severe action obliged to retrace his steps, and take refuge in the desert (1).

**Force of the Invaders.** The army, which landed at Aboukir nine thousand strong, consisting of the forces which had arrived at the close of the siege at Acre from Rhodes and had been transported thence to the mouth of the Nile by Sir Sidney Smith's squadron, though almost destitute of cavalry, was much more formidable than any which the French troops had yet encountered in the East. It was composed, not of the miserable Fellahs who constituted the sole infantry of the Mamelukes, but of intrepid Janizaries, admirably equipped and well disciplined, accustomed to discharge their firelock and throw themselves on the enemy with a sabre in one hand and a pistol in the other. The artillery of those troops was numerous and well served; they were supported by the British squadron; and they had recently made themselves masters of the fort of Aboukir, after putting its garrison of three hundred men to the sword. This fort was situated at the neck of an isthmus of sand, on which the Turkish forces were disembarked; the peninsula there is not above four hundred toises in breadth; so that the possession of it gave them a secure place of retreat in case of disaster. It was the more necessary to get quit of this army, as there was reason to expect, that a new host of invaders would ere long make their appearance on the side of Syria (2).

**Position which the Turks occupied.** Napoléon arrived within sight of the peninsula of Aboukir on the 25th July, and, though his force did not exceed eight thousand men, including Kléber's division; which had just arrived and was in reserve, he no sooner saw the dispositions of the enemy, than he resolved to make an immediate attack. The Turks occupied the peninsula, and had covered the approach to it with two lines of intrenchments. The first, which ran across the neck of land, about a mile in front of the village of Aboukir, from the lake Maadieh to the sea; extended between two mounts of sand, each of which was strongly occupied and covered with artillery, and was supported in the centre by a village, which was garrisoned by two thousand men. The second, a mile in the rear, was strengthened in the centre by the fort constructed by the French, and terminated at one extremity in the sea (3), at the other in the lake. Between the two lines was placed the camp. The first line was guarded by four thousand men, the latter by five thousand, and supported by twelve pieces of cannon, besides those mounted on the fort (4).

**Napoléon's dispositions for an attack. First line carried.** The dispositions of the general were speedily made. Lannes, with two thousand men, attacked the right of the first line; D'Estaing, with the like force, the left; while Murat, whose cavalry was arranged in three divisions, was destined at once to pierce the centre and turn both wings, so as to cut off all communication with the reserve in the second intrenchment. These measures were speedily crowned with success. The Turks maintained their ground on the height on the left, till they saw it turned by Murat's cavalry; but the moment that was done they fled in

(1) Nap. ii. 323. Bour. 364.

(2) Th. x. 397. Dum. ii. 227. Nap. ii. 326, 328. Wilson's Egypt, 29.

(3) Jom. xii. 295, 296. Th. xi. 329. Nap. ii. 331, 332. Dum. ii. 232.

(4) So strongly was the mind of Napoléon already impressed by the great destinies to which he conceived himself called, that when he arrived in sight of these intrenchments, he said to Murat.—“This

battle will decide the fate of the world.”—“Get that of this army,” replied the other; “but you should feel confidence from the circumstance, that all the soldiers feel they must now conquer or die. The enemy have no cavalry; ours is brave; and be assured, if ever infantry were charged to the teeth by cavalry, the Turks shall be to-morrow, by mine”—Mior, 240.

confusion to the second line, and being charged in their flight by the French horse, rushed tumultuously into the water, where almost the whole were either drowned or cut down by grape-shot. The same thing occurred at the other extremity of the line. Lannes attacked the height on the right, while the other division of Murat's cavalry turned it. The Turks fled at the first onset, and were driven by Murat into the sea. Lannes and D'Estaing, now united, attacked the village in the centre. The Janizaries defended themselves bravely, calculating on being supported from the second line; but the column, detached for that purpose from the fort of Aboukir having been charged in the interval between the two lines, and routed by Murat, the village was at length carried with the bayonet, and its defenders, who refused all quarter, put to the sword, or drowned in the water (1).

Second line also forced, after a desperate struggle. The extraordinary success of this first attack inspired Napoléon with the hope, that by repeating the same manœuvre with the second, the whole remainder of the army might be destroyed. For this purpose, after allowing a few hours' repose to the troops, and establishing a battery to protect their operations, he commenced a new attack upon the interior and more formidable line of defence. On the right a trench joined the fort of Aboukir to the sea; but on the left it was not carried quite so far, leaving a small open space between the intrenchment and the lake Maadieh. Napoléon's dispositions were made accordingly. On the right D'Estaing was to attack the intrenchment, while the principal effort was directed against the left, where the whole cavalry, marching under cover of Lannes' division, were to enter at the open space, between the trenches and the lake, and take the line in rear. At three o'clock the charge was beat, and the troops advanced to the attack. D'Estaing led his men gallantly forward, arranged in echelon of battalions; but the Turks, transported by their ardour, advanced out of their intrenchments to meet them, and a bloody conflict took place in the plain. In vain the Janizaries, after discharging their fusils and pistols, rushed to the attack with their formidable sabres in the air; their desperate valour at length yielded to the steady pressure of the European bayonet, and they were borne back, struggling every inch of ground, to the foot of the intrenchments. Here, however, the plunging fire of the redoubt, and the sustained discharge of musketry from the top of the works, arrested the French soldiers; ~~Lannes~~ was killed, Fuguries wounded, and the column, in disorder, recoiled from the field of carnage towards the exterior line. Nor was Murat more successful on his side. Lannes indeed forced the intrenchments towards the extremity of the lake, and occupied some of the houses in the village; but when the cavalry attempted to pass the narrow defile between the works and the lake, they were assailed by such a terrible fire from the gunboats, that they were repeatedly forced to retire. The attack had failed at both extremities, and Napoléon was doubtful whether he should continue the combat, or rest contented with the advantage already gained (2).

Total destruction of the Turks. From this perplexity he was relieved by the imprudent conduct of the Turks themselves. No sooner did they see the column which had assailed their right retire, than they rushed out of the fort of Aboukir, in the centre, and began to cut off the heads of the dead bodies which lay scattered over the plain. Napoléon instantly saw his advantage, and quickly

(1) Th. x. 400. Jom. xii. 298. Nap. ii. 334.

(2) Miot, 251. Jom. xii. 299, 300. Dum. ii. 234. Th. x. 402. Nap. ii. 335.

turned it to the best account. Advancing rapidly with his reserves in admirable order, he arrested the sortie of the centre, while Lannes returned to the attack of the intrenchments, now in a great measure denuded of their defenders, and d'Estaing re-formed his troops for another effort on the lips to the right. All these attacks proved successful; the whole line of redoubts, now almost destitute of troops, was captured, while several squadrons, in the confusion, penetrated through the narrow opening on the margin of the lake, and got into the rear of the second line. The Turks upon this fled in confusion towards the fort of Aboukir; but the cavalry of Murât, which now inundated the space between the second line and the fort, charged them so furiously in flank, that they were thrown into the sea, and almost all perished in the waves. Murat penetrated into the camp of Mustapha Pacha, where, with his own hand, he made that commander prisoner, and shut up the remnant of the army, amounting to about two thousand men, in the fort of 30th July. Aboukir. Heavy cannon were immediately planted against the fort, which surrendered a few days after. Five thousand corpses floated in the bay of Aboukir; two thousand had perished in the battle, and the like number were made prisoners of war in the fort. Hardly any escaped; a circumstance almost unexampled in modern warfare (1).

Napoléon is made acquainted with the disasters of the Republic in Europe.

The day after this extraordinary battle, Napoléon returned to Alexandria. He had ample subject for meditation. Sir Sidney Smith, having dispatched a flag of truce on shore to settle an exchange of prisoners, sent some files of English newspapers, which made him acquainted with the disasters experienced by the Directory in Europe, the conquest of Italy, the reverses in the Alps, the retreat to Zurich. At the same time he learned the capture of Corfu by the Russians and English, and the close blockade which promised soon to deliver over Malta to the same power. His resolution was instantly taken. He determined to return alone, braving the English fleets, to Europe. All prospects of great success in Egypt were at an end, and he now only wished to regain the scene of his early triumphs and primitive ambition in France. Orders were immediately given that two frigates, the *Muiron* and the *Carrera*, should be made ready for sea, and Napoléon, preserving the utmost secrecy as to his intended departure, proceeded to Cairo, where he drew up long and minute instructions for Kléber, to whom the command of the army was intrusted, and immediately returned to Alexandria (2).

22d Aug. He secretly sets sail for Europe from Alexandria.

On the 22d August he secretly set out from that town, accompanied by Berthier, Lannes, Murat, Marmont, Andreossy, Berthollet, Monge, and Bourrienne, and escorted only by a few of his faithful guides. The party embarked on a solitary part of the beach on board a few fishing boats, which conveyed them out to the frigates, which lay at a little distance from the shore. The joy which animated all these persons when they were told that they were to return to France, can hardly be conceived. Desirous to avoid a personal altercation with Kléber, whose rude and fearless demeanour led him to apprehend some painful sally of passion on receiving the intelligence, Napoléon communicated to him his resolution by letter, which he was aware could not reach Cairo till several days after his departure. Kléber afterwards expressed the highest indignation at that cir-

(1) Nap. ii. 336, 338. Th. x. 402, 403. Jom. xli. 300, 301. Dum. ii. 235, 237. Wilson's Egypt, 29.

(2) Jom. xli. 302. Th. x. 405. Bour. ii. 305. Dum. ii. 240.

circumstance, and in a long and impassioned report to the Directory, charged Napoleon with leaving the army in such a state of destitution, that the defence of the country for any length of time was impossible (1).

It was almost dark when the boats reached the frigates, and the distant lights of Alexandria were faintly descried by the glimmering of the stars on the verge of the horizon. How different from the pomp and circumstance of war which attended his arrival on the same shore,—in the midst of a splendid fleet, surrounded by a powerful army, with the visions of hope glittering before his eyes; and dreams of Oriental conquest captivating his imagination, Napoleon directed that the ships should steer along the coast of Africa, in order that, if escape from the English cruisers became impossible, he might land on the deserts of Lybia, and force his way to Tunis, Oran, or some other port, declaring that he would run any danger rather than return to Egypt.

He starts  
saw the  
sail of  
Africa. For three and twenty days they beat against adverse winds along the coast of Africa, and at length, after passing the site of Carthage, a favourable wind from the southeast enabled them to stretch across to the western side of Sardinia, still keeping near the shore, in order to run aground, if necessary, to avoid the approach of an enemy. The sombre disquietude of this voyage afforded the most striking contrast to the brilliant anticipations of the former. His favourite aides-de-camp were all killed; Caffarelli, Brueys, Casa-Bianca, were no more; the illusions of hope were dispelled, the visions of imagination extinguished; no more scientific conversations enlivened the weary hours of navigation, no more historical recollections gilded the headlands which they passed. One only apprehension occupied every mind, the dread of falling in with English cruisers; an object of rational disquietude to every one on board, but of mortal anxiety to Napoleon, from the destruction which it would occasion to the fresh ambitious projects which already filled his mind (2).

He lands at  
Ajaccio in  
Corsica. Contrary winds obliged the vessel which conveyed him to put into Ajaccio in Corsica, where he revisited, for the first time since his prodigious elevation, the house of his fathers and the scenes of his infancy. He there learned the result of the battle of Novi and the death of Joubert. This only increased the feverish anxiety of his mind; and he began to contemplate with horror the *ennui* of the quarantine at Toulon, where he proposed to land. His project at times was to make for Italy, take the command of the Italian army, and gain a victory, the intelligence of which he was with, and  
quitted the  
Lapin fleet. hoped would reach Paris as soon as that of his victory at Aboukir. At length, after a sojourn of eight days at the place of his nativity, he set sail with a fair wind. On the following evening, an English fleet of fourteen sail was descried in the midst of the rays of the setting sun. Admiral Gauthaume proposed to return to Corsica, but Napoleon replied, "No. Spread every sail; every man to his post; steer for the north-west." This order proved the salvation of the ships; the English saw the frigates, and made signals to them; but concluding, from the view they got with their glasses, that they were of Venetian construction, then at peace with Great Britain, they did not give chase. The night was spent in the utmost anxiety, during which Napoleon resolved, if escape was impossible, to throw himself into a boat, and trust for safety to his oars; but the morning sun dispelled these apprehensions, by disclosing the English fleet steering peaceably towards the north-east. All sail

(1) Bour. ii. 313, 314.

(2) Bour. iii. 5, 6, 7.



8th Oct.  
Lands in  
France.

was now spread for France; and at length, on the 8th October, the long-wished-for mountains of Provence appeared; and the frigates shortly after anchored in the bay of Frejus. The impatience and enthusiasm of the inhabitants when they heard of his arrival; knew no bounds; the sea was covered with boats eager to get a glimpse of the Conqueror of the East (†); the quarantine laws were, by common consent, disregarded; and Napoléon landed in a few hours, and set off the same day for Paris.

Proof which  
the Egyptian  
expedition  
affords of the  
superiority  
of civilized  
to savage  
arms.

The expedition to Egypt demonstrates one fact of more importance to mankind than the transitory conquests of civilized nations over each other. It can no longer be doubted, from the constant triumphs of a small body of European troops over the whole forces of the East, that the invention of fire-arms and artillery, the improvement of discipline, and the establishment of regular soldiers as a separate profession, have given the European a decided superiority over the other nations of the world. Europe, in the words of Gibbon, may now contemplate without apprehension an irruption of the Tartar horse; barbarous nations, to overcome the civilized, must cease to be barbarous. The progress of this superiority since the era of the Crusades, is extremely remarkable. On the same ground where the whole feudal array of France perished, under St.-Louis, from the arrows of the Egyptians, the Mameluke cavalry was dispersed by half the Italian army of the Republic; and ten thousand veterans could with ease have wrested that Holy-Land from the hordes of Asia, which Saladin successfully defended against the united forces of France and England under Richard Cœur-de-Lion. Civilisation, therefore, has given Europe a decided superiority over barbaric valour; if it is a second time overwhelmed by savage violence, it will not be because the means of resistance are wanting, but because the courage to wield them has decayed.

General reflections on  
the probable  
fate of an  
Eastern empire under  
Napoléon.

It is a curious speculation, what would have been the fate of Asia and the world if Napoléon had not been arrested at Acre by Sir Sidney Smith, and had accomplished his project of arming the Christian population of Syria and Asia Minor, against the Mussulman power. When it is recollected, that in the parts of the Ottoman empire where the Turkish population is most abundant, the number of Christians is in general triple that of their oppressors, there can be little doubt, that, headed by that great general, and disciplined by the French veterans, a force could have been formed which would have subverted the tottering fabric of the Turkish power, and possibly secured for its ruler a name as terrible as Genghis Khan or Tamerlane. But there seems no reason to believe that such a sudden apparition, how splendid soever, would have permanently altered the destinies of mankind, or that the Oriental empire of Napoléon would have been more lasting than that of Alexander or Nadir Shah. With the life of the hero who had formed, with the energy of the veterans who had cemented it, the vast dominion would have perished. The Crusades, though supported for above a century by the incessant tide of European enthusiasm, were unable to form a lasting establishment in Asia. It is in a different region, from the arms of another power, that we are to look for the permanent subjugation of the Asiatic powers, and the final establishment of the Christian religion in the regions from which it sprung. The north is the quarter from whence all the great settlements of mankind have come, and by its inhabitants all the lasting

(†) Th. x. 430, 431. Boar, iii. 12, 16, 20.



conquests of history have been effected. Napoléon indirectly paved the way for a permanent revolution in the East; but it was destined to be accomplished, not by the capture of Acre, but the conflagration of Moscow. The recoil of his ambition to Europe, which the defeat in Syria occasioned, still further increased by mutual slaughter the warlike skill of the European states; and from the strife of civilisation at last has arisen that gigantic power which now overshadows the Asiatic empires, and is pouring down upon the corrupted regions of the East the energy of northern valour and the blessings of Christian civilisation.

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## CHAPTER XXVI.

FROM THE PEACE OF CAMPO FORMIO TO THE RENEWAL OF THE WAR.

OCTOBER 1797—MARCH 1799.

## ARGUMENT.

Views of the different Parties on the War—Fair opportunity afforded to France of pursuing a pacific System after the Treaty of Campo Formio—Limited Estimates for the year in Britain—Establishment of the Volunteer System in these Islands—Its great Effects—Finances of France—National Bankruptcy there—External Policy of the Directory—Attack upon Holland—Its situation since the French Conquest—Measures of the French Directory to Revolutionize that State—Tyrannical Acts of the Dutch Directory—Political State of Switzerland—Inequality of Political Rights in the different Cantons—Measures of the Discontented to bring on a Contest with the Swiss Diet—Powerful Impression which they produce in the Subject Cantons—First open Acts of Hostility by the French—This is all done under the direction of Napoléon—Consternation in consequence excited in Switzerland—The Aristocratic Party make some Concessions—Hostilities commence in the Pays de Vaud—Rebel conduct of the Mountaineers—Commencement of Hostilities in the Canton of Berne—Surrender of Soleure and Fribourg—Bloody Battle before Berne—Heroic Resolution of the Swiss, their dreadful Excesses after Defeat—Capture of Berne, its Treasure, and Arsenal—Enormous Contributions every where levied by the French—New Constitution of Switzerland—Generous efforts of the Mountaineers—Arguments by which they were roused by the Clergy—Aloys Reding—First Successes, and ultimate Disasters of the Peasants—Heroic Defence of the Schwytzers at Morgarten—Bloody Conflicts in the Valais—Oppressive conduct of the French to the Inhabitants—An Alliance offensive and defensive with France is forced upon Switzerland—Glorious resistance of Uri, Schwytz, and Unterwalden—Cruel Massacre by the French—The Grisons invoke the aid of Austria, which occupies their country—Extreme Impolicy, as well as Iniquity of this attack on Switzerland—Great Indignation excited by it in Europe—Attack on the Papal States—Miserable Situation of the Pope—Measures of Napoléon, and the French Government, to hasten the catastrophe of the Papal Government—Duphot is slain in a Scuffle at the French Ambassador's—War is in consequence declared by France against Rome—Berthier advances to Rome—Revolution there—Atrocious Cruelty of the Republicans to the Pope—Their continued Severity towards him—He is removed into France, and there dies—Systematic and Abominable Pillage of Rome by the Republicans—Confiscation of the Church Property in the whole Papal territories—These disorders excite even the Indignation of the French Army—Great Mourning at Rome and Mantua—Revolt of the Roman Populace—Its bloody Suppression—The whole Papal States are Revolutionized—New Constitution and Alliance with France—Violent changes effected by the French in the Cisalpine Republic—Excessive Discontent excited by these changes in Lombardy—The Spoliation of the King of Sardinia is resolved on—Cruel Humiliations to which he had previously been subjected—The King is reduced to the condition of a prisoner in his own capital—He is at length forced to Abdicate, and retire to Sardinia—Affairs of Naples—Their Military Preparations—The Court enter into Secret Engagements with Austria—and are encouraged to Resist by the Battle of the Nile—On Nelson's arrival at Naples, Hostilities are rashly resolved on—Forces levied by the French in the affiliated Republics—Mack takes the Command at Naples—Dispersed Situation of the French Troops in the Roman States—The Neapolitans enter Rome—They are every where Defeated when advancing further—Fresh Disasters of the Neapolitans—Retreat of Mack—The Neapolitan Court take Refuge on board the English Fleet—Championnet resolves to invade Naples—His Plan of Operations—And surprising Success—Critical Situation of the French Army in front of Capua—Mack proposes an Armistice, which is gladly accepted—Indignation which it excites among the Neapolitan Populace—Advance of the French against Naples—Desperate Resistance of the Lazzaroni—Frightful Combats around the Capital—The French force the Gates and Ports—Bloody Conflicts in the Streets—Establishment of the Parthenopian Republic—State of Ireland—Reflections on the Melancholy History of that Country—Original Evil arising from Confiscation of Land—Peculiar Causes which

have aggravated this evil in that Country—Its inhabitants are as yet unfit for Free Privileges—Intimate Union formed by the Irish Malecontents with France—Revolutionary Organization established throughout the whole Country—Combination of Orangemen to uphold the British Connexion—Treaty of Irish Rebels with France—The Insurrection at length breaks out—Various Actions with the Insurgents—They are totally Defeated at Vinegar Hill—Imminent Danger from which England then escaped—Nugatory Efforts of the Directory to revive the Insurrection—Maritime Affairs of the Year—Disputes of France with the United States—Shameful Rapacity of the French Government—Contributions levied on the Hanse Towns by the Directory—Retrospect of the late Encroachments of France—Their System rendered the continuance of Peace impossible—Leads to a general Feeling in favour of a Confederacy, in which Russia joins—Tumult at Vienna, and insult to the French Ambassador—Who leaves the Austrian Capital—Progress of the Negotiation at Rastadt—The Secret Understanding between France and Austria is made manifest—Financial Measures of the Directory to meet the approaching Hostilities—Adoption of the law of the Conscription by the Legislature—Reflections on this Event.

The two great parties into which the civilized world had been divided by the French Revolution, entertained different sentiments in regard to the necessity of the war which had so long been waged by the aristocratic monarchies against its unruly authority. The partisans of democracy alleged that the whole misfortunes of Europe, and all the crimes of France, had arisen from the iniquitous coalition of kings to overturn its infant freedom; that if its government had been let alone, it would neither have stained its hands with innocent blood at home, nor pursued plans of aggrandisement abroad; and that the Republic, relieved from the pressure of external danger, and no longer roused by the call of patriotic duty, would have quietly turned its swords into pruning-hooks, and, renouncing the allurements of foreign conquest, thought only of promoting the internal felicity of its citizens. The aristocratic party, on the other hand, maintained that democracy is in its very essence and from necessity ambitious; that the turbulent activity which it calls forth, the energetic courage which it awakens, the latent talent which it developes, can find vent only in the enterprise of foreign warfare; that being founded on popular passion, and supported by the most vehement and enthusiastic classes in the state, it is driven into external aggression as the only means of allaying internal discontent; that it advances before a devouring flame, which, the instant it stops, threatens to consume itself; and that, in the domestic suffering which it engenders, and the stoppage of pacific industry which necessarily results from its convulsions, is to be found both a more cogent inducement to foreign conquest, and more formidable means for carrying it on, than either the ambition of kings or the rivalry of their ministers.

Had the revolutionary war continued without interruption from its commencement in 1792 till its conclusion in 1815, it might have been difficult to have determined which of these opinions was the better founded. The ideas of men would probably have been divided upon them till the end of time; and to whichever side the philosophic observer of human events, who traced the history of democratic societies in time past, had inclined, the great body of mankind, who judge merely from the event, would have leaned to the one or the other, according as their interests or their affections led them to espouse the conservative or the innovating order of things.

It is fortunate, therefore, for the cause of historic truth, and the lessons to be drawn from past calamity in future times, that two years of Continental peace followed the first six years of this bloody contest, and that the Republican government, relieved of all grounds of apprehension from foreign

Pair opportunity afforded to France of pursuing a pacific system after the peace of Campo-Formio.

powers, and placed with uncontrolled authority at the head of the vast population of France, had so fair an opportunity presented of carrying into effect its alleged pacific inclinations. The coalition was broken down and destroyed; Spain had not only given up the contest, but had engaged in a disastrous maritime war to support the interests of the revolutionary state; Flanders was incorporated with its territory, which had no boundaries but the Alps, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees; Holland was converted into an affiliated republic; Piedmont was crushed; Lombardy revolutionized, and its frontier secured by Mantua and the fortified line of the Adige; the Italian powers were overawed, and had purchased peace by the most disgraceful submissions, and the Emperor himself had retired from the strife, and gained the temporary safety of his capital by the cession of a large portion of his dominions. Great Britain alone, firm and unsubdued, continued the war, but without either any definite military object, now that the Continent was pacified, or the means of shaking the military supremacy which the arms of France had there acquired, and rather from the determination of the Directory to break off the recent negotiations, than any inclination on the part of the English government to prolong, at an enormous expense, an apparently hopeless contest. To complete the means of restoring a lasting peace which were at the disposal of the French cabinet, the military spirit had signally declined with the vast consumption of human life in the rural departments during the war; the armies were every where weakened by desertion; and the most ambitious general of the Republic, with its finest army, was engaged in a doubtful contest in Africa, without any means, to all appearance, of ever returning with his troops to the scene of European ambition (1). Now, therefore, was the time when the pacific tendency of the revolutionary system was to be put to the test, and it was to be demonstrated, by actual experiment, whether its existence was consistent with the independence of the adjoining states.

Limited estimates for the year in Britain.

The estimates and preparations of Great Britain for the year 1798 were suited to the defensive nature of the war in which she was now to be engaged, the cessation of all foreign subsidies, and the approach of an apparently interminable struggle to her own shores. The regular soldiers were fixed at one hundred and nine thousand men, besides sixty-three thousand militia; a force amply sufficient to ensure the safety of her extensive dominions, considering the great protection she received from her innumerable fleets which guarded the seas. One hundred and four ships of the line, and three hundred frigates and smaller vessels, were put in commission, manned by one hundred thousand seamen. Supplies to the amount of L. 25,500,000 were voted, which, with a supplementary budget brought forward on 25th April, 1798, in consequence of the expenses occasioned by the threatened invasion from France, amounted to L. 28,450,000; exclusive, of course, of the charges of the debt and sinking fund (2).

But in providing for these great expenses, Mr. Pitt unfolded an important change in his financial policy, and made the first step towards a system of taxation, which, although more burdensome at the moment, is incomparably less oppressive in the end than that on which he had previously proceeded. He stated, that the time had now arrived when the policy hitherto pursued, of providing for all extraordinary expenses by loan, could not be carried further without evident danger to public credit; that such a system, however

(1) *Jom. x. 264.*

(2) *Ann. Reg. 1798. 181.*

applicable to a period when an extraordinary and forced effort was to be made to bring the war at once to a conclusion by means of foreign alliances, was unsuitable to the lengthened single-handed contest in which the nation was at last, to all appearance, engaged; that the great object now should be, to make the sum raised within the year as nearly as possible equal its expenditure, so as to entail no burden upon posterity; and therefore he proposed, instead of making the loan, as in former years, L.19,000,000, to make it only L.12,000,000, and raise the additional L.7,000,000 by means of trebling the assessed taxes on house-windows, carriages, and horses. By this means an addition of only L.8,000,000 would be made to the national debt, because L.4,000,000 would be paid off in the course of the year by the sinking fund; and, to pay off this L.8,000,000, he proposed to keep on the treble assessed taxes a year longer; so that, at the expiration of that short period, no part of the debt then contracted would remain a burden on the nation. An admirable plan, and a near approach to the only safe system of finance, that of making the taxes raised within the year equal its expenditure, but which was speedily abandoned amidst the necessities and improvidence of succeeding years (1).

The same period gave birth to another great change in the military policy of Great Britain, fraught in its ultimate results with most important effects, both upon the turn of the public mind, and the final issue of the war. This was the *Volunteer System*, and the general arming of the people.

Establishment of the Volunteer System in Great Britain. During the uncertainty which prevailed as to the destination of the great armaments preparing both in the harbours of the Channel and the Mediterranean, the British government naturally felt the greatest anxiety as to the means of providing for the national defence, without incurring a ruinous expense by the augmentation of the regular army. The discipline of that force was admirable, and its courage unquestioned; but its numbers were limited, and it appeared highly desirable to provide some subsidiary body which might furnish supplies of men to fill the chasms which might be expected to occur in the troops of the line, in the event of a campaign taking place on the British shores. For this purpose the militia, which, in fact, was part of the regular force, was obviously insufficient; its officers were drawn from a class from whom the most effective military service was not to be expected; and under the pressure of the danger which was anticipated, government, with the cordial approbation of the King, ventured upon the bold, but, as it turned out, wise and fortunate step, of allowing regiments of volunteers to be raised in every part of the kingdom. On the 11th April it was determined by the cabinet to take this decisive step; and soon after a bill was brought into Parliament by the secretary at war, Mr. Dundas, to permit the regular militia to volunteer to go to Ireland, and to provide for the raising of volunteer corps in every part of the kingdom. The speech which he made on this occasion was worthy of an English minister. Not attempting to conceal the danger which menaced the country, he sought only to rouse the determined spirit which might resist it. "The truth," said he, "is undeniable, that the crisis which is approaching must determine whether we are any longer to be ranked as an independent

(1) *James, ii. No. 6, App. Ann. Reg. 1798, 182, 184-211. Parl. Deb. xxiii. 1042, 1066.*

Even in that very year it was, to a certain degree, broken in upon; the assessed taxes produced only L.4,500,000 instead of L.9,000,000, as was expected;

and the expenses having increased to L.3,000,000 beyond the estimates, the loan was augmented to L.15,000,000, exclusive of L.2,000,000 for Ireland, besides L.3,000,000 raised by means of exchequer bills.

nation. We must take the steps which are best calculated to meet it; let us provide for the safety of the infirm, the aged, the women, the children, and put arms into the hands of the people. We must fortify the menaced points; accumulate forces round the capital, affix on the churchdoors the names of those who have come forward as volunteers, and authorize members of Parliament to hold commissions in the army without vacating their seats. I am well aware of the danger of intrusting arms to the whole people without distinction. I am no stranger to the disaffection, albeit much diminished, which still lingers amongst us; I know well that, under the mask of pursuing only salutary reforms, many are still intent upon bringing about a revolution, and for that purpose are willing to enter into the closest correspondence with the avowed enemies of their country. But, serious as is the danger of entrusting arms to a people embracing a considerable portion of such characters, it is nothing to the risk which we should run, if, when invaded by the enemy, we were unprepared with any adequate means of defence. I trust to the good sense of the great body of the people to resist the factious designs of such enemies to their country. I trust that the patriotism by which the immense majority of them are animated, will preclude them from ever using their arms but for worthy purposes: I trust to the melancholy example which has been afforded in the neighbouring kingdom of the consequences of engaging in popular insurrection, for a warning to all Britons who shall take up arms, never to use them but in defence of their country, or the support of our venerable constitution." So obvious was the danger to national independence from the foreign invasion which was threatened, that the bill passed the House without opposition; and in a few weeks a hundred and fifty thousand volunteers were in arms in Great Britain. Mr. Sheridan, as he always did on such occasions, made a noble speech in support of Government. Another bill, which at the same time received the sanction of Parliament, authorized the King, in the event of an invasion, to call out the *levy en masse* of the population, conferred extraordinary powers upon lords-lieutenant and generals in command, for the seizure, on such a crisis, of horses and carriages, and provided for the indemnification, at the public expense, of such persons as might suffer in their properties in consequence of these measures (1). At the same time, to guard against the insidious system of French propagandism, the alien bill was re-enacted, and the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act continued for another year.

The adoption of these measures indicates an important era in the war: that in which popular energy was first appealed to, in order to combat the Revolution; and governments, resting on the stubborn evidence of facts, confidently called upon their subjects to join with them in resisting a power which threatened to be equally destructive to the cottage and the throne. It was a step worthy of England, the first-born of modern freedom, to put arms into the hands of her people, to take the lead in the great contest of general liberty against democratic tyranny; and the event proved that the confidence of government had not been misplaced. In no instance did the volunteer corps deviate from their duty, in none did they swerve from the principles of patriotism and loyalty which first brought them round the standard of their country. With the uniform which they put on, they cast off all the vacillating or ambiguous feelings of former years: with the arms which they received, they imbibed the firm resolution to defend the cause

(1) Parl. Hist. xxiii. 1358, 1423, 1429, 1454.



of England. Even in the great manufacturing towns, and the quarters where sedition had once been most prevalent, the volunteer corps formed so many centres of loyalty, which gradually expelled the former disaffection from their neighbourhood; and to nothing more than this well-timed and judicious step, was the subsequent unanimity of the British empire in the prosecution of the war to be ascribed. Had it been earlier adopted, it might have shaken the foundations of society, and engendered all the horrors of civil war; subsequently, it would probably have come too late to develop the military energy requisite for success in the contest. Nor were the effects of this great change confined only to the British isles; it extended to foreign nations and distant times; it gave the first example of that touching developement of patriotic ardour which afterwards burned so strongly in Spain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia; and in the British volunteers of 1798 was found the model of those dauntless bands by which, fifteen years afterwards, the resurrection of the Fatherland was accomplished.

While England was thus reaping the fruits, in the comparatively prosperous state of its finances and the united patriotism of its inhabitants, of the good faith and stability of its government, the French tasted, in a ruinous and disgraceful national bankruptcy, the natural consequences of undue democratic influence and revolutionary convulsions. When the new government, established by the Revolution of the 18th Fructidor, began to attend to the administration of the finances, they speedily found that, without some great change, and the sacrifice of a large class of existing interests, it was impossible to carry on the affairs of the state. The resources of assignats and mandates were exhausted, and nothing remained but to reduce the most helpless class, the public creditors, and by their ruin extricate the government from its embarrassments (1). As the income was calculated at the very highest possible rate, and the expenditure obviously within its probable amount, it was evident that some decisive measure was necessary to make the one square with the other. For this purpose, they at once struck off *two-thirds* of the debt, and thereby reduced its annual charge from 258 millions to 86 (2). To cover, indeed, the gross injustice of this proceeding, the public creditors received a paper, secured over the national domains, to the extent of the remaining two-thirds, calculated at twenty years' purchase: but it was at the time foreseen what immediately happened, that, from the total impossibility of these miserable fund-holders turning to any account the national domains which were thus tendered in payment of their claims, the paper fell to a tenth part of the value at which it was forced on their acceptance, and soon became altogether unsaleable; so that the measure was to all intents and purposes a public bankruptcy. Notwithstanding the enfeebled state of the legislature by the mutilations which followed the 18th Fructidor, this measure excited a warm opposition; but at length the revolutionary party prevailed, and it

(1) The most favourable view of the public revenue, and which in the end proved to be greatly overcharged, only exhibited an income of. . . . . 616,000,000 francs.

But the expenses of the war were

estimated at, . . . . .	283,000,000	} 788,000,000
Other services, . . . . .	247,000,000	
Interest of debt, . . . . .	258,000,000	

Annual deficit, . . . . . 172,000,000, or L. 7,000,000.

Being just about the same deficit which in 1789 was made the pretext to justify the Revolution.

(2) See ante, ch. xxiv,

passed both Councils by a large majority. Yet such had been the abject destitution of the fundholders for many years, in consequence of the unparalleled depreciation of the paper circulation in which they were paid, that this destruction of two-thirds of their capital, when accompanied by the payment of the interest of the remainder in specie, was felt rather as a relief than a misfortune. Such were the consequences, to the monied interest, of the Revolution which they had so strongly supported, and which they fondly imagined was to be an invincible rampart between them and national bankruptcy (1).

**External policy of the French Directory.** The external policy of the Directory soon evinced that passion for foreign conquest which is the unhappy characteristic of democratic states, especially in periods of unusual fervour, and forms the true vindication of the obstinate war which was maintained against them by the European monarchs. "The coalition," they contended, "was less formed against France than against the principles of the Revolution. Peace, it is true, is signed; but the hatred which the sovereigns have vowed against it, is not, on that account, the less active; and the chicanery which the Emperor and England oppose in the way of a general pacification, by showing that they are only waiting for an opportunity for a rupture, demonstrates the necessity of establishing a just equilibrium between the monarchical and the democratical states. Switzerland, that ancient asylum of liberty, now trampled under foot by an insolent aristocracy, cannot long maintain its present government without depriving France of a part of its resources, and of the support which it would have a right to expect in the event of the contest being renewed (2)." Thus the French nation, having thrown down the gauntlet to all Europe, felt, in the extremities to which they had already proceeded, a motive for still further aggressions and more insatiable conquests; obeying thus the moral law of nature, which, in nations as well as individuals, renders the career of guilt the certain instrument of its own punishment, by the subsequent and intolerant excesses into which it precipitates its votaries.

**Attack upon Holland.** Holland was the first victim of the Republican ambition. Not content with having revolutionized that ancient commonwealth, expelled the Stadtholder, and compelled its rulers to enter into a costly and ruinous war to support the interests of France, in which they had performed their engagements with exemplary fidelity, they resolved to subject its inhabitants to a convulsion of the same kind as that which had been terminated in France by the 18th Fructidor.

**Its situation since the French conquest.** Since their conquest by Pichegru, the Dutch had had ample opportunity to contrast the ancient and temperate government of the House of Orange, under which they had risen to an unexampled height of prosperity and glory, with the democratic rule which had been substituted in its stead. Their trade was ruined, their navy defeated, their flag swept from the ocean, and their numerous merchant vessels rotting in their harbours. A reaction, in consequence, had become very general in favour of the ancient order of things; and so strong and fervent was this feeling, that the National Assembly, which had met on the first triumph of the Republicans, had never ventured to interfere with the separate rights and privileges of the provinces, as settled by prescription and the old constitution. The French Directory beheld with secret disquietude this leaning

(1) *Dum.* 32, 35. *Th.* ix. 321, 322. *Jom.* x. 277.(2) *Jom.* x. 285. *Th.* x. 26.

to the ancient order of things, and could not endure that the old patrician families should, by their influence in the provincial diets, temper in any degree the vigour of their central democratic government. To arrest this tendency, they recalled their minister from the Hague: supplied his place by Delacroix, a man of noted democratic principles, and gave Joubert the command of the armed force. Their instructions were, to accomplish the overthrow of the ancient federative constitution, overturn the aristocracy, and vest the government in a Directory of democratic principles entirely devoted to the interests of France (1).

The Dutch Assembly was engaged at this juncture in the formation of a constitution, all previous attempts of that description having proved miserable failures. The adherents of the old institutions, who still formed a majority of the inhabitants, and embraced all the wealth and almost all the respectability of the United Provinces, had hitherto contrived to baffle the designs of the vehement and indefatigable minority, who, as in all similar contests, represented themselves as the only real representatives of the people, and stigmatized their opponents as a mere faction, obstinately opposed to every species of improvement. A majority of the Assembly had passed some decrees, which the democratic party strenuously resisted, and forty-three of its members, all of the most violent character, had protested against their adoption. It was to this minority that the French minister addressed himself to procure the overthrow of the constitution (2).

Measures of the French Directory to revolutionize the State. At a public dinner, Delacroix, after a number of popular toasts, exclaimed, with a glass in his hand, "Is there no Batavian who will plunge a poniard into the constitution, on the altar of his country?" Amidst the fumes of wine, and the riot of intoxication, the plan for its assassination was soon adopted; and its execution was fixed for the 22d January. On that night, the forty-three deputies who had signed the protest assembled at the Hotel of Haarlem, and ordered the arrest of twenty-two of the leading deputies of the Orange party and the six commissioners of foreign relations. At the same time the barriers were closed; the national guard called forth; and the French troops, headed by Joubert and Daendels, intrusted with the execution of the order. Resistance was fruitless; before daybreak those arrested were all in prison; and the remainder of the Assembly, early in the morning, met in the hall of their deliberations, where, surrounded by troops, and under the dictation of the bayonet, they passed decrees, sanctioning all that had been done in the night, and introducing a new form of government on the model of that already established in France (3).

By this constitution the privileges of the provinces were entirely abolished; the ancient federal union superseded by a republic, one and indivisible; the provincial authorities changed into functionaries emanating from the central government; a Council of Ancients and a Chamber of Deputies established, in imitation of those at Paris: and the executive authority confided to a Directory of five members all completely in the interest of France. The sitting was terminated by an oath of hatred to the Stadtholder, the federal system, and the aristocracy: and ten deputies, who refused to take it, were deprived of their seats on the spot. So completely was the whole done under the terror of the army, that some months afterwards, when the means of intimidation

(1) Th. x. 26, 27. Jom. x. 281. Ann. Reg. 1798, 49, 50, 78, 80.

(2) Th. x. 26. Jom. x. 124.

(3) Th. x. 27. Jom. x. 281, 282. Ann. Reg. 1798, 80.

were removed, a number of deputies who had joined in these acts of usurpation gave in their resignation, and protested against the part they had been compelled to take in the transaction (1).

Tyrannical  
acts of the  
new Direc-  
tory.

The inhabitants of Holland soon discovered that, in the pursuit of democratic power, they had lost all their ancient liberties. The first step of the new Directory was to issue a proclamation, strictly forbidding, under severe penalties, all petitions from corporate bodies or assemblages of men, and declaring that none would be received but from insulated individuals; thereby extinguishing the national voice in the only quarter where it could make itself heard in a serious manner. All the public functionaries were changed, and their situations filled by persons of the Jacobin party; numbers banished or proscribed; and, under the pretext of securing the public tranquillity, domiciliary visits and arrests multiplied in the most arbitrary manner. The individuals suspected of a leaning to the adverse party were every where deprived of their right of voting in the primary assemblies; and finally, to complete the destruction of all the privileges of the people, the sitting Assembly passed a decree, declaring itself the legislative body, thereby depriving the inhabitants of the election of their representatives. This flagrant usurpation excited the most violent discontents in the whole country, and the Directors soon became as obnoxious as they had formerly been agreeable to the populace. Alarmed at this state of matters, and apprehensive lest it should undermine their influence in Holland, the French Directory enjoined General Daendels to take military possession of the government. He accordingly put himself at the head of two companies May 4, 1798. of grenadiers, and proceeded to the palace of the Directory, where one member was seized, while two resigned, and the other two escaped. A provisional government was immediately formed, consisting of Daendels and two associates, all entirely in the interest of France, without the slightest regard to the wishes of, or any pretence even of authority from, the people. Thus was military despotism the result of revolutionary changes in Holland, as it had been in France, within a few years after they were first commenced amidst the general transports of the lower orders (2).

Political  
state of  
Switzer-  
land.

Switzerland was the next object of the ambition of the Directory. The seclusion of that beautiful country, its retirement from all political contests for above two centuries, the perfect neutrality which it had maintained between all the contending parties since the commencement of the Revolution, the indifference which it had evinced to the massacre of its citizens on the 10th August, could not save it from the devouring ambition of the Parisian enthusiasts. As little, it must be owned with regret, could the wisdom and stability of its institutions, the perfect protection which they afforded to persons and property, the simple character of its inhabitants, or the admirable prosperity which they had enjoyed for above five centuries under their influence, save a large proportion of them from the pernicious contagion of French democracy. The constitutions of the cantons were various. In some, as the Forest Cantons, highly democratical; in others, as in Berne, essentially aristocratic; but in all, the great objects of government, security to persons and property, freedom in life and religion, were attained, and the aspect of the population exhibited a degree of well-being unparalleled in any other part of the world. The traveller was never weary of admiring, on the sunny margin of the lake of Zurich, on the vine-clad hills

(1) Jom. x. 282. Th. x. 27. Ann. Reg. 1798, 81,

(2) Ann. Reg. 1798, 82, 85. Jom. xi. 14, 15.

of the Leman sea, in the smiling fields of Appenzel, in the romantic valleys of Berne, and the lovely recesses of Underwalden—the beautiful cottages, the property of their inhabitants, where industry had accumulated its fruits, and art had spread its elegancies, and virtue had diffused its contentment; and where, amidst the savage magnificence of nature, a nearer approach appeared to have been made to the simplicity of the golden age than in any other quarter of the civilized globe (1).

Of all the European governments, that of Switzerland was the one the weight of which was least felt by the people. Economy, justice, and moderation, were the bases of its administration, and the federal union by which the different cantons of which it was composed were held together, seemed to have no other object than to secure their common independence. Taxes were almost unknown, property was perfectly secure, and the expenses of government incredibly small (2). The military strength of the state consisted in the militia of the different cantons, which, though formidable, if united and led by chiefs well skilled in the difficult art of mountain warfare, was little qualified to maintain a protracted struggle with the vast forces which the neighbouring powers had now brought into the field.

Irregularity  
of political  
rights in the  
different  
Cantons.

The chief defect in the political constitution of the Helvetic Confederacy was, that with the usual jealousy of the possessors of political power, they had refused to admit the conquered provinces to a participation of the privileges which they themselves enjoyed, and thereby sown the seeds of future dissension and disaffection between the different parts of their dominion. In this way the Pays de Vaud was politically subject to the canton of Berne, the Italian bailiwicks to that of Uri, and some towns of Argovia and Thurgovia to other cantons; while the peasants of Zurich, in addition to the absence of political privileges, were galled by a monopoly in the sale of their produce, which was justly complained of as oppressive. Yet the moderation and justice of the government of the senate of Berne was admitted even by its bitterest enemies; the economy of their administration had enabled them, with extremely light burdens, not only to meet all the expenses of the state, but accumulate a large treasure for future emergencies; and the practical blessings of their rule were unequivocally demonstrated by the well-being of the peasantry and the density of the population,—features rarely found in unison, but which cannot coexist but under a paternal and beneficent system of administration (3).

The French  
revolve to  
excite one  
part of the  
inhabitants  
against the  
other.

The uniform system of the French revolutionary government, when they wished to make themselves masters of any country, was to excite a part of the population, by the prospect of the extension of political power, against the other; to awaken democratic ambition by the offer of fraternal support, and having thus distracted the state by intestine divisions, they soon found it an easy matter to triumph over both. The situation of the Swiss cantons, some of which held conquered provinces in subjection, and which varied extremely among each other, in the extent to which the elective franchise was diffused through the people, offered a favourable prospect of undermining the patriotism of the inhabitants, and accomplishing the subjection of the whole by the adoption of this insidious system. The treasure of Berne, of which report had magnified the amount, offered an irresistible bait to the cupidity of the French Directory; and whatever argu-

(1) Dum. i. 425, 428.

(2) Jom. x. 293, 294, 300.

(3) Hard. v. 277, Lac. xiv. 184. Jom. x. 295,



ments were adduced in favour of respecting the neutrality of that asylum of freedom, they were always met by the consideration of the immense relief which those accumulated savings of three centuries would afford to the finances of the Republic (1).

The first spark of the revolutionary flame had been lighted in Switzerland in 1791, when many sincere and enthusiastic men, among whom was Colonel La Harpe, formerly preceptor to the Emperor Alexander, contributed by their publications to the growth of democratic principles. The patricians of Berne were the especial object of their attacks, and numerous were the efforts made to induce the inhabitants of its territory to shake off the aristocratic yoke. But the success of their endeavours was for many years prevented by the catastrophe of 10th August, and the savage ferocity with which the Swiss guard were treated by the Parisian populace on that occasion, for no other crime than unshaken fidelity to their duty and their oaths. Barthélemy was sent to Berne as ambassador of France to counteract this tendency; and his efforts and address were not without success in allaying the general exasperation, and reviving those feelings of discontent which, in an especial manner, brooded among the inhabitants of the subject cantons. The government, however, persisted in a cautious system of neutrality; the wisest course which they could possibly have adopted, if supported by such a force as to cause it to be respected, but the most unfortunate when accompanied, as it was, by no military preparations to meet the coming danger (2).

The Swiss democrats formed a considerable party, formidable chiefly from their influence being concentrated in the great towns, where the powers of thought were more active, and the means of communication greater than in the rural districts. Zurich was the centre of their intrigues; and it was the great object of the revolutionists to counterbalance, by the influence of that city, the authority of Berne, at the head of which was Steiger, the chief magistrate of the confederacy. Ochs, grand tribune of Basle, a turbulent and ambitious demagogue, Pfefir, son of one of the chief magistrates of Lucerne, and Colonel Weiss at Berne, formed a secret committee, the object of which was, by all possible means, to bring about the downfall of the existing constitution, and the ascendancy of French influence in the whole confederacy. Their united efforts occasioned an explosion at Geneva in 1792, and threatened the liberties of all Switzerland; but the firmness of the government of Berne averted the danger; fourteen thousand militia speedily approached the menaced point; and the troops of the Convention retired before a nation determined to assert its independence (3).

Their measures to bring on a contest with the Swiss Diet.

The subjugation of Switzerland, however, continued a favourite object of French ambition; it had been resolved on by the Directory long before the treaty of Campo Formio. In July, 1797, their envoy Mengaud was dispatched to Berne to insist upon the dismissal of the English resident Wickham, and at the same time to set on foot intrigues, with the democratic party, similar to those which had proved so successful in effecting the overthrow of the Venetian republic. By the prudent resolution of the English government, who were desirous not to embroil the Swiss with their formidable neighbours, Wickham was withdrawn. Foiled in this attempt to involve the Swiss in a conflict, the Directory next ordered their troops on the frontier to take possession of that part of the territory of Basle

(1) Lac. xiv. 188.

(2) Hard. v. 277, 285.

(3) Hard. v. 282, 290.



which was subject to the jurisdiction of the cantons; but here too they were unsuccessful, for the Swiss government confined themselves to simple negotiations for so glaring a violation of existing treaties. But Napoléon, by his conduct in regard to the Valteline, struck a chord which soon vibrated with fatal effect throughout Switzerland, and, by rousing the spirit of democracy, prepared the subjugation of the country. This country, consisting of five bailiwicks, and containing one hundred and sixty thousand souls, extending from the source of the Adda to its junction with the lake of Como, had been conquered by the Grisons from the Dukes of Milan; Francis I guaranteed to them their enjoyment of it, and they had governed it with justice and moderation with a council of its own for three centuries. Napoléon, however, perceived in the situation of this sequestered valley the means of inserting the point of the wedge into the Helvetic confederacy. Its proximity to the Milanese territory, where the revolutionary spirit was then furiously raging, and the common language which they spoke, rendered it probable that they would rapidly imbibe the spirit of revolt against their German superiors; and, in order to sound their intentions, and foment the desire of independence, he, early in the summer 1797, sent his aide-de-camp Leclerc to their cottages. The result was, that the inhabitants of the Valteline openly claimed their independence, rose in insurrection, hoisted the tricolor flag, and expelled the Swiss authorities. Napoléon, chosen during the plenitude of his power at Montebello as mediator between the contending parties, pronounced, on 10th

Oct. 10, 1797. October, 1797, a decree which, instead of settling the disputed points between them, annexed the whole insurgent territory to the Cisalpine Republic, thereby bereaving the ancient allies of France, during a time of profound peace, of a territory to them of great value, which they had enjoyed for three hundred years. This decree was professedly based on the principle of still more general application. "That no one people should be subjected to another people (1).

Powerful effect which they produced in the subject cantons. This iniquitous proceeding, which openly encouraged every subject district in the Swiss confederacy to declare its independence, was not lost upon the Valais, the Pays de Vaud, and all the other dependencies of that Republic. To increase the ferment, a large body of troops, under General Ménard, was moved forward to the frontiers of that discontented province, and Napoléon, in his journey from Milan to Rastadt, took care to pass through those districts, and stop in those towns, where the democratic spirit was known to be most violent. At Lausanne he was surrounded by the most ardent of the revolutionary party, and openly proclaimed as the Restorer of their independence. A plan of operations was soon concerted with Ochs and La Harpe, the leaders of revolutionary projects in that country. It was agreed that a republic, one and indivisible, should be erected, as that was considered as more favourable to the interests of France than the present federal union; that the Directory should commence by taking possession of Bienne, L'Esquil, and Munsterthal, which were dependencies of

(1) Nap. iv. 196, 200, 202. Jom. x. 202, 262, 263. Ann. Reg. 1798, 22. Hard. v. 302, 307.

June 21, 1797. Napoléon at the same time dispatched an agent to negotiate with the republic of the Valais for a communication over the Simplon, through their territory, with the Cisalpine Republic. The Swiss government, however, had influence enough, by means of Barthélemy, who, at that period, was a member of the Directory, to obtain a negative on that attempt. The French general, upon

this, had recourse to the usual engine of revolution; he stirred up, by his secret emissaries, the lower Valaisans to revolt against the upper Valaisans, by whom they were held in subjection; and the inhabitants, assured of his support, and encouraged by the successful result of the revolt of the Valteline, declared their independence. [Corresp. Conf. June 21, 1797, and July 13, 1797. Hard. v. 205, 293.]

the bishopric of Basle : that all the Italian bailiwicks should be stimulated to follow the example of the Pays de Vaud in throwing off the yoke of the other cantons : that the French Republic should declare itself the protector of all the districts and individuals who were disposed to shake off the authority of the aristocratic cantons, and that Mengaud should encourage the formation of clubs, inundate the country with revolutionary writings, and promise speedy succours in men and money. At Berne, Napoléon asked a question of sinister import as to the *amount of its treasure* ; and though the senator, to whom it was addressed, prudently reduced its amount to 10,000,000 francs, or about L.400,000, this was sufficient to induce that ambitious man, who was intent on procuring funds for his Eastern expedition, to urge the Directory to prosecute their invasion of Switzerland (1).

**First open acts of hostility.** The first act of open hostility against the Helvetic league was the seizure of the country of Erguel by five battalions, drawn from the army of the Rhine, on the 15th December. This event, accompanied as it was by an alarming fermentation, and soon an open insurrection in the Pays de Vaud, produced the utmost consternation in Switzerland; and a diet assembled at Arau to deliberate concerning the public exigencies. This act of hostility was followed, two days after, by an intimation from Mengaud, the French envoy, "that the members of the governments of Dec. 17. Berne and Friburg should answer personally for the safety of the persons and property of such of the inhabitants of the Pays de Vaud as might address themselves to the French Republic to obtain the restitution of their rights." As the senate of Berne seemed resolved to defend their country, Mengaud, early in January, summoned them instantly to declare their intentions. At the same time, General Ménard crossed Savoy with ten thousand men, from the army of Italy, and established his headquarters at Ferney, Jan. 4, 1798. near Geneva; while Monnier, who commanded the troops in the Cisalpine Republic, advanced to the frontiers of the Italian bailiwicks, to support the expected insurrection in the southern side of the Alps. These threatening measures brought matters to a crisis in the Pays de Vaud; the standard of insurrection was openly hoisted, trees of liberty planted, the Swiss authorities expelled, and the *Leman Republic* solemnly recognised by the French Directory (2).

**This is all done under the direction of Napoléon.** These iniquitous measures against the Swiss confederacy were all adopted by the government, with the concurrence and by the advice of Napoléon. He was the great centre of correspondence with the malecontents of Helvetia; and by his council, assistance, and directions, kept alive that spirit of disaffection which ultimately proved fatal to the independence of the confederacy. In concert, at Paris, with La Harpe, Ochs, and the other leaders of the insurrection, he prepared a general plan of a revolt against the Swiss government. So little did the Directory deem it necessary to conceal either their own or his share in these intrigues, that they openly avowed it; and, in a journal published under their immediate superintendence, it was publicly declared that, with the assistance of Napoléon, they were engaged in a general plan for the remodelling the Helvetic constitution; and that they took under their especial protection the patriots of the Pays de Vaud, and all who were engaged in the great struggle

(1) Jom. x. 292, 298. Lac. xiv. 195. De Staël, ii. 209, Ann. Reg. 1798, 24, 25.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1798, 22, 23. Jom. x. 302. Lac. xiv. 195.

for equality of privileges and French fraternization throughout the whole confederacy (1).

(1) *Hard. v. 310, 311.*

In the *Ami des Lois*, a journal entirely under the direction of Barras, there appeared at this period the following article: "Several French travellers have been sent within these few days to Switzerland, with instructions to observe the singular variety in the Helvetic governments, their division into thirteen republics, and their distribution into sovereign and subject states. The same travellers are directed to consider the inconveniences likely to arise from the accumulation, so near the French frontiers, of the leaders of so many parties who have been vanquished in the different crises of the Revolution. They are authorized to declare that France is particularly the ally of all the conquered or subject people, and of all who are in a state of opposition to their governments, all of which are notoriously sold to England. They are directed, in an especial manner, to observe the situation of Geneva, which is eminently republican, and friendly to France. M. Talleyrand is much occupied with the political state of Switzerland; he has frequent conferences with General Bonaparte, Colonel La Harpe, and the Grand Tribune Ochs. The latter distinguished character, who is received at all the public fêtes on the same terms as the foreign ambassadors, is occupied, under the auspices of the Directory, and in concert with the persons whom they have appointed to share their labours, with a general remodelling of the ancient Helvetic constitution. In a word, a revolutionary explosion is hourly expected on the two extremities of Switzerland, in the Grisons and the Pays de Vaud."—*Ami des Lois*, Dec. 11, 1797.

The direction which Napoléon took of these intrigues is abundantly proved by his *Confidential Dec. 12. Correspondence.* On December 12, 1797, Ochs addressed the following note to that general:—"The material points to consider are, whether we are to continue the federal union which is so agreeable to Austria, or establish unity, the only means of rendering Switzerland the permanent ally of France. I perceive, with the highest satisfaction, that you agree with the Swiss patriots on this point. But the result of our conferences and correspondence is, that it is indispensable that we should have a convention, supported by a French *corps d'armée*, in the immediate neighbourhood. May I therefore be permitted to insinuate to my friends, in guarded phrases, that they will be supported? May I assure the patriots of Zurich, that the amnesty demanded will be extended to the inhabitants of Kaiffa, that France will make good its incontestable rights to the Val Montier, the Val d'Érguel, and the town of Bienne; that she will guarantee the liberties of the Pays de Vaud, and that the Italian bailiwicks may present petitions, and fraternize with the Cisalpine Republic? Basle revolutionized might propose to the Italian bailiwicks, the Pays de Vaud, and the other subject states, to send deputies to a national convention; if matters were only brought that length, there can be no doubt that the remainder of Switzerland would come into their measures. But it is indispensable that the agents of France should publish revolutionary writings, and declare every where that we take under your especial protection all who labour for the regeneration of their country. This declaration, however, may be made either publicly or confidentially; I shall be happy to prepare a sketch of such a confidential letter, if you prefer that method." [Corr. Conf. iv. 470, 472.]

19th Dec. It would appear that Napoléon had not at once replied to this letter; for, six days after-

wards, Ochs again wrote to him:—"I wrote to you on the 12th, and begged to know to which of the alternatives proposed in my letter the patriots are to look. Meanwhile, they are preparing, but I am much afraid they will do more harm than good; they will probably effect a half revolution only, which will be speedily overturned, and leave matters worse than before." [Ibid. iv. 474, 475.] 2d Dec.

On the 2d December, Bacher, the revolutionary agent for the Grisons, wrote to Napoléon:—"The explosion which we have so long expected has at length taken place; the chiefs and members of the Grey league have been deposed, and placed in confinement at Coire; the general assembly of the people has been convoked. Their first act has been to send a deputation to express to you, citizen general, the profound sense which the Congress entertain of your powerful mediation, and to give you all the information which you can desire." [Ibid. iv. 463.] On 21st December, Ochs wrote to Napoléon:—"My letters have at length informed me, that the French troops are in possession of the bishopric of Basle. I am transported with joy on the occasion; the last hour of the aristocracy appears to have struck. Listen to what one of your agents writes to me:—'Have only a little patience, and full justice will be done; war will be waged with the oligarchy and the aristocracy; government established in its primitive simplicity, universal equality will prevail, and then France will indeed live on terms of amity with its Swiss neighbours.'" [Corresp. Conf. iv. 476, 477.]

17th Feb. 1798. On the 17th February, 1798, the revolutionary deputies of the Pays de Vaud presented the following address to Napoléon:—"The deputies of the Pays de Vaud, whom the generous protection of the Directory has so powerfully aided, desire to lay their homage at your feet. They owe it the more, because it was your passage through their country which electrified the inhabitants, and was the precursor of the thunderbolt which has overwhelmed the oligarchy. The Helvetians swore, when they beheld the Liberator of Italy, to recover their rights." [Ibid. iv. 508.] Brune also corresponded with Napoléon throughout the whole campaign in Switzerland:—In one of his letters, 17th March. on 17th March, 1798, he says,—"I have studied your political conduct throughout your Italian campaign; I follow your labours to the best of my ability; according to your advice, I spare no methods of conciliation; but at the same time am fully prepared to act with force, and the genius of liberty has seconded my enterprises. I am, like you, surrounded by rascals; I am constantly paring their nails, and locking the public treasures from them." [Ibid. iv. 533.] Lastly, Napoléon no sooner heard of the invasion of the Pays de Vaud, than he wrote to the Directors of the Cisalpine Republic in these terms:—"The Pays de Vaud and the different cantons of Switzerland are animated with the same spirit of liberty; we know that the Italian bailiwicks share in the same disposition; but we deem it indispensable that at this moment they should declare their sentiments, and manifest a desire to be united to the Cisalpine Republic. We desire in consequence that you will avail yourselves of all the means in your power to spread in your neighbourhood the spirit of liberty; circulate liberal writings; and excite a movement which may accelerate the general revolution of Switzerland. We have given orders to General Monnier to approach the frontiers of the Italian bailiwicks with his troops, to support any movements of the insurgents; he has received orders to

Consternation in consequence excited in Switzerland. They make some concessions.

These violent steps, which threatened the whole confederacy with dissolution, excited the deepest alarm in the Swiss Diet, assembled at Arau. This was increased by a note addressed by Mengaud, which declared that, if the Austrians entered the Grisons, the French would immediately occupy the canton of Berne. The most violent debates, meantime, took place in the senate of that canton, as to the course which should be adopted. In order to appease the public discontents, they passed a decree by which the principal towns and districts in the canton were empowered to elect fifty deputies to sit in the legislature. This example was immediately followed by the cantons of Zurich, Friburg, Lucerne, Soleure, and Schaffhausen. But this measure met with the usual fate of all concessions yielded, under the influence of fear, to revolutionary ambition; it displayed weakness without evincing firmness, and encouraged audacity without awakening gratitude (1).

20th Jan. 1798.

Hostilities commence in the Pays de Vaud.

Convinced at length by the eloquence of Steiger, that resistance was the only course which remained, the Senate of Berne ordered the militia, twenty thousand strong, to be called out, and sent Colonel Weiss, with a small force, to take possession of Lausanne. But this officer had not troops sufficient to accomplish the object; the insurgents instantly invited General Ménard to enter the territory of the confederacy, and the French battalions quickly poured down from the Jura. Upon his approach, the revolution broke out at Lausanne, the Swiss were driven out, and Ménard, advancing, summoned Weiss instantly and entirely to evacuate the Pays de Vaud. Two soldiers of the escort of the flag of truce were killed; and although the Senate of Berne offered to deliver up the men who had committed this aggression, Ménard obstinately insisted upon construing it into a declaration of war, and established his head-quarters at Lausanne. Meanwhile Ochs and Mengaud, the leaders of the democratic party, succeeded in revolutionizing all the north of Switzerland, as far as the foot of the mountains; the territories of Zurich, Basle, and Argovie, quickly hoisted the tricolor flag, and convulsions took place in the Lower Valais, Friburg, Soleure, and St. Gall (2). To such a height of audacity did the insurgents arrive, that they hoisted that emblem of revolution at Arau, without the Diet being able to overawe them by their presence, or prevent them by their authority.

27th Jan.

Resolute conduct of the Senate of Berne.

Driven to desperation by these insurrections, the Senate of Berne tardily, but resolutely, resolved upon resistance. They intimated to the French government the concessions made to the popular party; but the Directory declared that nothing would be deemed satisfactory, unless the whole ancient constitution was overturned, and a provisional government of five revolutionists established in its stead. The Senate, finding their ruin resolved on, issued a proclamation calling on the shepherds of the Alps to defend their country; Steiger repaired in person to the army to put himself under the orders of Erlach, and the most energetic measures to repel the danger were adopted (3). A minority, unworthy of the name of Swiss, abdicated, and agreed to all the propositions of the French general; not intimidated by the terror of the Republican arms, but deluded by the contagion of its principles.

Desirous still, if possible, to avoid proceeding to extremities, the Senate

concert measures with you for the attainment of an object equally important to both Republics."—See *Hard. v. 330.*

(1) *Ann. Reg. 1798, 26. Jom. x. 304, 308. Th. x. 46.*

(2) *Jom. x. 305, 306. Lac. xiv. 200. Th. x. 47. 49. Ann. Reg. 1798, 26.*

(3) *Jom. x. 308. Lac. xiv. 201. Hard. v. 312. 319.*

addressed a note to the Directory, in which they complained of the irruption of their troops into the Pays de Vaud, and offered to disband their militia if the invaders were withdrawn. This drew forth from the enemy a full statement of their designs. No longer pretending to confine themselves to the support of the districts in a state of revolution, or the securing for them the privileges of citizens, they insisted on overturning the whole constitution of the country, forming twenty-two cantons instead of thirteen, and creating a Republic, one and indivisible, with a Directory, formed in all respects on the model of that of France (1); at the same time Mengaud published at Aran a declaration, that "all Swiss who should refuse to obey the commands, or follow the standards of the Senate of Berne, would be taken under the immediate protection of the French Republic."

Heroic conduct of the mountain-coys. Meanwhile the Oberland *en masse* flew to arms; the shepherds descended from their glaciers; every valley sent forth its little horde of men, and the accumulated streams, uniting like the torrents of the Alps, formed a body of nearly twenty thousand combatants on the frontiers of Berne. The small cantons followed the glorious example; Uri, Unterwalden, Schwytz, and Soleure, sent forth their contingents with alacrity; the inmost recesses of the Alps teemed with warlike activity, and the peasants joyfully set out from their cottages, not doubting that the triumphs of Morat, Laupen, and Granson, were about to be renewed in the holy war of independence. The women fanned the generous flame: they not only encouraged their husbands and brothers to swell the bands of their countrymen, but themselves in many instances joined the ranks, resolved to share in the perils and glories of the strife. Almost every where the inhabitants of the mountains remained faithful to their country, the citizens of towns and of the plains alone were deluded by the fanaticism of revolution (2).

Commencement of hostilities. General d'Erlach, who commanded the Swiss troops, had divided his army into three divisions, consisting of about seven thousand men each. The first, under General Andermatt, occupied the space between Friburg and the lake of Morat; the second, under Graffenried, was encamped between the town of Buren and the bridge over the river Thiels, the third, under Colonel Watteville, was in communication with the preceding, and covered Soleure. Had the Swiss army instantly attacked, they might possibly have overwhelmed the two divisions of the French troops, which were so far separated as to be incapable of supporting each other; the multitude of waverers in Switzerland would probably have been decided by such an event, to join the armies of their country, and thus the confederacy might have been enabled to maintain its ground till the distant armies of Austria advanced to its relief. But, from a dread of precipitating hostilities while yet accommodation was practicable, this opportunity, notwithstanding the most urgent representations of Steiger, was allowed to escape, and General Brune, who at this time replaced Ménard in the command, instantly concentrated his forces, and sent forward an envoy to Berne to propose terms of accommodation. By this artifice he both induced the enemy to relax their efforts, and gained time to complete his own preparations. The Senate meanwhile fluctuated between the enthusiasm of the peasantry to resist the enemy, and their apprehensions of engaging in such a contest. At length Brune, having com-

(1) Journ. x. 310. Hard. v. 343.

(2) De Staël, ii. 72. Lac. xiv. 202, 203. Journ. x. 310. Ann. Reg. 1798, 28. Hard. v. 321, 322.



pleted his preparations, declared that nothing would satisfy the Directory but the immediate disbanding of the whole army; upon which the Senate at length authorized d'Erlach to commence hostilities, and notice was sent to the French commander that the armistice would not be renewed (1).

Brune, however, resolved to anticipate the enemy. For this purpose, the  
 March 2. troops were moved, before day-break on the 2d March, towards Soleure and Friburg, where they had many partisans among the revolutionary classes. A battalion of Swiss, after a heroic resistance, was cut to pieces at the advanced posts; but the towns were far from imitating this gallant example. Soleure surrendered at the first summons, and Friburg, after a show of resistance, did the same. These great successes, gained evidently by concert with the party who distracted Switzerland, not only gave the invaders a secure bridge over the Aar, but by uncovering the right of the Swiss army, compelled the retreat of the whole. This retrograde movement, immediately following these treacherous surrenders, produced the most fatal effect; the peasants conceived they were betrayed, some disbanded and retired, boiling with rage, to their mountains, others mutinied and murdered their officers; nothing but the efforts of Steiger and d'Erlach brought any part of the troops back to their colours, and then it was discovered that half their number had disappeared during the confusion (2).

Bloody battle before Berne. While the Swiss troops at this critical moment were undergoing this ruinous diminution, the French were vigorously following up their successes. Before daybreak, on the 5th, a general attack was commenced on the Swiss position. General Pigeon, with fifteen thousand men, passed the Sarine, and, by a sudden assault, made himself master of the post of Neuenek, on the left of the army; but the Swiss, though only eight thousand strong, under Graffenried, having returned to the charge, after a desperate conflict, drove his veteran bands back, with the loss of eighteen pieces of cannon, and two thousand men, and, amidst loud shouts, regained the position they had occupied in the morning. But while fortune thus smiled on the arms of freedom on the left, a fatal disaster occurred on the right. After the fall of Soleure, the division of Schawenburg moved forward on the road to Berne, and, after an obstinate struggle, dislodged the Swiss advanced guard of four thousand men placed in the village of Frauenbrunne. After this success, he pushed on till his advance was arrested by the corps commanded by d'Erlach in person, seven thousand strong, posted, with his right resting on a ridge of rocks, and his left on marshes and woods. But the strength of this position, where formerly the Swiss had triumphed over the Sire of Coucy, proved inadequate to arrest the immense force which now assailed it. The great superiority of the French, who had no less than sixteen thousand veteran troops in the field, enabled them to scale the rocks and turn his right, while dense battalions, supported by a numerous artillery, pressed upon the centre and left. After a brave resistance, the Swiss were forced to retreat; in the course of it, they made a heroic stand at Granholz. The extraordinary

(1) Jom. x. 312, 315. Ann. Reg. 1798, 23, 28. Hard. v. 359, 375.

The ultimatum of the French general was in these terms:—"The government of Berne is to recall the troops which it has sent into the other cantons, and disband its militia. There shall forthwith be established a provisional government, differing in form and composition from the one which exists; within a month after the establishment of that provisional government, the primary

assemblies shall be convoked; the principle of political liberty and equality of rights assumed as the base of the new constitution, and declared the fundamental law of the confederacy; all persons detained for political offences shall be set at liberty. The Senate of Berne shall instantly resign its authority into the hands of the provisional government."—Hard. v. 375, 376.

(2) Jom. x. 317, 318. Lac. xiv. 203, 204. Ann. Reg. 1798, 29.



nature of the war here appeared in the strongest colours. The Swiss peasants, though defeated, faced about with the utmost resolution; old men, women, children, joined their ranks; the place of the dead and the wounded was instantly supplied by crowds of every age and sex, who rushed forward, with inextinguishable devotion, to the scene of danger. At length the numbers and discipline of the French prevailed over the undaunted resolution of their opponents; the motley crowd was borne backwards at the point of the bayonet to the heights in front of Berne. Here d'Erlach renewed the combat for the fifth time that day, and for a while arrested their progress; but the cannon and cavalry having thrown his undisciplined troops into confusion, they were driven into the town, and the cannon of the ramparts alone prevented the victors from following in their steps. The city capitulated the same night, and the troops dispersed in every direction (1).

Dreadful excesses of the Swiss after defeat. Deplorable excesses followed the dissolution of the Swiss army. The brave d'Erlach was massacred by the deluded soldiers at Muzingen, as he was endeavouring to reach the small cantons. Steiger after undergoing incredible hardships, escaped by the mountains of Oberland into Bavaria. Numbers of the bravest officers fell victims to the fury of the troops; and the democratic party, by spreading the belief that they had been betrayed by their leaders, occasioned the destruction of the few men who could have sustained the sinking fortunes of their country (2).

Capture of Berne, its treasures and arsenal. The French, immediately after their entrance into Berne, made themselves masters of its treasures, the chief incentive to the war. Its exact amount was never ascertained, but the most moderate estimate made it reach to 20,000,000 francs, or L.800,000 sterling. The arsenal, containing 300 pieces of cannon, and 40,000 muskets, the stores, the archives, all became the prey of the victors. The tree of liberty was planted, the democratic constitution promulgated, and a Directory appointed. Several senators put themselves to death at beholding the destruction of their country; many died of grief at the sight (3).

Enormous contributions levied by the French every where. The fall of Berne was soon followed by an explosion of the revolutionary volcano over great part of Switzerland. The people of Zurich and Lucerne rose in open insurrection; dispossessed the authorities; and hoisted the tricolor flag; the Lower Valaisans revolted against the Upper, and by the aid of the French, made themselves masters of the castellated cliffs of Sion. All the level parts of Switzerland almost joined the innovating party. They were not long in tasting the bitter fruits of such conduct. Enormous contributions, pillage of every sort, attended the steps of the French armies; even the altar of Notre-Dame-des-

(1) Jom. x. 319, 322. Ann. Reg. 1798, 30, 31. Lac. xiv. 205, 208. Th. x. 50.

During all these negotiations and combats with the Republic of Berne, Brune corresponded confidentially with, and took directions from, Napoléon. On the 8th February he wrote from Lausanne to him:—"Berne has made some flourishes before my arrival, but since that period it has been chiefly occupied with remodelling its constitution; anticipating thus the stroke which the Directory had prepared for it. To-morrow I shall advance to Morat, and from thence make you acquainted, my general, with our military and political situation." Three days afterwards he again wrote:—"The letter of citizen Mengaud, affixed to the coffee-houses of Berne, has awakened the oligarchs; their battalions are on foot; nothing less than the 12,000 men which you have demanded from the army of the

Rhine for this expedition can ensure its success. The presence of an armed force is indispensable.—*Corresp. Conf. de Nap.* iv. 511, 512; and *Hard.* v. 355, 356.

(2) Jom. x. 322. Lac. xiv. 208. Hard. v. 391.

(3) Jom. x. 322, 323. Lac. xiv. 209. Th. x. 51. Hard. v. 409.

Brune announced the capture of Berne to Napoléon in these terms:—"From the moment that I found myself in a situation to act, I assembled all my strength to strike like lightning; for Switzerland is a vast barrack, and I had every thing to fear from a war of posts: I avoided it by negotiations, which I knew were not sincere on the part of the Bernese, and since that I have followed the plan which I traced out to you. I think always that I am still under your command."—*Correspond.* iv. 531.

Hermites, the object of peculiar veneration, was despoiled; the generals received prodigious gifts out of the plunder (1); the troops were clothed at the expense of their democratic allies; and the scourge of commissaries, as in Belgium and Italy, following in the rear of the armies, exhibited, by the severity and enormity of their exactions, a painful contrast to the lenity and indulgence of their former government (2). The Swiss revolutionists were horrorstruck at these exactions, and all persons of respectable character, who had been misled by the fumes of democracy, saw that the independence of Switzerland was destroyed, threw up their employments in the service of the invaders (3), and lamented in silence the despotic yoke they had brought on their country (4).

April 12.  
New consti-  
tution of  
Switzerland.

A new constitution was speedily framed for the confederacy, formed on the basis of that established in France in 1793, and proclaimed at Arau on 12th April. The barriers of nature, the divisions formed by mountains, lakes, and torrents; the varieties of character, occupa- tion, language, and descent, were disregarded, and the Republic, one and indivisible proclaimed. Five directors, entirely in the interest of France, were appointed, with the absolute disposal of the executive and military power of the state; and by a law, worthy of Tiberius, whoever spoke even in a disrespectful manner of the new authorities, was to be punished with death (5). Geneva at the same time fell a prey to the ambition of the all-engrossing Republic. This celebrated city had long been an object of their desire; and the divisions by which it now was distracted, afforded a favour- able opportunity for accomplishing the object. The democratic party loudly demanded a union with that power, and a commission was appointed by the Senate, to report upon the subject. Their report, however, was unfavour- able; upon which General Gérard, who commanded a small corps in the neighbourhood, took possession of the town; and the Senate, with the bayonet at their throats, formally agreed to a union with the conquering Re- public (6).

Generous  
efforts of the  
mountain-  
eers.

But while the rich and populous part of Switzerland was thus falling a prey to the revolutionary fervour of the times, a more generous spirit animated the shepherds of the small cantons. The people of Schwytz, Uri, Underwalden, Glarus, Sargans, Turgovie, and St.-Gall, rejected the new constitution. The inhabitants of these romantic and sequestered regions, communicating little with the rest of the world, ardently attached to their liberties, proud of their heroic struggles in defence of

(1) That of General Brune amounted to 800,000 francs, or L. 36,000 sterling.—LACRETELLE, xiv. 210.

(2) The French imposed a tax of 15,000,000 francs, or L. 600,000, on their democratic "allies" in Berne, Friburg, Soleure, Lucerne, and Zurich; a sum far greater than ever had been raised before in those simple countries in ten years. This was independent of 19,000,000 francs, or L. 760,000, already paid by these cantons in bills of exchange and cash, and of

(3) Jom. x. 323, 330, 348, 349. Lac. xiv. 210. Th. x. 53.

(4) The total plunder exacted from the cantons of Berne alone by the French, in 1798, amounted to the enormous sum of 42,280,000 francs, or above L. 1,700,000. The particulars were as follows:

	Francs.
Treasure, . . . . .	7,000,000
Ingots, . . . . .	3,700,000
Contributions, . . . . .	4,000,000
Sale of Titles, . . . . .	2,000,000
Wheat seized. . . . .	17,140,000
Wine, . . . . .	1,440,000
Artillery and stores in arsenal, . .	7,000,000
Total, . . . . .	42,280,000 francs, or L. 1,710,000.

(5) Lac. xiv. 213. Jom. x. 330.

(6) Jom. x. 331.

ancient freedom, and inheriting all the dauntless intrepidity of their forefathers, were not to be seduced by the glittering but deceitful offers which had deluded their richer and more civilized brethren. They clearly perceived that, when once they were merged in the Helvetic Union, their influence would be destroyed by the multitude who would share their privileges; that they would soon fall under the dominion of the cities, with whose wealth and ambition they were wholly disqualified to contend; and that, in the wreck of all their ancient institutions, the independence of their country could not long be maintained. They saw that the insidious promises of the French envoys had terminated only in ruinous exactions and tyrannical rule, and that irreligion, sacrilege, and infidelity universally marked the invaders' steps. Every day they had proofs of the repentance, when too late, of the cantons who had invited the enemy into their bosom; and multitudes, escaping from the theatre of French exactions, fled into their secluded valleys, stimulating their inhabitants to resistance, by the recital of their oppressions, and offering to aid them by their arms. Animated by these feelings, the small cantons unanimously rejected the new constitution. "We have lived," said they, "for several centuries, under a republic based on liberty and equality; possessing no other goods in the world but our religion and our independence, no other riches but our herds, our first duty is to defend them (1)."

Arguments by which they were moved by the clergy. The clergy in these valleys had unbounded influence over their flocks. They were justly horrorstruck at the total irreligion which was manifested by the French armies in every part of the world, and the acrimonious war which they, in an especial manner, waged against the Catholic faith. The priests traversed the ranks, with the crucifix in their hands, to exhort the peasants to die as martyrs if they could not preserve the independence and religion of their country. "It is for you," they exclaimed, "to be faithful to the cause of God; you have received from Him gifts a thousand times more precious than gold or riches,—the freedom and faith of your ancestors. A peril far more terrible than heresy now assails you; impiety itself is at your gates; the enemy marches covered with the spoils of your churches; you will no longer be the sons of William Tell if you abandon the faith of your fathers; you are now called on not only to combat as heroes, but to die as martyrs." The women showed the same ardour as at Berne; numbers joined the ranks with their husbands, others carried provisions and ammunition for the combatants; all were engaged in the holy cause. The tricolor flag became the object of the same hatred as the Austrian standard five centuries before; the tree of liberty recalled the pole of Gesler; all the recollections of William Tell mingled with the newborn enthusiasm of the moment. "We do not fear," said the shepherds of Uri, "the armies of France; we are four hundred, and if that is not sufficient, four hundred more in our valley are ready to march to the defence of their country (2)." Animated by such feelings, the peasants confidently hoped for victory; the spots on which the triumphs of Nacfels, Laupen, and Morgarten were to be renewed, were already pointed out with exulting anticipations of success; and the shepherds of a few cantons, who could not bring ten thousand men into the field, fearlessly entered the lists with a power beneath which the Austrian monarchy had sunk to the ground.

(1) *Jom. x. 326, 342, 342. Lac. xiv. 216, 217.*

(2) *De Staël, Réc. Franç. ii. 216. Lac. xiv. 216, 219. Jom. x. 349, 350.*

**Aloys Reding.** Aloys Reding was the soul of the confederacy. Descended from the ancient founders of Helvetic independence, the relative of numbers who had perished on the Place du Carrousel on the 10th August, an old antagonist of the French in the Spanish war, he was filled with the strongest enmity at that grasping tyranny, which, under the name of freedom, threatened to extinguish all the liberties of the civilized world. His military talents and long experience made him fully aware of the perilous nature of the contest in which his countrymen were engaged, but he flattered himself that, amidst the precipices and woods of the Alps, a Vendéen war might be maintained till the German nations were roused to their relief, forgetting that a few valleys, whose whole population was not eighty thousand, could hardly hope for success in a contest in which three millions of Bretons and Vendéens had failed (1).

**First successes and ultimate disasters of the peasants.** The peasants were justly apprehensive of the war being carried into their own territories, as the ravages of the soldiers or the torch of the incendiary might destroy in a moment the work of centuries of labour. Reding, too, was in hopes that, by assailing the French troops when dispersed over a long line, he might gain a decisive success in the outset of the campaign; and accordingly it was determined to make an immediate attack on Lucerne and Zurich. A body of four thousand men marched upon the former town, which surrendered by capitulation, and where the Swiss got possession of a few pieces of cannon, which they made good use of in the mountain warfare to which they were soon reduced. No sooner had they made themselves masters of the city, than, like the Vendéens, they flocked to the churches to return thanks to Heaven for their success. Meanwhile two other columns threatened Zurich, the one from Rapperswyl, the other from Richtenswyl: but here they found that the French, now thoroughly alarmed, were advancing in great force; and that, abandoning all thoughts of foreign conquest, it was necessary to concentrate all their forces for the defence of their own valleys. In effect, Schawenberg, with one brigade, surprised three thousand peasants at Zug, and made them all prisoners; while General Novion, after a bloody conflict, won the passage of the Reuss at Mellingen. He then divided his men into two divisions, one of which, after an obstinate battle, drove the peasants back into Rapperswyl, while the other forced them, after a desperate struggle, from Richtenswyl into the defile of Kusnacht (2).

**May 2.** After these disasters, the canton of Zug, which was now overrun by French troops, accepted the new constitution. But Schwytz was still unsubdued; its little army of three thousand men resolved to defend their country, or perish in the attempt. They took post, under Reding, at Morgarten, already immortalized in the wars of Helvetic independence. At daybreak the French appeared, more than double their force, descending the hills to the attack: They instantly advanced to meet them, and running across the plain, encountered their adversaries before they had come to the bottom of the slope. The shock was irresistible; the French were borne backwards to the summit of the ridge, and after a furious conflict, which lasted the whole day, the peasants remained masters of the contested ground. Fresh reinforcements came up on both sides during the night, and the struggle was renewed next day with doubtful success.

**Heroic defence of the Schwytzers at Morgarten.**

(1) Jom. x. 346. Lac. xiv. 216.

(2) Jom. x. 353, 356. Lac. xiv. 221, 222. Ann. Reg. 1798, 33.

The coolness and skill of the Swiss marksmen counterbalanced the immense superiority of force, and the greater experience and rapidity of movement, on the part of their adversaries; but, in spite of all their efforts, they were unable to gain a decisive success over the invaders. The rocks, the woods,

May 2. the thickets, were bristling with armed men; every cottage became a post of defence, every meadow a scene of carnage, every stream was dyed with blood. Darkness put an end to the contest while the mountaineers were still unsubdued; but they received intelligence during the night which rendered a longer continuance of the struggle hopeless. The inhabitants of Uri and Unterwalden had been driven into their valleys; a French corps was rapidly marching in their rear upon Schwytz, where none but women remained to defend the passes; the auxiliaries of Sargans and Glarus had submitted to the invaders. Slowly and reluctantly the men of Schwytz were brought to yield to inexorable necessity; a resolution not to submit till two-thirds of the canton had fallen was at first carried by acclamation; but at length they yielded to the persuasions of an enlightened ecclesiastic and the brave Reding, who represented the hopelessness of any further contest, and agreed to a convention, by which they were to accept the constitution and be allowed to enjoy the use of their arms, their religion, and their property, and the French troops to be withdrawn from their frontier. The other small cantons soon followed their example, and peace was for a time restored to that part of Switzerland (1).

Bloody conduct of the French in the Valais. The same chequered fortune attended the arms of the Swiss in the Valais. The brave inhabitants of the rocky, pine-clad mountains, which guard the sources of the Rhone, descended from Leuk to Sion, where they expelled the French garrison, and pursued them as far as St.-Maurice. Here, however, they were assailed by a column of the Republicans, May 7. on their march to Italy, and driven back towards the Upper Valais. An obstinate conflict ensued at the bridge of La Morge, in front of Sion; twice the Republicans were repulsed; even the Cretins, seeming to have recovered their intellect amidst the animation of the affray, behaved with devoted courage. At length, however, the post was forced, and the town carried by escalade; the peasants despairing of success retired to their mountains, and the new constitution was proclaimed with opposition, amidst deserted and smoking ruins (2).

Oppressive conduct of the French to the inhabitants. A temporary breathing time from hostilities followed these bloody defeats; but it was a period of bitter suffering and humiliation to Switzerland. Forty thousand men lived at free quarters upon the inhabitants; the requisitions for the pay, clothing, and equipment of these hard taskmasters proved a sad contrast to the illusions of hope which had seduced the patriotism of its urban population. The rapacity and exactions of the commissaries and inferior authorities, exceeded even the cruel spoliation of the Directory; and the warmest supporters of the democratic party sighed when they beheld the treasures, the accumulation of ages, and the warlike stores, the provident savings of unsubdued generations, sent off, under a powerful guard, to France, never to return. In vain the revolutionary authorities of Switzerland, now alive to the tyranny they had brought on their country, protested against the spoliation, and affixed their seals to the treasures which were to be carried off; they were instantly broken by the French commissaries; and a proclamation of the Directory informed the in-

(1) *Jour. x.* 357, 358. *Lac. xiv.* 224, 226.

(2) *Jour. x.* 360.



habitants that they were a conquered nation, and must submit to the lot of the vanquished (1).

An alliance  
offensive and  
defensive  
with France  
is forced  
upon Swit-  
zerland.

All the public property, stores, and treasures of the cantons were soon declared prize by the French authorities, the liberty of the press extinguished, a vexatious system of police introduced, and those magistrates who showed the slightest regard for the liberties of their country dismissed without trial or investigation. The ardent democrats, who had joined the French party in the commencement of the troubles, were now the foremost to exclaim against their rapacity, and lament their own weakness in having ever lent an ear to their promises. But it was all in vain; more subservient Directors were placed by the French authorities at

Aug. 4.

the head of affairs, in lieu of those who had resigned in disgust; and an alliance offensive and defensive concluded at Paris between the two Republics, which bound Switzerland to furnish a contingent of troops, and to submit to the formation of two military roads through the Alps, one to Italy, and one to Swabia,—conditions which, as Jomini justly observes, were worse for Switzerland than an annexation to France, as they imposed upon it all the burdens and dangers of war, without either its advantages or its glories (2).

Glorious re-  
sistance of  
Uri and  
Schwytz.  
Cruel mas-  
sacre by the  
French.

The discontents arising from these circumstances were accumulating on all sides, when the imposition of an oath to the new constitution brought matters to a crisis in the small cantons. All took it with the utmost reluctance; but the shepherds of Unterwalden unanimously declared they would rather perish, and thither the most determined of the men of Schwytz and Uri flocked, to sell their lives dearly in defence of their country. But resistance was hopeless. Eight thousand French embarked at Lucerne, and landed at Stantz, on the eastern side, while the like number crossed the beech-clad ridge of the Brunig, and descended by the lovely lakes of Lungern and Sarnen, at the western extremity of the valley. Oppressed by such overwhelming forces, the peasants no longer hoped for success; an honourable death was alone the object of their wishes. In their despair they observed little design, and were conducted with hardly any discipline; yet such is the force of mere native valour, that for several days it enabled three thousand shepherds to keep at bay above sixteen thousand of the bravest troops of France. Every hedge, every thicket, every cottage, was obstinately contested; the dying crawled into the hottest of the fire; the women and children threw themselves upon the enemy's bayonets; the greyhaired raised their feeble hands against the invaders: but what could heroism and devotion achieve against such desperate odds? Slowly, but steadily, the French columns forced their way through the valley, the flames of the houses, the massacre of the inhabitants, marking their steps. The beautiful village of Stantz, entirely built of wood, was soon consumed; seventy peasants, with their curate at their head, perished in the flames of the church. Two hundred auxiliaries from Schwytz arriving too late to prevent the massacre, rushed into the thickest of the fight; and, after slaying

Sept. 9.

(1) Ann. Reg. 1798. 35, 36. Jom. x. 361.

The rapacity of the French commissaries who followed in the rear of the armies, soon made the Swiss regret even the spoliations of Brune and their first conquerors. L'earlier levied 100,000 crowns in Friburg, and 800,000 francs in Berne; and as the public treasure was exhausted, the effects of 300 of the richest families were taken in payment, and the

principal senators sent as prisoners to the citadel of Besançon till the contribution was paid. He was succeeded by Rapinat, whose exactions were still more intolerable. He levied a fresh contribution of 6,000,000 on Berne; on Zurich, Friburg, and Soleure, of 7,000,000; 750,000 francs were taken from six abbeys alone.—HARD. vi. 180, 181.

(2) Jom. xi. 17, 18. HARD. vi. 180, 182.



double their own number of the enemy, perished to the last man. Night at length drew its veil over these scenes of horror; but the fires from the burning villages still threw a lurid light over the cliffs of the Engleberg; and long after the rosy tint of evening had ceased to tinge the glaciers of the Titlis, the glare of the conflagration illuminated the summit of the mountain (1).

The Grisons invoke the aid of Austria, who occupy their country. Oct. 19. These tragical events were little calculated to induce other states to follow the example of the Swiss in calling in the aid of the French democracy. The Grisons, who had felt the shocks of the revolutionary earthquake, took counsel from the disaster of their brethren in the forest cantons, and invoking the aid of Austria, guaranteed by ancient treaties, succeeded in preserving their independence and ancient institutions. Seven thousand Imperialists entered Coire in the end of October; and spreading through the valley of the Rhine, already occupied those posts which were destined to be the scene of such sanguinary conflicts in the succeeding campaign. The French, on their part, augmented rather than diminished the force with which they occupied Switzerland; and it was already apparent that, in the next conflict between these gigantic powers, the Alps would be the principal theatre of their strife (2).

Extreme impolicy, as well as reticence, of the attack on Switzerland. In this unprovoked attack upon Switzerland, the Directory committed as great a fault in political wisdom as in moral duty. The neutrality of that country was a better defence to France, on its south-eastern frontier, than either the Rhine or the iron barrier on its north-western. The allies could never venture to violate the neutrality of the Helvetic Confederacy, lest they should throw its warlike population into the arms of France; no armies were required for that frontier, and the whole disposable forces of the state could be turned to the Rhine and the Maritime Alps. In offensive operations, the advantage was equally apparent. The French, possessing the line of the Rhine, with its numerous fortifications, had the best possible base for their operations in Germany; the fortresses of Piedmont gave them the same advantage in Italy; while the great mass of the Alps, occupied by a neutral power, rendered their conquests, pushed forward in either of these directions, secure from an attack in flank, and preserved the invading army from all risk of being cut off from its resources. But when the Alps themselves became the theatre of conflict, these advantages were all lost to the Republic; the bulwark of the Rhine was liable to be rendered valueless at any time, by a reverse in Switzerland, and France exposed to an invasion in the only quarter where her frontier is totally defenceless; while the fortifications of Mantua and the line of the Adige were of comparatively little importance, when they were liable to be turned by any inconsiderable success in the Grisons or the Italian bailiwicks. The Tyrol, besides, with its numerous, warlike, and enthusiastic population, afforded a base for mountain warfare, and a secure asylum in case of disaster, which the French could never expect to find amidst the foreign language and hostile feelings of German Switzerland; while, by extending the line of operations from the Adriatic to the Channel, the Republic was forced to defend an extent of frontier, for which even its resources, ample as they were, might be expected to prove insufficient (3).

Nothing done by the revolutionary government of France ever had so powerful an effect in cooling the ardour of its partisans in Europe, and opening

(1) *Lac.* xiv. 229, 230. *Ann. Reg.* 1798, 34, 35.  
*Jom.* xi. 19, 20.

(2) *Jom.* xi. 20, 22.

(3) *Arch.* Ch. i. 127, 140. *Jom.* x. 286, 289.

Great indig-  
nation ex-  
cited by it  
in Europe.

the eyes of the intelligent and respectable classes in every other country as to their ultimate designs; as the attack on Switzerland (1). As long as the Republic was contending with the armies of kings, or resisting the efforts of the aristocracy, it was alleged that it was only defending its own liberties, and that the whole monarchies of Europe were leagued together for its destruction. But when, in a moment of general peace, its rulers commenced an unprovoked attack on the Swiss confederacy; when the loud declaimers in favour of popular rights forced an obnoxious constitution on the mountaineers of the Alps, and desolated with fire and sword the beautiful recesses of the democratic cantons; the sympathies of Europe were awakened in favour of a gallant and suffering people, and the native atrocity of the invasion called forth the wishes of freedom on the other side. The Whig leaders of England, who had palliated the atrocities of the Revolution longer than was consistent either with their own character or their interest as a political party, confessed that "the mask had fallen from the face of revolutionary France, if indeed it ever had worn it (2)." "Where," it was asked over all Europe, "will the Revolution stop? What country could be imagined less alluring to their cupidity than that, where, notwithstanding the industry of the inhabitants, the churlish soil will barely yield its children bread? What government can pretend to favour in the eyes of the Directory, when it visits with fire and sword those fields where the whole inhabitants of a canton assemble under the vault of heaven to deliberate, like the Spartans of old, on their common concerns? What fidelity, and proof of confidence does it expect more complete than that which leaves a whole frontier without defence; or rather which has hitherto considered it as better defended by the unalterable neutrality of its faithful allies, than by the triple line of fortresses which elsewhere guards the entrance to its soil (3)?"

The Ecclesiastical States were the next object of attack. It had long been an avowed object of ambition with the Republican government to revolutionize the Roman people, and plant the tricolor flag in the city of Brutus (4),

(1) Its effect on the friends of freedom in England may be judged of from the following indignant lines by Coleridge, once an ardent supporter of the Revolution, in his *Ode to Freedom*, written in 1798:—

"Forgive me, freedom! oh forgive those dreams!  
I hear thy voice, I hear thy loud lament,  
From bleak Helvetia's icy cavern sent—  
I hear thy groans upon her blood-stain'd streams!  
Heroes, that for your peaceful country perish'd,  
And ye, that fleeing, spot your mountain snows  
With bleeding wounds, forgive me, that I cherish'd  
One thought that ever bless'd your cruel foes!  
To scatter rage and traitorous guilt,  
Where peace her jealous home had built;  
A patriot race to disinherit  
Of all that made their stormy wilds so dear!—  
Oh! France, that mockest heaven, adulterous, blind,  
And patriot only in pernicious toils,  
Are these thy boasts, champion of humankind,  
To insult the shrine of liberty with spoils  
From freemen torn; to tempt and to betray?"

(2) *Parl. Deb.* xxxiv. 1323.

(3) *Dum.* i. 428, 429. *Journ.* x. 331.

(4) The resolution of Napoleon and the Directory to revolutionize Rome, and effect the overthrow of the Papal government, was adopted long before the treaty of Campo-Formio. On the 12th February, 1797, the Directory wrote to Napoleon:—"The possession of Tyrol and Trieste, and the conquest of Rome, will be the glorious fruits of the fall of Mau-  
May 19, 1797. tua." On 19th May, 1797, Napoleon wrote to the Directory:—"The Pope is dangerously

ill, and is eighty-three years old. The moment I received this intelligence, I assembled all my Poles at Bologna, from whence I shall push them forward to Ancona. What shall I do if the Pope dies?" The May 25.

Directory answered:—"The minister of foreign affairs will inform General Bonaparte, that they trust to his accustomed prudence to bring about a democratic revolution in the Roman states with as little convulsion as possible." [*Hard.* iv. 387, 388.] The prospect, however, failed at that time, as the Pope recovered. Meanwhile the pillage of the ecclesiastical states continued without intermission; and having exhausted the public treasury, and drained the country of all its specie, the French agents laid their rapacious hands upon all the jewels and precious stones they could find. The value of plunder thus got was astonishing. "The Pope," says Cacault, the French ambassador at Rome, to Napoleon, "gives us full satisfaction in every thing regarding any errors in accounting, weight, etc., that may occur in the payment of the 30,000,000 francs. June 3, 1797. The payments in diamonds amount to 11,271,000 francs (L. 450,000). He has paid 4,000,000 in francs, of contributions levied since the treaty of Tolentino. But it is with the utmost difficulty that these payments are raised; the country is exhausted; let us not drive it to bankruptcy. My agent, citizen Haller, wrote to me the other day, 'Do not forget, citizen minister, that the immense and unceasing demands of the army oblige us to play a little the corsair, and that we must not enter into discussions

and fortune at length presented them with a favourable opportunity to accomplish the design.

Attack on the Papal States. Miserable state of the Pope. The situation of the Pope had become, since the French conquests in Italy, in the highest degree precarious. Cut off, by the Cisalpine republic, from any support from Austria; left by the treaty of Campo Formio entirely at the mercy of the French Republic; threatened by the heavings of the democratic spirit within his own dominions, and exposed to all the contagion arising from the complete establishment, and close vicinity, of republican governments in the north of Italy, he was almost destitute of the means of resisting so many seen and unseen enemies. The pontifical treasury was exhausted by the immense payments stipulated by the treaty of Tolentino; while the activity and zeal of the revolutionary clubs in all the principal towns of the ecclesiastical states was daily increasing with the prospect of success. To enable the government to meet the enormous demands of the French army, the principal Roman families, like the Pope, had sold their gold, their silver, their jewels, their horses, their carriages, in a word, all their valuable effects; but the exactions of the republican agents were still unabated. In despair, they had recourse to the fatal expedient of issuing a paper circulation; but that, in a country destitute of credit (1), soon fell to an inconsiderable value, and augmented rather than relieved the public distress.

Joseph Bonaparte, brother to Napoléon, had been appointed ambassador at the court of Rome; but as his character was deemed too honourable for political intrigue, Generals Duphot and Sherlock were sent along with him; the former of whom had been so successful in effecting the overthrow of the Genoese aristocracy. The French embassy, under their direction, soon became the centre of the revolutionary action, and those numerous ardent characters with which the Italian cities abound, flocked there as to a common focus, from whence the next great explosion of democratic power was to be expected (2). In this extremity, Pius VI, who was above eighty years of age, and sinking into the grave, called to his counsels the Austrian General Provera, already distinguished in the Italian campaigns; but the Directory soon compelled the humiliated Pontiff to dismiss that intrepid counsellor (3). As

as it would sometimes turn out that we are in the wrong.' I always supported a mortal war against the Pope, as long as the Papal government resisted; but now that it is prostrated at our feet, I am become suddenly pacific; I think such a system is both for your interest and that of the Directory." [Corresp. Conf. iii. 274, 275.] On the 25th May, 1797, the same ambassador wrote to Napoléon:—"I am occupied in collecting and transporting from hence to Milan all the diamonds and jewels I can collect; I send there also whatever is made the subject of dispute in the payments of the contributions. You will keep in view that the people here are exhausted, and that it is in vain to expect the destitute to pay. I take advantage of these circumstances, to prostrate at your feet Rome and the Papal government." [Ibid. iii. 246, 249.] On 5th August, 1797, he again wrote to Napoléon:—"Discontent is at its height in the Papal states; the government will fall to pieces of itself, as I have repeatedly predicted to you. But it is not at Rome that the explosion will take place; too many persons are here dependent upon the expenditure of the great. The payment of 30,000 000, stipulated by the treaty of Tolentino, at the close of so many previous losses, has totally exhausted this old circus. We are making it expire by a slow fire; it will soon crumble to the dust. The revolutionists,

by accelerating matters, would only hasten a dissolution certain and inevitable. [Corresp. Conf. iii. 515, 516.]

(1) Hard. v. 175, 176. Bot. ii. 443.

(2) It would appear, however, that the French ambassador was by no means satisfied with the first efforts of the Roman patriots. "They have manifested," said Joseph Bonaparte to Napoléon, "all the disposition to overturn the government, but none of the resolution. If they have thought and felt like Brutus and the great men of antiquity, they have spoken like women, and acted like children. The government has caused them all to be arrested"—*Letter Joseph to Napoléon, 10th September, 1797; Corresp. Confid.*

Sept. 29, 1797. (3) "You must forthwith intimate to the Court of Rome," said Napoléon to his brother Joseph, ambassador there, "that if General Provera is not immediately sent away from Rome, the Republic will regard it as a declaration of war. I attach the utmost importance to the removal of an Austrian commander from the Roman troops. You will insist not only that he be deprived of the command of the Roman troops, but that within twenty-four hours he departs from Rome. Assume a high tone: it is only by evincing the greatest firmness, and making use of the most energetic expressions,

his recovery then seemed hopeless, the instructions of government to their ambassador were to delay the proclamation of a republic till his death, when the vacant chair of St.-Peter might be overturned with little difficulty; but such was the activity of the revolutionary agents, that the train was ready to take fire before that event took place, and the ears of the Romans were assailed by incessant abuse of the ecclesiastical government, and vehement declamations in favour of republican freedom (1).

The resolution to overturn the Papal government, like all the other ambitious projects of the Directory, received a very great impulse from the re-ascendant of Jacobin influence at Paris, by the results of the revolution of 18th Fructidor. One of the first measures of the new government was to dispatch an order to Joseph Bonaparte at Rome, to promote, by all the means in his power, the approaching revolution in the Papal states; and above all things to take care that at the Pope's death no successor should be elected to the chair of St.-Peter (2). Napoléon's language to the Roman pontiff became daily more menacing. Immediately before setting out for Rastadt, he ordered his brother Joseph to intimate to the Pope that three thousand additional troops had been forwarded to Ancona; that if Provera was not dismissed within twenty-four hours, war would be declared; that if any of the revolutionists who had been arrested were executed, reprisals would forthwith be exercised on the cardinals; and that, if the Cisalpine republic was not instantly recognized, it would be the signal for immediate hostilities (3). At

that you will succeed in overawing the Papal authority. Timid when you show your teeth, they rapidly become overbearing if you treat them with any respect. I know the court of Rome well. That single step, if properly taken, will complete its ruin. At the same time, you will hold out to the Papal secretary of state, 'That the French Republic, continuing its feelings of regard for the Papal government, is on the point of restoring Ancona. You are ruining all your affairs; the whole responsibility rests on your head. The French troops will give you no assistance in quelling the revolts with which you are menaced, if you continue your present course.' Should the Pope die, you must do your utmost to prevent the nomination of a successor, and bring about a revolution. Depend upon it, the King of Naples will not stir. Should he do so, you will inform him that the Roman people are under the protection of the French Republic; but, at the same time, you must hold out to him secretly that the government is desirous to renew its negotiations with him. In a word, you must be as haughty in public as you are pliant in private,—the object of the first being to deter him from entering Rome; of the last, to make him believe that it is for his interest not to do so. Should no revolutionary movement break out at Rome, so that there is no pretence for preventing the nomination of a Pope, at least take care that the Cardinal Albani is not put in nomination. Declare, that the moment that is done I will march upon Rome." [Corresp. Conf. iv. 199, 201.]—*Secret Despatch, Napoléon to Joseph Bonaparte, dated Passeriano, 29th Sept 1797.*—These instructions, it is to be recollected, were sent to the French ambassador at Rome, when France was still and completely at peace with the Holy See, and it had honourably discharged the burdensome conditions of the treaty of Tolentino.

(1) Bot. ii. 443, 445. Lac. xiv. 146, 147. Jom. x. 332.

(2) Talleyrand, on 10th October, wrote to Joseph Bonaparte at Rome:—"You have two things, citizen-general, to do:—1. To prevent, by all possible means, the King of Naples from entering

the Papal territory. 2. To increase, rather than restrain, the good dispositions of those who think that it is high time the reign of the popes should finish; in a word, to encourage the *elan* of the Roman people towards liberty. At all events, take care that we get hold of Ancona and a large portion of the coast of Italy." [Corresp. Conf. Oct. 10, 1797.] Eleven days afterwards Laréveillière Lapeaux, the President of the Directory, wrote to Napoléon:—"In regard to Rome, the Directory cordially approve of the instructions you have given to your brother to prevent a successor being appointed to Pius VI. We must lay hold of the present favourable circumstances to deliver Europe from the pretended Papal supremacy. Tuscany will next attract your attention. You will, therefore, if hostilities are resumed, give the Grand Duke his congé, and facilitate by every means the establishment of a free and representative government in Tuscany"—*Letter of the Directory to Napoléon, 21st Oct. 1797; Corresp. Confid. iv. 241.*

(3) "I cannot tell you, citizen-ambassador," said Napoléon, "what indignation I felt when I heard that Provera was still in the service of the Pope. Let him know instantly, that though the French Republic is at peace with the Holy See, it will not for an instant suffer any officer or agent of the Imperialists to hold any situation under the Papal government. You will, therefore, insist on the dismissal of M. Provera within twenty-four hours, on pain of instantly demanding your passports. You will let him know that I have moved three thousand additional soldiers to Ancona, not one of whom will recede till Provera is dismissed. Let him know further, that if one of the prisoners for political offences is executed, Cardinal Rucca and the other cardinals shall answer for it with their heads. Finally, make him aware that the moment you quit the Papal territory, Ancona will be incorporated with the Cisalpine Republic. You will easily understand that the last phrase must be *spoken*, not *written*."—*Confidential Letter, Napoléon to Joseph Bonaparte, 14th Nov. 1797.*

the same time, ten thousand troops of the Cisalpine republic advanced to St.-Léon, in the Papal duchy of Urbino, and made themselves masters of that fortress; while at Ancona, which was still garrisoned by French troops, notwithstanding its stipulated restoration by the treaty of Tolentino to the Holy See, the democratic party openly proclaimed "the Anconite republic." Similar revolutionary movements took place at Corneto, Civita Vecchia, Pesaro, and Senigaglia; while at Rome itself, Joseph Bonaparte, by compelling the Papal government to liberate all persons confined for political offences, suddenly vomited forth upon the capital several hundreds of the most heated Republicans in Italy. After this great addition, measures were no longer kept with the government. Seditious meetings were constantly held in every part of the city; immense collections of tricolor cockades were made to distinguish the insurgents, and deputations of the citizens openly waited upon the French ambassador to invite him to support the insurrection, to which he replied in ambiguous terms, "The fate of nations, as of individuals, being buried in the womb of futurity, it is not given to me to penetrate its mysteries (1)."

In this temper of men's minds, a spark was sufficient to occasion an explosion. On the 27th December, 1798, an immense crowd assembled, with seditious cries, and moved to the palace of the French ambassador, where they exclaimed—"Vive la République Romaine," and loudly invoked the aid of the French to enable them to plant the tricolor flag on the Capitol. The insurgents displayed the tricolor cockade, and evinced the most menacing disposition; the danger was extreme; from similar beginnings the overthrow of the governments of Venice and Genoa had rapidly followed. The papal ministers sent a regiment of dragoons to prevent any sortie of the Revolutionists from the palace of the French ambassador; and they repeatedly warned the insurgents, that their orders were to allow no one to leave its precincts.

Duphot is slain in a scuffle at the French ambassador's. Duphot, however, indignant at being restrained by the pontifical troops, drew his sword, rushed down the staircase, and put himself at the head of one hundred and fifty armed Roman democrats, who were now contending with the dragoons in the court-yard of the palace; he was immediately killed by a discharge ordered by the sergeant commanding the patrol of the Papal troops; and the ambassador himself, who had followed to appease the tumult, narrowly escaped the same fate. A violent scuffle ensued, several persons were killed and wounded on both sides; and, after remaining several hours in the greatest alarm, Joseph Bonaparte with his suite retired to Florence (2).

War is in consequence declared against Rome. This catastrophe, however obviously occasioned by the revolutionary schemes which were in agitation at the residence of the French ambassador, having taken place within the precincts of his palace, was unhappily a violation of the law of nations, and gave the Directory too fair a ground to demand satisfaction. But they instantly resolved to make it the pretext for the immediate occupation of Rome and overthrow of the Papal government. The march of troops out of Italy was countermanded, and Berthier, the commander-in-chief, received orders to advance rapidly into the Ecclesiastical States. Meanwhile, the democratic spirit burst forth more violently than ever at Ancona and the neighbouring towns; and the Papal authority was soon lost in all the provinces on the

(1) Hard. v. 198, 206.

(2) Joseph Bonaparte's Report. Hard. v. 207, 209, 215. Bol. ii. 445, 447. Lac. xiv. 146, 147.

Join. x. 333, 334.



eastern slope of the Apennines. To these accumulated disasters, the Pontiff could only oppose the fasts and prayers of an aged conclave—weapons of spiritual warfare little calculated to arrest the conquerors of Arcola and Lodi (1).

Berthier  
advances to  
Rome.  
Jan. 25,  
1798.

Berthier, without an instant's delay, carried into execution the orders of the Directory. Six thousand Poles were stationed at Rimini to cover the Cisalpine republic, a reserve was established at Tolentino, while the commander-in-chief, at the head of eighteen thousand veteran troops, entered Ancona. Having completed the work of revolution in that turbulent district, and secured the fortress, he crossed the Apennines; and, advancing by Foligno and Narni, appeared on the 10th February before the Eternal City. The Pope, in the utmost consternation, shut himself up in the Vatican, and spent night and day at the foot of the altar in imploring the Divine protection (2).

Revolution  
at Rome.

Rome, almost defenceless, would have offered no obstacle to the entrance of the French troops; but it was part of the policy of the Directory to make it appear that their aid was invoked by the spontaneous efforts of the inhabitants. Contenting himself, therefore, with occupying the castle of St.-Angelo, from which the feeble guards of the Pope were soon expelled, Berthier kept his troops for five days encamped without the walls.

Feb. 15. At length the revolutionists having completed their preparations, a noisy crowd assembled in the Campo Vaccino, the ancient Forum; the old foundations of the Capitol were made again to resound with the cries, if not the spirit, of freedom, and the venerable ensigns, S. P. Q. R., after the lapse of fourteen hundred years, again floated in the winds (3). The multitude tumultuously demanded the overthrow of the Papal authority; the French troops were invited to enter; the conquerors of Italy, with a haughty air, passed the gates of Aurelian, defiled through the Piazza del Popolo, gazed on the indestructible monuments of Roman grandeur, and, amidst the shouts of the inhabitants, the tricolor flag was displayed from the summit of the Capitol.

Atrocious  
cruelty of  
the Repub-  
licans to the  
Pope.

But while part of the Roman populace were surrendering themselves to a pardonable intoxication upon the fancied recovery of their liberties, the agents of the Directory were preparing for them

(1) Bot. ii. 450. Jom. x. 334.

(2) Bot. ii. 452. Jom. x. 336. Hard. v. 230, 241.

The Directory, in their orders to Berthier, prescribed to him a course as perfidious as it was hostile. Their words were as follows:—"The intention of the Directory is, that you march as *secretly and rapidly* as possible on Rome with 18,000 men. Its celerity is of the utmost importance; that alone can ensure success. The King of Naples will probably send an envoy to your headquarters, to whom you will declare that the French government is *actuated by no ambitious designs*; and that, if it was generous enough to restrain its indignation at Tolentino, when it had much more serious causes of complaint against the Holy See, it is still more probable that it will do the same now. While holding out these assurances, you will at the same time advance as rapidly as possible towards Rome: the great object is to keep your design secret, till you are so near that city that the King of Naples cannot prevent it. When within two days' march of Rome, menace the Pope and all the members of the government, in order to terrify them, and make them take to flight. Arrived in Rome, *employ your whole influence to establish a Roman republic.*"—HARD. v. 221.

Berthier, however, was too much a man of honour to enter cordially into the revolutionary projects of the Directory. On 1st January, 1798, he wrote to Napoléon:—"I always told you the command in Italy was not suited to me. I wish to *extricate myself from revolutions*. Four years' service in them in America, ten in France, is enough, general. I shall ever be ready to combat as a soldier for my country, but have no desire to be mixed up with revolutionary politics." [Corresp. Conf. iv. 482.] It would appear that the Roman people generally had no greater desire than he had to be involved in a revolution; for, on the morning of his arrival at that city, he wrote to Napoléon:—"I have been in Rome since this morning; but I have found nothing but the utmost consternation among the inhabitants. *One solitary patriot* has appeared at headquarters; he offered to put at my disposition two thousand galley slaves; you may believe how I received that proposition. My further presence here is useless. I beseech you to recall me; it is the greatest boon you can possibly confer upon me."—Berthier to Napoléon, 10th Feb. 1798. Corresp. Confid. iv. 510.

(3) Bot. ii. 458, 459. Jom. x. 336. Lac. xiv. 150.



the sad realities of slavery. The Pope, who had been guarded by five hundred soldiers ever since the entry of the Republicans, was directed to retire into Tuscany; his Swiss guard relieved by a French one, and he himself ordered to dispossess himself of all his temporal authority. He replied, with the firmness of a martyr, "I am prepared for every species of disgrace. As supreme Pontiff, I am resolved to die in the exercise of all my powers. You may employ force—you have the power to do so; but know that though you may be masters of my body, you are not so of my soul. Free in the region where it is placed, it fears neither the events nor the sufferings of this life. I stand on the threshold of another world; there I shall be sheltered alike from the violence and impiety of this." Force was soon employed to dispossess him of his authority; he was dragged from the altar in his palace, his repositories all ransacked and plundered, the rings even torn from his fingers, the whole effects in the Vatican and Quirinal inventoried and seized, and the aged pontiff conducted, with only a few domestics, amidst the brutal jests and sacrilegious songs of the French dragoons, into Tuscany, where the generous hospitality of the Grand Duke strove to soften the hardships of his exile. But though a captive in the hands of his enemies, the venerable old man still retained the supreme authority in the church. From his retreat in the convent of the Chartreuse, he yet guided the counsels of the faithful; multitudes fell on their knees wherever he passed, and sought that benediction from a captive which they would, perhaps, have disregarded from a triumphant pontiff (1).

Their continued severity towards him. He is removed to France and there dies. The subsequent treatment of this venerable man was as disgraceful to the Republican government as it was honourable to his piety and constancy as the head of the church. Fearful that from his virtues and sufferings he might have too much influence on the continent of Italy, he was removed by their orders to Leghorn, in March 1799, with the design of transferring him to Cagliari in Sardinia; and the English cruisers in the Mediterranean redoubled their vigilance, in the generous hope of rescuing the father of an opposite church from the persecution of his enemies. Apprehensive of losing their prisoner, the French altered his destination, and forcing him to traverse, often during the night, the Apennines and the Alps in a rigorous season, he at length Aug. 25, 1799. reached Valence, where, after an illness of ten days, he expired in the eighty-second year of his age, and the twenty-fourth of his pontificate. The cruelty of the Directory increased as he approached their dominions; all his old attendants were compelled to leave him, and the Father of the Faithful was allowed to expire, attended only by his confessor. Yet even in this disconsolate state, he derived the highest satisfaction from the devotion and reverence of the people in the provinces of France through which he passed. Multitudes from Gap, Vizelle, and Grenoble, flocked to the road to receive his benediction; and he frequently repeated, with tears in his eyes (2), the words of Scripture: "Verily, I say unto you, I have not seen such faith, no, not in Israel."

Systematic and abominable pillage of Rome by the Republicans. But long before the Pope had sunk under the persecution of his oppressors, Rome had experienced the bitter fruits of Republican fraternization. Immediately after the entry of the French troops, commenced the regular and systematic pillage of the city. Not

(1) Bot. ii. 463. Lac. xiv. 152, 153. Hard. v. 243, 244. Pacca, i. 172, 174.

(2) Hard. v. 248, 253. Lac. xiv. 157, 159. Bot. ii. 464. Pacca, i. 180, 184.

only the churches and the convents, but the palaces of the cardinals and of the nobility, were laid waste. The agents of the Directory, insatiable in the pursuit of plunder, and merciless in the means of exacting it, ransacked every quarter within its walls, seized the most valuable works of art, and stripped the Eternal City of those treasures which had survived the Gothic fire and the rapacious hands of the Spanish soldiers. The bloodshed was much less, but the spoil collected incomparably greater, than at the disastrous sack which followed the death of the Constable Bourbon. Almost all the great works of art which have, since that time, been collected throughout Europe, were then scattered abroad. The spoliation exceeded all that the Goths or Vandals had effected. Not only the palaces of the Vatican, and the Monte Cavallo, and the chief nobility of Rome, but those of Castel Gandolfo, on the margin of the Alban lake, of Terracina, the Villa Albani, and others in the environs of Rome, were plundered of every article of value which they possessed. The whole sacerdotal habits of the Pope and cardinals were burnt, in order to collect from the flames the gold with which they were adorned. The Vatican was stripped to its naked walls; the immortal frescoes of Raphael and Michael Angelo remained in solitary beauty amidst the general desolation. A contribution of four millions in money, two millions in provisions, and three thousand horses, was imposed on a city already exhausted by the enormous exactions it had previously undergone. Under the directions of the infamous commissary Haller, the domestic library, museum, furniture, jewels, and even the private clothes of the Pope, were sold. Nor did the palaces of the Roman nobility escape devastation. The noble galleries of the Cardinal Braschi and the Cardinal York, the last relic of the Stuart line, underwent the same fate. Others, as those of the Chigi, Borghese, and Doria palaces, were rescued from destruction only by enormous ransoms. Every thing of value that the treaty of Tolentino had left in Rome, became the prey of republican cupidity, and the very name of freedom soon became odious from the sordid and infamous crimes which were committed in its name (1).

Confiscation  
of the whole  
Church prop-  
erty in the  
Papal terri-  
tories.

Nor were the exactions of the French confined to the plunder of palaces and churches. Eight cardinals were arrested and sent to Civita Castellana; while enormous contributions were levied on the Papal territory, and brought home the bitterness of conquest to every poor man's door. At the same time, the ample territorial possessions of the church and the monasteries were confiscated, and declared national property; a measure which, by drying up at once the whole resources of the affluent classes, precipitated into the extreme of misery the numerous poor who were maintained by their expenditure or fed by their bounty. All the respectable citizens and clergy were in fetters; and a base and despicable faction alone, among whom, to their disgrace be it told, were found fourteen cardinals, followed in the train of the oppressors (2); and at a public festival, returned thanks to God for the miseries they had brought upon their country.

These dis-  
orders excite  
even the in-  
dignation of  
the French  
army.  
Great mult-  
ity at Rome  
and Mantua.

To such a height did the disorders rise, that they excited the indignation of the army itself, albeit little scrupulous in general about the means by which plunder was acquired. While the agents of the Directory were thus enriching themselves and sullyng the name of France by unheard-of spoliation, the inferior officers and sol-

(1) *Hord.* v. 244, 245, 249. *Rot. il.* 465, 469, 470. *Joan.* x. 336, 337. *Lac. xiv.* 160, 161.

(2) *Rot. il.* 472, 473. *Ann. Reg.* 1798, 60, 63. *Jom.* x. 337, 338. *Lac. xiv.* 160, 161.

diers were suffering the greatest privations. For several months they had been without pay, their clothes were worn out, their feet bare, their knapsacks empty. Indignant at the painful contrast which their condition offered to that of the civil agents, who were daily becoming richer from the spoils of the city, and comparing their penury with the luxurious condition of the corps stationed in the Cisalpine republic, the officers and soldiers in and around Rome broke out into open and unmeasured terms of vituperation.

Feb. 24. On the 24th February a general meeting of all the officers, from the rank of captain downwards, was held in the Pantheon, at which an address was agreed to by General Berthier, in which they declared their detestation of the extortions which had been practised in Rome, protested that they would no longer be the instruments of the ignominious wretches who had made such a use of their valour, and insisted for immediate payment of their large arrears. The discontents soon wore so alarming an aspect, that Masséna, who had assumed the command, ordered all the troops, excepting three thousand, to leave the capital. But they refused to obey; and another meeting, at which still more menacing language was used, having shortly after been held (1), which his soldiers refused to disperse, he was compelled to abandon the command, and retire to Ancona, leaving the direction of the army to General Dallemagne. At the same time the troops in Mantua raised the standard of revolt, and, resolving to abandon Italy, had already fixed all their days' march to Lyons and the banks of the Rhine (2).

Revolt of  
the Roman  
populace.  
Its rapid  
suppression.

The Roman populace, encouraged by these dissensions among their oppressors, deemed the opportunity favourable to shake off the yoke, and recover their independence. But they soon found

(1) St.-Cyr, Hist. Mil. i. 35, 36. Ann. Reg. 1798, 60, 61. Jom. x. 338. Bot. ii. 470, 471. Hard. v. 254.

(2) The remonstrance framed by the French army at this great meeting in the Pantheon bears:—"The first cause of our discontent is regret that a horde of robbers, who have insinuated themselves into the confidence of the nation, should deprive us of our honour. These men enter the chief houses of Rome, give themselves out for persons authorized to receive contributions, carry off all the gold, jewels, and horses; in a word, every article of value they can find, without giving any receipts. This conduct, if it remains unpunished, is calculated to bring eternal disgrace on the French nation in the eyes of the whole universe. We could furnish a thousand proofs of these assertions. The second cause is the misery in which both officers and men are involved; destitute of pay for five months; in want of every thing. The excessive luxury of the officers of the staff, affords a painful contrast to the naked condition of the general body of the army. The third cause of the general discontent is the arrival of General Masséna. The soldiers have not forgot the extortions and robberies he has committed wherever he has been invested with the command. The Venetian territory, and above all Padua, is a district teeming with proofs of his immorality." [Hard. v. 526.] In an address to Berthier from the officers of the army, the expressions are still more strong:—"The soldiers are in the utmost misery for want of pay. Many millions are in the public chest; three would discharge their arrears. We disavow in the sight of Heaven, in whose temple we are assembled, the crimes committed in the city of Rome and the Ecclesiastical States; we swear that we will no longer be the instruments of the

wretches who have perpetrated them. We insist that the effects seized from various individuals, belonging to states with whom we are still at peace, be restored; and, independent of our pay, we persist in demanding justice upon the official and elevated monsters, plunged night and day in luxury and debauchery, who have committed the robberies and spoliations in Rome."—See St.-Cyr, Hist. Mil. i. 282.

A singular occurrence took place at the revolt in Mantua, highly characteristic of the composition of the French army in Italy at this period. The chief of the twelfth demi-brigade, when endeavouring, sword in hand, to defend the standard with which he was intrusted, killed one of the grenadiers. His fellow soldiers immediately exclaimed, "We will not revenge our comrade; you are only doing your duty." The chief of the fourteenth wishing, for the same reason, to resist the mutineers, they unscrewed their bayonets from their guns to prevent his being injured in the strife which ensued for its seizure. Not a single officer was insulted or maltreated; the battalions answered by unanimous refusals all the exhortations of their officers to return to their duty, but the sentinels saluted the officers when they passed, as if in a state of the most perfect subordination. No acts of pillage followed the raising the standard of revolt, though the shops where it broke out were all open and unguarded. The soldiers were equally, as their brethren at Rome, loud in their condemnation of the officers and civil authorities who had "embezzled all the funds which should have gone to the payment of their arrears." In the midst of so much revolutionary profligacy and corruption, it is pleasing to have to record traits so honourable to the French army.—See BARAGUAY D'HILLIER'S Report, 19th Feb. 1798; Corresp. Confid. iv. 517, 525.

that it is easier to invite an enemy within your walls than expel him when the gates are placed in his hands. The assemblages in Rome were soon dispersed with great slaughter by General Dallemagne; and, collecting a few troops, he moved rapidly to Velletri and Castel Gandolfo, routed the insurgents who had occupied these posts, and struck such a terror into the inhabitants, that they quickly threw aside their arms, and abandoned all thoughts of further resistance (1).

The whole Papal States are revolutionized. New constitution, and alliance with France. Meanwhile the work of revolution proceeded rapidly in the Roman states. The whole ancient institutions were subverted; the executive made to consist of five consuls, after the model of the French Directory; heavy contributions and forced loans exacted from the wealthier classes; the legislative power vested in two chambers, chosen by the lowest ranks, and the state divided into eight departments. But, to preserve the entire dependence of this government on the French Directory, it was specially provided that an alliance, offensive and defensive, should immediately be concluded between the French and Roman Republics; that no laws made by the Roman legislative bodies should either be promulgated or have force without the approval of the French general stationed at Rome; and that he might of his own authority, enact such laws as might appear necessary, or were ordered by the French Directory. At the same time edicts were published, prohibiting the nobles, under severe penalties, from dismissing any of their domestics, or discontinuing any of their charitable donations, on account of the diminished or ruined state of their fortunes (2).

Violent revolutions effected by the French in the Cisalpine Republic. March 29, 1798. While the Roman states were thus undergoing fusion in the revolutionary crucible, the constitution of the Cisalpine republic disappeared as rapidly as it had been formed. Towards the end of March, a treaty was concluded at Paris between the French Republic and its infant offspring, by which it was stipulated that the Cisalpine should receive a French garrison of 22,000 infantry, and 2500 cavalry, to be paid and clothed while there by the Italian Republic; and that, in case of war, they should mutually assist each other with all their forces. This treaty, which placed its resources entirely at the disposal of France, was highly unpopular in the whole republic, and it was not without the utmost difficulty, and by the aid, both of threats of arresting a large portion of their members, and unbounded promises in case of compliance, that the councils could be brought to ratify it. The democratic spirit extended greatly in the country. Those chosen to the principal offices of government were all men of the most violent temperament, and a conspiracy was generally formed to emancipate themselves from French thralldom, and establish, instead of a Gallic yoke, real freedom. To curb this dangerous disposition, the Directory sent Trouvé, a man of a determined character, to Milan, and his first care was to suppress, by measures of severity, the spirit of freedom which threatened to thwart the ambitious projects of the French government. With this view the constitution of the Republic was violently changed by the Transalpine forces; the number of deputies was reduced from 240 to 120, and those only retained who were known to be devoted to the French government. After this violent revolution, Trouvé, who was detested throughout all Lombardy, was recalled, and Brune and Fouché were succe-

(1) Hard. v. 267, 270. Jom. x. 338. Ann. Reg. 1798, 65. Bot. ii. 470, 471. St.-Cyr, i. 39, 48.

(2) Hard. v. 263, 275. Bot. ii. 474, 475. Ann. Reg. 1798, 63.

sively sent in his stead; but all their efforts proved ineffectual to stem the torrent. The discontents went on continually increasing, and at length recourse was openly had to military force. On the morning of the 6th December, the legislative body was surrounded with foreign bayonets; the senators opposed to the French interest expelled; several members of the Directory changed, and the government prostrated, as in France and Holland, by a military despotism. The democratic constitution, established by Napoléon, was immediately annulled, and a new one established under the dictation of the French ambassadör, in the formation of which no attention was paid to the liberties or wishes of the people (1).

Excessive  
discontent  
excited by  
these chan-  
ges in Lon-  
bardy.

These violent changes, introduced by the mere force of military power, occasioned the utmost discontent in the Cisalpine republic; and contributed more than any thing that had yet occurred, to cool the ardour of the Italian Revolutionists. "This, then," it was

said, "is the faith, the fraternity, and the friendship which you have brought to us from France. This is the liberty, the prosperity, which you boast of having established in Italy! What vast materials for eloquence do you afford to those who have never trusted in your promises! They will say, that you never promised liberty to the Italians but in order that you might be the better enabled to plunder and oppress them; that under every project of reform were concealed new, and still more grievous, chains; that gold, not freedom, is your idol; that that fountain of every thing noble or generous is not made for you, nor you for it; finally, that the liberty of France consists entirely in words and speeches; in the howling of a frantic tribune, and the declamations of impudent sophists. These changes which, with your despotic power and so much unconcern, you have effected in the Cisalpine governments, will assuredly prove the forerunner of the fall of your own republic (2)."

The spoliation  
of the  
King of Sar-  
dinia is re-  
solved on.

While Lombardy was thus writhing under the withering grasp of the French Republic, the King of Sardinia was undergoing the last acts of humiliation from his merciless allies. The early peace which this monarch had concluded with their victorious general, the fidelity with which he had discharged his engagements, the firm support which the possession of his fortresses had given to their arms, were unable to save him from spoliation. The Directory persisted in believing that a rickety republic, torn by intestine divisions, would be a more solid support to their power than a king who had devoted his last soldier and his last gun to their service (3). They soon found an excuse for subjecting him finally to their power, and rewarding him for his faithful adherence to their cause by the forfeiture of all his continental dominions.

After the unworthy descendant of Emmanuel Victor had opened the gates of Italy to France by the fatal cession of the Piedmontese fortresses (4), his

(1) Bot. iii. 45, 58. Lac. xiv. 172. Th. x. 175, 177 Jom. x. 364, 365.

(2) Bot. ii. 53. Th. x. 177, 178.

Lacien Bonaparte did not hesitate, at Milan, to give vent to the same sentiments. "Nothing," said he, "can excuse the bad faith which has characterized these transactions. The innovations in the Cisalpine republic, tending as they do to abridge popular freedom by the excessive power they confer upon the Directory, especially the exclusive right of proposing laws, are worthy of eternal condemnation. Nations, disgusted at last with the vain and empty name of liberty which France is continually resounding in their ears, and with the

constitutions given to them one day, only to be taken away the next, will finally conceive a well-founded detestation of the Republic, and prefer their former submission to a sovereign."—Botta, ii. 53.

(3) Jom. x. 365.

(4) The magnitude of the obligation thus conferred by Piedmont on France, was fully admitted by the Directory. "Never," said they, on congratulating Charles-Emmanuel on his accession to the throne, "Never will France forget the obligations which she owes to the Prince of Piedmont."—HARD, vii. 72.



**Cruel humiliations to which he had previously been subjected.** life had been a continual scene of mortification and humiliations. His territories were traversed in every direction by French columns, of whose approach he received no notification except a statement of the supplies required by them, which he was obliged to furnish gratuitously to the Republican commissaries. He was compelled to banish all the emigrants from his dominions, and oppress his subjects by enormous contributions for the use of his insatiable allies; while the language of the revolutionary clubs, openly patronised by the French ambassador and agents, daily became more menacing to the regal government. At length they threw off the mask. The insurgents of the valleys of the Tanaro and the Bormida assembled to the number of six thousand in the neighbourhood of Carrosio, supported by two thousand troops of the Ligurian republic, who left Genoa at midday, with drums beating and the tricolor flag flying. Ginguené, the French ambassador, endeavoured to persuade the King, in the usual language of revolutionists, that there was no danger in conceding all the demands of the insurgents, but great in opposing any resistance to their wishes; and strongly urged the necessity, as a measure of security, of his placing the citadel of Turin in the hands of a French garrison; while the Ligurian republic resolutely refused any passage for the Piedmontese troops through that part of their territories which required to be passed before the insulated district of Carrosio could be reached. This was soon followed by a menacing proclamation, in which they declared their resolution to support the insur-  
June 10, 1798 gents to the utmost of their power; while the French ambassador continued to insist for a complete pardon of these rebels, on condition of their laying down their arms, and above all, the immediate surrender of the citadel of Turin. When the troops of Piedmont approached the Ligurian territory to attack the rebels in Carrosio, the French ambassador forbade them to pass the frontier, lest they should violate the neutrality of the allied republic. Notwithstanding this, they came up with the united forces of the insurgents and Genoese, and defeated them in two engagements, with such loss, that it was evident their total overthrow was at hand. The Directory now threw off the mask; they pretended that a conspiracy had been discovered for renewing the Sicilian Vespers with all the French in Piedmont, and, as a test of the King not being involved in the design, insisted on the immediate cession of the citadel of Turin. Pressed on all sides, threatened with insurrection in his own dominions, and menaced  
June 27, 1798. with the whole weight of republican vengeance, the King at length submitted to their demands; and that admirable fortress, the masterpiece of Vauban, which had stood, a century before, the famous siege which enabled the Austrian forces, under Eugene, to advance to its relief, and terminated in the expulsion of the French from Italy, was yielded without a struggle to their arms (1).

**The King is reduced to a prisoner.** The surrender of this impregnable fortress put the King of Sardinia entirely at the mercy of the French troops. He was no longer permitted the semblance even of regal authority; French guards attended him on all occasions, and, under the semblance of respect, kept him a state prisoner in his own palace; while the ambassadors of the other powers, deeming Piedmont now a French province, wrote to their respective sovereigns requesting to be recalled from Turin, where the French ambassador was now the real sovereign. The republican generals improved the time to reduce the



unhappy monarch to despair. They loaded all his ministers, civil and military, with accusations, and insisted on their dismissal from his court and capital; forced him to abandon all proceedings against the insurgents of every description; new-modelled the government according to their republican ideas, and compelled him to deliver up all the places he had taken from the Genoese republic (1).

He is at length forced to abdicate, and retire to Sardinia. For a few months this shadow of authority was left to the King; but at length his complete dethronement was effected. He was charged with having, in his secret correspondence with Vienna, allowed a wish to escape him, that he might soon be delivered from his imperious allies; and only made his peace with the Directory by the immediate payment of 8,000,000 francs, or L.350,000. When the Roman republic was invaded by the Neapolitans, he was ordered to furnish the stipulated contingent of eight thousand men; and this was agreed to. The surrender of all the royal arsenals was next demanded; and during the discussion of that demand, the French, under Joubert, treacherously commenced hostilities (2). Novarra, Suza, Coni, and Alexandria, were surprised; a few battalions who attempted to resist were driven into Turin, where the King, having drained the cup of misery to the dregs, was compelled to resign all his continental dominions, which were immediately taken possession of by the French authorities. A fugitive from his capital, the ill-fated monarch left his palace by torch-light during the night, and owed his safe retreat to the island of Sardinia to the generous efforts of Talleyrand, then ambassador at Turin, who protected him from the dangers which threatened his life. A provisional government was immediately established in Turin, composed of twenty-five of the most violent of the democratic party; while Grouchy seized hold of the treasury, arsenals, and fortresses of the kingdom, and published a proclamation, denoun-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1798. 122. Not. iii. 112, 115. Lac. xiv. 177.

(2) Recovering, in the last extremity, a portion of the courage which, if earlier exerted, might have averted their fate, the Piedmontese cabinet at this crisis prepared a manifesto, which the Directory instantly and carefully suppressed. It bore:—“The Piedmontese government, in the anxious wish of sparing its subjects the misfortunes which threatened it, has acceded to all the demands of the French Republic, both in contributions, clothing, and supplies for the army of Italy, though greatly exceeding the engagements which it had contracted, and which were so burdensome as entirely to exhaust the royal treasury. His majesty has even gone so far as to agree to place in their hands the citadel of Turin; and the very day on which it was demanded, he gave orders for the furnishing of the contingent stipulated by the treaty. At the same moment he dispatched a messenger to Paris to negotiate concerning other demands, which were inadmissible, in particular the surrender of all the arsenals. But in the midst of these measures, the commander of the French garrison in the citadel of Turin violently seized possession of the towns of Novarra, Alexandria, Chivasso, and Suza. His majesty, profoundly afflicted at these events, feels it his duty to declare thus publicly, that he has faithfully performed all his engagements to France, and given no provocation whatever to the disastrous events which threaten his kingdom.” Grouchy, the French general, forced the King to suppress this proclamation, threatening to bombard him in his own palace in case of refusal. [Hard. vii. 117.]

The unworthy intrigues, falsehoods, and menaces by which the resignation of the throne was forced

upon the King, are thus detailed by the same general in his secret report to the Directory.—“The moment had now arrived, when all the springs which I had prepared were to be put in motion. At this crisis, an envoy came to me from the King; he was a man to be gained, and was so; other persons were also corrupted; but the great difficulty was, that these propositions all emanated from the King, and that no writing reached me, so that in no event could I be disavowed. Circumspection was the more necessary, as war was not yet declared against the King of Sardinia, and it was necessary to act so that his resignation might appear to be voluntary. I confined myself to threatening the envoy, and sent him out of the citadel. Meanwhile, my secret agents were incessantly at work; the envoy returned to me; I announced the arrival of columns which had not yet come up; and informed him that the hour of vengeance had arrived, that Turin was surrounded on all sides, that escape was impossible, and that unqualified submission alone remained. The Council of State had sat all the morning; my hidden emissaries there had carried their point. The conditions I exacted were agreed to. I insisted, as an indispensable preliminary, that all the Piedmontese troops which had been assembled in Turin for a month past, should be dismissed; in presence of Clausel, the King signed the order; and after eight hours of further altercation, the same officer compelled him to sign the whole articles which I had required.”—See HARD. vii. 118, 120. See also *the Resignation*, correctly given in HARD. vii. 122, *et seq.* The French general made the King disavow the proclamation already quoted, of which some copies had been printed.

cing the pain of death against whoever had a pound of powder or a gun in his possession, and declaring that any nobles who might engage in an insurrection should be arrested, sent to France, and have half their goods confiscated (1).

While these events were in progress in the north of Italy, war had arisen and a kingdom been overthrown in the south of the peninsula. Naples, placed on the edge of the revolutionary volcano since the erection of the States of the Church into a separate republic, had viewed with the utmost alarm the progress of the democratic spirit in its dominions; and on the occupation of Rome by the French troops, thirty thousand men were stationed in the mountain passes on the frontier, in the belief that an immediate invasion was intended. These apprehensions were not diminished by the appearance of the expedition to Egypt in the Mediterranean, the capture of Malta, and the vicinity of so large a force to the coasts of Naples. Rightly judging, from the fate of the other states in Italy, that their destruction was unavoidable, either from internal revolution or external violence, if measures were not taken to avert the danger, the Neapolitan cabinet augmented their military establishment, and secretly entered into negotiations with Austria, whose disposition to put a stop to the further encroachments of France was obvious from their occupation of the Grisons, for the purpose of concerting measures for their common defence. The French ambassador, Garat, a well-known republican, in vain endeavoured to allay their apprehensions; but, at the same time, smiled at the feeble military force with which they hoped to arrest the conquerors of Arcola and Rivoli (2).

Considered merely with reference to the number and equipment of its forces, the Neapolitan monarchy was by no means to be despised, and was capable, apparently, of interfering with decisive effect in the approaching struggle between France and Austria in the Italian peninsula. Its infantry consisted of thirty thousand regular soldiers and fifteen thousand militia; the artillery, organized by French officers, was on the best possible footing; and the cavalry had given proof of its efficiency in the actions on the Po, in the commencement of the campaign of 1796. Forty thousand men were ordered to be added to the army, to carry it to the war establishment, and the militia to be quadrupled. But these energetic measures were never carried into full execution; notwithstanding the imposition of heavy taxes, and liberal donations from the nobility and clergy, insurmountable difficulties were experienced in the levying and equipping so large a body of troops; and the effective forces of the monarchy never exceeded sixty thousand men, of which one-third were required to garrison the fortresses on the frontier. These troops, such as they were, appeared deficient in military spirit; the officers, appointed by court intrigue, had lost all the confidence of the soldiers; and the discipline, alternately carried on on the German and Spanish systems, was in the most deplorable state. To crown the whole, the common men, especially in the infantry, were destitute of courage; a singular circumstance in the descendants of the Samnites, but which has invariably been the disgrace of the Neapolitan army since the fall of the Roman empire (3).

The French commenced their revolutionary measures in Naples by requiring the immediate liberation of all those of the democratic party who were confined for political offences, and though this demand

(1) Hard. vii. 126, 128. Jom. xi. 59. Lac. xiv. 178, 179. Bot. iii. 120, 137.

(2) Jom. xi. 33, 34. Lac. xiv. 165, 166. Ann. Reg. 1798, 125.

(3) Jom. xi. 34. Ann. Reg. 1798, 121, 125.

was highly obnoxious to the court, yet such was the terror inspired by the French arms, that they were obliged to comply. Meanwhile, intrigues of every kind were set on foot by the French agents in the Neapolitan territories; the insolence of their ambassador knew no bounds; the grossest libels were daily published in the Roman papers, under the direction of the French generals, against the queen and the royal family (1); and a general military survey made of the Neapolitan frontiers, and transmitted to the Directory at Paris.

The court  
enter into  
secret en-  
gagements  
with Aus-  
tria.

During these revolutionary measures, however, the French were daily augmenting their forces at Rome, and making preparations for offensive operations; and the cabinet of Naples was warned not to put any reliance on so distant a power as Austria, as the French

in the Ecclesiastical States would be adequate to the conquest of Naples before the Imperial troops could pass the Pô. But the court were firm; the military preparations were continued with unabated vigour, and a treaty, offensive and defensive, was concluded with the Emperor, by which the King of Naples was to be assisted, in the event of an invasion, by a powerful army of Austrians. It was no part of the first design of the Neapolitans to commence hostilities, but to wait till the Republicans were fully engaged with the Imperialists on the Adige, when it was thought their forces might act with effect in the centre of the peninsula (2).

Aug. 20,  
1799.

Matters were in this inflammable state in the kingdom of Naples when the intelligence arrived of the glorious victory of the Nile, and the total destruction of the French fleet on the shores of Egypt. The effect produced over all Europe, but especially in Italy, by this great event, was truly electrical. It was the first decisive defeat which the French had experienced since the rise of the Republic; it an-

And are en-  
couraged to  
trust by the  
battle of the  
Nile.

nilated their naval power in the Mediterranean, left Malta to its fate, and, above all, seemed to banish Napoléon and his victorious troops for ever from the scene of European warfare. The language of humiliation and despondency was every where laid aside; loud complaints of the perfidy and extortion of the French armies became universal; and the giddy multitude, who had recently hailed their approach with tumultuous shouts of joy, taught by bitter experience, now prepared to salute, with still louder acclamations, those who should deliver them from their yoke (3).

The enthusiasm at Naples was already very great, when the arrival of Nelson with his victorious fleet at that port, raised it to the highest possible pitch. He was received with more than regal honours; the King and the Queen went out to meet him in the bay; the immense and ardent population of the capi-

On Nelson's  
arrival at  
Naples, they  
raptly re-  
ceive an  
hostilities.

tal rent the air with their acclamations; and the shores of Posilippo were thronged with crowds anxious to catch a glance of the Conqueror of the Nile. The remonstrances of the French ambassador were unable to restrain the universal joy; the presence of the British

admiral was deemed a security against every danger; a signal for the resurrection of the world against its oppressors. In vain Ariola, and the more prudent counsellors of the King, represented the extreme peril of attacking, with their inexperienced forces, the veterans of France before the Austrians were ready to support them on the Adige; these wise remonstrances were disregarded, and the war party, at the head of which were the Queen and Lady

(1) Hard. vii. 6, 8.

(2) Jom. x. 36. Bot. iii. 142. Ann. Reg. 1798, Th. x. 141, 142.

(3) Jom. xi. 36, 37. Ann. Reg. 1798, 126, 127.

Hamilton, the wife of the English ambassador, succeeded in producing a determination for the immediate commencement of hostilities (1).

Though irritated to the last degree at the determined stand which the King of Naples had made against their revolutionary designs, and the open joy his subjects had testified at their disasters, the French were by no means desirous at this time to engage in immediate warfare with a new opponent. The battle of the Nile, and consequent isolation of their bravest army and best general, had greatly damped the arrogance of their former presumption : their finances were in an inextricable state of confusion ; the soldiers, both at Rome and Mantua, had lately mutinied from want of pay ; and the forces of Austria, supported, as it was foreseen they would be, by those of Russia, were rapidly increasing both in numbers and efficiency. In these circumstances, it was their obvious policy to temporize, and delay the overthrow of the Neapolitan monarchy till the great levies they were making in France were ready to take the field, and keep in check the Imperial forces on the Adige till the work of revolution in the south of Italy was completed (2).

Force levied  
by the  
French in  
the affiliated  
Republics.

Meanwhile, the affiliated republics were called on to take their full share of the burdens consequent upon their alliance with France. Every man in Switzerland capable of bearing arms, from sixteen to forty-five years of age, was put in requisition ; the King of Sardinia compelled to advance 8,000,000 francs ; the Cisalpine republic assessed at a loan of 24,000,000 francs, or L.1,000,000 sterling, and required to put its whole contingent at the disposal of France ; and a fresh contribution of 12,000,000 francs imposed on the Roman territory, besides having assignats issued on the security of ecclesiastical estates (3).

Mack takes  
the com-  
mand in  
Naples.

Previous to the commencement of hostilities, the Neapolitan government had requested the Austrians to send them some general capable of directing the movements of the large force which they had in readiness to take the field. The Aulic Council sent General Mack, an officer who stood high at Vienna in the estimation of military men, but who, though skilled in sketching out plans of a campaign on paper, and possessed of considerable talent in strategetical design, was totally destitute of the penetration and decision requisite for success in the field. Nelson at once saw through his character. "Mack," said he, "cannot travel without five carriages. I have formed my opinion of him : would to God that I may be mistaken !" An opinion which, to the disgrace of Austria, was too literally verified in the events at Ulm, which have given a mournful celebrity to his name (4).

Dispersed  
situation of  
the French  
troops.

For long the Directory persisted in the belief that the Neapolitans would never venture to take the field till the Austrian forces were ready to support them, which it was known would not be the case till the following spring. They had done nothing, accordingly, towards concentrating their troops : and when there could no longer be any doubt that war was about to commence, their only resource was to send Championnet to take the command of the army in the environs of Rome. He found them dispersed over a surface of sixty leagues. Macdonald, with 6000, lay at Terracina, and guarded the narrow defile betwixt its rocks and the Mediterranean sea ; Casa Bianca with the left wing, 5000 strong, occupied the reverse of the Apennines towards Ancona ; in the centre, General Lemoine, with

(1) Journ. xi. 37. Ann. Reg. 1798, 128. Th. x. 143, 144.

(2) Journ. xi. 37, 38. Ann. Reg. 1798, 129.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1798, 128. Lac. xiv. 168.

(4) Southey's Nelson, li. 19. Journ. xi. 168. Harl. vii. 16.

1000 men, was stationed at Terni, and watched the central defiles of the Apennines; while 5000 were in the neighbourhood of Rome. Thus 20,000 men were stretched across the peninsula from sea to sea, while double that number of Neapolitans were concentrated in the environs of Capua, ready to separate and overwhelm them. This was rendered the more feasible, as the bulk of the Neapolitan forces advanced in the Abruzzi, had passed, by a considerable distance, the Republicans at Rome and Terracina. Circumstances never occurred more favourable to a decisive stroke, had the Neapolitan generals possessed capacity to undertake, or their soldiers' courage to execute it (1).

Nov. 23,  
1798.

Mack com-  
mences hos-  
tilities.

Mack began his operations on the 23d of November; but, instead of profiting by the dispersion of the French force, to throw an overwhelming mass upon their centre, detach and surround the right wing and troops at Rome, which were so far advanced as almost to invite his seizure, he divided his forces into five columns to enter the Roman territory by as many different points of attack. A corps of seven thousand infantry and six hundred horse, was destined to advance along the shore of the Adriatic towards Ancona; two thousand men were directed against Terni and Foligno; the main body, under Mack in person, consisting of twenty thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry, was moved forward, through the centre of the Peninsula, by Valmontone, on Frascati, while eight thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry advanced by Terracina and the Pontine marshes on Albano and Rome, and five thousand men were embarked on board some of Lord Nelson's ships, to be landed at Leghorn and effect a diversion in the rear of the enemy (2).

The Neapo-  
litans enter  
Rome.

The overwhelming force which was directed against Frascati, and which threatened to separate the Republicans stationed there from the remainder of the army, obliged Championnet to evacuate Rome and concentrate his forces at Terni; and the King of Naples made his triumphal entry into that city on the 29th. Such, however, was the state of discipline of his troops, that they fell into confusion merely from the fatigues of the march and the severity of the rains, and arrived in as great disorder at the termination of a few days' advance, as if they had sustained a disastrous retreat. While Mack was reorganizing his battalions at Rome, General Lemoine succeeded in surrounding and making prisoners the corps of two thousand men which advanced against Terni; while Giustini, who commanded another little column in the centre, was driven over the mountains to the main body on the banks of the Tiber. The corps which advanced against Ancona, after some trifling success, was thrown back about the same time within the Neapolitan frontier (3).

They are  
every where  
defeated  
where ad-  
vancing  
further.

These successes, and the accounts he received of the disordered state of the main body of the enemy's forces at Rome, encouraged Championnet to keep his ground on the southern slope of the Apennines. Stationing, therefore, Macdonald, with a large force, at Civita Castellana, the ancient Veii, a city surrounded by inaccessible precipices, he hastened himself to Ancona to accelerate the formation of the parks of artillery, and the organization of the reserves of the army. This distribution of his forces exposed the troops at Civita Castellana to the risk of being cut off by an irruption, in force, of the enemy upon the line of their retreat

(1) Jom. xi. 28, 30, 40. Ann. Reg. 1798, 121.

(3) Jom. xi. 44, 46. Ann. Reg. 1798, 129. Hard.

(2) Hard. vii. 16, 19. Jom. xi. 40, 41. Lec. xiv. v. 17, 18, 169, 233.



at Terni; but the Republicans had not to contend either with the genius or the troops of Napoléon. Mack, persisting in the system of dividing his forces, exposed them to defeat from the veterans of France at every point of attack, and in truth, their character was such that by no possible exertions could they be brought to face the enemy. One of his columns, commanded by the Chevalier Saxe, destined to turn Civita Castellana on the left, was attacked, at the bridge of Borghetto over the Tiber, by Kniazwitz, at the head of three thousand of the Polish legion, and totally defeated, with the loss of all its artillery. The other, intended to turn it on the right, encountered the advanced guard of Macdonald near Nepi, and was speedily routed, with the loss of two thousand prisoners, all its baggage, and fifteen pieces of artillery. Dec. 4, 1798. In the centre, Marshal Bourcard in vain endeavoured to force the bridge of Rome, thrown over the chasm on the southern side of Civita Castellana; and at length Mack, finding both his wings defeated, withdrew his forces, and began to meditate a new design to dislodge his antagonists from their formidable position (1).

**Fresh disasters of the Neapolitans.** Instructed by this disaster, both in regard to the miserable quality of his own troops and the ruinous selection he had made of the point of attack, Mack resolved upon a different disposition of his forces. Leaving, therefore, Marshal Bourcard with four thousand men in front of Civita Castellana, he transported the main body of his army to the other bank of the Tiber, with the design of overwhelming Lemoine in the central and important position of Terni. This movement, which, if rapidly executed with steady troops, might have been attended with decisive success, became, from the slowness with which it was performed, and the wretched quality of the soldiers to whom it was intrusted, the source of irreparable disasters. Dec. 10. General Metch, who commanded his advanced guard, five thousand strong, having descended from the mountains and surprised Otricoli, was soon assailed there by General Mathieu, and driven back to Calvi, where he was thrown into such consternation by the arrival of Kniazwitz on his flank with fifteen hundred men, that he laid down his arms with four thousand men (2), though both the attacking columns did not exceed three thousand five hundred.

**Retreat of Mack.** After this check, accompanied with such disgraceful conduct on the part of the troops, Mack despaired of success, and instantly commenced his retreat towards the Neapolitan frontier. The King of Naples hastily left Rome in the night, and fled in the utmost alarm to his own capital, while Mack retired with all his forces, abandoning the Ecclesiastical States to their fate. Dec. 12. Championnet vigorously pursued the retiring column; the French troops entered Rome; and General Damas, cut off with three thousand men from the main body, and driven to Orbitello, concluded a convention with Kellermann, by which it was agreed that they should evacuate the Tuscan states without being considered as prisoners of war. Seventeen days after the opening of the campaign, the Neapolitan troops were expelled at all points from the ecclesiastical territory; Rome was again in the hands of the Republicans; eighteen thousand veterans had driven before them forty thousand men, splendidly dressed and abundantly equipped, but destitute of all the discipline and courage requisite to obtain success in war (3).

(1) Th. x. 194, 195, 196. Jom. xi. 48, 50.

(2) Th. x. 196, 197. Jom. xi. 55, 57. Bot. iii.

(3) Jom. xi. 52, 53, Th. x. 195, 196. Ann. Reg. 141, 147. 1798, 131.



The Neapolitan court take refuge on board the English fleet. Dec. 27, 1798. Such was the terror inspired by these disasters, that the Court of Naples did not conceive themselves in safety even in their own capital. On the 21st December, the royal family, during the night, withdrew on board Nelson's fleet, and embarked for Sicily, taking with them the most valuable effects in the palace at Naples and Caserta, the chief curiosities in the museum of Portici, and above a million in specie from the public treasury. The inhabitants of the capital were thrown into the utmost consternation when they learned in the morning that the royal family and ministers had all fled, leaving to them the burden of maintaining a disastrous and ruinous contest with France. Nothing, of course, could be expected from the citizens when the leaders of the state had been the first to show the example of desertion. The revolutionary spirit immediately broke out in the democratical part of the community; rival authorities were constituted, the dissensions of party paralysed the efforts of the few who were attached to their country, and every thing seemed to promise an easy victory to the invaders (1).

Championnet not resolves to invade Naples. Meanwhile, Championnet was engaged in preparations for the conquest of Naples; an object which, considered in a military point of view, required little more than vigour and capacity, but which, politically, could not fail to be highly injurious to the interests of France, by the demonstration it would afford of the insatiable nature of the spirit of propagandism by which its government was actuated, and the dispersion of its military force over the whole extent of the peninsula which it would produce. The sagacity of Napoléon was never more clearly evinced than in the resistance which he made to the tempting offers made to him in his first campaign for the conquest of Rome; and the wisdom of his resolution was soon manifested by the disastrous effects which followed the extension of the French forces into the extremity of Naples, when they had the whole weight of Austria to expect on the Adige (2).

His plan of operations. Untaught by the ruinous consequences of an undue dispersion of force by the Austrian commander, Championnet fell into precisely the same error in the invasion of Naples. He had at his disposal, after deducting the garrisons of Rome and Ancona, twenty-one thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, having received considerable reinforcements from the north of Italy since the contest commenced. This force he divided into five columns: on the extreme right, Rey; with two thousand five hundred infantry and eight hundred cavalry, was ordered to advance by the Pontine marshes to Terracina, while Macdonald, with seven thousand foot and three hundred horse, pushed forward to Ciprano; Lemoine, with four thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry, was directed to move upon Sulmona; while seven thousand infantry and two hundred horse, under Duhesme, ascended the course of the Pescara to Popoli, where they were to effect their junction with the division of Lemoine. The object of these complicated movements was to assemble a formidable force in front of Capua and along the stream of the Volturnus; but the difficulty of uniting the different columns after a long march in a mountainous and rugged country was so great, that, had they been opposed by an enemy of skill and resolution, they would have experienced the fate of Wurmser, when he divided his army in presence of Napoléon on the opposite sides of the lake of Guarda (3).

(1) Jom. xi. 60, 61. Th. x, 199. Lac. xiv. 234.  
Bot. iii. 154, 155.

(2) Jom. xi. 61. Bot. iii. 150.

(3) Jom. xi. 64, 65. Bot. iii. 150, 151.

**His surpris-  
ing success.** Notwithstanding their perilous dispersion of force, the invading army at all points met with surprising success. On approaching the Neapolitan territory, they found Mack posted with twenty-five thousand men in a strong position behind the Volturnus, stretching from Castella Mare to Scaffa di Cajazzo; having Capua, with its formidable ramparts, in the centre, and both its wings covered by a numerous artillery. But nothing could induce the Neapolitan troops to withstand the enemy. After a sharp skirmish, their advanced guard abandoned the wooded cliffs of Itri, fled through their almost impregnable thickets to Gaeta, the strongest place in the Neapolitan dominions, which surrendered with its garrison, three thousand six hundred strong, on the first summons of General Rey, with an inferior force. The troops on the left, behind the Volturnus, seized with an unaccountable panic, at the same time abandoned their position and artillery, and fled for refuge under the cannon of Capua. Thither they were pursued in haste by Macdonald's division; but the cannon of the ramparts opened upon them so terrible a fire of grape-shot, that they were repulsed with great slaughter; and had the Neapolitan cavalry obeyed Mack's order to charge at that critical moment, that division of the French army would have been totally destroyed (1).

**Critical situation of  
Championnet in front  
of Capua.** But though the junction of the divisions of Rey and Macdonald, and the capture of Gaeta, gave Championnet a solid footing on the great road from Rome to Naples, in front of the Volturnus, his situation was daily becoming more critical. For more than a week no intelligence had been received from the other divisions of the army; the detachments sent out to gain intelligence, found all the mountain passes in the interior of the Abruzzi choked up with snow, and the villages in a state of insurrection; Itri, Fondi, and all the posts in the rear of the army, soon fell into the hands of the peasants, who evinced a courage which afforded a striking contrast to the pusillanimity of the regular forces; and the victorious division was insulated in the midst of its conquests. At the same time, the insurrection spread with the utmost rapidity in the whole Terra di Lavoro; a large assemblage of armed peasants collected at Sessa, the bridge over the Volturnus was broken down, and all the insulated detachments of the army  
Jan. 6, 1799. attacked with a fury very different from the languid operations of the regular forces. Had Mack profited by his advantages, and made a vigorous attack with his whole centre upon Macdonald's division, there is reason to think that, notwithstanding the pusillanimity of his troops, he might have forced them to a disastrous retreat (2).

**Mack proposes an  
armistice,  
which is  
gladly accepted.** But the Austrian general had now lost all confidence in the forces under his command; and the vacillation of the provisional government at Naples, gave him no hopes of receiving support from the rear in the event of disaster. An attempt against the mountains of Cajazzo with a few battalions failed; Damas had not yet arrived with the troops from Tuscany; of nine battalions, routed at the passage of the Volturnus, none but the officers had entered Naples, and he was aware that a powerful party, having ramifications in his own camp, was desirous to take advantage of the vicinity of the French army to overturn the monarchy. Rendered desperate by these untoward circumstances, he resolved to make the most of the critical situation of the invaders, by proposing an armistice. The situa-

(1) Jom. xi. 65, 66. Bot. iii. 157. Th. x. 200.

(2) Jom. ix. 67, 70. Bot. ii. 157, 158. Th. i. 200. Hard. vii. 133, 134.

Jan. 11. 1799. tion of Championnet was become so hazardous, from the failure of provisions and the increasing boldness of the insurgents, that the proposal was accepted with joy, and an armistice for two months was agreed to, on condition that 2,500,000 francs should be paid in fifteen days, and the fortresses of Capua, Acerra, and Benevento, delivered up to the French forces. Thus, by the extraordinary pusillanimity of the Italian troops, was the French general delivered from a situation all but hopeless, and an army, which ran the most imminent danger of passing through the Caudine forks, enabled to dictate a glorious peace to its enemies. Shortly after the conclusion of the convention (1), Mack, disgusted with the conduct of his soldiers, and finding that they were rapidly melting away by desertion, resigned the command and retired to Naples.

Indignation which it excites among the Neapolitan populace. The intelligence of this armistice excited the utmost indignation among the populace of that capital, whose inhabitants, like all others of Greek descent, were extremely liable to vivid impressions, and totally destitute of the information requisite to form a correct judgment on the chance of success. The discontent was raised to the highest pitch by the arrival of the French commissaries appointed to receive payment of the first instalment of the contribution stipulated by the convention. The popular indignation was now worked up to a perfect fury; the lazzaroni flew to arms; the regular troops refused to act against the insurgents; the cry arose that they had been betrayed by the viceroy, the general, and the army; and the people, assembling in multitudes, exclaimed, "Long live our holy faith; long live the Neapolitan people." In the midst of the general confusion, the viceroy and the provisional government fled to Sicily; for three days the city was a prey to all the horrors of anarchy; and the tumult was only appeased by the appointment of Prince Moliterno and the Duke of Bocca Romana as chiefs of the insurrection, who engaged to give it a direction that might save the capital from the ruin with which it was threatened (2).

Advance of the French against Naples. Meanwhile, the divisions in the Abruzzi having fortunately effected their junction with the main army on the Volturnus, Championnet advanced in three columns, with all his forces, towards Naples, while Mack, whose life was equally threatened by the furious lazzaroni and his own soldiers, sought safety in the French camp. Championnet had the generosity to leave him his sword, and treat him with the hospitality due to his misfortunes: an admirable piece of courtesy, which the Directory showed they were incapable of appreciating, by ordering him to be detained a prisoner of war. As the French army approached Naples, the fury of the parties at each other increased in violence, and the insurrection of the lazzaroni assumed a more formidable character. Distrusting all their leaders of rank or property, whose weakness had in truth proved that they were unworthy of confidence, they deposed Prince Moliterno and the Duke of Bocca Romana, and elected two simple lazzaroni, Paggio and Michel le Fou, to be their leaders. Almost all the shopkeepers and burghers, however, being attached to democratic principles, desired a revolutionary government, and to these were now added nearly the whole class of proprietors, who were justly afraid of general pillage, if the unruly defenders, to whom their fate was unhappily intrusted, should prove successful. The quarters of

(1) Bot. iii. 158, 160. Jom. xi. 72, 73. Th. x. 200. Hard. vii. 134, 139.

(2) Th. x. 201. Bot. iii. 160, 161. Jom. xi. 74.

Championnet, in consequence, were besieged by deputations from the more opulent citizens, who offered to assist his forces in effecting the reduction of the capital; but the French general, aware of the danger of engaging a desperate population in the streets of a great city, refused to advance till fort St.-Elmo, which commands the town, was put into the hands of the partisans of the Republic. This assurance having at length been given, he put all his forces in motion, and advanced in three columns against the city.

At the same time he issued a proclamation to the Neapolitan people, in which he said, "Be not alarmed, we are not your enemies. The French punish unjust and haughty kings, but they bear no arms against the people. Those who show themselves friends of the Republic will be secured in their persons and property, and experience only its protection. Disarm the perfidious wretches who excite you to resistance. You will change your government for one of a republican form: I am about to establish a provisional government(1)." In effect, a revolutionary committee was immediately organized at the French headquarters, having at its head Charles Laubert, a furious republican, and formerly one of the warmest partisans of Robespierre.

Desperate  
resistance of  
the lazzar-  
oni.

But the lazzaroni of Naples, brave and enthusiastic, were not intimidated by his approach, and though deserted by their king, their government, their army, and their natural leaders, prepared with undaunted resolution to defend their country. Acting with inconceivable energy, they at once drew the artillery from the arsenals to guard the avenues to the city, commenced intrenchments on the heights which commanded its different approaches, armed the ardent multitude with whatever weapons chance threw in their way, barricaded the principal streets, and stationed guards at all the important points in its vast circumference. The few regular troops who had not deserted their colours were formed into a reserve, consisting of four battalions and a brigade of cannoniers. The zeal of the populace was inflamed by a nocturnal procession of the head and blood of St.-Januarius around the city, and the enthusiastic multitude issued in crowds from the gates to meet the conquerors of Italy (2).

Frightful  
combats  
around the  
capital,  
21st and  
22d Jan.  
1799.

The combat which ensued was one of the most extraordinary of the revolutionary war, fruitful as it was in events of unprecedented character. For three days the battle lasted, between Aversa and Capua,—on the one side, numbers, resolution, and enthusiasm; on the other, discipline, skill, and military experience. Often the Republican ranks were broken by the impetuous charges of their infuriated opponents; but these transient moments of success led to no lasting result, from the want of any reserve to follow up the advantage, and the disorder into which any rapid advance threw the tumultuary ranks. Still crowd after crowd succeeded. As the assailants were swept down by volleys of grape-shot, new multitudes rushed forward. The plain was covered with the dead and the dying; and the Republicans, weary with the work of slaughter, slept at night beside their guns, within pistol-shot of their indomitable opponents. At length the artillery and skill of the French prevailed; the Neapolitans were driven back into the city, still resolved to defend it to the last extremity (3).

A terrible combat ensued at the gate of Capua. The Swiss battalion, which,

(1) Jom. xi. 76, 79. Th. x. 202. Bot. iii. 162, 163. Hard. vii. 139, 144, 149.

(2) Jom. xi. 79. Lac. xiv. 242. Bot. iii. 162.

(3) Bot. iii. 164, 165. Jom. xi. 79, 80. Lac. xiv. 242. Hard. vii. 151, 153.

The French  
force the  
gates and  
forts; bloody  
conflicts in  
the streets.

with two thousand lazzaroni, was entrusted with the defence of that important post, long resisted all the efforts of the Republicans.

Two attacks were repulsed with great slaughter, and at length the chief of the staff, Thiébault, only succeeded in making himself

master of the entrance by feigning a retreat, and thus drawing the inexperienced troops from their barricades into the plain, where they were charged with the bayonet by the French, who entered the gate pell-mell with the fugitives. Still, however, they made good their ground in the streets. The Republicans found they could expel the besieged from their fastnesses only by burning down or blowing up the edifices, and their advance through the city was rendered almost impracticable by the mountains of slain which choked up the causeway. But while this heroic resistance was going on at the gates, a body of the citizens, attached to the French party, made themselves masters of the fort of St.-Elmo, and the castello del Uovo, and immediately sending intimation to Championnet, a body of troops were moved forward, and these important posts taken possession of by his soldiers. The lazzaroni shed tears of despair when they beheld the tricolor flag waving on the last strong-holds of their city; but still the resistance continued with unabated resolution. Championnet upon this gave orders for a general attack. Early

Jan. 21. on the morning of the 23d, the artillery from the castle of St.-Elmo showered down cannon-shot upon the city, and dense columns of infantry approached all the avenues to its principal quarters. Notwithstanding the utmost resistance, they made themselves masters of the fort del Carmine; but Kellermann was held in check by Paggio, near the Seraglio. The roofs of the houses were covered with armed men, showers of balls, flaming combustibles, and boiling water fell from the windows, and all the other columns were repulsed with great slaughter, when an accidental circumstance put an end to the strife, and gave the French the entire command of Naples. Michel-le-Fou, the lazzaroni leader, having been made prisoner, was conducted to the headquarters of the French general, and having been kindly treated, offered to mediate between the contending parties. Peace was speedily established. The French soldiers exclaimed, "Vive St.-Januaire,"—the Neapolitans, "Vivent les Français;" a guard of honour was given to St.-Januarius (1); and the populace, passing, with the characteristic levity of their nation, from one extreme to another, embraced the French soldiers with whom they had so recently been engaged in mortal strife (2).

Establish-  
ment of the  
Partheno-  
peian Re-  
public.

No sooner was the reduction of Naples effected than the lazzaroni were disarmed, the castles which command the city garrisoned by

French troops, royalty abolished, and a new democratic state, called

the *Parthenopeian Republic*, proclaimed in its stead. In the outset, a provisional government of twenty-one members was appointed. Their first measure was to levy upon the exhausted inhabitants of the capital a contribution of 12,000,000 of francs, or L.500,000, and upon the remainder of the kingdom one of 15,000,000 francs, or L.620,000, burdens which were felt as altogether overwhelming in that poor country, and were rendered doubly oppressive by the unequal manner in which they were levied, and the additional burden of feeding, clothing, lodging, and paying the troops, to which they were at

(1) Bot. iii. 166, 169. Jom. xi. 84, 85. Lac. xiv. 243, 244. Hard. vii. 159, 175.

(2) The most contumelious proclamations against the reigning family immediately covered the walls of Naples. In one of them it was said, "Who is the Capet who pretends to reign over you, in virtue of

the investiture of the Pope? Who is the crowned scoundrel who dares to govern you? Let him dread the fate of his relative who crushed by his despotism the rising liberty of the Gauls." (Signed) "CHAMPIONNET."—HARD. vii. 172, 173.



the same time subjected. Shortly after, there arrived Faypoult, the commissary of the Convention, who instantly sequestered the whole royal property, all the estates of the monasteries, the whole banks containing the property of individuals, the allodial lands, of which the King was only administrator, and even the curiosities of Herculaneum and Pompeii, though still buried in the bowels of the earth. Championnet, ashamed of this odious proceeding, suspended the decree of the Convention; upon which he was immediately recalled, indicted for his disobedience, and Macdonald intrusted with the supreme command; while a commission of twenty-five members was appointed to draw up a constitution for the new Republic. The constitution which they framed was, as might have been anticipated, fraught with the grossest injustice, and totally unsuitable to the circumstances of the country. Jacobin clubs were established; the right of election confined to colleges of electors named by government, deprived the people of the free franchises which they had inherited from the ancient customs; a national guard established, in which not three hundred men were ever enrolled; and, finally a decree passed, which declared that in every dispute between the barons and individuals, judgment should, without investigation, be given in favour of the private citizen! But amidst these frantic proceedings, the French generals and civil authorities did not lose sight of their favourite objects, public and private plunder; the arsenals, palaces, and private houses were pillaged without mercy; all the bronze cannon which could be found, melted down and sold; and the Neapolitan democrats had even the mortification of seeing the beautiful statues of the same metal which adorned the streets of their capital, disposed of to the highest bidder, to fill the pockets of their republican allies. The utmost discontent immediately ensued in all classes; the patriots broke out into vehement exclamations against the perfidy and avarice of their deliverers; and the democratic government soon became more odious even to the popular party than the regal authority by which it had been preceded (1).

State of  
Ireland.

While Italy, convulsed by democratic passions, was thus every where falling under the yoke of the French Directory, Great Britain underwent a perilous crisis of its fate; and the firmness and intrepidity of English patriotism was finely contrasted with the fumes of Continental democracy, and the vacillation of Continental resolution. Ireland was the scene of danger; the theatre, in so many periods of English history, of oppressive or unfortunate legislation on the side of government, and of fierce and blindfold passions on the part of the people.

Reflections  
on the melancholy  
history of that  
country.

In surveying the annals of this unhappy country, it appears impossible at first sight to explain the causes of its suffering by any of the known principles of human nature. Severe and conciliatory policy seem to have been equally unavailing to heal its wounds. Conquest has failed in producing submission, severity in enforcing tranquillity, indulgence in awakening gratitude. The irritation excited by the original subjugation of the island, seems to be unabated after the lapse of five centuries; the indulgence with which it has been often treated, has led uniformly only to increased exasperation, and more formidable insurrections; and the greater part of the suffering which it has so long undergone, appears to have arisen from the measures of severity rendered necessary by the excitation of popular passion consequent on every attempt to return to a more lenient system of government.

(1) Rot. iii. 172, 177. Jom. xi. 318, 319. Hard. vii. 179, 187.



The first British sovereign who directed his attention to the improvement of Ireland was James I. He justly boasted that there would be found the true theatre of his glory, and that he had done more in a single reign for the improvement of that important part of the empire, than all his predecessors, from the days of Henry II. Instead of increased tranquillity and augmented gratitude, there broke out, shortly after, the dreadful rebellion of 1641, which was only extinguished by Cromwell in oceans of blood. A severe and oppressive code was imposed soon after the Revolution in 1688, and under it the island remained discontented, indeed, but comparatively tranquil, for a hundred years. The more galling parts of this code were removed by the beneficent policy of George III. From 1780 to 1798, was an uninterrupted course of improvement, concession, and removal of disability, and this indulgent policy was immediately followed by the rebellion of 1798. The last fetters of restriction were struck off by the Catholic Relief Bill in 1829, and the exasperation, discontent, and violence in Ireland, which immediately followed, have been unprecedented in the long course of its humiliated existence. All the promises of tranquillity so often held forth by its advocates were falsified, and half a century of unbroken indulgence was succeeded by the fierce demand for the Repeal of the Union, and a degree of anarchy, devastation, and bloodshed, unparalleled in any Christian land.

These effects are so much at variance with what was predicted and expected to arise from such conciliatory measures, that many able observers have not hesitated to declare them inexplicable, and to set down Ireland as an exception to all the ordinary principles of human nature. A little consideration, however, of the motives which influence mankind on such occasions, and the state of society in which they were called into operation, will be sufficient to demonstrate that this is not the case, and that the continued turbulence of Ireland is the natural result of these principles acting in peculiar and almost unprecedented circumstances.

Original  
evil arising  
from confis-  
cation of  
land. The first evil which has attached to Ireland was the original and subsequent confiscation of so large a portion of the landed property; and its acquisition by persons of a different country, habits, and religion, from the great body of the inhabitants. In the greater part of the insurrections which that country has witnessed, since the English standard first approached its shores, nearly all its landed property has been confiscated, and lavished either on the English nobility, or companies, or individuals of English extraction. Above eight millions of acres were bestowed away in this manner upon the adventurers and soldiers of fortune who followed the standard of Cromwell (1). It is the great extent of this cruel and unjust measure which has been the original cause of the disasters of Ireland, by nourishing profound feelings of hatred in the descendants of the dispossessed proprietors, and introducing a body of men into the country, necessarily dependent for their existence upon the exclusion of the heirs of the original owners from the inheritance of their forefathers.

But other countries have been subjected to landed confiscation as well as Ireland; nearly all the land of England was transferred, first from the Britons to the Saxons, and thence from the Saxons to the Normans; the lands of Gaul were almost entirely, in the course of five centuries, wrested by the Franks from the native inhabitants (2); and yet upon that foundation have been

(1) Lingard, xi. 136, and xii. 74.

(2) Guizot, *Essais sur l'Histoire de France*, 179, 179.

reared the glories of English civilisation and the concentrated vigour of the French monarchy. Other causes, therefore, must be looked for, coexisting with or succeeding these, which have prevented the healing powers of nature from closing there, as elsewhere, that ghastly wound, and perpetuated to distant ages the irritation and the animosities consequent on the first bitterness of conquest. These causes are to be found in the unfortunate circumstance, that Ireland was not the seat, like England or Gaul, of the permanent residence of the victorious nation; that absent proprietors, and their necessary attendants, middlemen, arose from the very first subjugation of the kingdom, by a race of conquerors who were not to make it their resting-place; and that a different religion was subsequently embraced by the victors from the faith of the vanquished, and the bitterness of religious animosity superadded to the causes of discontent arising from civil distinction. The same progress was beginning in Scotland after the country was overrun by Edward I, when it was arrested by the vigorous efforts of her unconquerable people; five centuries of experienced obligation have not yet fully developed the inappreciable consequences of the victory of Bannockburn, or stamped adequate celebrity on the name of Robert Bruce.

Peculiar causes which have aggravated this evil in Ireland. Great as were these causes of discontent, and deeply as they had poisoned the fountains of national prosperity, they might yet have been obliterated in process of time, and the victors and vanquished settled down, as in France and England, into one united people, had it not been for another circumstance, to which sufficient attention has not yet been paid, viz., the incessant agitation and vehemence of party strife arising from the extension, perhaps unavoidable from the connexion with England, of the forms of a free and representative government to a people who were in a state of civilisation unfit for either. The fervid and passionate character of the Irish peasantry, which they share more or less with all nations in an infant state of civilisation, and, still more, of unmixed Celtic descent, is totally inconsistent with the calm consideration and deliberate judgment requisite for the due exercise of political rights. The duties of grand and common jurymen, of electors for representatives to Parliament, and of citizens uniting in public meetings, cannot as yet be fitly exercised by a large portion of the Irish people.

The Irish are as yet unfit for free privileges. From the periodical recurrence of such seasons of excitation has arisen the perpetuating of popular passions, and the maintenance of party strife, from the extinction of which alone can habits of industry or good order be expected to arise. Continued despotism might have healed the wounds of Ireland in a few generations, by extinguishing the passions of the people with the power of indulging them; but the alternations of severity and indulgence which they have experienced under the British government, like a similar course pursued to a spoiled child, have fostered rather than diminished the public discontent, by giving the power of complaint without removing its causes, and prolonging the sense of suffering by perpetuating the passions from which it has arisen. This explains the otherwise unaccountable circumstance, that all the most violent ebullitions of Irish insurrection have taken place shortly after the greatest boons had been conferred upon them by the British Legislature, and that the severest oppression of which they complain is not that of the English Government, whose conduct towards them for the last forty years has been singularly gentle and beneficent, but of their own native magistracy, from whose vindictive or reckless proceedings their chief

miseries are said to have arisen. A people in such circumstances are almost as incapable of bearing the excitements of political change, or the exercise of political power, as the West India Negroes or the Bedouins of Arabia; and hence, the fanatical temper of the English nation, in the reign of Charles I, speedily generated the horrors of the Tyrone rebellion; the fumes of French democracy, in the close of the eighteenth century, gave rise to the insurrection of the United Irishmen; and the excitement consequent on the party agitation set on foot to effect Catholic Emancipation, the removal of tithes, and the repeal of the Union, has produced in our own times a degree of animosity and discord on its peopled shores, which bids fair to throw it back for half a century in the career of real freedom (1).

Intimate  
union form-  
ed by Irish  
malecon-  
tents with  
France.

Following out the system which they uniformly adopted towards the states which they wished to overthrow, whether by open hostility or secret propagandism, the French government had for years held out hopes to the Irish malecontents, and by every means in their power sought to widen the breach, already, unhappily, too great, between the native and the English population. This was no difficult task. The Irish were already sufficiently disposed to ally themselves with any enemy who promised to liberate them from the odious yoke of the Saxons, and the dreams of liberty and equality which the French spread wherever they went, and which turned so many of the strongest heads in Europe, proved altogether intoxicating to their ardent and enthusiastic minds. From the beginning of the Revolution, accordingly, its progress was watched with intense anxiety in Ireland. All the horrors of the Reign of Terror failed in opening the eyes of its inhabitants to its real tendency; and the greater and more enterprising part of the Catholic population, who constituted three-fourths of its entire inhabitants, soon became leagued together for the establishment of a republic in alliance with France, the severance of all connexion with England, the restoration of the Catholic religion, and the resumption of the forfeited lands (2).

Revolution-  
ary organi-  
zation esta-  
blished  
throughout  
Ireland.

The system by which this immense insurrection was organized was one of the most simple, and, at the same time, one of the most efficacious, that ever was devised. Persons were sworn into an association in every part of Ireland, called the Society of United Irishmen, the real objects of which were kept a profound secret, while the ostensible ones were those best calculated to allure the populace. No meeting was allowed to consist of more than twelve members; five of these were represented by five members in a committee, vested with the management of all their affairs. From each of these committees a deputy attended in a superior body; one or two deputies from these composed a county committee; two from every county committee, a provincial one; and they elected five persons to superintend the whole business of the Union. This provisional government was elected by ballot; and the names of its members were only communicated to the secretaries of the provincial committees, who

(1) The serious crimes in Ireland during the last three months of 1829

(The Emancipation Bill passed in March), 300

Do. of 1830, . . . . . 499

Do. of 1831 (Reform Agitation), . . . 814

Do. of 1832 Tithe and Repeal agitation), 1513

The crimes reported in Ireland in the year 1831 were 16,669, of which 210 were murders; 1478 robberies; burning houses, 466; attacks on houses, 2296; burglaries, 531; robbery of arms, 678. The

crimes reported in England in the same year were 19,647. The population of England and Wales in 1831, was 13,894,000; that of Ireland, 7,784,000. See Parl. Returns, 14th March, 1833; 8th May, 1833; and population census, 1833. By the Coercion Act the serious crimes were at once reduced to a fourth part, or nearly so, of these numbers.—See HANSARD, Parl. Deb. Feb. 9, 1834.

(2) Wolfe Tone, ii. 187, 191. Ann. Reg. 1798, 153, 157. Jom. xi, 428, 429. *Ante*, iii. 96.

were officially intrusted with the scrutiny of the votes. Thus, though their power was unbounded, their agency was invisible, and many hundred thousand men obeyed the dictates of an unknown authority. Liberation from tithes and dues to the Protestant clergy, and the restoration of the Roman Catholic faith, formed the chief boons presented to the lower classes; and, in order to effect these objects, it was speciously pretended that a total change of government was necessary. The real objects of the chiefs of the insurrection, which they would have had no difficulty in persuading the giddy multitude who followed their steps to adopt, were the overthrow of the English Government, and the formation of a republic allied to France. Parliamentary Reform was the object ostensibly held out to the country, as being the one most calculated to conceal their ultimate designs, and enlist the greatest number of the respectable classes on their side. So strongly were men's minds infected with party spirit at that period, and so completely did it obliterate the better feelings of our nature, even in the most generous minds, that these intentions were communicated to several of the Opposition party on both sides of the Channel; and even Mr. Fox, if we may believe the poetic biographer of Lord E. Fitzgerald (1), was no stranger to the project entertained for the dismemberment and revolutionizing of the empire (2).

Combina-  
tion of  
Orangemen  
to uphold  
British con-  
nexion. To resist this formidable combination, another society, composed of those attached to the British government and the Protestant ascendancy, was formed, under the name of Orangemen, who soon rivalled the activity and energy of the Catholic party. The same vehement zeal and ardent passions which have always characterised the Irish people, signalized their efforts. The feuds between these two great parties soon became universal; deeds of depredation, rapine, and murder filled the land; and it was sometimes hard to say whether most acts of violence were perpetrated by the open enemies of law and order, or its unruly defenders (3).

Treaty of the  
Irish rebels  
with France. The leaders of the insurrection, Lord Edward Fitzgerald, Mr. Arthur O'Connor, and Wolfe Tone, went over to France in June 1796, where a treaty was concluded with the French Directory, by which it was agreed that a considerable fleet and army should, in the autumn of that year, be ready for the invasion of Ireland, to enable it to throw off the connexion with England, and form a republic in alliance with France. It has been already mentioned how these expectations were thwarted, first by

(1) Ann. Reg. 1798, 154, 157. Wolfe Tone, ii. 197, 201. Moore's Fitzgerald, i. 165, 166, 277. Harl. vi. 201, 202.

(2) "In order to settle," says Moore, "all the details of their late agreement with France, and in fact to enter into a formal treaty with the Directory, it was thought of importance by the United Irishmen to send some agent whose station and character should, in the eyes of their new allies, lend weight to his mission; and to Lord Edward Fitzgerald the no less delicate than daring task was assigned. About the latter end of May, he passed a day or two in London on his way, and dined at a member of the House of Lords', as I have been informed by a gentleman present, where the company consisted of Mr. Fox, Mr. Sheridan, and several other distinguished Whigs—all persons who had been known to concur warmly in every step of the popular cause in Ireland, and to whom, if Lord Edward did not give some intimation of the object of his present journey,

such an effort of reserve and secrecy was, I must say, very unusual to his character. . . . It is well known that Mr. Fox himself, impatient at the hopelessness of all his efforts to rid England, by any ordinary means, of a despotism which aristocratic alarm had brought upon her, found himself driven, in his despair of Reform, so near that edge where revolution begins, that had there existed, at that time, in England any thing like the same prevalent sympathy with the new doctrines of democracy as responded throughout Ireland, there is no saying how far short of the daring aims of Lord Edward even this great constitutional leader of the Whigs might, in the warmth of his generous zeal, have ventured." It is to be hoped that the biographer of the great English statesman will be able to efface the stain thus cast on his memory by the warmth of combined poetic and Irish zeal.—See Moore's Fitzgerald, i. 165, 166, 276.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1798, 155.

the dispersion of the French fleet in Bantry bay in December 1796, and then by the glorious victory of Camperdown in 1797. The vigorous efforts of government at that period, and the patriotic ardour of a large portion of the more respectable part of the people, contributed in no small degree to overawe the discontented, and postponed for a considerable period the final explosion of the insurrection (1).

Government, meanwhile, were by no means aware of the magnitude of the danger which threatened them. They had received only some vague information of the existence of a seditious confederacy; when there were two hundred and fifty thousand men organized in companies and regiments in different parts of the kingdom, and the leaders appointed by whom the insurrection was to be carried into execution in every county of the island. But the defeat of the Dutch fleet having left the insurgents little hope of any powerful succour from France, they became desperate, and began to break out into acts of violence in several parts of the country. From want of arms and military organization, however, they were unable to act in large bodies, and, commencing a Vendéen system of warfare in the southern counties, soon compelled all the respectable inhabitants to fly to the towns to avoid massacre and conflagration. These disorders were repressed with great severity by the British troops and the German auxiliaries in English pay. The yeomanry, forty thousand strong, turned out with undaunted courage at the approach of danger, and many cruelties were perpetrated under the British colours, which, though only a retaliation upon the insurgents of their own excesses, excited a deep feeling of revenge, and drove to desperation their furious and undisciplined multitudes (2).

Feb. 19,  
1798.  
The insur-  
rection at  
length  
breaks out.

The beginning of 1798 brought matters to an extremity between the contending parties. On the 19th February, Lord Moira made an eloquent speech in their favour in Parliament; but the period of accommodation was past. On the same day the Irish committees

came to a formal resolution, to pay no attention to any offers from either House of Parliament, and to agree to no terms but a total separation from Great-Britain. Still, though their designs were discovered, the chiefs of the conspiracy were unknown: but at length, their names having been revealed by one of their own leaders, fourteen of the chiefs were arrested at Dublin; and Lord Edward Fitzgerald, who escaped at that time, was mortally wounded, some months after, when defending himself from arrest, after having rejected, from a generous devotion to his comrades, all the humane offers made by government to enable him to retire in safety from the kingdom (3). The places of these leaders were filled up by subordinate authorities; but their arrest was a fatal blow to the rebellion, by depriving it of all the chiefs of character, rank, or ability.

Various as-  
saults with  
the insur-  
rects.  
May 28,  
1798.

Notwithstanding this untoward event, the insurrection broke out at once in many different parts of Ireland in the end of May.

The design was to seize the castle and artillery, and surprise the camp at Dublin, while, at the same time, the attention of government was to be distracted by a simultaneous rising in many different parts of the country. The attempt upon Dublin was frustrated by the vigilance of the lord-lieutenant, who, on the very day on which it was to have taken

(1) Ann. Reg. 1796, 158, 159. Wolfe Tone, ii. Moore's Fitzgerald, i. 2, 77. Hard. vi. 212, 213.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1798, 158, 161. Jom. x. 429, 430. Wolfe Tone, ii. 255, 270. Hard. vi. 205, 206.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1798, 162. Moore's Fitzgerald, ii. 371, 378.



place, arrested the leaders of the conspiracy in ~~the capital~~; but in other quarters the revolt broke out with great violence. Bodies of the insurgents were worsted at Rath farm-house by Lord Roden, and at Tallanghill by the

**May 25.** royal forces, but their principal army, fifteen thousand strong, defeated the English at Enniseorthy, captured that burgh, and soon after made themselves masters of the important town of Wexford, containing a considerable train of artillery, and opening a point of communication with France. Following up their successes, they advanced against New Ross, on the confines of Kilkenny, but there they were defeated with great loss by the royal troops; and the rebels revenged themselves for the disaster, by the massacre, in cold blood, of above a hundred prisoners taken at Wexford. At Newtonbarry, after having taken and retaken the town several times, they were finally dislodged with great loss, by the yeomanry and militia. At length, the British commanders having collected above ten thousand men

**June 21.** in the county of Wexford, commenced a general attack on the insurgents, who were fifteen thousand strong in their camp at Vinegar Hill.

**Totally defeated at Vinegar Hill.** The resistance was more obstinate than could have been expected from their tumultuary masses, but at length discipline and skill prevailed over untrained valour. They were broken in several charges by the English cavalry, and dispersed, leaving all their cannon, thirteen in number, and their whole ammunition in the hands of the victors. This was a mortal stroke to the rebellion. The insurgents, flying in all directions, were routed in several smaller encounters, and at length the revolt was so completely got under, that government were enabled to send Lord Cornwallis with a general amnesty for all who submitted before a certain day, with the exception of a few leaders who were afterwards brought to justice. Such was the success of these measures, that out of sixty thousand men who were in arms at the commencement of the insurrection, there remained at the end of July only a few isolated bands in the mountains of Wicklow and Wexford (1).

**Imminent danger from which England then escaped.** It was fortunate for England, during this dangerous crisis, that the French government made no adequate attempt to support the insurrection; that they had exposed their navy to defeat in the previous actions at St.-Vincent's and Camperdown, and that now, instead of wounding their mortal enemy in this vulnerable point, they had sent the flower of their army, their best general, and most powerful squadron, upon a distant expedition to the coast of Africa. Confidently trusting, as every Briton must do, that the struggle between France and this country would have terminated in the overthrow of the former, even if it had taken place on our own shores, it is impossible to deny that the landing of Napoléon with forty thousand men, in the midst of the immense and discontented population of Ireland, would have led to most alarming consequences; and possibly the imminent peril to the empire might earlier have produced that burst of patriotic feeling and developement of military prowess which was afterwards so conspicuous in the Peninsula war.

**Negative efforts of the Directory to revive the insurrection.** Awakened when too late to the importance of the opening which was thus afforded to their arms, the Directory made several attempts to rekindle the expiring flame of the insurrection. Eleven hundred men, under General Humbert, setting sail from Rochfort, landed at Killala, and, with the aid of Napper Tandy, the Irish revolutionist,

(1) Ann. Reg. 1798, 161, 165. Join. x. 430, 435. Hard. vi. 217, 218.



speedily commenced the organization of a provisional government and the enrolment of revolutionary legions, in the province of Connaught (1) A force of four thousand men, consisting chiefly of yeomanry and militia, was defeated by this enterprising commander, with the loss of seven pieces of cannon and six hundred prisoners;—a disaster which demonstrates the danger which would have been incurred if Napoléon, with the army of Egypt, had arrived in his stead. At length the little corps was surrounded, and compelled

Sept. 8. led to surrender, after a gallant resistance, by Lord Cornwallis. A French force, consisting of the *Hoche* of seventy-four guns and eight frigates, having on board three thousand men, eluded the vigilance of the Channel fleet, and arrived on the coast of Ireland; but they were there attacked by the squadron under the command of Sir John Borlase Warren, and the whole

Oct. 12, 1798. taken, after a short action, with the exception of two frigates, which regained the ports of the Republic. On board the *Hoche* was seized the celebrated leader, Wolfe Tone, who, after having with great firmness undergone a trial for high treason, prevented a public execution by a deplorable suicide, accompanied with more than ordinary circumstances of horror. His death closed the melancholy catalogue of executions on account of this unhappy rebellion; and it is but justice to the British government to add, that although many grievous acts were perpetrated by the troops under their orders in its suppression, yet the moderation and humanity which they themselves displayed towards the vanquished, were as conspicuous as the vigilance and firmness of their administration (2).

Maritime  
affairs of the  
year.

The maritime affairs of this year were chiefly distinguished by the capture of Minorca, which, notwithstanding the great strength of

(1) The landing of the French troops was announced by two proclamations, one from the French general, the other from Napper Tandy to his countrymen. The first bore:—"United Irish! The soldiers of the great nation have landed on your shores, amply provided with arms, artillery, and munitions of all sorts, to aid you in breaking your fetters and recovering your liberties. Napper Tandy is at their head; he has sworn to break your fetters or perish in the attempt. To arms! freemen, to arms! the trumpet calls you; do not let your brethren perish unrevealed; if it is their destiny to fall, may their blood cement the glorious fabric of freedom." That from Napper Tandy was still more vehement:—"What do I hear? The British government talks of concessions! will you accept them? Can you for a moment entertain the thought of entering into terms with a government which leaves you at the mercy of the English soldiery, which massacres inhumanly your best citizens—with a ministry which is the pest of society and the scourge of the human race! They hold out in one hand the olive branch; look well to the other, you will see in it the hidden dagger. No, Irishmen; you will not be the dupe of such base intrigues: feeling its inability to subdue your courage, it seeks only to seduce you. But you will frustrate all its efforts. Barbarous crimes have been committed in your country; your friends have fallen victims to their devotion to your cause; their shades surround you; they cry aloud for vengeance. It is your duty to avenge their death; it is your duty to strike the assassins of your friends on their bloody throats. Irishmen! declare a war of extermination against your oppressors; the eternal war of liberty against tyranny.—NAPPER TANDY." But the conduct of this leader was far from keeping pace with these vehement protestations; for no sooner did he hear of the reverse sustained by the French corps which had landed in Killala bay, than he re-embarked on

board the French brig *Anacreon*, and got safe across the Channel.—See both proclamations in *HARD. vi. 223, 225.*

(2) *Ann. Reg. 1798, 165. Jom. x. 440, 442. Hard. vi. 219.*

The firmness and success of the British government, amidst so many examples of weakness elsewhere, excited at this juncture the highest admiration on the Continent. "In the British cabinet," says Prince Hardenberg, "there was then to be seen neither irresolution nor discouragement; no symptoms of that cruel perplexity which tormented the continental sovereigns. In vain were the efforts of the Directory directed against that point of the globe, which they assailed with all their weapons, both military and revolutionary. England sustained the shock with daily increasing energy. Her dignity was untouched, her arms unconquered. The most terrible war to which an empire could be exposed, there produced less anxiety, troubles, and disquietude, than was experienced by those states which had been seduced by the prospect of a fallacious peace to come to terms of accommodation with the French Republic. It was with eight hundred ships of war, a hundred and fifty thousand sailors, three hundred thousand land troops, and an expenditure of fifty millions sterling a-year, that she maintained the contest. It was by periodical victories of unprecedented splendour, by drawing closer together the bonds of her constitution, that she replied to all the efforts of France to dismember her dominions. But never did she run greater danger than this year, when one expedition, directed against the East, threatened with destruction her Indian empire, and another against the West, was destined to carry into Ireland the principles of the French Revolution, and sever that important island from the British Empire."—*HARD. vi. 197, 198.*

its fortifications, yielded to a British force under the command of General Stewart. In August, the inhabitants of the little island of Gozo, a dependence of Malta, revolted against the French garrison, made them prisoners to the number of three hundred, and compelled the Republicans to shut themselves up in the walls of la Valette, where they were immediately subjected to the most rigorous blockade by the British forces by land and sea (1).

Disputes of  
France with  
the United  
States.

So unbounded was the arrogance, so reckless the policy of the French government at this time, that it all but involved them in a war with the United States of North America, the country in the world in which democratic institutions prevail to the greatest extent, and where gratitude to France was most unbounded for the services rendered to them during their contest with Great Britain.

The origin of these disputes was a decree of the French government in January 1789, which directed "that all ships having for their cargoes, in whole or in part, any English merchandise, should be held lawful prize, whoever was the proprietor of that merchandise, which should be held contraband from the single circumstance of its coming from England, or any of its foreign settlements; that the harbours of France should be shut against all vessels which had so much as touched at an English harbour, and that neutral sailors found on board English vessels, *should be put to death*." This barbarous decree immediately brought the French into collision with the United States, who, at that period, were the great neutral carriers of the world. Letters of marque were issued, and an immense number of American vessels, having touched at English harbours, brought into the French ports. The American government sent envoys to Paris, in order to remonstrate against these proceedings. They urged that the decree of the French proceeded on the oppressive principle, that because a neutral is obliged to submit to exactions from one belligerent party, from inability to prevent them, therefore it must submit to the same from the other, though neither sanctioned, as in the other case, by previous usage, nor authorized by treaty. The envoys could not obtain an audience of the Directory, but they were permitted to remain in Paris, and a negotiation opened with Talleyrand and his inferior agents,

Shameful ra-  
parity of the  
French govern-  
ment.

which soon unfolded the real object which the French government had in view. It was intimated to the envoys that the intention of the Directory, in refusing to receive them in public, and permitting them to remain in a private capacity, was to lay the United States under a contribution, not only of a large sum as a loan to the government, but of another for the private use of the Directors. The sum required for the first object was L.1,000,000, and for the last L.50,000. This disgraceful proposal was repeatedly pressed upon the envoys, not only by the subaltern agents of Talleyrand, but by that minister himself, who openly avowed that nothing could be done at Paris without money, and that there was not an American there who would not confirm him in this statement. Finding that the Americans resolutely resisted this proposal, they were at length informed, that if they would only "pay, by way of fees, just as they would to any lawyer who should plead their cause, the sum required for the private use of the Directory, they might remain at Paris until they had received further orders from

May 26.  
June 9.  
July 7.

America as to the loan required for government (2). These terms were indignantly rejected; the American envoys left Paris, letters

(1) Ann. Reg. 1798, 127. Jom. x. 443.

(2) This transaction was so extraordinary, that it is advisable to lay before the reader the official re-

port on the subject, presented by the American plenipotentiaries to their government. "On the 18th October, the plenipotentiary Pinckney received a

of marque were issued by the American President, all commercial intercourse with France was suspended, Washington declared generalissimo of the forces of the commonwealth, the treaties with France declared at an end, and every preparation made to sustain the national independence (1).

Contributions levied on the Hanse Towns by the Directory.

The Hanse towns were not so fortunate in escaping from the exactions of the Directory. Their distance from the scene of contest, their neutrality so favourable to the commerce of the Republic, the protection openly afforded them by the Prussian government, could not save them from French rapacity. Their ships, bearing a neutral flag, were daily made prisoners by the French cruisers, and they obtained licenses to navigate the high seas only by the secret payment of L.150,000 to the republican rulers (2).

Retrospect of the late encroachments of France.

It was impossible, as long as the slightest hope of maintaining their independence remained to the European states, that these incessant and endless usurpations of the French government could fail to lead to a renewal of the war. France began the year 1798 with three affiliated republics at her side, the Batavian, the Cisalpine, and the Ligurian. Before its close she had organized three more, the Helvetic, the Roman, and the Parthenopeian. Pursuing constantly the same system; addressing herself to the discontented multitude in every state; paralysing the national strength by a division of its population, and taking advantage of that division to overthrow its independence, she had succeeded in establishing her dominion over more than one-half of Europe. From the Texel to the extremity of Calabria, a compact chain of republics was formed, which not only threatened the independence of the other states of Europe by their military power, but promised speedily to subvert their whole social institutions by the incessant propagation of revolutionary principles. Experience had proved that the freedom which the Jacobin agents insidiously offered to the deluded population of other states, was neither more nor less than an entire subjection to the agents of France; and that the moment that they endeavoured to obtain in reality that liberty which they had been promised in name, they were subjected to the most arbitrary and despotic oppression (3).

Their system rendered peace impossible.

In resisting this alarming invasion not merely of the independence of nations, but the principles which hold together the social union, it was obvious that no time was to be lost; and that the peril incurred was even greater in peace than during the utmost dangers of war. France had made more rapid strides towards universal dominion during one

visit from the secret agent of M. Talleyrand (M. Bellarni). He assured us that Citizen Talleyrand had the highest esteem for America and the citizens of the United States; and that he was most anxious for their reconciliation with France. He added, that, with that view, some of the most offensive passages in the speech of President Adams must be expunged, and a *douceur* of L. 50,000 sterling put at the disposal of M. Talleyrand for the use of the Directors; and a large loan furnished by America to France. On the 20th the same subject was resumed in the apartments of the plenipotentiary, and on this occasion, besides the secret agent, an intimate friend of Talleyrand was present; the expunging of the passages was again insisted on, and it was added, that after that, money was the principal object. His words were—'We must have money, a great deal of money.' On the 21st, at a third conference, the sum was fixed at 32,000,000 (L.1,280,000) as a loan, secured on the Dutch contributions, and a gratification of L.50,000 in the form of a *douceur* to the Di-

rectors." At a subsequent meeting on the 27th October, the same secret agent said, "Gentlemen, you mistake the point; you say nothing of the money you are to give. You make no offer of money. On that point you are not explicit."—"We are explicit enough," replied the American envoys, "we will not give you one farthing; and before coming here we should have thought such an offer as you now propose would have been regarded as a mortal insult."—See the Report in *Hans.* vi. 14. 22. When the American envoys published this statement, Talleyrand disavowed all the proceedings of these secret agents; but M. Bellarni published a declaration at Hamburg, "that he had neither said, written, or done a single thing without the orders of Citizen Talleyrand."—*Ibid.* vi. 29.

(1) *Ann. Reg.* 1798. 241. 247. *Jom.* x. 363. *Hard.* vi. 21.

(2) *Jom.* x. 364. *Hard.* vi. 34, 38.

(3) *Th.* x. 206.

year of pacific encroachment, than six previous years of hostilities. The continuance of amicable relations was favourable to the secret propagation of the revolutionary mania, with all the extravagant hopes and expectations to which it gave rise; and without the shock of war, or an effort even to maintain the public fortunes, the independence of nations was silently melting away before the insidious, but incessant efforts of democratic ambition. It was but a poor consolation to those who witnessed this deplorable progress, that those who lent an ear to these suggestions were the first to suffer from their effects, and that they subjected themselves and their country to a far worse despotism than that from which they hoped to emancipate it; the evil was done, the national independence was subverted; revolutionary interests were created, and the principle of democracy, using the vanquished states as an advanced post, was daily proceeding to fresh conquests, and openly aimed at universal dominion.

Leads to a general feeling in favour of a confederacy, which Russia joins. These considerations, strongly excited by the subjugation of Switzerland and the Papal States, led to a general feeling throughout all the European monarchies, of the necessity of a general coalition to resist the further encroachments of France, and stop the alarming progress of revolutionary principles. The Emperor of Russia at length saw the necessity of joining his great empire to the confederacy; and a Muscovite army, sixty thousand strong, began its march from Poland towards the north of Italy, while another, amounting nearly to forty thousand, moved towards the south of Germany (1).

Progress of the negotiations at Rastadt. The negotiations at Rastadt, notwithstanding their length and intricacy, had led to no satisfactory result. The temper in which they were conducted underwent a material change with the lapse of time. The treaty of Campo Formio was more than an ordinary accommodation; it was a league by the great powers, who there terminated their hostilities, for their own aggrandisement at the expense of their neighbours, and in its secret articles were contained stipulations which amounted to an abandonment of the empire, by its head, to the rapacity of the Republican government.

Signed on Dec. 1, 1797. Venice was the glittering prize which induced this dereliction of principle on the part of the Emperor; and accordingly it was agreed, that on the same day on which that great city was surrendered to the imperial troops, Mayence, the bulwark of the German empire on the Lower Rhine, should be given to the Republicans (2). By an additional article it was provided, that the Austrian troops should, within twenty days after the ratification of the secret articles, evacuate also Ingolstadt, Philipsburg, and all the fortresses as far back as the frontiers of the hereditary states, and that within the same period the French forces should retire from Palma Nuova, Legnago, Ozoppo, and the Italian fortresses as far as the Adige (3).

This important military convention, which totally disabled the empire from making any effectual resistance to the French forces, was kept a pro-

(1) Th. x. 146. Lac. xiv. 311, 312.

(2) The Emperor, in the secret articles, agreed that the Republican frontiers should be advanced to the Rhine, and stipulated that the Imperial troops should take possession of Venice on the same day on which the Republicans entered Mayence. He promised to use his influence to induce the empire to agree to that arrangement; but if, notwithstanding his endeavours, the Germanic states should refuse to accede to it he engaged to employ no troops, excepting the contingent he was bound, as a member of the Confederation, to furnish, in any war which

might ensue, and not even to suffer them to be engaged in the defence of any fortified place; any violation of this last article was to be considered as a sufficient ground for a resumption of hostilities against Austria. Indemnities were to be obtained, if possible, for the dispossessed princes on the left bank of the Rhine; *but no acquisition was to be proposed for the benefit of Prussia.*—See the *Secret Articles* in *Corresp. Conf. de Nap.* vii. 287, 292.

(3) Art. 12, 14, Secret Treaty. *Corresp. Conf. de Nap.* vii. 291, 292.

The secret  
understand-  
ing between  
France and  
Austria is  
made mani-  
fest.

found secret, and only became known to the German princes when, from its provisions being carried into execution, it could no longer, in part at least, be concealed. But in the mean time it led to a very great degree of intimacy between Napoléon and Cobentzell, the

Austrian ambassador at Rastadt, insomuch that the Emperor, who perceived the extreme irritation which at that moment the French general felt against the Republican government at Paris, offered him a principality in Germany, with 250,000 souls, in order that "he might be for ever placed beyond the reach of democratic ingratitude." But the French general, whose ambition was fixed on very different objects, declined the offer. To such a length, however, did the two diplomatists proceed, that Napoléon made Cobentzell acquainted with his secret intention at some future period of subverting the Directory. "An army," said he, "is assembled on the coasts of the channel ostensibly for the invasion of England; but my real object is to march at its head to Paris, and overturn that ridiculous government of lawyers, which cannot much longer oppress France. Believe me, two years will not elapse before that preposterous scaffolding of a Republic will fall to the ground. The Directory may maintain its ground during peace, but it cannot withstand the shock of war; and therefore it is, that it is indispensable that we should both occupy good positions." Cobentzell lost no time in making his cabinet acquainted with these extraordinary revelations, which were highly acceptable at Vienna, and furnish the true key to the great influence exercised by Napoléon over that government during the remainder of his residence in Europe prior to the Egyptian expedition (1).

Great was the consternation in Germany when at length it could no longer be concealed that the line of the Rhine had been abandoned, and that all the states on the left bank of that river were to be sacrificed to the engrossing republic. It was the more difficult for the Austrian plenipotentiaries at Rastadt to reconcile the dispossessed proprietors to this catastrophe, as the Emperor had officially announced to the Diet, shortly after the conclusion of the armistice of Leoben, "that an armistice had been concluded by the Emperor for the empire, on the base of the *integrity of the Germanic body*." Remonstrances and petitions in consequence rapidly succeeded each other, as suspicions of the fate impending over them got afloat, but without effect; and soon the decisive evidence of facts convinced the most incredulous, that a portion at least of the empire had been abandoned. Intelligence successively arrived, that Mayence had been surrendered to the Republicans on the 30th December, in presence of, and without opposition from, the Austrian forces: that Venice, stripped of all its riches, had been abandoned to the Imperialists on the 15th January; and that the fort of the Rhine, opposite Mannheim, which refused to surrender to the summons of the Republican general, had been carried by assault on the 25th of the same month; while the Austrian forces, instead of opposing any resistance, were evidently retiring towards the frontiers of the hereditary states. An universal stupor seized on the German people when they beheld themselves thus abandoned by their natural guardians, and the only ones capable of rendering them any effectual protection; and their deputies expressed themselves in angry terms to the imperial plenipotentiaries on the subject (2). But, M. Lehrbach

(1) Hard. v. 66, 70, 71.

(2) Hard. v. 78, 96.



replied, when no longer able to conceal this dismemberment of the empire, —“ All the world is aware of the sacrifices which Austria has made during the war; and that the misfortunes which have occurred are nothing more than what she has uniformly predicted would occur, if a cordial union of all the Germanic states was not effected to maintain their independence. Singly, she has made the utmost efforts to maintain the integrity of the empire; she has exhausted all her resources in the attempt; if she has been unsuccessful, let those answer for it who contributed nothing towards the common cause.” This defence was perfectly just; Austria had performed, and nobly performed her part as head of the empire; its dismemberment arose from the inaction of Prussia, which, with an armed force of above two hundred thousand men, and a revenue of nearly L.6,000,000 sterling, had done nothing whatever for the cause of Germany. It is not the cession of the left bank of the Rhine to France; it is the spoliation of Venice which at this period forms an indelible stain on the Austrian annals (1).

After the cession of the line of the Rhine to France was finally divulged, the attention of the plenipotentiaries was chiefly directed to the means of providing indemnities to the dispossessed princes, and the republican envoys had already broached their favourite project of *secularizations*; in other words, indemnifying the lay princes at the expense of the church, when an event occurred at Vienna, which threatened to produce an immediate explosion between the two governments. On occasion of the anniversary of the April 13, 1798. general arming of the Vienna volunteers on April 13, the youth of that capital expressed a strong desire to give vent to the ardour of their patriotic feeling by a *fête* in honour of the glorious stand then made by their countrymen. It was hazardous to agree to such a proposal, as the French ambassador, General Bernadotte, had testified his repugnance to it, and declared his resolution, if it was persisted in, to give a dinner in honour of democratic principles at his hotel. But the Austrian government could not withstand the wishes of the defenders of the monarchy; the proposed *fête* took place, and the French ambassador, in consequence, gave a great entertainment to his friends, and hoisted an immense tricolor flag before his gate, with the words “ *Liberté, Égalité*,” inscribed upon it. The opposing principles being thus brought into contact with each other, a collision took place. The people of Vienna conceived the conduct of the French ambassador to be a direct insult offered to their beloved Emperor, and flocked in menacing crowds to the neighbourhood of his hotel. The Austrian authorities, seeing the popular exasperation hourly increasing, in vain besought Bernadotte to remove the obnoxious standard. He deemed his own honour and that of the Republic pledged to its being kept up, and at length the multitude began to ascend ladders to break open the windows. A pistol discharged by one of the servants within, which wounded one of the assailants, only increased the ferment; the gates and windows were speedily forced, the apartments pillaged, and the carriages in the yard broken to pieces. Fifty thousand persons assembled in the streets, and the French ambassador, barricaded in one of the rooms of his hotel, was only delivered at one o'clock in the morning by two regiments of cuirassiers, which the Imperial government sent to his relief. Justly indignant at this disgraceful outrage, Bernadotte transmitted several angry notes to the Austrian cabinet; and although they published

Tumult at  
Vienna, and  
insult to the  
French am-  
bassador.

April 13.

(1) Hard. vi. 433, 434, and vii. 6.



a proclamation on the following day, expressing the deepest regret at the disorders which had occurred, nothing would appease the exasperated ambassador, and on the 13th he left Vienna, under a numerous escort of cavalry, and took the road for Rastadt (1).

Conferences opened at Seltz, which led to no result. When matters were in this combustible state, a spark only was required to light the conflagration. Conferences were opened at Seltz, in Germany, were, on the one hand, the Directory insisted on satisfaction for the insult offered to the ambassador of the Republic; and, on the other hand, the Emperor demanded an explanation of the conduct of France in subduing, without the shadow of a pretext, the Helvetic Confederacy, and extending its dominion through the whole of Italy. As the Austrians could obtain no satisfaction on these points, the Emperor drew more closely his bonds of intimacy with the court of St.-Petersburg, and the march of the Russian armies through Gallicia and Moravia was hastened, while the military preparations of the Austrian monarchy proceeded with redoubled activity (2).

Progress of the negotiations at Rastadt. The negotiations at Rastadt for the settlement of the affairs of the Germanic empire proceeded slowly towards an adjustment; but their importance disappeared upon the commencement of the more weighty discussions involved in the Seltz conferences. The French insisted upon a variety of articles, utterly inconsistent with the spirit of the treaty of Campo Formio or the independence of Germany. They first demanded all the islands of the Rhine, which were of very great importance in a military point of view; next that they should be put in possession of Kehl and its territory opposite to Strasburg, and Cassel and its territory opposite to Mayence; then that a piece of ground, adequate to the formation of a *tête-de-pont*, should be ceded to them at the German end of the bridge of Huningen; and, lastly, that the important fortress of Ehrenbreitzen should be demolished. The German deputation, on the other hand, insisted that the principle of separation should be that of the *thalweg*; that is to say, of the division of the valley by the middle of its principal stream. As a consequence of this principle, they refused to cede Kehl, Cassel, or the *tête-de-pont* at Huningen, or to demolish the fortifications of Ehrenbreitzen, all of which lay on the German bank of the river. Subsequently, the French commissioners admitted the principle of the *thalweg*, consented to the demolition of Cassel and Kehl, and the Germans agreed to that of Ehrenbreitzen; but the Republicans insisted on the cession of the island of Petersaw, which would have given them the means of crossing opposite that important point. Matters were in this unsettled state when they were interrupted by the march of the Russian troops through Moravia. The French government upon that issued a note, in which they declared that they would consider the crossing of the Germanic frontier by that army as equivalent to a declaration of war; and as their advance continued without interruption, the negotiations at Rastadt virtually came to an end (3).

Financial measures of the Directory to meet the approaching hostilities. Seeing themselves seriously menaced with an armed resistance to their project for subjugating all the adjoining states by means of exciting revolutions in their bosom, the Directory at length began to adopt measures to make head against the danger. The finances of

(1) Hard. v. 135, 493, 508.

(3) Jom. xi. 27, 28. Th. x. 154, 157. Hard. vi.

(2) Th. x. 145, 146, 149. Jom. xi. 8, 9. Lac. x. 371, 388.

the Republic were in a most alarming state. Notwithstanding the confiscation of two-thirds of the national debt, it was discovered that there would be a deficit of 200,000,000 francs, or above L.8,000,000 sterling, in the returns of the year. New taxes, chiefly on doors and windows, were imposed, and a decree passed, authorizing national domains, to the value of 125,000,000 of francs, or L.5,000,000 sterling, to be taken from the public creditors, to whom they had been surrendered in liquidation of their claims, and the property of the whole Protestant clergy to be confiscated to the service of the state (1) : thus putting, to support their revolutionary conquests, the last hand to their revolutionary confiscations,

Adoption  
of the law  
of the con-  
scription by  
the legisla-  
ture.

It remained, to adopt some method for the augmentation of the army, which had been extremely diminished by sickness and desertion since the peace of Campo Formio. The skeletons of the regiments and the non-commissioned officers remained ; but the ranks exhibited large chasms, which the existing state of the law provided no means of supplying. The Convention, notwithstanding their energy, had made no permanent provision for recruiting the army, but had contented themselves with two levies, one of 300,000, and one of 1,200,000 men, which, with the voluntary supplies since furnished by the patriotism or suffering of the people, had been found adequate to the wants of the state. But now that the revolutionary fervour had subsided, and a necessity existed for finding a permanent supply of soldiers to meet the wars into which the insatiable ambition of the government had plunged the country, some lasting resource became indispensable. To meet the difficulty, General Jourdan proposed the law of the CONSCRIPTION, which became one of the most important consequences of the Revolution. By this decree, every Frenchman from twenty to forty-five years of age was declared amenable to military service. Those liable to serve were divided into classes, according to the years of their birth, and the government were authorized to call out the youngest, second, or third class, according to Sept. 28, 1798. the exigencies of the times. The conscription was to take place by lot, in the class from which it was directed to be taken (2). This law was immediately adopted ; and the first levy of two hundred thousand men from France ordered to be immediately enforced, while eighteen thousand men were required from the affiliated republic of Switzerland, and the like number from that of Holland.

Reflections  
on this  
event.

Thus, the justice of Heaven made the revolutionary passions of France the means of working out their own punishment. The atrocious aggression on Switzerland, the flames of Underwalden, the subjugation of Italy, were registered in the book of fate, and brought about a dreadful and lasting retribution. Not the bayonets of the Allies, not the defence of their country, occasioned this lasting scourge ; the invasion of other states, the cries of injured innocence, first brought it into existence. They fixed upon its infatuated people that terrible law, which soon carried misery into every cottage, and bathed with tears every mother in France. Wide as had been the spread of the national sin, as wide was the lash of national punishment. By furnishing an almost inexhaustible supply of military population, it fanned the spirit of universal conquest, and precipitated its people into the bloody career of Napoléon. It produced that terrible contest which, after

(1) Jom. xi. 25, 26.

(2) Jom. xi. 23, 24. Th. x. 183, 184.

exhausting the resources, brought about the subjugation of that great kingdom, and wrung from its infuriated but not repentant inhabitants what they themselves have styled tears of blood (1). It is thus that Providence vindicates its superintendence of the moral world; that the guilty career of nations, equally as that of individuals, brings down upon itself a righteous punishment; and that we feel, amidst all the sins of rulers, or madness of the people; the truth of the sublime words of Scripture: "Ephraim is joined to idols; let him alone."

(1) *Sav. iv. 382.*

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## CHAPTER XXVII.

CIVIL HISTORY OF FRANCE FROM THE REVOLUTION OF 18TH FRUCTIDOR, TO THE SEIZURE OF SUPREME POWER BY NAPOLEON.

SEPTEMBER 1797—NOVEMBER 1799.

## ARGUMENT.

Apathy of the public mind after the Revolution of 18th Fructidor—Extreme Difficulties of Government since that event—Universal Dissatisfaction after the new elections in Spring 1799—Restoration of the Liberty of the Press—Formation of a league against the Government—Measures of the Opposition—Revolution of 30th Prairial—Character of the New Directory—Fresh Ministerial Appointments—Efforts of the Jacobins to revive the Revolutionary spirit, which totally fail—Forced Loan and Levy of 200,000 men decreed by the Councils—Anarchy of the Provinces—Cruel Law of the Hostages—Insurrection in Brittany and la Vendée—Great Severity in the collection of the Forced Loan—Success of the Military Conscription—Increased Violence of the Jacobins—Fouché is appointed Minister of Police—His Character and Conservative designs—He closes the Jacobin Club—Violence of the Daily Press—Attack on the Journalists by the Directory—Their continued vigorous Measures against the Jacobins—Deplorable state of France at this period—Arrival of Napoleon at Fréjus—Universal Enthusiasm which it excites—His Journey, and Arrival at Paris—Reception there by the Directory—Previous Intrigues of Barras and Siéyes with Louis XVIII.—Junction of the Malecontents of all Parties to support Napoleon—Profound Dissimulation of his Conduct.—His Efforts to gain Gohier and Moulins, who refuse—After much hesitation, he resolves to join Siéyes—Measures resolved on—He tries in vain to gain Bernadotte—Progress of the Conspiracy—Great Banquet at the Hall of the Ancients—Preparations of the Conspirators at the Council of the Ancients—Efforts of Napoleon with all Parties—The 18th Brumaire—Meeting of all the Conspirators in the rue Chantereine—Napoleon's Address to the Ancients—Resignation of some of the Directory, Arrest of others—Napoleon, Siéyes, and Roger Ducos are appointed Consuls—The 12th Brumaire at St.-Cloud—Excessive Vehemence in the Council of Five Hundred—Imminent Danger of Napoleon, who enters the Hall of the Ancients—His Speech there—He enters the Hall of the Five Hundred—Frightful Disorder there—Intrepid Conduct of Lucien—Dissolution of the Five Hundred by an armed Force—Nocturnal Meeting of the Conspirators in the Orangery—Their Decrees—Joy in Paris at these events—General Satisfaction which they diffused through the Country—Clemency of Napoleon after his Victory—Formation of a Constitution—Napoleon is appointed First Consul—Outlines of the New Constitution—Appointments in Administration made by Napoleon—Venality of Siéyes—Immense majority of the People who approved of the New Constitution—Reflections on the Accession of Napoleon to the Consular Throne—Durable Liberty had been rendered impossible in France by the destruction of the Aristocracy and Clergy—Disastrous Effects of the Irreligion of that country—Prodigious Effects of the Centralization of Power introduced by the Revolution—Distinction between the safe and dangerous Spirit of Freedom—Immense impulse which the changes resulting from the Revolution have given to the spread of Christianity over the World.

THE Revolution of France had run through the usual course of universal enthusiasm, general suffering, plebeian revolt, bloody anarchy, democratic cruelty, and military despotism. There remained a last stage to which it had not yet arrived, but which, nevertheless, was necessary to tame the passions of the people, and reconstruct the fabric of society out of the ruined fragments of former civilisation. This stage was that of a SINGLE DESPOT, and to this final result the weakness consequent on exhausted passion was speedily bringing the country.

Apathy of  
the public  
mind after  
the Revolution  
of 18th  
Fructidor.

To the fervour of democratic license there invariably succeeds in a few years a period of languor and listlessness, of blighted hope and disappointed ambition, of despair at the calamitous results of previous changes, and heedlessness to every thing but the gratification of selfish passion. The energetic, the ardent, the enthusiastic, have for the most part sunk under the contests of former faction, few remain but the base and calculating, who, by stooping before the storms under which their more elevated rivals perished, have contrived to survive their fall. This era is that of public degradation, of external disaster, and internal suffering, and in the despair of all classes, it prepares the way for the return to a more stable order of things.

Extreme  
difficulties  
of govern-  
ment since  
that event.

The external disasters, which had accumulated upon the Republic rapidly since the commencement of hostilities, of which an account will be given in the next chapter, could hardly have failed to overturn a government so dependant on the fleeting gales of popular favour as that of the Directory, even if it had not been tainted by the inherent vice of having been established by the force of military power, in opposition to the wishes of the nation and the forms of the constitution. But this cause had for long been preparing its downfall; and the removal of the armies to the frontier, upon the resumption of hostilities, rendered it impossible any longer to stifle the public voice. That inevitable scourge of all revolutionary states, embarrassment of finance, had, since the Revolution of the 18th Fructidor, impeded all their operations. Notwithstanding the confiscation of two-thirds of the public debt, it was found impossible, in the succeeding season, to pay the interest on the third which remained, without recurring to fresh expenditures. The deficit on the year was announced by the minister of finance as amounting to at least 63,000,000 francs, or L.2,520,000; it was known to amount to nearly 100,000,000; and the taxes were levied slowly, and with extreme difficulty. To meet the deficiency, the duty on doors and windows was doubled; that on carriages raised tenfold, and the effects of the Protestant clergy were confiscated, putting them, like the Catholics, on the footing of payment from government. Thus the Revolution, as it advanced, was successively swallowing up the property even of the humblest in the community (1).

The new elections of a third of the legislature, in March 1799, were conducted with greater order and freedom than any which had preceded them, because the army, the great support of the Directory, was for the most part removed, and the violence used on previous occasions to secure the return could not so easily be put in force. A large proportion of representatives, accordingly, were returned adverse to the government established by the bayonets of Angereau, and waited only for an opportunity to displace it from the helm. It fell to Rewbell's lot to retire from the Directory, and Sièyes was chosen by the two Councils in his stead. The people were already dissatisfied with the administration of affairs, when the disasters at the commencement of the campaign came to blow the flame into a conflagration (2).

Universal  
dissatisfac-  
tion after  
the new  
elections.

After these events, the public indignation could no longer be restrained. Complaints broke out on all sides; the conduct of the war, the management of the finances, the tyranny exercised over the elections, the arbitrary dispersion of the Chambers, the iniquitous removal of nearly one-half of the deputies, the choice of the generals, the di-

(1) Th. x. 214, 215. Mig. ii. 442.

(2) Lac. xiv. 351, 352. Th. x. 260.

rection of the armies, all were made the subject of vehement and impassioned invective. The old battalions, it was said, had been left in the interior to overawe the elections; the best generals were in irons; Championnet, the conqueror of Naples, had been dismissed for striving to repress the rapacity of the inferior agents of the Directory; Moreau, the commander in so glorious a retreat, was reduced to the rank of a general of division, and Scherer, unknown to fame, had been invested with the command of the army of Italy. Even measures which had formerly been the object of general praise, were now condemned in no measured terms; the expedition to Egypt, it was discovered, had given an eccentric direction to the best general and bravest army of the Republic, and provoked the hostility at once of the Sublime Porte and the Emperor of Russia; while the attack on Switzerland was an unjustifiable invasion of neutral rights, which necessarily aroused the indignation of all the European powers, and brought on a war which the government had made no preparations to withstand. These complaints were, in a great degree, well founded; but they would never have been heard if the fortune of war had proved favourable, and the Republican armies, instead of being thrown back on their own frontier, had been following the career of victory into the Imperial states. But the Directory now experienced the truth of the saying of Tacitus :—“ *Hæc est bellorum pessima conditio : Prospera omnes sibi vindicant, adversa uni solo imputantur* (1).”

Restoration  
of the liberty  
of the  
press.

In the midst of this general effervescence, the restraints imposed on the liberty of the press after the revolution of the 18th Fructidor, could no longer be maintained. The armed force which had imposed and kept them on was wanting; the soldiers were almost all combating on the frontier. They were, accordingly, no longer enforced against the daily journals, and the universal indignation speedily spread to the periodical press. In every quarter, in the newspapers, the tribune, the pamphlets, the clubs, nothing was to be heard but declamations against the government. The parties who had alternately felt the weight of their vengeance, the Royalists and the Jacobins, vied with each other in inveighing against their imbecility and want of foresight; while the soldiers, hitherto their firmest support, gave open vent to their indignation at the “Advocates” who had brought back the Republican standards to the Alps and the Rhine (2).

Formation  
of a league  
against the  
government.

A league was speedily formed against the government, at the head of which were Generals Joubert and Augereau. Barras, though a Director, entered into the plan, and gave it the weight of his reputation, or rather his revolutionary audacity and vigour. It was agreed that no questions should be brought forward, until the obnoxious Directors were removed, as to the form of government which should succeed them; and the three Directors Laréveillière-Lépaux, Treilhard, and Merlin de Douai, were marked out for destruction. The conspiracy was far advanced when the misfortunes in Italy and on the Rhine gave tenfold force to the public discontent, and deprived the government of all means of resistance. The departments in the south, now threatened with invasion from the Allied army, were in a state of extreme fermentation, and sent deputations to the Councils, who painted in the most lively colours the destitute state of the troops, the consternation of the provinces, the vexations of the people, the injustice done to

(1) Lac. xiv. 352, 353. Th. x. 260, 261. Dum. i. 220, 221.

(2) Th. x. 268. Lac. xiv. 354. Goh. i. 96.



the generals, and the indignation of the soldiers. The nomination of Sièyes to the Directory was the most convincing proof of the temper of the Councils, as he had always and openly expressed his dislike at the constitution and the Directorial government. To elect him, was to proclaim, as it were, that they desired a revolution (1).

Measures of the opposition. Sièyes soon became the head of the conspirators, who thus numbered among their ranks two Directors, and a great majority of both Councils. It was no longer their object to remodel the constitution, but to gain immediate possession of the reins of power, in order to extricate the country from the perilous situation in which it was placed. For this purpose they refused all accommodation or consultation with the three devoted Directors; while the most vehement attacks were made on them in both Councils. The disastrous state of the finances afforded too fair an opportunity for invective. Out of 400,000,000 francs already consumed in the public service for the year 1799, not more than 210,000,000 francs had been received by the treasury, and the arrears were coming in very slowly. Various new taxes were voted by the Councils, but it was apparent to every one that their collection, under the present system, was impossible. A still more engrossing topic was afforded by the discussions on the proposed alteration of the law on the liberty of the press and the popular societies, in order to take away from the Directory the arbitrary power with which they had been invested by the law of the 19th Fructidor. The democrats exclaimed that it was indispensable to electrify the public mind, that the country was in the same danger as in 1793, and that the same means must be taken to meet it; that every species of patriotism would speedily expire if the clubs were not re-opened, and unlimited freedom allowed to the press. Without joining in this democratic fervour, the Royalists and Constitutionalists concurred with them in holding that the Directory had made a bad use of the dictatorial power given to them by the revolution of 18th Fructidor, and that the restoration of the popular clubs had become indispensable. So general a concord among men of such dissimilar opinions on all other subjects, announced the speedy fall of the government (2).

Revolution of 30th Prairial. The first measures of the conspirators were opened by a message from the different commissions of the Councils, presented by Boulay de la Meurthe, in which they insisted upon being informed of the causes of the exterior and interior dangers which threatened the state, and the means of averting them which existed. The Directory, upon receiving this message, endeavoured to gain time, by promising to give an answer in detail, which required several days to prepare. But this was by no means what the revolutionists intended. After waiting a fortnight without receiving any answer, the Councils, on the recommendation of their committees of war, expenditure, and finance, agreed to declare their sittings permanent, till an answer to the message was obtained, and the three committees were constituted into a single commission of eleven members, in other words, a provisional government. The Directory on their part also declared their sittings permanent, and every thing seemed to presage a fierce conflict. The commission dexterously availed themselves of the circumstance that Treilhard, who for thirteen months had been in the Directory, had been appointed four days before the legal period, and instantly proposed that his nomination should

(1) Mign. ii. 442, 443. Lac. xiv. 353, 355. Th. x. 268, 274, and 310.

(2) Th. x. 313, 317. Mign. ii. 417. Lac. xiv. 355.

be annulled. Laréveillière, who was gifted with great political firmness, in vain strove to induce Treilhard to resist; he saw his danger, and resolved to yield to the storm. He accordingly sent in his resignation, and Gohier, a vehement republican, but a man of little political capacity, though an able writer, was named by the Councils in his stead (1).

The victory was gained, because this change gave the Councils a majority in the Directory; but Laréveillière was still firm in his refusal to resign. After exhausting every engine of flattery, threats, entreaties, and promises, Barras  
25th May, 1799. at length broke up the conference by declaring, "Well, then, it is all over; the sabres must be drawn."—"Wretch!" exclaimed Laréveillière, "is it you that speak of sabres? There is nothing here but knives, and they are all directed against those virtuous citizens whom you wish to murder, because you cannot induce them to degrade themselves."  
20th Prairial. But a single individual could not withstand the legislature; he yielded at length to the entreaty of a deputation from the Councils, and sent in his resignation during the night. His example was immediately followed by Merlin; and General Moulins and Roger Ducos were appointed as successors to the expelled Directors (2).

Thus, the government of the Directory was overturned in less than four years after its first establishment, and in twenty months after it had, by a violent stretch of illegal force, usurped dictatorial powers. The people of Paris took no part in this subversion of their rulers, which was effected by the force of the national assemblies illegally directed. Revolutionary fervour had exhausted itself; and an event which, six years before, would have convulsed France from one extremity to the other, passed over with hardly more agitation than a change of ministers in a constitutional monarchy (3).

Character of the new Directory. The violent measures, however, which had dispossessed the government, were far from bringing to the helm of affairs any accession either of vigour or ability. The new Directory, composed, like the Councils, of men of opposite principles, was even less qualified than that which had preceded it to make head against the tempest, both without and within, which assailed the state. Sièyes, the only man among them of a superior intellect, dreamed of nothing but a new political organization of society, and had none of the qualities fitted to struggle with the misfortunes of a sinking state. Roger Ducos, an old Girondist, was merely his creature, and unfit to direct any department of the Republic. Moulins, an obscure general, but a vehement republican, had been nominated by the Jacobin party to uphold their interests in the government, and being unknown to the armies, possessed none of the influence with the military so necessary to revive their former spirit. Barras was the only man capable of giving any effectual assistance to the administration; but he was so much under the influence of his passions and his vices, and had taken so many and such contradictory parts in the course of the Revolution, that no reliance could be placed on his assistance. After having been a violent Jacobin after the revolution of 31st May, a leading Thermidorien after the fall of Robespierre, a revolutionary Director on the 18th Fructidor, and a vehement enemy of his ancient colleagues on the 30th Prairial, he now became a royalist Director, elected to withstand the principles of democracy which had so often elevated him to power. Gohier was sincere and honest in his intentions, but he was

(1) Th. x. 322. Mign. ii. 443.

(2) Th. x. 326, 328. Lac. xiv. 256. Mign. ii. 443.

(3) Lac. xiv. 359. Th. x. 330. Stael, ii. 223, 224.

an infatuated republican, who, amidst the general wreck of its institutions, was dreaming only of the social compact and the means of averting a counter revolution. From the moment of their installation, their sentiments on most subjects were found to be so much at variance, that it was evident no cordial co-operation could be expected amongst them (1).

New ministerial appointments.

The first and most pressing necessity was to stem the torrent of disaster which had overwhelmed the armies of the Republic. Immediately after the change in the government, news arrived of the forcing of the lines of Zurich; and, before the consternation which it occasioned had subsided, it was followed by intelligence of the battle of the Trebbia, and the evacuation of the ridge of the Apennines. These disasters rendered it absolutely necessary to take some steps to restore the public confidence, and for this purpose a great change was made in the military commanders of the Republic. Championnet, who had been thrown into prison for evading the orders of the Directory regarding the pillage of the Neapolitan dominions, was liberated from his fetters, and received the command of an army which it was proposed to establish along the line of the higher Alps; Bernadotte, from whose activity great results were justly expected, was appointed minister at war; and Joubert, whose exploits in the Tyrol had gained for him a brilliant reputation, nominated to the command of the shattered army of Italy (2).

Efforts of the Jacobins to revive the revolutionary spirit.

The overthrow of the government was the signal for the issuing of the Jacobins from their retreats, and the recommencement of revolutionary agitation, with all the perilous schemes of democratic ambition. Every where the clubs were re-opened; the Jacobins took possession of the Riding-school hall, where the debates of the Constituent Assembly had been held, and began again to pour forth those impassioned declamations from which such streams of blood had already taken their rise. Taught by former disasters, however, they abstained from demanding any sanguinary proceedings, and confined themselves to a strenuous support of an agrarian law, and these measures for the division of property to which Babeuf had fallen a victim. The leading members of the Councils attended their meetings, and swelled the ardent multitudes who already crowded their assemblies (3), flattering themselves, even in the decrepitude of the revolutionary fervour, with the hopeless idea that they would succeed in directing the torrent.

Which totally fail.

But the times were no longer the same, and it was impossible in 1799 to revive the general enthusiasm which ten years before had intoxicated every head in France. The people had not forgotten the Reign of Terror, and the dreadful calamities which had followed the ascendant of the Jacobins; they received their promises without joy, without allusion, and listened with undisguised anxiety to the menaces which they dealt out to all who opposed their designs. Their apathy threw the Jacobins into despair; who were well aware that, without the aid of the populace, they would be unable to overturn what yet remained of the fabric of society. "We cannot twice," said the citizens, "go through the same fiery ordeal; the Jacobins have no longer the power of the assignats at their command; the illusion of the people has been dispelled by their sufferings; the army regards their rule with horror." The respectable citizens, worn out with convulsions, and apprehensive beyond every thing of a return to the yoke of the multitude, sighed for the restoration of a stable government, and were pre-

(1) Th. x. 331, 332. Lac. xiv. 353, 360, 361. Mign. ii. 446. Goh. Mem. i. 104.

(2) Th. x. 333. Jom. Vie de Nap. i. 361.

(3) Lac. xiv. 358. Mign. ii. 445.

pared to rally round any leader who would subject the passions of the Revolution to the yoke of despotic power (1).

Forced loan, and conscription of 200,000 men decreed by the councils. To supply the enormous and daily increasing deficit in the public treasury, the Revolutionists maintained that it was indispensable to recur to the energy and patriotic measures of 1793; to call into active service all the classes of the state, and levy a forced loan of 120,000,000 of francs, or L.4,800,000, upon the opulent classes, increasing in severity with the fortunes of those from whom it was to be extracted. After long debates, this arbitrary measure was adopted; and, at the same time, a conscription of two hundred thousand men ordered, to recruit the armies. These vigorous measures promised, in the course of time, to procure a great supply for the public necessities; but in the mean while the danger was imminent; and it was much to be feared that the frontiers would be invaded before any efficient support could be afforded to the armies intrusted with their defence (2).

Anarchy of the provinces. What rendered every measure for the supply either of the army or the treasury difficult of execution, was the complete state of anarchy into which the provinces had fallen, and the total absence of all authority from the time that the troops had been removed to the frontier. The Vendéens and Chouans had, in the west, broken into fearful activity; the companies of the Sun renewed their excesses in the south, and every where the refractory conscripts, forming themselves into bands of robbers, occupied the forests, and pillaged travellers and merchandise of every description along the highways. To such a height had these disorders, the natural and inevitable consequence of a revolution, arisen, that in most of the departments there was no longer any authority obeyed, or order maintained, but the strong pillaged the weak with impunity, as in the rudest ages. In these circumstances a law, named the law of the *hostages*, was proposed and carried in the councils, and remains a singular and instructive monument of the desperate tyranny to which those are in the end reduced, who adventure on the perilous course of democratic innovation. Proceeding on the supposition, at once arbitrary and unfounded, that the relations of the emigrants were the sole cause of the disorders, they enacted, that whenever a commune fell into a notorious state of anarchy, the relations of emigrants, and all those known to have been at all connected with the ancient *régime*, should be seized as hostages, and that four of them should be transported for every assassination that was committed in that district, and their property be rendered liable for all acts of robbery which there occurred. But this law, inhuman as it was, proved wholly inadequate to restore order in this distracted country; and France was menaced with an anarchy, so much the more terrible than that of 1793, as the Committee of Public Safety was wanting, whose iron arm, supported by victory, had then crushed it in its grasp (3).

Insurrection in Brittany and la Vendée. The disturbances in the western provinces, during this paralysis of the authority of government, had again risen to the most formidable height. That unconquerable band, the Vendéens and Chouans, whom the utmost disasters could never completely subdue, had yielded only a temporary submission to the energetic and able measures of General Hoche, and with the arrival of less skilful leaders of the republican forces, and the

(1) Lac. xiv. 358, 359. Th. x. 332, 333.

(2) Th. x. 336, 337. Jom. Vie de Nap. i. 362.

(3) Th. x. 337, 338. Mig. ii. 446. Goh. i. 62. 66 and Jom. Vie de Nap. i. 364.

increasing weakness of government, their activity again led them to insurrection. This fresh outbreak of the insurrection, was chiefly owing to the cruel and unnecessary persecutions which the Director Laréveillière-Lépeaux kept up against the priests; and it soon rose to the most formidable height. In March 1799, the spirit of Chouanism, besides its native departments in Brittany, had spread to la Vendée, and the Republic beheld with dismay the fresh breaking out of that terrible volcano. Chollet, Montaigne, Herbiers, names immortalized in those wonderful wars, were again signalized by the successes of the Royalists; and the flame, spreading further than the early victories of the Vendéens, menaced la Touraine (1). BOURMONT, afterwards conqueror of Algiers, a chief of great ability, revenged in Mans the bloody catastrophe of the Royalist army; and Godet de Chatillon, after a brilliant victory, entered in triumph into Nantes, which had six years before defeated the utmost efforts of the grand army under Cathelineau.

Great severity in the collection of the forced loan. Nor did the financial measures of government inspire less dread than the external disasters and internal disorders which overwhelmed the country. The forced loan was levied with the last severity; and as all the fortunes of the Royalists had been extinguished in the former convulsions, it now fell on those classes who had been enriched by the Revolution, and thus spread an universal panic through its most opulent supporters. They now felt the severity of the confiscation which they had inflicted on others. The ascending scale, according to which it was levied, rendered it especially obnoxious. No fixed rule was adopted for the increase according to the fortune of the individual, but every thing was left to the tax-gatherers, who proceeded on secret and frequently false information. In these circumstances, the opulent found their whole income disappearing under a single exaction. The tax voted was 120,000,000 francs, or L.4,800,000; but in the exhausted state of the country, it was impossible to raise this sum, and specie, under the dread of arbitrary exactions, entirely disappeared from circulation. Its collection took three years, and then only realized three-fourths of its amount (2). The three per cents consolidated, that melancholy relic of former bankruptcy, had fallen to six *per cent* on the remnant of a third which the great confiscation of 1797 had left; little more than a *sixtieth* part of the former value of the stock at the commencement of the Revolution.

Source of the military conscription. The executive were more successful in their endeavours to recruit the military forces of the Republic. Under the able and vigorous management of Bernadotte, the conscription proceeded with great activity; and soon a hundred thousand young men were enrolled and disciplined at the dépôts in the interior of the country. These conscripts were no sooner instructed in the rudiments of the military art, than they were marched off to the frontier, where they rendered essential service to the cause of national independence. It was the reinforcements thus obtained which enabled Masséna to extricate the Republic from extreme peril at the battle of Zurich; and it was in their ranks that Napoléon, in the following year, found the greater part of those dauntless followers who scaled the barrier of the Great St.-Bernard, and descended like a thunderbolt on the plain of Marengo (3).

While the Republic, after ten years of convulsions, was fast relapsing into that state of disorder and weakness which is at once the consequence

(1) Lac. xiv. 366, 369. Beauch. iii. 120, 349. Goh. i. 6.

(2) Lac. xiv. 399, 400. Goh. i. 73, 75, 78. (3) Goh. i. 90.

Increased violence of the Jacobins. and punishment of revolutionary violence, the hall of the Jacobins resounded with furious declamations against all the members of the Directory, and the whole system which in every country has been considered as the basis of social union. The separation of property was, in an especial manner, the object of invective, and the agrarian law, which Babeuf had bequeathed to the last Democrats of the Revolution, universally extolled as the perfection of society. Felix Lepelletier, Arena, Drouet, and all the furious revolutionists of the age, were there assembled, and the whole atrocities of 1798 speedily held up for applause and imitation. They celebrated the manes of the victims shot on the plain of Grenelle, demanded in loud terms the instant punishment of all "the leeches who lived on the blood of the people," the general disarming of the Royalists, a levy *en masse*, the establishment of manufactures of arms on the public places, and the restoration of their cannon and pikes to the inhabitants of the faubourgs. These ardent feelings were roused into a perfect fury, when the news arrived of the battle of Novi, and the retreat of the army of Italy over the Alps. Talleyrand became, in an especial manner, the object of attack. He was accused of having projected the expedition to Egypt, the cause of all the public disasters; Moreau was overwhelmed with invectives, and Siéyes, the president of the Council of the Ancients, stigmatized as a perfidious priest, who was about to belie in power all the patriotic resolutions of his earlier years (1).

Fouché is appointed Minister of Police. His character, and conservative designs.

In these perilous circumstances, the Directory named Fouché minister of police. This celebrated man, who under Napoléon came to play so important a part in the government of the empire, early gave indication of the great abilities and versatile character which enabled him so long to maintain his influence, not only with many different administrations, but under so many different governments. An old member of the Jacobin club, and thoroughly acquainted with all their designs; steeped in the atrocities of Lyon; a regicide and atheist; bound neither by affection nor principle to their cause, and seeking only in the shipwreck of parties to make his own fortune, he was eminently qualified to act as a spy upon his former friends, and to secure the Directory against their efforts. He perceived at this critical period that the ascendant of the revolutionists was on the wane; and, having raised himself to eminence by their passions, he now resolved to attach himself to that conservative party who were striving to reconstruct the elements of society, and establish regular authority by their subversion. The people beheld with dismay the associate of Collot d'Herbois and a regicide member of the Convention, raised to the important station of head of the police; but they soon found that the massacres of Lyon were not to be renewed; and that the Jacobin enthusiast, intrusted with the direction of affairs, was to exhibit, in combating the forces of anarchy, a vigour and resolution unknown in the former stages of the Revolution. His accession to the administration at this juncture was of great importance; for he soon succeeded in confirming the wavering ideas of Barras, and inducing him to exert all his strength in combating those principles of democracy which were again beginning to dissolve the social body (2).

He closes the Jacobin Club.

Under the auspices of so vigorous a leader, the power of the Jacobins was speedily put to the test. He at once closed the Riding-school hall, where their meetings were held, and, supported by the Council

(1) Th. x. 60, 61. Lac. xiv. 59, 60. Jom. Vie de Nap. i. 364.

(2) Rob. i. 110. Th. x. 364. Lac. xiv. 362.



of the Ancients, within whose precincts it was placed, prohibited any further assemblies in that situation. The Democrats, expelled from their old den, reassembled in a new place of meeting in the Rue du Bac, where their declamations were renewed with as much vehemence as ever. But public opinion had changed; the people were no longer disposed to rise in insurrection to support their ambitious projects. Fouché resolved to follow up his blow by closing their meetings altogether. The Directory were legally invested with the power of taking this decisive step, as the organization of the society was contrary to law; but there was a division of opinion among its members as to the expedience of adopting it, Moulins and Gohier insisting that it was only by favouring the clubs, and reviving the revolutionary spirit of 1793, that the Republic could make head against its enemies. However, the majority, consisting of Siéyes, Barras, and Roger Ducos, persuaded by the Aug. 12. 1799. arguments of Fouché, resolved upon the decisive step. The execution of the measure was postponed till after the anniversary of the 10th August; but it was then carried into effect without opposition, and the Jacobin club, which had spread such havoc through the world, at last and for ever closed (1).

Vindictor of the daily press. Deprived of their point of rendezvous, the Democrats had recourse to their usual engine, the press; and the journals immediately were filled with the most furious invectives against Siéyes, who was stigmatized as the author of the measure. This able, but speculative man, the author of the celebrated pamphlet, "What is the Tiers-Etat," which had so powerful an effect in promoting the Revolution in 1789, was now held up to public execration as a perfidious priest, who had sold the Republic to Prussia. In truth, he had long ago seen the pernicious tendency of the democratic dogmas with which he commenced in life, and never hesitated to declare openly that a strong government was indispensable to France, and that liberty was utterly incompatible with the successive tyranny of different parties, which had so long desolated the Republic. These opinions were sufficient to point him out as the victim of republican fury, and, aware of his danger, he was already beginning to look around for some military leader who might execute the *coup d'état*, which he foresaw was the only remaining chance of salvation to the country (2).

Attack on the journals by the Directory. In the meanwhile, the state of the press required immediate attention; its license and excesses were utterly inconsistent with any stable or regular government. The only law by which it could be restrained, was one which declared that all attempts to subvert the Republic should be punished with death; a sanguinary regulation, the offspring of democratic apprehensions, the severity of which prevented it, in the present state of public feeling, from being carried into execution. In this extremity, the three directors declared that they could no longer carry on the government, and France was on the point of being delivered over to utter anarchy when the Directory thought of the expedient of applying to the press the article of the constitution which gave the executive power the right to arrest all persons suspected of carrying on plots against the Republic. Nothing could be more forced than such an interpretation of this clause (3), which was obviously intended for a totally different purpose; but necessity and the well-known principle, *Salus Populi suprema Lex*, seemed to justify, on

(1) Th. x. 366, 367. Lac. xiv. 363. Mign. ii. 417.  
Goh. 125, 126.

(2) Th. x. 368. Mign. ii. 418.  
(3) Art. 114.

Sept. 3. 1799. the ground afterwards taken by Charles X., a stretch indispensable for the existence of regular government, and an *arrêt*, was at length resolved on, which authorized the apprehension of the editors of eleven journals, and the immediate suppression of their publications (1).

Sept. 11. Their continued vigorous measures against the Jacobins. Sept. 17. This bold step produced an immediate ebullition among the democrats; but it was confined to declamations and threats, without any hostile measures. The tribune resounded with "dictators, the fall of liberty," and all the other overflowings of revolutionary zeal; but not a sword was drawn. The three resolute directors, continuing their advantage, succeeded in throwing out, by a majority of 245 to 171, a proposal of Jourdan to declare the country in danger, which was supported by the whole force of the Jacobin party, and soon after successfully ventured on the bold step of dismissing Bernadotte, the minister of war, whose attachment to democratical principles was well known. All thoughts were already turned towards a military chief capable of putting an end to the distractions of the Republic, and extricating it from the perilous situation in which it was placed from the continued successes of the Allies. "We must have done with declaimers," said Siéyes; "what we want is a head and a sword." But where to find that sword was the difficulty. Joubert had recently been killed at Novi; Moreau, notwithstanding his consummate military talents, was known not to possess the energy and moral resolution requisite for the task; Masséna was famed only as a skilful soldier; while Augereau and Bernadotte had openly thrown themselves into the arms of the opposite party. In this emergency, all eyes were already turned towards that youthful hero who had hitherto chained victory to his standards, and whose early campaigns, splendid as they were, had been almost thrown into the shade by the romantic marvels of his Egyptian expedition. The Directory had already assembled an immense fleet in the Mediterranean to bring back the army from the shores of the Nile, but it had broken up without achieving any thing. But Lucien and Joseph Bonaparte had conveyed to Napoléon full intelligence of the disastrous state of the Republic, and it was by their advice that he resolved to brave the English cruisers and return to France. The public mind was already in that uncertain and agitated state which is the general precursor of some great political event; and the journals, a faithful mirror of its fleeting changes, were filled with conjectures as to the future revolutions he was to achieve in the world (2).

Deplorable state of France at this period In truth, it was high time that some military leader of commanding talent should seize the helm, to save the sinking fortunes of the Republic. Never since the commencement of the war had its prospects been so gloomy, both from external disaster and internal oppression. A contemporary republican writer, of no common talent, has drawn the following graphic picture of the internal state of France at this period:—"Merit was generally persecuted; all men of honour chased from public situations; robbers every where assembled in their infernal caverns; the wicked in power; the apologists of the system of terror thundering in the tribune; spoliation re-established under the name of forced loans; assassination prepared; thousands of victims already designed, under the name of hostages; the signal for pillage, murder, and conflagration anxiously looked for, couched in the words the 'country is in danger;' the same cries, the same shouts were heard

(1) Th. x. 360. Lac. xiv. 363.

(2) Th. x. 375, 377. Mign. ii. 448. Lac. xiv. 362. 363. Goh. i. 140, 155.

in the clubs as in 1793; the same executioners, the same victims; liberty, property, could no longer be said to exist; the citizens had no security for their lives—the state for its finances. All Europe was in arms against us; America even had declared against our tyranny; our armies were routed, our conquests lost, the territory of the Republic menaced with invasion (1). Such was the situation of France before the revolution of the 18th Brumaire.” And such is the picture of the ultimate effect of democratic convulsions, drawn by their own authors; such the miseries which compelled the nation, instead of the feeble sceptre of Louis, to receive the dreaded sword of Napoléon.

Arrival of  
Napoléon  
at Fréjus.

The despatches, containing the account of the expedition into Syria, and of the marvellous victories of Mont Thabor and Aboukir, arrived at this time, and spread far and wide the impression that the conqueror of Rivoli was the destined saviour of the state, for whom all classes were so anxiously looking. His name was in every mouth. Where is he? What will he do? What chance is there that he will avoid the English cruisers? were the questions universally asked. Such was the anxiety of the public mind on the subject, that rumour had twice outstripped the hopes of his friends, and announced his arrival; and when at length the telegraph gave the official intelligence that he had arrived at Fréjus, the public transports knew no bounds (2).

Universal  
enthusiasm  
which it  
excited.

When the people at Fréjus heard that the conqueror of Egypt was on their coast, their enthusiasm broke through all the restraints of government. The laws of quarantine were in a moment forgotten. A multitude, intoxicated with joy and hope, seized the first boats, and rushed on board the vessels; Napoléon, amidst universal acclamations, landed and immediately set out for Paris. The telegraph, with the rapidity of the winds, announced his arrival, and the important intelligence speedily spread over the capital. The intoxication was universal, the joy unanimous. All wishes had been turned towards a hero who could restore peace to desolated France, and here he was, dropt from the clouds: a fortunate soldier presented himself, who had caused the French standards to float on the Capitol and the Pyramids; in whom all the world recognised both civil and military talents of the very highest order. His proclamations, his negotiations, his treaties, bore testimony to the first; his astonishing victories afforded irrefragable evidence of the second. So rare a combination might suggest alarm to the friends of liberty, were it not that his well-known principles and disinterestedness precluded the idea that he would employ the dictatorship to any other end than the public good and the termination of the misfortunes of the country. Discourses of this sort, in every mouth, threw the public into transports, so much the more entrancing as they succeeded a long period of disaster; the joyful intelligence was announced, amidst thunders of applause, at all the theatres; patriotic songs again sent forth their heart-stirring strains from the orchestra; and more than one enthusiast expired of joy at the advent of the hero who was to terminate the difficulties of the Republic (3).

His jour-  
ney, and ar-  
rival at  
Paris.

The conqueror was greeted with the most enthusiastic reception the whole way from Fréjus to Paris. At Aix, Avignon, Vienne, and Lyon, the people came forth in crowds to meet him; his journey resembled a continual triumph. The few bells which the Revolution had left

(1) *Prim. Ann. du Consulat de Bonaparte*, 7. *Dum* ii. 335. *Th.* x. 429. *Bour.* iii. 27.

(2) *Th.* x. 429, 431. *Mign.* ii. 449.

(3) *Four.* iii. 28, 29. *Th.* x. 432. *Nap.* i. 56.

in the churches were rung on his approach; his course at night marked by  
 Oct. 16. the bonfires on all the eminences. On the 16th October he arrived unexpectedly at Paris; his wife and brothers, mistaking his route, had gone out to meet him by another road. Two hours after his arrival he waited on the Directory; the soldiers at the gate of the palace, who had served under him at Arcola, recognised his figure, and loud cries of *Vive Bonaparte!* announced to the government that the dreaded commander had arrived. He was  
 Oct. 17. received by Gohier, and it was arranged that he should be presented in public on the following day (1). His reception then was, to external appearance, flattering, and splendid encomiums were pronounced on the victories of the Pyramids, of Mont Thabor, and Aboukir; but mutual distrust prevailed on both sides, and a vague disquietude already pervaded the Directory at the appearance of the renowned conqueror, who at so critical a moment had presented himself in the capital.

Reception  
 there by  
 the Direc-  
 tory.

Though convinced that the moment he had so long looked for had arrived, and resolved to seize the supreme authority, Napoléon landed in France without any fixed project for carrying his design into execution. The enthusiasm, however, with which he had been received in the course of his journey to Paris, and the intelligence which he there obtained of the state of the country, made him at once determine on the attempt. The circumstances of the time were singularly favourable for such a design. None of the Directory were possessed of any personal consideration except Sièyes, and he had long revolved in his mind the project of substituting, for the weak and oppressive government which was now desolating France, the firm hand of a vigorous and able military leader. Even so far back as the revolt of the sections on the 13th Vendémiaire (10th Nov. 1795), he had testified his opinion of the weakness of his colleagues to Napoléon. At the most critical moment of the day, when the Committee of Government had lost their heads, Sièyes approached Napoléon, and, taking him into the embrasure of a window, said, "You see how it is, general; they are haranguing when the moment for action has arrived; large bodies are unfit for the lead of armies, they never know the value of time. You can be of no use here. Go, general, take counsel only of your own genius, and the dangers of the country; the sole hope of the Republic is in you." These words were not lost on Napoléon; they pointed him out as the fit associate in his designs; and to these were soon added M. Talleyrand, who was too clear-sighted not to perceive that the only chance of safety was in the authority of a dictator, and who had also private grievances of his own to induce him to desire the overthrow of the government (2).

Previous  
 intrigues of  
 the Direc-  
 tory with  
 Louis  
 XVIII.

Indeed, so general was the impression at that period of the impossibility of continuing the government of France under the Republican form, that, previous to Napoléon's arrival, various projects had been not only set on foot, but were far advanced, for the restoration of monarchical authority. The brothers of Napoléon, Joseph and Lucien, were deeply implicated in these intrigues. The Abbé Sièyes at one time thought of placing the Duke of Brunswick on the throne; Barras was not averse to the restoration of the Bourbons, and negotiations were on foot with Louis XVIII for that purpose (3). They had even gone so far, that the terms of the director

(1) Bour. iii. 38, 39. Th. x. 433. Nap. i. 55, 56.  
 Goh. i. 197, 202

(2) Nap. i. 57, 59. Jom. xli. 392, 393. Bour.  
 ii. 32.

(3) Bour. iii. 45. Capéfigue, Hist de la Restaura-  
 tion, i. 129.

were fixed for playing the part of General Monk; twelve millions of livres were to have been his reward, besides two millions to divide among his associates (1). But in the midst of these intrigues, Joseph and Lucien Bonaparte were in a more effectual way advancing their brother's interests, by inducing the leaders of the army to co-operate in his elevation; they had already engaged Macdonald, Leclerc, Lefebvre, Augereau, and Jourdan, to favour his enterprise; but Moreau hung back, and all their efforts had failed in engaging Bernadotte, whose republican principles were proof against their seductions (2).

Junction of  
the male-  
contents of  
all parties  
to support  
Napoleon.

No sooner had Napoléon arrived at his unassuming dwelling in the rue Chantereine, than the whole generals who had been sounded, hastened to pay their court to him, and with them all who had been dismissed or conceived themselves ill-used by the Direc-

tory. His saloon soon resembled rather the court of a monarch than the rendezvous of the friends of any private individual, how eminent soever. Besides Lannes, Murat, and Berthier, who had shared his fortunes in Egypt, and were warmly attached to him, there were now assembled Jourdan, Augereau, Macdonald, Bournonville, Leclerc, Lefebvre, and Marbot, who, notwithstanding their many differences of opinion on other subjects, had been induced, by the desperate state of the Republic, to concur in offering the military dictatorship to Napoléon; and although Moreau at first appeared undecided, he was at length won by the address of his great rival, who made the first advances, and affected to consult him on his future designs. In addition to this illustrious band of military chiefs, many of the most influential members of the legislature were also disposed to favour the enterprise. Roederer, the old leader in the municipality, Regnault St.-Angely, long known and respected for his indomitable firmness in the most trying scenes of the Revolution, and a great number of the leading deputies in both Chambers, had paid their court to him on his arrival. Nor were official functionaries, and even the members of administration, wanting. Siéyes and Roger Ducos, the two Directors who chiefly superintended the civil concerns, and Moulins, who was at the head of the military department of the Republic, Cambacérès, the minister of justice, Fouché, the head of the police, and Réal, a commissary in the department of the Seine, an active and intriguing partisan, were assiduous in their attendance. Eight days had hardly elapsed, and already the direction of government seemed to be insensibly gliding into his hands (3).

The ideas of these different persons, however, were far from being unanimous as to the course which should be adopted. The Republican generals offered Napoléon a military dictatorship, and agreed to support him with all their power, provided he would maintain the principles of the Riding-school Club. Siéyes, Talleyrand, Roger Ducos, and Regnier, proposed to place him simply at the head of affairs, and to change the constitution, which experience had proved to be so miserably defective; while the Directors Barras and Gohier vainly endeavoured to rid themselves of so dangerous a rival, by offering and anxiously pressing upon him the command of the armies (4).

Profound  
dissimula-  
tion of his  
conduct.

In the midst of this flattering adulation, the conduct of Napoléon was influenced by that profound knowledge of human nature and thorough dissimulation, which formed such striking features of his character. Affecting to withdraw from the eager gaze of the multitude, he

(1) Capéfigue, Hist. de la Restauration. i. 129, 135. Nap. i. 66.

(2) Th. x. 434. Bour. iii. 41, 45.

(3) Gnh. i. 211, 212. Nap. i. 64, 65, 74. Th. x. 435, 437.

(4) Th. x. 436, 437. Nap. iii. 64, 65. Gnh. i. 218



seldom showed himself in public; and then only in the costume of the National Institute, or in a grey surtout, with a Turkish sabre suspended by a silk ribbon; a dress which, under seeming simplicity, revealed the secret pride of the Conqueror of the Pyramids. He postponed from day to day the numerous visits of distinguished individuals who sought the honour of being presented to him; and, when he went to the theatre, frequented only a concealed box, as if to avoid the thunders of applause which always attended his being recognised. When obliged to accept an invitation to a sumptuous repast, given in his honour by the minister of justice, he requested that the leading lawyers might be invited; and selecting M. Tronchet, the eloquent defender of Louis XVI, conversed long with him and Treilhard on the want of a simple code of criminal and civil jurisprudence which might be adapted to the intelligence of the age. To private dinners in his own house, he invited only the learned-men of the Institute, and conversed with them entirely on scientific subjects; if he spoke on politics at all, it was only to express his profound regret at the misfortunes of France. In vain the directors exaggerated to him the successes of Masséna in Switzerland, and Brune in Holland; he appeared inconsolable for the loss of Italy, and seemed to consider every success of no moment till that gem was restored to the coronet of the Republic (1).

His efforts,  
to gain Gohier and  
Moulins,  
who refuse.

Napoléon's first attempt was to engage in his interest Gohier, the president of the Directory, and Moulins, who were both strongly attached to the Republican side; and, with this view, he not only paid them in private the greatest attention, but actually proposed to them that he should be taken into the government instead of Siéyes, though below the age of forty, which the constitution required for that elevated function. "Take care," said he, "of that cunning priest Siéyes; it is his connexion with Prussia, the very thing which should have excluded him from it, which has raised him to the Directory; unless you take care, he will sell you to the coalesced powers. It is absolutely necessary to get quit of him. It is true, I am below the legal age required by the constitution; but in the pursuit of forms we must not forget realities. Those who framed the constitution did not recollect that the maturity of judgment produced by the Revolution was often far more essential than the maturity of age which in many is much less material. Ambition has no share in these observations; they are dictated alone by the fears which so dangerous an election could not fail to inspire in all the friends of real freedom." Gohier and Moulins, however, agreed in thinking that the Republic had more to fear from the young general than the old metaphysician; and therefore replied, that though, if of the legal age, he would doubtless have secured all suffrages, yet nothing in their estimation could counterbalance a violation of the constitution, and that the true career which lay before him was the command of the armies (2).

After much  
hesitation,  
he at length  
resolves to  
join Siéyes.

Meanwhile all Europe was resounding with the return of Napoléon, and speculation with its thousand tongues was every where busied, in anticipating the changes which he was to effect in the fate of France and of the world. "What will Bonaparte do? Is he to follow the footsteps of Cromwell, or Monk, or Washington? What change is he like-

(1) Nap. i. 60, 61. Lac. xiv. 401. Th. x. 437.

(2) Goh. i. 205, 210.

At this period, Siéyes's indignation at Napoléon knew no bounds. "Instead," said he, "of lamenting his inactivity, let us rather congratulate ourselves upon it; far from putting arms into the hands

of a man whose intentions are so suspicious; far from giving him a fresh theatre of glory, let us cease to occupy ourselves more about his concerns, and endeavour, if possible, to cause him to be forgot."—Gonina, i. 216.



ly to make in the fate of the war?" were the questions asked from one end of Europe to the other. But the general himself was for a short time undecided as to the course which he should pursue. To avail himself of the support of the Jacobins and the Riding-school Club seemed the plan most likely to disarm all opposition, because they were the only efficient or energetic body in the state; but he well knew that the Jacobins were jealous of every leader, and were at once exclusive and violent in their passions; and to make use of them for his own elevation, and immediately break the alliance and persecute them, would be a dangerous course. Sièyes, on the other hand, was at the head of a numerous body of leading men in the Chambers. His character precluded him from becoming an object of jealousy to the dictator; and although many of his party were firm Republicans, they were not of such an impetuous and energetic kind as to be incapable of employment under a regular government, after the struggle was over; and, besides, their strife with the Riding-school Club was too recent to render any coalition between such opposite bodies the subject of apprehension. Influenced by these considerations, Napoléon resolved to attach himself to Sièyes and his party, and enter into none of the projects of the Jacobins (1).

On the 30th October, he dined with Barras. "The Republic is perishing," said the Director; nothing can be in a more miserable state; the government is destitute of all force. We must have a change, and name Hédouville President of the Republic. Your intention, you know, is to put yourself at the head of the army. As for me, I am ill, my popularity is gone, and I am fit for private life." Napoléon looked at him steadily, without making any answer. Barras cast down his eyes, and remained silent: they had divined each other. Hédouville was a man of no sort of celebrity; his name had been used merely as a cover to the searching question. The conversation here dropped; but Napoléon saw that the time for action had arrived, and a few minutes after he called on Sièyes, and agreed to make the change between the 15th and 20th Brumaire (9th to 11th November). On returning home, he recounted to Talleyrand, Fouché, and others, what had passed; they communicated it during the night to Barras, and at eight the following morning the Director was at his bed-side, protesting his devotion, and that he alone could save the Republic; but Napoléon declined his open assistance, and turned the conversation to the difference between the humid climate of Paris and the burning sands of Arabia (2).

Notwithstanding his utmost efforts, however, Napoléon was unable to make any impression on Bernadotte. That general, partly from republican principles, partly from jealousy, resisted all his advances. "You have seen," said he, to Bourrienne, "the enthusiasm with which I was received in France, and how evidently it springs from the general desire to escape out of a disastrous predicament. Well! I have just seen Bernadotte,

(1) Nap. i. 67, 68. Th. x. 438, 439. Bour. iii. 61, 62.

Though political considerations, however, led to this alliance, there were no two men in France who hated each other more cordially than Napoléon and Sièyes. They had lately met at dinner at the Director Gohier's; the former, though he had made the first advances to Moreau, thought it unworthy of him to do the same to the veteran of the Revolution, and the day passed over without their addressing each other. They separated mutually exasperated. "Did you see that little insolent fellow?" said Sièyes; "he would not even condescend to notice

a member of the government, who, if they had done right, would have caused him to be shot."—"What on earth," said Napoléon, "could have made them put that priest in the Directory? he is sold to Prussia, and unless you take care, he will deliver you up to that power." Yet these men, stimulated by ambition, acted cordially together in the revolution which so soon approached. Such is the friendship of politicians. [Th. x. 443. Bour. iii. 39, 61. Lac. 403. Goh. i. 202.]

(2) Nap. i. 69, 70. Th. x. 448, 449. Lac. xiv. 407, 408.

who boasts, with a ridiculous exaggeration, of the great successes of the Republic; he spoke of the Russians beat, and Genoa saved; of the innumerable armies which were about to be raised. He even reproached me with not having brought back my soldiers from Egypt.—‘What!’ I answered, ‘you tell me that you are overflowing with troops, that two hundred thousand infantry, and forty thousand cavalry, will soon be on foot. If that is so, to what purpose should I have brought back the remains of my army?’ He then changed his tone, and confessed that he thought us all lost. He spoke of external enemies, of *internal* enemies, and at that word he looked steadily in my face. I also gave him a glance;—but patience, the pear will soon be ripe.” Soon after, Napoléon expressed himself with his wonted vehemence, against the agitation which reigned among the Jacobins, and of which the Riding-school hall was the centre. “Your own brothers,” replied Bernadotte, “were its principal founders, and yet you accuse me of having favoured that club: it is to the instructions of some one, *I know not who*, that we are to ascribe the agitation that now prevails.” At these words Napoléon could no longer contain himself. “True, general,” he replied with the utmost vehemence, “and I would rather live in the woods than in a society which presents no security against violence.” Their conversation only augmented the breach, and soon after they separated in sullen discontent (1).

Progress of the conspiracy Though a few of the military, however, held out, the great proportion of them were gained. Berthier, Lannes, and Murat, were daily making converts of such as were backward in sending in their adhesion. The officers of the garrison, headed by Moreau, demanded that they should be presented to Napoléon. The forty adjutants of the national guard of Paris made the same request; his brothers, Lucien and Joseph, daily augmented his party in the Councils; the 8th and 9th regiments of dragoons, who had served under him in Italy, with the 21st chasseurs, who had been organized by him, were devoted to his service. Moreau said, “He did not wish to be engaged in any intrigues, but that, when the moment for action arrived, he would be found at his post (2).” The people of Paris, who awaited in anxious expectation the unfolding of the plot, could no longer conceal their impatience. “Fifteen days have elapsed,” said they, “and nothing has been done (3). Is he to leave us, as he did on his return from Italy, and let the Republic perish in the agony of the factions who dispute its remains?” Every thing announced the approach of the decisive moment.

Nov. 6.  
Great banquet at the Hall of the Ancients.

By the able and indefatigable efforts of Lucien Bonaparte, a banquet, at which he himself was president, was given at the Council of the Ancients, in honour of Napoléon. It passed off with sombre

(1) Bour. iii. 46, 51.

(2) An interesting conversation took place between Napoléon and Moreau when they met, for the first time in their lives, at a dinner party at Gohier's. When first introduced, they looked at each other a moment without speaking. Napoléon was the first to break silence, and testify to Moreau the desire which he had long felt to make his acquaintance. “You have returned victorious from Egypt,” replied Moreau, “and I from Italy, after a great defeat. It was the month which his marriage induced Joubert to spend at Paris which caused our disasters, by giving the Allies time to reduce Mantua, and bring up the force which besieged it to take a part in the action. It is always the greater number which defeats the less.”—“True,” replied Napoléon, “it is always the greater number which beats the less.”—“And yet,” said Gohier, “with

small armies you have frequently defeated legions.”—“Even then,” rejoined he, “it was always the inferior force which was defeated by the superior. When with a small body of men I was in presence of a large one, collecting my little band, I fell like lightning on one of the wings of the enemy and defeated it; profiting by the disorder which such an event never failed to occasion in their whole line, I repeated the attack, with similar success, in another quarter, still with my whole force. I thus beat it in detail; and the general victory, which was the result, was still an example of the truth of the principle, that the greater force defeats the lesser.”—See GOMIZ, i. 203, 204. Two days after, Napoléon made Moreau a present of a dagger, set with diamonds, worth 10,000 francs.—*Moniteur*, 1799, p. 178.

(3) Th. x. 451, 452. Nap. i. 71, 72.

tranquillity. Every one spoke in a whisper, anxiety was depicted on every face, a suppressed agitation was visible even in the midst of apparent quiet. His own countenance was disturbed; his absent and preoccupied air sufficiently indicated that some great project was at hand. He rose soon from table, and left the party, which, although gloomy, had answered the object in view, which was to bring together six hundred persons of various political principles, and thus engage them to act in unison in any common enterprise. It was on that night, that the arrangements for the conspiracy were finally made between Sièyes and Napoléon. It was agreed that the government should be overturned; that, instead of the five directors, three consuls should be appointed, charged with a dictatorial power which was to last for three months; that Napoléon, Sièyes, and Roger Ducos, should fill these exalted stations; and that the Council of the Ancients should pass a decree on the 18th Brumaire (9th Nov.), at seven in the morning, transferring the legislative body to St.-Cloud, and appointing Napoléon commander of the guard of the legislature, of the garrison at Paris, and the national guard. On the 19th, the decisive event was to take place (1).

Prepara-  
tions of the  
con-spir-  
ators in the  
Council of  
the An-  
cients.

During the three critical days which followed, the secret, though known to a great number of persons, was faithfully kept. The preparations, both civil and military, went on without interruption.

Orders were given to the regiments, both infantry and cavalry, which could be relied on, to parade in the streets of Chantierne and Mont-Blanc, at seven o'clock in the morning of the 18th. Moreau, Lefebvre, and all the generals, were summoned to attend at the same hour, with the forty adjutants of the national guard. Meanwhile the secret Council of the Ancients laboured, with shut doors and closed windows, to prepare the decree which was to pass at seven in the morning; and as it forbade all discussion, and the Council of Five Hundred were only summoned to meet at eleven, it was hoped the decree would pass at once, not only without any opposition, but before its opponents could be aware of its existence (2).

Efforts of  
Napoléon  
with all  
parties

Meanwhile Napoléon, in his secret intercourse with the different leaders, was indefatigable in his endeavours to disarm all opposition. Master of the most profound dissimulation, he declared himself, to the chiefs of the different parties, penetrated with the ideas which he was aware would be most acceptable to their minds. To one he protested that he certainly did desire to play the part of Washington, but only in conjunction with Sièyes: the proudest day of his life would be that when he retired from power; to another, that the part of Cromwell appeared to him ignoble, because it was that of an impostor. To the friends of Sièyes he professed himself impressed with the most profound respect for that mighty intellect before which the genius of Mirabeau had prostrated itself; that, for his own part, he could only head the armies, and leave to others the formation of the constitution. To all the Jacobins who approached him he spoke of the extinction of liberty, the tyranny of the Directory, and used terms which sufficiently recalled his famous proclamation which had given the first impulse to the revolution of the 18th Fructidor (3). In public he announced a review of the

(1) Bour. iii. 57, 59. Goh. i. 226. Nap. i. 73. Mige. ii. 450 Th. x. 452, 455.

(2) Th. x. 456, 457. Nap. i. 73, 75.

(3) Th. x. 457. Lac. xiv. 408, 409.

At a small dinner party, given by Napoléon at this time, where the Director Gohier was present, the conversation turned on the turbans used by the

Orientalists to clasp their turbans. Rising from his chair, Napoléon took out of a private drawer two brooches, richly set with those jewels, one of which he gave to Gohier, the other to Dumas. "It is a little toy," said he, "which *no Republicans* may give and receive without impropriety."

Soon after, the conversation turned on the

troops on the morning of the 18th Brumaire, after which he was to set off to take the command of the army on the frontier.

The 18th  
Brumaire,  
Nov. 8.

All the proposed arrangements were made with the utmost precision. By daybreak on the 18th Brumaire (8th Nov.), the boulevards were filled with a numerous and splendid cavalry, and all the officers in and around Paris repaired, in full dress, to the rue Chantereine. The Deputies of the Ancients, who were not in the secret, assembled, with surprise at the unwonted hour, in their place of meeting, and already the conspirators were there in sufficient strength to give them the majority. The president of the commission charged with watching over the safety of the legislative body, opened the proceedings; he drew, in energetic and gloomy colours, a picture of the dangers of the Republic, and especially of the perils which menaced their own body, from the efforts of the anarchists. "The Republic," said he, "is menaced at once by the anarchists, and the enemy; we must instantly take measures for the public safety. We may reckon on the support of General Bonaparte; it is under the shadow of his protecting arm that the Councils must deliberate on the measures required by the interests of the Republic." The uninitiated members were startled, and a considerable agitation prevailed in the assembly; but the majority were instant and pressing, and at eight o'clock the decree was passed, after a warm opposition, transferring the seat of the legislative body to St.-Cloud, appointing them to meet there on the following day at noon, charging Napoléon with the execution of the decree, authorizing him to take all the measures necessary for its due performance, and appointing him to the command of the garrison of Paris, the national guard, the troops of the line in the military divisions in which it stood, and the guard of the two Councils. This extraordinary decree was ordered to be instantly placarded on all the walls of Paris, dispatched to all the authorities, and obeyed by all the citizens (1).

Meeting of  
the conspi-  
rators in the  
rue Chan-  
tereine.

Napoléon was in his own house in the rue Chantereine when the messenger of state arrived; his levee resembled rather the court of a powerful sovereign than the dwelling of a general about to undertake a perilous enterprise. No sooner was the decree received, than he opened the doors, and, advancing to the portico, read it aloud to the brilliant assemblage, and asked if he might rely on their support? They all answered with enthusiasm in the affirmative, putting their hands on their swords. He then addressed himself to Lefebvre, the governor of Paris, who had arrived in ill humour at seeing the troops put in motion without his orders, and said, "Well, Lefebvre, are you, one of the supporters of the Republic, willing to let it perish in the hands of lawyers? Unite with me to save it; here is the sabre which I bore at the battle of the Pyramids; I give it you as a pledge of my esteem and confidence." The appeal was irresistible to a soldier's feelings. "Yes," replied Lefebvre, strongly moved, "let us throw the advocates into the river." Joseph Bonaparte had brought Bernadotte, but, upon seeing what was in agitation, he rapidly retired to warn the Jacobins of their danger. Fouché, at the first intelligence of what was going forward, had ordered the

prospect of an approaching pacification. "Do you really," said Napoléon, "advocate a general peace? You are wrong, president; a Republic should never make but *partial accommodations*; it should always contrive to have some war on hand to keep alive the military spirit."—GONIAZ, i. 214, 215.

(1) Nap. i. 75, 77. Lac. xiv. 411, 412. Th. x. 459.

To all the suspicious of Gohier, Napoléon invited himself to dine with him on *that very day* (the 18th Brumaire), and sent that director a pressing invitation, carried by Eugène Beauharnais, to breakfast with him in the rue Chantereine on the preceding morning.—See GONIAZ, i. 228, 234.

barriers to be closed, and all the usual precautions taken which mark a period of public alarm, and hastened to the rue Chantereine to receive his orders; but Napoléon ordered them to be opened and the usual course of things to continue, as he marched with the nation and relied on its support. A quarter of an hour afterwards he mounted on horseback, and put himself at the head of his brilliant suite and fifteen hundred horsemen, and rode to the Tuileries. Names since immortalized in the rolls of fame were there assembled: Moreau and Macdonald, Berthier and Murat, Lannes, Marmont, and Lefebvre. The dragoons, assembled as they imagined for a review, joyfully followed in the rear of so splendid a *cortége*; while the people, rejoicing at the termination of the disastrous government of the Directory, saw in it the commencement of the vigour of military, instead of the feebleness of legal ascendant, and rent the air with their acclamations (1).

Napoléon's  
speech at  
the bar of  
the An-  
cients.

The military chief presented himself at the bar of the Ancients, attended by that splendid staff. "Citizen-representatives," said he, "the Republic was about to perish when you saved it. Wo to those who shall attempt to oppose your decree! Aided by my brave companions in arms, I will speedily crush them to the earth. You are the collected wisdom of the nation; it is for you to point out the measures which may save it. I come, surrounded by all the generals, to offer you the support of their arms. I name Lefebvre my lieutenant: I will faithfully discharge the duty you have intrusted to me. Let none seek, in the past, examples to regulate the present; nothing in history has any resemblance to the close of the eighteenth century; nothing in the eighteenth century resembles this moment. *We are resolved to have a Republic*; we are resolved to have it founded on true liberty and a representative system. I swear it in my own name, and in that of my companions in arms."—"We swear it," replied the generals. A deputy attempted to speak: the president stopped him, upon the ground that all deliberation was interdicted till the Council met at St.-Cloud. The assembly immediately broke up; and Napoléon proceeded to the gardens of the Tuileries, where he passed in review the regiments of the garrison, addressing to each a few energetic words, in which he declared that he was about to introduce changes which would bring with them abundance and glory. The weather was beautiful; the confluence of spectators immense; their acclamations rent the skies; every thing announced the transition from anarchy to despotic power (2).

Proceedings  
of the  
Council of  
Five Hun-  
dred.

While all was thus proceeding favourably at the Tuileries, the Council of Five Hundred, having received a confused account of the revolution which was in progress, tumultuously assembled in their hall. They were hardly met, when the message arrived from the Ancients, containing the decree removing them to St.-Cloud. No sooner was it read

(1) Lac. xiv. 413. Nap. i. 78. Th. x. 461, 462. Goh. i. 254.

(2) Th. x. 461, 463. Nap. i. 79. Lac. xiv. 413, 414.

During these events, the anxiety of all classes in Paris on the approaching revolution had risen to the highest pitch. A pamphlet, eagerly circulated at the doors of the Councils, contains a curious picture of the ideas of the moment, and the manner in which the most obvious approaching events are glanced over to those engaged in them. The dialogue ran as follows:—"One of the Five Hundred. Between ourselves, my friend, I am seriously alarmed at the part assigned to Bonaparte in this affair. His renown, his consideration, the just confidence of the

soldiers in his talents themselves, may give him the most formidable ascendant over the destinies of the Republic. Should he prove a Cæsar, a Cromwell!"—"The Ancient. A Cæsar, a Cromwell! Bad parts; stale parts; unworthy of a man of sense, not to say a man of property. Bonaparte has declared so himself on several occasions. 'It would be a sacrilegious measure,' said he, on one occasion, 'to make any attempt on a representative government in this age of intelligence and liberty.' On another—'There is none but a fool who would attempt to make the Republic lose the gauntlet it has thrown down to the royalty of Europe, after having gone through so many perils to uphold it.'"—BOU-  
AIRES II, iii. 76, 77.



than a host of voices burst forth at once : but the president, Lucien Bonaparte, succeeded in reducing them to silence, by appealing to the decree which interdicted all deliberation till they were assembled at that palace. At the same moment an aide-de-camp arrived from Napoléon to the guard of the Directory, communicating the decree, and enjoining them to take no orders but from him. They were in deliberation on the subject, when an order of an opposite description arrived from the Directory. The soldiers, however, declared for their comrades in arms, and ranged themselves round the standard of Napoléon. Soon after, a part of the Directory sent in their resignation. Sièyes and Roger Ducos were already in the plot, and did so in concert with Napoléon. Barras was easily disposed of. Boutot, his secretary, waited on Napoléon. He bitterly reproached him with the public disasters. "What have you made of that France," exclaimed he, "which I left so brilliant? I left you in peace, I find you at war : I left you victories, I find only disasters : I left you the millions of Italy, and in their stead I find only acts of spoliation! What have you made of the hundred thousand men, my companions in glory? They are dead! This state of things cannot continue ; in less than three years it would lead to despotism." At length the Director yielded : and, accompanied by a guard of honour, set out for his villa of Gros-Bois (1).

The two Directors who remained, however, were not disposed of without considerable difficulty. These were Gohier and Moulins, brave republicans, but whose powers of acting, according to the constitution, which required a majority of the Directory for every legal act, were paralysed by the resignation or desertion of the majority of their brethren. Napoléon waited upon them, and said that he believed they were too good citizens to attempt to oppose a revolution which appeared inevitable ; and that he therefore expected they would quietly send in their resignations. Gohier replied with vehemence, that, with the aid of his colleague Moulins, he did not despair of saving the Republic. "With what?" said Napoléon. "With the means of the constitution which is falling to pieces?" At this instant a messenger arrived with the intelligence that Santerre was striving to raise the faubourgs. "General Moulins," said Napoléon, "you are the friend of Santerre. I understand he is rousing the faubourgs ; tell him, that at the first movement I will cause him to be shot." Moulins replied with equal firmness. "The Republic is in danger," said Napoléon ; "we must save it : *it is my will*. Sièyes and Roger Ducos have sent in their resignations ; you are two individuals insulated and without power. I recommend you not to resist." The directors replied, that they would not desert their post. Upon that they were sent back to the Luxembourg, separated from each other, and put under arrest by orders of Napoléon transmitted to Moreau. Meanwhile, Fouché, minister of police, Cambacérès, minister of justice, and all the public authorities, hastened to the Tuileries to make their submission (2). Fouché, in the name of the Directory, provisionally dissolved the twelve municipalities of Paris, so as to leave no rallying point to the Jacobins. Before night the government was annihilated, and there remained no authority in Paris but what emanated from Napoléon.

Napoléon, Sièyes, and Roger Ducos, are named consuls.

A council was held in the evening at the Tuileries, to deliberate on the course to be pursued on the following day. Sièyes strongly urged the necessity of arresting forty leaders of the Jacobins, who were already fomenting opposition in the Council of Five Hundred,

(1) Th. x. 468, 469. Gob. i. 243, 258, 261. Lac. xiv, 416.

(2) Th. x. 464, 466. Lac. xiv. 414, 415. Nap. i. 81, 82. Gob. i. 254.



and by whom the faubourgs were beginning to be agitated; but Napoléon declared that he would not violate the oath which he had taken to protect the national representation, and that he had no fear of such contemptible enemies. At the same time a provisional government was formed. Napoléon, Siéyes, and Roger Ducos were named First Consuls, and it was agreed that the Councils should be adjourned for three months (1). Murat was appointed to the command of the armed force at St.-Cloud, Ponsard to that of the guard of the legislative body, Serrurier, of a strong reserve stationed at Point-du-Jour. The gallery of Mars was prepared for the Council of the Ancients, the Orangery for the Five Hundred.

The 19th Brumaire at St.-Cloud. On the morning of the 19th Brumaire (9th November), a formidable military force, five thousand strong, surrounded Saint-Cloud: the legislature were not to deliberate, as on June 2d, under the daggers of Nov. 9. the populace, but the bayonets of the soldiery. The Five Hundred, however, mustered strong in the gardens of the palace. Formed into groups, while the last preparations were going on in the hall which they were to occupy, they discussed with warmth the extraordinary position of public affairs, mutually sounded and encouraged each other, and succeeded, even during that brief space, in organizing a very formidable opposition. The members of the Five Hundred demanded of the Council of the Ancients what they really proposed to themselves as the result of the proceedings of the day. "The government," said they, "is decomposed."—"Admitted," replied the others; "but what then? Do you propose, instead of weak men, destitute of renown, to place there Bonaparte?" Those of the Ancients who were in the secret, ventured to insinuate something about the necessity of a military leader; but the suggestion was ill received, and the majority of the Five Hundred was every moment becoming stronger, from the rumours which were spread of the approaching dictatorship. The Ancients were violently shaken at the unexpected resistance they had experienced, and numbers in the majority were already anxious to escape from the perilous enterprise on which they had adventured (2). The opinions of the Five Hundred were already unequivocally declared; every thing seemed to indicate that the legislature would triumph over the conspirators.

Narrative of the 19th Brumaire in the Five Hundred. It was in the midst of this uncertainty and disquietude that the Councils opened. Lucien Bonaparte was in the chair of the Five Hundred. Gaudin ascended the tribune, and commenced a set speech, in which he dwelt in emphatic terms on the dangers which threatened the country, and concluded by proposing a vote of thanks to the Ancients for having transferred their deliberations to Saint-Cloud, and the formation of a committee of seven persons to prepare a report upon the state of the Republic. Had this been carried, it was to have been immediately followed up by the appointment of the consuls and an adjournment. But no sooner had Gaudin concluded, than the most violent opposition arose. "The winds," says Napoléon, "suddenly escaping from the caverns of Æolus, can give but a faint idea of that tempest." The speaker was violently dragged from the tribune, and a frightful agitation rendered any farther proceedings impossible. "Down with the dictators! long live the constitution!" resounded on all sides. "The constitution or death!" exclaimed Delbrel; "bayonets will not deter us; we are still free here." In the midst of the tumult,

(1) Mign. ii. 454. Th. x. 467. Nap. i. 83, 85. lac. xiv. 419.

(2) Th. x. 469, 472. Nap. i. 86, 87. Lac. xiv. 419, 420. Jom. xii. 403. Gob. i. 272, 273.

Lucien in vain endeavoured to restore his authority. After a long scene of confusion, one of the deputies proposed that the assembly should swear fidelity to the constitution; this proposal was instantly adopted, and the roll called for that purpose. This measure answered the double purpose of binding the Council to support its authority, and giving time for the Jacobin leaders to be sent for from the capital. In fact, during the two hours that the calling of the roll lasted, intelligence of the resistance of the Five Hundred circulated in Paris with the rapidity of lightning, and Jourdan, Augereau, and other leaders of the Jacobin party, believing that the enterprise had miscarried, hastened to the scene of action. The Five Hundred, during this delay, hoped that they would have time to communicate with the Directory; but before it terminated the intelligence arrived that the government was dissolved, and no executive authority remaining but in the person of Napoléon (1).

Imminent  
danger of  
Napoléon,  
who enters  
the Hall of  
the An-  
cients.

The danger was now imminent to that audacious general; the Five Hundred were so vehement in their opposition to him, that the whole members, including Lucien, were compelled to take the oath to the constitution; and in the Ancients, although his adherents had the majority, the contest raged with the utmost violence, and the strength of the minority was every instant increasing. The influential Jacobins were rapidly arriving from Paris; they looked on the matter as already decided. Every thing depended on the troops, and although their attachment to Napoléon was well known, it was extremely doubtful whether they would not be overawed by the majesty of the legislature. "Here you are," said Augereau to him the moment he arrived, "in a happy position."—"Augereau," replied Napoléon, "recollect Arcola; things then appeared much more desperate. Take my word for it; remain tranquil if you would not become a victim. Half an hour hence you will thank me for my advice." Notwithstanding this seeming confidence, however, Napoléon fully felt the danger of his situation. The influence of the legislature was sensibly felt on the troops; the boldest were beginning to hesitate; the zealous had already become timid (2): the timid had changed their colours. He saw that there was not a moment to lose; and he resolved to present himself, at the head of his staff, at the bar of the Ancients. "At that moment," said Napoléon, "I would have given two hundred millions to have had Ney by my side."

In this crisis Napoléon was strongly agitated. He never possessed the faculty of powerful extempore elocution; a peculiarity not unfrequently the accompaniment of the most profound and original thought; and on this occasion, from the vital interests at stake, and the vehement opposition with which he was assailed, he could hardly utter any thing intelligible (3). So far as his meaning could be gathered, amidst the frightful tumult which prevailed, it was to the following purpose:—"You are on the edge of a volcano. Allow

His speech  
there.

me to explain myself; you have called me and my companions in arms to your aid \* \* \* but you must now take a decided part. I know they talk of Cæsar and Cromwell, as if any thing in antiquity resembled the present moment. And you, grenadiers, whose feathers I perceive already waving in the hall, say, have I ever failed in performing the promises I made to you in the camps?" The soldiers replied by waving their hats, and loud acclamations; but this appeal to the military, in the bosom of the legislature,

(1) Nap. i. 87. Lac. xiv. 420, 422. Th. x. 473, 474. Gob. i. 273, 276.

(2) Th. x. 474, 475. Lac. xiv. 423, 424. Nap. i. 87, 88. Las Cas. vii. 235.

(3) Bour. iii. 83, 84, 112, 114.

wrought up to a perfect fury the rage of the Opposition. One of their number, Linglet, rose, and said, in a loud voice, "General, we applaud your words; swear then obedience and fidelity to the Constitution, which can alone save the Republic." Napoléon hesitated; then replied with energy: "The Constitution does not exist; you yourselves violated it on the 10th Fructidor, when the government violated the independence of the legislature; you violated it on the 30th Prairial, when the legislative body overthrew the independence of the executive; you violated it on the 22d Floreal, when, by a sacrilegious decree, the government and legislature violated the sovereignty of the people by annulling the elections which they had made. Having subverted the constitution, new guarantees, a fresh compact, is required. I declare, that as soon as the dangers which have invested me with these extraordinary powers have passed away, I will lay them down. I desire only to be the arm which executes your commands. If you call on me to explain what are the perils which threaten our country, I have no hesitation in answering, that Barras and Moulins have proposed to me to place myself at the head of a faction, the object of which is to effect the overthrow of all the friends of freedom." The energy of this speech, the undoubted truths and audacious falsehoods which it contained, produced a great impression: three-fourths of the assembly arose and loudly testified their applause. His party, recovering their courage, spoke in his behalf, and he concluded with these significant words: "Surrounded by my brave companions in arms, I will second you. I call you to witness, brave grenadiers, whose bayonets I perceive, whom I have so often led to victory; I can bear witness to their courage; we will unite our efforts to save our country. And if any orator," added he, with a menacing voice, "paid by the enemy, should venture to propose to put me *hors la loi*, I shall instantly appeal to my companions in arms to exterminate him on the spot. Recollect that I march accompanied by the god of fortune and the god of war (1)."

He enters  
the Hall of  
the Five  
Hundred.  
Frightful  
disorder  
there.

Hardly was this harangue concluded, when intelligence arrived that in the Council of Five Hundred the calling of the roll had ceased; that Lucien could hardly maintain his ground against the vehemence of the Assembly, and that they were about to force him

to put to the vote a proposal to declare his brother *hors la loi*. It was a similar proposal which had proved fatal to Robespierre: the cause of Napoléon seemed wellnigh desperate, for if it had been passed, there could be little doubt it would have been obeyed by the soldiers. In truth, they had gone so far as to declare, that the oath of 18th Brumaire should receive a place as distinguished in history as that of the *Jeu de Paume*, "the first of which created liberty, while the second consolidated it," and had decreed a message to the Directory to make them acquainted with their resolution. This decree was hardly passed, when a messenger arrived with a letter from Barras, containing his resignation of the office of Director, upon the ground, "that now the dangers of liberty were *all surmounted*, and the interests of the armies secured." This unlooked-for communication renewed their perplexity; for now it was evident that the executive itself was dissolved (2).

Napoléon, who clearly saw his danger, instantly took his resolution. Boldly advancing to the hall of the Five Hundred, whose shouts and cries already resounded to a distance, he entered alone, uncovered, and ordered

(1) Th. x. 477. Bour. iii. 85. Goh. i. 281, 288.

(2) Goh. i. 291, 293, 295.

the soldiers and officers of his suite to halt at the entrance. In his passage to the bar he had to pass one half of the benches. No sooner did he make his appearance, than half of the assembly rose up, exclaiming, "Death to the tyrant! down with the dictator!" The scene which ensued baffles all description. Hundreds of deputies rushed down from the benches, and surrounded the general, exclaiming, "your laurels are all withered; your glory is turned into infamy; is it for this you have conquered? respect the sanctuary of the laws; retire." Two grenadiers left at the door, alarmed by the danger of their general, rushed forward, sword in hand, seized him by the middle, and bore him, almost stupified, out of the hall; in the tumult one of them had his clothes torn. Nothing was to be heard but the cries, "No Cromwell! down with the dictator! death to the dictator (1)!"

Intrepid  
conduct of  
Lucien.

His removal increased rather than diminished the tumult of the assembly. Lucien alone, and unsupported in the president's chair, was left to make head against the tempest. All his efforts to justify his brother were in vain. "You would not hear him," he exclaimed. "Down with the tyrant! *hors la loi* with the tyrant!" resounded on all sides. With rare firmness, he for long resisted the proposal. At length, finding further opposition fruitless, he exclaimed, "You dare to condemn a hero without hearing him in his defence. His brother has but one duty left, and that is to defend him. I renounce the chair, and hasten to the bar to defend the illustrious accused;" and with these words, deposing his insignia of president, mounted the tribune. At that instant an officer, dispatched by Napoléon, with ten grenadiers, presented himself at the door. It was at first supposed that the troops had declared for the Council, and loud applause greeted their entrance. Taking advantage of the mistake, he approached the tribune and laid hold of Lucien, whispering at the same time in his ear, "By your brother's orders;" while the grenadiers exclaimed, "Down with the assassins!" At these words a mournful silence succeeded to the cries of acclamation, and he was conducted without opposition out of the hall (2).

Dissolution  
of the Five  
Hundred by  
an armed  
force.

Meanwhile Napoléon had descended to the court, mounted on horseback, ordered the drums to beat the order to form circle, and thus addressed the soldiers:—"I was about to point out the means of saving the country, and they answered me with strokes of the poniard. They desire to fulfil the wishes of the Allied sovereigns—what more could England do? Soldiers, can I rely on you?" Unanimous applause answered the appeal; and soon after the officer arrived, bringing out Lucien from the Council. He instantly mounted on horseback, and with Napoléon rode along the ranks, then halting in the centre, said, with a voice of thunder which was heard along the whole line, "Citizen-soldiers! the President of the Council of Five Hundred declares to you, that the immense majority of that body is enthralled by a factious band, armed with stilettoes, who besiege the tribune, and interdict all freedom of deliberation! General, and you soldiers, and you citizens, you can no longer recognise any as legislators but those who are around me. Let force expel those who remain in the Orangery; they are not the representatives of the people, but the representatives of the poniard. Let that name for ever attach to them, and if they dare to show themselves to the people, let all fingers point to them as the representatives of the poniard."—"Soldiers," added Napoléon, "can I rely on you?" The soldiers,

(1) Nap. i. 91. Th. x. 477, 478. Lac. xiv. 428. (2) Goh. i. 293, 308.  
Goh. i. 298.

however, appeared still to hesitate, when Lucien as a last resource, turned to his brother, and raising his sword in his hand, swore to plunge it in his breast if ever he belied the hopes of the Republicans, or made an attempt on the liberty of France. This last appeal was decisive. "Vive Bonaparte!" was the answer. He then ordered Murat and Leclerc to march a battalion into the Council, and dissolve the Assembly. "Charge bayonets," was the word given. They entered slowly in, and the officer in command notified to the Council the order to dissolve. Jourdan and several other deputies resisted, and began to address the soldiers on the enormity of their conduct. Hesitation was already visible in their ranks, when Leclerc entering with a fresh body, in close column, instantly ordered the drums to beat and the charge to sound. He exclaimed, "Grenadiers, forward!" and the soldiers slowly advancing, with fixed bayonets, speedily cleared the hall, the dismayed deputies throwing themselves from the windows, and rushing out at every aperture to avoid the shock (1).

Nocturnal  
meeting of  
the conspir-  
ators in the  
Orangery.  
Their de-  
crees.

Intelligence of the violent dissolution of the Five Hundred was conveyed by the fugitives to the Ancients, who were thrown by this event into the utmost consternation. They had expected that that body would have yielded without violence, and were thunderstruck by the open use of bayonets on the occasion. Lucien immediately appeared at their bar, and made the same apology he had done to the troops for the *coup d'état* which had been employed, viz. that a factious minority had put an end to all freedom of deliberation by the use of poniards, which rendered the application of force indispensable; that nothing had been done contrary to forms; that he had himself authorized the employment of the military. The Council were satisfied, or feigned to be so, with this explanation; and at nine at night the remnant of the Five Hundred who were in the interests of Napoléon, five-and-thirty only in number, under the direction of Lucien, assembled in the Orangery, and voted a resolution, declaring that Bonaparte and the troops under his orders had deserved well of their country. "Representatives of the people," said that audacious partisan in his opening speech, "this ancient palace of the Kings of France, where we are now assembled, attests that *power is nothing*, and that *glory is every thing*." At eleven at night, a few members of the two Councils, not amounting in all to sixty persons, assembled, and unanimously passed a decree abolishing the Directory, expelling sixty-one members from the Councils as demagogues, adjourning the legislature for three months, and vesting the executive power in the mean time in Napoléon, Sièyes, and Roger Ducos, under the title of Provisional Consuls. Two Commissions of twenty-five members each, were appointed from each Council, to combine with the Consuls in the formation of a new constitution (2).

Joy in Paris  
at these  
events

During these two eventful days, the people of Paris, though deeply interested in the issue of the struggle, and trembling with anxiety lest the horrors of the Revolution should be renewed, remained perfectly tranquil. In the evening of the 19th, reports of the failure of the enterprise were generally spread, and diffused the most mortal disquietude; for all ranks, worn out with the agitation and sufferings of past convulsions, passionately longed for repose, and it was generally felt that it could be obtained only under the shadow of military authority. But at length the result was

(1) Nap. i. 93. Mign. ii. 458, 459. Th. x. 470. (2) Nap. i. 94, 95. Journ. xii. 409. Th. x. 481.  
480. Lac. xiv. 431. Journ. xii. 406, 408. Bour. iii. Goh. i. 314, 334.  
95, 97. Goh. i. 309, 311.



communicated by the fugitive members of the Five Hundred, who arrived from St.-Cloud, loudly exclaiming against the military violence of which they had been the victims; and at nine at night the intelligence was officially announced by a proclamation of Napoléon, which was read by torchlight to the agitated groups (1).

General  
satisfaction  
which it  
diffused  
through the  
country.

With the exception of the legislature, however, all parties declared for the revolution of 18th Brumaire. The violation of the laws and *coups d'état* had been so common during the Revolution, that the people had ceased to regard them as illegal; and they were judged of entirely by their consequences. To such a height had the anarchy and distresses of the country arisen in the latter years of the Revolution, that repose and a regular government had become the object of universal desire at any price, even the extinction of the very liberty to attain which all these misfortunes had been undergone. The feeling, accordingly, not only of Paris, but of France, was universal in favour of the new government. All parties hoped to see their peculiar tenets forwarded by the change. The Constitutionalists trusted that rational freedom would at length be established; the Royalists rejoiced that the first step towards a regular government had been made, and secretly indulged the hope that Bonaparte would play the part of General Monk, and restore the throne; the great body of the people, weary of strife, and exhausted by suffering, passionately rejoiced at the commencement of repose; the numerous exiles and proscribed families regained the prospect of revisiting their country, and drawing their last breath in that France which was still so dear to them. Ten years had wrought a century of experience. The nation was as unanimous in 1799 to terminate the era of Revolution, as in 1789 it had been to commence it (2).

Clemency of  
Napoléon  
after his  
victory.

Napoléon rivalled Cæsar in the clemency with which he used his victory. No proscriptions or massacres, few arrests or imprisonments, followed the triumph of order over Revolution. On the contrary, numerous acts of mercy, as wise as they were magnanimous, illustrated the rise of the Consular throne. The law of hostages and the forced loan were abolished; the priests and persons proscribed by the revolution of 18th Fructidor permitted to return; the emigrants who had been shipwrecked

(1) Nap. i. 98. Th. x. 482. Join. xii. 410.

This proclamation is chiefly remarkable for the unblushing effrontery with which it set forth a statement of facts, utterly at variance with what above a thousand witnesses, only five miles from the capital, had themselves beheld, and which Napoléon himself has subsequently recorded in his own Memoirs, from which the preceding narrative has in part been taken. He there said, "At my return to Paris, I found division among all the authorities, and none agreed except on this single point, that the constitution was half destroyed and could no longer save the public liberty. All parties came to me, and unfolded their designs, but I refused to belong to any of them. The Council of the Ancients then summoned me; I answered their appeal. A plan for a general restoration had been concerted among the men in whom the nation had been accustomed to see the defenders of its liberty, its equality, and property; but that plan demanded a calm and deliberate investigation, exempt from all agitation or control, and therefore the legislative body was transferred by the Council of the Ancients to St.-Cloud." After narrating the events of the morning of the 18th, it proceeded thus:—"I presented myself to the Council of the Five Hundred,

alone and unarmed, in the same manner as I had been received with transport by the Ancients. I was desirous of rousing the majority to an exertion of its authority, when *twenty assassins precipitated themselves on me*, and I was only saved from their hands by the brave grenadiers, who rushed to me from the door. The savage cry of '*Hors la loi*' arose; the howl of violence against the force destined to repress it. The assassins instantly surrounded the president; I heard of it, and sent ten grenadiers, who extricated him from their hands. The factions, intimidated, *left the hall and dispersed*. The majority, relieved from their strokes, re-entered peaceably into its hall, deliberated on the propositions submitted to it in the name of the public weal, and passed a salutary resolution, which will become the basis of the provisional constitution of the Republic." Under such colours did Napoléon veil one of the most violent usurpations against a legislature recorded in history. When such falsehood was employed in matters occurring at St.-Cloud, it renders probable all that Bourrienne has said of the falsehood of the bulletins in regard to more distant transactions.—See Napoléon, i. 98, 101.

(2) Mign. ii. 462. Lac. xiv. 433, 434.



on the coast of France, and thrown into prison, where they had been confined for four years, were set at liberty. Measures of severity were at first put in force against the violent Republicans, but they were gradually relaxed, and finally abandoned. Thirty-seven of this obnoxious party were ordered to be transported to Guiana, and twenty-one to be put under the observation of the police; but the sentence of transportation was soon changed into one of *surveillance*, and even that was shortly abandoned. Nine thousand state prisoners, who languished at the fall of the Directory in the state prisons of France, received their liberty. Their numbers, two years before, had been sixty thousand. The elevation of Napoléon was not only unstained by blood, but not even a single captive long lamented the car of the victor. A signal triumph of the principles of humanity over those of cruelty, glorious alike to the actors and the age in which it occurred; and a memorable proof how much more durable the victories gained by moderation and wisdom are, than those achieved by violence, and stained by blood (1).

Formation of a constitution. The revolution of the 18th Brumaire had established a provisional government, and overturned the Directory; but it still remained to form a permanent constitution. In the formation of it a rupture took place between Sièyes and Napoléon. The views of the former, long based on speculative opinions, and strongly tinged with republican ideas, were little likely to accord with those of the young conqueror, accustomed to rule every thing by his single determination; and whose sagacity had already discovered the impossibility of forming a stable government out of the institutions of the Revolution. He allowed Sièyes to mould, according to his pleasure, the legislature, which was to consist of a Senate, or Upper Chamber; a Legislative Body, without the power of debate; and a Tribune, which was to discuss the legislative measures with the Council of State: but opposed the most vigorous resistance to the plan which he brought forward for the executive, which was so absurd, that it is hardly possible to imagine how it could have been seriously proposed by a man of ability. The plan of this veteran constitution-maker, who had boasted to Talleyrand ten years before, that "politics was a science which he flattered himself he had brought to perfection (2)," was to have vested the executive in a single *Grand Elector*, who was to inhabit Versailles, with a salary of 600,000 francs a-year, and a guard of six thousand men, and represent the state to foreign powers. This singular magistrate was to be vested with no immediate authority; but his functions were to consist in the power of naming two consuls, who were to exercise all the powers of government, the one being charged with the interior, the finances, police, and public justice; the other the exterior, including war, marine, and foreign affairs. He was to have a council of state, to discuss with the legislature all public measures. He was to be irresponsible, but liable to removal at the pleasure of the Senate.—It was easy to perceive that, though he imagined he was acting on general principles, Sièyes in this project was governed by his own interests; that the situation of grand elector he destined for himself, and the military consulship for the conqueror of Arcola and Rivoli (3).

Napoléon, who saw at once that this senseless project, besides presenting insurmountable difficulties in practice, would reduce him to a secondary part, exerted all his talents to combat the plan of Sièyes. "Can you sup-

(1) Nap. in Month. i. 178. Mign. ii. 463. Lac. xiv. 434, 440.

(2) Dom. 64. *Ante*, i. 201.

(3) Jom. vii. 413, 415. Mign. ii. 464, 465.

pose," said he, "that any man of talent or consideration will submit to the degrading situation assigned to the grand elector? What man, disposing of the national force, would be base enough to submit to the discretion of a Senate, which, by a simple vote, could send him from Versailles to a second flat in Paris? Were I a grand elector, I would name as my Consul of the exterior Berthier, and for the interior some other person of the same stamp. I would prescribe to them their nominations of ministers; and the instant that they ceased to be my staff-officers I would overturn them." Sièyes replied, "that in that case the grand elector would be *absorbed* by the Senate." This phrase got wind, and threw such ridicule over the plan in the minds of the Parisians, that even its author was compelled to abandon it. He soon found that his enterprising colleague would listen to no project which interfered with the supreme power, which he had already resolved to obtain for himself, and which, in truth, was the only form of government capable at that period of arresting the disorders, or terminating the miseries, of France (1).

Napoléon's  
appointment  
as First  
Consul.

The ideas of Napoléon were unalterably fixed; but he was too clear-sighted not to perceive that time and a concession, in form at least, to public opinion were necessary to bring them into practice. "I was convinced," says he, "that France could not exist but under a monarchical form of government; but the circumstances of the times were such, that it was thought, and perhaps was, necessary to disguise the supreme power of the president. All opinions were reconciled by the nomination of a FIRST CONSUL, who alone should possess the authority of government, since he singly disposed of all situations, and possessed a deliberative voice, while the two others were merely his advisers. That supreme officer gave the government the advantage of unity of direction; the two others, whose names appeared to every public act, would soothe the republican jealousy. The circumstances of the times would not permit a better form of government." After long discussion, this project was adopted. The government was in fact exclusively placed in the hands of the First Consul; the two other Consuls had a right to enlighten him by their counsels, but not to restrain him by their vote. The Senate, itself nominated by the Consuls, selected out of the list of candidates who had been chosen by the nation those who were to be the members of the Tribune and Legislature. Government alone was invested with the right of proposing laws. The Legislative Body was interdicted the right of speaking; it was merely to deliberate and decide upon the questions discussed before it by the Tribune, and the Council of State nominated by the Consuls; the first being understood to represent the interests of the people, the second that of the government. The Legislative Body was thus transformed from its essential character in a free state, that of a deliberative assembly, into a supreme court, which heard the state pleadings, and by its decision formed the law (2).

The people no longer were permitted to choose deputies for themselves, either in their primary assemblies or electoral colleges. They were allowed only to choose the *persons eligible* to these offices, and from the lists thus furnished, government made its election. The whole citizens first chose a tenth of their number in each arrondissement, who formed the electors of the *commune*. This body, composed of the electors, again chose out of the

(1) Join. xii. 417, 418. Nrp. ii. 141, 143. Mign. ii. 468.

(2) Mign. ii. 464, 465. Const. Tit. iii. Nrp. i. 363, 364. Bignon, i. 27, 28.

list of eligible persons for the *department* a tenth, who were to form the departmental electors, and they again a tenth of their body, who formed the list out of which the legislature was to be chosen. The Senate, in the close of all, selected such as it chose out of the last list, thus trebly purified, to form the Legislative body. The senators being nominated by the First Consul, and holding their situations for life, the whole legislature was subjected to the control of the executive. Its duty was strictly conservative, to watch over the maintenance of the fundamental laws, and the purification of the other branches of the legislature. All public functionaries, civil and military including the whole judges, instead of being chosen, as heretofore, by the people, were appointed by the First Consul, who thus became the sole depository of influence. The lowest species of judges, called *juges-de-paix*, were alone left in the gift of the people (1). By means of the Senate, chosen from his creatures, he regulated the legislature, and possessed the sole initiative of laws; by the appointment to every office, he wielded the whole civil force of the state; by the command of the military, he overawed the discontented, and governed its external relations.

Outline of  
the new  
constitution The departmental lists were the most singular part of the new constitution. Every person born and residing in France, above twenty-one, was a citizen, but the rights of citizenship were lost by bankruptcy, domestic service, crime, or foreign naturalization. But the *electors* were a much more limited body. "The citizens of each *arrondissement* chose by their suffrages those whom they deemed fit to conduct public affairs, amounting to not more than *a tenth* of the electors. The persons contained in this first list were alone eligible to official situations in the *arrondissement* from which they were chosen. The citizens embraced in this list chose a tenth of their number for each *department*, which formed the body alone eligible for departmental situations. The citizens chosen by the departmental electors again selected a tenth of their number, which formed the body alone capable of being elected for national situations (2)." The persons on the first list were only eligible to the inferior situations, such as *juges-de-paix*, a species of arbiters to reconcile differences and prevent lawsuits; those on the second were the class from whom might be selected the prefects, the departmental judges, tax-gatherers, and collectors; those on the third, who amounted only to *six thousand persons*, were alone eligible to public offices, as the Legislature, any of the Ministries of State, the Senate, the Council of State, the Tribunal of Cassation, the ambassadors at foreign courts. Thus, the whole offices of state were centred in six thousand persons, chosen by a triple election from the citizens. The lists were to be revised, and all the vacancies filled up every three years. These lists of notability, as Napoléon justly observed, formed a limited and exclusive nobility, differing from the old noblesse only in this, that it was elective, not hereditary; and it was, from the very first, subject to the objection, that it excluded from the field of competition many of the most appropriate persons to hold public situations. The influence of the people in the legislature was, by these successive elections, completely destroyed, and the whole power of the state, it was early foreseen, would centre in the First Consul (3). The changes introduced diffused, however, general satisfaction.

All the members of the legislature received pensions from government :

(1) *Jour.* xii. 420, 421. *Mign.* ii. 464, 468, 469.  
*Const.* Tit. iv. Sect. 41. *Bign.* i. 27, 28.

(2) *Const.* Tit. i. sec. 78, 79.  
(3) *Nap.* i. 139, 141.

that of the senators was 25,000 francs, or L.1000 a year; that of the Tribunate, 15,000 francs; or L.650 yearly; that of the Legislative Body, 10,000 fr. or L.400 a-year. The Senate was composed of persons above forty years of age; the Legislative Body, above thirty. A senator remained in that high station for life, and was ineligible to any other situation (1).

Appoint-  
ments in ad-  
ministration  
made by  
Napoléon.

On the 24th December, 1799, the new constitution was proclaimed; and the whole appointments were forthwith filled up, without waiting for the lists of the eligible, who were, according to its theory, to be chosen by the people. Two consuls, eighty senators, a hundred tribunes, three hundred legislators, were forthwith nominated, and proceeded to the exercise of all the functions of government. In the choice of persons to fill such a multitude of offices, ample means existed to reward the moderate, and seduce the Republican party; and the consuls made a judicious and circumspect use of the immense influence put into their hands. Sièyes, discontented with the overthrow of his favourite ideas, retired from the government; received as a reward for his services 600,000 francs and the estate of Crosne, afterwards changed for the more valuable domain of la Faisanderie in the park of Versailles; and the democratic fervour of the author of the pamphlet—"What is the Tiers-État?" sunk into the interested apathy of the proprietor of fifty thousand pounds. Roger Ducos also withdrew, perceiving the despotic turn which things were taking: and Napoléon appointed in their stead Cambacérès and Lebrun, men of moderation and probity, who worthily discharged the subordinate functions assigned to them in the administration. "In the end," said Napoléon, "you must come to the government of boots and spurs; and neither Sièyes nor Roger Ducos was fit for that (2)." Talleyrand was made minister of foreign affairs, and Fouché retained in that of the police; the illustrious La Place received the portfolio of the interior. By the latter appointments Napoléon hoped to calm the fears and satisfy the ambition of the Republican party. Sièyes was very adverse to the continuance of Fouché in office; but Napoléon was resolute. "We have arrived," said he, "at a new era; we must recollect in the past only the good, and forget the bad. Age, the habits of business, and experience,

(1) Const. Tit. ii. and iii. Nap. i. 361, 362.

(2) Las Cas. ii. 353.

A curious incident occurred on occasion of the dismissal of Sièyes, highly characteristic of the disposition of that veteran of the Revolution, as well as of the preceding governments. At the first meeting which Napoléon had with him in the apartments of the Directory, Sièyes, after cautiously shutting the doors, and looking around to see that he was not overheard, said, in a low voice, to Napoléon, pointing to a bureau, "Do you see that piece of furniture? You will not easily guess what it is worth. It contains 800,000 francs. During our magisterial duties, we came to perceive that it would be unseemly for a Director to leave office without being worth a farthing; and we therefore fell upon the expedient of getting this depot, from whence every one who retired might take a suitable sum. But now the Directory is dissolved, what shall we do with it?"—"If I had been officially informed of it," said Napoléon, "it must have been restored to the public treasury; but as that is not the case, I am not supposed to know any thing of the matter. Take it, and divide it with Ducos, but make haste, for to-morrow it may be too late." Sièyes did not require a second bidding; that very day he took out the treasure, "but appropriated," says Napoléon, "600,000 francs to himself, and gave only

200,000 to poor Ducos." In truth, Ducos got only 100,000; the Grand Elector absorbed all the rest. [Goh. ii. 5.] This treasure, however, was far from satisfying Sièyes. One day, soon after, he said to Napoléon, "How fortunate you are; all the glory of the 18th Brumaire has fallen to your lot; while I shall probably incur only blame for my share in the attempt."—"What!" exclaimed Napoléon, "have not the consular commissaries passed a resolution that you have deserved well of your country? Tell me honestly, what do you want?" Sièyes, with a ridiculous grimace, replied, "Do you not think, citizen-consul, that some *national domain*, a monument of the national gratitude, would be a fit recompense to one who has co-operated with you in your great designs?"—"Oh! I understand you now," said Napoléon; "I will speak with Ducos on the subject." Two days afterwards appeared a decree of the commission of the Councils, awarding to Sièyes the national domain of Crosne, in "name of national recompense." But Sièyes soon found out that the nation had not the right to dispose of the estate of Crosne; and it was exchanged for the superb Hotel del Infantado in Paris, and the rich lands of la Faisanderie in the park of Versailles—See Napoléon, i. 146, Las Casas, ii. 350, and Goh. ii. 5, 8.

have formed or modified many characters." High salaries were given to all the public functionaries, on condition only that they should live in a style of splendour suitable to their station : a wise measure, which both secured the attachment of that powerful body of men, and precluded them from acquiring such an independence as might enable them to dispense with the employment of government (1).

Immense majority of the people who approved of the new constitution. Such was the exhaustion of the French people, occasioned by revolutionary convulsions, that this constitution, destroying, as it did, all the objects for which the people had combated for ten years, was gladly adopted by an immense majority of the electors. It was approved of by 3,011,007 citizens; while that of 1793 had only obtained 1,801,918 suffrages, and that in 1795, which established the Directory, 1,057,390 (2). These numbers are highly instructive. They demonstrate, what so many other considerations conspire to indicate, that even the most vehement changes are brought about by a factious and energetic minority, and that it is often more the supineness than the numerical inferiority of the better class of citizens which subjects them to the tyranny of the lowest. In 1789, indeed, the great majority of all classes were carried away by the fever of innovation; but these transports were of short duration; and from the time that the 'sombre days of the Revolution began, their numerical superiority was at an end. It was the terrors and disunion of the class of proprietors, which, by leaving no power in the state, but the populace and their demagogues, delivered the nation over to the horrors of Jacobin slavery.

Reflections on the accession of Napoleon to the Consular Throne. Such was the termination of the changes of the French Revolution; and such the government which the people brought upon themselves by their sins and their extravagance. On the 23d June, 1789, before one drop of blood had been shed or one estate confiscated, Louis offered the States-General a constitution containing all the elements of real freedom, with all the guarantees which experience has proved to be necessary for its duration; the security of property, the liberty of the press, personal freedom, equality of taxation, provincial assemblies, the voting of taxes by the States-General, and the vesting of the legislative power in the representatives of the three estates in their separate chambers (3). The popular representatives, seduced by the phantom of democratic ambition, refused the offer, usurped for themselves the whole powers of sovereignty, and with relentless rigour pursued their victory, till they had destroyed the clergy, the nobles, and the throne. France waded through an ocean of blood; calamities unheard of assailed every class, from the throne to the cottage; for ten long years the struggle continued, and at length it terminated in the establishment, by universal consent, of a government which swept away every remnant of freedom, and consigned the state to the tranquillity of military despotism (4).

(1) Mign. ii. 468, 469. Jom. xii. 422. 423. Nap. i. 113. Gob. ii. 6, 8.

(2) Mign. ii. 469.

(3) See Vol. i. 203, 207.

(4) So evidently was this result the punishment of the crimes of the Revolution, that it appeared in that light even to some of the principal actors in that convulsion. In a letter written by Siéyès to Riouffe at that period, he said, "It is then for such a result that the French nation

has gone through its Revolution! The ambitious villain! He marches successfully through all the ways of fortune and crime—all is vanity, distrust, and terror. There is here neither elevation nor liberality. *Providence wishes to punish us by the Revolution itself.* Our chains are too humiliating; on all sides nothing is to be seen but powers prostrated; leaden oppression, military despotism is alone triumphant. If any thing could make us retain some esteem for the nation, it is the luxury of per-



**Durable freedom had been rendered impossible by the destruction of the aristocracy and clergy.** Had this been merely a temporary result, the friends of freedom might have found some consolation in the reflection, that the elements at least of ultimate liberty were laid, and that the passing storm had renovated, not destroyed, the face of society. But the evil went a great deal deeper. In their democratic fervour, the people had pulled down the bulwarks, not only of order, but of liberty; and when France emerged from the tempest, the classes were extinct whose combined and counteracting influence are necessary for its existence.

“The principle of the French Revolution,” says Napoléon, “being the absolute equality of all classes, there resulted from it a total want of aristocracy. If a republic is difficult to construct on any durable basis without an order of nobles, much more so is a monarchy. To form a constitution in a country destitute of any species of aristocracy, is like attempting to navigate in a single element. The French Revolution has attempted a problem as insoluble as the direction of balloons (1).” “A monarchy,” says Lord Bacon, “where there is no nobility at all, is ever a pure and absolute tyranny, as that of the Turks; for nobility attempers sovereignty, and draws the eyes of the people somewhat aside from the line royal (2).” In these profound observations is to be found the secret of the subsequent experienced impossibility of constructing a durable free government in France, or preserving any thing like a balance between the different classes of society. The Revolution had left only the government, the army, and the people; no intermediate rank existed to counteract the influence of the former, or give durability to the exertions of the latter. Left to themselves, the people were no match in the long run for an executive wielding the whole military force of the kingdom, and disposing, in offices and appointments, of above L.40,000,000 a-year. In moments of excitement, the democratic spirit may become powerful; and, by infecting the military, give a momentary triumph to the populace; but, with the cessation of the effervescence, the influence of government must return with redoubled force, and the people be again subjected to the yoke of servitude. Casual bursts of democratic passion cannot maintain a long contest in a corrupted age with the steady efforts of a regular government; and if they could, they would lead only to the transference of despotic power from one set of rulers to another. It is hard to say whether liberty has most to dread, in such circumstances, from its friends or its enemies.

Durable freedom is to be secured only by the steady, persevering efforts of an aristocracy, supported, when necessary, by the enthusiasm of the people, and hindered from running into excess by the vigour of the executive. In all ages of the world, and under all forms of government, it is in the equipoise of these powers that freedom has been formed, and from the destruction of one of them that the commencement of servitude is to be dated. The French Revolution, by totally destroying the whole class of the aristocracy, and preventing, by the abolition of primogeniture, its reconstruction, has rendered this balance impossible, and, instead of the elements of European freedom, left in society only the instruments and the victims of Asiatic despotism. It is as impossible to construct a durable free government with such materials, as it would be to form glass or gunpowder with two only of the three elements

fidly of which it has been the victim. But the right of the sabre is the weakest of all; for it is the one which is soonest worn out.”—*Letter, SIÈYES to RIQUETTES, Jan. 17, 1800; HARD. vii. 371.*

(1) *Nap. i. 145, 146.*

(2) *Bacon. ii. 282.*



of which they are composed ; and the result has completely established the truth of these principles. The despotism of Napoléon was, till his fall, the most rigorous of any in Europe : and, although France enjoyed fifteen years of liberty under the Restoration, when the swords of Alexander and Wellington had righted the balance, and the recollection of subjugation had tamed for a time the aspirations of democracy ; yet, with the rise of a new generation and the oblivion of former disaster, the scales were anew subverted, the constitutional monarchy was overturned, and from amidst the smoke of the Barricades, the awful figure of military power again emerged.

Diminished  
effects of the  
irreligion of  
France.

Grievous as has been the injury, however, to the cause of freedom which the ruin of the French aristocracy has occasioned, it is not so great or so irreparable as has resulted from the destruction of the Church, and consequent irreligion of the most energetic part of the population. This evil has spread to an unparalleled extent, and produced mischiefs of incalculable magnitude. If it be true, as the greatest of their philosophers has declared, that it was neither their numbers, nor their talent, nor their military spirit which gave the Romans the empire of the world, but the religious feeling which animated their people (1), it may be conceived what consequences must have resulted from the extinction of public worship over a whole country, and the education of a generation ignorant of the very elements of religious belief. It is the painful duty of the moralist, to trace the consequences of so shocking an act of national impiety, in the progressive dissolution of manners, the growth of selfishness, and the unrestrained career of passion, by which so large a portion of the French people have since been distinguished ; but its effects upon public freedom, are, in a political point of view, equally important. Liberty is essentially based on the generous feelings of our nature ; it requires often the sacrifice of private gratification for the public good ; it can never subsist for any length of time without that heroic self-denial, which can only be founded on the promises and the belief of religion. We must not confound with this generous and elevated spirit the desire for licentiousness, which chafes against every control, whether human or divine ; the one is the burst of vegetation in its infancy, and gives promise of the glories of summer and the riches of harvest ; the other, the fermentation which precedes corruption. By destroying the Church, and educating a whole generation without any religious principles, France has given a blow to her freedom and her prosperity, from which she can never recover. The fervour of democracy, the extension of knowledge, will give but a transient support to liberty when deprived of that perennial supply which is derived from the sense of duty which religion inspires. "As Atheism," says Lord Bacon, "is in all respects hateful, so in this, that it depriveth human nature of the means of exalting itself above human frailty ; and as it is in particular persons, so it is in nations." Passion will find as many objects of gratification under a despotism as a republic ; seduction is as easy from private as public desires ; pleasure is as alluring in the palace of opulence as in the forum of democracy. The transition is in general slow from patriotic principle or public spirit to private gratification, because they spring from the opposite motives to human conduct ; but it is rapid, from rebellion against the restraints of virtue, to thralldom under the chains of vice, for the former

(1) Nec numero Hispanos, nec robore Gallos, nec calliditate Pœnos, nec artibus Græcos, nec denique hoc ipso hujus gentis et terræ domestico nativæque sensu, Italos ipsos et Latinos ; sed pietate ac reli-

gione, atque hac una sapientia, quod Deorum immortalium numine omnia regi gubernarique perspeximus, omnes gentes, nationesque superavimus. —CICERO.

is but the commencement of the latter. "The character of democracy and despotism," says Aristotle (1), "is the same. Both exercise a despotic authority over the better class of citizens; decrees are in the one what ordinances and arbitrary violence are in the other. In different ages, the democrat and court favourite are not unfrequently the same men, and always bear a close analogy to each other; they have the principal power in their respective forms of government; favourites with the absolute monarch; demagogues with the sovereign multitude." "Charles II" says Chateaubriand, "threw Republican England into the arms of women;" but, in truth, it was not the amorous monarch who effected the change; it was the easy transition from democratic license to general corruption, which debased the nation at the Restoration. Mr. Hume has observed, that religious fanaticism during the Civil Wars disgraced the spirit of liberty in England; but, in truth, it was the only safeguard of public virtue during those critical times; and but for the unbending austerity of the Puritans, public freedom would have irrecoverably perished in the flood of licentiousness which overwhelmed the country on the accession of Charles II.

"Knowledge," says Lord Bacon, "is power;" he has not said it is either wisdom or virtue. It augments the influence of opinion upon mankind; but whether it augments it to good or evil purpose, depends upon the character of the information which is communicated, and the precautions against corruption which are simultaneously taken. As much as it enlarges the foundations of prosperity in a virtuous, does it extend the sources of corruption in a degenerate age. Unless the moral and religious improvement of the people extends in proportion to their intellectual cultivation, the increase of knowledge is but an addition to the lever by which vice dissolves the fabric of society.

Prodigious effects of the centralization of power introduced by the Revolution.

The revolutionary party have frequently said, that it was Napoléon who constructed with so much ability the fabric of despotism in France; but, in truth, it was not he that did it, nor was his power, great as it was, ever equal to the task. It was the Constituent Assembly who broke the bones of France, and left only a disjointed, mis-shapen mass, forming an easy prey to the first despotism which should succeed it. By destroying the parliaments, provincial assemblies, and courts of law; by annihilating the old divisions and rights of the provinces; by extinguishing all corporations and provincial establishments, at the same time that they confiscated the property of the Church, drove the nobles into exile, and soon after seized upon their estates, they took away for the future all elements of resistance even to the power of the metropolis. Every thing was immediately centralized in its public offices; the lead in all public matters taken by its citizens; and the direction of every detail, however minute, assumed by its ministers. France, ever since, has fallen into a state of subjection to Paris to which there is nothing comparable even in the annals of Oriental servitude. The ruling power in the East is frequently shaken, sometimes overturned, by tumults originating in the provinces; but there has been no example, since the new *régime* was fully established by the suppression of the la Vendée rebellion, of the central authority in France being shaken but by movements originating in the capital. The authority of Robespierre, Napoléon, Louis, and Louis-Philippe, were successively acknowledged by thirty millions over the country, as soon as a faction in Paris had obtained the as-

(1) Arist. de Pol. iv. c. 4.

cendency; and the obedient departments waited for the announcement of the telegraph, or the arrival of the mail, to know whether they should salute an emperor, a king, a consul, or a decemvir (1). This total prostration of the strength of a great nation to the ruling power in the metropolis, could never have taken place under the old government; and, accordingly, nothing of the kind was experienced under the monarchy. It was the great deeds of democratic despotism perpetrated by the Constituent Assembly which destroyed all the elements of resistance in the provinces, and left France a helpless multitude, necessarily subject to the power which had gained possession of the machinery of government. Despotism as the old government of France was, it could never have attempted such an arbitrary system; even the power of the Czar Peter, or the Sultan Mahmoud, would have been shattered against such an invasion of established rights and settled interests. A memorable instance of the extreme danger to which the interests of freedom are exposed from the blind passions of democracy; and of the fatal effect of the spring flood which drowns the institutions of a state, when the opposing powers of the people and the government are brought for a time to draw in the same direction.

To all human appearance, therefore, the establishment of permanent freedom is hopeless in France; the bulwarks of European liberty have disappeared in the land, and over the whole expanse is seen only the level surface of Asiatic despotism. This grievous result is the consequence and the punishment of the great and crying sins of the Revolution; of the irreligious spirit in which it was conceived; the atheistical measures which it introduced; the noble blood which it shed; the private right which it overturned; the boundless property which it confiscated. But for these offences, a constitutional monarchy, like that which for a century and a half has given glory and happiness to England, might have been established in its great rival; because, but for these offences, the march of the Revolution would have been unstained by crime. In nations, as in individuals, a harvest of prosperity never yet was reaped from seed sown in injustice. But nations have no immortality; and that final retribution which in private life is often postponed, to outward appearance at least, to another world, is brought with swift and unerring wings upon the third and fourth generation in the political delinquencies of mankind.

Distinction between the safe and dangerous spirit of freedom. Does, then, the march of freedom necessarily terminate in disaster? Is improvement inevitably allied to innovation, innovation to revolution? And must the philosopher, who beholds the infant struggles of liberty, ever foresee in their termination the blood of Robespierre, or the carnage of Napoléon? No! The distinction between the two is as wide as between day and night—between virtue and vice. The simplest and rudest of mankind may distinguish, with as much certainty as belongs to erring mortals, whether the ultimate tendency of innovations is beneficial or ruinous—whether they are destined to bring blessings or curses on their wings. This test is to be found in the character of those who support them, and the moral justice or injustice of their measures. If those who forward the work of reform are the most pure and upright in their private conduct, if they are the foremost in every moral and religious duty; most unblemished in their intercourse with men, and most undeviating in their duty to God; if they are the best fathers, the best husbands, the best landlords, the most charitable and humane of society who take the lead; if their

(1) St.-Clément, 237, 260.

proceedings are characterised by moderation, and they are scrupulously attentive to justice and humanity in all their actions : then the people may safely follow in their steps, and anticipate blessings to themselves and their children from the measures they promote. But if the reverse of all this is the case; if the leaders who seek to rouse their passions are worthless or suspicious in private life; if they are tyrannical landlords, faithless husbands, negligent fathers; if they are sceptical or indifferent in religion, reckless or improvident in conduct, ruined or tottering in fortune; if they are selfish in their enjoyments, and callous and indifferent to the poor; if their liberty is a cloak for licentiousness, and their patriotism an excuse for ambition; if their actions are hasty and inconsiderate, and their measures calculated to do injustice or create suffering to individuals, on the plea of state necessity : then the people may rest assured that they are leading them to perdition; that the fabric of liberty never yet was reared by such hands, or on such a basis; and that, whatever temporary triumph may attend their steps, the day of reckoning will come, and an awful retribution awaits them or their children.

Immense  
impulse  
given, by  
changes of  
revolution,  
to the  
spread of  
Christianity  
over the  
world.

The final result of the irreligious efforts of the French people is singularly illustrative of the moral government to which human affairs are subject, and of the vanity of all attempts to check that spread of religion which has been decreed by Almighty power. When the Parisian philosophers beheld the universal diffusion of the spirit of scepticism which they had produced; when a nation was seen abjuring every species of devotion, and a generation rising in the heart of Europe ignorant of the very elements of religious belief, the triumph of infidelity appeared complete, and the faithful trembled and mourned in silence at the melancholy prospects which were opening upon the world. Yet in this very spirit were preparing, by an unseen hand, the means of the ultimate triumph of civilized over barbaric belief, and of a greater spread of the Christian faith than had taken place since it was embraced by the tribes who overthrew the Roman empire. In the deadly strife of European ambition, the arms of civilisation acquired an irresistible preponderance; with its last convulsions the strength of Russia was immeasurably augmented, and that mighty power, which had been organized by the genius of Peter and matured by the ambition of Catharine, received its final developement from the invasion of Napoléon. The Crescent, long triumphant over the Cross, has now yielded to its ascendant; the barrier of the Caucasus and the Balkan have been burst by its champions; the ancient war-cry of Constantinople, "Victory to the Cross!" has, after an interval of four centuries, been heard on the Ægean Sea; and that lasting triumph, which all the enthusiasm of the Crusaders could not effect, has arisen from the energy infused into what was then an unknown tribe, by the infidel arms of their descendants. In such marvellous and unforeseen consequences, the historian finds ample grounds for consolation at the temporary triumph of wickedness; from the corruption of decaying, he turns to the energy of infant civilisation; while he laments the decline of the principles of prosperity in their present seats, he anticipates their resurrection in those where they were first cradled; and traces through all the vicissitudes of nations, the incessant operation of those general laws which provide, even amidst the decline of present greatness, for the final improvement and elevation of the species.

**HISTORY OF EUROPE**  
**FROM THE COMMENCEMENT**  
**OF THE**  
**FRENCH REVOLUTION**

**IN M.DCC.LXXXIX.**

**TO THE RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS**

**IN M.DCCC.XV.**

**BY ARCHIBALD ALISON, F.R.S.E.**

**ADVOCATE.**

*"Bellum maxime omnium memorabile quod unquam gestu sit; me scriptum; quod Hannibale duce Carthaginenses cum populo Romano pugnare. Nam neque validiores opibus ulli inter se civitates gentesque contulerunt arma, neque his ipsi tantum unquam viriam aut roboris fuit; et haud ignotas belli artes inter se, sed expertas primo Punico consueverant bello; odia etiam prope majoribus certabant quam viribus; et adeo varia belli fortuna, encirpaque Mars fuit, ut propriis periculum faceret qui vicerunt."—TIT. LIV. lib. 21.*

**VOL. IV.**

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**1841.**





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Revival of the spirit of Europe by the battle of the Nile. THE cannon of Nelson, which destroyed the French fleet at Aboukir, re-echoed from one end of Europe to the other, and every where revived the spirit of resistance to their ambition. That great event not only destroyed the charm of Republican invincibility, but relieved the Allies of the dread arising from the military talents of Napoléon and his terrible Italian army, whom it seemed to sever for ever from the soil of Europe. The subjugation of Switzerland and the conquest of Italy were no longer looked upon with mere secret apprehension; they were the subject of loud and impassioned complaint over all Europe, and the allied sovereigns, upon this auspicious event, no longer hesitated to engage in open preparations for the resumption of hostilities (1).

Preparation of Austria. Austria felt that the moment was approaching when she might regain her lost provinces, restore her fallen influence, and oppose a barrier to the revolutionary torrent which was overwhelming Italy. She had accordingly been indefatigable in her exertions to recruit and remodel her armies since the treaty of Leoben; and they were now, both in point of discipline, numbers, and equipment, on the most formidable footing. She had two hundred and forty thousand men, supported by an immense artillery, ready to take the field, all admirably equipped and in the finest order, and to these were to be added sixty thousand Russians, who were advancing under the renowned Suwarrow, flushed with the storming of Ismael and Warsaw, and anxious to measure their strength with the conquerors of southern Europe. The Emperor of Russia, though he had been somewhat tardy in following out the designs of his illustrious predecessor, had at length engaged warmly in the common cause; the outrage committed on the Order of Malta, which had chosen him for their protector, filled him with indignation, and he seemed desirous not only to send his armies to the support of the Germanic states, but to guarantee the integrity of their Confederation. Turkey had forgotten its ancient enmity to Russia, in animo-

(1) Th. x. 144, 145. Ann. Reg. 1799, 226. Jom. xi. 10, 11.



city against France for the unprovoked attack upon Egypt, and its fleets and armies threatened to enclose the conqueror of the Pyramids in the kingdom he had won. Thus, while the ambition of the Directory in Switzerland and Italy roused against them the hostility of the centre of Europe, their impolitic and perilous expedition to the shores of Africa arrayed against France the fury of Mussulman zeal and the weight of Russian power (1).

Treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between England and Russia. On the 18th December, 1798, a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, was concluded between Great Britain and Russia, for the purpose of putting a stop to the further encroachments of France. By this treaty, Russia engaged to furnish an auxiliary force of forty-five thousand men, to act in conjunction with the British forces in the north of Germany; and England, besides an immediate advance of L.225,000, was to pay a monthly subsidy of L.75,000. The Emperor Paul immediately entered, with all the vehemence of his character, into the prosecution of the war; he gave an asylum to Louis XVIII in the capital of Courland; behaved with munificence to the French emigrants who sought refuge in his dominions; accepted the office of Grand Master of the Knights of St.-John of Malta, and excited by every means in his power the spirit of resistance to the advances of republican ambition. All his efforts, however, failed in inducing the Prussian cabinet to swerve from the cautious policy it had adopted ever since the retreat of the Duke of Brunswick, and the neutrality it had observed since the treaty of Basle (2). That power stood by in apparent indifference, and saw a desperate strife between the hostile powers, in which her own independence was at stake, when her army, now 220,000 strong, might have interfered with decisive effect in the struggle; and she was rewarded for her forbearance by the battle of Jena.

Dec. 2, 1798. Great Britain made considerable exertions to improve the brilliant prospects thus unexpectedly opened to her view. Parliament met on the 20th November, 1798, and shortly after entered on the arduous duty of finance. To meet the increased expenses which the treaty with Russia, and the vigorous prosecution of the war in other countries, were likely to occasion, Mr. Pitt proposed a new tax, hitherto unknown in Great Britain, that Income-Tax. on property. No income under L.60 a-year was to pay any duty at all; those under L.105 only a fortieth part, and above L.200 a tenth. The total income of the nation was estimated at L.102,000,000, including L.20,000,000 as the rent of lands; and the estimated produce of the tax on this graduated scale was L.7,500,000. This tax proceeded on the principle of raising as large a portion as possible of the supplies of the year by taxation within its limits, and compelling all persons to contribute, according to their ability, to the exigencies of the state; an admirable principle, if it could have been fully carried into effect, and which, if practicable and uniformly acted upon, would have prevented all the financial embarrassments consequent on the war. But this was very far indeed from being the case. The expenses incurred so far exceeded the income, even in that very year, that a supplementary budget was brought forward on June 6th, 1799, which very much augmented the annual charges (3).

The principle of making the supplies of the year as nearly as possible keep pace with its expenditure, is the true system of public as well as

(1) Arch. Ch. i. 40, 41, 47. Jom. xi. 96. Th. x. 146. Ann. Reg. 1799, 238.

(2) Hurd, vii. 6, 7. Ann. Reg. 1799, 76, 78. Jom. xi. 9, 10.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1799, 176, 191. Parl. Hist. xxxi. 174.

Between the two budgets, loans were contracted to the amount of L.15,000,000; and the total expenditure, including L.13,653,000 for the army; L.8,840,000 for the navy; and a subsidy of L.825,000 to Russia; amounted, exclusive of the charges of the debt, to no less than L.34,000,000.

Observa-  
tions on the  
expedience  
of this tax.

private finance; which has suffered, in every country, from nothing so much as the convenient but ruinous plan of borrowing for immediate exigencies, and laying the undying burden of interest upon the shoulders of posterity. But a greater error in finance never was committed than the introduction of the income-tax. In appearance the most equal, it is in reality the most unequal of burdens; because it assesses at the same rate many different classes whose resources are widely different. The landed proprietor, whose estate is worth thirty years' purchase of the rental at which he is rated; the fundholder, whose stock is worth twenty or twenty-five of the same annual payment; the merchant, whose profits one year may be swallowed up by losses the next season; the professional man, whose present income is not worth five years' purchase; the young annuitant, whose chance of life is as twenty, and the aged spinster, in whom it is not two, are all rated at the same annual sum. The tax, in consequence, falls with excessive and undue severity upon one class, and with unreasonable lightness upon others; it extinguishes the infant accumulations of capital, and puts an end to the savings of laborious industry; while it is comparatively unfelt by the great capitalist and the opulent landed proprietor. Unlike the indirect taxes, which are paid without being felt, or forgotten in the enjoyments of the objects on which they are laid, it brings the bitterness of taxation, in undisguised nakedness, to every individual, and produces, in consequence, a degree of discontent and exasperation which nothing but the excitement of continual warfare, or a sense of uncontrollable necessity, can induce a nation to bear.

Land and  
sea forces  
voted by  
Parliament.

A considerable addition was made to the army this year. The land forces were raised to 138,000 men; the sea to 120,000, including 20,000 marines; and 104 ships of the line were put in commission. Besides this, 80,000 men were embodied in the militia of Great Britain alone, besides 40,000 in Ireland; an admirable force, which soon attained a very high degree of discipline and efficiency, proved, through the whole remainder of the war, the best nursery for the troops of the line, and was inferior only in the quality and composition of its officers to the regular army (1).

Universal  
discontent  
at the  
French go-  
vernment.

The forces with which France was to resist this formidable confederacy were by no means commensurate either to the ambition of the Directory, or the vast extent of territory that they had to defend. Both externally and internally the utmost discontent and dissatisfaction existed. The Republican armies, which in the outset divided so many states by the delusive promises of liberty and equality, had excited universal hatred by the exactions which they had made, and the stern tyranny to which they had every where subjected their new allies. Their most devoted adherents no longer attempted to palliate their conduct; from the frontier of the Jura to the extremity of Calabria, one universal cry had arisen against the selfish cupidity of the Directory, and the insatiable rapacity of its civil and military officers. The Swiss democrats, who had called in the French to revolutionize their country, made the loudest lamentations at the unrelenting severity with which the great contributions, to which they were so little accustomed, were exacted from the hard-earned fruits of their industry. The Cisalpine republic was a prey to the most vehement divisions; furious Jacobinism reigned in its legislative assemblies; the authorities imposed on them by the French bayonets were in the highest degree unpopular; while in

(1) *Parl. His.* xxxi. 231, 242. *James' Naval Hist.* App. Vol. iii. *Ann. Reg.* 1799, 1803. App. to Chron.

Holland, the whole respectable class of citizens felt the utmost dissatisfaction at the violent changes made, both in their government and representative body, by their imperious allies. From the affiliated republics, therefore, no efficient support could be expected; while the French government, nevertheless, was charged with the burden of their defence. From the Texel to Calabria, their forces were expanded over an immense surface, in great, but still insufficient numbers; while the recent occupation of Switzerland had opened up a new theatre of warfare hitherto untrod by the Republican soldiers (1).

State of the  
military  
forces of  
France.

During the two years which had elapsed since the termination of hostilities, the military force of France had signally declined. Sick-

ness and desertion had greatly diminished the ranks of the army; twelve thousand discharges had been granted to the soldiers, but more than ten times that number had deserted from their colours, and lived without disguise at their homes, in such numbers as rendered it neither prudent nor practicable to attempt the enforcing their return. Five-and-thirty thousand of the best troops were exiled under Napoléon on a distant shore, and though the addition of two hundred thousand conscripts had been ordered, the levy proceeded but slowly, and some months must yet elapse before they could be in a condition to take the field. The result of the whole was, that for the actual shock of war, from the Adige to the Maine, the Directory could only count on one hundred and seventy thousand men; the remainder of their great forces were buried in the Italian peninsula, or too far removed from the theatre of hostilities, to be able to take an active part in the approaching contest. The administration of the armies was on the most corrupted footing; the officers had become rapacious and insolent in the command of the conquered countries; and the civil agents either lived at free quarters on the inhabitants, or plundered without control the public money and stores which passed through their hands. Revolutionary energy had exhausted itself; regular and steady government was unknown, and the evils of a disordered rule and an abandoned administration were beginning to recoil on those who had produced them (2).

Their dispo-  
sition over  
the theatre  
of approach-  
ing war.

The disposition of the Republican armies was as follows: Of one hundred and ten thousand men, who were stationed in Italy, thirty thousand under Macdonald, were lost in the Neapolitan dominions, and the remainder so dispersed over the extensive provinces of Lombardy, Tuscany, and the Roman states, that only fifty thousand could be collected to bear the weight of the contest on the Adige. Forty-two thousand, under General Jourdan, were destined to carry the war from the Upper Rhine, across the Black Forest, into the valley of the Danube. Masséna, at the head of forty-five thousand, was stationed in Switzerland, and intended to dislodge the Imperialists from the Tyrol and the upper valley of the Adige. Thirty thousand, under Bernadotte, were designed to form a corps of observation on the Lower Rhine from Dusseldorf to Mannheim; while Brune at the head of fifteen thousand French, and twenty thousand Dutch troops, was intrusted with the defence of the Batavian republic. The design of the Directory was to turn the position of the Imperialists on the Adige by getting possession of the mountains which enclosed the upper part of the stream, and then drive the enemy before them, with the united armies of Switzerland and Italy, across the mountains of Carinthia, while that of the Upper Rhine,

(1) Jom. xi. 88, 89. Th. ii. 161, 173, 174, 207, 208. Bot. iii. 94, 97.

(2) Th. x. 182, 208, 209. Jom. xi. 89, 94. Dum. i. 33. Arch. Ch. Campagne de 1799, i. 48, 51.

descending the course of the Danube, was to unite with them under the walls of Vienna (1).

Forces of  
the Impe-  
rialists, and  
their dispo-  
sition.

The forces of the Austrians were both superior in point of number, better equipped, and stationed in more advantageous situations. Their armies were collected behind the Lech, in the Tyrol, and on the Adige. The first, under the command of the Archduke Charles, consisted of fifty-four thousand infantry and twenty-four thousand cavalry; in the Grisons and Tyrol, forty-four thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred horse were assembled under the banners of Bellegarde and Laudon; twenty-four thousand foot-soldiers and one thousand four hundred horse, under the command of Hotze, occupied the Vorarlberg; while the army on the Adige, seventy-two thousand strong, including eleven thousand cavalry, obeyed the orders of Kray; and twenty-four thousand on the Maine, or in garrison at Wurtzburg, observed the French forces of the Lower Rhine. Thus two hundred and forty-six thousand men were concentrated between the Maine and the Po, and their centre rested on the mountains of Tyrol; a vast fortress, which had often afforded a sure refuge in case of disaster to the Imperial troops, and whose inhabitants were warmly attached to the House of Austria. Above fifty thousand Russians were expected (2); but they could not arrive in time to enter into operations either on the Danube or the Adige at the commencement of the campaign.

These dispositions on both sides were made on the principle that the possession of the mountains ensures that of the plains, and that the key to the Austrian monarchy was to be found in the Tyrol Alps; a great error, and which has been since abundantly refuted by the campaigns of Napoléon, and the reasoning of the Archduke Charles (3). The true avenue to Vienna is the valley of the Danube; it is there that a serious blow struck is at once decisive, and that the gates of the monarchy are laid open by a single great defeat on the frontier. It was not in the valley of the Inn, nor in the mountains of the Grisons, but on the heights of Ulm and the plains of Bavaria, that Napoléon prostrated the strength of Austria in 1805 and 1809; and of all the numerous defeats which that power had experienced, none was felt to be irretrievable but that of Hohenlinden, on the banks of the Iser, in 1800. There is no analogy between the descent of streams from the higher to the lower grounds, and the invasion of civilized armies from mountains to the adjacent plains. A ridge of glaciers is an admirable fountain for the perennial supply of rivers, but the worst possible base for military operations (4).

ruinous ef-  
fects of the  
invasion of  
Switzerland  
and Italy to  
the French  
military  
power.

By the invasion of Switzerland the French government had greatly weakened, instead of having strengthened, their military position. Nothing was so advantageous to them as the neutrality of that republic, because it covered the only defenceless frontier of the state, and gave them the advantage of carrying on the campaigns in Germany and Italy, for which the fortresses on the Rhine and in Piedmont afforded an advantageous base, without the fear of being turned by a reverse in the mountains. But all these advantages were lost when the contest was conducted in the higher Alps, and the line of the Rhine or the Adige was liable to be turned by a single reverse on the Aar or the St.-Gothard. The surface over which military operations were carried, was by this conquest immensely extended, without any proportionate addition either to the means of offensive

(1) Dum. i. 32, 33. Jom. xi. 90, 91. Arch. Ch. i. 50, 51.

(2) Arch. Ch. i. 40, 41. Dum. i. 33. Jom. xi. 95. 96. Th. x. 226.

(3) Archduke, i. 117, 162. Camp de 1796.

(4) Jom. x. 286, and xi. 96. Archduke, i. 53.

Guerre de 1799.

or defensive warfare. The Tyrol was a great central fortress, in which the Imperialists had often found shelter in moments of disaster, but no such advantage could be hoped for by the Republicans from their possession of the hostile or discontented cantons of Switzerland; while no avenue to the heart of Austria was so difficult as that which lay through the midst of the brave and indomitable inhabitants of that almost inaccessible province (1).

Nor had the invasion of the Roman and Neapolitan states, and the banishment of Napoléon to the sands of Egypt, contributed less to weaken the formidable powers with which two years before he had shattered the Austrian monarchy. Now was seen the sagacity with which he had chosen the line of the Adige for tenacious defence, and the wisdom of the declaration, that if he had listened to the suggestions of the Directory, and advanced to Rome, he would have endangered the Republic. Though the forces in the Peninsula were above one hundred and ten thousand, and were soon increased by the arrival of conscripts to one hundred and thirty thousand men, the Republicans were never able to meet the Imperialists in equal force on the Adige; and Italy was lost, and the retreat of the army from Naples all but cut off, while yet an overwhelming force, if it could only have been assembled at the decisive point, existed in the Peninsula (2).

The French commence hostilities, March 1, 1799. Notwithstanding the deficient state of their military preparations, and the urgent representations of all their generals that the actual force under their command was greatly inferior to the amount which the Directory had led them to expect, the French government, led away by ill-founded audacity, resolved to commence hostilities. The Austrian cabinet having returned no answer to the peremptory note, in which the Directory required the sending back of the Russian troops, Jourdan received orders to cross the Rhine, which was immediately done at Kehl and Huningen, and the Republicans advanced in four columns towards the Black Forest. A few days after, Bernadotte, with ten thousand men, took possession of Mannheim, and advanced against Philipsburg, which refused to capitulate, notwithstanding an angry summons from the Republican general. Upon receiving this intelligence, the Archduke passed the Lech, and advanced in three columns towards Biberach, Waldsee, and Ravensberg, at the head of thirty-seven thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry; while Starry, with thirteen thousand men, was moved upon Neumarckt, and six thousand men were thrown into the fortifications of Ulm (3).

Operations in the Grisons. March 5 and 6. While the hostile armies were thus approaching each other, in the space between the Rhine and the Danube, the contest had commenced, on the most extended scale, in the mountains of the Grisons. During the night of the 5th March, Masséna marched upon Sargantz, and having summoned the Austrian general, Auffenberg, to evacuate the district, his troops advanced at all points to cross the Rhine. The left wing, under Oudinot, afterwards, Duke of Reggio, "a general," said Napoléon, "tried in a hundred battles," was destined to make a false attack on the post of Feldkirch, so as to hinder Hotze, who commanded at that important point, from sending any succour to the centre at Coire, and the right at Reichenau; the right wing, under Dumont, was destined to cross at that place, and turn the position of Coire by the upper part of the stream, while Masséna himself, in the centre, was to force the passage opposite to Luciensteg, and carry the intrenchments of that fort. Subordinate to these principal attacks, Loison, with

(1) Th. x. 217. Arch. Ch. i. 56.

(2) Jom. xi. 95, 96. Th. x. 218, 219, 226.

(3) Jom. xi. 95, 96. Th. x. 227, 229. Arch. Ch. i. 140.



a brigade, was directed to descend from the valley of Urseren upon Disentis, and support the attack of Dumont; while Lecourbe, who lay at Bellinzona, received orders to penetrate by Tüsis, over the snowy summit of the Bernhardin and down the stupendous defile of the Via-mala, into the Engadine, and open up a communication with the Italian army on the Adige (1).

March 6. These attacks were almost all successful. The Rhine, yet charged with melting snows, was crossed under a murderous fire; after an obstinate resistance, the fort of Luciensteg was carried by the intrepidity of the French chasseurs, who scaled an almost inaccessible height which commanded it, and eight hundred men, with five pieces of cannon, were made prisoners. Meanwhile Dumont, having forced the pass of Kunkel, and made himself master of the central point and important bridge of Reichenau, situated at the junction of the two branches of the Rhine, not only succeeded in maintaining himself there, but made prisoners an Austrian detachment which had resisted Loison at Disentis. The result of this movement was, that Auffenberg, who fell back slowly, contesting every inch of ground, towards Coire, found his retreat cut off up the Rhine: and, being surrounded there by superior forces, he had no alternative but to lay down his arms, with two thousand men and ten pieces of cannon, while a battalion he had stationed at Embs underwent the same fate (2).

March 7. While these successes were gained on the centre and right, Oudinot advanced against Feldkirch. Hotze instantly collected his troops, and advanced to meet him, in order to preserve his communication with Auffenberg; but, after maintaining his ground for a whole day, he was at length driven back to the intrenchment of Feldkirch, with the loss of a thousand men and several pieces of cannon.

At the same time, Lecourbe, having broken up from Bellinzona, crossed the Bernhardin, yet encumbered with snow, and arrived at Tüsis by the terrible defile of the Via-mala, where he divided his forces into two columns, one of which moved over the Julian Alps, towards the sources of the Inn, while the other, under Lecourbe in person, began to ascend the wild and rocky valley of the Albula. The intention of the Republicans was to have supported this irruption by Dessoles, who received orders to debouche from the Valteline into the valley of the Upper Adige; but the march of the latter column across the mountains having been retarded by unavoidable accidents, General Bellegarde, who commanded the Austrian forces in that quarter, made preparations, by occupying all the passes in the neighbourhood, to envelope the invaders (3).

March 14. Martinsbruck in consequence was assailed by Lecourbe without success; but although Laudon, in his turn, made an attack with his own troops, combined with its garrison, in all fourteen thousand men, upon the French forces, he was unable to gain any decisive advantage; and the Republicans, awaiting their reinforcements, suspended their operations for ten

March 24. days. At length Dessoles having come up, and other reinforcements arrived, Lecourbe commenced a general attack on Laudon's forces, leading his division against Martinsbruck, while Dessoles and Loison were directed to cross the mountains into the Munsterthal and cut off their retreat. To arrive at that valley it was necessary for the division of the former to cross the highest ridges in Europe, amidst ice and snow, which might have deterred the most intrepid chasseurs. With undaunted courage his soldiers

(1) Arch. Ch. i. 141, 142. Dum. i. 36, 37. Jom. xi. 100, 101. Th. x. 230, 231.

(2) Jom. xi. 101, 102. Dum. i. 38, 39. Arch. Ch. i. 58, 62.

(3) Arch. Ch. i. 98. Jom. xi. 114.



ascended the glaciers of the Wurmser Joch, which separates the sources of the Adda from one of those of the Adige. After having turned the fortifications on the summit, which the Imperialists occupied in perfect security, he descended by the wild and rocky bed of the torrent of Rambach, amidst frightful precipices, where a handful of men might have arrested an army, surprised the post of Taufers, which Laudon had fortified with care, and totally routed its garrison, after a desperate resistance, with the loss of four thousand prisoners and all its artillery. The situation of the Austrian general was now altogether desperate; for while Dessoles was achieving this decisive success, Loison had seized upon Nauders, and Lecourbe forced the post and passage of Martinsbruck, so that all the avenues by which his retreat could be effected were cut off, and he had no resource but to throw himself, with three hundred men, into the glaciers of Gebatch, from whence, after undergoing incredible hardships, he at length reached the valley of Venosta, and joined General Bellegarde, who was marching to his relief. After this glorious victory, achieved with forces hardly half the number of the vanquished, and which cannot be appreciated but by those who have traversed the rugged and inhospitable ridges among which it was effected, Dessoles advanced to Glurns (1); and the French found themselves masters of the upper extremity of the two great valleys of the Tyrol, the Inn and the Adige; but here their advance was arrested by General Bellegarde, who had collected nearly forty thousand men to oppose their progress, and the intelligence of events in other quarters, which restored victory to the Imperial standards.

But Masséna is defeated in repeated attacks on Feldkirch. The intelligence of the first success in the Grisons reached Jourdan on the 11th, and induced him to move forward. On the 12th, he passed the Danube, and advanced in four marches to Pfullendorf and Mengen, between that river and the lake of Constance. Judging, however, that he was not in sufficient strength to attempt any thing until the post of Feldkirch was carried, he urged Masséna to renew his attacks in that quarter. That important town, situated on a rocky eminence

March 11, 12, and 14. in the middle of the valley, and supported by intrenchments extending from the river Ill, which bathed its feet, to inaccessible cliffs on either side, was repeatedly attacked by Oudinot, at the head of the French grenadiers, with the utmost impetuosity; but all his efforts recoiled before the steady courage of the Imperialists. Masséna, conceiving this post to be of the utmost importance, from its commanding the principal passage from the Vorarlberg into the Tyrol, united the whole division of Ménard to the troops of Oudinot, and advanced in person to the attack. But the great strength of the works, and the invincible tenacity of the Austrians, defeated all his efforts. In vain the French sought to establish themselves on the right of the position; the Tyrolese sharpshooters ascended the adjacent eminences, and assailed the Republicans with such a close and destructive fire, as rendered it impossible for them to maintain their ground (2); and Masséna, after beholding the flower of his army perish at the foot of the intrenchments, was obliged to draw off his forces, with the loss of three thousand men, to Luciensteg and Coire, while Oudinot recrossed the Rhine, and established himself at Reineck.

Jourdan, to compensate the inferiority of his force, had taken up a strong position between the lake of Constance and the Danube. Two torrents, the

(1) *Dum.* i. 54, 56. *Jom.* x. 114, 116. *Arch. Ch.* i. 96, 136.

(2) *Jom.* xi. 110, 113. *Dum.* i. 47, 48. *Arch. Ch.* i. 112, 118.

**Journal re-** Ostrach and the Aach, flowing in opposite directions, the one into  
**ceives a** the Danube, the other into the lake, from a marsh in his centre,  
**check from** ran along the front of his position. St.-Cyr, with the left, was sta-  
**the Arch-** tioned at Mengen; Souham, with the centre, at Pfullendorf; Ferino,  
**duke** with the right, at Barnsdorf, while Lefebvre, with the advanced guard, oc-  
**Charles.** cupied the heights behind the village of Ostrach. That point was the most  
 accessible of the line: placed at the source of the two torrents, it was to be  
 reached by a chaussée, which crossed the marshy ground from which they  
 descended. It was against this part of the line that the principal efforts of  
 the Imperialists were directed, while subordinate attacks were simultaneously  
 commenced on the right and left against St.-Cyr and Ferino. The force  
 brought to bear against Ostrach, under the Archduke in person, was  
 long resisted, notwithstanding the great superiority of numbers in the attack-  
 ing columns, by the Republicans, under Jourdan; but at length the left,  
 under St.-Cyr, having been outflanked at Mengen, and the centre  
 being on the point of sinking under the increasing masses of the assailants, a  
 general retreat was ordered, and such was the danger of the left wing, that  
 it was continued, without intermission, on the day following, till they reached  
 the position of STOCKACH (1).

**Importance** This affair did not cost above two thousand men to the vanquished  
**of this suc-** party, and the loss of the victors was nearly as great; but it had the  
**cess.** most important effect upon the fate of the campaign. It broke the charm of  
 Republican invincibility, compelled the French standards openly to retreat  
 before the Imperial, and gave to the Austrians all the advantage of a first suc-  
 cess. Now appeared the good use which they had made of their time during  
 the short interval of peace. Their cannon, well served and formidable, were  
 much more numerous in proportion to the troops engaged than they had  
 been in the former war, and the light artillery in particular, formed on the  
 French model, had attained a degree of perfection which entirely deprived  
 the Republicans of their advantage in that important weapon of modern  
 warfare (2).

**Position of** Jourdan clearly saw the importance of the village of Stockach,  
**the French** where all the roads to Swabia, Switzerland, and the valley of the  
**at Stockach.** Neckar, unite, and beyond which he could not continue his retreat, without  
 abandoning his communications with Masséna and the Grisons. Perceiving  
 that the Archduke was preparing an attack, he resolved to anticipate him,  
 and obtain the advantage of the initiative, always an object of importance in  
 the commencement of a campaign. The Austrians were by this time in great  
 force on the Stockach, a small stream which flows in a winding channel be-  
 fore the village of the same name, and terminates its devious course in the  
 lake of Constance; their centre occupied the plateau of Nellenberg in front  
 of the river, their right extended along the same plateau towards Liptingen,  
 their left from Zollbruck to Wahlweis. On the side of the Republicans, Souham  
 commanded the centre, Ferino the right, and St.-Cyr, whose vanguard was  
 led by Soult, the left wing. This last body was destined to attack Liptingen,  
 where Meerfeld was stationed; and it was in that quarter that the principal  
 effort was to be made, with a view to turn the Austrians, and force them to  
 retreat by the single chaussée of Stockach in their rear, where they of neces-  
 sity must, in case of disaster, have lost all their artillery (3).

At five in the morning all the columns were in motion, and the advanced

(1) Arch. Ch. i. 147, 151. Th. x. 233. Dum. i. 43, 45. Jom. xi. 120, 124. St.-Cyr, i. 130, 132.

(2) Dum. i. 42, 43. Arch. Ch. i. 156, 165.

(3) Jom. xi. 128. Dum. i. 49. St.-Cyr, i. 133, 135. Arch. Ch. i. 171, 175.

guard of Soult soon came in sight of the videttes of Meerfeld. He was soon attacked so vigorously by that general and St.-Cyr, that he was driven from Liptingen, and thrown back in confusion into the woods which lay along the road of Stockach. Speedily were they expelled from that stronghold; the infantry, in great disorder, retreated to Stockach, and the cavalry on the road towards Möeskirch. Meanwhile the two armies were engaged along the whole line. Souham in the centre repulsed the light troops of the enemy as far as Wahlweis and Orsingen on the Stockach, and menaced the plateau of Nellemberg, while Ferino was actively engaged on the right. A violent cannonade was heard along the whole front of the army; a decisive success had been gained on one point, the Austrian right was turned, the victory seemed already decided (1).

*Battle of  
Stockach.*

No sooner, however, did the Archduke perceive the impression which the French had made on his right wing, than he set off at the gallop for that quarter of the field, followed by twelve squadrons of cuirassiers, after whom succeeded six battalions of grenadiers; while a powerful body of cavalry were stationed in the plateau of Nellemberg to protect the retreat of the army, in case of its becoming necessary to have recourse to that extremity. These dispositions, rapidly adopted at the decisive moment, changed the fortunes of the day, and their effect was increased by a faulty step of Jourdan, who, instead of supporting the menaced point with all his disposable force, sent orders to St.-Cyr to advance to Möeskirch, in the idea of cutting off the retreat of the Imperialists. A violent struggle now ensued in the woods of Liptingen, which Soult had gained in the first moment of success. The Archduke attacked them with fresh troops, the Republicans defended them with heroic valour; and one of the most furious combats that occurred in the whole war, took place, without intermission, for several hours. Three times the French advanced out of the wood to meet their enemies, and three times, notwithstanding the most vigorous efforts, they were repulsed by the obstinate perseverance of the Germans. At length the Imperialists became the assailants; the Archduke charged in person at the head of the Hungarian grenadiers. Prince Fürstemburg and Prince Anhalt Bemburg were killed while leading on their respective regiments, and the flower of the army on both sides perished under the terrible fire which overspread the field of battle. St.-Cyr, who felt that he had gained what, if properly supported, might have become a decisive success, long and obstinately maintained his ground; but at length, finding that the principal effort of the Austrians was directed against his wing, and that their reserves were coming into action, he ordered Soult to evacuate the wood, and retire into the plain of Liptingen. This perilous movement was performed by that able officer in presence of a victorious enemy, and when his rear-guard was almost enveloped by their cuirassiers, with admirable steadiness; but, when they reached the open country, they were charged by Kollowrath, at the head of the six battalions of grenadiers and twelve squadrons of cuirassiers, which the Archduke had brought up from the reserve. This effort proved decisive. In vain Jourdan charged the Austrian cavalry with the French horse; they were broken and driven back in disorder by the superior weight and energy of the cuirassiers, and the general-in-chief narrowly escaped being made prisoner in the flight. This overthrow constrained the infantry to a disastrous retreat, during which two regiments were enveloped and made prisoners; and St.-Cyr, who was now entirely cut off from the centre of his army, alone escaped total destruc-

(1) *Jom.* xi. 130 *Dum.* i. 49, 50. *St.-Cyr*, i. 136, 139. *Arch.* Ch. i. 175, 190.

tion by throwing himself across the Danube, the sole bridge over which he was fortunate enough to find unoccupied by the enemy (1).

Defeat of the French. This great success, and the consequent separation of St.-Cyr from the remainder of the army, was decisive of the victory. Souham and Ferino, with the centre and right, had maintained their position, notwithstanding the superiority of force on the part of their opponents; but they had gained no advantage, and they were totally unequal, now that the left wing of the army was separated, and unable to render any assistance, to maintain their ground against the victorious troops of the Archduke. Although, therefore, the French had bravely withstood the superior forces of the enemy, and the loss on both sides was nearly equal, amounting to about five thousand men to each party, yet, by the separation of their left wing, they had sustained all the consequences of a serious defeat; and it became necessary, renouncing all idea of co-operating with the Republicans in Helvetia, which could not be approached without the sacrifice of St.-Cyr and his wing (2), to endeavour to reunite the scattered divisions of the army by a retreat to the passes of the Black Forest.

Jourdan was so much disconcerted with the result of this action, that, after reaching the defiles of that forest, he surrendered the command of the army to Ernouf, the chief of the staff, and set out for Paris, to lay in person his complaints as to the state of the troops before the Directory (3).

Retreat of the French across the Rhine. With superior forces, and twenty thousand cavalry, in admirable order, the Austrians had now an opportunity of overwhelming the French army in the course of its retreat to the Rhine, such as never again occurred to them till the battle of Leipsic. The Archduke clearly perceived that there was the important point of the campaign: and had he been the unfettered master of his actions, he would, in all probability, have constrained the French army to a retreat as disastrous as that from Wurtzburg in 1796; but the Aulic Council, influenced by the erroneous idea that the key to ultimate success was to be found in the Alps, forbade him to advance towards the Rhine till Switzerland was cleared of the enemy. He was compelled, in consequence, to put his army into cantonments between Engen and Wahlweis, while the Republicans leisurely effected their retreat through the Black Forest, by the valley of Kintzig and that of Hell, to the Rhine, which stream they crossed at Old Brisach and Kehl a few days after, leaving only posts of observation on the right bank. This retreat compelled

April 6. Bernadotte, who, with his little army of eight thousand men, had already commenced the siege of Philipsburg, to abandon his works with precipitation, and regain the left bank (4); so that, in a month after the campaign had been commenced with so much presumption and so little consideration by the Directory, their armies on the German frontier were every where reduced to the defence of their own territory.

The bad success of their armies at the opening of this campaign, to which the French had been so little accustomed since the brilliant era of Napoléon's victories, might have proved fatal to the government of the Directory, had it not been for an unexpected event which occurred at this time, and restored to the people much of the enthusiasm and vigour of 1793 (5). This was the massacre of the French plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Rastadt.

(1) St.-Cyr, i. 139, 150. Th. x. 238, 240. Jom. x. 131, 134. Dum. i. 50, 52. Arch. Ch. i. 190, 198.

(2) Arch. Ch. i. 198, 202. Jom. xi. 136, 137. Th. x. 241. St. Cyr, i. 150, 156. Dum. i. 51.

(3) Th. x. 241, 242. Jom. xi. 138, 139. St.-Cyr i. 160, 167.

(4) Arch. Ch. i. 211, 218. Jom. xi. 139, 140. Th. x. 242.

(5) Jom. xi. 141.

Congress of  
Rastadt is  
still sitting.

Though at war with Austria, France was yet at peace with the German empire, and the Congress at Rastadt was still continuing, under the safeguard of neutrality, its interminable labours. When the victory of Stockach had placed that city in the power of the Imperialists, the Cabinet of Vienna ordered the Count Lehbach, their minister plenipotentiary, to endeavour to obtain intelligence of the extent to which the princes of the empire had made secret advances to the Directory. The Count conceived the most effectual way would be to seize the papers of the French embassy at the moment of their leaving the city, and for this purpose he solicited and obtained from his court authority to require an armed force from the Archduke Charles. That gallant officer refused, in the first instance, to comply with the request, alleging that his soldiers had nothing to do with the concerns of diplomacy; but fresh orders from Vienna obliged him to submit, and a detachment of the hussars of Szeckler was in consequence placed at the disposal of the Imperial plenipotentiary (1).

Its dissolu-  
tion.

Towards the end of April, the communications of the ministers at Rastadt having been interrupted by the Austrian patrols, the Republicans addressed an energetic note on the subject to the Austrian authorities, and the remonstrance having been disregarded, the Congress declared itself dissolved. The departure of the diplomatic body was fixed for the 28th April, but the Austrian colonel gave them orders to set out on the 19th, as the town was to be occupied on the following day by the Imperial troops, and refused to grant the escort which they demanded, upon the plea that it was wholly unnecessary. The French plenipotentiaries in conse-

Assassina-  
tion of the  
French plen-  
ipotentiaries.

quence, Jean Debry, Bonnier, and Roberjot, set out on the same evening for Strasburg, but they had scarcely left the gates of Rastadt when they were attacked by some drunken hussars of the regiment of Szeckler, who seized them, dragged them out of their carriages, slew Bonnier and Roberjot, notwithstanding the heroic efforts of the wife of the latter to save her husband, and struck down Jean Debry, by sabre blows, into a ditch, where he escaped destruction only by having the presence of mind to feign that he was already dead. The assassins seized and carried off the papers of the legation, but committed no other spoliation; and leaving two of their victims lifeless, and one desperately wounded, on the ground, disappeared in the obscurity of the night. Jean Debry, whose wounds were not mortal, contrived to make his way, after their departure, into Rastadt, and presented himself, bleeding and exhausted, at the hotel of M. Gertz, the Prussian envoy (2).

General  
horror  
which it  
excites in  
France, and  
throughout  
Europe.

This atrocious violation of the law of nations excited the utmost indignation and horror throughout Europe. The honour of the Germans felt itself seriously wounded by the calamitous event, and the members of the deputation who remained at the Congress unanimously signed a declaration expressive of detestation at its authors. It is, perhaps, the strongest proof of the high character and unstained honour of the Emperor Francis and the Archduke Charles, that although the crime was committed by persons in the Austrian uniform, and the hussars of Szeckler had been detached from the army of the Archduke to the environs of Rastadt, no suspicion fell upon either of these exalted persons as having been accessory to the nefarious proceeding. That it was committed for political purposes, and not by common robbers, is evident from their having

(1) *Jom.* xi. 142. *Lac.* xiv. 318. *Th.* x. 255.

*Ministres Plénipotent. à Rastadt.* *Lac.* xiv. 435.

(2) *Hard.* vii. 236, 238. *Jom.* xi. 142, 143. *Lac.* xiv. 318, 328. *Th.* x. 256, 275. *Procès-Verbal des*

*Arch.* Ch. i. 224.



taken nothing but state papers; and although the Directory has not escaped the suspicion of having been the secret authors of the crime (1), in order to inflame the national spirit of the French, there seems no ground for imputing to them so atrocious a proceeding, or ascribing it to any other cause than an unauthorized excess by drunken or brutal soldiers of a duty committed to them by their government, requiring more than ordinary discretion and forbearance. But though Austria has escaped the imputation of having been accessory to the guilt of murder, she cannot escape from the disgrace of having been remotely the cause of its perpetration; of having authorized an attack upon the sacred persons of ambassadors, which, though not intended to have been followed by assassination, was at best a violation of the law of nations and a breach of the slender links which unite humanity together during the rude conflicts of war, and of having taken guilt to herself by adopting no judicial steps for the discovery of the perpetrators of the offence (2). As such, it is deserving of the severest reprobation, and, like all other unjustifiable actions, its consequences speedily recoiled upon the head of its authors. The military spirit of the French, languid since the commencement of hostilities, was immediately roused to the highest pitch by this outrage upon their ambassadors. No difficulty was any longer experienced in completing the levies of the conscription (3); and to this burst of national feeling is, in a great measure, to be ascribed the rapid augmentation of Masséna's army, and the subsequent disasters which overwhelmed the Imperialists at the conclusion of the campaign.

Commence-  
ment of hos-  
tilities in  
Italy.

While an implacable war was thus breaking out to the north of the Alps, reverses of a most serious character attended the first commencement of hostilities in the Italian plains. The approach of the Russians, under Suwarrow, who, it was expected, would reach the Adige by the middle of April, rendered it an object of the last importance for the Republicans to force their opponents from the important line formed by that stream before the arrival of so powerful a reinforcement; but by the senseless dispersion of their vast armies through the whole peninsula, they were unable to collect a sufficient force in the plains of the Mincio, in the

Imprudent  
dispersion of  
the French  
forces there.

commencement of the campaign, to effect that object. The total force commanded by Schérer on the Adige was now raised, by the arrival of conscripts, to fifty-seven thousand men; Macdonald was at the head of thirty-four thousand at Rome and Naples; ten thousand were in the Cisalpine republic, the like number in Piedmont, five thousand in Liguria; but these latter forces were too far removed to be able to render any assistance at the decisive point; while, on the other hand, the Imperial forces consisted of fifty-eight thousand combatants, including six thousand cavalry, cantoned between the Tagliamento and the Adige, besides a reserve of twenty thousand infantry and five thousand horse in Carinthia and Croatia. Their field-artillery amounted to 180 pieces; the park of the army to 170 more; and a heavy train of eighty battering guns, admirably provided with horses and ammunition, was ready at Palma Nuova, for the siege of any of the fortresses that might be attacked. This summary is sufficient to demonstrate the erroneous principles on which the Directory proceeded in their plan of

(1) Nap. in Month. vi. 40.

(2) The Queen of Naples was the real instigator of this atrocious act, though the catastrophe in which it terminated was as little intended by her as the single-hearted general who detached from his

army the hussars by whom it was committed.—D'ABRANTES, ii. 304.

(3) Th. x. 257, 250. Journ. xi. 143, 144. Let. xiv. 324. Hard. vii. 244, 245.



the campaign, and their total oblivion of the lessons taught by Napoléon as to the importance of the line of the Adige to the fate of the Peninsula; while the Imperialists were collecting all their force for a decisive blow in that quarter, half the French troops lay inactive and scattered along the whole extent of its surface, from Piedmont to Calabria (1).

Position of  
the Imperialists  
on the Adige.

The Austrians had, with great foresight, strengthened their position on the Adige during the cessation of hostilities. Legnago, commanding a bridge over that river, had become a formidable fortress; the castles of Verona were amply supplied with the means of defence; a bridge of boats at Polo enabled them to communicate with the intrenched camp of Pastrengo, on the eastern slope of the Montebaldo; Venice, placed beyond the reach of attack, contained their great magazines and reserves of artillery stores; all the avenues by which it could be approached were carefully fortified; a flotilla of forty boats, carrying three hundred pieces of cannon (2), was prepared, either to defend the Lagunæ of that capital, or carry the supplies of the army up the Po; while bridges, established over the Piave and the Tagliamento, secured the communication of the army in the field with the reserves by which it was to be supported.

Schérer had obtained the command of the French army; an officer who had served with distinction in the Pyrenees and the Alps during the campaign of 1795, but being unknown to the Italian army, he possessed the confidence neither of the officers nor soldiers; while Moreau, the glorious commander of the retreat through the Black Forest in 1796, occupied the unworthy situation of inspector of infantry. On the side of the Austrians, Melas had obtained, upon the death of the Prince of Orange, the supreme command; an officer of considerable experience and ability, but whose age, above seventy years, rendered him little competent to cope with the enterprising generals of the Republic. Until his arrival, however, the troops were under the orders of General Kray, a Hungarian by birth, and one of the most distinguished officers of the empire. Active, intrepid, and indefatigable; gifted with a cool head and an admirable *coup-d'œil* in danger, he was one of the most illustrious generals of the Imperial army, and, after the Archduke Charles, has left the most brilliant reputation in its military archives of the last century (3).

French plan  
of operations.

The plan of the Directory was for Schérer to pass the Adige, near Verona, drive the Austrians over the Piave and the Brenta, while the right wing of Masséna's army, commanded by Lecourbe, was to form a junction with a corps detached from the Italian army into the Valteline, and fall, by Brixen and Botzen, on the right flank of the Imperial army. But at the very time that they meditated these extensive operations, they detached General Ganthier, with five thousand men, to occupy Tuscany; a conquest which was indeed easily effected, but was as unjustifiable as it was inexpedient, both by weakening the effective force on the Adige, and affording an additional example of that insatiable desire for conquest which the allied powers so loudly complained of in the Republican government. Meanwhile Schérer, having collected his forces, established himself on the right bank of the Adige, opposite to the Austrian army, the right at Sanguinetto, the left at Peschiera; and immediately made preparations for crossing the river. At the same time Kray threw eight thousand men into the intrenched camp of Pastrengo, under Generals Gottesheim and Elnitz, while the divisions

(1) Jom. xi. 147, 148. Dum. i. 58. Th. x. 243, 244. St.-Cyr, i. 172, 173. Arch. Ch. i. 225.

(2) Jom. xi. 149. St.-Cyr, i. 173, 175.

(3) Jom. xi. 149, 153.

March 25. Kaim and Hohenzollern, twenty thousand strong, were established around Verona, with detachments at Arcola; Frœlich and Mercantin, with an equal force, were encamped near Bevilacqua; and Klenau, with four thousand, was stationed near Acqua; and the reserves, under Ott and Zoph, received orders to draw near to the Brenta (1).

Preliminary  
movements  
of both parties.

The French general having been led to imagine that the bulk of the Austrian forces were encamped at Pastrengo, between Verona and the lake of Guarda, resolved to make his principal effort in that quarter. With this view, the three divisions of the left wing, commanded by Serrurier, Delmas, and Grenier, were moved in that direction; while Moreau, with the divisions of Hatry and Victor, received orders to make a false attack near Verona, and, on the extreme right, Montrichard was to advance against Legnago. Kray, on his part, being led to believe that their principal force was directed against Verona, repaired in haste to Bevilacqua, where he concerted with Klenau an attack on the right flank of the Republicans. Thus both parties, mutually deceived as to each other's designs, manœuvred as if their object had been reciprocally to avoid each other; the bulk of the Austrian forces being directed against the French right, and the principal part of the Republicans against the Imperial left (3).

At three in the morning of the 26th March, the whole French left wing was in motion, while the flotilla on the lake of Guarda set sail during the night to second their operations. In this quarter they met with brilliant success; the redoubts and intrenchments of Pastrengo were carried, Rivoli fell into their hands; and the garrison of the intrenched camp, crossing in haste the bridge of Polo, left fifteen hundred prisoners and twelve pieces of cannon in the

March 26. hands of the Republicans. The action did not begin in the centre till near ten o'clock, but it soon became there also extremely warm. The

First success  
of the  
French on  
the Adige.

villages in front of Verona were obstinately contested, but after a desperate resistance, the Republicans pressed forward, and nearly reached the walls of Verona. At this sight, Kaim, who was apprehensive of being attacked in the town, made a general attack on the front and flanks of the assailants with fresh forces; but, although the village of San Massimo, taken and retaken seven times during the day, finally remained in the possession of the Austrians till night separated the combatants, they sensibly lost ground, upon the whole, in that quarter; and the post of Saint Lucie, also the theatre of obstinate contest, was carried by the Republicans. But, while fortune favoured their arms on the left, and divided her favours in the centre, the right was overwhelmed by a superior force, conducted by Kray in person. General Montrichard advanced in that quarter to Legnago, and had already commenced a cannonade on the place, when Frœlich debouched in three columns, and commenced a furious attack along the dikes which led to the French column, while the division of Mercantin advanced as a reserve. The Republicans were speedily routed; attacked at once in front and both flanks, they lost all their artillery, and were driven with great loss behind Torre on the road to Mantua (3).

Leads to no  
decisive result.

The loss of the French in this battle amounted to four thousand men, while that of the Imperialists was nearly seven thousand; but nevertheless, as the success on the left and centre was in some degree balanced by the disaster on the right, they were unable to derive any decisive advantage from this large difference in their favour. The capture of the

(1) Jom. xi. 155, 156. Dum. i. 58, Th. x. 215.  
Bot. lii. 216, 217. Arch. Ch. i. 226.

(2) Th. x. 246. Jom. 162. Dum. i. 58.

(3) Jom. xi. 166, 170. Th. x. 217. Dum. i. 58.  
60. St. Cyr, i. 177, 179. Arch. Ch. i. 226.

camp at Pastrengo and of the bridge at Polo was of little importance, as the Austrians held Verona, and the only road from thence to the plain passed through that town. Kray, abandoning the pursuit of Montrichard, hastened to Verona with the divisions of Mercantin and Frœlich, leaving a few battalions only to guard the line of the Lower Adige; while the Republicans recrossed the upper part of that river above Verona, and retired towards Peschiera. Thus the bulk of the forces on both sides were assembled near Verona, which was felt to be the key to the Adige equally by the Imperialists and Republicans. Already the courage of the Austrians was elevated by the balanced success which they had obtained (1); and from the hesitation of the enemy in following up his advantage at Pastrengo, they perceived with pleasure that the genius of Napoléon had not been inherited by his successor (2).

Scherer ex-  
periences a  
check in  
endeavour-  
ing to cross  
the Adige.

After much irresolution, and assembling a council of war, Schérer resolved to descend the Adige with the bulk of his forces, to attempt a passage between Verona and Legnago at Ronca or Albarredo, while Serrurier, with one division, was thrown across the

upper stream at Polo to distract the attention of the enemy. Preparatory to this design, the army was countermarched from left-right, a complicated operation, which fatigued and embarrassed the soldiers without any adequate advantage. At length, on the 30th March, while the main body of the army was descending the river, Serrurier crossed with seven thousand men

at Polo, and boldly advanced on the high-road leading to Trent towards Verona; Kray, debouching from the central point at Verona, assailed the advancing columns with fifteen thousand men of the divisions Frœlich and Elnitz, and attacking the Republicans with great vigour, drove them back in disorder to the bridge, and pressing forward, approached so near, that it would have fallen into his hands, if the French had not sunk the boats of which it consisted. The situation of Serrurier was now altogether desperate; part of his men dispersed and saved themselves in the mountains; a few escaped over the river at Rivoli; but above fifteen hundred were made prisoners, and the total loss of his division was nearly three thousand men (3).

Counter-  
marches of  
both parties.

Notwithstanding this severe check, Scherer persisted in his design of passing the Adige below Verona. After countermarching his troops, without any visible reason, he concentrated them below Villa Franca, between the Adige and the Tartaro; his right encamped near Porto-Legnago, the remainder in the position of Magnano. Kray, perceiving the defects of their situation, wisely resolved to bring the weight of his forces to bear on the Republican left, so as to threaten their communications with Lombardy. For this purpose, he directed Hohenzollern and St.-Julien to the Montebaldo and the road to Trent; while Wukassowich, who formed part of Bellegarde's corps in the Tyrol, was to move on La Chiesa, by the western side of the lake of Guarda, and he himself debouched from Verona, at the head of the divisions of Kaim, Zoph, and Mercantin, right against the Republican centre at Magnano. The peril of the left wing of the French was now extreme, and it became indispensable to move the right and centre towards it, in order to avoid its total destruction. Had Kray, whose army was now raised, by the arrival of his reserves, to forty-five thousand, attacked on the 4th April, he would have surprised the French in the midst of their

(1) Dum. i. 60, 61. Jom. xi. 172, 173. St.-Cyr, i. 179, 181.

(2) Saguntinis quia præter spem resisterent, cre-

vissent animi. Pœnus quia non vicisset pro victo esset.—Liv. xxi. 9.

(3) Jom. xi. 177. Dum. i. 62, 63. Th. x. 248, 249. St.-Cyr, i. 182, 183.

lateral movements, and destroyed two of their divisions; but by delaying the action till the day following, the perilous change of position was completed, and the opportunity lost (1).

Decisive  
battle at  
Magnano.

It was just when the lateral movement was on the point of being accomplished that the hostile armies encountered each other on the plains of MAGNANO. The French force amounted to thirty-four thousand infantry and seven thousand cavalry; the Austrians were superior, having nearly forty-five thousand in the field, of whom five thousand were horse. Mercantin was intrusted with the attack of the French right; Kaim the centre, and Zoph the left, while Frœlich, at the head of a powerful reserve, was to follow the steps of Kaim, and Hohenzollern was moved forward against Villa Franca on the road to Mantua. The marshy plain, to the south of Magnano, is intersected by a multitude of streams, which fall into the Tartaro and the Menago, and render the deploying of infantry difficult, that of cavalry impossible (2).

The right wing of the French, commanded by Victor and Grenier, overwhelmed the division of Mercantin to which it was opposed. But while this success attended the Republicans in that quarter, the Austrian centre, under Kaim, penetrated, without opposition, between the rear of Montrichard and the front of Delmas, who were in the act of completing their lateral movement from right to left, and occupied a salient angle in the centre of the French position. Had the Imperialists been in a situation to have supported this advantage by fresh troops, it would have been decisive of the fate of the day; but Kray, alarmed at the progress of the Republican right, was at the moment hastening to support Mercantin with the reserve of Frœlich; and thus time was given to Moreau and Delmas, not only to restore affairs in that quarter, by causing their rear and vanguards to form in line to resist the farther progress of the enemy, but even to attack and carry the village of Buttapreda, notwithstanding the most vigorous resistance from Kaim's division. On the left, Moreau, having arrived at the open plain, favourable to the operations of cavalry, executed several brilliant charges, and drove the Austrians from all the villages which they occupied, almost into the walls of Verona. Victory on every side seemed to incline to the Republican standard, though decisive success was no longer to be expected from the insulated situation of all the divisions, and the unconnected operations which they were severally carrying on. But Kray changed the fortune of the day, by a decisive operation against the French right. Putting himself at the head of the reserve of Frœlich, supported by two batteries of heavy artillery, he fell unawares upon the division of Grenier, and put it to the rout; Victor, trying to restore the combat, was charged in flank by the Imperial horse; and driven back in disorder, while the overthrow of that wing was completed by the attack of Mercantin's division, which had now rallied in its rear. Meanwhile, Moreau continued to maintain his ground in the centre, and Serrurier made himself master on the left of Villa Franca, and advanced near to Verona. But the rout of the right wing, which was now driven a mile and a-half from the field of battle, so as to leave the centre entirely uncovered, was decisive of the victory. Before night, Scherer drew off his shattered forces behind the Tartaro, carrying with them two thousand prisoners and several pieces of cannon, a poor compensation for the loss of four thousand killed and wounded, four thousand prisoners, seven standards,

Brilliant  
attack of  
Kray with  
the reserve  
gives the  
Austrians  
the victory.

(1) Jour. xi. 179, 181. Dum. i. 65. Th. x. 250. St.-Cyr, i. 184.

(2) Dum. i. 65. Jour. xi. 186, 187.

eight pieces of cannon, and forty caissons, which had fallen into the hands of the Imperialists (1).

*In decisive  
results.*

This victory, one of the most glorious in the annals of the Austrian monarchy, was decisive of the fate of Italy. Thenceforth, the French fall from one disaster into another, till they were driven over the Maritime Alps, and expelled from the whole peninsula—a striking example of the importance of early victory to the whole fate of a campaign, and of the facility with which the confidence and vigour resulting from long-continued triumphs may, by a single well-timed success, be exchanged for the depression and irresolution which are the sure forerunners of defeat. The advantages gained by the Imperialists were mainly owing to the possession of the fortified posts of Verona and Legnago, and the interior line of operations which they afforded them on the Adige,—another instance, among the many which this war exhibited, of the inestimable importance of a central position in the hands of one who can avail himself of it, and the degree to which it may sometimes, in the hands of a skilful general, counterbalance the most decided superiority in other respects (2).

*Disorderly  
retreat of  
the French.*

The Republicans, thrown into the deepest dejection by this defeat, retired on the following day behind the Mincio; and not feeling themselves in security there, even with the fortress of Mantua on one flank, and that of Peschiera on the other, Scherer continued his retreat behind the Oglio, and then the Adda. This retrograde move-

April 12.

ment was performed in such confusion, that it entirely lost that general consideration which remained to him with his troops, and they loudly demanded the removal of a leader who had torn from their brows the laurels of Rivoli and Arcola. The Austrians, astonished at their own success, and fearful of endangering it by a precipitate advance, moved slowly after the beaten army. Eight days after the battle elapsed before they crossed the Mincio, and established themselves at Castillaro, after detaching Eluitz, with ten thousand men, to observe Mantua, and three battalions to form the investment of Peschiera (3).

*Corfu sur-  
renders to  
the Russian  
and Turkish  
fleets.*

While the Republican fortunes were thus sinking in Italy, another disaster awaited them, in the capture of Corfu, which capitulated to the combined forces of Russia and Turkey, shortly after the commencement of hostilities; and thus deprived them of their last footing in the

March 2.

Ionian isles. Thus on every side the star of the Republic seemed to be on the wane, while that of Austria was rising in the ascendant (4).

*Operations  
in Ger-  
many.*

While these important events were in progress to the south of the Alps, the Austrians evinced an unpardonable tardiness in following up their success at Stockach. In vain the Archduke urged them not to lose the precious moments; the Aulic Council, desirous not to endanger the advantage which they had already gained, enjoined him to confine his operations in clearing the right bank of the Danube by detached parties. After several engagements, the French were finally expelled from the German side, but in their retreat they, with needless barbarity, burned the celebrated wooden bridge at Schaffhausen, the most perfect specimen of that species of architecture that existed in the world (5).

April 13.

(1) Th. x. 251, 252. Jom. xi. 190, 194. Dum. i. 44, 45. St.-Cyr, i. 185, 190.

(2) Jom. xi. 195.

(3) Th. x. 252, 253. Jom. xi. 198, 199. Dum. i. 46. St.-Cyr, i. 191, 194.

(4) Ann. Reg. 1799, 80. Jom. xi. 199.

(5) Jom. xi. 205. Dum. i. 72. Arch. Ch. i. 245, 224.



Masséna falls back on the Alps, and takes a defensive position in the Grisons.

Masséna, to whom the command of the army on the Rhine, as well as in the Alps, was now intrusted, found himself under the necessity of changing entirely the disposition of his army. Turned on the one flank by the Imperialists on the lake of Constance, and on the other by the advance of Kray beyond the Adige, he was necessitated to retire into the central parts of Switzerland, and the Directory now found how grievous an error they had committed by attacking that country, and rendering its rugged frontiers the centre of military operations. Deprived of the shelter which they had hitherto found for their flanks in the neutral ridges of the Alps, the Republicans were now compelled to maintain one uninterrupted line of defence from the Texel to the gulf of Genoa, and any considerable disaster in one part of that long extent weakened their operations in every other. Masséna was well aware that a mountainous country, in appearance the most easy, is frequently in reality the most difficult of defence; because the communication from one part of the line to another is often so much obstructed, and it is so easy for a skilful adversary to bring an overwhelming force to bear against an unsupported part. Impressed with those ideas, he drew back his advanced posts at Taufers, Glurentz on the Adige, and Fintermuntz on the Inn, and arranged his forces in the following manner. The right wing was composed of Lecourbe in the Engadine, Ménard in the Grisons, and Lorges in the valley of the Rhine, as far down as the lake of Constance; the centre, consisting of four divisions, supported by an auxiliary Swiss corps, occupied the line of that river as far as Huningen. Headquarters were established at Basle, which was put in a respectable posture of defence. The left wing, scattered over Huningen, Old Brisach, Kehl, and Mannheim, was destined to protect the line of the Rhine below that place. The whole of these forces amounted to one hundred thousand men, of whom about two-thirds were stationed in Switzerland and the Grisons (1).

Description of the theatre of war.

Three impetuous streams, each flowing within the other, descend from the snowy ridges of the Alps towards the north, and form, by their junction, the great river of the Rhine. The first of these is the Rhine itself, which, rising in the Glaciers near the St.-Gothard, and flowing through the Grisons to the north, loses itself in the great lake of Constance; issues from it at Stein, and flows to the westward as far as Basle, where it commences its majestic and perpendicular course towards the sea. This river covers the whole of Switzerland, and contains within its ample circuit all its tributary streams. The second is formed by the course of the Linth, which, rising in the Alps of Glarus and the Wallenstatter sea, forms in its course the charming lake of Zurich, and issuing from its northern extremity at the town of the same name, under the appellation of the Limmat, falls into the Aar, not far from the junction of that river with the Rhine. That line only covers a part of Switzerland, and is of much smaller extent than the former; but it is more concentrated, and offers a far more advantageous position for defence. Lastly, there is the Reuss, which, descending from the St.-Gothard through the precipitous valley of Schollenen, swells into the romantic lake of the four cantons at Altdorf, and leaving its wood-clad cliffs at Lucerne, falls into the Aar, near its junction with the Rhine. All these lines, shut in on the right by enormous mountains, terminating on the left in deep rivers, and intersected by vast lakes and ridges of rock, present the greatest advantages for defence. Masséna soon found that the exterior circle, that of the Rhine, could not be maintained, with the troops at his disposal,

(1) Dum. i. 71. Jom. xi. 211, 213, 215. Th. x. 277, 278. Archduke, i. 233, 241.



against the increasing forces of the Austrians, and he retired to the inner line, that of the Limmat and Linth, and established his head-quarters at Zurich, in a position of the most formidable strength (1).

General at-  
tack upon  
Masséna's  
line in the  
Grisons.  
April 30.

Meanwhile Hotze and Bellegarde were combining a general attack upon the whole line of the Republicans in the Grisons. Towards the latter end of April, their forces were all in motion along the immense extent of mountains from the valley of Coire to the Engadine. After a vigorous attack, Bellegarde was repulsed by Lecourbe, from the fortified post of Ramis, in the Lower Engadine, while a detachment sent by the Col de Tcherfs to Zemetz was cut to pieces, with the loss of six hundred prisoners, among whom was the young Prince de Ligne. But as the Imperialists were advancing through the valleys on his flanks, Lecourbe retreated in the night, and next day was attacked by Bellegarde at Suss, whence, after an obstinate resistance, he was driven with great loss to the sources of the Albula. At the same time, a general attack was made, in the valley of the Rhine, on the French posts; but though the Imperialists were at first so far successful as to drive back the Republicans to Luciensteg and the heights of Mayenfeld, yet, at the close of the day, they were obliged to fall back to their former position (2).

Insurrection  
of the Swiss  
in his rear;  
being un-  
supported,  
is crushed.

This general attack upon the French line in the Grisons, was combined with an insurrection of the peasants in their rear and in the small cantons, where the desire for revenge, on account of the cruelties of the French during the preceding year, had become ex-

remely strong. This feeling had been worked up to a perfect fury by an attempt of the Directory to complete the auxiliary forces of eighteen thousand men, which Switzerland was bound to furnish, by levies from the militia of the different cantons. Determined to combat rather against than for the destroyers of their liberties, ten thousand men took up arms in the small cantons and adjoining districts of the Grisons, and fell with such rapidity upon the French posts in the rear, that they not only made themselves masters of Disentis and Ilantz, but surprised the important bridge of Reichenau, which they strongly barricaded, thus cutting off all communication between the divisions of Lecourbe, at the sources of the Albula, and the remainder of the army. Had the attack of Hotze and Bellegarde succeeded at the same time that this formidable insurrection broke out in their rear, it is highly probable that Masséna's right wing would have been totally destroyed; but the defeat of Hotze at Luciensteg gave the Republicans time to crush it before it had acquired any formidable consistency. Masséna, aware of the vital importance of early success in subduing an insurrection, acted with the greatest vigour against the insurgents; Ménard moved towards Reichenau, which was abandoned at his approach, and pursued the peasants to Ilantz and Disentis. At

May 5.

this latter place they stood firm, in number about six thousand, and, though destitute of artillery, made a desperate resistance. At length, however, they were broken, and pursued with great slaughter into the mountains, leaving above one thousand men slain on the spot. At the same time, Soult proceeded with his division to Schwytz, where he overthrew a body of peasants; and, embarking on the lake of Lucerne, landed, in spite of the utmost resistance, at Altdorf, and cut to pieces a body of three thousand men, supported by four pieces of cannon, who had taken post in the defiles

(1) Th. x. 278, 279. Jom. xi. 213.

(2) Jom. xi. 215, 219. Dumf. i. 114, 117. Archduke, i. 253, 256.

of the Reuss above that place. The broken remains of this division fled by Wasen to the valley of Schollenen, but there they were met and entirely dispersed by Lecourbe, who, after subduing the insurrection in the Val-levantine, had crossed the St.-Gothard, and fallen upon the fugitives in rear. In this affair, above two thousand peasants were killed and wounded; and such was the consternation excited by the military execution which followed, that the people of that part of Switzerland made no further attempt, during the progress of the campaign, to take a part in hostilities. They saw that their efforts were of little avail amidst the immense masses of disciplined men, by whom their country was traversed; and suffering almost as much, in the conflicts which followed, from their friends as their enemies, they resigned themselves, in indignant silence, to be the spectators of a contest, from which they had nothing to hope, and no power to prevent (1).

Masséna  
draws back  
his right  
wing in the  
Italian  
Alps.

These movements, however, rendered it indispensable for the French to evacuate the Engadine, as great part of the troops who formed the line of defence had been drawn into the rear to quell the insurrection. Loison retired from Tirrano, and joined Lecourbe at S.-Giacomo; and as the Imperialists, who were now far advanced in Lombardy, were collecting forces at Lugano, evidently with the design of seizing upon the St.-Gothard, and so turning the flank of Masséna's position, that active general instantly crossed the Bernhardine, and descending the Misocco, advanced to Bellinzona, in order to protect the extreme right of his interior line, which rested on the St.-Gothard, the lake of Zurich, and the Limmat (2).

General at-  
tack by the  
Austrians on  
the French  
in the Gri-  
sons. Lu-  
ciensteg is  
carried.

The Archduke, convinced that it was by turning the right of Masséna in the mountains, that he would be most easily forced from this strong line of defence, strengthened Hotze by fresh troops, and combined a general attack with Lecourbe for the 14th May. The forces they brought into action on that day were very considerable, amounting to not less than thirty thousand men, while those of Ménard, since the greater part of Lecourbe's division had retreated to Bellinzona, did not exceed fourteen thousand men. Luciensteg, since it fell into the hands of the Republicans, had been greatly strengthened; a narrow defile, bounded by the precipices of the Alps on one side, and a rocky eminence bathed by the Rhine on the other, was crossed by strong intrenchments, mounted with a formidable artillery; but the intelligence which the Archduke received of the approach of thirty thousand Russians to support his army, who had already arrived in Galicia, determined him without delay to commence offensive operations. Accordingly, on the 12th May, the columns were every where put in motion in the mountains, and two days afterwards this important post was attacked. The assailants were divided into four columns; one was destined to engage the attention of the enemy by a false attack in front; the second to make a circuit by the Alps of Mayenfeld, and descend on the intrenchments in rear; a third to cross the Suvisir Alps; and the fourth, to which the cavalry and artillery were attached, to assail the pass called the Slapiner Joch. Hotze commanded in person the attack in front, while Jellachich directed the other columns. After twelve hours of fatiguing march, the latter succeeded in bringing his troops in rear to attack the intrenchments. When the animating sound of their hurra was heard, Hotze pressed forward to assail the works in front, and, after a stout resis-

(1) Jom. xi. 219, 221. Dum. i. 117, 119. Arch. Ch. i. 267, 268.

(2) Dum. i. 120, 121. Jom. xi. 222, 223. Arch. Ch. i. 263, 267.

tance, the barriers were burst open, and the fort carried, with the loss to the Republicans of fifteen hundred prisoners (1).

This important success occasioned the immediate retreat of the French armies from the Grisons. Their left fell back by Sargans to Wallenstadt; the centre by the gorge of Vettis; the right by Reichenau, Ilantz, and Disentis, into the valley of Urseren. The centre of the army was forced; and had Bellegarde been at hand to follow up the successes of Hotze, it would have been all over with the Republicans in Helvetia. As it was, they did not effect their retreat from the Grisons without sustaining a loss of three thousand men in prisoners alone; while the total loss of the Imperialists was only seventy-one men; an extraordinary, but well-authenticated proof of the immense advantage of offensive operations in mountain warfare, and the great disasters to which even the best troops are subjected by being exposed, when acting on the defensive, to the loss of their communications, by their adversary turning their position (2).

Retreat of  
Masséna  
behind the  
Lake of  
Zurich.  
May 26.

This catastrophe obliged Masséna to alter entirely his line of defence. The right wing in the Alps being driven back, it was no longer possible to maintain the line of the lake of Constance and the Rhine from Stein to Eglisau. In consequence, he fell back from

the Rhine behind the Thur; Lecourbe received orders to evacuate the St.-Gothard and concentrate his forces below the Devil's Bridge, in the valley of the Reuss, while the bulk of his army was assembled round the headquarters at Zurich, all the approaches to which were fortified with the utmost care (3).

Part of the  
Austrian  
left wing is  
detached  
into Lombardy.

Notwithstanding the strength of this position, Lecourbe would have been unable to have maintained his ground with the right wing against the impetuous attacks of Hotze, had that enterprising general been supported by Bellegarde; but the Aulic Council, con-

solving that Italy was to be the theatre of decisive operations, directed him to descend into Lombardy, and reinforce the army there, now commanded by Suwarrow, leaving only ten thousand men to guard the Valteline and gain possession of the St.-Gothard. In pursuance of these orders he crossed the Splügen, and proceeded by the lake of Como to Milan, while Hotze vigorously pursued the retreating enemy in the valley of the Rhine, and every where drove him back to the Swiss frontiers (4).

Encouraged by these successes, and the near approach of the Russian auxiliaries, to push the war with vigour, the Archduke published a proclamation to the Swiss, in which he announced that he was about to enter their territory, to deliver them from their chains, and exhorted them to take up

arms against their oppressors. At the same time the Rhine was passed at all points, a large column crossed at Stein, under Nauendorf; another at Eglisau, while Hotze crossed the upper part of the stream in the Grisons, and penetrated, by the source of the Thur, into the Toggenberg. To

prevent the junction of the Archduke and Hotze, Masséna left his intrenchments on the Limmat, and commenced an attack on the advanced guard of Nauendorf. A desultory action ensued, which was maintained with great vivacity on both sides; fresh troops continually came up to reinforce those who were exhausted with fatigue, and though undecisive upon the whole, Oudinot gained a considerable advantage over an Austrian division, commanded by Petrasch, which was defeated, with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners.

(1) Dum. i. 123, 124. Jom. xi. 224, 225. Arch. Ch. i. 271, 276.

(3) Jom. xi. 228. Dum. i. 127.

(2) Jom. xi. 226, 227. Dum. i. 124, 125. Arch. Ch. i. 271, 281.

(4) Dum. i. 124, 126. Jom. xi. 228, 230. Arch. Ch. i. 283, 284.

May 25.  
French  
centre is  
forced by  
the Arch-  
duke.

Notwithstanding that check, however, the object was gained; the Archduke marched on the following day, towards Winterthur, while Hotze descended with all his forces to support him. The important post called the Steigpass was attacked at noon, and carried by that intrepid general (1), while the Archduke effected his junction with the left wing of his army at Winterthur and Nestenbach. Masséna, upon this, fell back to Zurich, and the Republicans confined themselves to their defensive position on the Limmat.

Their right  
wing is  
driven from  
the St.-  
Gothard.

While the French centre was thus forced back to their interior line of defence, the right wing, under Lecourbe, was still more severely pressed by the Imperialists. No sooner had Bellegarde arrived in Lombardy, than Suwarrow detached General Haddick, with ten thousand men, to drive them from the St.-Gothard. Loison's division, defeated at the Monte Cenere, by Hohenzollern, retired up the valley of the Ticino, to May 29. Airolo, where it was reinforced by several additional battalions, in

order to maintain the passage of the St.-Gothard, and give time for the baggage and artillery to defile to Altdorf. Overwhelmed by numbers, Loison was at length driven over the snowy summit of that rugged mountain, through the smiling valley of Urseren, and down the deep descent of the Devil's Bridge, to Wasen, with the loss of six hundred prisoners. An Austrian brigade even chased him from Wasen down to Amsteg, within three miles of Altdorf; but Lecourbe, justly alarmed at so near an approach, sallied forth from that place, at the head of a considerable body of troops, and attacked them with such vigour, that they were obliged to retrace their steps in confusion up the whole valley of Schollenen, and could only prevent the irruption of the enemy into the valley of Urseren by cutting an arch of the Devil's bridge. At the same time, General Xaintrailles, at the head of a strong French division, which Masséna had dispatched to the support of the army of Italy, attacked and routed a body of six thousand peasants, which had taken post at Leuk (2), in the upper Valais, and made himself master of Brieg, the well-known village at the foot of the Simplon.

Masséna's  
position at  
Zurich.

Meanwhile, the bulk of the Austrian forces were concentrated in the environs of Zurich, where Masséna still maintained, with characteristic obstinacy, his defensive position. The French lines extended from the intrenched heights of Zurich, through those of Regensberg, and thence to the Rhine, in a direction nearly parallel to the course of the Aar. The camp around Zurich was strengthened by the most formidable redoubts, at which the army had laboured for above a month; while the whole country by which it could be approached, situated between the Glatt, the Limmat, and the Aar, filled with wooded heights, and intersected by precipitous ravines, presented

June 5.  
He is there  
unsuccess-  
fully attack-  
ed by the  
Archduke.

the greatest obstacles to an attacking army. On the 5th June, the Archduke, having assembled all his forces, assailed him along the whole line. The chief weight of his attack was directed against Masséna's centre and right. At the latter point, Hotze gained at first what seemed an important success; his advanced posts even penetrated into the suburbs of Zurich, and carried the whole intrenchments which covered the right of the army; but before the close of the day, Soult coming up with the reserve, regained the lost ground and forced back the Imperialists, after a desperate struggle, to the ground they had occupied at the commencement of the action. The combat at the same time raged in the centre with un-

(1) Dum. i. 164, 167. Jom. xi. 235, 237. Arch. Ch. i. 292, 306.

(2) Jom. xi. 240, 244. Dum. i. 158. Arch. Ch. i. 286, 290.

certain success; and at length the Archduke, seeing the repulse of Hotze, and deeming the heights of the Zurichberg the decisive point, detached General Wallis, with a portion of the reserve, to renew the attack, while the Prince of Lorraine made a simultaneous effort on the side of the Attisberg. Wallis at first made a great impression, carried the farm of Zurichberg, and, after a vehement struggle, arrived at the palissades of the intrenchments; but Masséna, seeing the danger, flew to the spot, at the head of a column of grenadiers, and assailed the Imperialists in flank, while a tremendous fire of grape and musketry from the summit of the works tore down the foremost of their ranks. Notwithstanding all their efforts, the Imperialists were unable to force the intrenchments; Hotze himself was severely wounded; and, after a bloody conflict, they retired over the Glatt, leaving three thousand killed and wounded on the field battle (1).

He prepares a second and better arranged attack. Masséna prevents it by a retreat. Noways discouraged by this check, the Archduke, after a day's repose, made arrangements for a renewal of the attack; and, taught, by experience, adopted such dispositions as must have ensured success. Before daybreak on the morning of the 6th, two columns, of eight thousand men each, were destined to assault the heights of Zurich and Wipchengen, while all the left, the reserve, and part of the centre, were to support their attack. But Masséna, apprehensive of the result, retreated during the night, defiled over the bridges of Zurich and Wellingen, and took post, between Lucerne and Zurich, on Mount Albis, a rocky ridge stretching from the lake of Zurich to the Aar, in a position even stronger than the one he had left. The retreat was effected without loss under cover of night; but the great arsenal of Zurich, containing 150 pieces of cannon, and immense warlike stores, fell on the day following into the hands of the Imperialists (2).

Dissolution of all the Swiss forces in the service of France. The evacuation of the intrenched camp at Zurich, drew after it the dissolution of the forces of the Swiss Confederacy in the interest of France. The battalions of Berne and Soleure, already much weakened by desertion, were entirely dissolved by that event; while those of Zurich and Turgovia, menaced with military execution on their dwellings, if they continued longer with the enemy, made haste to abandon a cause of which they were already ashamed in their hearts. In a week the battalions of the Pays de Vaud, and a few hundreds of the most ardent of the Zurich democrats, alone remained of the eighteen thousand auxiliaries first assembled under the tricolor standard. At the same time, the provisional government of Helvetia, no longer in safety at Lucerne, set off for Berne; the long file of its carriages excited the ironical contempt of the peasantry, still ardently attached to the institutions of their fathers, in the rural districts through which they passed (3).

Reflections on the magnitude of the preceding operations in the Alps. The details which have now been given of the campaign in the Alps, though hardly intelligible to those who have not traversed the country, or studied the positions with care in an excellent map, offer the most remarkable spectacle, in a military point of view, which the revolutionary war had yet exhibited (4). From the 14th May, when the attack on the fort of Luciensteg commenced, to the 6th June, when the intrenched camp at Zurich was abandoned, was nothing but one

(1) Jom. xi. 249, 251. Dum. i. 169, 170. Th. x. 293. Arch. Ch. i. 327, 344.

(2) Jom. xi. 251, 252. Th. x. 206. Dum. i. 169, 170. Arch. Ch. i. 345, 350.

(3) Jom. xi. 255, 256. Arch. Ch. i. 350, 357.

(4) Those who have enjoyed the advantage of

having travelled over these mountains will require the aid of no map to remind them of places whose relative position is indelibly imprinted in their memory. Those who have not, will find them delineated in the common *Carte Routière de la Suisse*.



continual combat, in a vast field of battle, extending from the snowy summits of the Alps, to the confluence of the great streams which flow from their perennial fountains. Posterity will hardly credit that great armies could be maintained in such a situation, and the same unity of operations communicated to a line, extending from Bellinzona to Basle, across the highest mountains in Europe, as to a small body of men manœuvring on the most favourable ground for military operations. The consumption of human life during these prolonged actions for twenty days; the forced marches by which they were succeeded; the sufferings and privations which the troops on both sides endured; the efforts necessary to find provisions for large bodies in those inhospitable regions, in many of which the traveller or the chamois hunter can often hardly find a footing, combined to render this warfare both the most memorable, and the most animating which had occurred since the fall of the Roman empire (1).

Arrival of  
the Rus-  
sians, under  
Suwarrow,  
on the Min-  
cio.

While success was thus attending the Imperial standards on the Rhine and the Alps, events of a still more decisive character occurred on the Italian plains. A few days after the important battle of Magnano, twenty thousand Russians, under Suwarrow, joined the Imperial army, still encamped on the shores of the Mincio. Thus were the forces of the north, for the first time since the origin of the Revolution, brought into collision with those of the south, and that desperate contest commenced which was destined to inflict such terrible wounds on both empires; to wrap in flames the towers of the Kremlin, and bring the Tartars of the Desert to the shores of the Seine, and ultimately establish a new balance of power in Europe, by arraying all its forces under the banners either of Asiatic despotism or European ambition.

The Emperor Paul, who now entered, with all the characteristic impetuosity of his character, into the alliance against France, had embraced the most extensive and visionary ideas as to the ulterior measures which should be adopted upon the overthrow of the French Revolutionary power. He laboured to effect the formation, not only of a cordial league between all the sovereigns of Europe, to stop the progress of anarchy, but the restoration of all the potentates and interests which had been subverted by the French arms, and the closing of the great schism between the Greek and Catholic Churches, which had so long divided the Christian world. He went even so far as to contemplate the union of the Catholics and Protestants, the stilling of all the controversies which distracted the latter body, and the assemblage of the followers of Christ, of whatever denomination, under the banners of one Catholic Church. Captivating ideas, which will never cease to attract the enthusiastic and benevolent in every age, but which the experienced observer of human events will dismiss to the regions of imagination, and class with the Utopia of Sir Thomas More, or the probable extinction of death, which amused the reveries of Condorcet (2).

Character  
of these  
troops and  
their com-  
manders.

The troops thus brought against the Republicans, though very different from the soldiers of Eylau and Borodino, were still formidable by their discipline, their enthusiasm, and their stubborn valour. Their cavalry, indeed, was poorly equipped, and their artillery inferior in skill and science to that of the French, but their infantry, strong, hardy and resolute, yielded to none in Europe in the energy and obstinacy so essential to military success. Field-marshal Suwarrow, who commanded

(1) Dum. i. 172, 173. Jom. xi. 257, 258.

(2) Nord. vii. 218, 217.



them, and now assumed the general direction of the allied army, though the singularity of his manner and the extravagance of his ideas in some particulars have detracted, in the estimation of foreigners, from his well-earned reputation, was yet unquestionably one of the most remarkable generals of the last age. Impetuous, enthusiastic, and impassioned, brave in conduct, invincible in resolution, endowed with the confidence and ardour which constitute the soul of the conqueror, without the vigilance or foresight which are requisite to the general, he was better calculated to sweep over the world with the fierce tempest of Scythian war, than conduct the long and cautious contests which civilised nations maintain with each other. His favourite weapon was the bayonet, his system of war incessant and vigorous attack, and his great advantage the impression of superiority and invincible power which a long course of success under that method had taught to his soldiers. The first orders he gave to General Chastelar, chief of the staff to the Imperialists, were singularly characteristic, both of his temper of mind and system of tactics. That general having proposed a reconnoissance, the marshal answered warmly, "Reconnoissance! I am for none of them; they are of no use but to the timid, and to inform the enemy that you are approaching. It is never difficult to find your opponents when you really wish it. Form column; charge bayonets; plunge into the centre of the enemy; these are my reconnoissances;" words which, amid some exaggeration, unfold more of the real genius of war than is generally supposed (1).

Fearless and impetuous in conversation as action, the Russian veteran made no secret of the ultimate designs with which his imperial master had entered into the war. To restore every thing to the state in which it was before the French Revolution broke out; to overturn the new republics, re-establish, without exception, the dispossessed princes, restrain universally the spread of revolutionary ideas, punish the authors of fresh disturbances, and substitute for the cool policy of calculating interest a frank, generous, disinterested system, was the only way, he constantly maintained, to put down effectually the Gallic usurpation. The Austrian officers, startled at such novel ideas, carefully reported them to the cabinet of Vienna, where they excited no small disquietude. To expel the French from the whole Italian peninsula, and, if possible, raise up an effectual barrier against any future incursions in that quarter from their ambition, was, indeed, a favourite object of their policy; but it was no part of their designs to sanction a universal restitution of the possessions acquired since the commencement of the war, or exchange the distant and rebellious provinces of Flanders for the rich and submissive Venetian territories adjoining the Hereditary States, and affording them at all times a secure entrance into the Italian plains. Hence a secret jealousy and distrust speedily arose between the coalesced Powers, and experienced observers already began to predict, from the very rapidity of the success with which their arms were at first attended, the evolution of such causes of discord as would ultimately lead to the dissolution of the confederacy (2).

The plan of operations concerted between the Archduke and Suwarrow was to separate entirely the French armies of Switzerland and Italy, and to combine the movements of the two allied armies by the conquest of the Italian Alps, Lombardy, and Piedmont, in order to penetrate into France on its most defenceless side by the Vosges mountains and the defiles of the Jura, the

(1) Journ. xi. 261, 262. Dnm. i 173. Hard. vii. 213, 219.

(2) Hard. vii. 220.

same quarter on which the great invasion of 1814 was afterwards effected. It was on this principle that they maintained so vigorous a contest under Bellegarde and Hotze, in the Val-levantine and Grisons; and by their successes the right wing of Masséna was forced to retire; the Imperialists were interposed in a salient angle between the Republican armies, and the one thrown back on the line of the Po, the other on that of the Aar (1).

Moreau succeeds to the command of the Italian army. Its wretched condition.

Moreau succeeded Sherer in the command of the army of Italy at this momentous crisis. He found it reduced, by sickness and the sword, to twenty-eight thousand combatants; and, after a vain attempt to maintain the line of the Oglio, the troops retired towards Milan, leaving the immense military stores and reserve artillery parks at Cremona to the Conquerors, while a bridge equipage, which was descending the Mincio from Mantua, with a view to gain the waters of the Po, also fell into the hands of the Imperialists (2).

Moreau retreats behind the Adda.

Moreau finding himself cut off from his connexion with Masséna in the Alps, and being unable to face the Allies in the plain of Lombardy, resolved to retire towards the mountains of Genoa, in order to facilitate his junction with Macdonald, who had received orders to evacuate the Parthenopean republic, and retire upon the Apennines. Mantua was invested; and all the frontier towns of the Cisalpine republic were abandoned to their own resources. Soon after, Peschiera was carried by assault; April 20. Ferrara besieged; and Brescia summoned. Kray, to whom the right wing was intrusted, carried the latter town without opposition; and the garrison, eleven hundred strong, which had retired into the castle, soon after surrendered at discretion. The French now retired behind the line of the Adda, a rapid stream, which, descending from the lake of Lecco, runs in a deep and swift torrent, over a surface of twenty-four leagues, to the Po. The right bank is almost every where so lofty as to command the left; and the bridges at Lecco, Cassana, Lodi, and Pizzighitone are defended either by fortified towns or strong *têtes-de-pont*. On the 25th April the Allies approached this formidable line; and a sharp skirmish ensued between the Russians, under Prince BAGRATHION, destined to meet a glorious death on the field of Borodino, and the French, before the walls of Lecco, in which the former were repulsed: commencing thus a contest which was never destined to be finally extinguished till the Russian standards waved on the heights of Montmartre (3).

The passage of the Adda is forced with immense loss to the French.

Suwarrow now left twenty thousand men, under Kray, to besiege Peschiera and blockade Mantua, and prepared to force the passage of the Adda. To frustrate this intention, Moreau accumulated his troops in masses on that part of the river which seemed chiefly threatened. But while actively engaged in this design, the Austrian division of General Ott succeeded in throwing a bridge, during the night, at Trezzo, and before morning his whole troops had crossed over to the right; while, at the same time, Wukassowich surprised the passage at Brivio. The French line was thus divided into three parts; and Serrurier's division, eight thousand strong, which formed the extreme left, was not only cut off from all support, but even from receiving any orders from the remainder of the army. The divisions of Ott and Zoph commenced a furious attack on Grenier's division, and after a brave resistance, drove it back towards Milan, with the loss of two thousand four hundred men, including eleven hundred pri-

(1) Dum. i. 174. Jom. xi. 262. Arch. Ch. ii. 33, 34.

(2) Jom. xi. 262, 263. Dum. i. 174, 175.

(3) Jom. xi. 265, 267. Dum. i. 79. St.-Cyr. l. 200, 202.

soners, while Serrurier, whose division was entirely isolated by the passage of Wukassowich at Brivio, took post at Verderio, in a strong position, determined to defend himself to the last extremity. Guillet, with the brigade under his orders, who was returning from the Valteline, escaped destruction by embarking on the lake of Como, steering for Menagio, and making his way to the lake of Lugano by the beautiful valley which leads from that place to Porlezza. By remaining in his position at Verderio while the Allied army was advancing, Serrurier necessarily was soon enveloped by their columns; evincing thus rather the courage of a soldier who disdains to retreat, than the conduct of an officer who knows how to extricate his men from difficulties. He was soon surrounded on all sides by the Imperialists; and, after an honourable resistance, finding his retreat cut off, and the assailants triple his own force, laid down his arms with seven thousand men. At the same time, Melas carried the *tête-de-pont* at Cassano, and pursued the fugitives with such vigour that he passed the bridge pell-mell with them, and pushed on before night to Gorgonzelo, on the road to Milan (1).

Surrender  
of Serrurier  
with 7000  
men.  
April 26.

The situation of the French was now in the highest degree critical. In these engagements they had lost above eleven thousand men, and could now, even with all the reinforcements which they received, hardly muster in their retreat twenty thousand to meet the great army of the Allies, above sixty thousand strong, which was advancing in pursuit. In these disastrous circumstances, Milan was abandoned, and the army withdrawn behind the Ticino. Suwarrow, the same day, made his triumphal entry into that capital, amidst the transports of the Catholic and aristocratic party, and the loud applause of the multitude, who greeted him with the same acclamations which they had lavished, on a similar occasion, on Napoléon three years before. The Republican army, having left a garrison of two thousand men in the castle, moved slowly in two columns towards Turin, in deep dejection, and heavily burdened with the numerous families compromised by the Revolution, who now pursued their mournful way towards the frontiers of France (2).

Suwarrow  
enters Milan  
in triumph.  
April 29.

Nothing now remained to Moreau but to retire to such a position as might enable him to rally to his standards the yet unbroken army which Macdonald was bringing up from the south of the peninsula. For this purpose he divided his forces into two columns, one of which, under his own command, escorting the parks of artillery, the baggage, and military chest, took the road of Turin, while the other, consisting of the divisions of Victor and Laboissiere, moved towards Alexandria, with a view to occupy the defiles of the Bochetta and the approaches to Genoa. Having effected the evacuation of the town and the arsenal, provided for the defence of the citadel, in which he left a garrison of three thousand men, under General Fiorilla, and secured the communications with the adjacent passes of the Alps, the French general moved the remainder of his army into the plain between the Po and the Tanaro, at the foot of the northern slope and principal debouches of the Apennines, where they encircle the bay of Genoa and join the Maritime Alps. This position, extending only over a front of four leagues, supported on the right by Alexandria, and on the left by Valence, affording the means of manœuvring either on the Bormida or the Po, and covering at once the roads from Asti to Turin and Cuni (3), and those

Moreau  
retires to  
Alexandria  
and Turin.  
May 7.

(1) Th. x. 284. Jom. xi. 276, 278. Dum. i. 112. St.-Cyr, i. 194, 199. Arch. Ch. i. 230, 231.

(2) Arch. Ch. i. 35, 36. Th. x. 286. Jom. xi. 278, 9. St.-Cyr, i. 199, 201.

(3) Jom. xi. 280, 284. Th. x. 286, 287. Dum. i. 141, 142. St.-Cyr, i. 200, 203.

from Acqui to Nizza and Savona, was better adapted than any other that could have been selected to enable the Republicans to maintain their footing in Italy, until they were reinforced by the army of Macdonald, or received assistance from the interior of France.

Whether he is tardily followed by Suwarrow. Master of all the plain of Lombardy, and at the head of an overwhelming force, Suwarrow did not evince that activity in pursuing the broken remains of his adversary which might have been expected from the general vigour of his character. For above a week he gave himself up to festivities at Milan, while an army hardly a third of his own was in full retreat, by diverging columns, before him. At length, finding his active disposition wearied with triumphal honours, he set out for Alexandria, leaving Latterman to blockade the castle of Milan with four thousand men. At the same time Orzi, Novi, Peschiera, and Pizzighetone surrendered to the Allies, with a hundred pieces of cannon, twenty gun-boats, a siege equipage, and immense stores of ammunition and provisions; an advantage which enabled Kray to draw closer the blockade of Mantua, and dispatch Hohenzollern to assist at the siege of the castle of Milan. On the 9th the Allies reached Tortona, blew open the gates, and drove the French into the citadel; while their advanced posts were pushed to San-Juliano, Garofalo, and Novi. Meanwhile, though a reinforcement of six thousand Russians arrived at Tortona, Moreau remained firm in his position behind the Po and the Tanaro. To divert his attention, the Russian general extended his right from Novi to Serravalle and Gavi, threatening thereby his communications with Genoa and France (1), but this was a mere feint, intended to mask his real design, which was to cross the Po, turn his left, and force him to a general and decisive action.

Check of the Russians, under Rosenberg, in endeavouring to cross the Po. The right, or southern bank of the Po, from the junction of the Tanaro to Valence, is more lofty than the northern, which is low, marshy, and approachable only on dykes. Some large islands opposite Mugarone having afforded facilities for the passage, Rosenberg, who commanded one of Suwarrow's divisions directed against Valence, was induced, by his military ardour, to attempt to cross it in that quarter. In the night of the 11th, he threw six thousand men across the principal arm into a wooded island, from whence they shortly passed over, some by swimming, others by wading, with the water up to their armpits, and took possession of the village of Mugarone. Moreau no sooner heard of this descent, than he directed an overwhelming force to the menaced point; the Russians, vigorously attacked in the village, were soon compelled to retire; in vain they formed squares, and, under Prince Rosenberg and the Archduke Constantine, defended themselves with the characteristic bravery of their nation; assailed on every side, and torn to pieces by a murderous fire of grape-shot, they were driven back, first into the island, then across to the northern bank, with the loss of eight hundred killed and wounded, four pieces of cannon, and seven hundred prisoners. No sooner was Suwarrow informed of the first success of Rosenberg's attack, than he pushed forward two divisions to support him, while another was advanced towards Marengo to effect a diversion; but the bad success of the enterprise, which failed because it was not combined with sufficient support at the first (2), rendered it necessary that they should be recalled, and the Allied army was concentrated anew in the intrenched camp of Garofalo.

(1) Dum. i. 142, 145. Jour. xi. 289, 290. St.-Cyr, i. 203. Arch. Ch. iii. 37, 39.

(2) Jour. xi. 292, 294. Dum. i. 146. St.-Cyr, i. 204, 205. Th. x. 288.

Indecisive  
action be-  
tween Su-  
warrow and  
Moreau  
near Alex-  
andria.

At the same instant that this was passing in one quarter, Suwarrow raised his camp at S.-Juliano, with the design of crossing the Po near Casa Tenia, and marching upon Sesia. This attempt was not attended with decisive success. A warm action ensued between the division of Victor and the Russian advanced guard, nine thousand strong, under the orders of Generals Bagrathion and Lusignan. Victory was long doubtful, and although the French were at length forced to retreat under shelter of the cannon of Alexandria, the demonstration led to no serious impression at the time on the position of the Republican general (1).

Moreau at  
length re-  
treats to the  
crest of the  
Apennines  
and Turin.

Tired with the unsatisfactory nature of these manœuvres, Suwarrow resolved to march with the bulk of his forces upon Turin, where the vast magazines of artillery and military stores of the French army were assembled, in the hope that, by reducing its citadel, and occupying the plains of Piedmont to the foot of the Alps, the position of Moreau on the Po and the Tanaro might be rendered no longer tenable, from the interruption of its communications with France. By a singular coincidence, not unusual in war, at the very time that the Russian marshal was adopting this resolution, Moreau had resolved, on his part, to retire by Asti, upon Turin and Coni, and, abandoning the line of the Apennines, concentrate his forces for the preservation of his communication with the Alps. Invincible necessity had compelled him to adopt this retrograde movement. Great part of Piedmont was in a state of insurrection; a large body of peasants had recently occupied Ceva, another had made themselves masters of Mondovi, which closed the principal line of retreat for the army, the sole one then practicable for artillery and carriages. The recent success of the Russians towards Alexandria led him to believe that the weight of their force was to be moved in that direction, and that he would soon be in danger of having his communications with France cut off. Influenced by these considerations, he detached the division of Victor, without artillery or baggage, by the mountain paths, towards Genoa, in order to maintain the crest of the Apennines, and reinforce, when necessary, the army of Macdonald, which was approaching from Naples, while he himself, having first thrown three thousand men into Alexandria, retired by Asti towards Turin, with the design of maintaining himself, if possible, at Coni, the last fortified place on the Italian side of the Alps, until he received the promised reinforcements from the interior of France (2).

May 21.  
Suwarrow  
surprises  
Turin.

No sooner was Suwarrow informed of the retreat of Moreau, than he occupied Valence and Casala, which had been abandoned by the Republicans, and, after having moved forward a strong body under

Schwiewowsky to form the investment of Alexandria, advanced himself with the main body of the army towards Turin. Wukassowich, who commanded the advanced guard, with the aid of some inhabitants of the town who favoured his designs, surprised one of the gates, and rapidly introducing his troops, compelled the French to take refuge in the citadel. The fruits of this conquest were 264 pieces of cannon, eighty mortars, 60,000 muskets, besides an enormous quantity of ammunition and military stores, which had been accumulating in that city ever since the first occupation of Italy by the arms of Napoleon. This great stroke, the success of which was owing to the celerity and skill of the Russian generals, deprived Moreau of all his resources, and rendered the situation both of his own army and that of Macdonald in the high-

(1) Jom. xi. 296, 297. Dum. i. 146. St.-Cyr, i. 205.

(2) Th. x. 291. Dum. i. 148, 149. Jom. xi. 300, 301. St.-Cyr, i. 206, 208. Arch. Ch. ij. 44, 45.



And the  
Castle of  
Milan is  
taken.  
May 24.

est degree critical. At the same time, intelligence was received of the fall of the castle of Milan, after four days of open trenches, an advantage which permitted the division of Hohenzollern to reinforce the besieging army before Mantua, while the artillery was dispatched to Tortona, which was now closely invested (1).

Moreau  
retreats  
towards  
Genoa.

Unable from these disasters, to maintain his ground in the basin of Piedmont, Moreau now thought only of regaining his position on the ridge of the Apennines, and covering the avenue to the city of Genoa, the only rallying point where he could still hope to effect a junction with Macdonald, and which covered the principal line of retreat for both armies into France. For this purpose he retired to Savigliano, having first moved forward an advanced guard, under Grouchy, to clear the road he was to follow, by retaking Mondovi and Ceva, into the latter of which the Austrians had succeeded in throwing a small garrison to support the insurgents who had occupied it. That general retook Mondovi, but all his efforts failed before the ramparts of Ceva. The closing of the great road through this town rendered Moreau's situation apparently hopeless. Suwarrow, with a superior force, was close in his rear; the only route practicable for artillery by which he could regain the Apennines was blocked up; and he could not retire by the Col di Tende without abandoning all prospect of rejoining Macdonald, and leaving his army to certain destruction. From this desperate situation the Republicans were extricated by the skill and vigour of their general, aided by the resources of Guilleminot and the engineer corps under his directions.

He retires  
over the  
Apennines  
to that  
town.

By their exertions and the indefatigable efforts of one-half of the French army, a mountain path, leading across the Apennines from the valley of Garessio to the coast of Genoa, was, in four days, rendered practicable for artillery and chariots; and as soon as this was done, the blockade of Ceva was raised, three thousand men were thrown as a garrison into Coni, which was abandoned to its own resources; and the remainder of

Still occu-  
pying the  
crest of the  
mountains.

the army, after a strong rear-guard had been posted at Murialto to cover the passage, defiled over the narrow and rocky path, and arrived in safety at Loano, on the southern side of the mountains. No sooner were they arrived there than they formed a junction with Victor, who had successfully accomplished his retreat by Acqui, Spigno, and Digo, and occupied all the passes leading towards Genoa over the Apennines; Victor was intrusted with the important post of Pontremoli, while the other divisions placed themselves on the crest of the mountains from Loano to the Bocchetta (2).

Suwarrow  
spreads over  
the whole  
of Piedmont  
and Lom-  
bardy.

Suwarrow, on being informed of the retreat of Moreau from the plain of Piedmont, spread his troops over its rich surface, and up the glens which run from thence into the heart of the Alps. The Russian divisions entered into the beautiful valleys of Suza, St.-Jean de Maurienne, and Aosta. Frœlich pushed his advanced posts to the neighbourhood of Coni; Pignerol capitulated; Suza surrendered at discretion: and the advanced posts of the Allies every where appearing on the summit of the Alpine passes, spread consternation over the ancient frontiers of France. At the same time the citadel of Turin was closely invested; the sieges of Tortona and Alexandria were pushed with vigour, while intelligence was received at the same time that a detachment, sent by Kray from before Mantua, had made itself master of Ferrara; that a flotilla from Venice had surprised Ravenna,

(1) Jom. xi. 302, 305 Dum. i. 152, 153. Th. x. 292. Arch. Ch. ii. 45.

(2) Jom. xi. 307, 308. Th. x. 292. Arch. Ch. ii. 45. Dum. i. 176, 177.



and an insurrection had broken out in the mountainous parts of Tuscany and the Ecclesiastical States, which threatened Ancona, and had already wrested Arezzo and Lucca from the Republican dominions (1).

Reflections on these rapid successes of the Allies. Thus, in less than three months after the opening of the Campaign on the Adige, the French standards were driven back to the summit of the Alps; the whole plain of Lombardy was regained, with the exception of a few of its strongest fortresses; the conquests of Napoléon had been lost in less time than it had taken to make them; and the Republican armies, divided and dispirited, were reduced to a painful and hazardous defence of their own frontiers, instead of carrying the thunder of their victorious arms over the Italian Peninsula. A hundred thousand men were spread over the plain of Lombardy, of whom forty thousand were grouped under Suwarrow round Turin (2). History has not a more brilliant or decisive series of triumphs to record; and they demonstrate on how flimsy and insecure a basis the French dominion at that period rested; how much it was dependent on the genius and activity of a single individual; how inadequate the revolutionary government was to the long-continued and sustained efforts which were requisite to maintain the contest from their own resources; and how easily, by a combined effort of all the powers at that critical period, when Napoléon was absent, and time and wisdom had not consolidated the conquests of democracy, they might have been wrested from their grasp, and the peace of Europe established on an equitable foundation. But, notwithstanding all their reverses, the European governments were not as yet sufficiently awakened to the dangers of their situation; Prussia still kept aloof in dubious neutrality; Russia was not irrevocably engaged in the cause; and Great Britain, as yet confining her efforts to the subsidizing of other powers, had not descended as a principal into the field, or begun to pour forth, on land at least, those streams of blood which were destined to be shed before the great struggle was brought to a termination.

These successes, great as they were, were yet not such as might have been achieved, if the Russian general, neglecting all minor considerations, and blockading only the greater fortresses, had vigorously followed up with his overwhelming force the retreating army of the Republicans, and driven it over the Maritime Alps. Unable to withstand so formidable an assailant, they must have retired within the French frontier, leaving not only Mantua and Genoa, but the army which occupied the Neapolitan territory, to its fate. This bold and decisive plan of operations was such as suited the ardent character of the Russian general, and which, if left to himself, he would unquestionably have adopted; but his better judgment was overruled by the cautious policy of the Aulic Council, who, above all things, were desirous to secure a fortified frontier for its Venetian acquisitions, and compelled him, much against his will, to halt in the midst of the career of victory, and besiege in form the fortresses of Lombardy. Something was no doubt gained by their reduction (3); but not to be compared with what might have been expected if an overwhelming mass had been interposed between the French armies, and the conquerors of Naples had been compelled to lay down their arms between the Apennines and the Po (4).

(1) *Jom.* xi. 310, 315. *Dum.* i. 176, 179. *Arch.* Ch. ii. 46, 48.

(2) *Arch.* Ch. ii. 47.

(3) *Arch.* Ch. ii. 47, 48. *Hard.* vii. 248, 249.

(4) A Russian officer of Suwarrow's staff at this juncture wrote to Count Rostopchin at St.-Petersburg:—"Our glorious operations are thwarted by those

very persons who are most interested in their success. Far from applauding the brilliant triumphs of our arms, the cursed cabinet of Vienna seeks only to retard their march. It insists that our great Suwarrow should divide his army, and direct it at once to several points, which will save Moreau from total destruction. That cabinet, which fears a too

Affairs of  
the Parthe-  
nopeian Re-  
public at  
Naples.

While these disastrous events were in progress in the north of the Peninsula, the affairs of France were not in a more favourable train in its southern provinces. The Parthenopeian republic, established at Naples in the first fervour of revolutionary success, had been involved in those consequences, the invariable attendant on a sudden concession of power to the people, spoliation of the rich, misery among the poor, and inextricable embarrassment in the finances of the state. In truth, the Directory, pressed by extreme pecuniary difficulties, looked to nothing so much in their conquests as indemnifying themselves for the expenses of their expeditions, and invariably made it the first condition with all the revolutionary states which they established, that they should pay the expenses of the war, and take upon themselves the sole support of the armies which were to defend them. In conformity with these instructions, the first fruits of democratic ascendancy in Naples were found to be bitter in the extreme; the successive contributions of twelve and fifteen millions of francs on the capital and provinces, of which mention has already been made, excited the utmost dissatisfaction, which was greatly increased soon after by the experienced insolence and rapacity of the civil agents of the Directory. A provisional government was established, which introduced innovations that excited general alarm; the Jacobin clubs speedily began to diffuse the arrests and terror of revolutionary times; the national guard totally failed in producing any efficient force, while the confiscation of the church property, and the abolition of its festivals, spread dismay and horror through that large portion of the population who were still attached to the Catholic faith. These circumstances speedily produced partial insurrections: Cardinal Ruffo, in Calabria, succeeded in exciting a revolt, and led to the field an army, fifteen thousand strong, composed of the descendants of the Bruttians and Lucanians, while another insurrection, hardly less formidable, broke out in the province of Apulia. But these tumultuary bodies, imperfectly armed and totally undisciplined, were unable to withstand the veteran troops of France. Trani, where the principal force of the insurgents of the latter province had established themselves, was carried by assault with great slaughter; but, on the other hand, Ruffo, in Calabria, defeated an attack on Castelluccia by the democratic bands of the new republic, and, encouraged by this success, marched into Apulia, where his forces were soon greatly augmented, and he was reinforced by some regular troops dispatched from Sicily (†).

May 7.  
Macdonald  
commences  
his retreat.

Affairs were in this dangerous state in the Neapolitan dominions, when orders reached Macdonald to evacuate, without loss of time, the south of Italy, in order to bring his army to support the Republican arms in Lombardy. He immediately assembled all his disposable forces, and after having left garrisons in fort St.-Elmo, Capua and Gaeta, set off for Rome at the head of twenty thousand men. His retreat, conducted with great rapidity and skill, was exposed to serious dangers. The peasantry, informed by the English cruisers of the disasters experienced by the French in Upper

rapid conquest of Italy, from designs which it dares not avow, as it knows well those of our magnanimous Emperor, has, by the Aulic Council, forced the Archduke Charles into a state of inactivity, and enjoined our incomparable chief to secure his conquests rather than extend them; that it is to waste its time and strength in the siege of fortresses which would fall of themselves if the French army was destroyed. What terrifies them even more than the

rapidity of our conquests, is the generous project, openly announced, of restoring to every one what he has lost. Deceived by his ministers, the Emperor Francis has, with his own hand, written to our illustrious general to pause in a career of conquest of which the very rapidity fills him with alarm."—*HABD.* vii. 249, 250.

(†) *Journ.* xi. 316, 338. *Orloff's Memoirs*, ii. 190, 220.

Italy, broke out into insurrection in every quarter. Duhesme left Apulia in open revolt, and had a constant fight to maintain before he reached Capua; a few hundred English landed at Salerno, and, aided by the peasantry, advanced to Vietri and Castello-mare; while the insurgents of the Roman and Tuscan states, becoming daily more audacious, interrupted all the communications with the north of Italy. Notwithstanding these menacing circumstances, Macdonald effected his retreat in the best order, and without sustaining any serious loss. He arrived at Rome on the 16th, where he reinforced his army by the divisions of Grenier, continued his route by Acquapendente to Florence, where he rallied to his standards the divisions of Gauthier and Montrichard, who were in the environs of Pistoia and Bologna, and established his headquarters at Lucca in the end of May. The left wing, composed of the Polish division Dombrowsky, took post at Carzana and Aula; the centre occupied the great road from Florence to Pistoia, the right, the high road to Bologna, and all the passes into the Modena, with an advanced guard in the city of Bologna itself (1).

Though repeatedly assailed, he retreats in safety to the north of Tuscany.

May 29.

He enters into communication with Moreau, and concert measures with him.

In this situation, Moreau and Macdonald were in open communication; and it was concerted between them that the chief body of their united forces should be brought to bear upon the Lower Po, with a view to threaten the communications of the Allies, disengage Mantua, and compel their retreat from the plain of Lombardy. For this purpose it was agreed that Macdonald should cross the Apennines and advance towards Tortona; his right resting on the mountains, his left on the right bank of the Po, while Moreau, debouching by the Bochetta, Gavi, and Serravalle, should move into the plain of that river. As the weight of the contest would in this view fall upon the former of these generals, the division of Victor, which formed the eastern part of Moreau's army, was placed under his orders, and a strong division directed to descend the valley of the Trebbia, in order to keep up the communication between the two armies, and support either as occasion might require (2).

Position of the Allies at this juncture.

The position of the allied armies, when these formidable preparations were making to dislodge them from their conquests, were as follows: Kray, who commanded the whole forces on the Lower Po, had 24,000 men under his orders, of whom one-half were engaged in the siege of Mantua, while 5,000 under Hohenzollern, had been dispatched to cover Modena, and 6,000, under Ott, watched the mouths of the lateral valleys of the Taro and the Trebbia. The main body of the army, consisting of the divisions Zoph, Kaim, and the Russians, amounting to 28,000 men, was encamped in the neighbourhood of Turin, with its advanced posts pushed into the entrance of the Alpine valleys. Frélich, with 6,000 men, observed Coni; Wukassowich, with 5,700, occupied Mondovi, Ceva, and Salicetto; Lusignan, with 3,000 combatants, blockaded Fenestrelles; Bagrathion, with a detachment of 1,500 men, was posted in Cezanna, and the Col di l'A-sietta; Schwiekousky, with 6,000, men, blockaded Tortona and Alexandria; the corps of Count Bellegarde, 15,000 strong, detached from the Tyrol, was advancing from Como to form the siege of these two fortresses; while that of Haddick, amounting to fourteen thousand bayonets, which formed the communication between the rear of the army and the left wing of the Archduke

(1) Th. x. 297. Journ. xi. 338, 341. Dum. i. 154, 156.

(2) Arch. Ch. ii. 49. Journ. xi. 341, 342. Th. x. 299.

Charles, was preparing to penetrate into the Valais by the Simplon and the pass of Nuffenen (1).

Dangers arising from their great dispersion. Thus, though the Allies had above a hundred thousand men in the field, they could hardly assemble thirty thousand men at any one point; so immensely had they extended themselves over the plains of Lombardy, and so obstinately had the Aulic Council adhered to the old system of establishing a cordon of troops all over the territory which they occupied. This vast dispersion of force was attended with little danger as long as the shattered army of Moreau alone was in the field; but the case was widely different when it was supported by thirty-five thousand fresh troops, prepared to penetrate into the centre and most unprotected part of their line. Had Macdonald been able to push on as rapidly from Florence as he had done in arriving at that place, he might have crushed the divisions of Klenau, Hohenzollern, and Ott, before they could possibly have been succoured from other quarters; but the time consumed in reorganizing his army in Tuscany, and concerting operations with Moreau, gave Suwarrow an opportunity to repair what was faulty in the disposition of his forces, and assemble a sufficient body of men to resist the attack at the menaced point (2).

June 12. Macdonald's advance. First combats with the Republicans. Macdonald, having at length completed his preparations, raised his camp in the neighbourhood of Pistoia on the 7th June, with an army, including Victor's division, of thirty-seven thousand men, and marched across the Apennines to Bologna. Hohenzollern, who commanded in the Modena, withdrew his posts into the town of Modena, where he was attacked in a few days, and, after a bloody engagement, driven out with the loss of fifteen hundred men. Had the right wing of the Republicans punctually executed his instructions, and occupied the road to Ferrara during the combat round the town, the whole of the Imperialists would have been made prisoners. Immediately after this success, Macdonald advanced to Parma, driving the Imperial cavalry before him, while Ott, who was stationed at the entrance of the valley of the Taro, seeing that his retreat was in danger of being cut off, retired to Placentia, leaving the road open to Victor, who upon that debouched entirely from the Apennines, and effected his junction with Macdonald at Borgo San Denino, entirely to the north of the mountains. On the day following, Placentia was occupied by the Republicans, and their whole army established in the neighbourhood of that city (3).

Able and energetic resolution immediately adopted by Suwarrow. No sooner was Suwarrow informed of the appearance of Macdonald's army in Tuscany, than he adopted the same energetic resolution by which Napoléon had repulsed the attack of Wursmer on the Adige three years before. All his advanced posts in Piedmont were recalled; the brigade of Lusignan near Fenestrelles, the divisions Frélich, Bagrathion and Schwiekousky began their march on the same day for the general rendezvous at Asti; and Kray received orders instantly to raise the siege of Mantua, dispatch his artillery with all imaginable speed to Paschiera and Verona, and hasten with all his disposable force to join the main army in the neighbourhood of Placentia. The vigour of the Russian general communicated itself to all the officers of his army. These movements were all punctually executed, notwithstanding the excessive rains which impeded the movements of the troops; the castles of Milan and Pizzighitone

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 48, 49. Jom. xi. 343, 344. Dum. i. 160, 182, 185. Th. x. 297, 298.

(2) Th. x. 298, 299. Dum. i. 184, 189. Jom. xi. 344.

(3) Arch. Ch. ii. 51, 52. St.-Cyr, i. 213, 214. Dum. i. 191, 192. Jom. xi. 346, 349.

were provisioned, a great intrenched camp formed near the *tête-de-pont* of Valence, and all the stores recently captured, not necessary for the siege of the citadel, removed from Turin. By these means the Allied army was rapidly reassembled, and on the 15th June, although Kray with the troops from Mantua had not yet arrived, thirty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry were encamped at Garofalo, on the ground they had occupied six weeks before (1).

The two armies meet on the Trebbia. The intelligence of Suwarrow's approach induced Macdonald to concentrate his forces; but, nevertheless, he flattered himself with the hope that he would succeed in overwhelming Ott before he could be supported by the succours which were advancing. Three torrents, flowing parallel to each other, from the Apennines to the Po, intersected the plain occupied by the French army; the Nura, the TREBBIA, and the Tidone. The bulk of the Republican forces were on the Nura; the divisions Victor, Dombrowsky, and Rusca, were in advance on the Trebbia, and received orders to cross it, in order to overwhelm the Austrian division stationed June 17. behind the Tidone. For this purpose, early on the morning of the 17th, they passed both the Trebbia and the Tidone, and assailed the Imperialists with such vigour and superiority of force, that they were speedily driven back in great disorder; but Suwarrow, aware, from the loud sound of the cannonade, of what was going forward, dispatched Chastellar with the advanced guard of the main army, which speedily re-established affairs. By degrees, as their successive troops came up, the superiority passed to the side of the Allies; the Austrians rallied, and commenced a vigorous attack on the division of Victor, while the Russian infantry, under Bagrathion, supported the left of the Imperialists. First and decisive action there. Soon after, Dombrowsky, on the left, having brought up his Polish division by a sudden charge, captured eight pieces of cannon, and pushed forward to Caramel; but at this critical moment, Suwarrow ordered a charge in flank by Prince Gortschakoff, with two regiments of Cossacks and four battalions, while Ott attacked them in front. This movement proved decisive; the Poles were broken, and fled in disorder over the Tidone. Meanwhile the right of the Republicans, composed of Victor's division, withstood all the efforts of Bagrathion, and was advancing along the Po to gain possession of the bridge of S.-Giovanni, when the rout of Dombrowsky's division obliged them to retire. This retreat was conducted in good order, till the retiring columns were charged in flank by the Cossacks, who had overthrown the Poles; in vain the French formed squares, and received the assailants with a rolling fire; they were broken, great part cut to pieces, and the remainder fled in disorder over the Trebbia. The Russians, in the heat of the pursuit (2), plunged like the Carthaginians of old into that classic stream, but they were received with so destructive a fire of musketry and grape-shot from the batteries of the main body of the French on the other side, that they were forced to retire with great loss; and the hostile armies bivouacked for the night on the same ground which had been occupied nineteen hundred years before by the troops of Hannibal and the Roman legions (3).

(1) St.-Cyr, i. 215, 217. Jom. xi. 349, 353. Dum. i. 193. Arch. Ch. ii. 55.

(2) Jom. xi. 354, 357. Dum. i. 195, 197. Th. x. 300, 301. Arch. Ch. ii. 53.

(3) It is remarkable, that the fate of Italy has thrice been decided on the same spot; once in the battle between the Romans and Carthaginians, again, in 1746, in that between the Austrians and French, and in 1799, between the French and

Russians. A similar coincidence will frequently again occur in the course of this work, particularly at Vittoria, Leipsic, Lutzen, Fleurus, and many others; a striking proof how permanent are the operation of the causes, under every variety of the military art, which conduct hostile nations, at remote periods from each other, to the same fields of battle.—See ARONDUKE CHARLES, ii. 61. The author visited this field in 1818, along with his



**Suwarrow's** During the night, Suwarrow brought up all his forces, and, encouraged by the success of the preceding day, made his dispositions for a general action. Judging, with great sagacity, that the principal object of Macdonald would be to maintain his ground on the mountains, by which the communication with Moreau was to be preserved, he directed towards his own right, which was to assail that quarter, his best infantry, consisting of the divisions Bagrathion and Schwiekousky, under the orders of Prince Rosenberg. These troops received orders to pass the Trebbia, and advance by Settimo to St. Georgia, on the Nura, in order to interpose between the French left and the mountains. Melas commanded the centre, supported by a powerful reserve under Frœlich; while Ott, with a small corps, formed the left, and was established on the high-road to Placentia, rather to preserve the communication with its castle, than to take any active part in the engagement. The day was the anniversary of the battle of Kolin; and Suwarrow, to stimulate the ardour of the Austrians; gave for the watchword, "Theresa and Kolin," while the general instructions to the army were to combat in large masses, and as much as possible with the bayonet (1).

**Judicious plan of attack.** Macdonald, who intended to have delayed the battle till the day following, had only the divisions Victor, Dombrowsky, and Rusca, with the brigade of Salm, in position on the Trebbia; those of Olivier and Montrichard could not arrive in line till noon. A furious action commenced at six o'clock, between the troops of Bagrathion and Victor's division, which formed the extreme left of the French and rested on the mountains. The French general, seeing he was to be attacked, crossed the Trebbia, and advanced against the enemy. A bloody battle ensued on the ground intersected by the Torridella, till at length, towards evening, the steady valour of the Russians prevailed, and the Republicans were driven back with great slaughter over the Trebbia, followed by the Allies, who advanced as far as Settimo. On the French right, Salm's division, enveloped by superior forces, retreated with difficulty across the river. In the middle of the day, the divisions of Olivier and Montrichard arrived to support the centre; but though they gained at first a slight advantage, nothing decisive occurred, and at the approach of night they retired at all points over the Trebbia, which again formed the line of separation between the hostile armies (2).

**Battle of the Trebbia, and success of the Russians on the second day.** Worn out with fatigue, the troops, on both sides, lay down round their watchfires, on the opposite shores of the Trebbia, which still, as in the days of Hannibal, flows in a gravelly bed, between banks of moderate height, clothed with stunted trees and underwood. The corps of Rosenberg alone had crossed the stream, and reached Settimo, in the rear of the French lines; but disquieted by its separation from the remainder of the army, and ignorant of the immense advantages of its position, it passed an anxious night, in square, with the cavalry bridled and the men sleeping on their guns, and before daybreak withdrew to the Russian side of the river. Towards midnight, three French battalions, misled by false reports, entered, in disorder, into the bed of the Trebbia, and opened a fire of musketry upon the Russian videttes, upon which the two armies immediately started to their arms; the cavalry on both sides rushed into the river, the artillery played, without distinguishing, on friends and foes, and the extraordinary spectacle

valued friend, Captain Basil Hall: the lapse of two thousand years had altered none of the features described by the graphic pen of Livy.

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 54. Journ. xi. 358, 359. Dum. i. 196, 197. Th. x. 302.

(2) Th. x. 302, 303. Dum. i. 197, 198. Journ. xi. 360, 361. Arch. Ch. ii. 54.



was exhibited of a nocturnal combat by moonlight, by hostile bodies up to the middle in water. At length the officers succeeded in putting an end to this useless butchery,] and the rival armies, separated only by the stream, sunk into sleep within a few yards of each other, amidst the dead and the dying (1).

Prepara-  
tions of both  
parties for  
battle on  
the third  
day.

The sun arose for the third time on this scene of slaughter; but no disposition appeared on either side to terminate the contest. Suwarrow, reinforced by five battalions and six squadrons, which had come up from the other side of the Po, again strengthened his right, renewed to Rosenberg the orders to press vigorously on in that quarter, and directed Melas to be ready to support him with the reserve. Hours, even minutes, were of value; for the Russian general was aware that Moreau had left his position on the Apennines, that the force opposed to him was totally inadequate to arrest his progress, and he was in momentary expectation of hearing the distant sound of his cannon in the rear of the army. Every thing, therefore, depended on a vigorous prosecution of the advantages gained on the two preceding days, so as to render the co-operation of the Republican armies impossible. On the other hand, Macdonald, having

June 19. now collected all his forces, and reckoning on the arrival of Moreau on the following day, resolved to resume the offensive. His plan was to turn at once both flanks of the enemy; a hazardous operation at all times, unless conducted by a greatly superior army, by reason of the dispersion of force which it requires, but doubly so in the present instance, from the risk of one of his wings being driven into the Po. The battle was to be commenced by Dombrowsky moving in the direction of Niviano to outflank the corps of Rosenberg, while Rusca and Victor attacked it in front; Olivier and Montrichard were charged with the task of forcing the passage of the river in the centre, while the extreme right, composed of the brigade of Salm and the reserve of Watrin, were to drive back the Russian left by interposing between it and the river Po (2).

Desperate  
conflict on  
the Trebbia.

Such was the fatigue of the men on both sides, that they could not commence the action before ten o'clock. Suwarrow at that hour was beginning to put his troops in motion, when the French appeared in two lines on the opposite shore of the Trebbia, with the intervals between the columns filled with cavalry, and instantly the first line crossed the river with the water up to the soldiers' arm-pits, and advanced fiercely to the attack. Dombrowsky pushed on to Rivallo, and soon outflanked the Russian right; and Suwarrow, seeing the danger in that quarter ordered the division Bagrathion to throw back its right in order to face the enemy, and, after a warm contest, that general succeeded in driving the Poles across the river. But that manœuvre having uncovered the flank of the division Schwiekousky, it was speedily enveloped by Victor and Rusca, driven back to Casaleggio, and only owed its safety to the invincible firmness of the Russian infantry, who formed square, faced about on all sides, and by an incessant rolling fire maintained their ground till Bagrathion, after defeating the Poles, came up in their rear, and Chastellar brought up four battalions of the division of Forster to attack them in front. The Poles, entirely disconcerted by their repulse, remained inactive; and, after a murderous strife, the French were overwhelmed, and Victor and Rusca driven, with great loss, over the Trebbia (3).

In the centre, Olivier and Montrichard had crossed the river, and attacked

(1) Jom. xi. 362. Th. x. 304.

(2) Arch. Ch. ii. 55. Jom. xi. 363. Th. x. 303.

(3) Jom. xi. 364, 365. Dum. i. 200, 201. Th. x.

304. Hard. vii. 256, 257.

Decisive  
attack of  
Prince  
Lichtenstein  
on the  
French  
centre.

the Austrians, under Melas, with such vigour, that they made themselves masters of some pieces of artillery, and threw the line into disorder. Already Montrichard was advancing against the division Forster, in the middle of the Russian line, when the Prince of Lichtenstein, at the head of the reserve, composed of the flower of the Allied army, who at that moment was defiling towards the right to support Schwie-kousky, suddenly fell upon their flank, when already somewhat disordered by success, and threw them into confusion, which was soon increased into a defeat by the heavy fire of Forster on the other side. This circumstance decided the fate of the day. Forster was now so far relieved as to be able to succour Suwarrow on the right, while Melas was supported by the reserve, who had been ordered, in the first moment of alarm, in the same direction. Prince Lichtenstein now charged the division of Olivier with such fury, that it was forced to retire across the river. At the extreme left of the Allies, Watrin advanced, without meeting with any resistance, along the Po; but he was ultimately obliged to retreat, to avoid being cut off and driven into the river by the victorious centre. Master of the whole left bank of the river, Suwarrow made several attempts to pass it; but he was constantly repulsed by the firmness of the French reserves, and night at length closed on this scene of carnage (1).

Victory re-  
mains with  
the Rus-  
sians. Ex-  
cessive loss  
on both  
sides.

Such was the terrible battle of the Trebbia, the most obstinately contested and bloody which had occurred since the commencement of the war, since, out of thirty-six thousand men in the field, the French, in the three days, had lost above twelve thousand in killed and wounded, and the Allies nearly as many. It shows how much more fierce and sanguinary the war was destined to become when the iron bands of Russia were brought into the field, and how little all the advantages of skill and experience avail, when opposed to the indomitable courage and heroic valour of northern states. But though the losses on both sides were nearly equal, the relative situation of the combatants was very different at the termination of the strife. The Allies were victorious, and soon expected great reinforcements from Hohenzollern and Klenau, who had already occupied Parma and Modena, and would more than compensate their losses in the field; whereas the Republicans had exhausted their last reserves, were dejected by defeat, and had no second army to fall back upon in their misfortunes. These considerations determined Macdonald; he decamped during the night (2), and retired over the Nura, directing his march to re-enter the Apennines by the valley of the Taro.

The disas-  
trous re-  
treat of the  
French over  
the Apen-  
nines.

Early on the following morning, a despatch was intercepted from the French general to Moreau, in which he represented the situation of his army as almost desperate, and gave information as to the line of his retreat. This information filled the Allied generals with joy, and made them resolve to pursue the enemy with the utmost vigour. For this purpose, all their divisions were instantly dispatched in pursuit; Rosenberg, supported by Forster, moved rapidly towards the Nura, while Melas, with the divisions Ott and Frœlich, advanced to Placentia. Victor's division, which formed the rear-guard on the Nura, was speedily assailed by superior forces both in front and flank, and, after a gallant resistance, broken, great part made prisoners, and the remainder dispersed over the mountains. Melas, on his side, quickly made himself master of Placentia, where the

(1) Dum. i. 201, 202. Jom. ii. 367, 368. Th. x. 305, 306. Hard. vii. 257, 258. Arch. Ch. ii. 55.

(2) Jom. xi. 367, 368. Th. x. 306, 307. Dum. i. 202, 203.

French wounded, five thousand in number, were taken prisoners, including the generals Olivier, Rusca, Salm, and Cambray; and had he not imprudently halted the division Frœlich at that town, the whole troops of Watrin would have fallen into his hands. Macdonald, on the following day, retired to Parma, from whence he dislodged Hohenzollern, and with infinite difficulty rallied the remains of his army behind the Larda, where they were reorganized

June 21. in three divisions. The melancholy survey showed a chasm in his ranks of above fifteen thousand men since crossing the Apennines. At the same time, Lapoype, defeated at Casteggio by a Russian detachment, was driven from the high-road, and with great pain escaped by mountain paths into the neighbourhood of Genoa (1). All the French wounded fell into the hands of the Allies; they made prisoners in all, during the battle and in the pursuit, four generals, five hundred and six officers, and twelve thousand seven hundred and seventy-eight private soldiers (2).

The pursuit of Suwarrow was not continued beyond the Larda, in consequence of intelligence which there reached him of the progress of Moreau. Macdonald retired, therefore, unmolested to Modena and Bologna, where he repulsed General Ott, who made an attack on his army at Sassocolo, and regained the positions which it had occupied before the advance to the Trebbia (3).

Successful operations, during the battle, of Moreau against Bellegarde. In effect, the return of Suwarrow towards Tortona was become indispensable, and the dangerous situation of matters in his rear showed the magnitude of the peril from which, by his rapid and decided conduct, he had extricated his army. Moreau, on the 16th, debouched from the Apennines by Gavi, and moved in two columns towards Tortona, at the head of fourteen thousand men. He advanced, however, with such circumspection, that on the 18th he had not passed Novi and Serravalle; and on that day the fate of the Neapolitan army was determined on the banks of the Trebbia. Bellegarde, unable with four brigades to arrest his progress, retired to a defensive position near Alexandria, leaving Tortona uncovered, the blockade of which was speedily raised by the French general. Immediately after, Moreau attacked Bellegarde with forces so immensely superior, that he defeated him, after a sharp action, with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners and five pieces of cannon. The Austrians, in disorder, sought refuge behind the Bormida, intending to fall back under the cannon of Valence (4); and Moreau was advancing towards Placentia, when he was informed of the victory of Suwarrow and the fall of the citadel of Turin.

Fall of the citadel of Turin. June 20. The vast military stores found by the Allies in the city of Turin, enabled them to complete their preparations for the siege of its citadel with great rapidity. A hundred pieces of heavy cannon speedily armed the trenches; forty bombs were shortly after added; the batteries were opened on the night of the 10th June, and on the 19th the second parallel was completed. Night and day the besiegers from that time thundered on the walls from above two hundred pieces of artillery, and such was the effect of their fire, that the garrison capitulated within twenty-four hours after, on condition of being sent back to France. This conquest was of immense importance. Besides disengaging the besieging force of General Kaim, which instantly set out to reinforce Bellegarde, and rendering the Allies masters of one of the strongest fortresses in Piedmont, it put into their hands 61 pieces of cannon, 40,000 muskets, and 50,000 quintails of powder, with the loss of only fifty men (5).

(1) Dum. i. 205. Th. x. 306. Jom. xi. 371, 373.

(2) Arch. Ch. ii. 56.

(3) Jom. xi. 374, 375. Dum. i. 205.

(4) Jom. xi. 379, 380. Dum. i. 204. Th. x. 307. Arch. Ch. ii. 57.

(5) St.-Cyr, i. 220. Jom. xi. 380, 381. Dum. i. 206.

June 28.  
Moreau re-  
treats on  
Suwarrow  
turning  
against him,  
and Macdo-  
nald regains  
Genoa after a  
painful cir-  
cuit.

No sooner was Suwarrow informed, upon the Larda, of the advance of Moreau and the defeat of Bellegarde, than, without losing an instant, he wheeled about, and marched with the utmost expedition to meet this new adversary. But Moreau fell back as rapidly as he approached, and after revictualling Tortona, retired by Novi and Gavi to his former defensive position on the Apennines. The Allies occupied Novi, and pushed their advanced posts far up the valleys into the mountains, while the blockade of Tortona was resumed; and the besieging force, removed from the lines before Mantua, sat down again before that important fortress. Macdonald commenced a long and painful retreat over the Apennines into Tuscany and the Genoese territory; a perilous lateral operation at all times in presence of an enemy in possession of the plain of the Po, and doubly so after the recent disaster which they had experienced. Fortunately for the French, Suwarrow had received at this time positive orders from the Aulic Council, ever attached to methodical proceedings, to attempt no operation beyond the Apennines till the fortresses of Lombardy were reduced (1), in consequence of which he was compelled to remain in a state of inactivity on the Orba, while his antagonist completed his hazardous movements. Macdonald arrived, leaving only a detachment on the Apennines near the sources of the Trebbia, at Genoa by Lerici, in the middle of July, in the most deplorable state; his artillery dismounted or broken down, the cavalry and caissons without horses, the soldiers half naked, without shoes or linen of any sort, more like spectres than men. How different from the splendid troops which, three years before, had traversed the same country, in all the pomp of war, under the standards of Napoléon (2)!

Reorganiza-  
tion of both  
French ar-  
mies under  
Moreau.

Mutual exhaustion, and the intervening ridge of the Apennines, now compelled a cessation from hostilities for above a month. Suwarrow collected forty-five thousand men in the plain between Tortona and Alexandria, to watch the Republicans on the mountains of Genoa, and cover the sieges of those places and of Mantua, which were now pressed with activity. The French, in deep dejection, commenced the reorganization of their two armies into one; Macdonald was recalled, and yielded the command of the right wing to St.-Cyr; Pérignon was intrusted with the centre, and Lemoine, who brought up twelve fresh battalions from France, put at the head of the left. Montrichard and Lapoype were disgraced, and Moreau continued in the chief command. Notwithstanding all the reinforcements he had received, this skilful general was not able, with both armies united, to reckon on more than forty thousand men for operations in the field; the poor remains of above a hundred thousand that might have been assembled for that purpose at the opening of the campaign (3).

Reflections  
on Suwar-  
row's admi-  
rable con-  
duct in the  
preceding  
movement.

The remarkable analogy must strike the most inattentive observer, between the conduct of Suwarrow previous to the battle of the Trebbia, and that of Napoléon on the approach of Wurmser to succour Mantua. Imitating the vigour and activity of his great predecessor, the Russian general, though at the head of an army considerably inferior to that of his adversaries, was present every where at the decisive point. The citadel of Turin, with its immense magazines, was captured by an army of only forty thousand men, in presence of two whose united force exceeded fifty thousand; for although Suwarrow ordered up great part of the garrison of Mantua to reinforce his army previous to the battle of the Trebbia,

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 63.

(2) Jom. xi. 381, 387, 388. St.-Cyr, i. 218, 219. i. 220.  
Arch. Ch. ii. 65, 67.

(3) Jom. xi. 388, 390. Dam. i. 220, 223. St.-Cyr.

they were prevented from joining by an autograph order of the Emperor, who deemed the acquisition of that fortress of greater importance than any other consideration to the Austrian empire (1). The Russian general, therefore, had to contend not only with the armies of Macdonald and Moreau, but the obstacles thrown in his way by the Imperial authorities; and when this is considered, his defeat of the Republicans, by rapidly interposing the bulk of his forces between them, and turning first on the one, and then on the other, must be regarded as one of the most splendid feats which the history of the war afforded.

Naval efforts of the Directory to get back the army from Egypt. During these critical operations at the foot of the Apennines, the Directory had succeeded in assembling a great naval force in the Mediterranean. Already convinced, by the disasters they had experienced, of the impolicy of the eccentric direction of so considerable a part of their force as had resulted from the expedition to Egypt, they exerted all their efforts to obtain the means of their return, or at least open a communication with that far-famed, now isolated army. No sooner was intelligence received of the defeat of Jourdan at Stockach, than Bruix, minister of marine, repaired to Brest, where he urged, with the utmost diligence, the preparations for the sailing of the fleet. Such was the effect of his exertions, that, in the end of April, he was enabled to put to sea, with twenty-five ships of the line, at the time when Lord Bridport was blown off the coast with the Channel fleet. As soon as intelligence was received that they had sailed, the English admiral steered for the southern coast of Ireland, while Bruix, directing his course straight to Cadiz, raised the blockade of that harbour, which Admiral Keith maintained with fifteen ships of the line, and passed the straits of Gibraltar. The entrance of the combined fleet into the Mediterranean seemed to announce decisive events, but nevertheless it came to nothing. The immense armament, amounting to fifty ships of the line, steered for the bay of Genoa, where it entered into communication with Moreau, and for a time powerfully supported the spirits of his army. But after remaining some weeks on the Italian coast, Bruix sailed for Cadiz, from whence he returned to Brest, which he reached in the middle of August, without either having fallen in with any of the English fleets, or achieved any thing whatever, with one of the most powerful squadrons that ever left a European harbour (2).

Which come to nothing. The retreat of Macdonald was immediately followed by the recovery of his dominions by the King of Naples. The army of Cardinal Ruffo, which was soon swelled to twenty thousand men, advanced against Naples, and having speedily dispersed the feeble bands of the revolutionists who opposed his progress, took possession of that capital; and a combined force of English, Russians, and Neapolitans having a few days after entered the port, the fort St.-Elmo was so vigorously besieged, that it was obliged to capitulate, the garrison returning to France, on condition of not again serving till exchanged. Capua was next attacked, and surrendered, by capitulation, to Commodore Trowbridge, which was followed, two days after, by the reduction of the important fortress of Gaeta, on the same terms, which completed the deliverance of the Neapolitan dominions (3).

June 20. Expulsion of the Republicans from Naples. The French, who surrendered in these two last fortresses, gave up unconditionally to their indignant enemies the revolted Neapolitans who had taken a part in the late revolution. A special commission

(1) Jom. xi. 386. Hard. vii. 250, 251.

(2) Jom. xi. 394, 396. Ann. Reg. 1799; 291.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1799, 292. Bot. iii. 395, 410.



was immediately appointed, which, without much formality, and still less humanity, condemned to death the greater part of those who had been engaged in the insurrection; and a dreadful series of executions, or rather massacres, took place, which but too clearly evinced the relentless spirit of Italian revenge. But the executions at Naples were of more moment, and peculiarly call for the attention of the British historians, because they have affixed the only stain to the character of the greatest naval hero of his country. The garrisons of the Castello Nuovo, and the Castella del Uovo, had capitulated to Cardinal Ruffo, on the express condition that they themselves, and their families, should be protected, and that they should have liberty either to retire to Toulon, or remain in Naples, as they should feel inclined; but in this latter case they were to experience no molestation in their persons or property. This capitulation was subscribed by Cardinal Ruffo, as viceroy of the kingdom; by Kerandy, on the part of the Emperor of Russia; and by Captain Foote, on the part of the King of Great Britain; and the cardinal, in the name of the King, shortly after published a proclamation, in which he granted an entire amnesty to the Republicans; guaranteeing to them perfect security, if they remained at Naples, and a free navigation to Marseilles, if they preferred following the fortunes of the tricolor standard. In terms of this treaty, two vessels, containing the refugees from Castellomare, had already arrived safe at Marseilles (1).

Violation of  
capitula-  
tions by the  
Neapolitan  
Court.

But these wise and humane measures were instantly interrupted by the arrival of the King and Queen, with the court, on board of Nelson's fleet. They were animated with the strongest feelings of revenge against the Republican party; and unfortunately the English admiral, who had fallen under the fascinating influence of Lady Hamilton, who shared in all the feelings of the court, was too much inclined to adopt the same principles. He instantly declared the capitulation null, as not having obtained the King's authority, and entering the harbour at the head of his fleet, made all those who had issued from the castles, in virtue of the capitulation, prisoners, and had them chained, two and two, on board his own fleet. The King, whose humanity could not endure the sight of the punishments which were preparing, returned to Sicily, and left the administration of justice in the hands of the Queen and Lady Hamilton.

Nelson con-  
curs in these  
iniquitous  
proceedings.

Numbers were immediately condemned and executed; the vengeance of the populace supplied what was wanting in the celerity of the criminal tribunals; neither age, nor sex, nor rank were spared; women as well as men, youths of sixteen, and grey-headed men of seventy, were alike led out to the scaffold, and infants of twelve years of age sent into exile. The Republicans behaved, in almost every instance, in their last moments with heroic courage, and made men forget, in pity for their misfortunes, the ingratitude or treason of which they had previously been guilty (2).

Deplorable  
fate of  
Prince Car-  
raccioli on  
board Nel-  
son's own  
ship.

The fate of the Neapolitan admiral, Prince Francis Carraccioli, was particularly deplorable. He had been one of the principal leaders of the revolution, and after the capitulation of the castles had retired to the mountains, where he was betrayed by a domestic, and brought bound on board the British admiral's flag-ship. A naval court-martial was there immediately summoned, composed of Neapolitan officers, by whom he was condemned to death. In vain the old man entreated that he might be shot, and not die the death of a malefactor; his prayers were disregarded, and after being strangled by the executioner, he was thrown from the vessel into the sea. Before night his body was seen erect

(1) Bot. iii. 401, 402. Ann. Reg. 1792, 292.

(2) Bot. iii. 406, 407. Southey's Nelson, ii. 47, 48.



in the waves from the middle upwards, as if he had risen from the deep to reproach the English hero with his unworthy fate (1).

Reflections  
on these unpardonable  
atrocities.

For these acts of cruelty no sort of apology can or ought to be offered. Whether the capitulation should or should not have been granted, is a different and irrelevant question. Suffice it to say, that it had taken place, and that, in virtue of its provisions, the Allied powers had gained possession of the castles of Naples. To assert in such a case that the King had not ratified the capitulation, and that without such a sanction it was null, is a quibble, which, though frequently resorted to by the French, is unworthy of a generous mind, and destitute of any support in the law of nations. The capitulation of the vanquished should ever be held sacred in civilized warfare, for this reason, if no other existed, that, by acceding to it, they have deprived themselves of all chance of resistance, and put the means of violating it with impunity in the hands of their adversaries—it then becomes a debt of honour which must be paid. The sovereign power which takes benefit from one side of a capitulation by gaining possession of the fortress which the capitulants held, is unquestionably bound to perform the other part of the bilateral engagement, by whomever entered into, which, so far from repudiating, it has, by that very act, homologated and acquiesced in. If the Neapolitan authorities were resolutely determined to commit such a breach of public faith, the English admiral, if he had not sufficient influence to prevent it, should at least have taken no part in the iniquities which followed, and not stained the standard of England by judicial murders committed under its own shadow. In every point of view, therefore, the conduct of Nelson in this tragic affair was inexcusable; his biographer may perhaps with justice ascribe it to the fatal ascendancy of female fascination (2); but the historian, who has the interests of humanity and the cause of justice to support, can admit of no such alleviation, and will best discharge his duty by imitating the conduct of his eloquent annalist, and with shame acknowledging the disgraceful deeds (3).

And on the  
inference to  
be drawn  
from the  
campaign.

The events of this campaign demonstrate, in the most striking manner, the vast importance of assuming the offensive in mountain warfare; and how frequently a smaller force, skilfully led, may triumph over a greater in such a situation, by the simple expedient of turning its position by the lateral valleys, and appearing unexpectedly in its rear. The nature of the ground is singularly favourable to such an operation, by the concealment which lofty intervening ridges afford to the turning column, and the impossibility of escape to the one turned, shut in on both sides by difficult, perhaps impassable ridges, and suddenly assailed in rear when fully occupied in front. The brilliant successes of Lecourbe at Glarus and Martinsbruck, and of Hotze at Luciensteg, were both achieved, in opposition to superior forces, by the skilful application of this principle. Against such a danger, the intrenchments usually thrown up in the gorge or at the summit of mountain passes, afford but little protection; for open behind (4), they are easily taken by the column which has penetrated into the rear by a circuitous route, and, destitute of casements, they afford no sort of protection against a plunging fire from the heights on either side.

Nor did this memorable struggle evince in a less convincing manner the erroneous foundation on which the opinion then generally received rested,

(1) Southey, ii. 47, 53. Bot. iii. 414, 415.

(2) Southey, 47, 53. Bot. iii. 415, 416. Hard. vii. 332, 333.

(3) It deserves to be recorded to the honour of Neapolton, that he endeavoured to palliate Nelson's

share in these dark transactions, ascribing it to misinformation, and the fascinating ascendancy of Lady Hamilton.—O'MEARA, i. 308.

(4) Arch. Ch. i. 95, 96.

that the possession of the mountains ensured that of the plains at their feet; and that the true key to the south of Germany and north of Italy was to be found in the Alps which were interposed between them. Of what avail was the successful irruption of Masséna into the Grisons, after the disaster of Stockach brought the Republican standards to the Rhine; or the splendid stroke of Lecourbe in the Engadine, when the disaster of Magnano caused them to lose the line of the Adige? In tactics, or the lesser operations of strategy, the possession of mountain ridges is often of decisive importance, but in the great designs of extensive warfare seldom of any lasting value. He that has gained a height which commands a field of battle is often secure of the day; but the master of a ridge of lofty mountains is by no means equally safe against the efforts of an adversary, who by having acquired possession of the entrance of all the valleys leading from thence into the plain, is enabled to cut him off both from his communications and his resources. Water descends from the higher ground to the lower; but the strength and sinews of war in general follow an opposite course, and ascend from the riches and fortresses of the plain to the sterility and desolation of the mountains. It is in the valley of the Danube and the plain of Lombardy that the struggle between France and Austria ever has and ever will be determined (1); the lofty ridges of Switzerland and Tyrol, important as an accessory to secure the flanks of either army, are far from being the decisive point.

Although the campaign had lasted so short a time, it was already apparent how much the views of the Austrian cabinet were hampered by the possession of Venice, and how completely the spoliation of that republic had thrown the apple of discord between the Allied Powers. The principle laid down by the Emperor Paul, of restoring to every one what he had lost, though the true foundation for the anti-revolutionary alliance, which had been eloquently supported by Mr. Burke, and afterwards became the basis of the great confederacy which brought the war to a successful issue, gave the utmost uneasiness to the cabinet of Vienna. They were terrified at the very rapidity of the Russian conqueror's success, and endeavoured, by every means in their power, to moderate his disinterested fervour, and render his surprising success the means only of securing their great acquisitions in the north of Italy. Hence the jealousies, heartburnings, and divisions which destroyed the cordial co-operation of the Allied troops, which led to the fatal separation of the Russian from the Austrian forces both in Italy and Switzerland, and ultimately brought about all the disasters of the campaign. Had the hands of Austria been clean, she might have invaded France by the defenceless frontier of the Jura, and brought the contest to a glorious issue in 1799, while Napoléon was as yet an exile on the banks of the Nile. Twice did the European powers lose the opportunity of crushing the forces of the Revolution, and on both occasions from their governments having imitated its guilt; first by the withdrawal of Prussia in 1794, to secure her share in the partition of Poland, and next from the anxiety of Austria, in 1799, to retain her iniquitous acquisitions in Italy. England alone remained throughout unsullied by crime, unfettered by the consciousness of robbery, and she alone continued to the end unsubdued in arms. It is not by imitating the guilt of a hostile power, but steadfastly shunning it, that ultimate success is to be obtained; the gains of iniquity to nations, not less than individuals, are generally more than compensated by their pains; and the only true foundation for durable prosperity is to be found in that strenuous, but upright course, which resists equally the seduction and the violence of wickedness.

(1) Arch. Ch. i. 53, 54.

## CHAPTER XXIX.

## CAMPAIGN OF 1799.—PART II.

FROM THE BATTLE OF THE TREBBIA TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE CAMPAIGN.

## . ARGUMENT.

Dangerous position of the Republic at this juncture—Enormous consumption of human life since the commencement of the Campaign—Clear proof thus afforded of the error of the Directory in attacking Switzerland and Italy—Military preparations of the Allies and Republicans—Objects of the contending generals—Great Levy of troops by the Directory—Their Measures to reinforce the Armies—The Aulic Council injudiciously restrain Suwarrow from active operations—This leads to an agreement for a disastrous separation of the Austrian and Russian forces—Resumption of hostilities by the Republicans around Genoa—Progress of the Siege of Mantua—Description of that fortress—Commencement of the Siege by Kray—Its Surrender—Fall of Alexandria—Commencement of the Siege of Tortona—Position of the Republicans in front of Genoa—Magnanimous conduct of Moreau on Joubert's assuming the Command—Advance of the French to raise the Siege—Positions of the Allies—and of the French—Joubert had resolved to retreat on learning the fall of Mantua—He is attacked before doing so by Suwarrow—Death of Joubert—Battle of Novi—The Allies are at first repulsed—Combined Attack of all their forces—The advance of Melas at length decides the Victory—Great Loss on both sides—Moreau still maintains himself on the crest of the Apennines—Separation of the victorious force—Operations of Championnet in the Alps at this time—Fall of Tortona—Situation of Masséna and the Archduke at Zurich—Insane dislocation of the Allied forces at this period by the Aulic Council—Description of the Theatre of War—Plan of the Allies—and of Masséna—Commencement of the Attack by Lecourbe on the St.-Gothard—The Imperialists are forced back at all points—They are driven from the Grimsel and the Furca—and the St.-Gothard—Successes of the French near Schwytz, who drive the Austrians into Glarus—Unsuccessful Attempt of the Archduke to cross the Limmat below Zurich—Being foiled, he marches to the Upper Rhine—Austrian left is defeated in Glarus—Successful Expedition of the Archduke against Mannheim—Plan of the Allies for a combined attack by Suwarrow and Korsakow on Masséna—Relative situation of the French and Russian centres at Zurich—Unfounded confidence of the latter—Masséna's able Plan of Attack—The passage of the Limmat is surprised below Zurich—Feigned attacks on Zurich and the Lower Limmat—Dreadful Confusion in the town of Zurich—Brave Resolution of Korsakow to cut his way through the enemy—He does so, but loses all his artillery and baggage—Success of Soult against Hotze above the Lake—Death of the latter officer—Operations of Suwarrow on the Ticino—Bloody Conflict above Airolo—The St.-Gothard is at length forced by the Russians—Dreadful Struggle at the Devil's Bridge—Arrived at Altdorf, Suwarrow is forced to ascend the Schachenthal—Difficult passage of that ridge to Mitten—He finds none of the expected reinforcements there—and is surrounded on all sides, and reluctantly compelled to retreat—He crosses the mountains into Glarus—Desperate Struggle at Naefels—Dreadful passage of the Alps of Glarus to Ilanz on the Rhine—Bloody Conflicts with Korsakow near Constance—The Archduke hastens to his aid, and checks the further pursuit—Treaty between Russia and England for an Expedition to Holland—Vigorous Preparations for the Expedition in England—The Expedition sails, and lands on the Dutch coast—Action at the Helder—Defeat of the enemy—Capture of the Dutch Fleet at the Texel—The British are attacked by the Republicans, but repulse them with great loss—The English, joined by the Russians, at length advance—Plan of the attack—Disaster of the Russians on the right—Victory of the British in the centre and left—But the continued retreat of the Russians arrests the British in the midst of their success—Removal of the Dutch Fleet to England—The Duke of York renews the attack, and is successful—His critical Situation notwithstanding—Indecisive Action—Which leads to the Retreat of the British—Who first Retire, and at length Capitulate—Reflections on this disaster in the nation—Affairs of Italy after the Battle of Novi—The Imperialists draw round Coni—Championnet is constrained to attempt its relief—Measures to effect that object—Preparations for a decisive battle—Battle of Genola, in which the French are defeated—Success of St.-Cyr near Novi—Siege and Fall of Coni—Gallant Conduct of St.-Cyr in the Bocchetta Pass—Unsuccessful Attempt of the Imperialists upon Genoa—Who go into Winter Quarters—Fall of Ancona—Position of the respective parties at the conclusion of the Campaign—Contrast

between the comforts of the Imperialists and the privations of the French—Death of Championnet—Jealousies between the Russians and Austrians—Suwarrow retires into Bavaria—Which leads to a rupture between the Cabinets of Vienna and St.-Petersburg—Positions assumed by the Austrians when so abandoned—Operations on the Lower Rhine—Reflections on the vast successes gained by the Allies in the campaign—Deplorable internal situation of the Republic—Causes of the Rupture of the alliance—Comparison of the Passage of the St.-Gothard by Suwarrow and the St.-Bernard by Napoléon—Deplorable insignificance of the part which England took in the Continental Struggle—Causes of the rapid fall of the French power in 1799.

SINCE the period when the white flag waved at Saumur and the tricolor was displaced at Lyon and Toulon, the Republic had never been in such danger as after the first pause in the campaign of 1799. It was, in truth, within a hairbreadth of destruction. If the Allied forces in 1795 were nearer her frontier, and the interior was torn by more vehement dissensions, on the other hand, the attacking powers in 1799 were incomparably more formidable, and the armies they brought into the field greatly superior both in military prowess and moral vigour. The war no longer languished in affairs of posts, or indecisive actions, leading to retreat on the first reverse; a hundred thousand men no longer fought with the loss of three or four thousand to the victors and the vanquished; the passions had been roused on both sides, and battles were not lost or won without a desperate effusion of human blood. The military ardour of the Austrians, slow of growth, but tenacious of purpose, was now thoroughly awakened, from the reverses the monarchy had undergone, and the imminent perils to which it had been exposed; the fanatical ardour of Suwarrow had roused to the highest pitch the steady valour of the Russians; and Great Britain, taught by past misfortunes, was preparing to abandon the vacillating system of her former warfare, and put forth her strength in a manner worthy of her present greatness and ancient renown. From the bay of Genoa to the mouth of the Rhine, nearly three hundred thousand veteran troops were advancing against the Republic, flushed by victory, and conducted by consummate military talent; while the Revolution had worn out the capacity which directed, as well as the energy which sustained its fortunes. The master spirit of Carnot had ceased to guide the movements of the French armies; the genius of Napoléon languished on the sands of Egypt; the boundless enthusiasm of 1793 had worn itself out; the resources of the assignats were at an end; the terrible Committee of Public Safety no longer was at the helm to wrench out of public suffering the means of victory; an exhausted nation and a dispirited army had to withstand the weight of Austria and the vigour of Russia, guided by the science of the Archduke Charles and the energy of Suwarrow.

Though the war had lasted for so short a time since its commencement, the consumption of human life had already been prodigious; the contending parties fought with unprecedented exasperation, and the results gained had outstripped the calculations of the most enthusiastic speculators. In little more than four months, the French and Allied armies had lost nearly a half of their effective force, those cut off or irrevocably mutilated by the sword were above 116,000 (1); while the means of supplying these vast chasms were much more ample on the part of the Allied Monarchs than the French Directory. Never, in ancient or modern times, had such immense armies contended on

(1) Dum. i. 434.

so extensive a field. The right of the Allies rested on the Maine; their centre was posted in Switzerland; while their left stretched over the plain of Lombardy to the foot of the Apennines; and a shock was felt all along this vast line, from the rocks of Genoa to the marshes of Holland. The results hitherto had been, to an unprecedented degree, disastrous to the French. From being universally victorious, they had everywhere become unfortunate; at the point of the bayonet they had been driven back, both in Germany and Italy, to the frontiers of the Republic; the conquests of Napoléon had been lost as they had been won; and the power which recently threatened Vienna, now trembled lest the Imperial standards should appear on the summits of the Jura or the banks of the Rhone.

Clear proof  
thus afford-  
ed of the  
error of  
starting  
Switzerland  
and Italy.

It was now apparent what a capital error the Directory had committed in overrunning Switzerland, in extending their forces through the Italian peninsula, instead of concentrating them to bear the weight of Austria on the Adige; and exiling their best army and greatest general in Africa at the very time when the Allies were summoning to their aid the forces of a new monarchy and the genius of a hitherto invincible conqueror. But these errors had been committed; their consequences had fallen like a thunderbolt on France; the return of Napoléon and his army seemed impossible; Italy was lost; and nothing but the invincible tenacity and singular talents of Masséna enabled him to maintain himself in the last defensive line to the north of the Alps, and avert invasion from France in the quarter where its frontier is most vulnerable. To complete its misfortunes, internal dissension had paralysed the Republic at the very time when foreign dangers were most pressing, and a new government added to its declining fortunes the weakness incident to every infant administration.

Military  
preparations  
of the Allies  
and Repub-  
licans.

The preparations of the allies to follow up this extraordinary flow of prosperous affairs were of the most formidable kind. The forces in Italy amounted to one hundred and fifteen thousand men; and after deducting the troops required in the siege of Mantua, Alexandria, and other fortresses in the rear, Suwarrow could still collect above fifty thousand men to press on the dispirited army of Moreau in the Ligurian Alps, which could not muster twenty thousand soldiers around its banners. This army was destined to clear the Maritime Alps and Savoy of the enemy, and turn the position of Masséna, who still maintained himself with invincible obstinacy on the banks of the Limmat. The Archduke had not under his immediate orders at that period above forty-three thousand men, twenty-two thousand having been left in the Black Forest, to mask the garrisons in the *têtes-de-pont* which the French possessed on the Upper Rhine, and sixteen thousand in the Grisons and the central Alps, to keep possession of the important ridge of the St.-Gothard. But a fresh Russian army of twenty-six thousand men was approaching under Korsakow, and was expected in the environs of Zurich by the middle of August; and something was hoped from the insurrection of the Swiss who had been liberated from the French armies (1).

To meet these formidable forces, the French, who had directed all the new levies to the north of Switzerland, as the chiefly menaced point, had seventy-five thousand men, under Masséna, on the Limmat, and the utmost efforts were made in the interior to augment to the greatest degree this important army. The English and Russians also had combined a plan for the descent of forty thousand men on the coast of Holland, for which purpose seventeen thousand men were to be furnished by his Imperial Majesty and

(1) Archduke, ii. 2, 92. Dum. i. 223, 225. Jom. xii. 60, 72.



twenty-five thousand by Great Britain; and this force, it was hoped, would not only liberate Holland, but paralyse all the north of France, as General Brune had only fifteen thousand French troops in the United Provinces, and the native soldiers did not exceed twenty thousand (1). Thus, while the centre of the French was threatened with an attack from overwhelming forces in the Alps, and an inroad preparing, by the defenceless frontier of the Jura, into the heart of their territory, their left was menaced by a more formidable invasion from the northern powers than they had yet experienced, and their right with difficulty maintained itself with inferior forces on the inhospitable summits of the Maritime Alps.

Objects of  
the contend-  
ing Gene-  
rale.

But although the plan of the Allies was so extensive, the decisive point lay in the centre of the line, and it was by the Archduke that the vital blow was to be struck, which would at once have opened to them an entrance into the heart of France. This able commander impatiently awaited the arrival of the Russians under Korsakow, which would have conferred a superiority of thirty thousand men over his opponent, and enabled him to resume the offensive with an overwhelming advantage. The object of Masséna, of course, was to strike a blow before this great reinforcement arrived; as, though his army was rapidly augmenting by conscripts from the interior, he had no such sudden increase to expect as awaited the Imperial forces. It was equally indispensable for the Republicans to resume the offensive without any delay in Italy, as the important fortresses of Mantua and Alexandria were now hard pressed by the Allies, and if not speedily relieved, must not only, by their fall, give them the entire command of the plain of Lombardy, but enable them to render the position of Masséna untenable to the north of the Alps (2).

Great levy  
of troops by  
the Direc-  
tory.

To meet these accumulating dangers, the French government exhibited an energy commensurate to the crisis in which they were placed. The imminence of the peril induced them to exhibit it without disguise to both branches of the legislature. General Jourdan proposed to call out at once all classes of the conscripts, which, it was expected, would produce an increase of two hundred thousand men to the armies, and to levy a forced loan of 420,000,000 francs, or L.4,800,000 on the opulent classes, secured on the national domains. Both motions were at once agreed to by the Councils. To render them as soon as possible available, the conscriptions were ordered to be formed into regiments, and drilled in their several departments, and marched off, the moment they were disposable, to the nearest army on the frontier, while the service of Lisle, Strasbourg, and the other fortresses was, in great part, intrusted to the national guards of the vicinity. Thus, with the recurrence of a crisis in the affairs of the Republic, the revolutionary measures which had already been found so efficacious were again put in activity. Bernadotte, who at this crisis was appointed minister at war, rapidly infused into all the departments of the military service his own energy and resolution; and we have the best of all authorities, that of his political antagonist Napoléon himself, for the assertion, that it was to the admirable measures which he set on foot, and the conscripts whom he assembled round the Imperial standards, that not only the victory of Zurich, at the close of the campaign, but the subsequent triumph of Marengo, were, in a great degree, owing (3).

(1) Jom. xii. 60, 178, 182. Ann. Reg. 1799, 301. Arch. Ch. ii. 2, 92.

(2) Arch. Ch. ii. 79, 86. Dum. i. 226.

(3) Nap. in Las Casas, ii. 241. Goh. i. 90. Jom. xii. 18, 20. Th. x. 336, 337.



Their measures to reinforce the armies. In order to counteract as far as possible the designs of the Allies, it was resolved to augment to thirty thousand men the forces placed on the summit of the Alps, from the St.-Bernard to the Mediterranean; while the army of Italy, debouching from the Apennines, should resume the offensive, in order to prevent the siege of Coni and raise those of Mantua and Alexandria; and Masséna should execute a powerful diversion on the Limmat ere the arrival of the Russians under Korsakow. For this purpose, all the conscripts on the eastern and southern departments were rapidly marched off to the armies at Zurich and on the Alps, and the fortresses of Grenoble, Briançon, and Fenestrelles, commanding the principal entrances from Piedmont into France, armed and provisioned. At the same time the direction of the troops on the frontier was changed. Championnet, liberated from prison, was intrusted with the command of the army of the Alps, while that of the army of Italy was taken from Moreau, under whom, notwithstanding his great abilities, it had experienced nothing but disaster, and given to Joubert; a youthful hero, who joined heroic valour to great natural abilities, and though as yet untried in the separate command of large armies, had evinced such talents in subordinate situations as gave the promise of great future renown if it had not been cut short in the very outset of his career on the field of Novi (1).

The Aulic Council in-judiciously restrain Suwarrow from active operations. Suwarrow, who was well aware of the inestimable importance of time in war, was devoured with anxiety to commence operations against the army of Moreau in the Ligurian Alps, now not more than twenty thousand strong, before it had recovered from its consternation, or was strengthened by the arrival of Macdonald's forces, which were making a painful circuit by Florence and Pisa in its rear. But the Aulic Council, who looked more to the immediate concerns of Austria than the general interest of the common cause, insisted upon Mantua being put into their hands before any thing was attempted either against Switzerland, Genoa, or the Maritime Alps; and the Emperor again wrote to Suwarrow, positively forbidding any enterprise until that important fortress had surrendered. The impetuous marshal, unable to conceal his vexation, and fully aware of the disastrous effects this resolution would have upon the general fate of the campaign, exclaimed, "Thus it is that armies are ruined!" but nevertheless, obeying the orders, he dispatched considerable reinforcements and a powerful train of artillery by the Po, to aid the siege of Mantua, and assembled at Turin the stores necessary for the reduction of Alexandria. Disgusted, however, with the subordinate part thus assigned to him, the Russian general abandoned to General Ott the duty of harassing the retreat of the army of Naples, and encamped with his veterans on the Bormida, to await the tedious operations of the besieging forces (2).

Leads to an agreement for a disengagement of the Russian and Austrian forces. This circumstance contributed to induce an event, attended ultimately with important effects on the fate of the campaign, viz., the separation of the Austrian and Russian forces, and the rupture of any cordial concert between their respective governments. The cabinet of Vienna were too desirous of the exclusive sovereignty of the conquests in Italy, to be willing to share their possession with a powerful rival; while the pride of the Russians was hurt at beholding their unconquered commander, whom they justly regarded as the soul of the confederacy, subjected to the orders of the Aulic Council, who could not

(1) *Jom. xii. 26, 26. St.-Cyr, i. 221, 222.*(2) *Chastellar's Memoirs, 137. Jom. xii. 27, 28. Hard. vii. 250, 251.*

appreciate his energetic mode of conducting war, and frequently interrupted him in the midst of the career of conquest. At the same time, the English government were desirous of allowing the Russian forces to act alone in Switzerland, aided by the insurrection which they hoped to organize in that country, and beheld with satisfaction the removal of the Muscovite standards from the shores of the Mediterranean, where their establishment in a permanent manner might possibly have occasioned them some uneasiness. These feelings on all sides led to an agreement between the Allied Powers, in virtue of which it was stipulated, that the whole Russian troops, after the fall of Alexandria and Mantua, should be concentrated in Switzerland under Marshal Suwarrow; that the Imperialists should alone prosecute the war in Italy, and that the army of the Archduke Charles should act under his separate orders on the Upper Rhine. This plan itself was highly advisable; but, from the time at which it was carried into execution, it led to the most calamitous results (1).

The whole forces of the Republic, at this period actually on foot, did not exceed 220,000 combatants; and although the new conscription was pressed with the utmost vigour, it could not be expected that it could add materially to the efficiency of the defending armies for several months, in the course of which, to all appearance, their fate would be decided (2).

July 29.  
Resumption  
of hostilities  
by the Im-  
perialists  
around  
Genoa. The arrival of the army of Naples at Genoa in the end of July having raised the French force to forty-eight thousand men, including three thousand cavalry and a powerful artillery, it was deemed indispensable on every account to resume offensive operations, in conjunction with the army of the Alps, which had now been augmented to a respectable amount. Every thing, accordingly, was put in motion in the valleys of the Alps and Apennines; and the French army, whose headquarters were at Cornegliano, occupied at Voltri, Savona, Vado, and Loano nearly the same position which Napoléon held, previous to his memorable descent into Italy in March 1796. But it was too late; all the activity of Moreau and Joubert could not prevent the fall of the bulwarks of Lombardy and Piedmont (3).

Progress of  
the siege of  
Mantua. The siege of Mantua, which had been blockaded ever since the battle of Magnano, was pressed in good earnest by General Kray after the victory of the Trebbia. The capture of Turin having placed at the disposal of the Allies immense resources, both in artillery and ammunition, the defeat of Macdonald relieved them from all anxiety as to the raising of the siege, thirty thousand men were soon collected round its walls, and the batteries of the besiegers armed with two hundred pieces of cannon. The garrison originally consisted of nearly eleven thousand men; but this force, barely adequate at first to man its extensive ramparts, was now considerably weakened by disease. The peculiar situation of this celebrated fortress rendered it indispensable that, at all hazards, the exterior works should be maintained, and this was no easy matter with an insufficient body of troops. The soldiers were provisioned for a year; but the inhabitants, thrice impoverished by enormous contributions, were in the most miserable condition, and the famine with which they were menaced, joined to the natural unhealthiness of the situation during the autumnal months, soon produced those contagious disorders ever in the rear of protracted war, which in spite of every precaution, seriously weakened the strength of the garrison (4).

(1) Archduke, ii. 83, 84.

(2) Dum. i. 283.

(3) Dum. i. 256. Jom. xii. 29, 30. St.-Cyr, i. 222.

(4) Dum. 258, 260. Jom. xii. 31, 35.

Description  
of that for-  
tress.

Mantua, situated in the middle of a lake, formed by the Mincio in the course of its passage from the Alps to the Po, depends entirely for its security upon its external works, and the command of the waters which surround its wall. Two chaussées traverse its whole extent on bridges of stone; the first leads to the citadel, the second to the faubourg St.-George. Connected with the citadel are the external works and intrenched camp, which surround the lake, and prevent all access to its margin. These works, with the exception of the citadel, are not of any considerable strength; the real defence of Mantua consists in the command which the garrison has of the waters in the lake, which is formed by three locks. That of the citadel enables them at pleasure to augment the upper lake; that of Pradella gives them the command of the entrance of its waters into the Pajolo; while that of the port Ceresse puts it in their power to dam up the canal of Pajolo, and let it flow into inundations to obstruct the approach of the place. But, on the other hand, the besiegers have the means of augmenting or diminishing the supply of water to the lake itself, by draining off the river which feeds it above the town; and the dykes which lead to Pradella are of such breadth as to permit trenches to be cut and approaches made along it. Upon the whole, an exaggerated idea had been formed both of the value and strength of Mantua, by the importance which it had assumed in the campaign of 1796, and the result of the present siege revealed the secret of its real weakness (1).

Commence-  
ment of the  
siege by  
Kray.

Kray, taking advantage with ability of all the means at his disposal, had caused his flotilla to descend by Peschiera and Goito from the lake of Guarda, and brought up many gunboats by the inferior part of the Mincio into the lower lake. By means of these vessels, which were armed with cannon of the heaviest calibre, he kept up an incessant fire on the dykes, and at the same time established batteries against the curtain between the citadel and fort St.-George. These were intended merely as feints to divert the attention of the besiegers from the real point of attack,

July 14.

which was the front of fort Pradella. On the night of the 14th July, while the garrison were reposing, after having celebrated by extraordinary rejoicings the anniversary of the taking of the Bastille, the trenches were opened, and after the approaches had been continued for some days, the tower of Ceresse was carried by assault, and the besiegers' guns rapidly brought close up to the outworks of the place. On the night of the 24th, all

July 19.

the batteries of the besiegers being fully armed, they opened their fire, from above two hundred pieces, with such tremendous effect, that the defences of the fortress speedily gave way before it; in less than two hours the outworks of fort Pradella were destroyed; while the batteries, intended to create a diversion against the citadel, soon produced a serious impression. Nothing could stand against the vigour and sustained weight of the besiegers' fire; their discharges gradually rose from six thousand cannon-shot to twelve thousand in twenty-four hours, and the loss of the garrison from its effects was from five to six hundred a-day. Under the pressure arising from so terrible an attack, the fort of St.-George and the battery of Pajolo were succes-

In surrender.

sively abandoned; and at length the garrison, reduced to seven thousand five hundred men, surrendered, on condition of being sent back to France, and not serving again until regularly exchanged. Hardly were the

July 30.

terms agreed to, when the upper lake flowed with such violence into the under, through an aperture which the governor had cut to let in the waters, that sixty feet of the dike were carried away, and the inundation of

(1) Jom. xii. 34, 35. Dum. i. 262.

Pajolo deepened to such a degree, that it might have prolonged for at least eight days his means of defence, and possibly, by preventing the besieging force taking a part in the battle of Novi, which shortly followed, altered the fate of the campaign (1).

July 8.  
Fall of  
Alexandria.  
July 21.

While the bulwark of Lombardy was thus falling, after an unexpectedly short resistance, into the hands of the Imperialists, Count Bellegarde was not less successful against the citadel of Alexandria. Trenches were opened on the 8th July, and in a few days, eighty pieces of cannon were placed in battery; and such was the activity with which they were served, that in seven days they discharged no less than forty-two thousand projectiles. On the 21st, the garrison, consisting of sixteen hundred men, surrendered at discretion. This conquest was of great importance to the future projects of Suwarrow; but it was dearly purchased by the loss of General Chastellar, his chief of the staff, who was severely wounded soon after the first trenches were opened, an officer whose talents and activity had, in a great degree, contributed to the success of the campaign (2).

Commence-  
ment of the  
siege of  
Tortona.  
Aug. 2.

After the fall of Alexandria and Mantua, Suwarrow, faithful to the orders he had received from Vienna, to leave no fortified place in the enemy's hands in his rear, drew his forces round Coni, and commenced the siege of Tortona. His army was soon augmented by the arrival of General Kray with twenty thousand men from the siege of the latter place, who entered into line on the 12th August. The trenches were opened before Tortona on the 5th August, and on the 7th, the castle of Serravalle, situated at the entrance of one of the valleys leading into the Apennines, was taken after a short cannonade. But the French army, who were now concentrated under Joubert on the Apennines, was preparing an offensive movement, and the approaches to Genoa were destined to be the theatre of one of the most bloody battles on record in modern times (3).

The Republicans at this epoch occupied the following positions. The right wing, fifteen thousand strong, under St.-Cyr, guarded the passes of the Apennines from Pontremoli to Torriglio, and furnished the garrison of Genoa. The centre, consisting of ten thousand, held the important posts of the Bocchetta and Campo Freddo; while the left, twenty-two thousand strong, was encamped on the reverse of the mountains on the side of Piedmont, from the upper end of the valley of Tanaro, and both guarded the communications of the whole army with France, and kept up the connexion with the corps under Championnet, which was beginning to collect on the higher passes of the Alps. On the other hand, the Allies could only muster forty-five thousand in front of Tortona; General Kaim, with twelve thousand being at Cherasco to observe the army of the Alps, and Klenau in Tuscany, with seven thousand combatants; and the remainder of their great army occupied in keeping up the communications between their widely scattered forces (4).

Position of  
the Repub-  
licans in  
front of  
Genoa.

Magnani-  
mous con-  
duct of  
Moreau on  
Joubert's  
assuming the  
command.

The arrival of Joubert to supersede him in the command of his army, had no tendency to excite feelings of jealousy in the mind of his great predecessor. Moreau was incapable of a personal feeling when the interest of his country was at stake; and with a magnanimity truly worthy of admiration, he not only gave his youthful successor the full benefit of his matured counsel and experience, but offered to accompany

(1) Jom. xii. 37, 47. Dum. i. 262, 272.

(2) Dum. i. 254, 255. Jom. xii. 48, 54.

(3) Jom. xii. 98. Arch. Ch. ii. 70, 71. Dum. i.

(4) Arch. Ch. ii. 71. Jom. xii. 96, 97. St.-Cyr. i. 221, 222.

him for some days after he opened his campaign ; contributing thus, by his advice, to the glory of a rival who had just supplanted him in the command. Joubert, on his side, not only profited by the assistance thus generously proffered, but deferred on every occasion to the advice of his illustrious friend ; and to the good understanding between these great men, the preservation of the Republican forces after the defeat at Novi and the death of Joubert is mainly to be ascribed (1). How different from the presumption of Laseuillade, who, a century before, had caused the ruin of a French army near the same spot, by neglecting the advice of Marshal Vauban before the walls of Turin.

**Advance of the French to raise the siege.** On the 9th of August, the French army commenced its forward movements ; and after debouching by the valleys of the Bormida, the Erro, and the Orba, concentrated, on the 13th, at Novi, and blockaded Serravalle, in the rear of their right wing. A fourth column, under the orders of St.-Cyr, destined to raise the siege of Tortona, descended the defiles of the Bocchetta. Suwarrow no sooner heard of this advance than he concentrated his army, which, on the evening of the 14th, occupied the following positions : Kray, with the divisions of Bellegarde and Ott, was encamped in two lines on the right, near the road from Novi to Bosco ; the centre, consisting of the divisions of Forster and Schwiekousky, commanded by Derfelden, bivouacked in rear of Pozzolo-Formigan, while Melas, with the left, consisting of the Austrian divisions of Frélich and Lichtenstein, occupied Rivalta. The army of Joubert was concentrated on the plateau in the rear of Novi, with his right on the Scrivia, his centre at Novi, and his left at Basaluzzo ; a position which enabled him to cover the march of the columns detached from his right, which were destined to advance by Cassano to effect the deliverance of Novi. The French occupied a semicircle on the northern slopes of the Monte Rotonda ; the left, composed of the divisions Grouchy and Lemoine, under the command of Perignon, extended itself, in a circular form, around Pacturana ; in the centre, the division Laboissiere, under St.-Cyr, covered the heights on the right and left of Novi ; while the division Watrin, on the right, guarded the approaches to the Monte Rotondo from the side of Tortona, and Dombrowsky, with the Polish division, blockaded Serravalle. The position was strong, and the concentrated masses of the Republicans presented a formidable front among the woods, ravines, slopes, and vineyards with which the foot of the Apennines was broken. On the side of the French, forty-three thousand men were assembled ; while the forces of the Allies were above fifty-five thousand ; a superiority which made the first desirous to engage upon the rugged ground at the foot of the hills, and the latter anxious to draw their opponent into the plain, where their great superiority in cavalry might give them a decisive advantage (2).

**Joubert had resolved to retreat on learning the Fall of Mantua.** Joubert, who had given no credit to the rumours which had reached the army of the fall of Mantua, and continually disbelieved the asseverations of St.-Cyr that he would have the whole Allied army on his hands, received a painful confirmation of its truth, by beholding the dense masses of Kray encamped opposite to his right wing. He was thrown by this unexpected discovery into the utmost perplexity ; to engage with so great an inferiority of force was the height of temerity, while retreat was difficult in presence of so enterprising an enemy. In these cir-

(1) Jom. xii. 97. Dum. i. 319, 320. St.-Cyr, i. 222.

(2) Arch. Ch. ii. 71, 72. Jom. xii. 98, 103. Dum. i. 521, 523. Th. x. 349, 350. St.-Cyr, i. 227, 231.



cumstances, he resolved, late on the night of the 14th, after such irresolution as throws great doubts on his capacity as general-in-chief, whatever his talents as second in command may have been, on retiring into the fastnesses of the Apennines, and only waited for the arrival of his scouts in the morning to give the necessary orders for carrying it into effect; when the commencement of the attack by the Allies compelled him to accept battle in the position which he occupied (1).

Aug. 15.  
He is at-  
tacked be-  
fore doing  
so by  
Suwarrow.  
Death of  
Joubert.

Suwarrow's design was to force back the right of the French, by means of the corps of Kray, while Bagrathion had orders to turn their left, and unite in their rear, under cover of the cannon of Serravalle, with that corps; while Derfelden attacked Novi in the centre, and Melas commanded the reserve, ready to support any part of the army which required his aid. In pursuance of these orders, Kray commenced the attack at five in the morning; Bellegarde attacked Grouchy, and Ott Lemoine; the Republicans were at first taken by surprise; and their masses, in great part in the act of marching, or entangled in the vineyards, received the fire of the Austrians without being able either to deploy or answer it. Notwithstanding the heroic resistance of some brigades, the Imperialists sensibly gained ground, and the heads of their columns were already mounting the plateau, when Joubert hurried in person to the spot, and received a ball in his breast, when in the act of waving his hat, and exclaiming, "Forward, let us throw ourselves among the tirailleurs!" He instantly fell, and with his last breath exclaimed, "Advance, my friends, advance (2)."

Battle of  
Novi.

The confusion occasioned by this circumstance would have proved fatal, in all probability, to the French army, had the other corps of the Allies been so far advanced as to take advantage of it; but, by a strange fatality, though the attacks of the Allies were all combined and concentric, they were calculated to take place at different times; and while this important advantage was gained on their left, the Russians in the centre were still resting at Pozzolo-Formigaro, and Melas had merely dispatched a detachment from Rivolta to observe the course of the Scrivia. This circumstance, joined to the opportune arrival of Moreau, who assumed the command and harangued the troops, restored order, and the Austrians were at length driven down to the bottom of the hill, on their second line. During this encounter, Bellegarde endeavoured to gain the rear of Pasturana by a ravine which encircled it, and was on the point of succeeding, when Pérignon charged him so vigorously with the grenadiers of Partouneaux and the cavalry of Richepanse, that the Imperialists were driven back in confusion, and the whole left wing rescued from danger (3).

The Allies  
are at first  
repulsed.

Hitherto the right of the Republicans had not been attacked, and St.-Cyr availed himself of this respite to complete his defensive arrangements. Kray, finding the whole weight of the engagement on his hands, pressed Bagrathion to commence an attack on Novi; and though the Russian general was desirous to wait till the hour assigned by his commander for his moving, he agreed to commence, when, it was evident, that unless

(1) Jom. xii. 103. St.-Cyr, i. 237, 243.

Suwarrow's order of battle at Novi was highly characteristic of that singular warrior. It was simply this: "Kray and Bellegarde will attack the left, the Russians the centre, Melas the right." To the soldiers he said, "God wills, the Emperor orders, Suwarrow commands, that to-morrow the enemy be conquered." Dressed in his usual costume, in his shirt down to the waist, he was on horseback at the advanced posts the whole preceding evening, at-

tended by a few horsemen, minutely reconnoitring the Republican position. He was recognised from the French lines by the singularity of his dress, and a skirmish of advanced posts in consequence took place.—HABD. vii. 271, and St.-Cyr, i. 236.

(2) Jom. xii. 105, 107. Dum. i. 323. Th. x. 351. St.-Cyr, i. 245, 246.

(3) Jom. xii. 106, 108. Th. x. 352. St.-Cyr, i. 247, 248.



speedily supported, Kray would be compelled to retreat. The Russians advanced with great gallantry to the attack ; but a discharge from the division Laboissiere of musketry and grape, at half gunshot threw them into confusion ; and, after an obstinate engagement, they were finally broken by a charge by Watrin, with a brigade of infantry, on their flank, and driven back with great loss to Pozzolo-Formigaro (1).

Combined attack of all their forces. The failure of these partial attacks rendered it evident that a combined effort of all the columns was necessary. It was now noon, and the French line was unbroken, although the superiority of numbers on the part of the Allies was nearly fifteen thousand men. Suwarrow, therefore, combined all his forces for a decisive movement ; Kray, whom nothing could intimidate, received orders to prepare for a fresh attack ; Derfelden was destined to support Bagrathion in the centre, Melas was directed to break up from Rivolta to form the left of the line ; while Rosenberg was ordered in all haste to advance from Tortona to support his movement. The battle, after a pause, began again with the utmost fury at all points. It was for long, however, most obstinately disputed. Notwithstanding the utmost efforts of Kray, who returned above ten times to the charge, the Imperialists could make no impression on the French left ; in vain column after column advanced to the harvest of death ; nothing could break the firm array of the Republicans ; while Bagrathion, Derfelden, and Milaradowitch, in the centre, after the most heroic exertions, were compelled to recoil before the terrible fire of the infantry and batteries which were disposed around Novi. For above four hours, the action continued with the utmost fury, without the French infantry being any where displaced, until at length the fatigue on both sides produced a temporary pause, and the contending hosts rested on their arms amidst a field covered with the slain (2).

The advance of Melas decides the victory. The resolution of any other general but Suwarrow would have been shaken by so terrible a carnage without any result ; but his moral courage was of a kind which nothing could subdue. At four o'clock the left wing of the Allies came up, under Melas, and preparations were instantly made to take advantage of so great a reinforcement. Melas was directed to assail the extreme right of the Republicans, and endeavour, by turning it, to threaten the road from Novi to Genoa, while Kray again attacked the left, and Suwarrow himself, with the whole weight of the Russians, pressed the centre. The resistance experienced on the left was so obstinate, that, though he led on the troops with the courage of a grenadier, Kray could not gain a foot of ground ; but the Russians, in the centre, after a terrible conflict, succeeded in driving the Republicans into Novi, from the old walls and ruined towers of which they still kept up a murderous fire. But the progress of Melas on the right was much more alarming. While one of his columns ascended the right bank of the Scrivia and reached Serravalle, another by the left bank had already turned the Monte Rotondo, and was rapidly ascending its sides ; while the general himself, with a third, was advancing against the eastern flank of the plateau of Novi. To make head against so many dangers, Moreau ordered the division Watrin to move towards the menaced plateau, but finding itself assailed during its march, both in front and rear, by the divisions of Melas, it fell into confusion, and fled in the utmost disorder, with difficulty cutting its way through the enemy on the road in the rear of the French position. It now became indispensable for the

(1) Dum. i. 323. Jom. xii, 109, 110. Th. x, 352. St.-Cyr, i, 248, 250.

(2) Th. x. 353. Jom. xii, 112, 113. Dum. i. 324, 325. St.-Cyr, i. 252, 254.

Republicans to retire; for Lichtenstein, at the head of the Imperial cavalry and three brigades of grenadiers, was already established on the road to Gavi, his triumphant battalions, with loud shouts, were sweeping round the rear of the Republicans, while the glittering helmets of the horsemen appeared on every eminence behind their lines, and no other line of communication remained open but that which led by Pasturana to Ovada. Suwarrow, who saw his advantage, was preparing a last and simultaneous attack on the front and flanks of his opponent, when Moreau anticipated him by a general retreat. It was at first conducted in good order, but the impetuous assaults of the Allies soon converted it into a rout. Novi, stripped of its principal defenders, could no longer withstand the assaults of the Russians, who, confident of victory, and seeing the standards of the Allies in the rear of the French position rushed forward with resistless fury and deafening cheers, over the dead bodies of their comrades, to the charge; Lemoine and Grouchy with difficulty sustained themselves, in retiring, against the impetuous attacks of their unwearied antagonist Kray, when the village of Pasturana, in their rear, was carried by the Russians, whose vehemence increased with their success, and the only road practicable for their artillery cut off. Despair now seized their ranks; infantry, cavalry, and artillery disbanded, and fled in tumultuous confusion across the vineyards and orchards which adjoined the line of retreat; Colli, with his whole brigade, were made prisoners; and Pérignon and Grouchy, almost cut to pieces with sabre wounds, fell into the hands of the enemy. The army, in utter confusion, reached Gavi, where it was rallied by the efforts of Moreau, the Allies being too much exhausted with fatigue to continue the pursuit (1).

Great loss  
on both  
sides.

The battle of Novi was the most bloody and obstinately contested that had yet occurred in the war. The loss of the Allies was 1800 killed, 5200 wounded, and 1200 prisoners; but that of the French was much more considerable, amounting to 1500 killed, 5500 wounded, and 3000 prisoners, besides 37 cannons, 28 caissons, and 4 standards. As the war advanced, and fiercer passions were brought into collision, the carnage became daily greater; the officers were more prodigal of their own blood and that of their soldiers; and the chiefs themselves, regardless of life, at length led them on both sides to the charge, with an enthusiasm which nothing could surpass. Joubert was the victim of this heroic feeling; Grouchy charged with a standard in his hand, and when it was torn from him in the *mêlée*, he raised his helmet on his sabre, and was thrown down and wounded in the shock of the opposing squadrons; and Kray, Bagrathion, and Melas led on their troops to the mouth of the enemy's cannon, as if their duty had been that of merely commanding grenadier battalions (2).

Moreau  
continues to  
maintain  
himself on  
the Apennines.

The consequences of the battle of Novi were not so great as might have been expected from so desperate a shock. On the night of the 15th, Moreau regained in haste the defile of the Apennines, and posted St.-Cyr, with a strong rear-guard, to defend the approaches to the Bocchetta. In the first moments of consternation, he had serious thoughts of evacuating Genoa, and the artillery was already collected at San Pietro d'Arena for that purpose; but finding that he was not seriously disquieted, he again dispersed his troops through the mountains, nearly in the position they held before the battle. St.-Cyr was intrusted with the right, where a serious impression was chiefly apprehended, and an attack which

(1) Jom. xii. 104, 120. Th. x. 351, 354. Dum. i. 324, 327. Arch. Ch. ii. 72, 73. St.-Cyr, i. 255, 264.

(2) Dum. i. 328, 330. Jom. xii. 121. St.-Cyr, i. 264, 270. Th. x. 355.

Klenau made on that part of the position with five thousand men was repulsed, with the loss of seven hundred men to the Imperialists. Suwarrow himself, informed of the successes of the French in the small cantons of Switzerland, immediately detached Kray, with twelve thousand men, to the Tessino; while he himself, in order to keep an eye on Championnet, whose force was daily accumulating on the Maritime Alps, encamped at Asti, where he covered at once the blockade of Coni and the siege of Tortona (1).

During the concentration of the Allied forces for the battle of Novi, this active commander so ably disposed his little army, which only amounted to sixteen thousand combatants, instead of thirty thousand, as he had been promised by the Directory, that he succeeded in forcing the passage of the Little St.-Bernard, and driving the Imperialists back to Suza. These successes continued even after the Russian commander took post at Asti; and in a variety of affairs of posts in the valleys of the Alps, they succeeded in taking fifteen hundred prisoners and four pieces of cannon. But these advantages were more than counterbalanced by the fall of Tortona, which capitulated on the 23th August, on condition that, if not relieved by the 11th September, the place should be surrendered to the Allies. This conquest was the only trophy which they derived from the bloody battle of Novi. Moreau made an ineffectual attempt to relieve the blockade, and, finding it impossible to effect the object, retired into the fastnesses of the Apennines; while Suwarrow, who had received orders to collect the whole Russians in the Alps, set out, agreeably to the plan fixed on, with seventeen thousand men for the canton of the Tessino (2).

While these great events were passing to the south of the Alps, events of still more decisive importance occurred to the north of those mountains. Immediately after the capture of Zurich and the retreat of Masséna to Mount Albis, the Archduke established the bulk of his forces on the hills which separate the Glatt from the Limmat, and placed a line of posts along the whole line of that river and the Aar, to observe the movements of the Republicans. Each of the opposing armies in Switzerland numbered about seventy-five thousand combatants; but the French had acquired a decided superiority on the Upper Rhine, where they had collected forty thousand men, while the forces of the Imperialists amounted in that quarter only to twenty-two thousand. Both parties were anxiously waiting for reinforcements; but as that expected by the Archduke, under Korsakow, was by much the most important, Masséna resolved to anticipate his adversary, and strike a decisive blow before that dreaded auxiliary arrived. For this purpose he commenced his operations by means of his right wing in the higher Alps, hoping, by the advantage which the initiative always gives in mountainous regions, to dispossess the Imperialists from the important position of the St.-Gothard, and separate their Italian from their German armies by the acquisition of these elevated ridges, which were universally at that period deemed the key to the campaign (3).

At the very time when the French general was making preparations for these important movements, the Aulic Council gave every possible facility to their success, by compelling the Archduke to depart with his experienced troops for the Rhine, and make way for the Russians under Korsakow, equally unskilled in mountain war-

(1) Jom. xii. 127, 128. Dum. i. 334, 335. St.-Cyr, ii. 1, 3.

(2) Jom. xii. 129, 133, 136. Arch. Ch. ii. 74, 77. Dum. i. 336, 337.

(3) Arch. Ch. ii. 77, 81. Jom. xii 55, 58. Dum. i. 296.

fare, and unacquainted with the French tactics. In vain that able commander represented that the line of the Rhine, with its double barrier of fortresses, was equally formidable to an invading as advantageous to an offensive army; that nothing decisive, therefore, could be expected in that quarter, while the chances of success were much greater from a combined attack of the Russians and Austrians on the frontier of the Jura, where no fortresses existed to impede an invading force; that fifty thousand Russians in Switzerland could not supply the place of seventy thousand Austrians; and the chances, therefore, were that some serious disaster would occur in the most important part of the line of operations; and that nothing could be more hazardous than to make a change of troops and commanders in presence of a powerful and enterprising enemy, at the very time that he was meditating offensive operations. These judicious observations produced no sort of effect, and the court of Vienna ordered "the immediate execution of its will, without further objections (1)."

**Description of the theatre of war.** To understand the important military operations which followed, it is indispensable to form some idea of the ground on which they took place. The St.-Gothard, though inferior in elevation to many other mountains in Switzerland, is nevertheless the central point of the country, and from its sides the greatest rivers in Europe take their rise. On the east, the Rhine, springing from the glaciers of Disentis and Hinter-Rhine, carries its waters, by a circuitous course, through the vast expanse of the lake of Constance to the German ocean; on the north, the Reuss and the Aar, descending in parallel ravines through rugged mountains, feed the lakes of Lucerne, Thun, and Brienz, and ultimately contribute their waters to the same majestic stream; on the west, a still greater river rises in the blue and glittering glacier of the Rhone, and descending through the long channel of the Valais, expands into the beautiful lake of Geneva; while to the south, the snows of the St.-Gothard nourish the impetuous torrent of the Tessino, which, after foaming through the rocks of Faido, and bathing the smiling shores of the Italian bailliwicks, swells out into the sweet expanse of the Lago Maggiore, and loses itself in the classic waves of the Po.

The line of the Limmat, which now separated the hostile armies, is composed of the Linth, which rises in the snowy mountains of Glarus, and, after

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 80, 91. Th. x. 407, 408.

The relative situation and strength of the two armies at this period is thus given by the Archduke Charles:—

FRENCH.		Infantry.	Cavalry.
From Huningen to the mouth of the Aar, . . . . .	10,991	3,208	
From the mouth of the Aar to Mount Uetli, . . . . .	23,792	3,239	
From Mount Albis to the lake of Lucerne, . . . . .	11,701	564	
From the lake of Lucerne to the valley of Oberhasli, . . . . .	7,732		
In the Valais, from Brig to St.-Maurice, . . . . .	10,886	554	
In the interior of Switzerland, . . . . .	2,088	1,126	
	<hr/>	<hr/>	
Total, . . . . .	67,250	8,691	—75,941

ALLIES.		Infantry.	Cavalry.
Between Weis and Wulach, . . . . .	4,269	1,829	
From the mouth of the Aar to the lake of Zurich, . . . . .	37,053	10,458	
Between the lake of Zurich and Lucerne, . . . . .	8,722	834	
From the lake of Lucerne to the St.-Gothard, . . . . .	4,184	175	
On the St.-Gothard, the Grimsel, and the Upper Valais, . . . . .	5,744	150	
In the Grisons, . . . . .	1,188	355	
Swiss, . . . . .	3,453		
	<hr/>	<hr/>	
Total, . . . . .	64,613	13,301	—77,914

forming in its course the lake of Zurich, issues from that great sheet of water, under the name of the Limmat, and throws itself into the Aar at Bruick. Hotze guarded the line of the Linth; the Archduke himself that of the Limmat. Korsakow was considerably in the rear, and was not expected at Schaffhausen till the 19th August (1).

One road, practicable for cavalry, but barely so for artillery at that period, crossed the St.-Gothard from Bellinzona to Altdorf (2). Ascending from Bellinzona on the southern side, it passes through a narrow defile close to the Tessino, between immense walls of rock between Faido and Airolo; climbs the steep ascent above Airolo to the inhospitable summit of the St.-Gothard; descends, by a torrent's edge, its northern declivity to the elevated mountain-valley of Urseren, from whence, after traversing the dark and humid gallery of the Unnerloch, it crosses the foaming cascade of the Reuss by the celebrated Devil's Bridge, and descends, through the desolate and rugged valley of Schol-len, to Altdorf on the lake of Lucerne. But there all vestige of a practicable road ceases; the sublime lake of Uri lies before the traveller, the sides of which, formed of gigantic walls of rock, defy all attempt at the formation of a path, and the communication with Lucerne is carried on by water along the beautiful lake of the four cantons. The only way in which it is possible to proceed on land from this point, is either by shepherds' tracks towards Stantz and the canton of Underwalden, or by the rugged and almost impracticable pass of the Schachenthal, by which the traveller may reach the upper extremity of the canton of Glarus. From the valley of Urseren, in the heart of the St.-Gothard, a difficult and dangerous path leads over the Furca and the Grimsel, across steep and slippery slopes, where the most experienced traveller can with difficulty keep his footing, to Meyringen, in the valley of Oberhasli.

Plan of the  
Allies

The plan of the Allies was, that Hotze, with twenty-five thousand Austrians, should be left on the Linth; and at the end of September a general attack should be made on the French position along the whole line.

Korsakow was to lead the attack on the left with his Russian forces; Hotz in the centre with the Austrians; while Suwarrow, with seventeen thousand of his best troops, flushed with the conquest of Italy, was to assail the right flank of the Republicans, and by the St.-Gothard throw himself into the rear of their position on the Limmat. This design might have been attended with success, if it had been undertaken with troops already assembled on the theatre of operations; but when they were to be collected from Novi and Bavaria, and undertaken in presence of a general perfectly master of the ground, and already occupying a central position in the midst of these converging columns, it was evidently attended with the most imminent hazard, as if any of the columns did not arrive at the appointed time, the whole weight of the enemy might be expected to fall on the first which appeared (3).

And of  
Masséna,

Masséna intrusted to Lecourbe, whose skill in mountain warfare had already been amply evinced, the important duty of throwing

forward his right wing, and expelling the Imperialists from the higher Alps; while he himself, by a false attack along the whole line, and especially upon Zurich in the centre, distracted the attention of the enemy, and prevented him from perceiving the accumulation of force which was brought to bear on the St.-Gothard. Early on the morning of the 14th August, his troops were every where in motion. On the left, the Allied

(1) Th. x. 400, 410. Arch. Ch. i. 96.

(2) The magnificent chaussée, which now tra-

verses this mountainous and romantic region, was not formed till the year 1819.

(3) Th. x. 411. Arch. Ch. ii. 100, 103.



outposts were driven in along the whole line; and in the centre the attack was so impetuous that the Austrians were forced back almost to Zurich, where the Archduke rapidly collected his forces to resist the inroad. After considerable bloodshed, as the object was gained, the Republicans drew off, and resumed their positions on the Limmat (1).

Commence-  
ment of the  
attack by  
Lecourbe on  
the St.-  
Gothard.

The real attack of Lecourbe was attended with very different results. The forces at his disposal, including those of Thureau in the Valais, were little short of thirty thousand men, and they were directed with the most consummate ability. General Gudin, with five battalions, was to leave the valley of the Aar, force the ridge of the Grimsel, and forming a junction with General Thureau in the Valais, drive the Austrians from the source of the Rhône and the Furca. A second column of three battalions, commanded by Loison, received orders to cross the ridge of the Steinen between Oberhasli and the valley of Schollenen, and descend upon Wasen; while a third marched from Engelberg upon Erstfeld, on the lake of Lucerne; and a fourth moved direct by the valley of Issi upon Altdorf. Lecourbe himself was to embark from Lucerne on board his flotilla, make himself master of Brunnen and Schwytz on its eastern shore, and combine with the other corps for the capture of Altdorf and all the posts occupied by the enemy in the valley of the Reuss (2).

Aug. 14.  
The Impe-  
rialists are  
forced back  
at all points.

These attacks all proved successful. The Republican parties, under Lecourbe and Oudinot, advanced by land and water against Schwytz, and after an obstinate combat, the united Swiss and Imperialists were driven from that canton into the Muttenthal. From Brunnen, the harbour of Schwytz on the lake, Lecourbe conducted his flotilla under the chapel of William Tell, through the sublime scenery of the lake of Uri, beneath precipices fifteen hundred feet high, to Fluellen, where he landed with great difficulty, under a heavy fire from the Austrian troops; and, after a warm engagement, forced General Simbschen, who defended Altdorf, to retire further up the valley of the Reuss. Meanwhile Loison, after encountering incredible difficulties, had crossed the Steinerberg and the glaciers of Susten, and not only forced the enemy back into the valley of Reuss, but, after five assaults, made himself master of the important elevated post of Wasen, in the middle of its extent, so as to expose the troops who had been driven up from Altdorf to be assailed in rear as well as front. In this extremity they had no resource but to retire by the lateral gorge of Maderaner, from whence they reached by Tavitch the valley of the Rhine (3).

They are  
driven from  
the Grimsel  
and the  
Furca.

Meanwhile successes still more decisive were achieved by the Republicans in the other parts of their mountain line. General Thureau at the same hour attacked Prince Rohan, who was stationed in the Valais, near Brig, to guard the northern approach to the Simplon, and defeated him with such loss, that he was constrained to evacuate the valley of the Rhône, and retire by the terrific gorges of the Simplon to Duomo d'Ossola, on the Italian side of the mountains. This disaster obliged Colonel Strauch, who guarded, amidst snow and granite, the rugged sides of the Grimsel and the Furca with eight battalions, to fly to the relief of the imperialists in the Upper Valais, leaving only fifteen hundred to guard the summit of that mountain. He succeeded in stopping the advance of the Republicans up the Valais, but during his absence the important posts of the Grimsel and Furca were lost, General Gudin, at the head of three thousand men, set out from

(1) Dum. i. 298, 299.

(2) Dum. i. 299, 304, 305. Arch. Ch. ii. 103. i. 305, 307.  
Journ. xii. 77, 78.

(3) Arch. Ch. ii. 107, 108. Journ. xii. 78, 80. Dum.



Goultanen, in the valley of the Aar, and after climbing up the valley, and surmounting with infinite difficulty the glaciers of Gbelmen, succeeded in assailing the corps who guarded, amidst ice and snow, the rugged summit of the Grimsel from a higher point than that which they occupied. After a desperate conflict, in which a severe loss was experienced on both sides, the Imperialists were driven down the northern side of the mountain into the Valais; and Colonel Strauch, finding himself now exposed on both flanks, had no alternative but to retire by the dangerous pass called the Pas de Nuffenen, over a slippery glacier, to Faïdo on the Tessino, from whence he rejoined the scattered detachments of his force, which had made their escape from the Valais by paths known only to chamois hunters through the Val Formazza at Bellinzona (1).

Lecourbe, ignorant of the success of his right wing, on the succeeding day pursued his career of victory in the valley of the Reuss. Following the retir-

Aug. 25. ing columns of the Imperialists up the dark and shaggy pass of Schollenen, he at length arrived at the Devil's Bridge, where a chasm thirty feet wide, formed by the blowing up of the arch, and a murderous fire from the rocks on the opposite side of the ravine, arrested his progress. But this obstacle was not of long duration. During the night the Republicans threw beams over the chasm; and the Austrians, finding themselves menaced on their flank by General Gudin, who was descending the valley of Urseren from the Furca by Realp, were obliged to evacuate that almost impregnable post, and retire to the heights of the Crispalt, behind the Oberalp, near the source

And the St. of the Rhine. There they maintained themselves, with great reso-  
Gothard. lution, against the Republican grenadiers till the evening; but on the following day as they were assailed by the united forces of Lecourbe and Gudin, they were finally broken and driven back to Ilantz, with the loss of a  
Aug. 26. thousand prisoners and three pieces of cannon. At the same time, a detachment took possession of the summit of the St.-Gothard, and established itself at Airolo, on the southern declivity of the mountain (2).

While Lecourbe was gaining these great successes on the right, his left, between the lakes of Lucerne and Zurich, was equally fortunate. General Chabran, on the extreme left, cleared the whole western bank of the lake of Zurich as far as Weggis, the central columnsdrove the Imperialists from Schwytz into the Muttenthal, and defeated Jellachich at Ensiedlen; and on the following day, aided by Chabran, who moved against his flank by the Wiggisthal, they totally routed the Austrians, who fell back, with the loss of twelve hundred prisoners, by the lake of Klonthal, into the canton of Glarus. Thus, by a series of operations, as ably executed as they were skilfully conceived, was the whole left wing of the Imperialists routed and driven back in less than forty-eight hours, with the loss of ten pieces of cannon, four thousand prisoners, and two thousand in killed and wounded, and the important post of the St.-Gothard, with all its approaches and lateral valleys, wrested from their hands (3).

These brilliant successes, however, were only gained by Masséna through the great concentration of his forces on the right wing. To accomplish this he was obliged to weaken his left, which, lower  
down in the plain, guarded the course of the Aar. The Archduke

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 105, 107. Jom. xii. 80, 81. Dum. i. 308, 309. Ebel, Manuel du Voyageur en Suisse, 325.

(2) Arch. Ch. ii. 108, 110. Jom. xii. 81, 82. Dum. i. 308, 309.

(3) Arch. Ch. ii. 212, 213. Jom. xii. 82, 84. Dum. i. 305.

Many readers will recognise, in the theatre of these operations, the scenes indelibly engraven on their memory by the matchless sublimity of their features.

resolved to avail himself of this circumstance to strike a decisive blow against that weakened extremity; in which he was the more encouraged by the arrival of twenty thousand Russians of Korsakow's corps at Schaffhausen, and the important effect which success in that quarter would have in threatening the communications of the Republican army with the interior of France. For this purpose, thirty thousand men were assembled on the banks of the river, and the point selected for the passage at Gross Dettingen, a little below the junction of the Reuss and the Aar. Hotze was left in Zurich with eight thousand men, which he engaged to defend to the last extremity; while Korsakow promised to arrive at Ober Endingen, in the centre of the line, with twenty-three thousand men. The march of the columns was so well concealed, and the arrangements made with such precision, that this great force reached the destined point without the enemy being aware of their arrival, and every thing promised a favourable issue to the enterprise, when it proved abortive from the difficulties of the passage, and the want of skill and due preparation in the Austrian engineers. The bridges for the crossing of the troops were commenced under such a violent fire of artillery

Aug. 16 and  
17.

as speedily cleared the opposite banks, but it was found impossible to anchor the pontoons in the rocky bed of the stream, and the rapidity of the current rendered it hopeless to construct the bridges in any other manner. Thus, from the want of a little foresight and a few precautions on the part of the engineers, did a project fail, as ably conceived as it was accurately executed by the military officers, and which promised to have altered the fate of the campaign, and perhaps of the war. Had the passage been effected, the Archduke, with forty thousand men, would have cleared all the right bank of the Aar, separated the French left wing on the Rhine from their centre and right in Switzerland, compelled Masséna to undertake a disastrous retreat into the canton of Berne, exposed to almost certain destruction the small corps at Basle, and opened to immediate invasion the defenceless frontier of the Jura, from the united troops of the Archduke, Korsakow, and Suwarrow. The want of a few grappling-irons defeated a project on which perhaps the fate of the world depended. Such is frequently the fortune of war (1).

Aug. 19.

Desirous still of achieving something considerable with his veteran troops before leaving the command in Switzerland, the Archduke, after his troops had resumed their position, again concentrated his left under Hotze. But the usual jealousies between the troops and commanders of rival nations prevented this project from being carried into execution; and before the end of the month the Austrians, under their able commander, were in full march for the Upper Rhine, leaving twenty-five thousand men, under Hotze, as an auxiliary force to support Korsakow until the arrival of Suwarrow from the plains of Piedmont (2).

Being foiled,  
he marches  
to the Upper  
Rhine.

Aug. 30.  
Austrian  
left is de-  
feated in  
Glarus.

This change of commanders, and weakening of the Allied forces, presented too great chances of success to escape the observation of so able a general as Masséna, whose army was now augmented, by reinforcements from the interior, to above eighty thousand men. The movement commenced with an attack by Soult, with the right wing of the Republicans, upon Hotze, who occupied the canton of Glarus, and, after several sharp skirmishes, a decisive action took place near Naefels, in which the Austrians were defeated, and compelled to fall back to a defensive line in

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 119, 126. Dum. i. 311, 312. Jom. xii. 87, 92.

(2) Jom. xii. 92, 227. Arch. Ch. ii. 129, 134.

their rear, extending from the lake of Zurich by Wasen through the Wallenstadter See, by Sargans to Coire, in the Grisons. It was at this critical moment that the Archduke, yielding to the pressing commands of the Aulic Council, was compelled to abandon the army with the great body of his troops, leaving the united force of Korsakow and Hotze, fifty-six thousand strong, scattered over a line forty miles in length, to sustain the weight of Masséna, who could bring sixty-five thousand to bear upon the decisive point around the ramparts of Zurich (1).

The arrival of the Archduke was soon attended with important effects upon the Upper Rhine. The French had crossed that river at Mannheim on the 26th August with twelve thousand men, and driving General Muller, who commanded the Imperialists, before them, laid siege to Philipsburg, on which they had commenced a furious bombardment. But the approach of the Austrian commander speedily changed the state of affairs. The columns of that prince rapidly approaching, threatened to cut off their retreat to the Rhine, and they were obliged hastily to raise the siege and retire to Mannheim.

Sept. 6.  
Successful  
expedition  
of the Arch-  
duke against  
Mannheim.  
Sept. 14. The insufficient state of defence of that important place, inspired the Archduke with the design of carrying it by a *coup-de-main*. Its fortifications had, some months before, been levelled by the Republicans; but since that time, they had been indefatigable in their endeavours to restore them, and they were already in a respectable state of defence. On the 17th, the Austrians, in two columns, one of fourteen thousand men, the other of seven thousand, with a reserve of eight thousand, moved towards Mannheim, and on the following day gave the assault. A thick fog favoured the enterprise; the Austrians got into the redoubts almost before the French were aware of their approach, and drove them over the Rhine, with the loss of eighteen hundred prisoners, and twenty-one pieces of cannon. This success threw a momentary lustre over the expedition, for which the Allies were about to pay dear by the disasters experienced before Zurich (2).

Plan of the  
Allies for a  
combined  
attack, by  
Suwarrow  
and Korsakow, on  
Masséna. After the departure of the Archduke, it was concerted between Suwarrow, Korsakow, and Hotze, that the former of these commanders should set out from Bellinzona on the 21st September, and attack the Republican positions near Airolo on the Tessino. On the 25th, he expected to be at Altdorf, after having made himself master of the St.-Gothard. From thence he was to form a junction with Korsakow at Zurich, and with their united forces assail the position of Masséna on the Limmat in front, while Hotze attacked it in flank. By this means they flattered themselves that they would be able to march on the Aar with the mass of their forces, and drive the French back upon the frontier of the Jura and their own resources. This project was well conceived, in so far as the turning the French position by the St.-Gothard was concerned, and if it had all been executed as vigorously and accurately as it was by Suwarrow, the result might have been very different, but it presented almost insurmountable difficulties in the execution, from the rugged nature of the country in which the principal operations were to be conducted, the difficulty of communicating from one valley or one part of the army to another, and the remote distances from which the corps who were to combine in the operation were to assemble. It would have been more prudent with such detached bodies, to have chosen the Misocco and the Bernardine for the field marshal's

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 135, 139. Th. x. 412, 413. Jom. xii. 231, 234.

(2) Jom. xii. 238, 241. Arch. Ch. ii. 140, 161.

march, as that would have brought him down, by roads practicable for artillery, through the Via-Mala into the heart of the Austrian army, under cover of the posts which they still occupied in the Grisons; but it did not promise such brilliant results in the outset as that which he adopted, and it was more suitable to the impetuous character of the Russian veteran to throw himself at once through the narrow ravines of the St.-Gothard upon the flank of his adversary's line (1).

**Relative situations of the French and Russian centres at Zurich.** Meanwhile Korsakow collected the greater part of his forces in the neighbourhood of Zurich, where they were encamped between the ramparts of the town and the banks of the Sill. The position which they occupied, and the necessity of striking a decisive blow before the arrival of Suwarrow, suggested to Masséna a plan which he conceived and executed with the most consummate ability. He had a superiority, until the arrival of Suwarrow, of ten thousand over the Allies; but the corps which that commander brought with him would turn the balance as far the other way (2). Now, therefore, was the moment, by a decisive blow in the centre, to ruin the Allied army before the junction of that dreaded commander. But the distribution of these troops rendered this superiority still more important; for Masséna could assemble thirty-nine thousand on the decisive line of the Limmat (3), while Korsakow could only collect twenty-five thousand, the bulk of whom were grouped together under the cannon of Zurich, where their numbers were of no avail, and their crowded state in a narrow space only impeded any military movements.

**Unfounded confidence of the latter.** The temper and feeling of the Russian troops, even more than their defective position, rendered them the ready victims of a skilful and daring adversary. Justly proud of their long series of victories over the Turks, and of the decisive impression which Suwarrow had made in the Italian campaign, they had conceived both an unreasonable confidence in their own strength, and an unfounded contempt for their enemies. This feeling was not the result of a course of successes over an antagonist with whom they had repeatedly measured their strength, but of a blind idea of superiority, unfounded either in reason or experience, and likely to lead to the most disastrous consequences. In presence of the first general then in Europe, at the head of a greatly superior force, Korsakow thought it unnecessary to adopt other measures or take greater precautions than if he had been on the banks of the Dneister, in front of an undisciplined horde of barbarians. Thus every thing, both on the French and Allied side, prepared the great catastrophe which was approaching (4).

**Masséna's able plan of attack.** Having minutely reconnoitred the position of the enemy, Masséna resolved to make only a feigned attack on Zurich, and to cross with the bulk of his forces further down the river at Closter-Fahr, where it was slenderly guarded; and thus to turn the position under the ramparts of that town, and attack Korsakow, both in front and rear (5), at the same time that the Republicans had cut him off from his right wing further down the river, and the lake of Zurich separated him from his left in the mountains. The execution of this plan was as able as its conception was felicitous on the part of the French commander (6).

(1) Dum. ii. 58, 61. Arch. Ch. ii. 172, 178. Jom. xii. 241, 242.

(2) The French army in the field was 76,000; that of the Allies, without Suwarrow, 70,000; with him, 88,000.—JOMINI, xii. 245.

(3) Jom. xii. 245, 246. Arch. Ch. ii. 189, 196.

(4) Arch. Ch. ii. 181, 182.

(5) Th. x. 414, 415. Jom. xii. 247, 248.

(6) The presumption and arrogance of Korsakow were carried to such a pitch, that, in a conference with the Archduke Charles, shortly before the battle, when that great general was pointing out the positions which should in an especial manner be guarded, and said, pointing to the map, "Here you

Sept. 24.  
The passage  
is surprised  
below Zu-  
rich.

By great exertions the French engineers collected, by land-carriage, twelve pontoons and thirty-seven barks at Dietikon, on the evening of the 24th September, where they were concealed behind an eminence and several hedges, and brought down to the margin of the river at daybreak on the following morning. The French masked batteries were then opened, and by the superiority of their fire the opposite bank was speedily cleared of the feeble detachments of the enemy who occupied it, and the passage commenced. Six hundred men, in the first instance, were ferried over, and the French artillery, directed by General Foy, protected this gallant band against the attacks of the increasing force of the enemy, till the boats returned with a fresh detachment. Meanwhile the pontoons arrived, at a quick trot, from Dietikon; the bridge began to be formed, and the troops, ferried over, attacked and carried the height on the opposite side, though defended with the most obstinate valour by three Russian battalions, from whence seven pieces of cannon had hitherto thundered on their crossing columns. By seven o'clock the plateau of Closter-Fahr, which commanded the passage, was carried (1), with the artillery which crowned it, and before nine the bridge was completed, and Oudinot, with fifteen thousand men, firmly established on the right bank of the river.

Feigned  
attacks on  
Zurich and  
the Lower  
Limmat.

While this serious attack was going on in the centre, General Ménard on the left had, by a feigned attack, induced the Russian commander, Durassow, to collect all his forces to resist the threatened passage on the lower Limmat, and Mortier, by a vigorous demonstration against Zurich, retained the bulk of the Russian centre in the neighbourhood of that city. His troops were inadequate to produce any serious impression on the dense masses of the Russians who were there assembled; but while he was retiring in confusion, and Korsakow was already congratulating himself on a victory, he was alarmed by the increasing cannonades in his rear, and intelligence soon arrived of the passage at Closter-Fahr, the disaster of Markoff, and the separation of the right wing under Durassow from the centre, now left to its own resources at Zurich. Shortly after, he received the most alarming accounts of the progress of Oudinot: he had made himself master of Hong, and the heights which surround Zurich on the north west; and, in spite of a sally which Korsakow made towards evening, at the head of five thousand men, which compelled the enemy to recede to the foot of the heights to the north of the town, they still maintained themselves in force on that important position, barred the road of Wintherthur, the sole issue to Germany, and all but surrounded the Allied army within the walls of the city. Before nightfall, Masséna, fully sensible of his advantages, summoned the Russian commander to surrender, a proposal to which no answer was returned (2).

Brutal  
confusion in  
the town of  
Zurich.

During these disasters the confusion in Zurich rose to the highest pitch. The immense confluence of horsemen, artillery, and baggage-waggons, suddenly thrown back upon the city, and by which its streets were soon completely blocked up; the cries of the wounded brought in from all quarters; the trampling of the cavalry and infantry, who forced their way through the dense mass, and mercilessly trode under foot the wounded and the dying to make head against the enemy, threatening to break in from all sides, formed a scene hitherto unexampled in the war, and for

should place a battalion."—"Accompany you mean," said Korsakow. "No," replied the Archduke, a "battalion."—"I understand you," rejoined the Archduke, "an Austrian battalion, or a Russian company." Russ. vii. 287.

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 190, 193. Th. x. 415, 416. Jom. xii. 250, 252.

(2) Arch. Ch. ii. 194, 196. Th. x. 416, 418. Jom. xii. 254, 256.



which a parallel can only be found in the horrors of the Moscow retreat. When night came, the extensive watch-fires on all the heights to the north and west of the city, showed the magnitude of the force with which they were threatened in that quarter; while the unruffled expanse of the lake offered no hope of escape on the other side, and the bombs which already began to fall in the streets, gave a melancholy presage of the fate which awaited them if they were not speedily extricated from their perilous situation (1).

Brave resolution of Korsakow to force his way through.

In these desperate circumstances, Korsakow evinced a resolution as worthy of admiration as his former presumptuous confidence had been deserving of censure. Disdaining the proposal to surrender, he spent the night in making arrangements for forcing, sword in hand, a passage on the next morning through the dense masses of the Republicans. Fortunately, considerable reinforcements arrived during the night; two strong battalions, detached by Hotze, and the whole right wing, under Durassow, successively made their appearance. He had been detained till late in the evening by the feigned attacks of Ménard, but having at length learned the real state of affairs (2), he lost no time in rejoining his commander at Zurich, by a long circuit which enabled him to avoid the French outposts. Strengthened by these reinforcements, Korsakow resolved to attempt the passage through the enemy on the following day.

Sept. 28. He cuts his way through the enemy, but loses all his baggage and artillery.

At daybreak, on the 28th, the Russian columns were formed in order of battle, and attacked with the utmost impetuosity the division Lorges and the brigade Bonterns, which had established themselves on the road to Wintherthur, the sole line of retreat which remained to them. The resistance of the French was obstinate and the carnage frightful, but the Russians fought with the courage of despair, and at length succeeded in driving the Republicans before them and opening a passage. The whole army of Korsakow was then arranged for a retreat; but contrary to every rule of common sense, as well as the military art, he placed the infantry in front, the cavalry in the centre, and the *artillery and equipages in the rear*, leaving only a slender rear-guard, to defend the ramparts of Zurich until the immense mass had extricated itself from the city. Masséna, perceiving his intention, collected his forces to prevent or distress his retreat; but the intrepidity of the Russian infantry overthrew all his efforts, and the head of the column cut its way through all the troops which could be collected to oppose its progress. But the efforts of the Republicans against the cavalry in the centre were more successful. The divisions Lorges and Gazan, by reiterated charges on the moving mass, at length succeeded in throwing it into confusion; the disorder soon spread to the rear; all the efforts of the generals to arrest it proved ineffectual; the brave Sacken, destined to honourable distinction in a more glorious war, was wounded and made prisoner, and amidst a scene of unexampled confusion, a hundred pieces of cannon, all the ammunition waggons and baggage of the army, and the military chest, fell into the hands of the victors. Meanwhile the fire approached Zurich on all sides. Mortier was thundering from the other side of the Limmat, while Oudinot, carrying every thing before him, pressed down from the heights on the north; the garrison defiled after the main army in confusion; soon the gates were seized; a mortal struggle ensued in the streets, in the course of which the illustrious Lavater, seeking to save the life of a soldier threatened with death, was barbarously shot. At length all the troops

(1) *Jour.* xii. 254, 256. *Arch. Ch.* ii. 195, 196. (2) *Arch. Ch.* ii. 197. *Th.* x. 416, 419. *Th.* x. 417, 418.



who remained in Zurich laid down their arms; and Korsakow, weakened by the loss of eight thousand killed and wounded, and five thousand prisoners, besides his whole artillery and ammunition, was allowed to retire without further molestation by Eglisau to Shaffhausen (1).

Sources of  
Soult against  
Hotze above  
the Lake.

While Zurich was immortalized by these astonishing triumphs, the attack of Soult on the Imperial right, on the upper part of the line above the lake, was hardly less successful. Hotze had there retained only two battalions, at his headquarters of Kaltbrun; the remainder were dispersed along the vast line, from the upper end of the lake of Zurich by Sargans, to Coire in the Grisons. Accumulating his forces, Soult skilfully and rapidly passed the Linth, at three in the morning of the 25th. One hundred and fifty volunteers first swam across the river, with their sabres in their teeth, during the darkness of the night, and aided by the artillery from the French side, speedily dispersed the Austrian posts on the right bank, and protected the disembarkation of six companies of grenadiers, who soon after made themselves masters of Schenis. Wakened by the sound of the cannon,

Sept. 26.  
Death of  
the latter  
officer.

Hotze ran, with a few officers and a slender escort, to the spot, and fell dead by the first discharge of the Republican videttes. This calamitous event threw the Austrians into such consternation, that they fell back from Schenis to Kaltbrun, from which they were also dislodged before the evening. At the same time, the French had succeeded in crossing a body of troops over the river, a little lower down, at Shemersken, and advanced to the bridge of Grynau, where a desperate conflict ensued. These disasters compelled the Austrians to retreat to their position at Wesen, where they were next day assaulted by Soult, and driven first behind the Thiers, and at length over the Rhine, with the loss of three thousand prisoners, twenty pieces of cannon, all their baggage, and the whole flotilla, constructed at a great expense, on the lake of Wallenstadt (2).

Operations  
of Suwar-  
row on the  
Tessino.

While these disasters were accumulating upon the Allied force, which he was advancing to support, Suwarrow was resolutely and faithfully performing his part of the general plan. He arrived at Taverno on the 15th August, and dispatching his artillery and baggage, by Como and Chiavenna, towards the Grisons, set out himself, with twelve thousand veterans, to ascend the Tessino and force the passage of the St.-Gothard, while Rosenberg, with six thousand, was sent round by the Val Blegno, to turn the position by the Crispalt and Disentis, and so descend into the valley of Urseren by its eastern extremity. On the 21st September, the Russian main body arrived at Airolo, at the foot of the mountain, where General Gudín was

Sept. 22.

strongly posted, with four thousand men, covering both the direct road over the St.-Gothard and the path which led diagonally to the Furca. Two days after, the attack was commenced, with the utmost resolution, by the Russian troops; but in spite of all their efforts, they were arrested in the steep zigzag ascent above Airolo by the rapid and incessant fire of the French tirailleurs. In vain the Russians, marching boldly up, answered by heavy platoons of musketry; their fire, however sustained, could produce little impression on detached parties of sharpshooters, who, posted behind rocks and scattered fir-trees, caused every shot to tell upon the dense array of their assailants. Irritated at the unexpected obstacles, the old marshal advanced to the front, lay down in a ditch, and declared his resolution "to be buried there, where his children had retreated

Body con-  
flict above  
Airolo. The  
St.-Gothard  
is at length  
forced by  
the Russians.

(1) Th. x. 419, 420. Arch. Ch. ii. 199, 201. Jom. xii. 257, 258. Hard. vii. 292.

(2) Jom. xii. 259, 263. Arch. Ch. ii. 203, 209. Dum. ii. 61, 63.

for the first time." Joining generalship to resolution, however, he dispatched detachments to the right and left to turn the French position; and when their fire began, putting himself at the head of his grenadiers, at length drove the Republicans from their position, and pursued them, at the point of the bayonet, over the rugged summit of the St.-Gothard to the valley of Urseren. At the same time, Rosenberg had assailed the French detachment on the summit of the Crispalt, and, after destroying the greater part, driven them down in great disorder into the eastern extremity of the same valley; while a detachment, under Auffenberg, dispatched from Disentis, was proceeding through the Maderanthal to Amsteg, to cut off their retreat by the valley of Schollenen (1).

**Sept. 24.**  
**Dreadful**  
**struggle at**  
**the Devil's**  
**Bridge.** Assailed by such superior forces, both in front and flank, Lecourbe had no alternative but a rapid retreat. During the night, therefore, he threw his artillery into the Reuss, and retired down the valley of Schollenen, breaking down the Devil's Bridge to impede the progress of the enemy, while Gudin scaled the Furca by moonlight, and took post on the inhospitable summit of the Grimsel. On the following morning the united Russian forces approached the Devil's Bridge, but they found an impassable gulf, two hundred feet deep, which stopt the leading companies, while a dreadful fire from all the rocks on the opposite side swept off all the brave men who approached the edge of the abyss. Hearing the firing in front, the column of Bagrathion pressed on, in double quick time, through the dark passage of the Unnerloch, and literally, by their pressure, drove the soldiers in front headlong over the rocks into the foaming Reuss. At length, the officers, tired of the fruitless butchery, dispatched a few companies across the Reuss to scale the rocks on the left, by which the post at the bridge was turned, and beams being hastily thrown across, the Russian troops, with loud shouts, passed the terrific defile, and pressing hard upon the retiring column of the Republicans, effected a junction with Auffenberg at Wasen, and drove the enemy beyond Altdorf to take post on the sunny slopes where the Alps of

**Sept. 26.** Surenen descend into the glassy lake of Lucerne (2).

**Arrived at**  
**Altdorf,**  
**Suwarrow**  
**is forced to**  
**ascend the**  
**Shachen-**  
**thal.** The capture of the St.-Gothard by the Russians, and the expulsion of the French from the whole valley of the Reuss, was totally unexpected by Masséna, and would have been attended with important results upon the general fate of the campaign, if it had not been simultaneous with the disaster of Korsakow at Zurich, and the defeat of Hotze's corps by the Republicans on the Linth. But, coming as it did in the midst of these misfortunes, it only induced another upon the corps whose defeat was about to signalize the Republican arms. Arrived at Altdorf, Suwarrow found his progress in a direct line stopt by the lake of Lucerne, whose perpendicular sides precluded all possibility of a further advance in that direction, while the only outlet to join the Allied forces on his right lay through the horrible defile of the Shachenthal, in which even the audacious Lecourbe had not ventured to engage his troops, however long habituated to mountain warfare. There was now, however, no alternative, and Suwarrow, with troops exhausted with fatigue, and a heart boiling with indignation, was compelled to commence the perilous journey (3).

**Difficult**  
**passage of**  
**that ridge**  
**to Mitten.** No words can do justice to the difficulties experienced by the Russians in this terrible march, or the heroism of the brave men engaged in it. Obligated to abandon their artillery and baggage, the whole army advanced in single file, dragging the beasts of burden after them,

(1) Th. x. 421, 422. Jom. xii. 265, 266. Dum. i. 51. Arch. Ch. ii. 227, 228.

(2) Jom. xii. 267, 269. Th. x. 422. Dum. ii. 52. 53. Arch. Ch. ii. 229, 235.

(3) Jom. x. 269, 270. Dum. ii. 54, 55. Th. x. 422. Arch. Ch. ii. 236.

up rocky paths, where even an active traveller can with difficulty find a footing. Numbers slipped down the precipices, and perished miserably; others, worn out with fatigue, lay down on the track, and were trodden under foot by the multitude who followed after them, or fell into the hands of Lecourbe, who closely hung upon their rear. So complete was the dispersion of the army, that the leading files had reached Mitten before the last had left

Sept. 22. Altdorf; the precipices beneath the path were covered with horses, equipages, arms, and soldiers unable to continue the laborious ascent. At length the marshal reached Mitten, where the troops, in a hospitable valley, abounding with cottages and green fields, hoped for some respite from their fatigues; and where, in conformity to the plan agreed on, they were to have met the Austrian corps of Jellachich and Linken, to threaten the right of the Republicans (1).

Sept. 23.  
He finds  
none of the  
expected  
reinforce-  
ments there. But it was too late: the disasters of the Imperialists deprived them of all hope of relief from this quarter. Jellachich, faithful to his instructions, had broken up from Coire and the valley of the Rhine on the 23th, with eight battalions made himself master of the village of Mollis, and driven the Republicans back to Naefels, at the bridge of which, however, they resolutely defended themselves. But on the following day, the French, issuing from Wasen, menaced the retreat of the Austrians by the side of the Wallenstadter See; and Jellachich, informed of the disasters at Zurich, the death of Hotze, and the retreat of his corps, made haste to fall back behind the Rhine. On the same day, Linken, who had crossed from the valley of the Rhine by the valley of Sernst and the sources of the Linth, after making prisoners two battalions whom they encountered, appeared in the upper part of the valley of Glarus, so as to put Molitor between two fires. His situation now appeared all but desperate, and by a little more vigour on the part of the Russians might have been rendered so; but the retreat of Jellachich having enabled Molitor to accumulate his forces against this new adversary, he was obliged to retreat, and after remaining inactive for three days at Schwanden, recrossed the mountains, and retired behind the Rhine (2).

And is there  
surrounded  
on all sides,  
and reluc-  
tantly forced  
to retreat. Suwarrow thus found himself in the Muttenthal, in the middle of the enemy's forces, having the whole of Masséna's army on one side, and that of Molitor on the other. Soon the masses of the Republicans began to accumulate round the Russian marshal. Molitor occupied Mont Brakel and the Klonthal, the summit of the pass between the Muttenthal and Glarus, while Mortier entered the mouth of the valley towards Schwytz, and Masséna himself arrived at Fluellen, to concert with Lecourbe a general attack on the Russian forces. In this extremity, Suwarrow having, with the utmost difficulty, assembled his weary troops in the Muttenthal, called a council of war, and following only the dictates of his own impetuous courage, proposed an immediate advance to Schwytz, in the rear of the French position at Zurich, and wrote to Korsakow, that he would hold him answerable with his head for one step further that he continued his retreat. The officers, however, perceiving clearly the dangerous situation in which they were placed, strongly urged the necessity of an immediate retreat into Glarus and the Grisons, in order to strengthen themselves by that wing of the Allied army which alone had escaped a total defeat. At length, with the utmost difficulty, the veteran conqueror was persuaded to alter his

(1) Jom. xii. 270, 274. Th. x. 423. Arch. Ch. ii. 37.

(2) Arch. Ch. ii. 212, 220. Jom. xii. 271, 272. Dum. ii. 68, 69.

plans, and, for the first time in his life, he ordered a retreat, weeping with indignation at thus finding the reputation of invincibility; which his marvellous successes had won for him, lost in the close of his career by the faults of the generals placed under his command (1).

Sept. 30. Preceded by the Austrian division under Auffenberg, the Russians ascended Mount Bragel, and chasing before them the detachments of Molitor, great part of whom were made prisoners near the lake Klonthal, threw back that general upon the banks of the Linth. It was now the turn of the French general to feel alarm; but, calm in the midst of dangers which would have overturned the resolution of an ordinary commander, he made the most resolute defence, disputing every inch of ground, and turning

Oct. 1. every way to face the adversaries who assailed him. Determined to block up the passage to the Russians, he ultimately took post at Naefels, already immortalized in the wars of Swiss independence, where he was fu-

He crosses  
the moun-  
tains into  
Glarus.  
Desperate  
struggle at  
Naefels.

riously attacked, for a whole day, by Prince Bagrathion. Both parties fought with the most heroic courage, regardless of ten days' previous combats and marches, in which they had respectively been engaged; but all the efforts of the Russian grenadiers could not prevail over the steady resistance of the Republicans, and towards evening, having received reinforcements from Wasen, they sallied forth, and drove the assailants back to Glarus. On the same day Masséna, with a large force, attacked the rearguard of the Russians, which was winding, encumbered with wounded, along the Muttenthal; but Rosenberg halting, withstood their attack with such firmness, that the Republicans were compelled to give way, and then breaking suddenly from a courageous defensive to a furious offensive, he routed them entirely, and drove them back as far as Schwytz, with the loss of five pieces of cannon, a thousand prisoners, and as many killed and wounded (2).

Dreadful  
passage of  
the Alps of  
Glarus to  
Ilantz on  
the Rhine.

Unable to force the passage at Naefels, the Russian general, after giving his troops some days' repose at Glarus, which was absolutely indispensable after the desperate fatigues they had undergone, resolved to retreat over the mountains into the Grisons by Engi, Matt, and the valley of Sernst. To effect this in presence of a superior enemy, pressing on his footsteps both from the side of Naefels and the Klonthal, was an enterprise of the utmost hazard, as the path over the arid summits of the Alps of Glarus, was even more rugged than that through the Shachenthal, and the horses and beasts of burden had all perished under the fatigues of the former march. Nothing could exceed the difficulties which presented themselves. Hardships, tenfold greater than those which all but daunted the Carthaginian conqueror in the outset of his career in the Pennine Alps, awaited the Russians, at the close of a bloody and fatiguing campaign, among mountains to which they were entire strangers. On the morning on which the army set out from Glarus, a heavy fall of snow both obliterated all traces of a path,

Oct. 5.

and augmented the natural difficulties of the passage. With incredible difficulty the wearied column wound its painful way amongst inhospitable mountains in single file, without either stores to sustain its strength, or covering to shelter it from the weather. The snow, which, in the upper parts of the mountains, was two feet deep, and perfectly soft from being newly fallen, rendered the ascent so fatiguing, that the strongest men could with difficulty advance a few miles in a day. No cottages were to be found in these

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 239, 240. Jom. xii. 273, 275.  
Dum. ib. 67, 68.

(2) Jom. xii. 276, 277. Arch. Ch. i. 46.

dreary and sterile mountains, not even trees were to be met with to form the cheerful light of the bivouacs, vast grey rocks starting up amongst the snow alone broke the mournful uniformity of the scene, and under their shelter, or on the open surface of the mountain, without any covering or fire, were the soldiers obliged to lie down, and pass a long and dreary autumnal night. Great numbers perished of cold, or sunk down precipices, or into crevices from which they were unable to extricate themselves, and where they were

Oct. 6. soon choked by the drifting of the snow. With incredible difficulty the head of the column, on the following day, at length reached, amidst colossal rocks, the summit of the ridge; but it was not the smiling plains of Italy which there met their view, but a sea of mountains, wrapped in the snowy mantle which seemed the winding-sheet of the army, interspersed with cold grey clouds which floated round their higher peaks. The Alps of Tyrol and the Grisons, whose summits stretched as far as the eye could reach in every direction, presented a vast wilderness, in the solitudes of which the army appeared about to be lost, while not a fire nor a column of smoke was to be seen in the vast expanse to cheer the spirits of the soldiers. The path, long hardly visible, now totally disappeared, not a shrub or a bush was to be met with; the naked tops of the rocks, buried in the snow, no longer served to indicate the lying of the precipices, or rest the exhausted bodies of the troops. On the southern descent the difficulties were still greater; the snow, hardened by a sharp freezing wind, was so slippery, that it became impossible for the men to keep their footing; whole companies slipped together into the abysses below, and numbers were crushed by the beasts of burden rolling down upon them from the upper parts of the ascent, or the masses of snow which became loosened by the incessant march of the army, and fell down with irresistible force upon those beneath. All the day was passed in struggling with these difficulties, and with the utmost exertions the advanced guards reached the village of Panix, in the Grisons, at night, where headquarters were established. The whole remainder of the columns slept upon the snow, where the darkness enveloped them without either fire or covering. But nothing could overcome the unconquerable spirit of the Russians. With heroic resolution and incredible perseverance they struggled on, through hardships which would have daunted any other soldiers (1); and at length the scattered stragglers were rallied in the valley of the Rhine, and head-quarters established at Llantz on the 10th, where the troops obtained some rest after the unparalleled difficulties which they had experienced.

Bloody conflicts with Korsakow, near Constance.

Meanwhile Korsakow, having reorganized his army, and recovered in some degree from his consternation, halted his columns at Busingen, and turning fiercely on his pursuers, drove them back to Trallikon; but the enemy having there received reinforcements, the combat was renewed with the utmost obstinacy, and continued, without any decisive result on either side, till nightfall. On the same day, a body of Russian and Austrian cavalry, three thousand strong, posted in the vineyards and gardens which form the smiling environs of Constance, were attacked by a superior body of Republicans, under the command of General Gazen; a furious combat commenced, in the course of which the town was three times taken and retaken, barricades were thrown up in the streets, and the unhappy citizens underwent all the horrors of a fortress carried by assault. The Archduke Charles, informed of these circumstances, hastened with all his disposable forces from the environs of Mannheim. From the 1st to the 7th of October,

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 249, 251. Jom. xii. 277, 279.



Archduke  
hastens to  
his aid, and  
checks the  
further pur-  
suit.

twenty-seven battalions and forty-six squadrons arrived in the neighbourhood of Villingen, and the prince himself fixed his headquarters at Donaschingen, in order to be at hand to support the broken remains of Korsakow's army. The Allies were withdrawn from the St.-Gothard, and all the posts they yet occupied in Switzerland, to the Grisons, and the Rhine formed the boundary between the hostile armies, the Russians being charged with its defence from Petershausen to Diesenhosen, and the Austrians with the remainder of the line (1).

Treaty be-  
tween Rus-  
sia and Eng-  
land for an  
expedition  
to Holland.

While these desperate conflicts were going on in the south of Europe, England, at length rousing its giant strength from the state of inactivity in which it had so long been held by the military inexperience and want of confidence in its prowess on the part of government, was preparing an expedition more commensurate than any it had yet sent forth to the station which it occupied in the war. Holland was the quarter selected for attack, both as being the country in the hands of the enemy nearest the British shores, and most threatening to its maritime superiority, where the most vigorous co-operation might be expected from the inhabitants, and the means of defence within the power of the Republicans were most inconsiderable. By a treaty, concluded on the 22d June, between England and Russia, it was stipulated that the former of these powers was to furnish 13,000, and the latter 17,000 men, towards a descent in Holland, and that L.44,000 a-month should be paid by England for the expenses of the Russian troops, and her whole naval force be employed to support the operations. To re-establish the stadtholder in Holland, and terminate the revolutionary tyranny under which that opulent country groaned; to form the nucleus of an army which might threaten the northern provinces of France, and restore the barrier which had been so insantly destroyed by the Emperor Joseph; to effect a diversion in favour of the great armies now combating on the Rhine and the Alps, and destroy the ascendancy of the Republicans in the maritime provinces and naval arsenals of the Dutch, were the objects proposed in this expedition, and which, by efforts more worthy of the strength of England, might unquestionable have been attained (2).

The preparations for the expedition, both in England and the Baltic, were pushed with the utmost vigour; and the energy and skill with which the naval departments and arrangements for disembarkation were made in the British harbours, were such as to exort the admiration of the French historians (3). In the middle of July, Sir Home Popham sailed for the Baltic to receive on board the Russian contingent; while twelve thousand men, early in August, were assembled on the coast of Kent, and twelve thousand more were preparing for the same destination. All the harbours of England resounded with the noise of preparation; it was openly announced in the newspapers that a descent in Holland was in contemplation; and the numerous British cruisers, by reconnoitring every river and harbour along the Channel, kept the maritime districts in constant alarm from Brest to the Texel. The best defensive measures which their circumstances would admit were adopted by the Directory, and Brune, the French general, was placed at the head of the forces of both nations; but he could only collect fifteen thousand French, and twenty thousand Dutch troops to resist the invasion (4).

Vigorous  
preparations  
for the ex-  
pedition in  
England.

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 259, 264. Jom. xii. 283, 286.  
(2) Jom. xii. 178, 179. Ann. Reg. 1799, 301, and  
State Papers, 216, 217. Dum. ii. 348, 349.

(3) Jom. xii. 180, 181. Dum. ii. 349, 354.  
(4) Jom. xii. 182, 183. Ann. Reg. 301. Dum. ii.  
351, 352.



The expedition sails, and lands on the Dutch coast.

On the 13th August, the fleet, with the first division of the army, twelve thousand strong, set sail from Deal, and joined Lord Duncan in the North Sea. Tempestuous weather, and a tremendous surf on the coast of Holland prevented the disembarkation from being effected for a fortnight; but at length, on the 26th, the fleet was anchored off the Helder, in north Holland, and preparations were immediately made for a descent on

Aug. 27.

the following morning. At daylight on the 27th the disembarkation began, the troops led with equal skill and resolution by Sir RALPH ABERCROMBY, and the landing covered by the able exertions of the fleet under Admiral Mitchell; and never was the cordial co-operation of the land and sea forces more required than on that trying service. The naval strength of England was proudly evinced on this occasion; fifteen ships of the line, forty-five frigates and brigs, and one hundred and thirty transport vessels covered the sea, as far as the eye could reach, with their sails. General Daendels, who was at the head of a division of twelve thousand men in the neighbourhood, marched rapidly to the menaced point; and when the first detachment of the British, two thousand five hundred strong, was landed, it found itself assailed by a much superior force of Batavian troops; but the fire from the ships carried disorder into their ranks, and they were driven back into the sandhills

Action at the Helder. Defeat of the Dutch.

on the beach, from which, after an obstinate conflict, they were expelled before six in the evening, and the debarkation of the remaining divisions effected without molestation. In the night, the enemy evacuated the fort of the Helder, which was taken possession of next day by the English troops. In this affair the loss of the different parties was singularly at variance with what might have been expected; that of the British did not exceed five hundred, while that of the Dutch was more than thrice that number (1).

Capture of the Dutch fleet at the Texel.

This success was soon followed by another still more important. The position at the Helder having been fortified, and a reinforcement of five thousand fresh troops come up from England, the British fleet entered the Texel, of the batteries defending which they had now the command by the occupation of the Helder, and summoned the Dutch fleet, under Admiral Story, consisting of eight ships of the line, three of fifty-four guns, eight of forty-four, and six smaller frigates, who had retired into the Vlietu canal, to surrender. At the sight of the English flag, symptoms of insubordination manifested themselves in the Dutch fleet; the admiral, unable to escape, and despairing of assistance, surrendered without firing a shot; and immediately the Orange flag was hoisted on all the ships, and on the towers and batteries of the Helder and Texel. By this important success the Dutch fleet was finally extricated from the grasp of the Republicans, a circumstance of no small moment, in after times, when England had to contend, single-handed, with the combined maritime forces of all Europe (2).

The British are attacked by the Republicans, but repulse them with great loss.

The Russian troops not having yet arrived, the British commander, who was only at the head of twelve thousand men, remained on the defensive, which gave the Republicans time to assemble their forces; and having soon collected twenty-four thousand, of whom seven thousand were French, under the orders of VANDAMME, General Brune, who had assumed the command-in-chief, resolved to anticipate the enemy, and resume the offensive. On the 10th of September all the columns were in motion; Vandamme, who commanded the right, was directed to move along

(1) Ann. Reg. 1799, 302. Jom. ii. 186, 189. Dum. ii. 365, 369.

(2) Dum. ii. 369, 372. Ann. Reg. 1799, 303; Jom. xii. 190.

the Langdyke, and make himself master of Ennsginberg; Dumonceau, with the centre, was to march by Schorlдам upon Krabbenham, and there force the key of the position; while the left was charged with the difficult task of chasing the enemy from the Sand-dyke, and penetrating by Kamp to Petten. The contest, like all those which followed, was of the most peculiar kind; restricted to dikes and causeys, intersecting in different directions a low and swampy ground, it consisted of detached conflicts at insulated points rather than any general movements; and, like the struggle between Napoléon and the Austrians in the marshes of Arcola, was to be determined chiefly by the intrepidity of the heads of columns. The Republicans advanced bravely to the attack, but they were every where repulsed. All the efforts of Vandamme were shattered against the intrepidity of the English troops which guarded the Sand-dyke; Dumonceau was defeated at Krabbenham, and Daendels compelled to fall back in disorder from before Petten. Repulsed at all points the Republicans resumed their position at Alkmaer, with a loss of two thousand men, while that of the British did not exceed three hundred (1).

The English  
joined by  
the Rus-  
sians, at  
length  
advanced.

Instructed by this disaster as to the quality of the troops with which he had to deal, General Brune remained on the defensive at Alkmaer, while the remainder of the expedition rapidly arrived to the support of the British army. Between the 12th and the 15th September, the Russian contingent, seventeen thousand strong, and seven thousand British, arrived, and the Duke of York took the command. The English general, finding himself now at the head of thirty-five thousand men, and being aware that extensive reinforcements were advancing to the support of the Republicans from the Scheldt and the Meuse, resolved to move forward and attack the enemy. As the nature of the ground precluded the employment of large masses, the attacking force was divided into four columns. The first, under the command of General Hermann, composed of eight thousand Russians and a brigade of English, was destined to advance by the Sand-dyke and the Slapperdyke against the left of Brune, resting on the sea; the second, under the orders of General Dundas, consisting of seven thousand men, of whom five thousand were English, was charged with the attack on Schorlдам and the French centre; the third, under Sir James Pulteney, which required to advance along the Langdyke, which was defended by powerful intrenchments, was intended rather to effect a diversion than make a serious attack, and was not to push beyond Oude Scarpell, at the head of the Langdyke, unless in the event of unlooked-for success; while the fourth, consisting of ten thousand choice troops, under Sir Ralph Abercromby, was destined to turn the enemy's right on the Zuyder Zee (2).

Disaster of  
the Russians  
on the right.

The action commenced at daybreak on the 19th September with a furious attack by the Russians, under Hermann, who speedily drove in the advanced guard of the Republicans at Kamp and Groot, and pressing forward along the Sand-dyke, made themselves masters of Sharlдам and Bergen, and drove back Vandamme, who commanded in that quarter, to within half a league of Alkmaer. But the assailants fell into disorder in consequence of the rapidity of their advance, and Brune, having speedily moved up the division of Daendels and considerable reinforcements from his centre to the support of his left, Vandamme was enabled to resume the offensive, in consequence of which the Russians were attacked at once in front and both flanks in the village of Bergen, from whence, after a murderous conflict,

(1) Dum. ii. 378, 380. Jom. xii. 192, 195. Ann. Reg. 1799, 303.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1799, 304. Jom. xii. 192, 193. Dum. ii. 384, 385.

they were driven at the point of the bayonet. Their retreat, which at first was conducted in some degree of order, was soon turned into a total rout by the sudden appearance of two French battalions on the flank of their column (1). Hermann himself was taken prisoner, with a considerable part of his division, and General Essen, his second in command, who had advanced towards Schorlham, was obliged to seek shelter, under cover of the English reserve, behind the Allied intrenchments of Zyp.

Success of  
the British  
in the centre  
and left.

While the Russians were undergoing these disasters on the right, the Duke of York was successful in the centre and left. Dundas carried the villages there, after an obstinate resistance; Dumonceau was driven back from Schorlham, and two of his best battalions were made prisoners. At the same time Sir James Pulteney having been encouraged, by the imprudence of Daendels in pursuing too warmly a trifling advantage, to convert his feigned attack into a real one, not only drove back the Dutch division, but made a thousand prisoners, and forced the whole line, in utter confusion, towards St.-Pancras, under the fire of the English artillery. Abercromby had not yet brought his powerful division into action; but every thing promised decisive success in the centre and left of the Allies, when intelligence was brought to the Duke of York of the disaster on the right, and the rapid advance of the Republicans in pursuit of the flying Russians. He

But the  
Russians  
retreated  
before the  
British  
and, had  
the British  
not been  
repulsed.

instantly halted his victorious troops in the centre, and marched upon Schorl with two brigades of English and three Russian regiments, which was speedily carried, and if Essen could have rallied his broken troops, decisive success might yet have been attained.

But all the efforts of that brave general could not restore order or rescue the soldiers from the state of discouragement into which they had fallen; and the consequence was, that as they continued their retreat to the intrenchments of Zyp, the Republicans were enabled to accumulate their forces on the Duke of York, who, thus pressed, had no alternative but to evacuate Schorl (2), and draw back his troops to their fortified position. In this battle the Republicans lost 3,000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners; the British lost 500 killed and wounded, and as many prisoners; the Russians were weakened by 3,500 killed and wounded, 26 pieces of cannon, and 7 standards.

Success of  
the British  
fleet in  
England.

While these events were in progress, the Dutch fleet was conveyed to the British harbours. It is remarkable that this measure gave equal dissatisfaction to the sailors on both sides. The Dutch loudly complained that their ships, instead of being employed in their own country, under Orange colours, should be taken as prizes to Great Britain; while the English sailors lamented, that a fleet which could not escape had not fallen into their hands as glorious trophies, like those at St.-Vincent or Camperdown. The officers on both sides were anxious to preserve a good understanding between their respective crews; but the sailors kept up a sullen distrust; so much more easy is it to accommodate differences between rival cabinets than heal the national animosity which centuries of warfare have spread among their subjects (3). Holland, however, had no reason in the end to complain of British generosity; after a decided, though unwilling hostility of twenty years, she obtained a lavish accumulation of gifts in Flanders and Java from her ancient rival, such as rarely rewards even the steadiest fidelity of an Allied power.

(1) *Jour. ail.* 289, 292, *Dum.* ii. 387, 398. *Ann.* Reg. 1799, 294, 301.

(2) *Ann.* Reg. 1799, 303, 306. *Jour. ail.* 290, 293. *Dum.* ii. 397, 399.

(3) *Dum.* ii. 381, 392.

The Duke  
of York  
renews the  
attack, and  
is successful.

The Duke of York was not discouraged by the issue of the attack on the 19th September. Having been reinforced, a few days after, by a fresh brigade of Russians and some English detachments, he arranged his army, as before, in four columns; and although the heavy rains for long prevented the projected operation from taking place, yet they were enabled to resume the offensive on the 2d October. The recollection of the success which had every where crowned their efforts in the preceding action, animated the English troops, while the Russians burned with anxiety to wash out the stain which their disasters on that occasion had affixed to the Imperial eagles. The Allied army on this occasion was about thirty thousand strong, and the Republicans nearly of equal force. At six in the morning the

Oct. 2. attack was commenced at all points. The Russian division of Essen, anxious to efface its former disgrace, supported by the English division of Dundas, advanced to the attack in the centre with such impetuosity, that the villages of Schorl and Schorldam were quickly carried, and the Republicans driven in confusion to the downs above Bergen. An attack was there projected by the Duke of York; but Essen, who recollected the consequence of the former rashness of the Russians on the same ground, refused to move till the advance of Abercromby on the right was ascertained; a circumstance which paralysed the success of the Allies in that quarter. Meanwhile, Abercromby, who commanded nine thousand men, advanced gallantly at the head of his troops along the Sand-dyke which adjoined the sea; and notwithstanding a hot fire of musketry and grape, by which he had two horses shot under him, succeeded in forcing the French left, and expelling them from the sandhills, and downs on which they rested. On the left, Sir James Pulteney had made little progress, and his measures were confined to demonstrations; but as the English centre and right were victorious, and they had completely turned the French left, Brune retired in the night from the field of battle, and took up a fresh position, abandoning Alkmaer and all his former line. The loss sustained by the Republicans in this contest was above three thousand men and seven pieces of cannon; that of the Allies about fifteen hundred. Already the attention of the French was attracted by the courage and address of the Highland regiments, who bravely fought up to the knees in water, and rapidly overcame the strongest obstacles, in their attack on the flank of the Republicans (1).

His critical  
situation  
notwith-  
standing.

But although they had gained this success, the situation of the Duke of York's army was far from encouraging. The enemy's force was daily increasing, while for his own no further reinforcements could be expected; the autumnal rains, which had set in with more than usual severity, rendered the roads almost unpassable for artillery or chariots; the insalubrity of the climate at that period of the year was already beginning to affect the health of the soldiers; and none of the expected movements of the inhabitants or Batavian troops in favour of the house of Orange had taken place. In these circumstances it was evident that, unless some important place could be captured, it would be impossible for the Allies to retain their footing in North Holland, and Haarlem was pitched on as most likely to furnish the necessary supplies. To achieve the conquest of this important city, the Allied forces were put in motion to attack the French position which occupied the narrow isthmus between Beverwick and the Zuyder Zee, by which it was necessary to pass to approach Haarlem, which was not more than three leagues distant (2).

(1) Dum. ii. 85, 86. Jom. xii. 207, 211. Ann. Reg. 1799, 308.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1799, 308, 309. Dum. ii. 208, 209. Jom. xii, 211, 212.

Oct. 6.  
Indecisive  
Action.

The action commenced at seven in the morning, and was obstinately contested during the whole day. In the centre the Allies were, in the first instance, successful; Essen bore down all opposition, and Paltbod, who commanded the Republicans, was on the point of succumbing, when Brune strengthened him with the greater part of a fresh division, and a vigorous charge threw back the Allies in confusion towards their own position. In their turn, however, the victorious Republicans were charged, when disordered with success, by an English regiment of cavalry, thrown into confusion, and driven back with great loss to Kastricum, where they were with difficulty rallied by Vandamme, who succeeded in checking the advance of the pursuers. The action was less obstinately contested on the right, as Abercromby, who commanded in that quarter, was obliged to detach a considerable part of his troops to reinforce Essen; while on the left the immense inundations which covered the front of the Republican position, prevented Paltenev from reaching the French right under Daendels. The loss on both sides was nearly equal, amounting to about two thousand in killed, wounded, and prisoners. That of the English alone was twelve hundred men (1).

Which leads  
to the  
retreat of  
the British.

The barren honours of this well-contested field belonged to the Allies, who had forced back the French centre to a considerable distance from the field of battle; but it is with an invading army as an insurrection, an indecisive success is equivalent to a defeat. Haarlem was the object of the English general, without the possession of which he could not maintain himself in the country during the inclement weather which was approaching, and Haarlem was still in the hands of the Republicans. The enemy's force was hourly increasing, and, two days after the action, six thousand infantry arrived to strengthen their already formidable position on the isthmus, by which alone access could be obtained to the interior of the country; and the total absence of all the necessary supplies in the corner of land within which the army was confined, rendered it impossible to remain there for any length of time. In these circumstances, the Duke of York, with the unanimous concurrence of a council of war, resolved to fall back to the intrenchments at Zyp, there to await reinforcements or farther commands from the British Cabinet; a resolution which was strengthened by the intelligence which arrived, at the same time, of the disasters which had befallen the Russians at Zurich. On the day after the battle, therefore, the Allies retired to the position they had occupied before the battle of Bergen (2).

The British  
first retire,  
and at last  
capitulate.

Brune lost no time in following up the retreating army. On the 8th the Republicans resumed their position in front of Alkmaer, and several sharp skirmishes ensued between the British rear-guard and the advanced posts of their pursuers. The situation of the Duke of York was now daily becoming more desperate; his forces were reduced by sickness and the sword to twenty thousand men; the number of those in hospital was daily increasing; there remained but eleven days' provision for the troops, and no supplies or assistance could be looked for from the inhabitants for a retreating army. In these circumstances he rightly judged that it was necessary to lose no time in embarking the sick, wounded, and stores, with such of the Dutch as had compromised themselves by their avowal of Orange principles and proposed a suspension of arms to General Brune, preparatory to the evacuation of Holland by the Allied troops. Some difficulty was at first experienced from the French insisting as a *sine*

Oct. 17.

(1) Jom. xii. 212, 216. Ann. Reg. 1799, 309. Dum. ii. 89.

(2) Jom. xii. 215, 217. Dum. ii. 90, 91. Ann. Reg. 1799, 310.



*qua non* that the fleet captured at the Texel should be restored; but this the British commander firmly resisted, and at length the conditions of the evacuation were agreed on. The principal articles were, that the Allies should, without molestation, effect the total evacuation of Holland by the end of November; that eight thousand prisoners, whether French or Dutch, should be restored; and that the works of the Helder should be given up entire, with all their artillery. A separate article stipulated for the surrender of the brave De Winter, made prisoner in the battle of Camperdown. Before the 1st of December all these conditions were fulfilled on both sides: the British troops had regained the shores of England, and the Russians were quartered in Jersey and Guernsey (1).

Reflections  
on this disaster  
on the  
nation.

Such was the disastrous issue of the greatest expedition which had yet sailed from the British harbours during the war, and the only one at all commensurate to the power or the character of England. Coming, as it did, after the hopes of the nation had been highly excited by its early successes, and when the vast conquests of the Allies in the first part of the campaign had led to a very general expectation of the fall of the jacobinal power in France, it produced the most bitter disappointment, and contributed, in a signal degree, both on the continent and at home, to confirm the general impression that the English soldiers had irrevocably declined from their former renown; that the victors of Cressy and Azincour were never destined to revive; and that it was at sea alone that any hope for resistance remained to Great Britain against the power of the Republic. The Opposition, as usual, magnified the public disasters, and ascribed them all to the rashness and imbecility of the Administration; while the credulous public, incapable of just discrimination, and ever governed by the event, overlooked the important facts that the naval power of republican Holland had been completely destroyed by the expedition; and that in every encounter the English soldiers had asserted their ancient superiority over those of France; and, instead of ascribing the failure of the expedition to its real causes, inadequacy of means and the jealousies incident to an Allied force unaccustomed to act together, joined the general chorus, and loudly proclaimed the utter madness of any attempts, by land at least, to resist the overwhelming power of France (2). The time was not yet arrived when a greater commander, wielding the resources of a more courageous and excited nation, was to wash out these stains on the British arms, and show to the astonished world that England was yet destined to take the lead, even on the continent, in the deliverance of Europe, and that the blood of the victors of Poitiers and Blenheim yet flowed in the veins of their descendants.

Affairs of  
Italy after  
the battle  
of Novi.

While the campaign was thus chequered with disaster to the north of the Alps, the successes of the Allies led to more durable consequences on the Italian plains. The Directory, overwhelmed by the calamitous result of the battle of Novi, gave the command of both the armies of Italy and Savoy to General Championnet, who could only assemble 54,000 men under his banners, exclusive of 6000 conscripts, who guarded the summits of the Alps. On the other hand, General Melas, who, after the departure of Suwarrow, had assumed the chief command, had 68,000 men under his orders, independent of 18,000 in garrisons in his rear, and 7000

(1) Ann. Reg. 1799, 218, 219. Dum. ii. 94, 96, Jom. xli. 216, 219.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1799, 312. Jom. xli. 221, 222.



who marched towards the Arno and the Tiber. In despair at the unpromising condition of his troops, occupying the circular ridge of the mountains from the sources of the Trebbia to the great St.-Bernard, the French general at last proposed to repass the Alps, and after leaving such a force in the Maritime Alps as might secure the south of France from insult, proceed, with the bulk of his forces, to join General Thureau in the Valais. But the Directory refused to accede to this wise proposition, and instead, prescribed to the French general to maintain his position, and exert his utmost efforts for the preservation of Coni, which was evidently threatened by the Imperialists (1).

The cautious and minute directions of the Aulic Council having completely fettered the Austrian general, his operations were confined to the reduction of this fortress, the last bulwark in the plain of Italy still held by the Republicans, and justly regarded as an indispensable preliminary to the conquest of Genoa, from its commanding the chief communications of that city with the plain of Piedmont. With this view, both generals drew their troops towards Coni; the Austrians encircling its walls with a chain of posts in the plain, and the French accumulating their forces to overlook it. In the desultory warfare which followed, the Imperialists were ultimately successful. Melas, with the centre, twenty thousand strong, defeated Grenier at Savigliano, while Kray threw back their left through the valley of Suza to the foot of Mont Cenis. At the same time, the Republicans were equally unsuccessful in the valley of Aosta, where the united forces of Kray and Haddick expelled them successively from Ivrea and Aosta, and forced them to retire over the great St.-Bernard to Martigny (2). Relieved by these successes from all disquietude for his right flank, Melas gradually drew nearer to Coni, and began his preparations for the siege of that place.

Pressed by the reiterated orders of the Directory, Championnet now resolved to make an effort for the relief of Coni. His disposable force for this enterprise, even including the army of the Alps under Grenier, did not exceed forty-five thousand men; but by a vigorous concentric effort, there was some reason to hope that the object might be effected. St.-Cyr in vain represented to the Directory that it was the height of temerity to endeavour to maintain themselves in a mountainous region, already exhausted of its resources, and that the wiser course was to fall back, with the army yet entire, to the other side of the Alps, and there assemble in a central position. How clear soever may have been the justice of this opinion, they had not strength of mind sufficient to admit the loss of Italy in a single campaign; and the French general set himself bravely about the difficult task of maintaining himself, with an inferior and dispirited army, on the Italian side of the mountains (3).

With this view, the divisions of Victor and Lemoine, forming the centre of the army, sixteen thousand strong, were directed to move towards Mondovi; while St.-Cyr, with the right, received orders to descend the Bocchetta, and effect a diversion on the side of Novi. The movement commenced in the end of September. Vico was taken by a party of the Republicans; but, finding the Imperialists too strongly posted at Mondovi to be assailed with success, Championnet contented himself with placing his troops in observation on the adjacent heights, while St.-Cyr

(1) *Arch. Ch.* ii. 202, 203. *Arch.*

(2) *Arch. Ch.* ii. 202, 340. *Journ. N.* 318, 322. *Dum. N.* 262, 261. *St.-Cyr*, ii. 12, 15.

(3) *Dum. N.* 260, 261. *St.-Cyr*, ii. 15, 19.

gained a trifling advantage in the neighbourhood of Novi. But intelligence having at this time been received of the decisive victory of Masséna in Switzerland, more vigorous operations were undertaken. St.-Cyr,

abandoning the route of Novi, threw himself towards Bracco on the rear of the Austrians, and attacked them with such celerity, that he made two hundred prisoners, and spread consternation through their whole line. Melas, thus threatened, concentrated the forces under his immediate command, consisting of thirty thousand men, in the finest condition,

on the Stura; upon which a variety of affairs of post took place around Coni, with chequered success, which gradually consumed the strength of the Republican forces. There was an essential error in these measures on the part of Championnet; for the Imperialists, grouped around the fortress where they occupied a central position, could at pleasure accumulate masses sufficient to overwhelm any attack made by the Republicans, whose detached columns issuing from the mountains, and separated by a wide distance, were unable to render any effectual assistance to each other. Nevertheless, the abilities of St.-Cyr on the right wing obtained some brilliant advantages. On the 23d of October, he put himself in motion, at the head of twelve thousand men, with only a few pieces of cannon and no cavalry, and defeated the Austrians at Pozzolo-Formigaro, and occupied Marengo, taking three thousand prisoners and three pieces of cannon. Alarmed at these repeated successes on his left, Melas withdrew the division of Haddick from the valley of Aosta, where the possession of the fort of Bard and the fall of snow in the Great St.-Bernard, relieved him from all disquietude, and with that reinforcement strengthened his left wing on the Bormida (1).

Preparations for a decisive battle.

Meanwhile both parties gradually accumulated their forces for the important object which the one strove to effect, the other to prevent, the delivery of Coni. The French had assembled thirty-five thousand men for that purpose; but the central position of Melas long prevented him from obtaining any advantage; and in an attack of Grenier on the Austrian centre, he was repulsed with the loss of a thousand men. Having at length resolved on a decisive action, Championnet made his dispositions. One column was to descend from Mont-Cenis by the valley of Berouse; another to advance by the left of the Stura; and a third to assail the enemy in front. By this means the French general hoped that, while he engaged the centre of the Austrians in front he would, at the same time, turn both their flanks, forgetting that in such an attempt, with columns converging from such remote and divided quarters, the chances were that the Imperialists, in their central position, would be able to defeat one column before the others could arrive to its assistance (2).

Battle of Genola, in which the French are defeated.

Perceiving that the plan of his adversary was to attack him on all sides, Melas wisely resolved to anticipate his movements, and with his concentrated masses assailed one of the French divisions before the others could arrive to its assistance. By a rapid accumulation of troops he could, in this way, bring above thirty thousand men, of whom six thousand were cavalry, to bear on the French centre, under Victor, who could not assemble above sixteen thousand to resist them. His dispositions were rapidly and ably made, and, on the morning of the 4th November, the Republicans were attacked at all points. Championnet was so far from anticipating any such event, that his troops were already in motion to

(1) Dum. ii. 268, 273. Arch. Ch. ii. 312, 318. Jom. xli. 326, 335. St.-Cyr, ii. 26, 28.

(2) Arch. Ch. ii. 312, 313. Dum. ii. 273, 275. St.-Cyr, ii. 28, 29.

a junction with the right wing, under St.-Cyr; when they were compelled, by the sudden appearance of the Imperialists in battle array, to halt and look to their own defence. Assailed by greatly superior forces, Victor, notwithstanding, made a gallant defence; and such was the intrepidity of the French infantry, that for long the advantage seemed to lie on their side, until at noon, *de laas*, by bringing up fresh troops, succeeded in throwing them into confusion, and drove them back towards Valdigi. Hardly was this success gained when news arrived that General Duhesme, with the Republican left, had carried the village of Savigliano in his rear; but, wisely judging that this was of little importance, provided he followed up the advantage he had gained, the Austrian general merely detached a brigade to check their advance; and continued to press on the retiring centre of the enemy. Having continued the pursuit till it was dark, he resumed it at daybreak on the following morning. The enemy, discouraged by the check on the preceding day, did not make a very vigorous resistance. Grenier and Victor, driven from a post they had taken up near Murazzo, were forced to seek safety in flight; a large part of their rearguard were made prisoners, and great numbers drowned in endeavouring to cross the Stura, and regain their intrenched camp. In this decisive battle the loss of the Republicans was seven thousand men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, while that of the Imperialists did not exceed two thousand; and Championnet, with his army cut into two divisions, one of which retired towards Genoa, and the other to the Col-di Tende, was obliged to seek safety in the mountains, leaving Coni to its fate (1).

While Championnet was thus defeated in the centre by the superior skill and combinations of his opponent, the talents of St.-Cyr gave him an advantage on the Bormida. The Imperialists being there reduced to an equality with the Republicans, Kray attacked St.-Cyr near *di*, and drove him back to the plateau in the rear of that city, so lately the theatre of a bloody and desperate conflict; but all the efforts of the Austrians were shattered against the invincible resistance of the French infantry in that position, and, after a bloody conflict, they were forced to retire, leaving five pieces of artillery in the hands of the enemy. St.-Cyr upon this retook his position in front of Novi, and Kray fell back towards Alexandria, to seek assistance from the centre of the army. But this success was more than counterbalanced by fresh disasters in the centre and left. On the 10th, the division Ott attacked Richepanse at Borgo San-Dalmazzo, and, after a gallant resistance, drove him into the mountains; while the other division of the Republicans was assailed at Mondovì, and after an obstinate combat, which lasted the whole day, forced to take refuge in the recesses of the Apennines. The French were now thrown back, on the one side, to the foot of the Col di Tende, and in the valley of the Stura to their own frontiers; while on the other, Victor's division was perched on the summits of the Apennines at S.-Giacomo and S.-Bernardo. Nothing remained to interrupt the siege of Coni (2).

The investment of this fortress was completed on the 18th November, and the trenches opened on the 27th. The governor made a brave defence; but the ignorance and inexperience of the garrison were soon conspicuous, and a tremendous fire on the 2d of December having destroyed a part of the town, and seriously injured the works, he at length yielded to the solicitations of the miserable inhabitants, and, to preserve the city

Dec. 4. from total destruction, agreed to a surrender. The garrison, 3000 strong, with 500 sick and wounded, who had been left in the place, were marched into the interior of Austria (1).

Dec. 6. Gallant conduct of St.-Cyr in the Bocchetta Pass. Meanwhile St.-Cyr maintained himself with extreme difficulty in the Apennines in front of Genoa. The city was in the utmost state of agitation; famine began to be felt within its walls, and the French army, encamped on the higher ridges of the mountains, already suffered extremely from cold, want, and the tempests of autumn. For long their rations had been reduced to a fourth-part of their usual amount; but even this miserable pittance, it was foreseen, could not last many days longer. Encouraged by their pitiable condition, Kray made an attack on their advanced posts at Novi and Acqui, expelled them from those stations, forced the blockade of Gavi, and forced back the Republicans to their old position on the inhospitable summits of the mountains at the Bocchetta and Campo Freddo. Such was the panic which then seized the soldiers, that they could not be retained by their officers on that important pass, but, abandoning the intrenchments on its summit,—rushed down in tumultuous crowds to Genoa, exclaiming, “What can we do here? we shall soon perish of cold and famine on these desert mountains; we are abandoned, sacrificed: to France, France!” In this extremity, St.-Cyr presented himself at the gates of the city alone before the mutinous soldiery. “Whither do you fly, soldiers?” “To France, to France!” exclaimed a thousand voices.—“Be it so,” claimed he, with a calm voice and serene air; “if a sense of duty no longer retains you; if you are deaf to the voice of honour, listen at least to the reason, and attend to what your own interest requires. Your ruin is certain if you persist in your present course; the enemy who pursues you will destroy you during the confusion of a tumultuous retreat. Have you forgotten that you have made a desert between your present position and France? No, your sole safety is in your bayonets; and if you indeed desire to reach your country, unite with me in repelling far from the gates of this happy city the enemy, who would take advantage of your disorder to drive you from the walls where alone the necessary convoys or security can be found.” Roused by these words to a sense of their duty, the soldiers fell back into their ranks and loudly demanded to be led against the enemy (2).

Unsuccessful attempt of the Imperialists upon Genoa, who go into winter quarters. It was high time that some steps should be taken to arrest the progress of the Imperialists; for they were now at the gates of Genoa, and threatened the Republicans with immediate destruction. The Austrians, under Klenau, had penetrated by the route of Corniche as far as St.-Martin d'Albaro and Nervi, within sight of that city; while from the Bocchetta another column threatened to descend upon it. A heavy fall of snow, however, having prevented the Imperialists from crossing the pass when it was deserted by the French, the rebellious troops resumed their positions, and reoccupied the intrenchments. St.-Cyr, now secure on that side, having turned all his forces against Klenau, the Austrians, assailed at once on front and flank, with difficulty cut their way through by Torriglio, and regained the banks of the Stura, leaving two hundred prisoners in the hands of the enemy, where they soon after went into winter quarters (3). Returned to Genoa, St.-Cyr had still a difficult task to perform in quieting the discontents of the troops, whom long confinement

(1) *Dum.* ii. 304, 308. *Jom.* xii. 254. *Arch. Ch.* ii. 323.

(2) *Dum.* ii. 297, 298. *St.-Cyr*, ii. 68, 74. *Hard.* vii. 321.

(3) *Jom.* xii. 355, 356. *Arch. Ch.* ii. 324. *Dum.* ii. 300, 302. *St.-Cyr*, ii. 76-84; 87, 88. *Hard.* vii. 321.

privation had almost driven to desperation; but at length the long wished-for sails whitened its splendid bay, and the Republicans, as the reward of their heroic exertions, tasted the enjoyment of plenty and repose.

While these great events were passing in the basin of Piedmont, operations of minor importance, but still conducive, upon the whole, to the expulsion of the French from the peninsula, took place in the south of Italy. The castle of St.-Angelo surrendered, in the end of October, to the Neapolitan forces, whom the retreat of Macdonald left at liberty to advance to the Eternal City; and the garrison of Ancona, after a gallant defence of six weeks, four of which were with open trenches, capitulated on the 13th November to the Russians, on condition of being sent to France, and not serving till regularly exchanged. By this success the Allies were made masters of 585 pieces of cannon, 7000 muskets, three ships of the line, and seven smaller vessels. The whole peninsula of Italy, with the exception of the entrenched camp at Genoa, and the mountain roads leading to it from France, was now wrested from the Republican arms (1).

The fall of Ancona terminated this campaign in Italy, the most disastrous ever experienced by the French in that country. In the respective positions which they occupied might be seen the immense advantages gained by the Allied arms during its continuance. The Imperialists, whose headquarters were at Turin, occupied the whole plain of Lombardy and Piedmont, from the stream of the Trebbia to the torrent of the Ticino, the left, under Kray, being so cantoned as to cover the valleys of the Bormida and Scrivia; the right, under Haddick and Rohan, occupying the valleys of Domo d'Ossola and Aosta; and the centre, under Kaim, guarding the passes over the Alps and the important position of Mondovì. The Republicans, on the other hand, on the exterior of this immense circle, occupied the snowy summits of the mountains, which stood the native guardians of the plain; the left, consisting of the divisions Grenier and Duhesme, occupying the Little St.-Bernard, the Mont Cenis, and the passes of the higher Alps; the centre, under Lemoine and Victor, the Col de Fenestrelles, and the passes of the Maritime Alps: while on the right, Labois and Watrin held the Bocchetta and other passes leading into the Genoese states (2).

Wider still was the difference between the comforts and resources of the two armies. Cantoned in the rich plains of Italy, on the banks of the Po, the Imperialists were amply supplied with all the comforts and luxuries of life; while its navigable waters incessantly brought up to the army the stores and supplies necessary to restore the losses of so active a campaign. On the side of the Republicans, again, thirty-eight thousand men, without magazines, or stores of provisions, were stationed on the desolate summits of the Alps and the Apennines, shivering with cold, exhausted with fatigue, and almost destitute of clothing. For five months, they had received hardly any pay; the soldiers were without cloaks; their shoes were worn out, and wood was even wanting to warm their frigid bivouacs. Overwhelmed with the horrors of his situation, Championnet retired to Nice, where he died of an epidemic disorder, which soon broke out among the troops and swept off great multitudes; and death dissolved the small remnants of discipline which remained in the army. The soldiers tumultuously broke up their cantonments; crowds of de-

(1) *Jom.* xii. 350, 361. *Arch. Ch.* ii. 326.

(2) *Jom.* xii. 363, 365. *Arch. Ch.* ii. 327, 329. *Dum.* ii. 307, 311.



serters left their colours and covered the roads to France, and it was only by one of those nervous flights of eloquence which touch, even in the greatest calamities, every generous heart, that St.-Cyr succeeded in stopping the return of a large body which had left Genoa, and was proceeding on the road to Provence. Alarmed at the representations which he drew of the disastrous state of the army, the government, which had now passed from the feeble hands of the Directory into the firm grasp of Napoléon, took the most active steps to administer relief; several convoys reached the troops, and Masséna, sent to assume the supreme command, succeeded, in some degree, in stopping the torrent of desertion and restoring the confidence of the army (1).

Jealousy between the Russians and Austrians.

At the same time, the campaign on the Rhine was drawing to a close. Notwithstanding the brilliant successes of the Republicans at Zurich, their forces in that quarter were not so numerous as to enable them, in the first instance, to derive any considerable fruit from their victory. But no sooner were they relieved, by the failure of the expedition in North Holland, from all apprehension in that quarter, than they resolved to concentrate all their disposable force on the Lower Rhine, of which the command was given to General Lecourbe, who had been so distinguished in the mountain warfare of Switzerland. But that which the strength of the Republicans could not effect, the dissensions of their enemies were not long in producing. The Russians and Austrians mutually threw upon each other the late disasters; the latter alleging that the catastrophe at Zurich was owing to the want of vigilance and skill in Korsakow; and the former replying, that if Suwarrow had been supported by Hotze, as he had a right to expect, when he descended from the St.-Gothard, all the misfortunes of the centre would have been repaired, and a brilliant victory on his right wing dispossessed Masséna from his defensive position on the line of the Limmat. In this temper of mind on both sides, and with the jealousy unavoidable between cabinets of equal power and rival pretensions, little was wanting to blow up the combustion into a flame. A trivial incident soon produced the effect. Suwarrow, after he had rested and reorganized his army, proposed to the Archduke that they should resume offensive operations against the enemy, who had shown no disposition to follow up the successes at Zurich. His plan was to abandon the Grisons, blow up the works of Fort St.-Lucie, and advance with all his forces to Wintherthur, where he was to form a junction with Korsakow, and attack the enemy in concert with the Imperialists. The Arch-

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duke apprehended with too much reason that the assembling of all the Russian troops on the banks of the Thur, in the centre of the enemy's line, which extended from Sargans to the junction of the Aar and Rhine, would be both difficult and perilous; and therefore he proposed instead

Suwarrow retires into Bavaria.

that the corps of Korsakow should march by Stockach to join the marshal behind the lake of Constance, and that he himself should detach a strong Austrian column to second the operations of the Russians in

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Switzerland. Irritated at any alteration of his plans by a younger officer, the old marshal, already soured by the disastrous termination of the campaign in Switzerland, replied in angry terms, on the following day, that his troops were not adapted for any farther operations in the mountains, and that he himself would march to join Korsakow, and concert measures with

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him for the projected operations in Switzerland (2). On the follow-

(1) Dum. ii. 310, 311. Jom. xli. 363, 365. Arch. Ch. ii. 327, 329. St.-Cyr, ii. 98, 100.

(2) This letter Suwarrow terminated with the following expressions:—"I am a field-marshal at



ing day, however, he changed his resolution; for, declaring that his troops absolutely required repose, and that they could find it only at a distance from the theatre of war, he directed them to winter quarters in Bavaria, between the Lech and the Iller, where they were soon after joined by the artillery which had come round by Verona and the Tyrol (1).

Which leads to a rupture between the cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg. This secession of the Russian force was not produced merely by jealousy of the Austrians, or irritation at the ill success of the Allied arms in Switzerland. It had its origin also in motives of state policy, and as such was rapidly communicated from the field-marshal's headquarters to the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg. The alliance between Russia and Austria, even if it had not been dissolved by the mutual exasperation of their generals, must have speedily yielded to the inherent jealousy of two monarchies, equal in power and discordant in interest. The war was undertaken for objects which, at that time at least, appeared to be foreign to the immediate interests of Russia; the danger to the balance of power by the preponderance of France seemed to be removed by the conquest of Italy, and the further successes of Austria, it was said, were only likely to weaken a power too far removed to be of any serious detriment to its influence, in order to enrich one much nearer, and from whom serious resistance to its ambition might be expected. The efforts for the preceding campaign, moreover, had been extremely costly, and in a great degree, notwithstanding the English subsidies, had exhausted the Imperial treasury. In these circumstances, the exasperation of the generals speedily led to a rupture between the cabinets, and the Russian troops took no further share in the prosecution of the war (2).

Left to its own resources, however, the Austrian cabinet was far from being discouraged. The Archduke Charles had collected eighty thousand men between Offenburg and Feldkirch; but great as this force was, it hardly appeared adequate, after the departure of the Russians, to a renewal of active operations in the Alps, and therefore he kept his troops on the defensive. Masséna, on his side in Switzerland, was too much exhausted by his preceding exertions to make any offensive movement. On the other hand, Lecourbe, whose forces on the Lower Rhine had been raised by the efforts of the Directory to twenty thousand men, passed that river in three columns, at Worms, Oppenheim, and Mayence, and moved forward against Prince Schwartzberg, who commanded the advanced guard of the right wing of the Austrians, which occupied the line of the Bergstrass from Frankfort to Darmstadt. As the French forces were greatly superior, the Austrian general was compelled to retire, and after evacuating Heidelberg and Mannheim, to concentrate his troops to Philipshurg, which, however, he was soon obliged to abandon to its own resources. The Archduke, though grievously embarrassed at the moment by the rupture with the Russians, turned his eyes to the menaced point, and, by rapidly causing reinforcements to defile in that direction, soon acquired a superiority over his assailant. The Republican advanced-guard was attacked and worsted at Erligheim; in consequence of which the blockade of Philipshurg was raised; but the French having again been reinforced,

as you; commander, as well as you, of an Imperial army; old, while you are young; it is for you to come and seek me." He was so profoundly afflicted with the defeat of the Russians at Zurich, that, when he reached his winter quarters, he took to bed, and became seriously ill; while the Emperor Paul gave vent to his indignation against the Aus-

trians in an angry article published in the Gazette of St.-Petersburg.—Haas, vii 297, 298.

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 272, 274, 284, 285. Jom. xii. 367, 379.

(2) Jom. xii. 370, 371. Arch. Ch. ii. 272, 274. Dum. ii. 317.

it was again invested. The Archduke, however, having at length terminated  
 Nov. 7. his correspondence with Suwarrow, turned his undivided attention  
 to the menaced quarter, and directed a large part of the Imperial army to  
 Dec. 2. reinforce his right. These columns soon overthrew the Republicans,  
 and Lecourbe was placed in a situation of such danger, that he had no means  
 of extricating himself from it but by proposing an armistice to Starray, who  
 commanded the Imperialists, on the ground of negotiations being on-  
 foot between the two powers for peace. Starray accepted it, under a reservation  
 of the approbation of the Archduke; but his refusal to ratify it was of no  
 avail; in the interval the stratagem had succeeded; three days had been  
 gained, during which the Republicans had leisure to desile without molesta-  
 tion over the Rhine (1).

Reflections on the vast successes gained by the Allies in the campaign. This closed the campaign of 1799, one of the most memorable of the whole revolutionary war. Notwithstanding the disasters by which its latter part had been chequered, it was evident that the Allies had gained immensely by the results of their operations. Italy had been regained as rapidly as it had been won; Germany, freed from the Republican forces, had rolled back to the Rhine the tide of foreign invasion; and the blood of two hundred thousand French soldiers had expiated the ambition and weakness of the Republican government. Not even in the glorious efforts of 1796, had the French achieved successes so important, chained victory to their standards in such an unbroken succession of combats. The conquest of all Lombardy and Piedmont; the reduction of the great treasures which it contained; the liberation of Naples, Rome, and Tuscany, were the fruits of a single campaign. Instead of a cautious offensive on the Adriatic, the Imperialists now assumed a menacing offensive on the Maritime Alps. Instead of trembling for the Tyrol and the Hereditary States, they threatened Switzerland and Alsace. The Republicans, weakened and disheartened, were every where thrown back upon their own frontiers; the oppressive system of making war maintain war could no longer be carried on; and a revolutionary state, exhausted by the sacrifices of nine years, was about to feel in its own territory a portion of the evils which it had so long inflicted upon others.

Deplorable internal situation of the Republic. The internal situation of France was even more discouraging than might have been inferred from the external aspect of its affairs. In truth, it was there that the true secret of their reverses was to be found; the bravery and skill of the armies on the frontier had long concealed, but could no longer singly sustain, the internal weakness of the state. The prostration of strength which invariably succeeds the first burst of revolutionary convulsions, had now fallen upon France; and if an extraordinary combination of circumstances had not intervened to extricate her from the abyss, there can be no doubt she would have sunk for ever. The ardour of the Revolution had totally subsided. Distrust and despondency had succeeded to the enthusiasm of victory; instead of the patriotism of generous, had arisen the cupidity of selfish minds. "The radical vice," says General Mathieu Dumas, "of a government without a chief was now apparent; the courage and talents of the generals, the valour and intelligence of the soldiers, who, during this dreadful campaign, had sustained this monstrous species of authority, sapped by every species of abuse and the exhaustion arising from the excess of every passion, could no longer repair or conceal the faults of those at the head of affairs. Public spirit was extinguished; the resources of the interior exhausted; the forced requisitions could no longer furnish supplies."

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 292, 305. Jom. xii. 375, 385. Dum. ii. 332, 348.

plies to assuage the misery of the soldiers; the veteran ranks had long since perished, and the young conscripts, destined to supply their place, deserted their standards in crowds, or concealed themselves to avoid being drawn; more than half the cavalry was dismounted; the state in greater danger than it had ever been since the commencement of the war (1). The losses sustained by the French during the campaign had been prodigious; they amounted to above a hundred and seventy thousand men, exclusive of those who had been cut off by sickness and fatigue (2). In these circumstances, nothing was wanting to have enabled the coalition to triumph over the exhausted and discordant population of France, but union, decision, and a leader of paramount authority; nothing could have saved the Republicans from their grasp but their own divisions. These were not slow, however, in breaking out; and, amidst the ruinous jealousies of the Allies, that mighty conqueror arose, who was destined to stifle the democracy and tame the passions of France, and bring upon her guilty people a weight of moral retribution, which could never have been inflicted till the latent energies of Europe had been called forth by his ambition.

Causes of the rupture of the Alliance. "The alliance between Austria and Russia," says the Archduke Charles, "blew up, like most coalitions formed between powers of equal pretensions. The idea of a common interest, the illusion of confidence based on the same general views, prepares the first advances; difference of opinion as to the means of attaining the desired objects, soon sows the seeds of misunderstanding; and that envenomed feeling increases in proportion as the events of the war alter the views of the coalesced powers, change their plans, and undeceive their hopes. It seldom fails to break out when the armies are destined to undertake any operation in concert. The natural desire to obtain the lead in command, as in glory, excites the rival passions both of chiefs and nations. Pride and jealousy, tenacity and presumption, spring from the conflict of opinion and ambition; continual contradictions daily inflame the mutual exasperation, and nothing but a fortunate accident can prevent such a coalition from being dissolved before one of the parties is inclined to turn his arms against the other. In all the varieties of human events, there are but two in which the co-operation of such unwieldy and heterogeneous masses can produce great effects; the one is, when an imperious necessity, and an insupportable state of oppression, induces both sovereigns and their subjects to take up arms to emancipate themselves, and the struggle is not of sufficient duration to allow the ardour of their first enthusiasm to cool; the other, when a state, by an extraordinary increase of power, can arrogate to itself and sustain the right to rule the opinion of its allies, and make their jealousies bend to its determination. Experience has proved that these different kinds of coalitions produce different results: almost all oppressive conquerors have been overthrown by the first; the second has been the chief instrument in the enthralment of nations (3)." In these profound remarks is to be found the secret both of the long disasters attending the coalition against France, of the steady rise and irresistible power of the alliance headed by Napoléon, and of his rapid and irretrievable overthrow. They should never be absent from the contemplation of the statesman in future times, either in estimating the probable result of coalitions of which his own country forms a part; or in calculating on the chances of its resisting those which may be formed for its subjugation (4).

(1) Dum. ii. 335.

(2) See "Etat des Postes de l'Armée Française en 1799." Hist. vii. 473.

(3) Arch. Ch. ii. 273.

(4) With regret, the author must now bid adieu to the Memoirs of the Archduke Charles, so long

Comparison  
of the pas-  
sage of the  
St.-Gothard  
by Suwar-  
row, and the  
St.-Bernard  
by Napoléon.

The passage of the St.-Bernard by Napoléon, has been the subject of unmeasured eulogium by almost all the French historians; but nevertheless, in the firmness with which it was conducted, the difficulties with which it had to contend, and the resolution displayed in its execution, it must yield to the Alpine campaign of the Russian hero. In crossing from Martigny to Ivrea, the first-consul had no enemies to overcome, no lakes to pass, no hostile army to vanquish, after the obstacles of nature had been surmounted; the difficulty of the ascent and the roughness of the road constituted the only serious impediments to the march; but, in passing from Bellinzona to Altdorf by the St.-Gothard, Suwarrow had to encounter not merely a road of greater length and equal difficulty, but to force his way, sword in hand, through columns of the enemy, long trained to mountain warfare, intimately acquainted with the country, under a leader of pre-eminent skill in that species of tactics; and to do this with troops as ignorant of Alpine geography as those of France would have been of the passes of the Caucasus. When he descended, like a mountain torrent, to Altdorf, overthrowing every thing in his course, he found his progress stopped by a lake, without roads on its sides, or a bark on its bosom, and received the intelligence of the total defeat of the army with which he came to co-operate under the walls of Zürich. Obligated to defile by the rugged paths of the Schenthal to the canton of Glarus, he found himself enveloped by the victorious columns of the enemy, and his front and rear assailed at the same time by superior forces, flushed by recent conquest. It was no ordinary resolution which in such circumstances could disdain to submit, and after fiercely turning on his pursuers, and routing their bravest troops, prepare to surmount the difficulties of a fresh mountain passage, and, amidst the horrors of the Alps of Glarus, brave alike the storms of winter and the pursuit of the enemy. The bulk of men in all ages are governed by the event; and to such persons the passage of the St.-Bernard, followed as it was by the triumph of Marengo, will always be the highest object of interest; but, without detracting from the well-earned fame of the French general, it may safely be affirmed that those who know how to separate just combination from casual disaster, and can appreciate the heroism of valour when struggling with misfortune, will award a still higher place to the Russian hero, and follow the footsteps of Suwarrow over the snows of the St.-Gothard and the valley of Engi with more interest than either the eagles of Napoléon over the St.-Bernard, or the standards of Hannibal from the shores of the Rhone to the banks of the Po.

The expedition to Holland was ably conceived, and failed only from the inadequacy of the force employed, and the inherent weakness incident to

the faithful guide in the German campaigns, as his invaluable annals do not come further down than the close of the campaign of 1799. Military history has few more remarkable works of which to boast. Luminous, sagacious, disinterested, severe in judging of himself, indulgent in criticising the conduct of others; liberal of praise to all but his own great achievements, profoundly skilled in the military art, and gifted with no common powers of narrative and description, his work is a model of candid and able military disquisition. Less vehement and forcible than Napoléon, he is more circumspect and consistent; with far inferior genius, he is distinguished by infinitely greater candour, generosity, and trustworthiness. On a fact stated by the Archduke, whether favourable or adverse to his reputation, or a criticism made by him on others, the most perfect reliance may be placed. To a similar statement in the St.-Helena Memoirs implicit credit

cannot be given, unless its veracity is supported by other testimony, or it is borne out, as is often the case, by its own self-evident justice and truth. In the Memoirs of these two great antagonists may be seen, as in a mirror, the opposite principles and talents brought into collision during the revolutionary war; on the one side, methodical judgment, candour, and honesty, without the energy requisite to command early advantage in the struggle; on the other, genius, vigour, invention, but none of the moral qualities essential to confer lasting success. Or, perhaps, a more profound or fanciful observer may trace in the German chief the fairest specimens of the great and good qualities which, in every age, have been the characteristic of the blue-eyed children of the Gothic race; in the French, the most brilliant assemblage that ever occurred of the mental powers of the dark-haired Celtic family of mankind.

Deplorable  
insignifi-  
cance of the  
part which  
England  
took in the  
continental  
struggle.

an enterprise conducted by allied forces. It was the greatest ar-  
mament which had been sent from Great Britain during the war,  
but yet obviously inadequate, both to the magnitude of the enter-  
prise and the resources of the state mainly interested in its success.

In truth, the annals of the earlier years of the war incessantly sug-  
gest regret at the parsimonious expenditure of British force, and the great  
results which, to all appearance, would have attended a more vigorous effort  
at the decisive moment. "Any person," says Mr. Burke, "who was of age to  
take a part in public affairs forty years ago, if the intermediate space were  
expunged from his memory, would hardly credit his senses when he should  
hear, from the highest authority, that an army of two hundred thousand men  
was kept up in this island, and that in Ireland there were at least eighty thou-  
sand more. But how much greater would be his surprise, if he were told again  
that this mighty force was kept up for the mere purpose of an inert and pas-  
sive defence, and that, by its very constitution, the greater part was disabled  
from defending us against the enemy by one preventive stroke or one opera-  
tion of active hostility! What must his reflections be on learning further,  
that a fleet of five hundred men-of-war, the best appointed that this country  
ever had upon the sea, was for the greater part employed in the same system  
of unenterprising defence? What must be the feelings of any one who re-  
members the former energy of England, when he is given to understand  
that these two islands, with their extensive sea-coast, should be considered  
as a garrisoned sea-town; that its garrison was so feebly commanded as never  
to make a sally; and that, contrary to all that has been hitherto seen in war,  
an inferior army, with the shattered relics of an almost annihilated navy,  
may with safety besiege this superior garrison, and, without hazarding the  
life of a man, ruin the place merely by the menaces and false appearances of  
an attack (1)?"

If this was true in 1797, when the indignant statesman wrote these cutting  
remarks, how much more was it applicable in 1799, when France was reduced  
to extremities by the forces of Austria and Russia, and the extraordinary  
energy of the Revolution had exhausted itself? The Archduke Charles, in-  
deed, has justly observed, that modern history presents few examples of great  
military operations executed in pursuance of a descent on the sea-coast; and  
that the difficulties of the passage and the uncertainty of the elements, pre-  
sent the most formidable obstacles in the way of the employment of consider-  
able forces in such an enterprise (2); but experience in all ages has demon-  
strated that they are not insurmountable, and that from a military force, thus  
supported, the greatest results may reasonably be expected, if sufficient  
energy is infused into the undertaking. The examples of the overthrow of  
Hannibal at Zama, of the English at Hastings, of the French at Cressy and  
Azincourt, and of Napoléon in Spain and at Waterloo, prove what can be  
effected, even by a maritime expedition, if followed up with the requisite vi-  
gour. And, unquestionably, there never was an occasion when greater results  
might have been anticipated from such an exertion than in this campaign.  
Had sixty thousand native English, constantly fed by fresh supplies from the  
parent state, been sent to Holland, they would have borne down all opposi-  
tion, hoisted the Orange flag on all the fortresses of the United Provinces, libe-  
rated Flanders, prevented the accumulation of force which enabled Masséna  
to strike his redoubled blows at Zurich, hindered the formation of the army  
of reserve, and intercepted the thunder of Marengo and Hohenlinden.

(1) Burke on a Regicide Peace, Works, viii. 374.

(2) Arch: Ch: ii. 165.



Cause of the  
rapid fall of  
the French  
power in  
1799.

The rapid fall of the French military power in 1799, was the natural result of the sudden extension of the frontiers of the Republic beyond its strength, and affords another example of the truth of the maxim, that the more the ambition of a nation in a state of fermentation leads to its extension, the more does it become difficult for it to preserve its conquests (1). Such a state as France then was, with a military power extending from the mouth of the Ems to the shores of Calabria, and no solid foundation for government but the gratification of ambition, has no chance of safety but in constantly advancing to fresh conquests. The least reverse, by destroying the charm of its invincibility, and compelling the separation of its armies to garrison its numerous fortresses, leaves it weak and powerless in the field, and speedily dissolves the splendid fabric. This truth was experienced by the Directory in 1799; it was evinced on a still greater scale, and after still more splendid triumphs, by Napoléon in 1813. It is power slowly acquired and wisely consolidated, authority which brings the blessings of civilisation and protection with its growth, victories which array the forces of the vanquished states in willing and organized multitudes under the standards of the victor, which alone are durable. Such were the conquests of Rome in the ancient world, such are the conquests of Russia in Europe, and England in India, in modern times. The whirlwinds of an Alexander, a Timour, or a Napoléon, are in general as short-lived as the genius which creates them. The triumphs flowing from the transient ebullition of popular enthusiasm sink with the decay of the passion from which they spring. Nothing is durable in nature but what has arisen by slow degrees; nothing in the end obtains the mastery of nations but the power which protects and blesses them.

(1) Rom. xii. 886.



## CHAPTER XXX.

FROM THE ACCESSION OF NAPOLEON TO THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO.

NOVEMBER, 1799—MAY, 1800.

## ARGUMENT.

Napoleon's Letter, proposing Peace to the British Government—Lord Grenville's Answer—M. Talleyrand's Reply—Debates on this Proposal in Parliament—Arguments of the Opposition for an immediate Peace—And of Mr. Pitt and the Government for refusing to treat—Parliament resolve to continue the Contest—Reflections on this Decision of the Legislature—Supplies voted by the British Parliament—Land and Sea forces employed—Mr. Dundas's India Budget—The Union with Ireland passes the Parliaments of Great Britain and Ireland—Its leading Provisions—Views of the Leaders on both sides of Parliament on this great Change—Great Prosperity of the British Empire at this period—Vast Change of Prices—Statistical Details—Bad Harvest of 1799, and consequent Scarcity in 1800—Great efforts of Government to relieve it, and noble patience of the people—Measures of England and Austria for the Prosecution of the War—Treaties entered into for that purpose with Austria and Bavaria—Military Preparations of the Imperialists—Discontented state of the French affiliated Republics—Measures of Napoleon to restore Public Credit in France—Pacification of la Vendée—Iniquitous Execution of Count Louis Frotte—Napoleon effects a Reconciliation with the Emperor Paul—His energetic Military Measures—Revival of the Military Spirit in France—His steps to suppress the Revolutionary Fervour of the People—He totally extinguishes the Liberty of the Press—And fixes his Residence at the Tuileries—Commencement of the Etiquette and Splendour of the Court there—Recall of many Exiles banished since the 18th Fructidor—Establishment of the Secret Police—Napoleon's hypocritical *éloge* on Washington—Comparison of his system of government with that established by Constantine in the Byzantine empire—Commencement of his great designs for Architectural Embellishment at Paris—Suppression of the *fête* on 21st January, and elevation of Tronchet—Correspondence between Napoleon and Louis XVIII—General improvement in the Prospects of France.

The first step of Napoleon, upon arriving at the consular throne, was to make proposals of peace to the British government. The debate on that subject in Parliament is the most important that occurred during the war, and forms the true introduction to the political history of Europe during the nineteenth century.

Dec. 25.  
1799. The letter of Napoleon to the King of England, couched in his usual characteristic language, was in these terms: "Called by the wishes of the French nation to occupy the first station in the Republic, I think it proper on entering into office to make a direct communication to your Majesty.

Napoleon's letter proposing peace to the British government. "The war which for eight years has ravaged the four quarters of the globe, is it destined to be eternal? Are there no means of coming to an understanding? How can the two most enlightened nations of Europe, powerful and strong beyond what their independence and safety requires, sacrifice to ideas of vain greatness the benefits of commerce, prosperity, and domestic happiness? How has it happened that they do not feel that peace is of the first necessity as well as the truest glory? "These sentiments cannot be foreign to the heart of your Majesty, who reign over a free nation with the sole desire of rendering it happy. You will see in this overture only the effect of a sincere desire to contribute efficaciously, for the second time, to a general pacification, by a step speedy, implying confidence, and disengaged from those forms which, however neces-

sary to disguise the dependence of feeble states, prove only in those which are strong the mutual desire of deceiving each other.

“France and England may, by the abuse of their strength still for a time, to the misfortune of nations, retard the period of their exhaustion; but I will venture to say, the fate of all civilized nations is attached to the termination of a war which involves the whole world.”

Lord Grenville's answer.

To this letter the following answer was returned by Lord Grenville, the English minister of foreign affairs:—“The King has given frequent proofs of his sincere desire for the re-establishment of secure and permanent tranquillity in Europe. He neither is, nor has been, engaged in any contest for a vain and false glory. He has had no other view than that of maintaining against all aggression the rights and happiness of his subjects. For these he has contended against an unprovoked attack; and for the same objects he is still obliged to contend: Nor can he hope that this necessity could be removed by entering at the present moment into a negotiation with those whom a fresh revolution has so recently placed in the exercise of power in France; since no real advantage can arise from such negotiation to the great and desirable object of a general peace, until it shall distinctly appear that those causes have ceased to operate which originally produced the war, and by which it has been since protracted, and in more than one instance renewed. The same system, to the prevalence of which France justly ascribes all her present miseries, is that which has also involved the rest of Europe in a long and destructive warfare, of a nature long since unknown to the practice of civilized nations.

“For the extension of this system, and for the extermination of all established governments, the resources of France have, from year to year, and in the midst of the most unparalleled distress, been lavished and exhausted. To this indiscriminate spirit of destruction, the Netherlands, the United Provinces, the Swiss Cantons, his Majesty's ancient allies, have been successively sacrificed. Germany has been ravaged; and Italy, though now rescued from its invaders, has been made the scene of unbounded rapine and anarchy. His Majesty himself has been compelled to maintain an arduous and burdensome contest for the independence and existence of his kingdoms.

“While such a system continues to prevail, and while the blood and treasure of a numerous and powerful nation can be lavished in its support, experience has shown that no defence but that of open and steady hostility can be availing. The most solemn treaties have only prepared the way for fresh aggression; and it is to a determined resistance alone that is now due whatever remains in Europe of security for property, personal liberty, social order, or religious freedom. For the security, therefore, of these essential objects, his Majesty cannot place his reliance on the mere renewal of general professions of pacific dispositions. Such dispositions have been repeatedly held out by all those who have successively directed the resources of France to the destruction of Europe; and whom the present rulers have declared to have been, from the beginning and uniformly, incapable of maintaining the relations of peace and amity.

“Greatly indeed will his Majesty rejoice if it shall appear that the dangers to which his own dominions and those of his allies have so long been exposed have really ceased: whenever he shall be satisfied that the necessity for resistance is at an end; that, after the experience of so many years of crime and miseries, better principles have ultimately prevailed in France; and that all the gigantic projects of ambition, and all the restless schemes of destruction which have endangered the very existence of civil society, have at length

been finally relinquished. But the conviction of such a change, however agreeable to his Majesty's wishes, can result only from experience and the evidence of facts.

"The best and most natural pledge of its reality and permanence would be the restoration of that line of princes, which for so many centuries maintained the French nation in prosperity at home and consideration and respect abroad. Such an event would at once have removed, and will at any time remove, all obstacles in the way of negotiation or peace. It would confirm to France the unmolested enjoyment of its ancient territory; and it would give to all the other nations in Europe, in tranquillity and peace, that security which they are now compelled to seek by other means. But desirable as such an event must be, both to France and the world, it is not to this mode exclusively that his Majesty limits the possibility of secure and solid pacification. His Majesty makes no claim to prescribe to France what shall be the form of her government, or in whose hands she shall vest the authority necessary for conducting the affairs of a great and powerful nation. He looks only to the security of his own dominions and those of his Allies, and to the general safety of Europe. Whenever he shall judge that such security can in any manner be attained, as resulting either from the internal situation of the country from whose internal situation the danger has arisen, or from such other circumstances, of whatever nature, as may produce the same end, his Majesty will eagerly embrace the opportunity to concert with his Allies the means of a general pacification (1). Unhappily no such security hitherto exists; no sufficient evidence of the principles by which the new government will be directed; no reasonable ground by which to judge of its stability (2)."

These able state papers are not only valuable as exhibiting the arguments

(1) *Parl. Hist.* xxxiv. 1799.

(2) To this it was replied by M. Talleyrand, the French minister for foreign affairs:—"Very far from France having provoked the war, she had, it must be recollected, from the very commencement of the Revolution, solemnly proclaimed her love of peace, her disinclination for conquests, her respect for the independence of all governments; and it is not to be doubted that, occupied at that time entirely with her own internal affairs, she would have avoided taking any part in those of Europe, and would have remained faithful to her declarations.

"But from an opposite disposition, as soon as the French Revolution had broken out, almost all Europe entered into a league for its destruction. The aggression was real, long before it was public; internal resistance was excited, its opponents were universally received, their extravagant declamations were supported, the French nation was insulted in the person of its agents, and England set, particularly, this example, by the dismissal of the minister accredited by her; finally, France was, in fact, attacked in her independence, and her honour, and in her safety, long before war was declared.

"Thus it is to the projects of dismemberment, degradation, and dissolution, which were prepared against her, and the execution of which was several times attempted and pursued, that France has a right to impute the evils which she has suffered, and those which have afflicted Europe. Such project for a long time, without example with respect to a powerful nation, could not fail to bring on the most fatal consequences. Assailed on all sides, the Republic could not but extend universally the efforts of her defence, and it is only for the maintenance of her own independence that she has made use of those means which she possessed in her own strength and the courage of her citizens. As long as she saw that her enemies obstinately refused to

recognise her rights, she counted only upon the energy of her resistance, but as soon as they were obliged to abandon the hope of invasion, she sought for means of conciliation, and manifested pacific intentions; and if these have not always been efficacious; if, in the midst of the critical circumstances of her internal situation, which the Revolution and the war have successively brought on, the former depositaries of the executive power in France have not always shown as much moderation as the nation itself has shown courage, it must, above all, be imputed to the fatal and persevering animosity with which the resources of England have been lavished to accomplish the ruin of France.

"But if the wishes of his Britannic Majesty, in conformity with his assurances, are in unison with those of the French Republic for the re-establishment of peace, why, instead of attempting the apology of the war, should not attention be paid to the means of terminating it? The First Consul of the French Republic cannot doubt that his Britannic Majesty must recognise the right of nations to choose the form of their government, since it is from the exercise of this right that he holds his crown; but he cannot comprehend how, after admitting this fundamental principle, upon which rests the existence of political societies, he could annex insinuations which tend to an interference in the internal affairs of the Republic, and which are not less injurious to the French nation and its government, than it would be to England and his Majesty. If a sort of invitation were held out in favour of that Republican form of government, of which England adopted the forms about the middle of the last century, or an exhortation to recall to the throne that family whom their birth had placed there, and whom a Revolution had compelled to descend from it. [*Parl. Hist.* xxxiv. 1199, 1202.]

Jan. 14.

1800.

Mr. Talley-

rand's reply.

advanced by the opposite parties in this memorable contest, but as containing an explicit and important declaration of the object uniformly pursued by Great Britain throughout its continuance. The English ministry never claimed a right to interfere in the internal affairs of France, or dictate to her inhabitants the form of government or race of sovereigns they were to choose; the object of the war is there expressly declared to have been, what it always was, defensive. It was undertaken, not to impose a government upon France, but to prevent its imposing one upon other nations; not to partition, or circumscribe its territory, but oppose a barrier to the inundation of infidel and democratical principles, by which the Republic first shook the opinions of the multitude in all the adjoining states, and then, having divided their inhabitants, overthrew their independence. The restoration of the Bourbons was held forth as the mode most likely to remove these dangers; but by no means as an indispensable preliminary to a general pacification, if adequate security against them could in any other way be obtained. Of the reality of the peril, the existence of the Batavian, Ligurian, Cisalpine, Helvetian, Roman, and Parthenopean republics, most of whom had been revolutionized in a state of profound peace, afforded ample evidence; and it was one which increased rapidly during any interval of hostilities, because it was then that the point of the wedge was most readily inserted by the revolutionary propagandists into an unsuspecting people.

Debates on  
this propo-  
sal in Par-  
liament.

The debates, however, which followed in both Houses of Parliament on this momentous subject, were still more important, as unfolding the real views of the contending parties, and forming the true key to the grounds on which it was thereafter rested on both sides.

On the part of the Opposition, it was urged by Mr. Fox and Mr. Erskine, "that now was the first time when the house were assembled in a new epoch of the war; that, without annexing any epithet to it, or adverting to its unparalleled calamities; it could not be denied that a new era in any possible war, or which led to a nearer prospect of peace, was a most critical and auspicious period. That the real question was, whether the House of Commons could say, in the face of a suffering nation and a desolated world, that a lofty, imperious, declamatory, insulting answer to a proposition professing peace and conciliation, was the answer which should have been sent to France, or to any human government. That though he might not be able to determine what answer, in the circumstances of the country, should have been sent, they could, without the possibility of being mistaken, pronounce that the answer given was odiously and absurdly wrong. As a vindication of the war, it was loose, and in some parts unfounded; but as an answer to a specific proposition, it was dangerous, as a precedent, to the best interests of mankind. It rejected the very idea of peace, as if it were a curse; and held fast to war, as an inseparable adjunct to the prosperity of nations.

Arguments  
of the Oppo-  
sition for an  
immediate  
peace.

"The French Revolution was undoubtedly, in its beginning, a great and awful event, which could not but extend its influence more or less to other nations. So mighty a fabric of despotism and superstition, after having endured for ages, could not fall to the ground without a concussion which the whole earth should feel; but the evil of such a Revolution was only to be averted by cautious internal policy, and not by external war, unless it became impossible, from actual and not speculative aggression, to maintain the relations of peace. The question was not, whether the tendency of the Revolution was beneficial or injurious, but what was our own policy and duty as connected with its existence? In Mr. Burke's words,

applied to the American Revolution, the question is not, whether this condition of human affairs deserves praise or blame, but what, in God's name, are you to do with it?

"When war was first proclaimed by this country, after the death of Louis, it was rested on 'the late atrocious act perpetrated at Paris.' Then, as now, it was provoked, and peace rejected upon general and unjustifiable objections—speculative dangers to religion and government, which, supposing them to have existed, with all their possible consequences, were more likely to be increased than diminished by the bitterness of war. At that time, ministers were implored not to invite war upon principles which made peace dependent upon systems and forms of government, instead of the conduct of nations; upon theories which could not be changed, instead of aggressions which might be adjusted. France had then, and for a long time after, a strong interest in peace; she had not then extended her conquests; but Europe combined to extinguish France, and place her without the pale of the social community; and France, in her turn, acted towards Europe on the same principles. She desolated and ravaged whatever countries she occupied, and spread her conquests with unexampled rapidity. Could it be expected that so powerful a nation, so assailed, should act merely on the defensive, or that, in the midst of a revolution which the confederacy of surrounding nations had rendered terrible, the rights of nations would be respected? Ambitious projects, not perhaps originally contemplated, followed their steps; and the world was changed with portentous violence, because the government of Great Britain had resolved, that, if changed at all, it should revert to establishments which had reached their period and expired.

"In 1793, without any pacific proposition from France, when the government of France was not a month old, at a time when the alarm was at its height in England, and the probable contagion of French principles, by the intercourse of peace, was not only the favourite theme of ministers, but made the foundation of a system by which some of our most essential liberties were bridged—even these ministers invited the infant, democratic, Jacobin, republic of France to propose a peace. On what principle, then, could peace now be refused when the danger was so much diminished, because the restless fury of that popular spirit which had been the uniform topic of denunciation had not only subsided, from time and expansion, but was curbed, or rather extinguished, by the forms of the new government which invited us to peace? If Bonaparte found that his interests were served by an arrangement with England, the same interests would lead him to continue it. Surrounded with perils, at the head of an untried government, menaced by a great confederacy, of which England was the head, compelled to press heavily upon the resources of an exhausted people, it was not less his interest to propose than it was ours to accept peace.

"It is impossible to look without the most bitter regret on the enormities which France has committed. In some of the worst of them, however, the Allies have joined her. Did not Austria receive Venice from Bonaparte? and is not the receiver as bad as the thief? Has not Russia attacked France? Did not the Emperor and the King of Prussia subscribe a declaration at Pilnitz which amounted to a hostile aggression? Did they not make a public declaration, that they were to employ their forces, in conjunction with the other Kings of Europe, 'to put the King of France in a situation to establish, in perfect liberty, the foundations of a monarchical government equally agreeable to the rights of sovereigns and the welfare of the French?' and, whenever the other princes should co-operate with them, did they not 'then, and in that



case, declare their determination to act promptly, and by mutual consent to obtain the end proposed by all of them?' Can gentlemen lay their hands on their hearts, and not admit that the fair construction of this is, that whenever the other powers should concur, they would attack France, then at peace with them, and occupied only in domestic and internal regulations?

"The decree of 19th November 1792, is alleged as a clear act of aggression, not only against England, but all the sovereigns of Europe. Much weight should not be attached to that silly document, and it has been sufficiently explained by M. Chauvelin, when he declared that it never was meant to proclaim the favour of France for insurrection, but that it applied to those people only who, after having acquired their liberty by conquest, should demand the assistance of the Republic. Should not a magnanimous nation have been satisfied with this explanation; and where will be the end of wars, if idle and intemperate expressions are to be made the groundwork of bitter and never-ending hostilities?

"Where is the war, pregnant with so many horrors, next to be carried? Where is it to stop? Not till you establish the House of Bourbon!—and this you cherish the hope of doing, because you have had a successful campaign. But is the situation of the Allies, with all they have gained, to be compared with what it was after Valenciennes was taken? One campaign is successful to you; another may be so to them; and in this way, animated by the vindictive passions of revenge, hatred, rancour, which are infinitely more flagitious than those of ambition and the thirst of power, you may go on for ever, as, with such black incentives, no end can be foreseen to human misery. And all this without an intelligible motive, merely that you may gain a better peace a year or two hence. Is then peace so dangerous a state, war so enviable, that the latter is to be chosen as a state of probation, the former shunned as a positive evil (1)?"

And of Mr. Pitt and the government for refusing to treat. On the other hand, it was contended by Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt, "that the same necessity which originally existed for the commencement and prosecution, still called for perseverance in the war. The same proneness to aggression, the same disregard to justice, still actuated the conduct of the men who rule in France. Peace with a nation by whom war was made against all order, religion, and morality, would rather be a cessation of resistance to wrong than a suspension of arms in the nature of an ordinary warfare. To negotiate with established governments was formerly not merely easy, but in most circumstances safe; but to negotiate with the government of France now would be to incur all the risks of an uncertain truce, without attaining the benefits even of a temporary peace. France still retains the sentiments, and is constant to the views which characterised the dawn of her Revolution. She was innovating, she is so still; she was Jacobin, she is so still; she declared war against all kings, and she continues to this hour, to seek their destruction. Even the distant republic of America could not escape that ravaging power, and next to a state of active and inveterate war were the relations of those two commonwealths for a long time. The Republic, indeed, has frequently published her disinclination to conquest; but has she followed up that declaration by any acts indicating a similar disposition? Have we not seen her armies march to the Rhine, seize the Netherlands, and annex them to her dominions? Have we not witnessed her progress in Italy? Are not the wrongs of Switzerland recent and marked? Even into Asia she has carried her lust for dominion,

(1) *Parl. Hist.* xxxiv. 1291, 1292.



severed from the Porte, during a period of profound peace, a vast portion of its empire, and stimulated 'Citizen Tippoo' to engage in that contest which ultimately proved his ruin?

"The Republic has proclaimed her respect for the independence of all governments. How have her actions corresponded with this profession? Did not Jacobin France attempt the overthrow of every government? Did she not, whenever it suited her purpose, arm the governors against the governed, or the governed against the governors? How completely has she succeeded, during a period of profound peace which had been unbroken for centuries, in convulsing the population, and so subduing the independence of Switzerland? In Italy, the whole fabric of civil society has been changed, and the independence of every government violated. The Netherlands, too, exhibit to mankind monuments of the awful veneration with which the Republic has regarded the independence of other states. The memorable decree of November 1792, has not slept a dead letter in their statute-book. No, it has ever since been the active energetic principle of their whole conduct, and every nation is interested in the extinction of that principle for ever.

"Every power with whom the Republic has treated, whether for the purpose of armistice or peace, could furnish melancholy instances of the perfidy of France, and of the ambition, injustice, and cruelty of her rulers. Switzerland concluded a truce with the Republic; her rulers immediately excited insurrections among her cantons, overthrew her institutions, seized her fortresses, robbed her treasures, the accumulation of ages, and, to give permanence to her usurpations, imposed on her a government new alike in form and substance. The Grand Duke of Tuscany was among the earliest sufferers by a treaty of peace with the Republic. In every thing he strove to conform to the views of France; her rulers repeated to him her assurances of attachment and disinclination to conquest; but at the very time that the honour of the Republic was pledged for the security of his states, he saw the troops of his ally enter his capital, and he himself was deposed and a democracy given to the Florentines. The King of Sardinia opened the gates of his capital to the Republican arms, and, confiding in the integrity of the French government, expected to be secured in his dominions by the treaty which guaranteed his title and his rights, and communicated to France equal advantages. He was, however, in a state of peace, invaded in his dominions, forced to fly to his insular possessions, and Turin treacherously taken possession of by the Republican troops. The change in the Papal government was another part of the same system. It was planned by Joseph Bonaparte in his palace. He excited the populace to an insurrection; and effected the revolution in the capital at the head of the Roman mob. To Venice their conduct was still more atrocious. After concluding an armistice with the Archduke Charles, Bonaparte declared that he took the Venetians under his protection, and overturned the old government by the movements excited among the people; but no sooner was the national independence in this way destroyed, than he sold them to the very Imperial government against whose alleged oppression he had prompted them to take up arms. Genoa received the French as friends; and the debt of gratitude was repaid by the government being revolutionized, and, under the authority of a mock constitution, the people plundered, and the public independence subverted.

"It is in vain to allege that these atrocities are the work of former governments, and that Bonaparte had no hand in them. The worst of these acts of perfidy have been perpetrated by himself. If a treaty was concluded and broken with Sardinia, it was concluded and broken by Bonaparte. If peace

was entered into and violated with Tuscany, it was entered into and violated by Bonaparte. If Venice was first seduced into revolutionary revolt, and then betrayed and sold to Austria, it was by Bonaparte that the treachery was consummated. If the Papal government was first terrified into submission, and then overturned by rebellion, it was Bonaparte who accomplished the work. If Genoa was convulsed in a state of profound peace, and then sacrificed, it was by Bonaparte that the perfidious invasion was committed. If Switzerland was first seduced into revolution, and then invaded and plundered, it was by the deceitful promises and arts of Bonaparte that the train was laid. Even the affiliated republics and his own country have not escaped the same perfidious ability. The constitution which he forced on his countrymen, at the cannon's mouth, on the 13th Vendémiaire, he delivered up to the bayonets of Augereau on the 18th Fructidor, and overturned with his grenadiers on the 18th Brumaire. The constitution of the Cisalpine republic, which he himself had established, was overthrown by his lieutenant Berthier. He gained possession of Malta by deceitful promises, and immediately handed it over to the Republic. He declared to the Porte that he had no intention to take possession of Egypt, and yet he avowed to his army that he conquered it for France, and instantly roused the Copts into rebellion against the Mamelukes. He declared to the Mussulmans that he was a believer in Mahomet (1), thus demonstrating that, even on the most sacred subjects, truth was set at nought when any object was to be gained by its violation. Nay, he has, in his official instructions, openly avowed this system; for, in his instructions to Kléber, he declares, 'You may sign a treaty to evacuate Egypt, but do not execute the articles, and you may find a plausible excuse for the delay in the observation, that they must be sent home to be submitted to the Directory.' What reliance can be placed on a power which thus uniformly makes peace or truce a stepping-stone to farther aggressions; and systematically uses perfidy as an allowable weapon for circumventing its enemies? And what is especially worthy of observation, this system is not that of any one man; it has been the principle of all the statesmen, without exception, who have governed France during the Revolution; a clear proof that it arises from the force of the circumstances in which they are placed, and the ruinous ascendance of irreligious principles in the people; and that the intentions of the present ruler of the country, even if they were widely different from what they are, could afford no sort of security against its continuance.

"France would now derive great advantages from a general peace. Her commerce would revive; her seamen be renewed, her sailors acquire experience; and the power which hitherto has been so victorious at land, would speedily become formidable on another element. What benefit could it bring to Great Britain? Are our harbours blockaded, our commerce interrupted, our dockyards empty? Have we not, on the contrary, acquired an irresistible preponderance on the seas during the war, and is not the trade of the world rapidly passing into the hands of our merchants? Bonaparte would acquire immense popularity by being the means of bringing about an accommodation with this country; if we wish to establish his power, and permanently enlist the energy of the Revolution under the banners of a military chieftain, we have only to fall into the snare which he has so artfully prepared. In turbulent republics, it has ever been an axiom to maintain in-

(1) This was strictly true. "They will say I am a Papist," said *Napoléon*. "I am no such thing. I was a Mahometan in Egypt. I would become a Catholic here for the good of the people. I am no believer in any particular religion; but as to the idea of a God, look up to the Heavens, and say who made that?"—See *TRISAUDREAU Sur le Consulat*, 153.

ternal tranquillity by external action; it was on that principle that the war was commenced by Brissot and continued by Robespierre, and it is not likely to be forgotten by the military chief who has now succeeded to the helm of affairs.

“It is in vain to pretend that either the Allied powers or Great Britain were the aggressors in the terrible war which has so long desolated Europe. In investigating this subject, the most scrupulous attention to dates is requisite. The attack upon the Papal states, by the seizure of Avignon in August 1791, was attended by a series of the most sanguinary excesses which disgraced the Revolution; and this was followed, in the same year, by an aggression against the whole empire, by the seizure of Porentrui, part of the dominions of the Bishop of Basle. In April 1792, the French government declared war against Austria; and in September of the same year, without any declaration of war, or any cause of hostility, and in direct violation of their promises to abstain from conquest, they seized Savoy and Nice, upon the pretence that nature had destined them to form a part of France. The assertion that this war was rendered necessary by the threatening alliance formed at Pilnitz, is equally devoid of foundation; that celebrated declaration referred only to the state of imprisonment in which Louis XVI was kept, and its immediate object was to effect his deliverance, if a concert among the European powers could be brought about for that purpose, leaving the internal state of France to be decided by the King when restored to his liberty, with the free consent of the states of the kingdom, without one word relative to its dismemberment. This was fully admitted in the official correspondence which took place between this country and Austria; and as long as M. Delessart was minister of foreign affairs in France, there was a great probability that the differences would be terminated amicably; but the war party excited a tumult in order to dispossess him, as they considered, in Brissot’s words, that ‘war was necessary to consolidate the Revolution.’ Upon the King of France’s acceptance of the constitution, the emperor notified to all the courts of Europe that he considered it as his proper act, and thereby the convention of Pilnitz fell to the ground; and the event soon proved the sincerity of that declaration, for when war was declared by the French in 1792, the Austrian Netherlands were almost destitute of troops, and soon fell a prey to the Republicans.

“Great Britain at this time, and for long after, entertained no hostile designs towards France. So far from it, on 29th December 1792, only a month before the commencement of hostilities, a note was sent by Lord Grenville to the British ambassador at St.-Petersburg, imparting to Russia the principles on which we acted, and the terms on which we were willing to mediate for peace, which were, ‘the withdrawing the French arms within the limits of their territory, the abandoning their conquests, the rescinding any acts injurious to the sovereignty or rights of other nations, and the giving, in some unequivocal manner, a pledge of their intention no longer to foment troubles or excite disturbances against other governments. In return for these stipulations, the different powers of Europe might engage to abandon all measures or views of hostility against France, or interference in its internal affairs.’ Such were the principles on which we acted; and what, then, brought on the war with this country? The insane decrees of 19th November and 15th December 1792, which amounted to a declaration of war against all governments, and the attack on our Allies the Dutch, and the opening of the Scheldt, in open prosecution of the new code of public law then promulgated by the Republic.

“The fundamental principle of the revolutionary party in France always

has been an insatiable love of aggrandisement, an implacable spirit of destruction against all the civil and religious institutions of every other country. Its uniform mode of proceeding was to bribe the poor against the rich, by proposing to transfer into new hands, on the delusive notion of equality, and in breach of every principle of justice, the whole property of the country; the practical application of this principle was to devote the whole of that property to indiscriminate plunder, and make it the foundation of a revolutionary system of finance, productive in proportion to the misery and desolation which it created. It has been accompanied by an unwearied spirit of proselytism, diffusing itself over all the nations of the earth; a spirit which can apply itself to all circumstances and all situations; hold out a promise of redress equally to all nations; which enables the teachers of French liberty to recommend themselves to those who live under the feudal code of the German empire, the various states of Italy, the old republicans of Holland, the new republicans of America, the protestants of Switzerland, the Catholics of Ireland, the Mussulmans of Turkey, and the Hindoos of India; the natives of England, enjoying the perfection of practical freedom, and the Copts of Egypt, groaning under the last severity of Asiatic bondage. The last and distinguishing feature is a perfidy which nothing can bind; which no ties of treaty, no sense of the principles generally received among nations, no obligation, human or divine, can restrain. Thus qualified, thus armed for destruction, the genius of the French Revolution marched forth the terror and dismay of the world. Every nation has in its turn been the witness, many have been the victims, of its principles; and it is left now for us to decide whether we will compromise with such a danger, while we have yet resources to supply the sinews of war, while the heart and spirit of the country is yet unbroken, and while we have the means of calling forth and supporting a powerful co-operation in Europe. *Cur igitur pacem nolo—quia infida est, quia periculosa, quia esse non potest* (1)?”

Feb. 3, 1800. The House, upon a division, supported the measures of Administration by a majority of two hundred and sixty-five to sixty-four.

Reflections on this decision of Parliament. In judging of this decision of the British government, which formed the true commencement of the second period of the war, that in which it was waged with Napoléon, it is of importance to recollect the circumstances in which he was placed, and the nature of the government which he had assumed. France had not ceased to be revolutionary, but its energies were now, under a skilful and enterprising chief, turned to military objects. He was still, however, borne forward upon the movement, and the moment he attempted to stop, he would have been crushed by its wheels. No one was more aware of this than the First Consul. “The French government,” said Napoléon in 1800, “has no resemblance to those which surround it. Hated by all its neighbours, obliged to restrain many different classes of malecontents within its bosom, it stands in need of action, of *éclat*, and, by consequence, of war, to maintain an imposing attitude against so many enemies.”—“Your government,” replied Thibeaudeau, “has no resemblance to one newly established. It assumed the *toga virilis* at Marengo; and, sustained by a powerful head and the arms of thirty millions of inhabitants, its place is already sufficiently prominent among the European powers.”—“Do you really think that sufficient?” replied Napoléon; “*it must be first of all,*

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxiv. 1206, 1249.

It is impossible, in this abstract, to give any idea of the splendid and luminous speeches made on this memorable occasion in the British Parliament. They

are reported at large in Hansard, and throw more light on the motives and objects of the war than any other documents in existence.

*or it will perish.*”—“And to obtain such a result, you see no other method than war?”—“None other, citizen (1).”—“His fixed opinion from the commencement,” says Bourrienne, “was, that if stationary he would fall; that he was sustained only by continually advancing, and that it was not sufficient to advance, but he must advance rapidly and irresistibly.”—“My power,” said he, “depends on my glory, and my glory on the victories which I gain. My power would instantly fall, if it were not constantly based on fresh glory and victories. Conquest made me what I am: conquest alone can maintain me in it. A government newly established has need to dazzle and astonish; when its *éclat* ceases, it perishes. It is in vain to expect repose from a man who is the concentration of movement (2).”

Such were Napoléon's views; and that they were perfectly just, with reference to his own situation, is evident from the consideration that a revolutionary power, whether in civil or military affairs, has never yet maintained its ascendancy in any other way. But these being his principles, and the independence of England forming the great stumbling-block in his way, it is evident that no permanent peace with him was practicable; that every accommodation could have been only a truce; and that it never would be proposed, unless in circumstances when it was for his interest to gain a short breathing-time for fresh projects of ambition (3). The event completely proved the justice of these views, and forms the best commentary on the prophetic wisdom of Mr. Pitt. Every successive peace on the continent only paved the way for fresh aggressions; and at length he was precipitated upon the snows of Russia, by the same invincible necessity of dazzling his subjects by the lustre of additional victories which was felt in the commencement of his career. “His power, without and within,” says Marshal St.-Cyr, “was founded solely on the *éclat* of his victories. By intrusting himself without reserve to fortune, he imposed upon himself the necessity of following it to the utmost verge whither it would lead him. Unheard-of success had attended enterprises, the temerity of which was continually increasing; but thence arose a necessity to keep for ever awake the terror and admiration of Europe, by new enterprises and more dazzling triumphs. The more colossal his power became, the more immeasurable his projects required to be, in order that their unexpected success should keep up the same stupor in the minds of the vulgar. Admiration, enthusiasm, ambition, the emotions on which his dominion was founded, are not durable in their nature; they must be incessantly fed with fresh stimulants; and, to effect that, extraordinary efforts are requisite. These principles were well known to Napoléon; and thence it is that he so often did evil, albeit knowing better than any one that it was evil, overruled by a superior power, from which he felt it was impossible to escape. The rapid movement which he imprinted on the affairs of Europe was of a kind which could not be arrested; a single retrograde step, a policy which indicated a stationary condition, would have been the signal of his fall. Far, therefore, from making it subject of reproach to Napoléon, that he conceived an enterprise so gigantic as the Russian expedition, he is

(1) Thibauden, Consulat, 293.

(2) Bour. iii. 214.

(3) This accordingly was openly avowed by Napoléon himself. “England,” said he in January 1800, “*must be overturned*. As long as my voice has any influence, it will never enjoy any respite. Yes! yes! war to the death with England for ever—ay, till its destruction.” [D’Abr. ii. 179, 180.] He admits, in his own Memoirs, that when he made these proposals to Mr. Pitt, he had no serious intention of concluding peace. “I had then,” said he,

“need of war: a treaty of peace which would have derogated from that of Campo Formio and annulled the creations of Italy, would have withered every imagination. Mr. Pitt’s answer accordingly was impatiently expected. When it arrived, it filled me with a secret satisfaction. His answer could not have been more favourable. From that moment I foresaw that, with such impassioned antagonists, I would have no difficulty in reaching the highest destinies.” —NAP. in MONTM. i. 33, 34.



rather to be pitied for being placed in a situation where he was overruled by necessity; and this furnishes the true answer to those who would ascribe to chance, the rigour of the elements, or an excess of temerity, what was in truth but the inevitable consequence of the false position in which for fifteen years France had been placed (1).” It is this law of the moral world which rendered durable peace with that country, when headed by a revolutionary power, impossible; and which was ultimately destined to inflict an awful retribution on its guilt and its ambition.

Experience, therefore, has now proved that Mr. Pitt’s view of the character of the revolutionary war was well founded; and that the seizure of the consular throne by Napoléon, only gave a new and more dangerous direction to that restless and insatiable spirit which had arisen from the convulsions which the Revolution had produced. Justice requires that it should be declared, that, in espousing the cause of the enemy on this occasion, and uniformly palliating the crimes of the popular party in that country, the English Opposition were led, by the spirit of party, to forget equally the duties of patriotism and the dictates of reason. No hesitation need be felt by an English writer in expressing this opinion, because the ablest of the liberal party in France themselves admit that their partisans in this country fell into this enormous error. “Nothing,” says Madame de Staël, “was more contrary to Bonaparte’s nature, or his interest, than to have made peace in 1800. He could only live in agitation; and if any thing could plead his apology with those who reflect on the influence of external circumstances on the human mind, it is, that he could only breathe freely in a volcanic atmosphere. It was absolutely necessary for him to present, every three months, a new object of ambition to the French, in order to supply, by the grandeur and variety of external events, the vacuum occasioned by the removal of all objects of domestic interest. At that epoch, unhappily for the spirit of freedom in England, the English Opposition, with Mr. Fox at their head, took an entirely false view of Napoléon; and thence it was that that party, previously so estimable, lost its ascendant in the nation. It was already too much to have defended France under the Reign of Terror; but it was, if possible, a still greater fault to have considered Bonaparte as identified with the principles of freedom, when in truth he was their deadliest enemy (2).”—“The eloquent declarations of Mr. Fox,” says General Mathieu Dumas, “cannot invalidate the facts brought forward by Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville as to the origin of the war. The Girondists alone were the cause of its commencement. The names of those impostors who, to overturn the monarchical throne of France, prevailed on the King to declare that fatal war, should be consigned to an execrable celebrity; they alone brought down on Europe and their country a deluge of calamities (3).”

The Parlia-  
ment re-  
solve on  
war.

War being thus resolved on, the most vigorous measures were taken, both by Parliament and the executive, to meet the dangers with which it might be attended. Parliament voted the sum of L.500,000 to the crown, for the purpose of immediately aiding Austria in the armaments which she had in contemplation, and Mr. Pitt stated that a loan of L.2,500,000 to the Emperor would be advanced (4). The budget brought forward by the chancellor of the exchequer exhibited a most flattering picture of the public credit, and proved that, notwithstanding the immense expenditure of the eight preceding campaigns, the national resources were still

(1) St.-Cyr, Hist. Mil. iii. 3, 4.

(2) Mad. de Staël, Rév. Franç. ii. 268, 270.

(3) Dum. iv. 308, 312.

(4) Parl. Hist. xxxiv. 1439.



unimpaired (1). The extraordinary fact which he mentioned, that, in the eighth year of the war, a loan of eighteen millions and a half had been obtained at the rate of four and three-fourths per cent, proved the enduring credit of the government and the almost boundless extent of the wealth of England; but both that great financier and the British public, misled by the fallacious brilliancy of present appearances, overlooked the grievous burden which the contraction of debt in the three *per cents*, in other words, the imposition of a burden of L.100 for every L.60 advanced, was ultimately to produce upon the national resources.

The land forces of Great Britain in this year amounted to 168,000 men, exclusive of 80,000 militia; and for the service of the fleet, 120,000 seamen and marines were voted. The ships in commission were no less than 310, including 124 of the line. From a table laid before Parliament in this year, it appeared that the whole troops, exclusive of militia, which had been raised for the service of the state during the eight years from 1792 to 1800, had been only 208,000; a force not greater than might have been easily levied in a single year, out of a population then amounting to nearly sixteen millions, in the three kingdoms; and which, if ably conducted and thrown into the scale, when nearly balanced, between France and Austria, would unquestionably have terminated the war at the latest in two campaigns (2).

(1) The Budget stood thus:—

Receipt—Ways and Means.	
Land and Malt Tax, . . . . .	L.2,750,000
Lottery, . . . . .	200,000
Duties on Exports and Imports, . . . . .	1,250,000
Income Tax, . . . . .	5,300,000
Surplus of Consolidated Fund, . . . . .	5,512,000
Loan by Exchequer Bills, . . . . .	3,000,000
Lent by Bank without interest, . . . . .	3,000,000
Loan for Great Britain, . . . . .	18,500,000
	<hr/>
	L.39,512,000
Expenditure.	
Navy, . . . . .	L.12,619,000
Army, . . . . .	11,370,000
Miscellaneous, . . . . .	750,000
Interest on Exchequer Bills, . . . . .	816,000
Deficiencies of year 1799, . . . . .	440,000
Deficiency of Malt Tax and Land do. . . . .	350,000
Exchequer Bills, . . . . .	2,500,000
Do. for 1798, . . . . .	1,075,000
Vote of credit, . . . . .	3,000,000
Subsidies to Germans and Russians, . . . . .	3,000,000
Annual grant for National Debt, . . . . .	200,000
Unforeseen emergencies, . . . . .	1,800,000
	<hr/>
	L.37,920,000

To provide for the interest of this loan, amounting in all to L.21,500,000, Mr. Pitt laid on some trifling taxes on spirits and tea, amounting in all to L.350,000, the interest on the bulk of the debt being laid as a charge on the income tax. The interest paid on the loan was only 4½ per cent; a fact which he justly stated as extraordinary in the eighth year of the war. The interest on the public debt at this time was L.19,700,000, and on Exchequer Bills, etc., L.1,983,000, in all.

	L. 21,583,000
Civil List, . . . . .	898,000
Civil Expenses, . . . . .	647,000
Charges of management, . . . . .	1,779,000
Other charges on consolidated Fund, . . . . .	239,000
	<hr/>
	25,246,000
	<hr/>

Total National Expenditure in 1800. . . . . L.63,166,000

—See *Parl. Hist.* xxxiv. 1515, and *Ann. Reg. App. to Chronicle for 1800*, pp. 151, 152.

(2) James, ii. App. No. 8. *Ann. Reg.* 1800, 160;      The number of troops raised yearly from the commencement of the war for the regular army, was and 144, App. to Chron.

Mr Dundas' India bud-  
get.

Several domestic measures of great importance took place in this session of Parliament. The bank charter was renewed for twenty-one years, there being twelve years of the old charter still to run; in consideration of the advantages of which, the directors agreed to give the public a loan of L.3,000,000 for six years without interest; the suspension of the Habeas Corpus act was continued by a great majority in both houses of Parliament; and Mr. Dundas brought forward a full account of the affairs of India (1). The union of Ireland with Great Britain was, after a stormy debate in both houses of Parliament in Dublin, carried by a large majority, chiefly through the powerful abilities, cool courage, and vigorous efforts of Lord CASTLEREAGH, who then gave the first specimen of that indomitable firmness and steady perseverance which were afterwards destined, on a greater stage, to lead the coalition against France to a glorious issue in the campaign of 1814. This great measure, however, was not carried without the most violent opposition, both in the Irish Peers and Commons; and it left the seeds of an animosity between the two islands, which, fostered by religious rancour and democratic passion, produced melancholy effects in after times upon the tranquillity and strength of the empire (2).

May 24.

1800,

Union with  
Ireland  
passes the  
Parliament  
of Great  
Britain and  
Ireland

By the treaty of Union, the Peers for the united Imperial Parliament were limited, from Ireland, to twenty-eight temporal and four spiritual peers, the former elected for life by the Irish peerage, the latter by rotation; the commoners fixed at one hundred. The Churches of England and Ireland were united, and provision made for their union, preservation, and the continuance of their discipline, doctrine, and worship for ever. Commercial privileges were fairly communicated; the national debt of each was imposed as a burden on its own finances, and the general expenditure ordered to be defrayed, for twenty years after the Union, in the proportion of fifteen to Great Britain

Its leading  
provisions.

as follows—a woful picture of the ignorance which then prevailed as to the means of combating a revolutionary power;—

1793, . . . . .	17,038
1794, . . . . .	38,561
1795, . . . . .	40,460
1796, . . . . .	16,336
1797, . . . . .	16,096
1798, . . . . .	21,457
1799, . . . . .	41,316
1800, . . . . .	17,124

Total in eight years, . . . 208,388

Whereas, the French, with a population of 28,000,000, raised in 1792, 700,000, and in 1793, 1,500,000 soldiers. Prussia, with a population of

7,000,000, raised in 1813 nearly 200,000 men.—See *Ann. Reg.* 1800, 144, *App. to Chronicle*. The population of Great Britain, according to the census of 1800, was 10,942,000, that of Ireland probably 5,000,000.

(1) From which it appeared that the total revenue in 1798—9 was L.8,610,000, the local charges L.7,807,000, and the interest of debt and other charges L.875,000, leaving a deficiency in territorial revenue of L.71,000; to cover which there were the commercial profits, amounting to L.629,657; leaving a general balance in favour of the company of L.558,000 yearly.

The revenue and expenditure were thus divided:—

	Revenue.	Charges.
Bengal, . . . . .	L.6,259,600	L.3,952,847
Madras, . . . . .	2,004,993	2,857,519
Bombay, . . . . .	346,110	996,699
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	L.8,610,703	L.7,807,065
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	7,807,065	
	<hr/>	
Surplus, . . . . .	L.803,638	
Interest on debt, . . . . .	L.7,58,135	} 875,295
Other charges, . . . . .	117,160	
Deficiency, . . . . .	L.71,657	
Commercial Profits, . . . . .		L.629,657
Deduct territorial loss, . . . . .		71,657
		<hr/>
Annual Surplus, . . . . .		L.558,000

See *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 15.

(2) *Parl. Hist.* xxxiv. 1471; xxxv. 14, 15. *Ann. Reg.* 1801, 112, 116.

and two for Ireland. The laws and courts of both kingdoms were maintained on their present footing, subject to such alterations as the united Parliament might deem expedient. This important step was carried in the British House of Commons by a majority of 308 to 26, and in the Lords by 75 to 7 (1).

Views of the leaders on both sides of Parliament on this great change. The debates on this subject in the British Parliament, which, although highly important in English, are not of sufficient moment for quotation in European history, are chiefly remarkable for the complete blindness of all parties to the real and ultimate consequences of the measure which was adopted. Mr. Pitt was most desirous to show that the influence of the *crown* would not be unduly augmented by the Irish members in the House of Commons (2); while Mr. Grey contended that, “ultimately at least, the Irish members will afford a certain accession of force to the party of every administration, and therefore forty of the most decayed boroughs should be struck off before the Union takes place. He accordingly moved, that it should be an instruction to the House to guard against the increase of the influence of the crown in the approaching Union (3). To us, who know that by the aid of the Irish members, and their aid alone, even after the franchise had been raised from forty shillings to ten pounds by the Duke of Wellington, the great democratic change on the British constitution of 1832 was carried (4), these speculations as to the ultimate consequences of the Union are singular monuments of the difficulty which even the greatest intellects experience in prognosticating the consequences of any considerable change in the frame of government. In truth, the decisive addition which the Irish members furnished to the democratic party of the empire on the first great crisis which occurred, adds another to the numerous examples which history affords of the extreme peril of applying to one country the institutions or government of another, or of supposing that the system of representation which the habits of centuries have moulded to a conformity with the interests of one state, can be adopted without the utmost hazard by another in an inferior stage of civilization, inheriting from its forefathers a more ardent temperament, or under the influence of more vehement passions.

Great prosperity of the British empire at this period. Ever since the great financial crisis of 1797, and the limitation of cash payments by the act of that year, followed by the issue of two and one pound notes by the Bank of England, which immediately ensued, the prosperity of the British empire had been steadily and rapidly increasing. The expenditure of above sixty millions a-year by government, either in the current expenses or the payment of interest on debt, and the increase of the issues by the bank from eleven millions to above fifteen during that period (5), had produced a most extraordinary effect on the national industry. Prices of every species of produce had rapidly and steadily

(1) Parl. Hist. xxv. 31. 150, 195.

(3) Ibid. 101.

(2) Parl. Hist. xxv. 47.

(4) English and Scotch members for the Reform Bill on its first division, . . . 266

Against it, . . . 251—15

Ireland, against it, . . . 37

For it, . . . 53—16

Thus it was the admission of the Irish members which effected that great alteration in the English constitution.

(5) Bank of England notes in circulation last quarter, of

	Five pounds.	Two and one pounds.	Total.
1797, . . . . .	L.10,411,700	L.1,230,700	£.11,642,400
1798, . . . . .	10,711,890	1,730,380	12,442,070
1799, . . . . .	12,335,920	1,671,040	13,006,960
1800, . . . . .	13,338,670	2,062,300	15,400,970

—See Ann. Reg. 1800, p. 148, App. to Chronicle.

risen; that of grain in 1800, exclusive of the effects of the scarcity of that year, was double what it had been in 1792, and every other article had advanced in a similar proportion (1). The consequence was, that the industrious classes were, generally speaking, in affluent circumstances; immense fortunes rewarded the efforts of commercial enterprise; the demand for labour, encouraged by the employment of nearly four hundred thousand soldiers and sailors in the public service, was unbounded; and even the increasing weight of taxation, and the alarming magnitude of the debt, were but little felt amidst the general rise of prices and incomes which resulted from the profuse expenditure and lavish issue of paper by government (2).

One class only, that of annuitants, and all others depending on a fixed income, underwent, during those years, a progressive decline of comfort, which was increased in many cases to the most poignant distress by the high prices and severe scarcity which followed the disastrous harvest of 1799. The attention of Parliament was early directed to the means of alleviating the famine of that year. Six reports were made by the Commons and two by the Lords on the dearth of provisions; but the government, although severely pressed by the public suffering, steadily resisted all those harsh or violent measures which procure a present relief at the expense of

(1) Highest and lowest price of grain in five years, ending respectively  
1790,—from 51s. 11d. to 39s. 2d.  
1795,—from 74s. 2d. — 42s. 11d.  
1800,—from 113s. 7d. — 50s. 3d.

—See MURDOCH's *Industrial Situation of Great Britain*, 53.

(2) According to Mr. Pitt's statement in 1800, the British exports, imports, shipping, tonnage, and revenue in the under-mentioned years stood as follows :—

Imports.			
On an average of six years ending 5th Jan. 1793,	.	.	L.18,685,000
On an average of six years ending 5th Jan. 1801,	.	.	25,259,000
Exports.			
On an average of six years ending 5th Jan. 1793,			
Manufactures.	.	.	L.14,771,000
Foreign goods.	.	.	5,468,000
			L.20,239,000
On an average of six years ending 5th Jan. 1801,			
Manufactures,	.	.	L.20,085,000
Foreign goods,	.	.	12,867,000
			L.32,952,000
Shipping, etc.			
	Ships.	Tonnage.	Seamen.
Shipping in 1788,	13,827	1,363,000	107,925
1792,	16,079	1,540,145	118,286
1800,	18,877	1,905,438	143,661
Permanent taxes, exclusive of war taxes :—			
Year ending 5th Jan. 1793,	.	.	L.14,284,000
Do. do. 1794,	.	.	13,941,000
Do. do. 1795,	.	.	13,858,000
Do. do. 1796,	.	.	13,557,000
Do. do. 1797,	.	.	14,292,000
Do. do. 1798,	.	.	13,332,000
Do. do. 1799,	.	.	14,275,000
Do. do. 1800,	.	.	15,743,000
Gross receipt from taxes			
1797,	.	.	23,076,000
1798,	.	.	30,175,000
1799,	.	.	34,750,000
1800,	.	.	33,535,000

—See *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 1563.

Great efforts  
of govern-  
ment to re-  
lieve it, and  
noble pa-  
tience of the  
people.

future confidence in the cultivators. An act was passed to lower the quality of all the bread baked in the kingdom; the importation of rice and maize encouraged by liberal bounties; distillation from grain stopped, and by these and other means an additional supply, to the enormous amount of 2,500,000 quarters, was procured for the use of the inhabitants (1). By these generous and patriotic efforts, joined to the admirable patience and forbearance of the people, this trying crisis was surmounted without any of those convulsions which might have been anticipated from so severe a calamity during a period of almost universal war; and in the latter part of the year, England, so far from being overwhelmed by its reverses, was enabled to present an undaunted front to the hostility of combined Europe.

Measures of  
England and  
Austria for  
the prosecu-  
tion of the  
war.

Deprived by the secession of Russia of the power from whom they had derived such efficacious assistance in the preceding campaign, Austria and England made the utmost efforts to prosecute the war with vigour. By their united influence, the German empire was prevailed upon to sign a treaty, binding the states who composed it to furnish a contingent of three hundred thousand men for the common cause; but very few of the electors obeyed the requisition, and the troops of the empire were of hardly any service in the succeeding campaign. To stimulate their languid dispositions, a vigorous circular was, in the beginning of December, sent by the Archduke Charles to the anterior circles of the empire, in which he strenuously urged the formation of new levies, and pointed out, in energetic terms, the futility of the idea that any durable peace was practicable with a country in such a state of revolutionary excitement as France, and the vanity of supposing that, by concentrating all the powers of government in the hands of a victorious chieftain, it was likely to be either less formidable or more pacific. But although that great general was indefatigable in his endeavours to put the Imperialists on a respectable footing, and make the most active preparations for war, he was far from feeling any confidence in the issue of the approaching contest, now that Russia was withdrawn on the one side and Napoléon was added on the other; and he earnestly counselled the Austrian cabinet to take advantage of the successes of the late campaign, and the recent changes of government in France, by concluding peace with the Republic. The cabinet of Vienna, however, deemed it inadvisable to stop short in the career of success; and not only refused to treat with Napoléon, who had proposed peace on the basis of the treaty of Campo Formio, but deprived the Archduke, who had so candidly stated his opinion, of the command of the army in Germany, and conferred it on General Kray. Notwithstanding the great abilities of the latter general, this change proved extremely prejudicial to the Imperial fortunes: the Archduke was adored by the soldiers, and his retirement not only shook their confidence in

(1) The resources obtained in this way are thus detailed in the sixth report of the Commons:—

	Quarters.
Importation of wheat from Jan. 1 to Oct. 1, . . . . .	170,000
Do. of flour from America, . . . . .	580,000
Do. of flour from Canada, . . . . .	30,000
Do. of rice, equal to. . . . .	630,000
Stoppage of starch, equal to . . . . .	40,000
Do. of distilleries, . . . . .	360,000
Use of Coarse Meal, . . . . .	400,000
Retrenchment, . . . . .	300,000
	<hr/>
	2,510,000

themselves, but cooled the ardour of the circles in the south of Germany, to whom his great achievements in the campaign of 1796 were still the subject of grateful recollection. He retired to his government of Bohemia, from whence he had the melancholy prospect of a series of reverses, which possibly his talents might have prevented, whereby the monarchy was brought to the brink of ruin (1).

March 16,  
1800.

By a treaty, signed on the 16th March, the Elector of Bavaria agreed to put twelve thousand men in the pay of Great Britain, to be employed in the common cause; and by another treaty with the Elector of Mentz and the Duke of Wirtemberg, each of these petty states agreed to furnish six thousand men, paid by the same power for the same purpose. These troops, however, could not be organized in sufficient time to take a part in the early operations of the campaign, and they formed at best but a poor substitute for the sturdy Russian veterans, who were retiring towards the northern extremity of Germany, equally exasperated at their allies and their

Treaties entered into for this purpose with Austria and Bavaria.

enemies. By another and more important treaty, signed at Vienna, on the 28th June, the Emperor agreed to raise his forces, both in Germany and Italy, to the greatest possible amount, and the two powers bound themselves each not to make a separate peace without the consent of the other; in consideration of which England engaged not only to advance a subsidy of L.2,000,000 sterling to the Imperial treasury, but to augment as much as practicable the German and Swiss troops in the British pay in the German campaign (2).

Military preparations of the Imperialists.

Justly proud of the glorious successes of the preceding campaign, which, in so far as its troops were concerned, had been almost unchequered, and relying with confidence on its superb armies, two hundred thousand strong, in Germany and Italy, the cabinet of Vienna resolved on continuing the contest. But the military preparations which they made were not commensurate to the magnitude of the danger which was to be apprehended, since the First Consul was placed at the head of the French government. Their armies in Germany were raised to ninety-two thousand men, exclusive of the Bavarian and Wirtemberg contingents; but this vast body was scattered over an immense line, from the source of the Rhine to the banks of the Maine, while the centre, in the valley of the Danube, where the decisive blows were to be struck, was so weakened that no respectable force could be collected to make head against the French invasion. The army under Melas in Italy, was, by great exertions, augmented to ninety-six thousand men; the Aulic Council, seduced by the recent conquest of that country, having fallen into the great mistake of supposing that the vital point of the war was to be found in the Maritime Alps or on the banks of the Var, whereas it lay nearer home, on the shores of the Danube and the plains of Bavaria. No levies in the interior were made; few points were fortified, the government sharing in the common delusion that the strength of France was exhausted, and that it would without difficulty be brought to reasonable terms of accommodation in the ensuing campaign. The foresight of the Archduke Charles alone had surrounded Ulm with a formidable intrenched camp, which proved of the most essential service after the first disasters of the campaign, and retarded for six weeks the tide of Republican conquest in the heart of Germany (3).

(1) Dum. iii. 14, 16. Jom. xii. 12, 16. Arch. Ch. ii. 334. Ann. Reg. 1800, 168.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1800, 240, 243. State Papers.

(3) Arch. Ch. ii. 334. Dum. iii. 14, 16. Jom. xiii. 11, 12. Nap. i. 185.



Discontent-  
ed state of  
the French  
Affiliated  
Republics.

The Republics with which France had encircled her frontier had either been conquered by the Allies, or were in such a state of exhaustion and suffering as to be incapable of rendering any effectual aid to the parent state. The Dutch groaned in silence under a yoke which was every day becoming more oppressive: the democratic party looked back with unavailing regret to the infatuation, with which they had thrown themselves into the arms of a power which used them only as the instruments of its ambition; while the commercial aristocracy, finding the trade of the United Provinces destroyed, abandoned every species of enterprise, and quietly awaited in retirement the return of more prosperous days. By a treaty, concluded on the 5th January, 1800, Holland agreed to pay six millions to France, and obtained in return only the restitution of the effects of the clergy and emigrants who had possessions in the United States. So violent was the hatred at France among its inhabitants, that a loan of a million sterling, which Napoléon endeavoured to negotiate among the capitalists of Amsterdam, totally failed. Switzerland was in a still more discontented state. Without any regard to the rights of the allied republic, Masséna had imposed a forced loan on Berne, Basle, and Zurich; and as the Swiss magistrates courageously resisted this act of oppression, an intrigue was got up by the democratic party, and the councils were attempted to be dissolved by military force. The conspiracy failed, and Colonel Clavel, who had been appointed to execute it, was compelled to take refuge in France; but the violent party spirit which these proceedings left in Switzerland, deprived it of any weight in the approaching contest, and prepared the way for its total subjugation by Napoléon (1).

Measures of  
Napoléon to  
restore pub-  
lic credit in  
France.

To make head with such feeble auxiliaries against the united force of Austria and England, with a defeated army, an exhausted treasury, and a disunited people, was the difficult task which awaited the First Consul; but he soon showed that he was equal to the attempt. The first step which he took to accomplish the gigantic undertaking, was to introduce some degree of order into the finances, which the cupidity and profligacy of the Republican government had reduced to the most deplorable state. A deficit of 600,000,000 francs, or L.24,000,000 sterling, existed in the revenue of the preceding year; and recovery of arrears had become impossible from the universal penury and misery which prevailed. The remnant of the public funds, though deprived of two-thirds of their amount, were still at eight per cent, not more than a thirty-eighth part of their value in 1789, at the commencement of the Revolution. The public treasury was empty; sufficient funds were not to be found in it to fit out a courier. Payments of every description were made in bills or paper securities of some sort, which had already largely anticipated all the legal receipts of government. The armies were supported only by forced requisitions of horses, food, and clothing, which had become as oppressive as during the Reign of Terror. To avoid the forced loans and arbitrary taxation of the wealthier classes, expenditure of every sort had altogether ceased among the better description of citizens; and in France, after ten years of revolution, the concealment of treasure had become as common as in the pachalics of Turkey. Amidst the universal dismay, extortion, pillage, and corruption were general among the servants of government. Places, clothing, provisions, stores; every thing, in short, was sold to satisfy their cupidity; and while every office was openly put up to sale, enormous fortunes were amassed both by the elevated and inferior agents of corruption (2).

(1) *Jom.* xiii. 19, 23.

(2) *Jom.* xiii. 27, 29. *Bour.* iii. 241. *Nap.* i. 106.

The establishment of a firm and powerful government arrested these disorders, and re-established the finances as if by enchantment. The capitalists of Paris, long inaccessible to the demands for loans by the revolutionary government, came forward with 12,000,000 of francs; the sale of the estates of the house of Orange produced 24,000,000 more; national domains to a great extent found purchasers from the increasing confidence in government; and, instead of the forced loans from the opulent classes, which had utterly annihilated credit, and by the flagrant injustice with which they were levied recalled the worst days of the Reign of Terror, a new tax of twenty-five per cent on real property, though a burden that would be deemed intolerable in any state which had tasted of the sweets of real freedom, gave general satisfaction, and soon produced a large increase to the revenue. At the same time the foundations of a sinking fund and a national bank were laid, the public forests put under a new and rigorous direction, monthly remittances from the collectors of taxes established, and the measures commenced which were calculated to revive public credit after a prostration of ten years (1).

*Pacification  
of la Vendée.*

The pacification of la Vendée was the next object of the First Consul. The law of hostages and the forced requisitions had revived the civil war in that country, and sixty thousand men were in the field; but it was a different contest from the terrible burst which, seven years before, had proved so disastrous to the Republican arms. The devastation of the country and destruction of the population by that bloody strife, had annihilated the elements of resistance on any considerable scale; and mere guerilla bands, seldom amounting to two thousand men, traversed the fields in different directions, levying contributions, and held together as much by the love of pillage as indignation at oppression. Through the intervention of Hyde Neuville, an able young man of an ardent disposition, who nevertheless was not misled by the dictates of passion, a negotiation was opened with the leaders of the insurgents; and although they paid but little attention to the first proclamations of Napoléon, yet being soon convinced by the tenor of his administration, that a more equitable system than that of the Revolution was about to commence, they gradually listened to his proposals. At the same time, the approach of formidable forces from all quarters, convinced them that they had now a more difficult antagonist to deal with than the weak though tyrannical Directory. Chatillon and d'Antichamps were the first to give the example of submission; and soon after Suzanet and the Abbé Bernier concluded, at Mount Luçon, a treaty highly honourable to themselves for the termination of hostilities. The able and heroic Count Louis de Frotte was not equally fortunate. He had written a letter to the Republican chief, proposing a general pacification of the Chouans, and was at the place of conference, when the negotiation was protracted beyond the time assigned for the acceptance of terms of peace by the Royalists. He was then perfidiously seized, along with all his followers, on the ground of a letter he had written to an aide-de-camp during the negotiation, and brought before a military tribunal, by which they were im-

*Jan. 17, 1801.*

*Iniquitous  
execution  
of Count  
Louis  
Frotte.*

(1) Nap. i. 107, 110. Jom. xiii. 28.

The injustice committed by these forced loans is one of the most striking instances of the monstrous effects of the democratic ascendancy which, by the Revolution of 18th Fructidor, had obtained in France. They were laid indiscriminately on all property, movable and immovable, and were founded—1. On the amount of the direct contribution; and, 2. on an arbitrary base. Every one who paid 500 francs was taxed at four-tenths of his income;

all who paid 4000 francs and upwards, at its whole amount. The arbitrary base was founded on the opinion of a jury, who were entitled to tax the relations of emigrants or any persons of noble birth at any sum they chose. The effects of so iniquitous a system may be conceived. Property disappeared, or was concealed as studiously as in the dynasties of the East. Every branch of the public revenue was drying up from the extinction of credit.—See *Napoleon*, i. 107, note.

diately ordered to be executed. They underwent the sentence next day, and met death with the most heroic courage, standing erect, with their eyes unbandaged. One of the aides-de-camp was only wounded by the first fire; he coolly ordered the men to fire again, and fell pierced to the earth. The unhappy aide-de-camp whose unfortunate discovery of the letter had occasioned this catastrophe, was seized with such despair that he blew out his brains. This murder is a lasting stain on Napoléon's administration. Frotte was not taken in arms, but perfidiously seized by a company of Republicans, when under an escort of the national troops and engaged in a negotiation for a final pacification; but he was deemed too able to be permitted to survive, even in that age of returning clemency; and the intercepted letter, though imprudent, contained nothing which could warrant the captive's execution. It must be added, however, in justice to Napoléon, that it contained expressions extremely hostile to the First Consul, and that, at the earnest solicitation of his secretary Bourrienne, he had actually made out an order for his pardon, which, from some delay in the transmission, unfortunately arrived too late to save the hero's life. About the same time he generously pardoned M. Defeu, a brave emigrant officer taken in arms against the state, and doomed by the cruel laws of the Republic to instant death (1).

Georges, Bourmont, and some others, maintained for a few weeks longer in Brittany a gallant resistance; but, finding that the inhabitants were weary of civil war, and gladly embraced the opportunity of resuming their pacific occupations, they at length came into the measures of government, and were Feb. 23, 1801. treated with equal clemency and good faith by the First Consul, to whom they ever after yielded a willing and useful obedience. In the end of January, General Brune announced by proclamation that the pacification of la Vendée was complete, and on the 23d of the following month a general and unqualified amnesty was published. The Vendean chiefs were received with great distinction by Napoléon at Malmaison, and generally promoted to important situations (2). The curate Bernier was made Bishop of Orléans, and intrusted afterwards with the delicate task of conducting the negotiation concerning the concordat with the Papal government. The rapid and complete pacification of la Vendée by Napoléon, proves how much the long duration of its bloody and disastrous war had been owing to the cruelty and oppressions of the Republican authorities.

Napoléon effects a reconciliation with the Emperor Paul.

The next important step of Napoléon was to detach Russia completely from the alliance of Great Britain; an attempt which was much facilitated by the angry feelings excited in the mind of the Emperor Paul and his generals by the disastrous issue of the pre-

ceding campaign, and the rising jealousy of the maritime power of Great Britain, which had sprung up from fortuitous events in the minds of the Northern powers, and in the following year led to the most important results. Aware of the favourable turn which affairs in the Baltic had recently taken, Napoléon lost no opportunity of cultivating a good understanding with the Russian Emperor; and, by a series of adroit acts of courtesy, succeeded at length, not only in obliterating all feelings of hostility, but establishing the most perfect understanding between the two cabinets. Napoléon sent back all the Russian prisoners in France, seven thousand in number, who had been taken at Zurich and in Holland, not only without exchange, but equipped anew in the Russian uniform. This politic proceeding was not lost on

(1) Bour. iv. 8, 10. Beauch. iv. 498, 504.

(2) Nap. i. 129, 133. Jom. xiii. 29, 31. Dum. iii. 19, 21. Ann. Reg. 1800, 166.

the Czar, who had been already dazzled by the lustre of Napoléon's victories in Italy and Egypt; a contest of civilities and courtesies ensued, which soon terminated in the dismissal of Lord Whitworth from St.-Petersburg, and the arrival of Baron Springborton, the Russian ambassador, at Paris (1). The British vessels were soon after laid under embargo in the Russian harbour, and that angry correspondence began, which was shortly terminated by the array of all the powers of the North in open hostility against Great Britain.

**His energetic military measures.** The military measures of Napoléon were equally energetic. Upon the refusal of Great Britain to treat, he issued one of his heart-stirring proclamations which were so well calculated to rouse the ardent spirit of the French people. He told them that the English minister had rejected his proposals of peace; that to command it he had need of money, of iron, and soldiers, and that he swore not to combat but for the happiness of France and the peace of the world. This animated address, coupled with the magic that encircled the name of Napoléon, produced an amazing effect. Victory seemed about again to attend the Republican standards, under the auspices of a leader to whom she had never yet proved faithless; the patriotic ardour of 1793 was in part revived, with all the addition which the national strength had since received from the experience of later times. The first class of the conscription for the year 1800 was put in requisition, without any exemption either from rank or fortune; this supply put at the disposal of government one hundred and twenty thousand men. Besides this, a still more efficient force for immediate service, was formed by a summons of all the veterans who had obtained furlough or leave of absence for the eight preceding years, and who, unless furnished with a valid excuse, were required again to serve; a measure which procured a supply of thirty thousand experienced soldiers. At the same time, the *gendarmes* were put on a better footing; and various improvements effected, particularly in the artillery department, which greatly augmented the efficiency of that important arm of the public service. Twenty-five thousand horses, bought in the interior, were distributed among the artillery and cavalry on the frontier, and all the stores and equipments of the armies repaired with a celerity so extraordinary, that it would have appeared incredible, if long experience had not proved, that confidence in the vigour and stability of government operates as rapidly in increasing, as the vacillation and insecurity of democracy does in withering the national resources (2).

**Revival of the military spirit in France.** Far from experiencing the difficulty which had been so severely felt by the Directory in retaining the soldiers to their colours, the consular government was powerfully seconded by the patriotic efforts of all classes. Several brilliant corps of volunteers were formed; and the ranks rapidly filled up by veterans hastening to renew their toils under a leader to whom fortune had hitherto proved so propitious. In consequence, the government soon found itself at the head of two hundred and fifty thousand men to commence hostilities in Italy and Germany, while above one hundred thousand conscripts were rapidly learning the rudiments of war at the depôts in the interior, and before six months might be expected to join the armies on the frontier (3).

But it was not merely in such praiseworthy efforts for the security and pacification of France, that the energies of the First Consul were employed. He already meditated the re-establishment of the monarchy, and early

(1) *Jom.* xiii. 13, 14. *Bour.* iii. 269, 270. *Ann. Reg.* 1800, 234.

(2) *Dum.* iii. 23, 25. *Jom.* xlii. 33, 35.  
(3) *Jom.* xiii. 35. *Dum.* iii. 24, 25.

commenced that system of misleading the people by false epithets, and dazzling them by splendid pageants, which was intended to prepare them for the lustre of the throne, and induce them to concur in the reconstruction of all the parts of the social edifice which it had been the object of the Revolution to destroy.

His measures to distinguish the revolutionary fervour of the people.

To accomplish this object, he applied himself to what he was well aware is at all times, but especially during the decline of revolutionary fervour, the ruling principle of human nature, viz., self-interest. All the officers of state, all the members of the legis-

lature were endowed with ample salaries; even the tribunate, which professed to be the barrier of the people against the encroachments of government, received above L.50,000 a-year among its eighty members, being at the rate of nearly L.700 a-year to each individual who composed it; a very large allowance in a country where the highest civil functionaries, the heads of the law and church, received only from L.300 to L.600 annually (1). From the very first he commenced the demolition of all those ensigns and expressions which recalled the idea of the liberty and equality, from the strife of which his redoubtable power had arisen. The image of the Republic, seated and holding a spear in her hand, which was at the top of all the official letters at the commencement of the consulship, was suppressed. Some doubt existed in the first instance as to which of the consuls should take the chair, and Si yes openly asserted his pretensions to it, in virtue as well of his seniority as his great services in the cause of freedom; but Napol on cut the matter short by stepping into the chair himself, and the jealousy of the elder consul was soon removed by the grant of the large property out of the park of Versailles which has been already mentioned. At the same time, the habiliments and ensigns of authority were changed; the Greek and Roman costumes, which recalled the ideas of equality lately so much in vogue, were abolished and replaced by the military dress; the First Consul appeared on all occasions in uniform, with boots and spurs, and all the inferior military functionaries followed his example. The levees, which he held almost daily, were crowded with officers in full dress; and the court of the first magistrate of the Republic was noways distinguishable from the headquarters of its greatest general. At the same time, the institution of sabres and fusils of merit, as a testimony of reward to military distinction, already shadowed out to the discerning eye the Legion of Honour, and the re-establishment of titles of rank and a hereditary nobility; while the daily reviews with all the pomp and splendour of war, in the Place du Carrousel, accustomed the people to those magnificent pageants which were destined to conceal from their gaze the chains of the empire (2).

Dec. 24, 1799. These measures were all steps, and not unimportant ones, to the re-establishment of monarchical authority. But they were the

(1) The civil list under the First Consul was fixed at the following sums :—

Legislative Body,	2,400,000 francs.
Tribunate,	1,312,000
Archives,	75,000
Three Consuls,	1,800,000
Council of State,	675,000
Their Secretaries,	112,500
Six Ministers,	360,000
Minister of Foreign Affairs,	90,000

6,824,500 francs, or L. 275,000

See BOURNAIENNE, iii. 242.  
(2) Thib, 2, 3. Bour. iii. 243, 255, 256. Nap. i. 243.



prelude only to more important changes. In December, 1799, an important *arrêt* was published, which, on the preamble—"That a part of the journals printed at Paris are instruments in the hands of the enemies of the Republic; and that it is the first duty of the government to watch over its security," decreed, "That the minister of police should not *suffer to be printed*, during the continuance of the war, any journals but the following." Then followed a list of thirteen journals, thus invested with the monopoly of Paris; and from it were only excluded "those *exclusively* devoted to science, the arts, literature, commerce, or advertisements." It was decreed, by a separate article, that "any journal among those retained which inserted any thing contrary to the sovereignty of the people, should be immediately suppressed." This clause, inserted to blind the people to the real tendency of the measure, received in the sequel, as was foreseen at the time, the most liberal interpretation, and was applied, contrary to its obvious meaning, to sanction the extinction of all journals contrary to the consular government. Thus early commenced the system of Napoléon for the coercion of the press; a system which received, during the remainder of his reign, such ample developement; and which, as Madame de Staël justly remarks, converted that great engine, generally considered as the palladium of liberty, into the most powerful instrument of bondage, by perpetually exhibiting a series of false and delusive pictures to the human mind, and excluding all others from the view (1).

He fixes his  
residence at  
the Tuile-  
ries.

The next step of Napoléon was to fix his residence in the Tuileries, and sleep in the ancient apartment of the kings of France. This great change, however, required considerable caution in its accomplishment; it was so palpable an approach towards royalty, that it might shock the feeling of the people, and endanger the newly established authority. Slowly, and with profound dissimulation, therefore, he proceeded in his advances. A fine statue of Brutus was first placed in one of the galleries of the palace; it was thought the most ardent Republicans could apprehend nothing from a change which commenced with honour done to the hero who had slain a tyrant. Orders were next given to repair and put in order the royal apartments in the Tuileries, and under the veil of these words great changes were effected. The *bonnets rouges* were all effaced; the statues which were to adorn the great gallery chosen by Napoléon himself; he selected among the ancients, Démosthènes and Alexander, Brutus and Cæsar; among the moderns, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Condé, Prince Eugène, Marlborough, Marshal Saxe, Frédéric, Washington, Dugommier, Dampierre, and Joubert. At length, the translation of the Consuls from the Luxembourg to the Tuileries took place: the royal apartments were destined for Napoléon, those in the pavilion of Flora for the other Consuls. The *cortége* set out from the Luxembourg, surrounded by a splendid train of officers and three thousand chosen troops, among whom the famous regiment of Guides was peculiarly conspicuous. Napoléon, with the two other Consuls, was drawn in a magnificent chariot by six white horses, the same which the Emperor of Austria had given him after the treaty of Campo Formio; he bore in his hand the splendid sabre presented to him by the same sovereign on that occasion. The cabinet ministers followed in their carriages, the only ones which were to be seen on the occasion, for to transport the council of state they were obliged to have recourse to hackney coaches; such was the miserable destitution in which the Revolution

(1) De Staël, ii. 284. Bour. iii. 254.



had left the highest civil functionaries of France (1). The real luxury of that period consisted in the splendour of the troops, whose brilliant uniforms and prancing chargers formed a painful contrast to the meanness and simplicity of the civil authorities—last and sad effect of revolutionary convulsions, to cast to the earth every thing but the ensigns of military prowess.

Feb. 19,  
1800.

From the opening into the Carrousel, from the quay of the Tuileries to the gate of the palace, the procession passed through a double line of guards : a royal usage, which offered a singular contrast to the inscription on the guard-house by which it passed—"10th August, 1792—Royalty is abolished in France, and will never be re-established." No sooner had he arrived at the foot of the great stair, than Napoléon, allowing the other Consuls to ascend to the presence chamber, mounted on horseback, and, amidst incessant cries of "Vive le Premier Consul!" passed in review above twenty thousand men. Murat was on his right, Lannes on his left; the brilliant staff who surrounded him bore on their visages the marks of the sun of Italy or the sands of Egypt. When the banners of the ninetieth, the forty-third, and thirtieth demi-brigades, which exhibited only bare poles riddled with shot and surmounted by tatters black with powder, were carried past, he bowed with respect to the monuments of military valour. Enthusiastic acclamations rent the skies; and such was the universal transport, that when the review was concluded, and the First Consul ascended to the audience chamber and took his station in the centre of the room, his colleagues were reduced to the rank of pages following his train. On that day royalty was in truth re-established in France, somewhat less than eight years after it had been abolished by the revolt of the 10th August (2).

Commence-  
ment of the  
etiquette  
and splen-  
dour of a  
court.

No sooner was the First Consul established at the Tuileries, than the usages, dress, and ceremonial of a court were at once resumed.

The antechambers were filled with chamberlains, pages, and esquires; footmen in brilliant liveries filled the lobbies and stair-

cases; the levees were conducted with as much splendour as the dilapidated state of most fortunes would permit; and a drawing-room, composed chiefly of the wives of the young generals who had been the companions of Napoléon, and presided over by the grace and good-breeding of Josephine, already revived to a certain degree the lustre of a court. Napoléon was indefatigable in his attention to these matters. He deemed the colour of a livery, the cut of a court-dress not beneath his notice, endeavouring in every way to dazzle the eyes of the vulgar, and efface all recollection of the Republic before it was formally abolished by the authority of government (3). For the same reason, he revived the use of silk stockings in dress, and re-established the balls of the opera, an event which was so great an innovation on the manners of the

(1) Bour. iii 320, 321. Goh. ii. 15, 19. Thib. 2.  
(2) 318, 323. Thib. 2, 3.

On the night of his entry into the Tuileries, Napoléon said to his secretary, "Bourrienne, it is not enough to be in the Tuileries, we must take measures to remain there. Who has not inhabited this palace? It has been the abode of robbers, of members of the Convention. Ah! there is your brother's house, from which, eight years ago, [See vol. i. 159] we saw the good Louis XVI besieged in the Tuileries and carried off into captivity. But you need not fear a repetition of the scene. Let them attempt it with me if they dare." [Bour. iv.]

(3) The King of Prussia was among the first to

recognise the consular government, and Napoléon was highly gratified when an aide-de-camp, whom he dispatched to Berlin, was admitted to the honour of dining at the royal table. M. Lucchesini, in October, 1800, was charged with a special mission to the court of the Tuileries from the Prussian government. The First Consul received him at St. Cloud, and was at the balcony when he arrived. He was much struck with the decorations which he bore, and the rich livery of the servants who attended him: and he was heard to exclaim, "That is imposing; we must have things of that sort to dazzle the people."—See TALLEYRAND, 14—15.

Republic that it created quite a sensation at that period. But Napoléon, in pursuing these measures, knew well the character of the French. "While they are discussing these changes," said he, "they will cease to talk nonsense about my politics, and that is what I want. Let them amuse themselves, let them dance; but let them not thrust their heads into the councils of government. Commerce will revive under the increasing expenditure of the capital. I am not afraid of the Jacobins; I never was so much applauded as at the last parade. It is ridiculous to say that nothing is right but what is new; we have had enough of such novelties. I would rather have the balls of the opera than the saturnalia of the Goddess of Reason (1)."

Recall of  
many emi-  
grants ex-  
iled since  
18th Fructi-  
dor.

About the same time an *arrêt* was published, which took off the sentence of banishment against a great number of those who had been exiled by the result of the 18th Fructidor. It was only provided that they should be under the surveillance of the police, and reside at the places appointed for each respectively in the decree. Among the persons thus restored against an unjust sentence, were many of the most eminent citizens of the Republic: Carnot, Barthélemy, Boissy-d'Anglas, Portalis, Villoul, Joyeuse, and above forty others. He immediately made use of the most eminent of them in the service of the state: Carnot was appointed minister at war in the absence of Berthier, and contributed in a powerful manner to the glorious issue of the succeeding campaign. Barrère also was recalled, and was so desirous to receive employment, that he wrote a long letter justifying his conduct to the First Consul; but the latter never could be persuaded to take into his service that hardened Republican. Those proscribed by the Directory were thus early admitted into favour; at a subsequent period he received with equally open arms the Royalists and the victims of the Revolution; the only faction against which to the last he was inveterate was the remnant of the Jacobin party, who retained throughout all his reign the resolution of their character and the perversity of their opinion (2).

Establish-  
ment of the  
secret  
police.

At the time when Napoléon was placed on the consular throne he organized his *secret police*, intended to act as a check on the public one of Fouché. Duroc was at first at the head of this establishment, to which Junot, as governor of Paris, soon after succeeded. So early did this great leader avail himself of this miserable engine, unknown in constitutional monarchies, the resource of despots, inconsistent with any thing like freedom, but the sad legacy bequeathed to succeeding ages by the convulsions and devastation of the Revolution. The spies and agents of this police and counter-police soon filled every coffee-house and theatre in Paris; they overheard conversations, mingled in groups, encouraged seditious expressions, were to be found in saloons and palaces, and rendered every man insecure, from the monarch on the throne to the captive in the dungeon. Lately appointed governor of Paris, Junot had a multitude of inferior agents in his pay to watch the motions of Fouché, and he, in his turn, carried corruption into the bosom of the consular family, and, by liberally supplying funds for her extravagance, obtained secret information from Joséphine herself (3). This miserable system had survived all the changes to which it gave birth; the formidable engine, organized in the heart of Paris, with its arms extending over all France, is instantly seized upon by each successive faction which

(1) Bour. iii. 263, 264, 319, 326, 327. Thib. 15.  
D'Abr. ii. 265, 280.

(2) Bour. iii. 264, 267.  
(3) Bour. iii. 295, 303.

risks to the head of affairs; the herd of informers and spies is perpetrated from generation to generation, and exercises its prostituted talents for behoof of any government which the armed force of the capital has elevated to supreme power; the people, habituated to this unseen authority, regard it as an indispensable part of regular government; and a system, which was the disgrace of Roman servitude in the corrupted days of the empire, is engrafted on a government which boasts of concentrating within itself all the lights of modern civilisation (1).

Napoleon's  
hypocritical  
eulogy on  
Washington.

"Augustus knew well," says Gibbon, "that mankind are governed by names; and that they will in general submit to real slavery, if they are told that they are in the enjoyment of freedom."

No man understood this principle better than Napoléon. While he was preparing, by fixing his residence in the royal palace, the appointments of the legislature by the executive, the suppression of the liberty of the press, and the establishment of a vigilant police for the overthrow of all the principles of the Revolution, he was careful to publish to the world proclamations which still breathed the spirit of democratic freedom. Shortly before

his installation in the Tuileries, intelligence arrived of the death of Washington, the illustrious founder of American independence.

He immediately published the following order of the day to the army:—

"Washington is dead! That great man has struggled with tyranny; he consolidated the liberty of his country. His memory will be ever dear to the French people, as to all free men in both hemispheres, who, like him and the American soldiers, have fought for liberty and equality. As a mark of respect, the First Consul orders, that for ten days black crape shall be suspended from all the standards and banners of the Republic." Thus, by the skilful use of high-sounding names and heart-stirring recollections, did this

Comparison  
of his sys-  
tem of go-  
vernment  
with that  
established  
by Constan-  
tine in the  
Byzantine  
empire.

(1) The circumstances of the Roman empire, as remodelled by Constantine, afford a striking analogy to those of France when Napoléon ascended the throne; and it is curious to observe how exactly the previous destruction of the nobility and higher classes in the two countries paved the way, by necessary consequence, for the same

despotic institutions. "The Patrician families," says Gibbon, "whose original numbers were never recruited till the end of the commonwealth, either failed in the ordinary course of nature, or were extinguished in so many foreign or domestic wars. Few remained who could derive their genuine origin from the foundation of the city, when Caesar and Augustus, Claudius and Vespasian, created a countless number of new Patrician families. But these artificial supplies, in which the reigning house was always included, were rapidly swept away by the rage of tyrants, by frequent revolutions, the change of manners, and the intermixture of nations. Little more was left, when Constantine ascended the throne, than a vague and imperfect tradition that the Patricians had once been the first among the Romans. To form a body of nobles whose influence may restrain, while it secures the authority of the monarch, would have been very inconsistent with the character and policy of Constantine; but had he seriously entertained such a design, it might have exceeded the measure of his power to ratify, by an arbitrary edict, an institution which must expect the sanction of time and opinion. He revived, indeed, the title of patricians; but he revived it as a personal, not an hereditary distinction. They yielded only to the transient authority of the annual consuls;

but they enjoyed the pre-eminence over all the great officers of state. This honourable rank was bestowed on them for life, and as they were usually favourites and ministers at the imperial court, the true etymology of the word was perverted by ignorance and flattery, and the patricians of Constantine were revered as the adopted fathers of the emperor and the republic.

"The police insensibly assumed the license of reporting whatever they could observe of the conduct, either of magistrates or private citizens, and were soon considered as the eyes of the monarch and the scourge of the people. Under the warm influence of a feeble reign, they multiplied to the incredible number of 10,000, disdained the mild though frequent admonitions of the laws, and exercised in the profitable management of the posts a rapacious and insolent oppression. These official spies, who corresponded with the palace, were encouraged with reward and favour anxiously to watch the progress of every treasonable design, from the faint and latent symptoms of disaffection, to the actual preparation of open revolt. Their careless or criminal violation of truth and justice was covered by the consecrated mask of zeal; and they might securely aim their poisoned arrows at the breast either of the innocent or the guilty, who had provoked their resentment or refused to purchase their silence. A faithful subject of Syria, perhaps, or Britain, was exposed to the danger, or at least to the dread, of being dragged in chains to the court of Milan or Constantinople, to defend his life and fortune against the malicious charges of these privileged informers." This might pass for a description of the Conservative Senate and police of Napoléon.—See Gibbon, ch. xvii.

great master of the art of dissimulation veil his advances towards absolute power, and engraft an enthusiastic admiration for his despotic government on the turbulent passions which had been nourished by the Revolution (1).

Commence-  
ment of his  
great designs  
for architec-  
tural embel-  
lishment at  
Paris.

The mind of Napoléon was equally great in every thing which it undertook. He had early conceived an admiration for architectural decoration, which his residence among the stately monuments of Egypt had converted into a chastened and elevated passion. His present situation, as chief of the French government, gave him ample room for the indulgence of this truly regal disposition, and he already began to conceive those great designs for the embellishment of Paris and improvement of France, which have thrown such durable lustre over his reign. The inconceivable activity of his mind seemed to take a pleasure in discovering new objects for exertion; and at a time when he was conducting the diplomacy of Europe, and regulating all the armies of France, he was maturing plans for the construction of roads, bridges, and canals through all its wide extent, and setting on foot those great works which have given such splendour to its capital. He early selected M. Fontaine and M. Pérrier as the instruments of his designs, and, aided by the suggestions of these able architects, the embellishment of the metropolis proceeded at an accelerated pace. The formation of a quay on the banks of the Seine, opposite to the Tuileries, near the Quai Voltaire, first removed a deformity which had long been felt in looking from the windows of the palace, and the clearing out of the Place du Carrousel next suggested the idea of uniting the Louvre and Tuileries, and forming a vast square between those two sumptuous edifices. At first it was proposed to construct a building across the vacant area, in order to conceal the oblique position in which they stood to each other; but this idea was soon abandoned, as Napoléon justly observed, that "no building, how majestic soever, could compensate for a vast open space between the Louvre and Tuileries." The construction of a fourth side, for the great square opposite to the picture gallery, was therefore commenced, and the demolition of the edifices in the interior soon after began; a great undertaking, which the subsequent disasters of his reign prevented him from completing, and which all the efforts of succeeding sovereigns have not been able as yet to bring to a conclusion. The Pont-des-Arts, between the Louvre and the Palace of the Institute, was commenced about the same time, and the demolition of the convents of the Feuillans and Capucines made way for the Rue de Rivoli, which now forms so noble a border to the gardens of the Tuileries. Malmaison at this time was the favourite country residence of the First Consul; but he already meditated the establishment of his court at St.-Cloud, and the apartments of that palace began to be fitted up in that sumptuous style which has rendered them unequalled in all the palaces of France (2).

Suppression  
of the fête  
on 21st Ja-  
nuary, and  
elevation of  
Tronchet.

The First Consul did not as yet venture openly to break with the Republican party, but he lost no opportunity of showing in what estimation he held their principles. On occasion of the establishment of the Court of Cassation, the supreme tribunal of France, he said to Bourrienne,—“I do not venture as yet to take any decided step against the regicides; but I will show what I think of them. To-morrow I shall be engaged with Abrial in the formation of the Tribunal of Cassation. Target, who is its president, declined to defend Louis XVI: Whom do you

(1) Thib. 2, 3. Bour. iii. 278.

(2) Thib. 2, 3. Bour. iv. 46, 56.

suppose I am about to name in his place? Tronchet, who so nobly discharged that perilous duty. They may say what they choose; my mind is made up." Tronchet accordingly received the appointment so richly deserved by his heroic conduct. The commemoration of the murder of Louis XVI was at the same time suppressed, and concerts of sacred music were permitted on Sundays at the Opera. Thus, though the Republican calendar was still observed, an approach was made to the ancient mode of measuring time in the public amusements (1).

Correspondence between Napoleon and Louis XVIII.

Louis XVIII at this time wrote several letters to Napoléon, in which he expressed the high esteem in which he held his character, and offered him any situation which he chose to fix on under the government, if he would aid in re-establishing the throne of the Bourbons. Napoléon replied in firm but courteous terms, declining to have any connexion with the exiled family (2). He clearly foresaw, with admirable sagacity, all the difficulties which would attend the restoration of that unfortunate family, and felt no inclination to make way for such an event. "The partisans of the Bourbons," said he, "are much mistaken if they imagine that I am the man to play the part of Monk. I am not insensible to the hazard to which France may be one day exposed from my decease without issue, as my brothers are evidently unfit for such a throne; but consider the absurdity of the propositions which they have made to me. How could we secure so many new interests and vested rights against the efforts of a family returning with eighty thousand emigrants, and all the prejudices of fanaticism? What would become of the holders of national domains, and all those who had taken an active part in the Revolution? The Bourbons would conceive they had conquered by force; all their professions and promises would give way before the possession of power. My part is taken; no one but a fool would place any reliance upon them (3)."

General improvement in the prospects of France.

Thus, on all sides, the prospects of France rapidly brightened under the auspices of Napoléon. To the insecurity, distrust, and terror which had paralysed all the efforts of patriotism under the Direc-

(1) Bour. iv. 68, 70.

(2) The letter of Louis XVIII was in these terms:—  
Feb. 4. "For long, general, you must have known the esteem in which I hold you. If you doubt my gratitude, fix upon the place you desire for yourself; point out the situations which you wish for your friends. As to my principles, they are those of the French character. Clemency on principle accords with the dictates of reason."

"No—the victor of Lodi, Castiglione, and Arcola, the conqueror of Italy and Egypt can never prefer a vain celebrity to true glory. But you are losing the most precious moments. We could secure the happiness of France. I say we, for I require Bonaparte for such an attempt and he could not achieve it without me. General, Europe observes you—glory awaits you, and I am impatient to restore peace to my people."

Napoléon replied:—

Sept. 24. 1800. "I have received, sir, your letter. I thank you for the obliging expressions which it contains regarding myself."

"You should renounce all hope of returning to France. You could not do so, but over the bodies of one hundred thousand Frenchmen. Sacrifice your interest to the repose and happiness of France. History will duly appreciate your conduct in so doing."

"I am not insensible to the misfortunes of your

family, and shall learn with pleasure that you are surrounded with every thing which can secure the tranquillity of your retreat."

This answer was not dispatched for seven months after the receipt of the letter from Louis, and when the Congress of Lunéville was about to open.—See BOURBONNEN, iv. 77—79.

Not disconcerted with this repulse, the Bourbon family endeavoured to open a negotiation with Napoléon, through the Duchess of Guiche, a lady of great beauty and abilities, who found no difficulty in penetrating to Joséphine, and conveying to her the propositions of the exiled family, which were, that he should, on restoring them, be made Constable of France and receive the principality of Corsica. Napoléon no sooner heard of it than he ordered the fascinating duchess to leave Paris in twenty-four hours; an order which gave great satisfaction to Joséphine, who already had become somewhat uneasy at the proximity of so charming a personage. It had been proposed that a splendid pillar should be erected on the Place du Carrousel, surmounted by a statue of Napoléon crowning the Bourbons. "Nothing was wanting," said Napoléon, "to such a design except that the pillar should be founded on the dead body of the First Consul."—LAS CAS. i. 289, 290, and CAPEFIGUE, i. 140.

(3) Bour. iv. 72, 83. Capefigue, Hist. de la Restauration, i. 137, 141.

tory, succeeded confidence, energy, and hope; genius emerged from obscurity to take an active part in public affairs; corruption and profligacy ceased to poison every branch of administration. There is nothing more striking in European history than the sudden resurrection of France under the government of this great man, or more descriptive of the natural tendency of human affairs to right themselves after a period of disorder, and the general disposition of all classes, when taught wisdom by suffering, to resume that place in society for which they were destined by nature, and in which alone their exertions can add to the sum of general felicity.

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## CHAPTER XXXI.

## CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO.

FROM THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN TO THE ARMISTICE OF ALEXANDRIA.

MARCH—JULY, 1800.

## ARGUMENT.

Disposition of the French Armies at the Opening of the Campaign—Formation of the French Army of Reserve—Forces of the Imperialists—Plan of the Austrians for the Campaign—And of the First Consul—Position of Kray's Forces in Germany—And of Moreau's Troops—First Movements of the French General—Irresolution of the Austrian Generals in consequence—Moreau advances against their Centre—Battle of Engen—Victory of the French—Its great Results—Retreat of Kray—Battle of Moeskirch—It at length terminates in the Defeat of the Imperialists—Perilous Situation of St.-Cyr on the following day—Affair of Biberach—Kray retreats to the Intrenched Camp at Ulm—Advantages of that Position—Kray keeps the Field with part of his Force—Great Strength of the Intrenched Camp—Measures of Moreau to dislodge him from it—Vigorous stroke of the Austrian General against the Left Wing of the French—Increasing Perplexity of Moreau—He in vain moves round to Augsburg—He next advances on the Left Bank of the Danube—Imminent risk of the French Left—At length Moreau cuts off his Communications—The Passage of the Danube is effected by the French—Severe Action at Hochstedt—Kray is at length obliged to evacuate Ulm and reaches Nordlingen—Moreau occupies Munich—Kray crosses the Danube and descends the right bank to Landshut—And falls back behind the Inn—Operations against the Prince of Reuss in the Tyrol—Feldkirch is carried by the Republicans—Armistice of Parsdorf in Germany—Extreme suffering of the French on the Summit of the Maritime Alps—Masséna is appointed to the Command—Napoléon's Proclamation to these Troops—Energetic Measures taken to restore order—Positions of the Austrians—Description of Genoa—Measures taken for its Blockade by Land and Sea—Successful Attack of the Imperialists on the French Position—Suchet is separated from the main body and driven back towards France—Desperate and successful Sortie of Masséna—His disposition for re-opening his Communications with Suchet—Austrian Measures to prevent it, which prove successful—Continued Successes of the Imperialists—Masséna is finally driven into Genoa—Defeat of Suchet by Elnitz—Who is driven over the Var into France—General Attack by Ott on the French Positions round Genoa—Which, at first successful, is finally repulsed by Masséna—Successful Sally of the French—Which leads to another, in which they are defeated and Soult made prisoner—Siege is converted into a Blockade—Extreme want of the Inhabitants—A fresh Sortie is defeated—Agonies endured by the Inhabitants—Masséna at length surrenders—Mélas sets out to meet Napoléon—Allies advance to Nice—Description of Suchet's Position on the Var—Attack by the Austrians on it, which is repulsed—Fresh Attack, and final Repulse of them—Formation of the Army of Reserve by Napoléon—Skillful Measures taken to conceal its Strength—Description of the Passage of the St.-Bernard—Napoléon resolves to hazard the Passage—Measures taken for the crossing of the Artillery—Passage of the Mountains—Comparison of the Passage of the Alps by Hannibal, Napoléon, Suwarrow, and Macdonald—The Army is stopped in the Valley of Aosta by the Fort of Bard—Great Skill with which the Obstacle was evaded by the French Engineers—Passage of the St.-Gothard and Mount Cinis by the Wings of the Army of Reserve—Mélas in haste concentrates his Army—Different Plans which lay open to Napoléon—He resolves to occupy Milan—His Advance into Lombardy, and Capture of that City—He spreads his Forces over Lombardy, and addresses a Proclamation to his Soldiers—Napoléon advances to meet Melas, who concentrates his forces at Alexandria—The French Vanguard comes up with the Austrians at Montebello—Desperate and Bloody Action there, in which the Austrians are worsted—Position of the French Army in the Pass at Stradella between the Apennines and the Po—Disastrous Retreat of Elnitz from the Var—Gallant Resolution of Melas to cut his way through Napoléon's Army—Arrival of Desaix from Egypt at Napoléon's Headquarters—Preparatory Movements of both parties—Forces assembled on both sides—Battle of Marengo—Early Success of the Austrians—The French Reserves are brought into action under Desaix—After a gallant Charge he, too, is defeated—Decisive Charge of Kellermann converts a Rout into a Victory—Final Defeat of the Aus-

trians—Loss sustained on both sides—Melas proposes a Suspension of Arms—Armistice of Alexandria—Its immense Results—Is faithfully observed by the Austrians—Napoléon returns to Milan—And then to Paris—Reflections on this Campaign—Great Changes in human affairs are never owing to trivial causes—Extraordinary Resurrection of France on the accession of Napoléon—Causes of the Disasters of the Campaign to the Imperialists—Important Effect of Central Fortifications in a State—Merits of Napoléon in the Campaign—And of the Austrian Commanders—Inexpediency of receiving Battle in the Oblique Order—Inactivity of Abercromby's Corps at this crisis considered.

**Disposition of the French armies at the opening of the campaign.** THE French forces were disposed, previous to the commencement of hostilities, in the following manner:—The army of Italy, which occupied the crest of the Alps from the neighbourhood of Genoa to Mont-Cenis, was thirty-six thousand strong, of which twenty-eight thousand were assembled in Liguria, from the Trebbia to the Col di Tende, to guard the passes of the Apennines and protect Genoa from the Imperial forces, which were grouped in the plain round the walls of Alexandria. These troops, however, were for the most part in the most miserable condition; their spirits were depressed by a campaign of unprecedented disaster, their clothing was worn out, their feet bare, their artillery broken down, their cavalry dismounted, and it required all the efforts of St.-Cyr and their other officers during the winter to retain them at their colours (1).

**Formation of the French army of reserve.** The army of Germany, which was afterwards called the army of the Danube, was 128,000 strong, including 16,000 cavalry, of which immense force 103,090 men, including 14,000 horse, could be relied on for active operations. An army of reserve of 30,000 men was at the same time formed, the head-quarters of which were nominally at Dijon, but the bulk of the force was in reality disposed at Geneva, Lausanne, and the other towns which lay between the Jura and the Alps. This reserve was destined either to support the army of Italy or that of Germany, as circumstances required, and it was formed of 20,000 veteran troops, brought from Holland, under Brune, to la Vendée, which the pacification of that district rendered disposable for offensive operations, and 30,000 conscripts, directed to that quarter from the central dépôts. These troops traversed France, with drums beating and colours flying, in the finest order, and their splendid appearance contributed much to revive the martial ardour of the people, which the disasters of the preceding campaigns had so seriously impaired. Berthier received the command of this army, and gave up the portfolio of minister of war to Carnot, whom Napoléon sought out in exile to fill that important situation (2).

**Forces of the Imperialists.** On the other hand, the Imperialists had collected 96,000 men in Piedmont and at the foot of the Maritime Alps, besides 20,000, who were dispersed in garrisons in the states of Venice, Lombardy, and Tuscany. Their forces in Germany were still more considerable, amounting to 92,000 men, including 18,000 superb cavalry, and they were followed by above 400 pieces of artillery. This was independent of the troops of Bavaria and the minor states in the English pay, which amounted to 20,000 more, making in all 112,000 men. This great force, however, was scattered over an immense line, 200 miles long, from the Alps to the Maine, insomuch that, in the valley of the Danube, which was the decisive point of the whole, as it at once led to the Hereditary States, Kray could only assemble 45,000 men to resist the 75,000 which Moreau could direct against that point. The great error of the Austrians in this campaign consisted in supposing that Italy was the quarter where the decisive attack was to be made, and collecting in consequence the

(1) Jom. xiii. 48. St.-Cyr, Hist. Mil. ii. 84, 102.

(2) Jom. xiii. 111. Dum. iii. 25, 27. St.-Cyr. i. 102.

greater part of their reserves in that country; whereas the valley of the Danube was the place where danger was really to be apprehended, and where the principal forces of the Republicans were collected. But they were deceived by the great successes of the preceding campaign; they were ignorant or incredulous of the rapid change produced on the French armies by the seizure of supreme power by Napoléon; and were dreaming of conquests on the Var and in Provence, when their redoubtable adversary was already meditating strokes in the heart of Bavaria (1).

Plan of the Austrians. The plan of the Austrians was to resume the offensive vigorously in Italy, where the great numerical superiority of Melas, as well as the warlike and experienced quality of the troops he commanded, promised the most important results; to throw Masséna back into Genoa, and capture that important city; drive the French over the Maritime Alps, and carry the war into the heart of Provence. To co-operate with this design, an English expedition, having twelve thousand troops on board, was to proceed to the Mediterranean, and aid the Imperialists either in the south of France or the Maritime Alps. This being the quarter where active operations were to be undertaken, the war in Germany was intended to be merely defensive, and rather to occupy a considerable army of the enemy on the Rhine than to make any serious impression on his territories in that quarter (2).

And of the First Consul. On his side, Napoléon determined to prosecute the war vigorously where the Austrians proposed only to pursue defensive measures, and to liberate Italy by the blows struck at the Hereditary States in the heart of Germany. The possession of Switzerland, like a central fortress, gave the French the advantage of being able to take the line of the enemy's operations in rear, either in Italy or Swabia. Napoléon had intrusted the command of the army of Germany to Moreau, a generous proceeding towards so formidable a rival, but which his great military talents, and the unbounded confidence of the soldiers of the army of the Rhine in his capacity, as well as the important services which he had rendered to the First Consul on the 18th Brumaire, rendered indispensable. The plan which he proposed to his great lieutenant was to assemble all his forces in the neighbourhood of Schaffhausen, cross the Rhine by four bridges near that town, move directly in an imposing mass on Ulm, and thus turn the left of the Imperialists, and take in rear all the Austrians placed between the Rhine and the defiles of the Black Forest. By this means he hoped that the army, in a week after the opening of the campaign, would be at Ulm, and such of the Imperialists as escaped would have no alternative but to throw themselves into Bohemia, leaving Vienna and the Hereditary States to their fate. That these brilliant anticipations were not chimerical, is proved by the result of the campaigns of 1805 and 1809; and so strongly was Napoléon impressed with their importance, that he at one time entertained the project of putting himself at the head of the army of the Danube, and directing the army of reserve to its support, which would have brought a force of a hundred and eighty thousand men to bear upon the Austrian line in Germany. But Moreau would not submit to the indignity of acting as second in command to his former rival (3); and the disposition of his troops was too republican, and their attachment to their general too strong, to render it prudent to run the risk of revolt in so powerful an army, even for the sake of the greatest external advantages. An angry

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 334. Nap. i. 185, 161. Jom. xiii. 52, 113. St.-Cyr, ii. 108, 137.

(2) Nap. i. 162. Jom. xiii. 41, 42.

(3) He said, "I have no notion of seeing a little

Louis XIV at the head of my army. If the First Consul takes the command, I will send in my resignation."—St.-Cyr, ii. 103. *Hist. Mil.*

discussion took place between the two generals, which terminated in the retention of the supreme command by Moreau, and the adoption of a modified plan for the campaign in Germany, in lieu of the brilliant but hazardous one projected by the First Consul; and in consequence Napoléon resolved to direct the army of reserve to Italy, and in person renew the struggle on the scene of his former triumphs on the plains of Piedmont (1).

At this period the army of the Rhine was far from cordially supporting the government of the First Consul. Independent of the republican principles with which, in common with all the other French troops, they were more or less imbued, they were in a peculiar manner jealous of the audacious general who had placed himself at the head of affairs, and seized the sceptre which they thought would have been more worthily held by his more disinterested rival. Any attempt to displace Moreau from the command of this great army would probably have led to a collision, which might have proved fatal to the infant authority of Napoléon (2).

Position of  
Kray's  
forces in  
Germany.

Field-marshal Kray had his headquarters at Donauschingen; but his chief magazines were in the rear of his army, at Stockach, Egen, Moeskirch, and Biberach. The right wing, twenty-six thousand strong, under the command of Starray, rested on the Maine; its headquarters were at Heidelberg, and it guarded the line of the Rhine from the Renchen to the Maine. The left, under the orders of the Prince of Reuss, was in the Tyrol; it consisted of twenty-six thousand men, besides seven thousand militia, and occupied the Rheinthal and the shores of the lake of Constance. The centre, forty-three thousand strong, under the command of Kray in person, was stationed behind the Black Forest in the environs of Villingen and Donauschingen; its advanced posts occupied all the passes of that woody range, and observed the course of the Rhine from the lake of Constance to the neighbourhood of Kehl; while fifteen thousand men, under Keinmayer, guarded the passes from the Renchen to the Valley of Hell, and formed the link which connected the centre and right wing (3). Thus, though the Imperialists were nearly one hundred and ten thousand strong, they were stationed at such a distance from each other as to be incapable of rendering any effectual aid in case of need; and were rather to be regarded as three separate armies, the largest of which could not bring above forty thousand men into the field at any one point.

Positions of  
Moreau's  
troops.

The French army, at the opening of the campaign, was also divided in three corps. The right, thirty-two thousand strong, under Lecourbe, occupied the cantons of Switzerland from the St.-Gothard to Basle, won at the expense of so much blood in the preceding campaign, from the Imperialists; the centre, under Gouvion St.-Cyr, who was transferred to that command from the army of Genoa, consisted of twenty-nine thousand men, and occupied the left bank of the Rhine, from New Brisach to Plobsheim; the left, under Sainte-Suzanne, twenty-one thousand strong, extended from Kehl to Haguenau. Independent of these, Moreau himself was at the head of a reserve, consisting of twenty-eight thousand men, which was assembled in the neighbourhood of Basle, and which, if added to either of the divisions of the army, would give it a decided preponderance over that of the enemy to which it was opposed. Thus Moreau could, by uniting the reserve and centre, bring nearly sixty thousand men to bear upon the Austrian force of forty thousand in the same quarter; an immense advantage, which was speedily

(1) Nap. i. 163, 164. St.-Cyr, ii. 103, 104. Jom. xiii. 36, 37. Dum. iii. 84, 85. Bul. Feldzug, Ma-reugo, 17, 18.

(2) St.-Cyr, ii. 102. Dum. iii. 84, 85, 86.

(3) St.-Cyr, ii. 107, 108. Jom. xiii. 112, 113. Nap. i. 161, 162.

turned to the best account by that able commander. Besides these great forces, the French general had at his disposal the garrisons of the fortresses of Switzerland, Landau, and Spires; the division of Mayence, commanded by Laval, and the troops of the fifth and twenty-sixth military divisions, forming an aggregate of thirty-two thousand men additional, which might be termed the reserves of the army; while the possession of the bridges of Kehl, New Brisach (1), and Basle, gave him the means of crossing the Rhine when, ever he deemed it most advisable.

First move-  
ments of the  
French  
General.

It was part of the plan of Napoléon to detach sixteen thousand men under Moncey, from Lecourbe's wing stationed in Switzerland, in order to take a share in the great operations which he meditated in the Italian plains; and therefore it was of importance that Moreau should early resume the offensive, both in order to take advantage of his numerical superiority before that detachment took place, and operate as a diversion to the army of Italy, which it was foreseen would soon be hard pressed by Melas in the mountains of Genoa. Orders, therefore, were transmitted to him to open the campaign without delay, and every thing was ready for a forward movement by the 24th April. The plan finally arranged between Moreau and the First Consul was to make a feint on the left against the corps of Keinmayer and the enemy's right; and having thus drawn their attention to that quarter, accumulate all his disposable forces against the Imperial centre, and overwhelm it by a concentration of the French left wing, centre, and reserve. By this means he hoped to break through the Austrian line of defence with a preponderating force, and, after a single battle, cut off their communication with the Tyrol and Italy, and force them back, after losing their magazines at Moeskirch and Engen, to a disadvantageous defensive on the banks of the Danube (2).

The better to conceal this able design, Moreau, for some days before the army was put in motion, made the greatest demonstrations against the enemy's right. Every thing was prepared for the head-quarters at Colmar, and it was publicly announced that the reserve was to be directed against Keinmayer and the Valley of Hell. Meanwhile, the columns moved to the different points assigned to them, and on the 25th, at daybreak, Sainte-Suzanne crossed the bridge of Kehl, at the head of sixteen thousand men, and drove in the advanced posts of Keinmayer towards the entrance of the Black Forest. On the same day, the centre crossed at New Brisach, under the orders of St.-Cyr, and advanced towards Freyburg. Kray upon this moved a considerable part of his centre and reserves to the support of Keinmayer; but Sainte-Suzanne having thus executed his feint, suddenly remeasured his steps, recrossed the Rhine at Kehl, and advanced by forced marches to New Brisach, where he crossed again and formed a second line in the rear of St.-Cyr. On the 25th, Moreau also crossed at Basle with the reserve, and moved in the direction of Lauffenburg (3).

Resolution  
of the Aus-  
trian Gen-  
erals in con-  
sequence.

These different and apparently contradictory movements, threw the Austrian generals into the greatest perplexity. Uncertain where the storm was likely really to burst, they adopted the ruinous resolution of guarding equally every point; and still inclining to the belief that the right and the Valley of Hell were really threatened, they retained thirty thousand men, under Starray and Keinmayer, on the right, and twenty-five thousand on the left in the rocks of the Voralberg, while their centre and

(1) Jom. xiii. 110—111. St.-Cyr, ii. 109—110.

(3) St.-Cyr. ii. 120, 129. Dum, iii. 94, 99. Jom.

(2) Nap. i. 165. Jom. xiii. 116, 117. Dum, iii. xiii. 120, 125.



reserve, now reduced to forty thousand men, were menaced by an attack by Sainte-Suzanne, Moreau, and St.-Cyr, at the head of seventy thousand combatants. The two following days were employed in concentrating his forces between Kehl and Freyburg; and the better to distract the enemy, Lecourbe soon after crossed the Rhine, with the right wing, at Paradis and Richlingen, and, after throwing a bridge over at Stein, advanced towards Engen and Stockach. On the same day, the inaccessible fort of Hohenstohel capitulated without firing a shot, and the left of Lecourbe entered into communication with Moreau and St.-Cyr. Thus the whole French army, with the exception of two divisions of the left wing which observed Keimayer and Starray, were converging towards the Imperial magazines at Engen and Moeskirch, which it was evident could not be saved but by a battle fought against most unequal odds (1).

Ably profiting by the great advantages already gained, Moreau directed Lecourbe to move towards Stockach, in order to turn the centre of the enemy and cut off their communication with the left wing under the Prince of Reuss, while he himself, with the centre, reserve, and part of Sainte Suzanne's corps, moved directly upon the town of Engen, which it was anticipated would not be abandoned without a struggle, on account of the valuable magazines which it contained. Kray, on his part, assembled all the disposable force he could command in front of Engen, where he resolved to give battle, to gain time for the evacuation of his magazines upon Moeskirch. But while he was concentrating his forces in that central position, the Prince of Lorraine, who formed the communication between the Austrian centre and left wing, and was retiring with inferior forces before Lecourbe, was suddenly assailed by the French advanced guard, under Molitor, and the cavalry of Nansouty, and entirely routed. Three thousand prisoners and eight pieces of cannon were the immediate results of this brilliant affair; but it became still more important by the capture of Stockach, with all its magazines, directly in rear of the position of Kray in front of Engen (2).

On the same day on which this important success was gained on the right, the French centre, under Moreau in person, encountered the Austrian main body in the vast plain which lies before that town. Kray, with forty thousand men, was there in position, and the cavalry, above nine thousand strong, presented the most imposing spectacle, drawn up in echelon in front of the town. His design was to attack in front himself, at the head of the reserve and part of the centre, while St.-Cyr, with his division, was directed to turn the left of the enemy. But that general being five leagues in the rear, could not come up until a late hour of the day; and Moreau, apprehensive lest, if the attack were delayed, the enemy would retreat, commenced the action himself at the head of thirty-two thousand men. The chief efforts of the French general were directed to gain possession of a plateau on the right of the Imperialists, which would both command their line of retreat and facilitate his own junction with St.-Cyr, but he encountered the most stubborn resistance. Kray had skilfully availed himself of all the advantages which the ground afforded him in that quarter; and for long all the efforts of the Republicans were unable to drive back their opponents from the vineyards and wooded heights, which they had occupied in force, and surmounted with a numerous artillery. At length, the French carried the peak

(1) Nap. i. 166. Jom. xiii. 125, 129. Dum, iii, 98, 101. St.-Cyr, ii. 131, 137.

(2) Nap. i. 167. Jom. xiii. 132, 133. Dum. ii. 107, 109. St.-Cyr, ii. 157, 158.



of Hohenhowen, the most elevated point on the field of battle, and the Imperialists retired to the village of Ehingen. To restore the combat, the Austrian general strongly reinforced that important post, while Moreau brought up his reserve to expel the enemy from it. At first the Republicans were successful, and the village was carried; but Kray having charged in person at the head of the Hungarian grenadiers, they were driven out with great slaughter, and fled to the plain in the greatest confusion. Moreau instantly advancing to the spot, succeeded in restoring a certain degree of order, and in part regained the ground which had been lost, but the Hungarians continued to hold the village, and at nightfall all the avenues to it were still in their possession (1).

**Victory of the French.** Meanwhile the division of Richepanse, which had established itself on the peak of Hohenhowen, was exposed to a furious attack from the Austrian right; the summit of the mountain resembled a volcano, which vomited forth fire in every direction; and it was easy to see, from the intensity of the light, which, as the twilight approached, illuminated the heavens in that direction, that it was only by the greatest efforts that he could maintain his ground. At seven o'clock, however, the vanguard of the corps of St.-Cyr, which had met with the greatest difficulties in the course of its march, and had been compelled to fight his way against Nauendorf's division through strong defiles, arrived in the field, and soon after began to take a part in the action. The combat now became more equal, and though the fire of artillery on both sides continued extremely violent, it was evident that the enemy fought only to gain time to withdraw his stores and ammunition. In fact, at this hour the Austrian general received intelligence of the defeat of the Prince of Lorraine and the capture of Stockach, which threatened his line of communications (2). He therefore drew off his forces in the direction of Liptingen and Moeskirch, where he formed a junction with that prince, who had retreated with the remains of his division in the same direction.

**Its great results.** The loss of the Austrians in this battle was above seven thousand men, and that of the French was as great, but the moral consequences of the success with which it terminated to the Republicans, were incalculable. It at once raised the spirit of the army, and produced that confidence in themselves, which is the surest prelude to still greater success. Kray finding that the intentions of the enemy were now fully proclaimed, and that he had on his hands the whole strength of the French army, made the utmost efforts when too late to concentrate his forces. Keinmayer was advancing with the greatest expedition by the Valley of Hell, while Starray had received orders to hasten to the decisive point, leaving only six thousand in the neighbourhood of Mannheim to observe the enemy's forces in that quarter. Moreau having received intelligence of this intended concentration of force, resolved to make the most of his present advantages, and attack the Austrians before they received any farther reinforcements. On the 4th, the Imperialists retired to a strong position in front of Moeskirch; the whole front of their line was covered by a great ravine, which descends from Hendorf to Moeskirch, and its left by the Ablach, a rocky stream which flows in a rapid course into the Danube; the cavalry, and a reserve of eight battalions of grenadiers, were stationed on the heights of Rohrdorf. Powerful batteries commanded the chaussée which approached the village, and by their concentric fire seemed to render all access impossible. In this

**Retreat of Kray.**

(1) Dum. iii. 110, 114. Jom. xiii. 134, 139. St.-Cyr, ii. 156, 161.

(2) Dum. iii. 114, 116. Jom. xiii. 139, 141. St.-Cyr, ii. 158, 179.

formidable position were collected forty thousand foot soldiers, and twelve thousand splendid cavalry, besides above two hundred pieces of cannon (1).

**Battle of Moerskirch.** Though Moreau had ordered Lecourbe to join him with all his disposable force, in order to take a part in the general action which was approaching, yet he had not contrived matters so as to bring all his forces into the field at the same time. The consequence was, that Lecourbe, with that portion of his corps which had not taken a part in the action of the preceding day, first commenced the attack. He advanced with the greatest intrepidity to the assault of his old antagonist the Prince of Lorraine; but he was received by so tremendous a fire from the cross batteries which Kray had established on the heights, that his artillery was instantly dismounted, and he himself compelled to take refuge in the neighbouring woods to avoid the merciless storm. Moreau, upon this, brought forward the division Lorges, and attacked the position by its left and the village of Hendorf; but the attacking columns having been assailed by the enemy's masses, who suddenly debouched from behind their batteries, were thrown into confusion and entirely routed. Encouraged by this success, Kray made a sally with his right wing, and advanced into the plain; but it was received in so resolute a manner by the French left, that he was not only compelled to retire, but the victorious Republicans recovered all the ground they had lost, and the village was carried by their pursuing columns, who entered pell-mell with the fugitives. At the same time, Vandamme, with the Republican right, advanced against the Imperial left, and attacked the village of Moeskirch; the Austrians defended it with the utmost resolution, and it was taken and retaken several times: at length Lecourbe formed his division into four columns, which advanced simultaneously to the attack (2). Nothing could resist their impetuosity; they rushed down the sides of the ravines, up the opposite bank, and chased the Imperialists from the plateau, while Molitor drove them out of Moeskirch, and their victorious columns met in the centre of the town.

**It at length terminates in the defeat of the Imperialists.** Kray, seeing his left forced, skilfully executed a change of position in the very middle of the battle. He drew back his left from the plateau which had been so obstinately disputed, and took up a position parallel to the Danube, with his centre still resting on the plateau of Rohrdorf. This new position brought him on the flank of the division of Lorges, who was unsupported on that side. Kray instantly saw his advantage, and charged the exposed division, which was overthrown, and driven back in such confusion that nothing but the opportune arrival of Delmas with six fresh battalions prevented the French line being entirely broken through at that point. Both parties now made the utmost efforts; the Austrians to improve the advantage they had gained, the French to re-establish their line. Moreau executed a change of front, arranging his army parallel to that of the enemy, and during the progress of this new formation, the French division Delmas was furiously assailed, but all the efforts of the Imperialists were unable to break his admirable infantry. Still, however, Kray redoubled his efforts, and charged himself at the head of his reserve against the division of Bastoul; Moreau also brought up reinforcements, and the combat continued for two hours with various success, till at length the arrival of Richepanse with a fresh division induced the Austrian general to retire, which was done before nightfall in the best order to the heights of Bucherni and Rohrdorf (3).

In this action, so obstinately contested on both sides, the loss to the con-

(1) Jom. xiii. 144, 145. Dum. iii. 124, 125.

(3) St.-Cyr. ii. 195, 197. Dum. iii. 129, 131.

(2) Jom. xiii. 146, 150. Dum. iii. 126, 130. St.-Cyr. ii. 190, 191.

Jom. xiii. 150, 155.

tending parties was nearly equal, amounting to each to about six thousand men. The Austrians retained at the close of the day the plateau of Rohrdorf; the French slept on great part of the field of battle. But all the moral advantages of a victory were on their side; and as, on the following day, the Imperialists retired across the Danube—they in reality achieved the object for which they contended. The success was balanced chiefly in consequence of the non-arrival of St.-Cyr with his division, who lingered at Liptingen; had he come up and taken a part in the action, it would probably have terminated in a total defeat, the more disastrous to the Imperialists that they fought with their backs to the Danube. The cause of this inactivity in so able an officer, is to be found in the nature of the first instructions he had received from Moreau, and the intercepting of the couriers which conveyed the second orders to hasten to the decisive point (1).

Position of  
St.-Cyr on  
the follow-  
ing day.

Following out the only orders he had received, St.-Cyr, on the succeeding day, was leisurely moving parallel to the Danube, between that river and the Austrian army, when he came unawares upon their whole force drawn up in a small but strong position in front of the bridge of Sigmaringen. The ground they occupied would barely have sufficed for the deploying of a single division, being formed by a bend of the Danube, the base of which fronting the enemy, was covered by a formidable array of artillery, behind which the army was posted in seven lines almost forming a close column, and protecting in this manner the passage of their stores over the river. Upon the approach of the French the surprise was equal on both sides; Kray, much alarmed, and apprehending an immediate attack, drew up his rearguard in battle-array, and disposed the artillery which had crossed as well as that which remained in their front, in such a manner as to enfilade all the roads by which the position might be ap-  
May 6. proached. St.-Cyr also paused; with the half of his division, which alone had come up, he did not venture to attack the whole Austrian army, but he insulted them by a battery of twelve pieces, which was pushed forward within cannon shot; and so weakened was the spirit of the Imperialists, that they replied to this fire only by a discharge from their numerous batteries, instead of issuing from their lines and sweeping the pieces off by a charge of their powerful cavalry. There can be little doubt that if Moreau, instead of lingering at Moeskirch on the field of battle, had followed the traces of the enemy, joined St.-Cyr, and attacked them when backed by the Danube in this extraordinary position, he would have succeeded in destroying a large part of their army; but that general, with all his great qualities, had not the vigour in following up a success, which formed the leading characteristic of his more enterprising rival (2).

Affairs of  
Biberach.

At Sigmaringen the Austrian general was joined by Keimayer with his whole division; and with this augmented force he recrossed the Danube and moved towards Biberach. He had resolved to retire to the shelter of the intrenched camp at Ulm; but his object in this movement was to cover the evacuation of the great magazines at Biberach upon that place. Thither he was followed by the French army, and on the morning of the 9th  
May 9.

May their advanced posts found eighteen thousand Austrians posted at the entrance of the remarkable defile which leads to that town. This rearguard was posted for the most part on a series of formidable heights behind Biberach, which could be approached only by passing through that town, and

(1) *Memorial du Depoldi la Guerre*, v. 92. St.-Cyr, ii. 199, 201. *Dum.* iii. 129, 131. *Jour.* xiii. 154, 156.

(2) *Nap.* i. 169, 170. *Dum.* iii. 131. St.-Cyr, ii. 203, 205.

afterwards traversing a road which ran through a morass. An advanced guard, consisting of ten battalions and as many squadrons, with eight pieces of cannon, was placed in front of Biberach, at the entrance of the defile; this position, apparently so hazardous, was necessary to cover the evacuation of the great magazines which that town contained, preparatory to the concentration of the whole army in the intrenched camp of Ulm. This advanced guard was attacked by St.-Cyr with such superior forces, that they were speedily routed, and driven in the utmost disorder across the morass. Biberach was so rapidly carried that the Austrians had not time to destroy their magazines, which fell in great part entire into the hands of the victors. Transported with ardour, the French dragoons and light troops traversed the town and crossed the defile on the other side, notwithstanding a heavy and concentrated fire from the Austrian batteries; such was the intimidation produced by their audacity, that the Imperialists fired by platoons upon the light troops, as they would have done upon a regular line, instead of combating them with the same species of force. In this affair Kray lost fifteen hundred prisoners, besides a thousand killed and wounded, and five pieces of cannon; but he gained time by it for the evacuation of his magazines at Memmingen, which were transported in safety to the intrenched camp at Ulm (1). There his army was all collected in two days afterwards, eighty thousand infantry and twelve thousand horse were assembled; and after a campaign of unexampled activity, though only fifteen days' duration, the Republicans found their victorious columns on the banks of the Danube.

Kray retreats to the intrenched camp at Ulm. In retiring to Ulm, Kray separated himself from his left wing, twenty-five thousand strong, in the Tyrol, and the detached corps on the Maine; but the advantages of that central position were such as amply to counterbalance these circumstances. The intrenched camp occupying both banks of the Danube and the heights of St.-Michel, and connected with the fortress, was of the most formidable description. The town and *tête-de-pont* on the river were armed with a hundred and forty pieces of heavy cannon; the redoubts of the camp were complete, and lined with a proportional quantity of artillery: and not only were the magazines in the place most ample, but the extent of the works rendered all idea of a regular blockade out of the question. By remaining in this defensive position, the Austrian general not only preserved entire his own communications and line of retreat by Donawert and Ratisbon, but threatened those of his adversary; who, if he attempted to pass either on the north or south, exposed himself to the attack of a powerful army in flank. Securely posted in this central point, the Imperialists daily received accessions of strength from Bohemia and the Hereditary States; while the French, weakened by the detachments necessary to preserve their communications, and observe the Prince of Reuss in the Tyrol, soon began to lose that superiority which, by the skilful concentration of their force, they had hitherto enjoyed in the campaign (2).

Great advantage of that position. The difficulty of dislodging the Imperialists from this formidable position, was much augmented by the necessity to which Moreau at this period was subjected, of detaching nearly twenty thousand men under Moncey to cross the Alps by the St.-Gothard, and take a share in the projected operations of the First Consul in Italy. This great detachment restored the balance between the contending parties, and the spirit of the Austrians at the same time

(1) St.-Cyr, ii. 222, 228. Jom. xiii. 164, 169. Dum. iii. 138, 142. Nap. i. 171.

(2) Nap. i. 171, 172. Jom. xiii. 310, 313. Dum. iii. 145, 149. St.-Cyr, ii. 234, 235.

Kray keeps  
the field  
with part of  
his force.

was so much revived by the sight of their vast forces within the intrenched camp, and the great resources which they found in the place, that Kray no longer hesitated to keep the field; and detached the corps of Starray and Keinmayer, which had suffered least in the preceding operations, to the left bank of the Danube and the confluence of the Iller. Moreau accordingly found himself extremely embarrassed, and six weeks were employed in the vain attempt to dislodge a defeated army from this stronghold; a striking proof of the prophetic wisdom of the Archduke Charles in its formation, and the importance of central fortifications in arresting the progress of an invading enemy (1).

Great  
strength of  
the in-  
trenched  
camp.

As the efforts of Austria and Russia during the seven years' war were shattered against the intrenched camp of Frederick at Burtzelwitz, so this important position seemed to be the *ne plus ultra* of the Republican operations in this campaign. It was hopeless to attempt to conquer so strong a position by main force; and it was no easy matter to see by what movement the Austrian general could be compelled to abandon it. For Moreau to pass on, leaving eighty thousand men supported by impregnable fortifications in his rear, was impossible, as it would immediately have led to the intercepting his communications with France; while to attempt the passage of the Danube in presence of such a force, would have been in the highest degree perilous. The Austrians soon reaped the benefits of this admirably chosen stronghold (2); the soldiers, lodged in excellent quarters, rapidly recovered their strength; while the *morale* of the army, which had been extremely weakened by the rapid disasters of the campaign, as quickly rose, when they perceived that a stop was at length put to the progress of the enemy.

Measures of  
Moreau to  
dislodge him  
from it.

With a view to dislodge Kray, Moreau advanced with the right in front; headquarters passed the Gunz on the right bank of the Danube, St.-Cyr followed with his division in echelon, while Sainte-Suzanne received orders to approach Ulm on the left bank. The Republicans were masters of no bridge over the river, so that Sainte-Suzanne, with his single corps was exposed to the attack of the whole Austrian army. Finding that the distance of Moreau with the centre and right wing precluded him from giving any effectual support to his left, Kray resolved to direct all

his disposable forces against that general. On the 16th, the Archduke Ferdinand, at the head of the splendid Imperial cavalry, followed by several columns of infantry, suddenly assailed this detached corps near Erbach. The attack was so impetuous, and the surprise so complete, that the Republicans were speedily routed, and the Austrians pressing forward with great vigour, not only drove them back in disorder above two leagues, but interposed their victorious columns between their flying divisions. Nothing

Vigorous  
stroke of the  
Austrian  
General  
against the  
left wing of  
the French.

but the intrepidity and presence of mind of the French generals, preserved their left wing from total destruction. But while Sainte-Suzanne did his utmost to retard the advance of the enemy, St.-Cyr, alarmed by the violence and receding sound of the cannonade, which distinctly showed how much the left wing was losing ground, halted his corps, and moved it towards the scene of danger; at the same time rapidly bringing up his artillery, he placed it in batteries on the right bank of the Danube in such a manner as to enfilade the road by which the Archduke Ferdinand had issued from Ulm. Alarmed at this apparition on his left,

(1) Jom. xiii. 312. St.-Cyr, ii. 235, 236. Nap. i. 172.

(2) Jom. xiii. 314. Dum. iv. 12, 13. St.-Cyr, ii. 241.



which he feared was preparatory to a passage of the river by the French centre, the Archduke drew back his victorious columns to the intrenched camp, and an action was terminated, in which, if properly supported, the Imperialists might have achieved the destruction of the whole Republican left wing, and possibly changed the issue of the campaign (1).

Increasing perplexity of Moreau. He in vain moves round to Augsburg. Confounded by this vigorous stroke on his left, and made sensible, by his firm countenance, that the enemy was resolved to risk a battle rather than hazard the important position of Ulm, Moreau was thrown into a cruel perplexity. For several days he remained in a state of indecision, merely directing Sainte-Suzanne to cross the Danube, to the support of St.-Cyr; so that, of the eleven divisions of which his army was composed, six were on the right bank, and five on the left. At length he resolved to resume his operations on the right bank, and after moving St.-Cyr again across the river, advanced with his centre and right, followed by Sainte-Suzanne with the left, along the right bank towards Bavaria. Kray, upon this, made a sortie with ten thousand men on the moving mass; he attacked Souham's division with great vigour, but after an obstinate conflict, May 24. the Imperialists retired to Ulm, after inflicting a severe loss on the enemy. Meanwhile, Moreau continued his advance towards Bavaria, and on the 28th occupied Augsburg, directly in the rear of the Austrian army, on the May 28. high-road between them and Munich. The intelligence of this event, however, had no effect in inducing the Imperial general to quit his stronghold; on the contrary, wisely judging that the advance of Moreau was only to excite alarm, or levy contributions, he wrote to the Aulic Council, that Moreau would never advance into the Hereditary States, leaving his great army in his rear, and that he would merely push forward his parties in all directions to disquiet the enemy in his advance, and intercept his communications. His firmness was completely successful; the French general did not venture to advance farther into Germany, as long as the enemy remained in such force in his rear, while the lengthened stay of such immense masses in one quarter speedily rendered provisions scarce in the French army, and induced such disorders as rendered several severe examples, and a new organization of great part of their army, necessary (2).

He next advances on the left bank of the Danube. Finding that Kray had penetrated his design, and remained firm at Ulm, in such a position as to endanger his communications if he continued his present advance, Moreau conceived a new and more decisive project, which was, to pass the Danube below Ulm, and cut the Austrian army off from its great magazines in Bohemia. With this view, the advanced guard, which had occupied Augsburg, and levied a contribution of 600,000 florins (L.60,000) on that flourishing city, was withdrawn, and the army was preparing to follow in this direction, when their movement was June 4. interrupted by a sudden irruption of the Austrians on the right bank. In effect, Kray perceiving his adversary's design, collected thirty thousand men in the intrenched camp, with which, during the night, he crossed the bridge of Ulm, and assailed, at break of day, the flank of the French army. The tempest fell on the left wing, under the orders of Richepanse; it was speedily enveloped by superior forces, broken, and placed in a state of the

Imminent risk of the French left. greatest danger. From this almost desperate condition the Republicans were rescued by a seasonable and able attack by Ney, who, having received orders to support the menaced corps, flew to the scene of

(1) St.-Cyr, ii. 245, 251. Jom. xlii. 315, 317. Nap. i. 173, 174. Dum. iv. 16, 18.

(2) Dum. iv. 31, 36. Jom. xlii. 319, 320. St.-Cyr, ii. 258, 290. Nap. i. 174, 175.



danger, and advanced with such vigour against their vanguard, posted on the plateau of Kerchberg, that it was defeated with the loss of a thousand prisoners. Emboldened by this success, Richepanse halted his retiring columns, faced about, and renewed the combat with Kray, who, finding superior forces of the enemy now accumulating, withdrew to his intrenchments. Never did the French army incur greater danger; the Austrians in half an hour would have gained the bridge over the Iller, cut through the middle of the Republicans, and possibly, by opening a communication with the Prince of Reuss in the mountains of Tyrol, retrieved all the disasters of the campaign (1).

**June 10.** Heavy rains which fell at this time precluded the possibility of active operations for nearly a week to come, but Moreau, encouraged by this last success, was still intent on prosecuting his movement upon the Lower

**June 12.** Danube. With this view, he spread his troops along the whole line of the Upper Lech; Lecourbe made himself master of Landeberg, and continuing his march down the course of that river, entered a second time into Augsburg, directly in the rear of the Imperialists.

**At length Moreau cuts off his communications.** At the same time, the centre and left descended the Kamlach and Gunz, towards Krumbach; thus accumulating almost all the Republican army between the Austrians and Bavaria. Threatened by such superior forces, Star-ray, who commanded the detached corps of the Austrians in that quarter, was obliged to cross to the left bank of the Danube. This able movement re-established the Republican affairs in that quarter; Kray, in his turn, now saw his connexions with the interior threatened, and himself reduced to the necessity of either abandoning his intrenchments, or making an effort with his whole disposable force to re-establish his communications (2).

**The passage of the Danube is effected by the French.** Finding his adversary still immovably fixed at Ulm, Moreau after having concentrated his forces on the southern bank of the Danube, between Gunzburg and Donawerth, resolved to attempt the passage by main force. Far from penetrating his design, Starray, who commanded the Imperial forces on the opposite bank, sent all his

**troops, except eight battalions and a few squadrons, towards Ulm; where Kray lay inactive, neither attempting any thing against the French under Richepanse, between him and the Tyrol, nor taking any steps to secure his last and most important communications. Moreau ably profited by the supineness of his antagonist. After several unsuccessful attempts, which distracted the enemy's attention, the passage was effected on the 19th at Blindheim, with that romantic gallantry which so often in similar situations has characterised the French arms. The Austrians immediately hastened from all quarters to crush the enemy, before he was firmly established on the left bank; but Lecourbe, pushing on to Schwinningen, which lay between their detachments, prevented their junction; and after a murderous conflict, not only succeeded in maintaining his position, but made prisoners three battalions of the enemy (3).**

**Severe action at Hochstedt.** Both parties now hastened with all their disposable forces to the scene of action. Lecourbe speedily crossed over the remainder of his corps to the left bank, and advanced with fifteen thousand men to Hochstedt, while Kray detached the greater part of his cavalry and light artillery to the support of Starray. The Austrian general, not finding himself in sufficient strength to resist the increasing masses of the enemy, retired

(1) Jom. xiii. 326, 328. Dum. iv. 36, 37. Nap. i. 174, 175.

(2) Jom. xiii. 334, 336. Dum. iv. 40, 44. Nap. i. 176.

(3) Jom. xiii. 334, 336. Dum. iv. 44, 51. Nap. i. 178.

to Dillingen, severely harassed by the French cavalry, which made above a thousand men prisoners. Kray advanced two thousand cuirassiers to extricate his infantry, and a desperate *mêlée* took place between the Republican and Imperial cavalry, in which the Austrian horse maintained their high character, but could not bear up against the great superiority of the enemy. After a bloody conflict in the course of which Moreau and Lecourbe repeatedly charged in person, the Imperialists retired behind the Brentz, leaving the enemy securely established on the left bank of the Danube (1). Thus the Republican cavalry gained a glorious success on the very plains where a century before the presumption of Marshal Tallard had endangered the crown of Louis XIV, and brought an unheard-of disaster on the French arms.

Kray is at length compelled to abandon Ulm, and reaches Nordlingen. June 19.

The consequences of this victory were decisive. Twenty pieces of cannon, and four thousand prisoners, had been made in these continued combats; but what was of far more importance, Kray was cut off from his resources in Bohemia, and obliged to evacuate the intrenched camp of Ulm. Compelled to abandon that important position, he left a garrison of ten thousand men within its walls, and having stationed his cavalry on the Brentz, so as to cover his movement, and dispatched his grand park, consisting of one hundred and sixty pieces and eight hundred caissons, on the road to Neresheim and Nordlingen, he himself followed with the remainder of his army in three divisions, and after undergoing unparalleled fatigues and privations, during a continued forced march of four days, arrived on the 23d, late in the evening, at Nordlingen. This march of the Austrians, in a semicircle, of which the Republicans occupied the base, was performed with the greatest expedition, chiefly during the night, and a degree of military talent, which rescued them from their embarrassments, and reflects the highest honour on the capacity and determination of their commander. The opposing generals seemed to have changed places, during the eventful period from the 14th to the 25d June: the supineness of the Austrian commander during the first four days, when the able Republican movement was in preparation, exposed him to the greatest dangers, from which he was afterwards extricated not less by his own ability, when roused to a sense of the perils which surrounded him, than the tardiness and irresolution which deprived the French general of its fruits, at the very moment when they were within his grasp. Had Moreau, with his victorious and concentrated army, fallen perpendicularly on the flank of the Imperialists, when performing their perilous movement to regain their communications, the vanguard would probably have been separated from the rear, great part of the park taken, and the triumph of Hohenlinden been contemporary with that of Marengo (2).

Moreau occupies Munich.

During the last day's march, before arriving at Nordlingen, the Imperial cavalry were severely pressed by the French, and the exhaustion of the troops was such, that the Austrian general deemed it indispensable to give them a day's rest to recover from their fatigues. Moreau, finding that the enemy had gained several marches upon him, and that he could not hope to force him to a general engagement, resolved to change his direction, and by occupying Munich, and laying Bavaria under contribution, both separate Kray irretrievably from his left wing, under the Prince of Reuss, in the Tyrol, and secure for himself all the consequences of the most brilliant victory. For this purpose he detached general Decaen

(1) Daun. iv. 51, 55. Jom. xiii. 338, 341. Nap. i. 178.

(2) Nap. i. 176, 179. Jom. xiii. 342, 343. Daun. iv. 59, 61.

**June 25.** with ten thousand men, who set out on the 23th from Dillingen, marched in the three following days forty leagues, and, after defeating the troops of Meerfelt stationed to protect the electoral capital, entered Munich

**June 26.** on the 28th. The elector, taken by surprise, had hardly time to take refuge with his family behind the Iser, under the escort of the Austrian troops. At the same time, Richepanse with his corps invested Ulm on both sides of the Danube, and Kray leisurely continued his retreat towards the upper palatinate, abandoning the whole of Swabia and Franconia to the enemy (1).

**June 29.** Montrichard, with the Republican vanguard, came up with the Imperial rearguard, posted in front of Neuberg. Carried away by an impetuous courage, he immediately commenced an attack; but Kray, who was at hand with twenty-five thousand men, made him repent his temerity, and suddenly assailing the French with greatly superior forces, threw them into disorder, and drove them back above two leagues in the utmost confusion. The approach of night, and the arrival of Lecourbe with great reinforcements, induced him to draw off his victorious troops after this success;

**July 1.** and, finding that he could not establish himself on the Lech before the enemy, he continued his march during the night, reached Ingolstadt, repassed the Danube, and descending the right bank of that river, advanced towards Landshut. In this engagement the Republicans had to lament the loss of the brave La Tour-d'Auvergne, deemed the first grenadier of France. A model of every warlike virtue, this soldier, though a captain by rank, had taken a musket on his shoulder as a private grenadier. He perished from the stroke of a lance, while repulsing in the front rank a charge of Imperial cavalry. Such was the esteem in which he was held, that the whole army wore mourning for him for three days, and a monument was erected on the spot where he fell, which, according to the noble expression of General Dessolles in his order of the day on the occasion, "consecrated to virtue and courage, was put under the protection of the brave of every age and country." It was not in vain that this touching appeal was made to German honour. The Archduke Charles, at a subsequent period, when the fortune of war had restored the country where it stood to the power of the Imperialists, took it under his especial protection. It survived all the disasters which overwhelmed the throne of Napoléon, and still remains, in the midst of a foreign land, a monument honourable like to the French who erected, and the Imperialists who protected it (2).

**And still** Notwithstanding all his diligence, Kray could not reach Munich back behind before the French; and he had the mortification, on reaching the the Inn.

**July 7.** neighbourhood of that city, of finding that it was already in the hands of the enemy, and that his communication with his left wing in the Tyrol was irrecoverably cut off. Continuing his retreat, therefore, he left the banks of the Iser for those of the Inn, and arrived in five marches by Fartenberg, Hohenlinden, and Haag, at the camp of Amfing. He was there joined by the corps of Meerfelt, which had retired from Munich; the corps of the Prince of Condé received orders to advance to his support from Sultzburg, and as he approached the Hereditary States, the Imperial general began to receive those reinforcements, which the patriotism of their inhabitants never fails to afford to the monarchy when seriously menaced with danger (3).

(1) Dum. iv. 61, 63. Jom. xiii. 350, 355. Nap. i. 179.

(3) Jom. xiii. 355, 357. Dum. iv. 66, 71. Nap. i. 179.

(2) Fain, MS. de 1813, ii. 431. Dum. iv. 63, 66. Jom. xiii. 354, 355.

Operations  
against the  
Prince of  
Reuss in the  
Tyrol.  
Feldkirch  
is carried by  
the Repub-  
licans.

Both parties, at this period, received intelligence of the battle of Marengo and armistice of Alexandria, which shall immediately be noticed; and, not doubting that it would speedily be followed by a suspension of arms in Germany as well as Italy, Moreau resolved to take advantage of the short period which remained to clear his extreme right of the Prince of Reuss, who from the mountains of Tyrol was now in a situation, from the advance of the French army into the heart of Germany, to threaten its communications. For this purpose Lecourbe was detached, with the right wing of the army, towards Feldkirch, the formidable position which covered the north-west of that rugged district, and against which all the efforts of Masséna and Oudinot had failed in the preceding campaign. The troops who garrisoned their intrenchments, had been in great part drawn away to keep up the communication with the Prince of Condé, and the main body of the Imperialists on the eastern frontier of Tyrol; and those which remained, were so scattered over many different points, as to be incapable of rendering effectual resistance at any. After some trifling successes at Fussen and Immenstadt, Coire and Luciensteg were abandoned to the enemy, whose superiority of force rendered opposition impossible; and, although the Austrians, in the first instance, gained some successes before Feldkirch, they found themselves in the end unable to man sufficiently its extensive works, and on the following day that celebrated stronghold, which had lost much of its importance from the new theatre on which the war was carried on, was abandoned to the enemy (1).

While Lecourbe was thus clearing the right of the Republican position, Sainte Suzanne, who had been dispatched to the Lower Rhine to organize the French forces in that direction, was performing the same service on the banks of the Maine (2). He invested Philipsburg, and advanced to Aschaffenburg, where the Imperialists were repulsed; and the Lower Maine was speedily cleared of their troops.

July 15.

Armistice of  
Parsdorf in  
Germany.

Matters were in this situation, when the truce which had been concluded at Alexandria between France and Austria a month before, was extended to Germany, under the appellation of the armistice of Parsdorf. By this subsidiary treaty hostilities were terminated at all points in the empire, and were not to be resumed without a notice of twelve days. The French occupied all the country from Balzers in the Grisons, on the right bank of the Rhine, to the sources of the Inn; the whole valley of that river, from it by the reverse of the mountains to the sources of the Lech, and the whole intermediate country occupied by their troops along the Iser to its junction with the Danube; and from thence by Wessinburg and the Rednitz to the Maine. The fortresses included within this line, still in the hands of the Imperialists, particularly Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philipsburg, were to remain in their possession, on the condition, on the one hand, that their garrisons were not to be augmented, and on the other, that they were to be provisioned every ten days, at the sight of commissioners named by the belligerent powers (3). In the circumstances in which the Austrians then were, threatened with invasion in the Hereditary States in their most vulnerable quarter, the valley of the Danube, this armistice was a most fortunate event, and gave them a breathing-time, of which they stood much in need to repair their shattered forces, and prepare for the farther struggles which awaited the monarchy.

(1) Jom. xiii. 357, 367. Dum. iv. 71, 82. Nap. i. 180.

(2) Jom. xiii. 367.

(3) Dum. iv. 84, 90.

Important as these events were, they were eclipsed by those which at the same period occurred to the south of the Alps.

Designs of Napoleon for the reconquest of Italy. An ordinary general, terrified at the dangers with which the southern departments were threatened, would have hastened with the army of reserve to the Var, in order to protect the menaced frontier of Piedmont. But Napoléon, who was well aware of the difficulties attending a front attack upon the Imperialists in that mountainous region, and appreciated with all the force of his genius the importance of the central position which he occupied in Switzerland, determined upon a more important and decisive operation. This was to cross the Alps by one of the central passes after the Austrians were far advanced in Piedmont, and thus interpose between them and their resources, cut them off from their communication with the Hereditary States, and compel them to fight under the most disadvantageous circumstances, with their front towards Lombardy, and their rear shut in by the Mediterranean sea and the inhospitable ridges of the Apennines (1). Defeat in such circumstances could not be other than ruin, while a disaster to the French would be of comparatively little importance, as their retreat, at least for the infantry and cavalry, was secure over the passes of the St.-Gothard or the Simplon into Switzerland, which was still in their hands, and where experience had proved they could resist the utmost efforts of the Imperialists.

Extreme suffering of the troops on the summits of the Maritime Alps. But before this great blow could be struck, the French had a desperate and hopeless struggle to maintain on the ridges of the Apennines. During the winter months, while the Austrians were reposing from their fatigues, and repairing their losses in men, horses, and equipments, in the fertile plains of Lombardy, the French army, perched on the rugged summits of the mountains, had to contend at once with the hardships incident to those sterile regions, and the contagious maladies which they brought with them from their disastrous campaign in the plains. No words can describe the sufferings they underwent during that afflicting period : a few regiments lost two thousand men in the hospitals of Genoa in four months : the wants of the troops, without shoes, blankets, or winter-clothing, produced universal insubordination, and the authority of the officers being generally lost by the common calamities, vast numbers openly abandoned their colours and returned into France. The French army was rapidly melting away under such accumulated disasters, and every thing announced an easy conquest of Genoa to the Imperialists, when the torrent was arrested by the energetic measures adopted by the First Consul, immediately after he assumed the reins of public affairs (2).

Masséna is appointed to the command. Napoleon's proclamation to these troops. His first care was to appoint Masséna, whose abilities in mountain warfare had been so fully tried, and who was so well acquainted, from the campaigns of 1795 and 1796, with that country, to the direction of the army; and upon assuming the command, that great general issued an energetic proclamation in Napoléon's name to the troops :—"The first quality of a soldier," said he, "is to bear with constancy the privations of war; valour is but a secondary consideration. Many corps have abandoned their colours; they have remained deaf to the voice of their officers. Are, then, the brave men of Castiglione, Rivoli, and Teumarkt no more? Rather than desert their colours, they would have perished at their feet. Your rations, you complain, have not been regularly distributed. What would you have done, if, like the 18th and 32d regiments,

(1) *Jom.* xiii. 39, 40. *Nap.* i. 252.

(2) *Jom.* xiii. 45, 46.



you had found yourselves in the midst of the desert, without either bread or water, having nothing but horse and camel flesh to subsist on?—'Victory will give us bread,' said they. And you desert your standards! Soldiers of Italy! a new general is to take the command of you; he was ever with the advanced guard in the days of your glory; place your confidence in him, he will again chain victory to your standards." These energetic words, and still more the magic of Napoléon's name, had a prodigious effect on the French soldiers, ever liable to pass with rapidity from one extreme to another. The desertion speedily diminished, and some severe examples which Masséna made immediately after his arrival, soon stopt it altogether. At the same time, the vigour of the First Consul provided more substantial additions to the comforts of the men: their rations were augmented, and distributed with regularity; a portion of their arrears was discharged; and by incredible exertions, not only were ample supplies conveyed to their frigid bivouacs, but fresh clothing provided for their shivering limbs. By these means the spirit of the soldiers was in a short time so restored, that an army, which a few weeks before seemed menaced with approaching dissolution, became capable of the most persevering exertions. A new organization was completed by Masséna, and four regiments, which he brought with him, in the highest state of equipment from the north of Switzerland, became the model on which the army was formed. The army, which amounted to twenty-eight thousand men, in Liguria, exclusive of eight thousand on the summits of the Alps, from Argentiere to Mont Cenis, was divided into three corps. The right, under the command of Soult, sixteen thousand strong, occupied Gavi, the Campo-Freddo, the Bocchetta, and the summit of the valleys leading from Piedmont to Genoa; the centre, consisting of twelve thousand, guarded the ridges extending westward, from thence through Cadebone, Vado, Savona, and the Col di Tende, towards France; while the left wing, under Thureau, perched on the summit of the Alps which form the western boundary of the plain of Piedmont, watched the important passes of Mont Cenis, the Little St.-Bernard, and the Col di Genevre (1).

**Energetic measures taken to restore order.** The Austrians, cantoned in the plain below, and at the entrance of the numerous valleys which were occupied by the enemy, were so much scattered, that out of ninety-six thousand men who composed their active force, not more than sixty thousand could be assembled for operations on the Bormida and in the Apennines. This force, however, was amply sufficient for the object in view, which was the expulsion of the French from Italy; and at length the order from Vienna arrived, and active operations commenced on the 6th April (2).

The town of Genoa, against which all the efforts of the Imperialists were now directed, is situated in the centre of the gulf which bears its name; and from a very early period has occupied a distinguished place in the history of modern Europe. Placed on the southern slope of the Apennines, where they dip into the Mediterranean sea, it exhibits a succession of lofty buildings, terraces, gardens, and palaces, rising one above another in imposing masses from the water's edge to a very great eminence. The gay and glittering aspect of the buildings, ascending in succession from the harbour to the summit of the hills which screen it from the north; the splendour of the palaces which adorn its higher quarters, the picturesque air of the towers and fortifications by which it is surrounded; the contrast between the dazzling whiteness of the edifices, and the dark green of the firs and olives by

(1) *Bot.* iii. 455, 456. *Nap.* i. 201. *Jom* xiii. 45, 48, 51.

(2) *Jom.* xiii. 53, 54.



which they are shrouded; and the blue sea which washes the southern ramparts of the city, and reflects its innumerable domes and spires, form a spectacle at once so varied and gorgeous, as to have early captivated the imaginations of the Italians, and secured for it the appellation of *Genova la Superba*. A double circle of fortifications surrounds this splendid city; the outer or exterior walls consist of a triangle of nine thousand toises in circumference. On the south, bounded by the sea, this line extends from the point of the *Lanterne* at the mouth of the rivulet called the *Polcevera* to the mouth of the *Bisagno*; the eastern side runs along the banks of the *Bisagno* to the fort of *Eperon*, which forms the apex of the triangle, and the western descends from that elevated point to the *Lanterne* along the margin of the *Polcevera*. The batteries on the western side command the whole valley of the *Polcevera*, with the long and straggling faubourg of *St.-Pierro d'Arena*, which runs through its centre; those on the east, on the other hand, are themselves commanded by the heights of *Monte Ratti* and *Monte Faccio*, a circumstance which rendered it necessary to occupy them by detached outworks, which are called the forts of *Quizzi*, of *Richelieu*, and of *San Tecla*, on the *Madonne del Monte*. Higher up the *Apennines* than the fort *Eperon*, is the plateau of the *Two Brothers*, which is commanded in rear by the *Diamond Fort*, perched on a summit twelve hundred toises from fort *Eperon*. The peculiar situation of *Genoa*, lying on the rapid declivity where the *Apennines* descend into the sea, rendered it necessary to include these mountains in its rear in the exterior line of its fortifications, and to occupy so many points beyond their wide circuit by detached outworks; which give the ridges by which it is encircled the appearance of an immense castle. The interior line which surrounds the city properly so called, is susceptible of some defence; but the possession of the outer works would render any protracted resistance impossible, as the batteries on the *Lanterne* and the fort of *Eperon* would expose the city to the horrors of a bombardment (1).

Measures taken for its blockade by land and sea. Early in March, Admiral Keith, who commanded the British fleet in the Mediterranean, established a close blockade of the harbour of *Genoa* and its dependencies, which promised to augment extremely the difficulties of the besieged; and in the beginning of April, General Mélas having completed his preparations, moved forward in three columns to the attack of the French defensive positions. Ott, with the left wing, fifteen thousand strong, was intrusted with the attack of the right, and the forts on *Monte Faccio*; Mélas with the centre, consisting of twenty-four thousand, was to ascend the valley of the *Bormida*, and separate the centre of the enemy from their left wing; while Elnitz with the right, amounting to eighteen thousand soldiers, was to assail their left, and to facilitate the important and decisive movements of Mélas in the centre. These attacks all proved successful. The Imperialists experienced every where the most vigorous resistance, and the courage and enterprise on both sides seemed exalted to the highest pitch by the great object for which they contended, and the lofty eminences, midway between the plain and the clouds, on which the struggle took place. But the resolution of the Austrians, aided by their great superiority of numbers, and the advantage which the initiative always gives in mountain warfare, at length overcame all the aid which the French derived from the possession of the heights and the fortifications by which they were strengthened. Soult, on the French right, driven from *Montenotte*, the first scene of Napoleon's triumphs, was thrown

Successful attack of the Imperialists on the French position.

(1) Nap. i. 203, 204. Jom. xiii. 88, 92. Dum. iii. 227, 231. Personal observation.

Suchet is separated from the main body, and driven back towards France.  
April 6.

back towards Genoa, while Savona, Cadebone, and Vado, were occupied by the Imperialists, and their extreme left, under Suchet, altogether detached from the centre, and thrown back towards France. Hohenzollern, who was intrusted with the attack of the Bocchetta, drove the French from the neighbourhood of Gavi far up that important pass, and with some difficulty succeeded in retaining the crest of the mountains; while on the extreme left, Klenau obtained the most important advantages. Breaking up from the valley of the Trebbia, he advanced, in three columns, up the narrow ravines which led to the eastern fortifications of Genoa, carried the summit of the mountains, drove the Republicans from the Monte Faccio and the Monte Ratti, and invested the forts of Quizzi, Richelieu, and San Tecla, within cannon-shot of the walls of Genoa. Its inhabitants were variously agitated with hopes and fears, as the firing of the musketry and cannon came nearer and nearer. At length the smoke was distinctly visible, even from the interior ramparts, and while the broken regiments of Soult were entering the city from the westward, by the gates of the Lanterne, the whole heavens to the north and west were illuminated by the fires of the bivouacs, from the crowded summits of Monte Faccio (1).

Desperate and successful sortie of Masséna.

The situation of Masséna was now highly critical; the more especially as a large and influential part of the inhabitants were strongly attached to the cause of the Imperialists, and ardently desired a deliverance from the democratic tyranny to which for four years they had been subjected. Their ardour, strongly excited by the sight of the Austrian watchfires, and the sound of the tocsin which incessantly rung to rouse the peasants on the neighbouring mountains, was with difficulty restrained even by the presence of a garrison, now increased, by the refluxence from all quarters, to twenty thousand men. But Masséna was not a man to be easily daunted; and on this accumulation of force in the central position of Genoa, he founded his hopes of expelling the enemy from the post most threatening to the city. By daybreak on the 7th, he threw open the gates of the town, and attacked the Austrian division on the Monte Faccio with such vigour, that in a short time that important post was carried; the Imperialists were driven from the Monte Cornua, the Torriglio, and all the passes of the Apennines in that direction, and fifteen hundred men made prisoners, who were before nightfall marched through the astonished crowds into the interior of the city (2). On the same day a series of obstinate engagements took place on the Austrian right between Elnitz and Suchet, which though attended with varied success, upon the whole had the effect of establishing the Imperialists in great strength on the heights of St.-Jacques and Vado, and completing the separation of the French left wing from the centre of their army and the city of Genoa.

His dispositions for re-opening the communication with Suchet.

No sooner was the French general informed of this disaster, than he perceived that it was not by any transient success on the Monte Faccio, but a vigorous effort towards Savona, and the re-establishment of his communications with Suchet, that the torrent of disaster was to be arrested. With this view he divided his army into three divisions; the first under Miollis, being intrusted with the defence of the city and environs of Genoa; the second under Gazan, was to advance from Voltri towards Sassello, while the third under Masséna in person, was to move along the sea-coast. Suchet at the same time received orders to suspend his re-

(1) Dum. iii. 47, 51. Nap. i. 206, 207. Jom. xiii. 53, 57. Bot. iii. 460, 462. Thib. 70, 85. Siege de Genoa.

(2) Bot. iii. 463. Jom. xiii. 56, 57. Nap. i. 207. Dum. iii. 51, 52. Thib. 80, 110.

treat, and co-operate in the general attack which, it was hoped, would lead to the capture of the Austrian division at Montenotte and Savona, and re-establish the important communication with Suchet and France. The execution of the combined attack was fixed for the 9th of April (1).

Austrian  
measures to  
prevent it,  
which prove  
successful.

Meanwhile Melas, having so far strengthened Elnitz on the heights of Vado as to enable him to make head against Suchet, resolved to move with the bulk of his force against Masséna at Genoa, wisely judging that the principal efforts of his opponent would be directed to the opening a communication with France and the left wing of his army. With this view he moved forward Hohenzollern, on the evening of the 8th, who, after a sharp resistance, carried the Bocchetta by moonlight, which had been abandoned after the reverse on the Monte Faccio, and drove the French down the southern side to Campo Marone. This success so entirely disconcerted Soult, who directed Gazan's division, that though he had gained considerable advantages, he deemed it prudent to suspend the march of his troops. On the following night, however, he was strongly reinforced by the general-in-chief, and on the 11th he assailed with superior forces the division of St.-Julien at La Vereira, and after a desperate conflict routed it with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners and seven standards. But this success was more than compensated by the disaster which on the same day befell the left of the French at Cogoletto, who were overwhelmed by Melas, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of Masséna in person, and driven back, sword in hand, to the neighbourhood of Voltri. At the same time, Elnitz and Suchet combated with divided success on the Monte Giacomo. At first the Republicans were victorious, and an Austrian brigade commanded by General Ulm, separated from the main body, was surrounded and compelled to lay down its arms : but this success having led Suchet to attempt on the following day the attack of the Monte Giacomo itself, a lofty ridge of prodigious strength, he was repulsed with great slaughter, and, after leaving the slopes of the mountain and its snowy crest covered with the dead and the dying, driven back in confusion to Melogno and Sette Pani on the sea-coast (2).

Thus though the Republicans combated every where with rare intrepidity, and inflicted fully as great a loss on their adversaries as they received themselves, yet, on the whole, the object of their efforts was frustrated. Gigantic efforts had been made, blood had flowed in torrents, and the rival armies, amidst the rocks and clouds of the Apennines, had struggled with unheard-of obstinacy, but still the Austrians retained their advantage; their columns were still interposed in strength between the French centre and left, and the multitude of killed and wounded was weakening, in an alarming degree, an army now cut off from all external assistance. Both parties now made the utmost efforts to concentrate their forces, and bring this murderous warfare to a termination. On the 13th, Melas renewed the attack with the utmost vigour at Ponte Ivrea, and at the same time reinforced Hohenzollern on his left, and directed him to press down from the Bocchetta, and threaten the communication of the French with Genoa. Both armies, though exhausted with fatigue, and almost destitute of provisions, fought with the utmost obstinacy on the following day; but at length Soult, finding that his rear was threatened by a detachment of Hohenzollern, fell back to Voltri, overthrowing in his course the Austrian brigade who

Continued  
successes of  
the Imperialists.  
April 16.

(1) Jom. xiii. 60. Bot. iii. 463, 464. Nap. i. 208, 209. Thib. 110, 135.

(2) Bot. iii. 463, 465. Jom. xiii. 61. 71. Dum. iii. 53, 65. Nap. i. 210, 211. Thib. 167, 180.

endeavoured to dispute the passage. On the same day, Masséna in person was repulsed by the Imperialists under Latterman, and finding his retreat also menaced by Hohenzollern, he also retreated to Voltri in the night, where the two French divisions were united on the following morning (1).

Masséna

finally  
driven into  
Genoa.

But the Imperialists, who now approached from all quarters, gave the wearied Republicans no rest in this position. From the heights of Monte Fayole, Melas beheld the confusion which prevailed in the army of his opponents; while the corps of Ott, whose right wing now began to take a part in the hostilities, already threatened Sestri, and the only line of retreat to Genoa which still remained to them. A general attack was immediately commenced. Melas descended the Monte Fayole, while Ott, whose troops were comparatively fresh, assailed it from the eastern side, and by a detachment menaced the important post of Sestri in their rear. Ott forced his way to Voltri, while Soult was still resolutely combating Melas on the heights of Madonna dell'Acqua, at the foot of Monte Fayole, and a scene of matchless horror and confusion immediately ensued. Soult, informed that his communications were threatened, instantly began his retreat; the victorious troops of Ott were assailed at once by the flying columns of that general, who fought with the courage of despair, and the troops they had displaced from Voltri, who rallied and returned to the rescue of their comrades. After a desperate conflict, continued till nightfall, in which the French and Imperialists sustained equal losses, the passage was at length cleared, and the retreating columns, by torchlight, and in the utmost confusion, reached the Polcevera, and found shelter within the walls of Genoa (2).

April 21.

Thus, after a continued combat of fifteen days, maintained with matchless constancy on both sides, and in which the advantages of a fortified central position on the side of the Republicans long compensated their inferiority of force to the Imperialists, Masséna with his heroic troops was shut up in Genoa, and all hope of co-operating with Suchet, or receiving reinforcements from France, finally abandoned. In these desperate conflicts the loss of the French was seven thousand men, fully a third of the force which remained to their general after he was shut up in Genoa; but that of the Austrians was fully as great, and they were bereaved, in addition, of above four thousand prisoners (3), a success dearly purchased by the French in a city where the dearth of provisions already began to be severely felt.

April 20.

Defeat of  
Suchet by  
Elnitz.

Meanwhile Suchet, having been informed by Oudinot, who had made a perilous passage by sea in the midst of the English cruisers, of the desire of Masséna that he should co-operate in the general attack, instantly made preparations for a fresh assault on the blood-stained ridge of the Monte Giacomo; but in the interval, Melas, now relieved on his left by the retreat of Masséna into Genoa, had reinforced Elnitz by three brigades, and the position of the Imperialists, naturally strong, was thereby rendered impregnable. The consequence was, that the moment the Republicans made their appearance at the foot of the mountain, they were attacked and overthrown so completely, that it was only owing to an excess of caution on the part of the Imperialists that they were not wholly cut off and made prisoners. By this disastrous defeat Suchet lost all hope of regaining his communication with Genoa and was compelled to fall back, for his own security towards the Var and the frontier of Piedmont (4).

(1) Bot. iii. 464, 465. Nap. i. 211. Jom. xiii. 71, 75. Dum. iii. 69, 73. Thib. 180, 200.

(2) Thib. 200. 217. Dum. iii. 74, 76. Jom. xiii. 76, 78. Bot. iii. 467.

(3) Dum. iii. 76, 77. Jom. xiii. 76, 78, 80.

(4) Dum. iii. 79. Jom. xiii. 79, 80.

**April 27.** On the other hand, Melas, having completed the investment of Genoa, and left Ott with twenty-five thousand men to blockade that fortress, moved himself, with the bulk of his forces, to reinforce Elnitz on the Monte Giacomo, and pursue his successes against Suchet. To aid in the accomplishment of this object, he moved up part of the twenty-five thousand men, who, during this desperate struggle in the Apennines, had lain inactive in Piedmont under Kaim. Threatened by so many forces, Suchet retired with about ten thousand men to Albuega, in the rear of Loano, and took a position at Borghetto, where Kellermann, in 1795, had so successfully arrested the advance of General Divini. There, however, he was attacked a few days after by Melas with superior forces, and driven from the field with great loss : He endeavoured in vain to make a stand on the Monte di Torria and the Col de Tende; the columns of the Austrians turned his flanks and drove him across the frontier and over the Var, with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners, and an equal number killed and wounded. Thus the French, after a desperate struggle, were at length driven back into their own territories; and nothing remained to them of their vast conquests in Italy but the ground which was commanded by the cannon of Genoa (1).

**May 2.** While Melas was thus chasing the Republican eagles from the Maritime Alps, Ott was preparing a general attack, by which he hoped to drive the French from the exterior line of defence, and render their position untenable in that important fortress. With this view, while the English fleet kept up a severe cannonade upon the town from the entrance of the harbour, a general assault was planned both against the defence of Masséna on the Bisagno, the Polcevera, and the fortified summits of Madonna del Monte and Monte Ratti. These attacks were all in the first instance successful. Bussy, supported by the fire of the English gunboats, made himself master of St.-Pierro d'Arena and the valley of the Polcevera; while Palfi, by a vigorous attack, carried the Monte Ratti, surrounded the fort Richelieu, surprised the fort Quizzi, and made himself master of all the southern slopes of the Monte Faccio and the Madonna del Monte. At the same time Hohenzollern stormed the important plateau of the Two Brothers, and summoned the commander of fort Diamond, now completely insulated (2), to surrender. The Imperialists even went so far as to make preparations for establishing mortar batteries on the commanding heights of Albaro, and bombarding the city over its whole extent, so as to render the French position untenable within its walls.

**May 6.** Had the Austrians possessed a sufficient force to make good the advantages thus gained, they would have speedily brought the siege of Genoa to a conclusion, and by a concentration of all their forces on the Bormida, might have defeated the invasion by Napoléon over the Alps, and changed the fate of the campaign. But General Ott had only twenty-five thousand men at his disposal, while an equal number, under Kaim, lay inactive in the plains of Piedmont, and this imprudent distribution of force proved in the highest degree prejudicial to the Imperial interests through the whole campaign. Availing himself with skill of the immense advantage which the possession of a central position in an intrenched camp afforded, Masséna withdrew four battalions from the eastern side, where he judged the danger less pressing, and despatched them, under Soult, to re-

(1) Jom. xlii. 83, 86. Bot. iii. 467, 469. Dum. iii. 198, 200.

(2) Nap. i. 212. Bot. iii. 472, 473. Dum. iii. 234. Jom. xlii. 95, 96. Thib. 200, 209.



gain the heights of the Two Brothers, while he himself hastened, with four battalions more, to reinforce Miollis on the Monte Albaro. The Austrians, who had gained time to strengthen their acquisitions, received the attack with great resolution; the fury of the combatants was such that soon fire-arms became useless, and they fought hand to hand with the bayonet; for long the result was doubtful, and even some success was gained by the Imperialists; but at length the Republicans were victorious, and the Monte Ratti, with its forts and four hundred prisoners, fell into their hands. At the same time, Soult glided round by the ravines into the rear of the Two Brothers; and the Austrians, under Hohenzollern, assailed in front by the garrison of fort Diamond, and in the rear by these fresh troops, were thrown into confusion, and escaped in small parties only, by throwing themselves with desperate resolution on the battalions by which they were surrounded. By the result of this day the Austrians lost three thousand men, of whom eighteen hundred were made prisoners, and they were forced to abandon all the ground which they had gained from their opponents, excepting the Monte Faccio, while the spirits of the French were proportionally elevated by the unlooked for and glorious success which they had achieved (1). Taking advantage of the consternation of the besiegers, Masséna, on the following day, attempted a sally, and attacked the fortified heights of Coronata; but after a trifling advantage he was repulsed with great slaughter, and compelled finally to shut himself up in the walls of Genoa (2).

Successful  
sally of the  
French.

Nothing of moment occurred for the next ten days; but during that time Masséna, finding that famine was likely to prove even a more formidable enemy than the Austrian bayonets, and that it was necessary at all hazards to endeavour to procure a supply of provisions, resolved upon a sally. The Austrians had been celebrating, by a *feu de joie* along their whole lines, the success of Melas on the Var, when Masséna determined, by a vigorous effort, both to prove that the spirits of his own garrison were not sinking, and to facilitate the meditated descent of the First Consul into Piedmont. Miollis was charged with the attack of the Monte Faccio on the front of the Sturla, while Soult, ascending the bed of the torrent Bisagno, was to take it in flank. The attack of Miollis, commenced before Soult was at hand to second it, failed completely. He gained possession in the first instance of the front positions of the enemy on the slopes of the mountain, and was advancing over the ground, drenched with the blood of so many brave men of both nations, when his troops were charged by the Imperialists in close column with such vigour, that they were instantly thrown into confusion, and driven back in the utmost disorder to the glacis of the Roman gate of Genoa, where, by the opportune arrival of the general-in-chief with a reserve, some degree of order was at length restored. The expedition of Soult was more fortunate. The Imperialists, assailed in front by the Republicans whom Masséna had rallied on the Sturla, and in flank by the troops of Soult, were driven from the Monte Faccio, and were only able to force their way

(1) Dumas, iii. 236, 241. Jour. xlii. 97, 98. Nap. i. 212. Bot. iii. 472, 473. Thib. 210, 230.

(2) A singular circumstance occurred at this assault of the Monte Faccio. The soldiers of two French regiments, the 25th light infantry and the 24th of the line, had been on the worst possible terms since the opening of the campaign, because during the winter, when insubordination was at its height, the former, which maintained its discipline, had been employed to disarm the latter. They

had, in consequence, been carefully kept asunder from each other; but during the confusion of this bloody conflict, their ranks became intermingled. The same dangers, the same thirst for glory, animated both corps, and these generous sentiments so far obliterated their former jealousies, that the soldiers embraced in the midst of the fire, and fought side by side like brothers during the remainder of the day — See Dumas, iii. 245, 246.



through their pursuers by leaving thirteen hundred prisoners in the hands of the enemy (1).

This brilliant success led to a still more audacious enterprise, which proved the ruin of the able and enterprising French general. This was the attack of the Monte Greto, the most important position occupied by the Austrians on the mountains in the rear of the city, and which, if successful, would have rendered it necessary for them to raise the siege. The Republicans, six thousand strong, issued by the Roman gate, and ascending the olive-clad steeps of the Bisagno, attacked the Austrians in this important post, while Gazan, at the head of eighteen hundred men, assailed them on the other side. The intrenched camp on the Monte Greto was fortified with care, and its defence intrusted to Hohenzollern, supported by a powerful reserve. The French advanced with intrepidity to the attack, but as they approached the intrenchments, a violent thunder-storm enveloped the mountain, the air became dark, the rain descended in torrents, and the hostile forces could only discern each other by the flashes of lightning which at intervals illuminated the gloom. In the midst of the tempest the lines met; the shock was terrible, but the Republicans insensibly gained ground; already the first line of intrenchments was carried, and the Austrian barracks were on fire, when Hohenzollern, charging at the head of the reserve in close column, overthrew the assailants. Soult, wounded in the thigh, was made prisoner, and his troops, dispersed in the utmost confusion, fled to Genoa with a heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. At the same time intelligence was received of the surrender of Savona, and Masséna, now severely weakened, had no alternative but to remain shut up within the walls, exposed to all the horrors of approaching famine (2).

This disaster terminated the military operations of the siege of Genoa. Thenceforward it was a mere blockade; the Austrians, posted on the heights which surround the city, cut off all communication with the land side, while Admiral Keith, with the English fleet, rendered all intercourse impossible with the neighbouring harbour. The horrors of famine were daily more strongly felt, and in that inglorious warfare the army was called upon to make more heroic sacrifices than ever they had made in the tented field. The miserable soldiers, worn down by fatigue, and extenuated by famine, after having consumed all the horses in the city, were reduced to the necessity of feeding on dogs, cats, and vermin, which were eagerly hunted out in the cellars and common sewers. Soon even these wretched resources failed, and they were reduced to the pittance of four or five ounces of black bread, made of cocoa, rye, and other substances ransacked from the shops of the city. Affairs were in these desperate circumstances, when Captain Fianceschi, who had left Napoléon at the foot of the St.-Bernard, arrived in the roads of Genoa with despatches from the First Consul. In an open boat, with three rowers, he had succeeded, during the night, in steering through the midst of the English fleet; when day dawned, he was discovered, about a mile from the shore, under the guns of their cruisers. They instantly fired, and the seamen were wounded. The brave officer stripped off his clothes, took his sabre in his teeth, and swam towards the harbour. After incredible efforts he reached the shore, and landed, almost exhausted, on the mole, whence he was immediately conducted to the general-in-chief (3).

(1) Jom. xiii. 101, 102. Dum. iii. 243, 247. Bot. iii. 473. Nap. i. 220. Thib. 220, 249.

(2) Jom. xiii. 102, 105. Dum. iii. 247, 252. Nap. i. 220. Bot. iii. 473. Thib. 249, 260.

(3) Dum. iii. 255. Jom. xiii. 105. Bot. iii. 474. Thib. 250, 270.

May 12.  
Which leads  
to another,  
in which  
they are de-  
feated, and  
Soult made  
prisoner.

Siege is  
converted  
into a  
blockade.  
Extreme  
sufferings of  
the inhabi-  
tants.

May 27.

May 28.

A fresh sor-  
tie is de-  
fected.

The cheering intelligence of the passage of the Alps by Napoléon, and the first successes of Moreau in Germany, revived the dying hopes of the French garrison. The spectres who wandered along the ramparts were animated with a passing ebullition of joy, and Masséna, taking advantage of this momentary enthusiasm, commenced a general attack on the Monte Ratti and the Monte Faccio. But this effort was beyond the strength of his men. The soldiers marched out with all their wonted enthusiasm, and with a fierce countenance began the ascent of the heights; but the unusual exertion wore out their exhausted strength, and when they arrived at the foot of the redoubts, they were torn to pieces by a tremendous and well-sustained fire of grape and musketry, without the possibility of making any effort to avert their fate. Broken and dispirited, the enfeebled mass was driven back into the city, after having acquired, from sad experience, the mournful conviction that the Imperialists, whatever their reverses might have been in other situations, had abated nothing of their firm countenance in the neighbourhood of Genoa. Two days afterwards, the rolling of distant thunder in the Apennines was mistaken by General Gazan for the welcome note of their approaching deliverers. Masséna himself hastened, with a palpitating heart, to the heights of Tinaille; but he was there witness to the imperturbable aspect of the Austrians in their impregnable intrenchments, and the agitated crowd returned, sad and downcast, to their quarters (1).

Agonies en-  
dured by  
the inhabi-  
tants.

While the French garrison was alternately agitated by these hopes and fears, the wretched inhabitants were a prey to the most unparalleled sufferings. From the commencement of the siege the price of provisions had been extravagantly high, and in its latter days grain of any sort could not be had at any cost. The horrors of this prolonged famine, in a city containing above a hundred thousand souls, cannot be adequately described. All day the cries of the unhappy victims were heard in the streets, while the neighbouring rocks, within the walls, were covered with a famished crowd, seeking, in the vilest animals and the smallest traces of vegetation, the means of assuaging their intolerable pangs. At night, the lamentations of the people were still more dreadful; too agitated to sleep, unable to endure the agony by which they were surrounded, they prayed aloud for death to relieve them from their sufferings. In this extremity, the usual effect of long-endured calamity was conspicuous, in closing the fountains of mercy in the human heart, and rendering men insensible to every thing but their own disasters. Infants deserted in the streets by their parents, women who had sunk down from exhaustion on the public thoroughfares, were abandoned to their fate, and sought, with dying hands, in the sewers and other receptacles of filth, for the means of prolonging for a few hours a miserable existence. In the desperation produced by such prolonged torments, the more ardent and impetuous sought the means of destruction; they rushed out of the gates, and threw themselves on the Austrian bayonets, or precipitated themselves into the harbour, where they perished without either commiseration or assistance. In the general agony, not only leather and skins of every kind were consumed, but the horror at human flesh itself was so much abated, that numbers were supported on the dead bodies of their fellow-citizens. Pestilence, as usual, came in the rear of famine; contagious fevers swept off multitudes, whom the strength of the survivors was unable to inter. Death in every form awaited the crowds whom common suffering had blended together in the hospitals; and the multitude of unburied corpses

(1) Dum., iii, 256, 257; Bot., iii, 474; Jom., xlii, 274; Thib., 251, 260.

which encumbered the streets threatened the city with depopulation (1), almost as certainly as the grim hand of famine under which they were melting away.

Masséna at  
length sur-  
renders.  
May 31.

Such accumulated horrors at length shook the firm spirit of Masséna. The fermentation in the city had risen to an alarming height,

and there was every probability that the extenuated French garrison would be overpowered by the multitudes whom despair had armed with unwonted courage. Matters were in this desperate state, when the French general received a letter from Melas, couched in the most flattering terms, in which he invited him, since resistance had now become hopeless, to conclude an arrangement for the evacuation of the city. Masséna at first suspected that this was merely a *ruse* to cover the approaching raising of the siege, and refused to accede to any terms; but a severe bombardment both by land and sea, on the night of the 31st, having convinced him that there was no intention on the part of the Allies of abandoning their enterprise, and provisions, even after the most rigid economy, existing only for two days more, the negotiation was resumed, and at length, on the 4th June, when they were totally exhausted, a capitulation was agreed to, in virtue of which the gates were surrendered to the Allies on the following day at noon. It was

June 5. stipulated that the garrison should evacuate Genoa, with their arms, artillery, baggage, and ammunition; they were conducted by the Allies, to the number of nine thousand, by land and sea, to Voltri and Antibes. The conditions of the treaty were faithfully observed towards the vanquished, and all the stipulations in favour of the democratic party at Genoa implemented by the Austrians with true German faith (2); a trait as honourable to them, as the opposite conduct of the English admiral at Naples a year before, was derogatory to the well-earned character of British integrity.

When the evacuation took place, the extent of suffering which the besieged had undergone appeared painfully conspicuous. "Upon entering the town," says the faithful annalist of this memorable siege, "all the figures we met bore the appearance of profound grief or sombre despair; the streets resounded with the most heart-rending cries; on all sides death was reaping its victims, and the rival furies of famine and pestilence were multiplying their devastation; in a word, the army and the inhabitants seemed approaching their dissolution (3)." The Allies acted generously to the heroic garrison, with their illustrious chief; while, upon the signal of a gun fired from the ramparts, innumerable barks, laden with provisions, entered the harbour, amidst the transports of the inhabitants. "Your defence," said Lord Keith to Masséna, "has been so heroic, that we can refuse you nothing; yet you alone are worth an army; how can we allow you to depart (4)?"

Melas sets  
out to meet  
Napoleon.

It was not without reason that the Imperialists urged forward the evacuation, and granted the most favourable terms to the besieged, in order to accelerate their departure. At the very time when the negotiations were going on, a messenger arrived from Melas, with intelligence of the entry of Napoléon into Milan, and an immediate order to raise the siege. The embarrassment of the Austrian general, between his reluctance to relinquish so important a conquest and his apprehensions at disobeying the orders of his superior officer, was extreme; and he deemed himself happy at being able to escape from so serious a dilemma, by granting the most favourable terms of

(1) Bot. iii. 476, 477. Dum. fri. 257. Jom. xiii. 224.

(2) Bot. iii. 478. Jom. xiii. 228, 231. Dum. iii. 260, 263.

(3) Thib. 282.

(4) Jom. xiii. 229. Dum. iiii. 263.

capitulation to his enemy. No sooner was the place surrendered, than he detached a division to Tortona, and a brigade to Placentia; and set out on the following day with his remaining forces in the same direction, leaving Hohen-zollern to occupy Genoa with sixteen battalions (1).

May 11.  
Advance of  
the Allies to  
Nice.

Meanwhile Suchet continued his retrograde movement towards the Var; and on the 11th May effected the passage of that river. He was closely followed by the Austrians under Melas, who, on the same day, entered into Nice, and took up their quarters in the territory of the Republic. The enthusiasm of the troops rose to the highest pitch; at length they found themselves on the soil of France, and that ambitious power, which had so long sent forth its armies to devastate and oppress the adjoining states, began now to experience the evils it had inflicted on others (2).

Description  
of Suchet's  
position on  
the Var.

The Var is a mountain river, in general fordable, but which, like all mountain streams in those latitudes, is readily swelled by rains in a few hours into an impetuous torrent. It has always been considered as a weak part of the French frontier, because, to give solidity to its left extremity, it would be necessary to carry the line of defence far into the French Alps, at the distance of ten or twelve leagues from the sea. The portion of this line, however, which was occupied by Suchet, was much more inconsiderable, and did not extend above half a mile in breadth between the sea and the first rugged eminences. It had been fortified with care during the years 1794 and 1795, and the long bridge which traverses the river was covered by a formidable *tête-de-pont*, mounted with a plentiful array of heavy artillery. In this position Suchet hoped to arrest the enemy until the army of reserve, under Napoléon, had descended into Italy and appeared in their rear. In effect, the alarming reports which he received of the appearance of a powerful French force in the valley of Aosta, induced Melas, soon after his arrival at Nice, to detach a large part of his troops in that direction; and at length, when there could not longer be any doubt of the fact, he set out in

May 18.

person for Piedmont, leaving Elnitz, with eighteen thousand men, to make himself master of the bridge of the Var. Suchet had but thirteen thousand, but they were covered by formidable works, and were daily receiving additions of strength from the conscripts and national guard in the interior. The Imperialists having at length got up their heavy artillery from Nice, unmasked their batteries on the 22d, and advanced with great intrepidity

May 22.  
Attack by  
the Aus-  
trians on it,  
which is re-  
pulsed.

to the attack. But when Suchet evacuated the territory of Nice, he left a garrison in Fort Montauban, perched on a rock in the rear, from whence every thing which passed in the Austrian lines was visible, and from which he received, by telegraph, hourly intelligence of what was preparing on the enemy's side. Thus warned, the Republicans were on their guard; the Austrian columns, when they arrived within pistol-shot of the works, were received with a tremendous fire of grape and musketry; and after remaining long and bravely at the foot of the intrenchments, a prey to a murderous fire which swept off numbers by every discharge, they were compelled to retire, after sustaining a considerable loss (3).

Fresh at-  
tack and  
final repulse  
of them.

Elnitz, however, was not discouraged. The accounts which he received from his rear rendered it more than ever necessary to carry this important post, in order to secure a barrier against the French, in the event of its being necessary to retire, and make head against

(1) Jom. xiii. 227, 232. Nap. i. 224.

(2) Nap. i. 217. Jom. xiii. 87.

(3) Jom. xiii. 200, 201. Dum. iii. 204, 211. Nap. i. 218.

the invasion of the First Consul. Already accounts had arrived of the descent of Thureau upon Suza, and the capture of Ivrea by Lannes with the vanguard of Napoléon. Collecting, therefore, all his forces, he made a last effort. Twenty pieces of heavy cannon, placed in position within musket-shot, battered the Republican defences, while the English cruisers thundered on the right of the position. Under the cover of this imposing fire, the Hungarian grenadiers advanced to the assault, and the sappers succeeded in breaking through the first palisades; but the brave men who headed the column almost perished at the foot of the intrenchment, and, after sustaining a heavy loss, they were compelled to abandon their enterprise. After this check, all thoughts of carrying the *têtes-de-pont* on the Var were laid aside, and the Austrians broke up during the night, and retreated, with seventeen thousand men, in the direction of Piedmont (1).

Formation of the army of reserve by Napoléon. It is now time to resume the operations of Napoléon and the army of reserve, which rendered these retrograde movements of the Imperialists necessary, cut short their brilliant career of victories, and ultimately precipitated them into the most unheard-of reverses. This army, which had been in preparation ever since its formation had been decreed by the Consuls, on 7th January, 1800, had been intrusted, since the commencement of April, to Berthier, whose indefatigable activity was well calculated to create, out of the heterogeneous elements of which it was composed, a formidable and efficient force. Thirty thousand conscripts and twenty thousand veteran troops rendered disposable by the conclusion of the war in la Vendée, were directed to different points, between Dijon and the Alps, to form the basis of this armament. Napoléon, whose gigantic mind was equal alike to the most elevated conceptions and the superintendence of the minutest details, was indefatigable in his endeavours to complete the preparations, and from the interior of his cabinet directed the march, provisioning, and equipment of every regiment in the army. He was at first undecided whether to direct the great reserve upon Germany or Italy; but the angry correspondence which had passed between him and Moreau, joined to the reverses experienced by Masséna in the environs of Genoa, at length determined him to cross the Alps and move upon Piedmont. Reports were obtained from skilful engineers, on the state of all the principal passes, from Mount Cenis to the St.-Gothard. After full consideration, he determined to cross the Great St.-Bernard. The advantages of this passage were obvious. It was at once the shortest road across the mountains, being directly in front of Lausanne, Vevay, and Besançon where the greater part of the army was cantoned, and it led him in a few days into the rear of the army of Melas, so as to leave him no alternative but to abandon his magazines and reserves, or fight his way to them, with his face towards Milan and his back to the Maritime Alps. In such a situation, the loss of a considerable battle could hardly fail to be fatal to the Imperial army, and might reasonably be expected to lead to the conquest of all Italy; whereas a reverse to the Republicans, who could fall back upon the St.-Gothard and the Simplon, was not likely to be attended with any similar disaster (2).

Towards the success of this great design, however, it was indispensable that the real strength and destination of the army of reserve should be

(1) Dum. iii. 215, 216. Jom. xiii. 201.

(2) Nap. i. 252, 253. Jom. xiii. 172, 173. Dum. iii. 219.



carefully concealed, as the forces of the Austrians lay in the valley of Aosta, on the southern side of the St.-Bernard, and by occupying in strength the summit of the mountain, they might render the passage difficult, if not impossible. The device fallen upon by the First Consul for this purpose was to proclaim openly the place where the army was collected, and the service to which it was destined, but to assemble such inconsiderable forces there as might render it an object rather of ridicule than alarm to the enemy. With this view it was pompously announced, in various ways, that the army of reserve, destined to raise the siege of Genoa, was assembling at Dijon; and when the Austrians spies repaired thither, they found only a few battalions of conscripts and some companies of troops of the line, not amounting in all to eight thousand men, which entirely dissipated the fears which had been formed by its announcement. The army of reserve at Dijon in consequence became the object of general ridicule throughout Europe; and Melas, relieved of all fears, for his rear, continued to press forward with perseverance his attacks on the Var, and considered the account of this army as a mere feint, to serve as a diversion to the siege of Genoa (1).

Skilful measures taken to conceal its strength. The St.-Bernard, which had been used for above two thousand years as the principal passage between Italy and France, lies between Martigny in the Valais, and Aosta in the beautiful valley of the same name on the southern side of the Alps. Though the direct communication between these countries, however, and perfectly passable for horsemen and foot-soldiers, it presented great difficulties for the transit of artillery and caissons. As far as St.-Pierre, indeed, on the side of the Valais, the passage is practicable for cannon, and from Aosta to the Italian plains the road is excellent; but in the interval between these places the track consists merely of a horse or bridlepath, following the sinuosities of the ravines through which it is conducted, or round the innumerable precipices which overhang the ascent. The summit of the ridge itself, which is little short of 8000 feet above the level of the sea (2), consists of a little plain or valley, shut in by snowy mountains of still greater elevation, about a mile in length, with features of such extraordinary gloom as to be indelibly imprinted in the recollection of every traveller who has witnessed it. At the northern extremity, where the path, emerging from the steep and rugged ascent of the Valley of Desolation, as it is emphatically called, first enters upon the level surface, is situated the convent of St.-Bernard, the highest inhabited ground in Europe, founded a thousand years ago by the humanity of the illustrious saint whose name it bears, and tenanted ever since that time by pious and intrepid monks, the worthy followers of such a leader, who there, amidst ice and granite, have fixed their abode, to rescue from destruction the travellers overwhelmed by snow, amidst the storms to which those elevated regions are at almost every season of the year exposed. At the southern end are still to be seen a few remains of the Temple of Jupiter Penninus, which formerly stood at the summit of the Italian side of the pass, and at its foot the cut in the solid rock through which the Roman Legions defiled for centuries to the tributary provinces of the empire on the north of the Alps. Innumerable votive offerings are found among the ruins of the solitary edifice in which the travellers express in simple but touching language their gratitude to Heaven for having surmounted the dangers of the passage. In the centre of the valley, midway between the remains of heathen

(1) Jom. xiii. 175. Nap. i. 253, 254. Dum. iii.

(2) 7542. Saussure and Ebel, i. 173.

devotion and the monument of Christian charity, spreads out a lake, whose waters, cold and dark even at the height of summer, reflect the bare slopes and snowy crags which shut it in on every side. The descent towards Aosta is much more precipitous than on the north; and in the season when avalanches are common, travellers are often exposed to great danger from the masses of snow which, detached from the overhanging heights, sweep with resistless violence across the path, which there descends for miles down the bare and exposed side of the mountain. The climate in these elevated regions is too severe to permit of vegetation; the care of the monks has reared a few cresses and hardy vegetables in the sheltered corners of the slopes, on the northern side of the lake; but in general the mountains consist only of sterile piles of rock and snow, and not a human being is ever to be seen, except a few travellers, shivering and exhausted, who hasten up the toilsome ascent to partake in the never-failing hospitality of the convent at the summit (1).

Napoléon  
resolves to  
hazard the  
passage.

This scene, so interesting from historical recollections, as well as natural sublimity, was destined to receive additional celebrity from the memorable passage of the French army. None of the difficulties with which it was attended were unknown to their resolute chief, but, aware of the immense results which would attend an irruption into Italy, he resolved to incur their hazard. To all the observations of the engineers on the obstacles which opposed the passage, he replied, "We must surmount ten leagues of rocks covered with snow. Be it so; we will dismount our guns, and place them on sledges adapted to the rugged nature of the ascent. Nothing is to be found in these sterile mountains but a few chestnuts and herds of cattle; we will transport rice and biscuit by the lake of Geneva to Villeneuve; every soldier will carry as much as will suffice him for six days, and the sumpter mules will transport subsistence for six days more. When we arrive in the valley of Aosta, we will hasten to the fertile banks of the Ticino, where abundance and glory will reward our audacious enterprise." In pursuance of this bold design, the most active preparations were made by Marmont to facilitate the passage. Two millions of rations of biscuit were baked at Lyon, and transported by the lake of Geneva to Villeneuve, to await the arrival of the army; trees felled in the forests of the Jura to form sledges for the cannon, and mules and peasants summoned from all quarters to aid in the transport of the stores and ammunition. Napoléon set out from Paris on the 6th May, and arrived at Geneva on the 8th. He instantly sent for Marescot, the chief of engineers. After listening with patience to his enumeration of the difficulties of the attempt, he said, "Is it possible to pass?"—"Yes!" he replied, "but with difficulty."—"Let us then set out," answered the First Consul; words eminently descriptive of the clear conception and immovable resolution which formed the leading features of that great man's character (2).

At Geneva, Napoléon had an interview with M. Necker, who had remained in retirement at his villa of Coppet, near that town, since the period of his banishment by the Constituent Assembly. He professed himself little struck with his conversation, and alleged that he did not disguise his desire to be restored to the direction of the Republican finances; but it is probable the First Consul regarded the Swiss statesman with prejudiced eyes, from his strong sense of the incalculable evils which his concessions to democratic ambition had brought upon the French people (3). On the 13th, he passed in

(1) Personal observation.

(2) Jom. xiii. 174, 176. Nap. i. 255, 256.

(3) Nap. i, 257. Bour. vii. 109.

review at Lausanne the vanguard of the real army of reserve, consisting of six regiments of veteran troops newly equipped, and in the finest possible order. Shortly after, he received a visit from Carnot, the minister of war, who brought accounts of the victory of Moeskirch, and the advance of Moreau in Germany; while the stores and artillery arrived from all quarters.

May 9.  
Measures  
taken for  
the crossing  
of the artil-  
lery.

The preparations were rapidly completed. A hundred large fires were hollowed out so as to receive each a piece of artillery; the carriages were taken to pieces and put on the backs of mules; the ammunition dispersed among the peasants, who arrived from all quarters with their beasts of burden to share in the ample rewards which the French engineers held forth to stimulate their activity. Two companies of artillery workmen were stationed, the one at St.-Pierre, on the north, the other at St.-Remi, on the south of the mountains, to take to pieces the artillery and remount them on their carriages; the ammunition of the army was conveyed in little boxes, so constructed as to go on the backs of mules. With such admirable precision were these arrangements made, that the dismounting and replacing of the guns hardly retarded for an hour the march of the columns; and the soldiers, animated by the novelty and splendour of the enterprise, vied with each other in their efforts to second the activity of their officers. Berthier, when they reached the foot of the mountains, addressed them in the following proclamation: "The soldiers of the Rhine have signalised themselves by glorious triumphs; those of the army of Italy struggle with invincible perseverance against a superior enemy. Emulating their virtues, do you ascend and reconquer beyond the Alps the plains which were the first theatre of French glory. Conscripts! you behold the ensigns of victory; march, and emulate the veterans who have won so many triumphs; learn from them how to bear and overcome the fatigues inseparable from war. Bonaparte is with you; he has come to witness your first triumph. Prove to him that you are the same men whom he formerly led in these regions to immortal renown (1)." These words inflamed to the highest pitch the ardour of the soldiers, and there was but one feeling throughout the army, that of seconding to the uttermost the glorious enterprise in which they were engaged.

Passage of  
the moun-  
tain.

On the 16th May the First Consul slept at the convent of St.-Maurice, and on the following morning the army commenced the passage of the mountain. During the four following days the march continued, and from eight to ten thousand men passed daily. The first night they slept at St.-Pierre, the second at St.-Remi or Etroubles, the third at Aosta. Napoleon himself remained at St.-Maurice till the 20th, when the whole had crossed. The march, though toilsome, presented no extraordinary difficulties till the leading column arrived at St.-Pierre. But from that village to the summit, the ascent was painful and laborious in the highest degree. To each gun a hundred men were harnessed, and relieved by their comrades every half mile; the soldiers vied with each other in the fatiguing undertaking of dragging it up the toilsome and rugged track, and it soon became a point of honour for each column to prevent their cannon from falling behind the array. To support their efforts, the music of each regiment played at its head, and where the paths were peculiarly steep, the charge sounded to give additional vigour to their exertions. Toiling painfully up the ascent, hardly venturing to halt to draw breath lest the march of the column should be retarded, ready to sink under the weight of their arms and baggage, the

(1) Bot. iv. 10, 11. Nap. i. 257. Jom. xiii. 176, 177. Dum. iii. 109, 170.

soldiers animated each other by warlike songs, and the solitudes of the St.-Bernard resounded with the strains of military music. From amidst the snows and the clouds, the glittering bands of armed men appeared; and the distant chamois on the mountains above, startled by the unwonted spectacle, bounded away to the regions of desolation, and paused on the summit of its inaccessible cliffs to gaze on the columns which wound around their feet (1).

After six hours of toilsome ascent, the head of the army reached the hospice at the summit; and the troops, forgetting their fatigues, traversed with joyful steps the snowy vale, or reposing beside the cool waters of the lake, rent the air with acclamations at the approaching termination of their labours. By the provident care of the monks, every soldier received a large ration of bread and cheese, and a draught of wine at the gate; a seasonable supply, which exhausted the ample stores of their establishment, but was fully repaid by the First Consul before the termination of the campaign. After an hour's rest, the columns wound along the margin of the lake, and began the steep and perilous descent to St.-Remi. The difficulties here were still greater than on the northern side. The snow, hard beneath, was beginning to melt on the surface, and great numbers both of men and horses lost their footing, and were precipitated down the rapid declivity. At length, however, they reached a more hospitable region; the sterile rocks and snow gave place to herbage, enamelled with the flowers of spring; a few firs next gave token of the descent into the woody region, gradually a thick forest overshadowed their march, and before they reached Etroubles, the soldiers, who had so recently shivered in the blasts of winter, were melting under the rays of an Italian sun (2).

Napoléon himself crossed on the 28th. He was mounted on a sure-footed mule, which he obtained from the Priory of St.-Maurice, and attended by a young and active guide, who confided to him, without knowing his quality, all his wishes, and was astonished to find them, some time after, all realized by the generous recollection of the First Consul. He rested an hour at the convent, and descended to St.-Remi, over the hard and slippery surface of the snow, chiefly on foot, often sliding down, and with considerable difficulty (3).

(1) Nap. i. 259. Dum. ii. 170. Bot. iv. 13.

(2) Dum. iii. 171, 172. Bot. iv. 14, 15. Nap. i. 261.

"Oh joy! the signs of life appear,  
The first and single fir  
That on the limits of the living world  
Strikes in the ice its roots;  
Another and another now.  
And now the larch, that flings its arms  
Down curving like the falling wave,  
And now the aspen's glittering leaves  
Gory glitter on the moveless twig.  
The poplar's varying verdure now,  
And now the birch so beautiful,  
Light as a lady's plume."

(3) Nap. i. 261.

Comparison of the passage of the Alps, by Hannibal, Napoléon, Suwarrow, and Macdonald. The passage of the St.-Bernard has been the subject of great exaggeration from those who are unacquainted with the ground. To speak of the French troops traversing paths known only to the smuggler or the chamois hunter, is ridiculous, when the road has been a beaten passage for two thousand years, and is traversed daily in summer by great numbers of travellers. One would suppose from these descriptions, it was over the Col du Géant between Chamouni and Aosta, or over the summit of the Col du Bonhomme, that the French army had passed. It will bear no comparison with the passage of Hannibal over the Little St.-

Bernard, opposed as it was by the mountain tribes, by paths comparatively unformed, and in the course of which the Carthaginian general lost nearly half his army. Having traversed on foot both the ground over which Napoléon's army passed at the Great St.-Bernard, that traversed by Suwarrow on the St.-Gothard, the Schachenthal, and the Engiberg, and that surmounted by Macdonald in the passage of the Splügen, the Monte Aprigal, and the Mont Tonal, the author is enabled to speak with perfect confidence as to the comparative merit of these different undertakings. From being commenced in the depth of winter, and over ridges comparatively unfrequented, the march of Macdonald was by far the most hazardous, so far as mere natural difficulties were concerned; that of Suwarrow was upon the whole the most worthy of admiration, from the vigorous resistance he experienced at every step, the total inexperience of his troops in mountain warfare, and the unparalleled hardships, both physical and moral, with which its later stages were involved. That of Napoléon over the St.-Bernard, during a fine season, without any opposition from the enemy, with every aid from the peasantry of the district, and the experience of his own officers, and by a road impracticable only for carriages and cannon, must, with every impartial observer acquainted with the ground, rank as the easiest of these memorable enterprises.

The army is  
stopped in  
the valley of  
Aosta by the  
Fort of  
Bard.

Lannes, who commanded the advanced guard, descended rapidly the beautiful valley of Aosta, occupied the town of the same name, and overthrew at Chatillon a body of fifteen hundred Croats who endeavoured to dispute his passage. The soldiers, finding themselves in a level and fertile valley, abounding with trees, vines, and pasture, deemed their difficulties past, and joyfully followed the hourly increasing waters of the Dora Baltea, when their advance was suddenly checked by the fort and the cannon of Bard. This inconsiderable fortification had wellnigh proved a more serious obstacle to the army than the whole perils of the St.-Bernard. Situated on a pyramidal rock midway between the opposite cliffs of the valley, which there approach very near to each other, and at the distance of not more than fifty yards from either side, it at once commands the narrow road which is conducted close under its ramparts, and is beyond the reach of any but regular approaches. The cannon of the ramparts, two-and-twenty in number, are so disposed upon its well-constructed bastions, as to command not only the great road which traverses the village at its feet, but every path on either side of the adjacent mountains by which it appears practicable for a single person to pass (1). No sooner was the advanced guard arrested by this formidable obstacle, than Lannes advanced to the front, and ordered an assault on the town, defended only by a single wall. It was quickly carried by the impetuosity of the French grenadiers, but the Austrians retired in good order into the fort on the rock above, and from its secure casements the garrison kept up an incessant fire upon every column that attempted the passage. Marescot, the chief of the engineers, reported, after a reconnoissance, that the fort could not be carried by a *coup-de-main*, while the rocky cliffs of the mountains on either side opposed the greatest difficulties to a regular siege. The advance of the army was instantly checked; cannon, caissons, infantry, and cavalry accumulated in the narrow defile in the upper part of the valley, and the alarm rapidly running from front to rear, the advance of the columns behind was already suspended, from the apprehension that the enterprise was impracticable, and that they must recross the mountains (2).

May 23. Napoléon, deeming all his difficulties surmounted, was advancing with joyful steps down the southern declivity of the St.-Bernard, when he received this alarming intelligence. Instantly advancing to the vanguard, he ascended the Monte Albaredo, which commanded the fort on the left bank of the Dora Baltea, and with his telescope long and minutely surveyed its walls. He soon perceived that it was possible for the infantry to pass by a path along the face of the cliffs of that rugged mountain, above the range of the guns of the fort; but by no exertions was it possible to render it practicable for artillery. In vain the Austrian commandant was summoned, and threatened with an instant assault in case of refusal to surrender; he replied as became a man of courage and honour, well aware of the importance of his position, and the means of defending it which were in his power. A few pieces of artillery were, by great efforts, hoisted up to an eminence on the Monte Albaredo which commanded the fort, but their fire produced little impression on the bomb-proof batteries and vaulted casements which sheltered the garrison; a single piece only, placed on the steeple of the town, answered with effect to the fire of one of the bastions. Time pressed, however, and it was indispensable that the army should without de-

Great skill  
with which  
the obstacle  
was carried  
by the  
French en-  
gineers.

(1) Personal observation.

(2) Nap. i. 261, 262. Jom. xiii. 182, 183. Den. iii. 176, 177. Mot. iv. 14.



lay continue its advance. Contrary to the advice of Marescot, Napoléon ordered an escalade, and Berthier formed three columns, each of three hundred grenadiers, who advanced with the utmost resolution at midnight to the assault. They climbed in silence up the rock, and reached the works without being discovered. The outer palisades were carried, and the Austrian videttes retired precipitately to the ramparts above, but at its foot all the efforts of the Republicans were frustrated. The garrison was instantly on the alert. A shower of balls spread death through their ranks, while vast numbers of shells and hand grenades thrown down amongst them (1), augmented the confusion and alarm inseparable from a nocturnal attack. After sustaining a heavy loss, they were compelled to abandon the attempt; the passage seemed hermetically closed; the army could not advance a step further in its progress.

In this extremity, the genius and intrepidity of the French engineers surmounted the difficulty. The infantry and cavalry of Lannes' division traversed one by one the path on the Monte Albaredo, and re-formed lower down the valley, while the artillerymen succeeded in drawing their cannon, in the dark, through the town, close under the guns of the fort, by spreading straw and dung upon the streets, and wrapping the wheels up, so as to prevent the slightest sound being heard. In this manner forty pieces and a hundred caissons were drawn through during the night, while the Austrians, in unconscious security, slumbered above, beside their loaded cannon, directed straight into the street where the passage was going forward. A few grenades and combustibles were merely thrown at random over the ramparts during the gloom, which killed a considerable number of the French engineers, and blew up several of their ammunition waggons, but without arresting for a moment the passage. Before daylight a sufficient number were passed to enable the advanced guard to continue its march, and an obstacle, which might have proved the ruin of the whole enterprise, was effectually overcome. During the succeeding night, the same hazardous operation was repeated, with equal success; and while the Austrian commander was writing to Melas that he had seen thirty-five thousand men and four thousand horse cross the path of the Albaredo, but that not one piece of artillery or caisson should pass beneath the guns of his fortress, the whole cannon and ammunition of the army were safely proceeding on the road to Ivrea. The fort of Bard itself held out till the 5th June; and we have the authority of Napoléon for the assertion, that if the passage of the artillery had been delayed till its fall, all hope of success in the campaign was at an end. The presence of an Austrian division seven thousand strong would have equally sufficed to destroy the French troops as they emerged without cannon from the perilous defile of the Albaredo. On such trivial incidents do the fate and the revolutions of nations in the last result often depend (2).

Meanwhile Lannes, proceeding onward with the advanced guard, emerged from the mountains, and appeared before the walls of Ivrea. This place, once of considerable strength, and which in 1704 had withstood for ten days all the efforts of the Duke of Vendôme with a formidable train of artillery, had of late years fallen into decay, and its ruined walls, but partially armed, hardly offered an obstacle to an enterprising enemy. Lannes ordered an assault at once on the three gates of the city. He advanced himself with the column on the right, and with his

After a short skirmish at Ivrea, the French advanced to Turin

(1) Nap. i. 263. Jom. xiii. 185. Bour. iv. 102. Dum. iii. 176.

(2) Nap. i. 263, 265. Jom. xiii. 185, 188. Dum. iii. 176, 180. Bour. iv. 102, 103.

own hand directed the first strokes of the hatchet at the palisades. The defences were soon broken down, the chains of the drawbridges cut, the gates blown open, and the Republicans rushed, with loud shouts, on all sides into the town. A battalion which defended the walls was forced to fly, leaving three hundred prisoners in the hands of the enemy, and the Austrian troops drawn up behind the town retired precipitately towards Turin. They took post behind the Chinsella, spreading themselves out, according to custom, over a long line, to cover every approach to the capital of Piedmont. They were there attacked on the following day by Lannes, and a warm contest ensued. The Imperialists, confident in the numbers and prowess of their cavalry, vigorously charged the Republicans; but, though they led up their horses to the very bayonets of the infantry, they were in the end repulsed, and the bridge over the river was carried by the assailants. After this check the Austrians retired towards Turin, and Lannes, pursuing his successes, pushed on to the banks of the Po, where he made himself master of a flotilla of boats, of the greater value to the invading army, as they did not possess the smallest bridge equipage. The whole army, thirty-six thousand strong, was assembled at Ivrea, with all its artillery, on the 28th, while the advanced guard pushed its patrols to the gates of Turin (1).

May 26. May 28.

Passage of the St.-Gothard and Mont Cenis by the wings of the army.

While the centre of the army of reserve was thus surmounting the difficulties of the St.-Bernard, the right and left wings performed with equal success the movements assigned to them. Thureau, with five thousand men, descended to Susa and Novalesse, while Moncey, detached with sixteen thousand choice troops from the army of the Rhine, crossed the St.-Gothard, and began to appear in the neighbourhood of the Lago Maggiore. At the same time General Bethencourt, with a brigade of Swiss troops, ascended the Simplon, and forcing the terrific defile of Gondo, appeared at Duomo d'Ossola, and opened up the communication with the left of the army. Thus, above sixty thousand men, converging from so many different quarters, were assembled in the plains of Piedmont, and threatened the rear of the Imperial army engaged in the defiles of the Apennines from Genoa to the mouth of the Var (2).

Melas, in haste, concentrates the army.

No sooner did Melas receive certain information of the appearance of this formidable enemy in the Italian plains, than he dispatched couriers in all directions to concentrate his troops. He himself, as already mentioned, broke up from the Var with the greater part of his forces, and orders were dispatched to Ott to raise the siege of Genoa, and hasten with all the strength he could collect to the Bormida. The orders arrived at Genoa just at the time when the capitulation was going forward, so that the advance of the army of reserve was too late to raise the siege of that fortress; but still an important and decisive operation awaited the First Consul. To oppose him in the first instance, the Austrians had only the corps of Wukassowich, Laudon, and Haddick, who could hardly muster eighteen thousand men in all, and not above six thousand in any one point; so widely were their immense forces scattered over the countries they had conquered; while the concentration of their troops from the Var and the coast of Genoa would require a considerable time (3).

Different plans which lay open to Napoleon.

In these circumstances the French commander had the choice of three different plans, each of which promised to be attended with important results. The first was to incline to the right, form a

(1) Nap. i. 266, 267. Dum. iii. 185, 187. Jom. xiii. 193, 195.

(2) Jom. xiii. 196, 197. Dum. iii. 187, 189.

(3) Jom. Vie de Nap. i. 134.

junction with Thureau, and, in concert with Suchet, attack the Austrian army under Melas; the second, to cross the Po by means of the barks so opportunely thrown into his power, and advance to the relief of Masséna, who yet held out; the third, to move to the left, pass the Ticino, form a junction with Moncey, and capture Milan with the stores and reserve parks of the Imperialists. Of these different plans the first appeared unadvisable, as the forces of Melas were superior to those of the First Consul without the addition of Moncey, and it was extremely hazardous to run the risk of a defeat while the fort of Bard still held out and interrupted the retreat of the army.

He resolves to occupy Milan. The second was equally perilous, as it plunged the invading army, without any line of communication, into the centre of the Imperial forces, and it was doubtful whether Genoa could hold out till the Republican eagles approached the Bocchetta. The third had the disadvantage of abandoning Masséna to his fate, but to counterbalance that, it offered the most brilliant result. The possession of Milan could not fail to produce a great moral impression, both on the Imperialists and the Italians, and to renew, in general estimation, the halo of glory which was wont to encircle the brows of the First Consul. The junction with Moncey would raise the army to fifty thousand effective men, and secure for it a safe retreat in case of disaster by the St.-Gothard and the Simplon; the magazines and parks of reserve collected by the Austrians, lay exposed to immediate capture in the unprotected towns of Lombardy; while, by intercepting their communications with Germany, and compelling them to fight with their rear towards France and the Maritime Alps, the inestimable advantage was gained of rendering any considerable disaster the forerunner of irreparable ruin (1).

May 31. Advances in Lombardy, and capture of that city. Moved by these considerations, Napoléon directed his troops rapidly towards the Ticino, and arrived on the banks of that river on the 31st May. The arrival of so great a force, in a quarter where they were totally unexpected, threw the Austrians into the utmost embarrassment. All their disposable infantry was occupied at Belinzona to oppose the advance of Moncey, or had retired behind the Lago Maggiore, before Bethencourt. The only troops which they could collect to oppose the passage were the cavalry of Festenberg, with a few regiments of Laudon, a force under five thousand men, and totally inadequate to maintain the line of the Ticino from Sesto-Calende, where it flows out of the Lago Maggiore, to Pavia, where it joins the Po, against an enemy thirty thousand strong. Unable to guard the line of the river, the cavalry of Festenberg was drawn up in front of Turbigo, when Gérard, with the advanced guard, crossed the river under cover of the French artillery, advantageously posted on the heights behind, and instantly made himself master of the bridge of Naviglio, by which the infantry of the division began to defile to his assistance. He was immediately and warmly attacked by the Imperial cavalry, but though they at first had some success, yet the French having retired into a woody position deeply intersected by canals, they succeeded in maintaining their ground, until the Republicans had crossed over in such numbers as to enable them to carry Turbigo with the bayonet, and effectually establish themselves on the left bank of the river. At the same time Murat effected a passage at Buffalora, on the great road from Turin to Milan, with hardly any opposition; the Austrians retired on all sides, and Napoléon, with the advanced guard, made June 2. his triumphant entry into Milan on the 2d June, where he was received with transports of joy by the democratic party, and the same applause

(1) Nap. I. 268, 270. Journ. 215. 190, 196.

by the inconstant populace which they had lavished the year before on Suwarrow (1).

He spreads  
his forces  
over Lom-  
bardy, and  
addresses  
a proclama-  
tion to his  
troops.

Nothing could exceed the astonishment of the Milanese at this sudden apparition of the republican hero. Some believed he had died near the Red Sea, and that it was one of his brothers who commanded the army; none were aware that he had so recently crossed the Alps, and revisited the scenes of his former glory. He instantly dismissed the Austrian authorities, re-established, with more show than sincerity, the republican magistrates; but, foreseeing that the chances of war might expose his partisans to severe reprisals, wisely forbade any harsh measures against the dethroned party. Taking advantage of the public enthusiasm which his unexpected arrival occasioned, he procured, by contributions and levies, large supplies for his troops, and augmented their numbers by the regiments of Moncey, which slowly made their appearance from the St.-Gothard. On the 6th and 7th June these troops were reviewed, and the French outposts extended in all directions. They were pushed to Placentia and the Po, the principal towns in Lombardy being abandoned, without resistance, by the Austrians. Pavia fell into their hands, with 200 pieces of cannon, 8,000 muskets, and stores in proportion. At the same time the following animated proclamation was addressed to the troops, and electrified all Europe, long accustomed only to the reverses of the Republicans:—  
“Soldiers! when we began our march, one of our departments was in the possession of the enemy: consternation reigned through all the south of France. The greatest part of the Ligurian republic, the most faithful ally of our country, was invaded. The Cisalpine republic, annihilated in the last campaign, groaned under the feudal yoke. You advanced, and already the French territory is delivered: joy and hope have succeeded in our country to consternation and fear. You will restore liberty and independence to the people of Genoa: you already are in the capital of the Cisalpine. The enemy, terror-struck, seeks only to regain his frontiers: you have taken from him his hospitals, his magazines, his reserve parks. The first act of the campaign is finished; millions of men address you in strains of praise. But shall we allow our audacious enemies to violate with impunity the territory of the republic? Will you permit the army to escape which has carried terror into your families? You will not. March, then, to meet him; tear from his brows the laurels he has won; teach the world that a malediction attends those who violate the territory of the great people. The result of our efforts will be unclouded glory and a durable peace (2).”

Napoléon  
advances to  
meet Melas,  
who concen-  
trates his  
forces at  
Alexandria.

While these important operations were going forward in Lombardy, Melas conceived the project of threatening his adversary's communications by a movement on Vercelli. But when on the point of executing this design, he received intelligence of the simultaneous disasters which in so many different quarters were accumulating on the Austrian monarchy; the repeated defeats of Kray in Germany, and his concentration in the intrenched camp at Ulm; the arrival of Moncey at Belinzona, and the retreat of Wukassowich towards the Adda. In these circumstances more cautious measures seemed necessary, and he resolved to concentrate his army under the cannon of Alexandria. But while the French soldiers were abandoning themselves to the flattering illusions which this extraordinary and rapid success suggested, they received the disastrous

(1) Nap. i. 271, 272. Dum. iii. 265, 268. Jom. xiii. 208, 210.

(2) Nap. i. 272, 275. Jom. xiii. 209, 210, 216, 218. Dum. iii. 269, 271, 273. Bel. 110, 117.

intelligence of the surrender of Genoa ; and Napoléon had the mortification of finding, from the point to which the troops who capitulated were to be conveyed, that they could be of no service to him in the decisive operations that were fast approaching. It was evident, therefore, that he would have the whole Austrian army on his hands at once, and therefore no time was to be lost in striking a decisive blow. The fort of Bard capitulated on the 5th June, which both disengaged the troops of Chabran employed in its reduction, and opened the St.-Bernard as a secure line of retreat in case of disaster. The rapid marches and countermarches of the Republicans through the plain of Lombardy, had made the enemy fall back to Mantua and the line of the Mincio, and the French troops already occupied Lodi and blockaded Pizzighitone, and other fortresses on the Po ; but from this dispersion of force, and eccentric direction given to a large portion of the army, arose a most serious inconvenience ; it reduced to one-half the mass that could be collected to make head against Melas in Piedmont. In effect, out of the sixty thousand men which he commanded in Lombardy, Napoléon could only collect thirty thousand in one body to meet the main army of the enemy ; but, confident in his own abilities and the spirit of his troops, he resolved with this inconsiderable force to cut Melas off from his line of retreat, and for this purpose moved upon Stradella, on the right bank of the Po, which brought him on the great road from Alexandria to Mantua (1).

The French  
vanguard  
comes up  
with the  
Austrians at  
Montebello.

The French army began its march towards the Po on the 6th June, and Lannes, commanding the advanced guard, crossed that river at St.-Cipriano. At the same time, Murat, who had broken up from Lodi, attacked the *tête-de-pont* at Placentia, and drove the Austrians out of that town on the road towards Tortona, while Duhesme, not less fortunate, assailed Cremona, and expelled the garrison, with the loss of eight hundred men. The line of the Po being thus broken through at three points, the Imperialists every where fell back, and abandoning all hope of maintaining their communication with Mantua and their reserves in the east of Italy, concentrated their forces towards Casteggio and Montebello. Ott there joined them with the forces rendered disposable by the surrender of Genoa, and stationed his troops, on a chain of gentle eminences, in two lines, so disposed as to be able to support one another in case of need. Fifteen thousand chosen troops were there drawn up in the most advantageous position ; their right resting on the heights which formed the roots of the Apennines, and commanding the great road to Tortona which wound round their feet ; their left extending into the plain, where their splendid cavalry could act with effect. At the sight of such an array, Lannes was a moment startled, but instantly perceiving the disastrous effect which the smallest retrograde movement might have on a corps with its rear resting on the Po, he resolved forthwith to attack the enemy. His forces did not exceed nine thousand men, while those of the enemy were fifteen thousand strong ; but the division of Victor, of nearly equal strength, was only two leagues in the rear, and might be expected to take a part in the combat before its termination (2).

Desperate  
and bloody  
action there,  
in which the  
Austrians  
are worsted.

The French infantry, with great gallantry, advanced in echelon, under a shower of grape-shot and musketry, to storm the hills on the right of the Austrian position, where strong batteries were placed, which commanded the whole field of battle ; and succeeded in carrying the heights of Revetta : but they were there assailed, while disor-

(1) Napoléon, i. 275, 277. Dum. iii. 276, 279. Jom. xlii. 212, 220. Bul. 124, 127.

(2) Bot. iv. 23. Nap. i. 279. Dum. iii. 288, 290. Jom. xiii. 257, 258.



dered by success, by six fresh regiments; and driven with great slaughter down into the plain. In the centre, on the great road, Watrin with difficulty maintained himself against the vehement attacks of the Imperialists; and notwithstanding the utmost efforts of Lannes, defeat appeared inevitable, when the battle was restored by the arrival of a division of Victor's corps, which enabled the Republicans to rally their troops and prepare a fresh attack. New columns were immediately formed to assail the heights on the left, while Watrin commenced a furious onset in the centre; the Austrians were every where driven back, and the triumph of the French appeared certain, when Ott brought up his reserves from the second line, and victory again inclined to the other side. The Republicans, attacked in their turn by fresh troops, gave way, and the loud shouts of the Imperialists announced a total overthrow, when the arrival of the remainder of Victor's corps not only restored the balance, but turned it against the Austrians. Their troops, however, were too experienced, and their confidence in themselves too great, to yield without a desperate struggle; both sides were animated by the most heart-stirring recollections. The French fought to regain the laurels they had won in the first Italian campaign, the Imperialists to preserve those they had reaped in so many later triumphs; and both parties felt that the fate of the war, in a great degree, depended on their exertions; for the Austrians struggled to gain time for the concentration of their forces to meet this new enemy, the Republicans to avoid being driven back with ruinous loss into the Po. The last reserves on both sides were soon engaged, and the contending parties fought long hand to hand with the most heroic resolution. At length the arrival of Napoléon with the division Gardanne, decided the victory (1). Ott, who now saw his right turned, while the centre and left were on the point of giving way, reluctantly gave the signal of retreat, and the Imperialists, in good order, and with measured steps, retired towards S. Julian, after throwing a garrison of a thousand men into the fortress of Tortona (2).

Position of  
the French  
in the Pass  
of Stradella,  
between the  
Apennines  
and Po.

In this bloody combat, the Austrians lost three thousand killed and wounded, and fifteen hundred prisoners. The French had to lament nearly an equal number slain or disabled; but the moral effect of the victory was immense, and more than counterbalanced all their losses. It restored at once the spirit of their troops, which the continued disasters of the preceding campaign had severely weakened; and when Napoléon traversed the field of battle, late in the evening, he found the soldiers lying on the ground, and exhausted with fatigue, but animated with all their ancient enthusiasm. He halted his army at Stradella, a strong position, formed by the advance of a lower ridge of the Apennines towards the Po, where the intersected and broken nature of the ground promised to render unserviceable the numerous squadrons of the enemy. In this position he remained the three following days, concentrating and organizing his troops for the combat which was approaching, and covering, by *têtes-de-pont*, the two bridges over the Po in his rear—his sole line of retreat in case of disaster, or means of rejoining the large portion of his army which remained behind (3).

Disastrous  
retreat of  
Elms from  
the Var.

While Napoléon, with the army of reserve, was thus threatening Melas in front, and occupied, at Stradella, the sole line by which the Austrian general could re-establish his communications with the plain of Lombardy, disasters of the most formidable kind, were accumu-

(1) Nap. i. 278, 280. Bot. iv. 23, 24. Jom. xiii. 256, 260. Dum. iii. 293, 297. Bul. 137, 145.

(2) This was one of the most desperate actions which had yet occurred in the war. "The bones,"

said Lannes, "cracked in my division like glass in a hail-storm."—BOURBONNAY, iv. 112.

(3) Nap. i. 280. Dum. iii. 297, 299. Jom. xiii. 260, 261.

lating in his rear. No sooner did Elnitz commence his retreat, in the night of the 27th May, than Suchet, reinforced by some thousand of the national guard in the vicinity, which raised his corps to fourteen thousand men, instantly resumed the offensive. At noon, on the following day, General Ménard attacked the intrenchments which covered the retreat of the Austrians, forced them, and made three hundred prisoners. Following up his successes, he advanced rapidly on the three succeeding days, and on the 31st, attacked Bellegarde, and drove him from a strong position on the Col di Braus. On the next day, all the French columns were put in motion by sunrise. Garnier moved upon the Col di Tende by the Col di Rauss; Ménard, by the heights of Pietra Cava, directed his steps to the fort of Saorgio, now dismantled, and the camp of Mille Fourches; while Brunet attacked the Col di Brois in front, supported by a lateral column on each flank. These movements, though complicated from the nature of the ground, were attended with complete success. The important positions of the Col di Rauss, and the camp of Mille Fourches, were successively carried; the troops who defended them flying towards the Col di Tende and Fontan, leaving a thousand prisoners in the hands of the Republicans; Ménard descended from the heights in its rear to the romantic fort of Saorgio, which fell without any resistance; at the same time, Garnier and Lesuire established themselves on the Col di Tende, the troops intrusted with the defence of which sought refuge within the walls of Coni. The great road by the Col di Tende being thus carried, and the Austrian line broken through the middle, the usual series of disasters fell upon their scattered detachments. Elnitz, instead of uniting his forces to fall on Ménard, and regain the decisive pass of Saorgio and the great road, moved to the left to Acqua-Dolce to cover the great road to Genoa. The consequence of this was, that Ulm and Bellegarde, with two Austrian brigades, were surrounded at Breglio, and being cut off by the fall of Saorgio from the great road, had no alternative but to sacrifice their artillery, consisting of twelve light pieces, and throw themselves upon the heights of Foscoire, a branch of the Mont Jove. They were there attacked on the following day by Rochambeau, and driven back to Pigna, while Suchet pursued Elnitz towards Acqua-Dolce, and Ménard descended from the sources of the Tanaro towards Pieve. He had hardly arrived at that place when Ulm and Bellegarde, who, after unheard-of fatigues, had surmounted the rugged mountains which overhang Triola, arrived at the same place, exhausted with fatigue and totally unable to make any resistance. They occupied the houses without opposition, but they soon found that the overhanging woods were filled with enemies, and to complete their consternation, intelligence shortly after arrived that Delaunay, with an entire brigade, had cut off their only line of retreat. A panic instantly seized the troops; whole battalions threw down their arms and dispersed, and after wandering for days in the woods, were compelled by the pangs of hunger to surrender to the enemy. Of their whole force, only three hundred men, with the two generals, made their retreat by the Monte Ariolo to Latterman's camp (1). Elnitz at length, with eight thousand men, reached Ceva, having lost nearly nine thousand men in this disastrous retreat; while Suchet, united at Voltri with the garrison of Genoa, landed at that place by the Austrians, and advanced with their combined forces to the heights of Montenotte.

Thus disasters accumulating, one after another, on all sides, rendered the position of Melas highly critical. In his front was Napoléon, with the army

(1) *Jom.* xiii. 234, 243. *Dum.* iii. 249, 227. *Bot.* iv. 22, 24, *Bul.* 187, 195.

**Gallant resolution of Melas to cut his way through Napoléon's army.** of reserve, amounting in all to sixty thousand men; while in his rear, Suchet occupied all the mountain passes, and was driving before him the scattered Imperialists like chaff before the wind. On his left, the awful barrier of the Alps, leading only into a hostile country, precluded all hopes of retreat; while on his right, the ridges of the Apennines, backed by the sea, rendered it impossible to regain by a circuitous route the Hereditary States. Nothing could be more perilous than his situation; but the Austrian veteran was not discouraged, and concentrating all his disposable forces, he resolved to give battle, and open a communication, sword in hand, with the eastern provinces of the empire. Nor was it without reason that he ventured on this step, albeit hazardous at all times, and doubly so when retreat was impossible and communication with the base of operations cut off. He could collect above thirty thousand veteran troops, animated with the best spirit, and proud of two campaigns of unbroken glory: his artillery was greatly superior to that of the enemy, while the plains of the Bormida, where the decisive battle apparently was to be fought, seemed admirably adapted for his numerous and magnificent cavalry. Having taken his resolution, he dispatched troops in all directions to concentrate his forces; Elnitz, with the broken remains of his corps, was recalled from Ceva, Hohen-zollern from Genoa, the defence of which was intrusted to the extenuated prisoners, liberated from captivity by its fall (1); while a courier was dispatched, in haste, to Admiral Keith, to accelerate the arrival of a corps of twelve thousand English, who at this decisive crisis lay inactive at Minorca.

**Arrival of Desaix from Egypt at Napoléon's headquarters.** The post of Stradella, where Napoléon awaited the arrival of the enemy, and barred the great road to the eastward, was singularly well adapted to compensate the inferiority in cavalry and artillery of the First Consul. The right rested on impracticable morasses, extending to the Po; the centre was strengthened by several large villages; the left, commanding the great road, extended over heights, the commencement of the Apennines, crowned with a numerous artillery. Napoléon remained there, awaiting the attack, for three days; but the Austrian general had scarcely completed his operations, and he judged it not advisable to abandon the open plain, so favourable for his cavalry, for the broken ground selected by the enemy. On the 11th, Desaix, who had returned from Egypt, and performed quarantine at Toulon, arrived at headquarters with his aides-de-camp, Savary and Rapp. They sat up all night conversing on the changes of France, and the state of Egypt since they had parted on the banks of the Nile; and the First Consul, who really loved his lieutenant, and appreciated his military talents, immediately gave him the command of the division of Boudet. Finding that the Austrians were resolved not to attack him where he was, and remained grouped under the cannon of Alexandria, and fearful that they might recoil upon Suchet, or incline to the right towards Genoa, or the left to the Ticino, and threaten in turn his own communications, he resolved to give them battle in their own ground, and advanced to Voghera and the plains of MARENGO (2). Ott, at his approach, retired, across the Bormida, the two bridges over which were fortified, and armed with cannon.

Melas learned on the 10th, at Alexandria, the disastrous issue of the combat at Montebello, and the immense extent of the losses sustained by Elnitz. Far from being stunned by so many reverses, he only rose in firmness as the

(1) Dum. iii. 298, 299. Jom. xiii. 244, 248. Bul. 200, 209.

(2) Nap. i. 281, 283. Bot. iv. 24. Dum. iii. 298. Jom. xiii. 260, 263.

danger increased; and after dispatching a courier to Lord Keith, with accounts of his critical situation, and his resolution, in case of disaster to fall back upon Genoa, he addressed a noble proclamation to his troops, in which, without concealing their danger, he exhorted them to emulate their past glory, or fall with honour on the field which lay before them. Napoléon, on his side, fearful that the enemy meditated a retreat, and might retire unbroken to the fastnesses of the Apennines, pushed forward with vigour.

June 13. Lapoype, with his division, who had been left in observation on the north of the Po, received orders instantly to cross that river, and hasten to the scene of action, while Victor was directed to advance straight towards Marengo, and make himself master of the bridges over the Bormida. He successfully performed the task; Marengo, after a slight resistance, was carried, and the victorious French troops were arrested only by the fire of cannon

Preparatory movements of both parties. from the *tête-de-pont* on the Bormida. The facility with which Marengo was abandoned, confirmed Napoléon in his opinion that Melas meditated a retreat; and impressed with this idea, he re-

solved to return during the night to Ponte Curone, and move in the direction of the Po; a resolution which would have proved fatal to his army, as it would have been attacked and routed on the following day, while executing its movement, by the Austrian general (1). The rapid swelling of the torrent of the Scrivia rendered that impossible, and induced the First Consul to fix his headquarters at Torre de Garofalo, between Tortona and Alexandria; and during the night intelligence of such a kind was received as rendered it necessary to suspend the lateral movements, and concentrate all his forces to resist the enemy.

Forces assembled on both sides. In effect, Melas, having collected 31,000 men on the Bormida, of which 7,500 were cavalry, with 200 pieces of cannon, was advancing with rapid strides towards Marengo; having finally determined, in a general council on the preceding day, to risk every thing on the issue of a battle. Napoléon's troops of all arms present on the field, did not exceed 29,000, of which only 3,600 were horse; no less than 30,000 being in observation or garrison in the Milanese States, or on the banks of the Po. The Austrian force had undergone a similar diminution from the same supposed necessity of protecting the rear; 4,000 were left in Coni, and so many in Liguria, that instead of the 30,000 who were disposable at the end of May in that quarter, only 16,000 joined the Imperial headquarters. Their spirits, however, which had been somewhat weakened by the recent reverses, were elevated to the highest degree, when the determination to fight was taken; every one returned in joyful spirits to his quarters; the camp resounded with warlike cries and the note of military preparation, and that mutual confidence between officers and men was observable, which is the surest fore-runner of glorious achievements (2).

Battle of Marengo, June 24. By daybreak, on the 14th June, the whole army of Melas was in motion; they rapidly defiled over the three bridges of the Bormida, and when the first rays of the sun appeared above the horizon, they glittered on twenty thousand foot soldiers, seven thousand cavalry, and two hundred pieces of cannon, pressing forward in proud array over the vast field of Marengo, perhaps the only plain in Italy where charges of horse can be made in full career. The First Consul was surprised; he never anticipated an attack from the enemy; his troops were disposed in oblique order by echelon, the

(1) Nap. i. 287, 288. Jom. xiii. 263, 266. Dum, iii. 305, 307. Bul. 210, 220.

(2) Bot. iv. 25. Jom. xlii. 270. Bul. 230, 233.

left in front, and the right at half a day's march in the rear, in marching order; not more than twenty-two thousand men, under Lannes and Victor, could be brought till noon into the field to withstand the shock of the whole Austrian army. The vehemence of the cannonade soon convinced him that a general battle was at hand, and he instantly dispatched orders to Desaix to remeasure his steps, and hasten to the scene of action. But before he could do this, events of the utmost importance had taken place. At eight o'clock, the Austrian infantry, under Haddick and Kaim, preceded by a numerous and splendid array of artillery, which covered the deploying of their columns, commenced the attack. They speedily overthrew Gardanne, who, with six battalions, was stationed in front of Marengo, and drove him back in disorder towards that village. They were there received by the bulk of Victor's corps, which was by this time drawn up, with its centre in the village, and its wings along the hollow of Fontanone, which separated the two armies; that of Lannes was still in the rear. For two hours, Victor withstood all the efforts of Haddick and Kaim with heroic resolution, and at length the corps of Lannes came up, and the forces on both sides became more equal. The battle now raged with the utmost fury; the opposing columns stood, with invincible firmness, within pistol-shot of each other, and all the chasms, produced by the dreadful discharges of artillery, were rapidly filled up by a regular movement to the centre of the brave men who formed the ranks. While this desperate conflict was going on, intelligence was received that the advanced guard of Suchet had reached Acqui in the rear. Melas, uneasy for his communications, detached two thousand five hundred horse to arrest his progress; an unnecessary precaution, as he was too far off to effect any thing on the field of battle, and which, perhaps, decided the fate of the day. At length the perseverance of the Austrians prevailed over the heroic devotion of the French: Marengo was carried, the stream of the Fontanone forced, and the Republicans were driven back to the second line they had formed in the rear.

Great success of the Austrians.

Here they made a desperate stand, and Haddick's division, disordered by success, was repulsed across the stream by Watrin with the right of Lannes' division; but the Republicans could not follow up their advantage, as Victor's corps, exhausted with fatigue, and severely weakened in numerical strength, was in no condition to support any offensive movement. The Austrians, perceiving his weakness, redoubled their efforts; a fresh attack was made on the centre and left, by which Victor's corps, weakened by four hours' incessant fighting, was at length broken. The Imperialists pressed forward with redoubled vigour, when their adversaries gave way; their regiments were rapidly pursued, and frequently surrounded, and no resource remained but to traverse for two leagues the open plain as far as S.-Juliano, where the reserve under Lannes might be expected to arrive for their support. The Imperialists rapidly followed, preceded by fifty pieces of artillery, which spread death through the flying columns. Melas, with the centre, established himself at Marengo, and Lannes, now entirely uncovered on his left, was obliged to commence a retrograde movement, which at first was performed by echelon in squares with admirable discipline. Gradually, however, the retreat became more disorderly; in vain Kellermann and Champeaux, by repeated charges, arrested the Imperial cavalry, which swept round the retreating columns. He could not check the Hungarian infantry, which advanced steadily in pursuit, halting at every fifty yards, and pouring in destructive volleys, while the intervals between the regiments were filled up by a powerful artillery, which incessantly sent a storm of grape-shot through the retreating masses. No firmness could long endure such a trial;



gradually the squares broke; the immense plain of Marengo was covered with fugitives; the alarm spread even to the rear of the army, and the fatal cry, "*Tout est perdu, sauve qui peut*," was already heard in the ranks (1).

Matters were in this disastrous state when Napoléon, at eleven o'clock, arrived on the field of battle with his guard. The sight of his staff, surrounded by two hundred mounted grenadiers, revived the spirits of the fugitives; the well-known plumes recalled to the veterans the hopes of success. The fugitives rallied at S.-Juliano, in the rear of those squares of Lannes which still kept their ranks, and Napoléon detached eight hundred grenadiers of his guard to the right of the army, to make head against Ott, who there threatened to turn its flank. At the same time, he himself advanced with a demi-brigade to the support of Lannes, in the centre, and detached five battalions, under Monnier, the vanguard of Desaix's division, to Castel Ceriolo, on the extreme right, to hold in check the light infantry of the enemy, which was there making serious progress. The grenadiers first advanced in square into the midst of the plain, clearing their way equally through the fugitives and the enemy; from their sides, as from a flaming castle, issued incessant volleys of musketry, and all the efforts of the Imperialists were long unable to force back this intrepid band. At length, however, they were shaken by the steady fire of the Imperial artillery, and being charged in front by the Hungarian infantry, and in flank by the Austrian hussars, were broken and driven back in disorder. Their destruction appeared certain, when the leading battalions of Desaix's division, under Monnier, arrived, disengaged this band of heroes from the numerous enemies by whom they were surrounded, and advancing rapidly forward, made themselves masters of the village of Castel Ceriolo. Here, however, they were charged with fury by Vogelsang with part of Ott's division, who retook Castel Ceriolo, and separated Monnier from the grenadiers of the guard; it was soon, however, retaken by the French, and Cara St.-Cyr, barricading himself in the houses, succeeded in maintaining that important post during the remainder of the day (2).

The French reserve are brought into action under Desaix.

While the reserves of Napoléon were thus directed to the French right, with a view to arrest the advance of the Austrians in that quarter, the left was a scene of the most frightful disorder. Then was felt the irreparable loss to the Austrians which the detachment of so large a portion of their cavalry to the rear had occasioned; had the squadrons detached to observe Suchet poured in upon the broken fugitives in that quarter, the defeat of the left and centre would have been complete; and Desaix, assailed both in front and flank, would have come up only in time to share in the general ruin. But nothing of the kind was attempted; Melas, deeming the victory gained, after having had two horses shot under him, and being exhausted with fatigue, retired at two o'clock to Alexandria, leaving to his chief of the staff, Zach, the duty of following up his success; and the broken centre and left of the Republicans retired to S.-Juliano, leisurely followed by the Austrian army. Zach put himself at the head of the advanced guard, and at the distance of half a mile behind him came up Kaim with three brigades, and at an equal distance in his rear the reserve, composed of Hungarian grenadiers. Napoléon on his part had resolved to abandon the great road to Tortona, and effect his retreat by the shorter line of Sale or Castel Nuova (3).

(1) Nap. i. 289, 290. Bot. iv. 27, 28. Dam. iii. iv. 29, 30. Jom. xiii. 279, 282. Sav. i. 176. Bul. 310, 317. Jom. xiii. 272, 279. Sav. i. 174, 175. 249, 260.  
Bul. 232, 245.

(3) Nap. i. 291, 292. Jom. xiii. 282, 283. Bot.

(2) Nap. i. 290, 291. Dam. iii. 318, 321. Bot. iv. 29, 30. Dam. iii. 320. Sav. i. 177. Bul. 260, 264.

Matters were in this desperate state, when, at four o'clock, the main body of Desaix at length made its appearance at S.-Juliano. "What think you of the day?" said Napoléon to his lieutenant, when he arrived with his division. "The battle," said Desaix, "is completely lost. But it is only four o'clock; there is time to gain another one (1)." Napoléon and he alone were of this opinion; all the others counselled a retreat. In pursuance of this resolution, the remains of Victor and Lannes' corps were re-formed, under cover of the cavalry, which was massed in front of S.-Juliano, a masked battery prepared under the direction of Marmont, and Desaix advanced at the head of his corps, consisting of little more than four thousand men, to arrest the progress of the enemy. Napoléon, advancing to the front, rode along the line, exclaiming, "Soldiers! we have retired far enough. You know it is always my custom to sleep on the field of battle." The troops replied by enthusiastic shouts, and immediately advanced to the charge. Zach, little anticipating such an onset, was advancing at the head of his column, five thousand strong, when he was received by a discharge from twelve pieces, suddenly unmasked by Marmont, while at the same time Desaix debouched from the village at the head of his division. The Imperialists, astonished at the appearance of so considerable a body, where they expected to find only fugitives in disorder, and apprehensive of falling into a snare, paused and fell back; but Zach soon succeeded in restoring order in the front, and checked the advance of the enemy. At this moment Desaix was struck by a ball in the breast, and soon after expired. His last words were, "Tell the First Consul that my only regret in dying is, to have perished before having done enough to live in the recollection of posterity." This catastrophe, however, was far from weakening the ardour of his soldiers. The second in command, Boudet, succeeded in inspiring them with the desire of vengeance, and the fire rolled rapidly and sharply along the whole line. But the Imperialists had now recovered from their surprise; the Hungarian grenadiers advanced to the charge; the French in their turn hesitated and broke, and victory was more doubtful than ever (2).

At this critical moment, a happy inspiration seized Kellermann, which decided the fate of the day. The advance of Zach's column had, without their being aware of it, brought their flank right before his mass of cavalry, eight hundred strong, which was concealed from their view by a vineyard, where the festoons, conducted from tree to tree, rose above the horses' heads, and effectually intercepted the sight. Kellermann instantly charged, with his whole force, upon the flank of the Austrians, as they advanced in open column, and the result must be given in his own words (3). Zach's grenadiers, cut through the middle by this unexpected charge, and, exposed to a murderous fire in front from Desaix's division, which had rallied upon receiving this unexpected aid, broke and fled. Zach himself, with two thousand men, were made prisoners; the remainder, routed and dispersed, fled in the utmost disorder to the rear, overthrowing in their course the other divisions which were advancing to their support (4).

(1) Bour. iv. 122. Jom. xiii. 286.

(2) Jom. xiii. 287, 289. Nap. i. 292, 293. Dum. iii. 324, 325. Sav. i. 178. Bul. 260, 271.

(3) "The combat was engaged," says Kellermann; "Desaix soon drove back the enemy's tirailleurs on their main body; but the sight of that formidable column of 6000 Hungarian grenadiers made our troops halt. I was advancing in line on their flank, concealed by the festoons; a frightful discharge took place; our line wavered, broke, and fled; the Austrians rapidly advanced to follow up their

success, in all the disorder and security of victory. I see it; I am in the midst of them; they lay down their arms. The whole did not occupy so much time as it took me to write these six lines."—*Ses Dumas*, v. 361. The Duchess of Abrantes states also that she repeatedly heard the battle of Marengo discussed by Lannes, Victor, and the other generals engaged, at her own table, and that they all ascribed the victory to Kellermann's charge.—*D'Abrantes*, iii. 44, 45.

(4) Sav. i. 178, 179. Bul. 271, 276. Nap. i. 292.

Final defeat  
of the Aus-  
trians.

This great achievement was decisive of the fate of the battle. The remains of Victor and Lannes' corps no sooner beheld this success, than they regained their former spirit, and turned fiercely upon their pursuers. The infantry of Kaim, overwhelmed by the tide of fugitives, gave way; the cavalry, which already inundated the field, was seized with a sudden panic, and, instead of striving to restore the day, galloped off to the rear, trampling down in their progress the unfortunate fugitives who were flying before them. A general cry arose, "To the bridges—to the bridges!" and the whole army disbanding, rushed in confusion towards the Bormida. In the general consternation, Marengo was carried, after a gallant defence, by the Republicans; the cannoniers, finding the bridges choked up by the fugitives plunged with their horses and guns into the stream, where twenty pieces stuck fast, and fell into the hands of the enemy. At length Melas, who hastened to the spot, rallied the rearguard in front of the bridges, and by its heroic resistance, gained time for the army to pass the river; the troops, regaining their ranks, re-formed upon the ground they had occupied at the commencement of the day; and after twelve hours' incessant fighting, the sun set upon this field of carnage (1).

Loss sus-  
tained on  
both sides.

Such was the memorable battle of Marengo; one of the most obstinately contested which had yet occurred during the war, in which both parties performed prodigies of valour, and which was attended with greater results perhaps than any conflict that had yet occurred in modern Europe. The Imperialists had to lament the loss of seven thousand men killed and wounded, besides three thousand prisoners, eight standards, and twenty pieces of cannon. The French sustained an equal loss in killed and wounded, besides one thousand prisoners taken in the early part of the day. But although the disproportion was not so great in the trophies of victory, the difference was prodigious in the effect it produced on the respective armies, and the ultimate issue of the campaign. The Austrians had fought for life or death, with their faces towards Vienna, to cut their way sword in hand through the French army. Defeat in these circumstances was irreparable ruin. By retiring either to Genoa or the Maritime Alps, they ran the risk of being cooped up in a corner of a hostile territory, without any chance of regaining their own country, and the certainty of depriving the empire of the only army capable of defending its Italian possessions. The French, on the other hand, had now firmly established themselves in the plains of Piedmont; and could, by merely retaining their present position, effectually cut off the Imperialists, and hinder their rendering any assistance to the Hereditary States. In these circumstances, the victory gave the Republicans, as that under the walls of Turin had given the Imperialists a century before, the entire command of Italy. Such a result was in itself of vast importance; but coming as it did, in the outset of Napoléon's career as First Consul, its consequences were incalculable. It fixed him on the throne, revived the

202. Dum. iii. 324, 325. Jom. xiii. 288, 289. Bot. iv. 30, 31. Mém. du Dépôt de la Guerre, iv. 272.

(1) Bul. 275, 280. Sav. i. 179. Nap. i. 293, 294. Jom. xiii. 290, 294. Dum. iii. 325, 326. Bot. iv. 31. Sealfeld, iv. 230, 231. Gaz. Mil. d'Autriche, Aug. 1823.

There is a most extraordinary similarity between the crisis of Marengo and that of Waterloo, with this difference, that the rout of the French was complete before the arrival of Desaix, while not an English square was broken before the final charge of the old guard. But the defeat of the last attacks in both battles was accomplished in the same way.

The rout of Zach's columns, by the fire of Dessaix's division in front, aided by the charge of Kellermann in flank, was precisely similar to the defeat of the old guard at Mount St. John by the English guards, aided by the happy flank attack of Major Gawler with the 52d and 71st regiments, and the gallant charge of Sir Hussey Vivian with the 10th and 18th hussars. In both cases the overthrow of the last columns of attack drew after it the total defeat of the army.—See "*Crisis of Waterloo*." By MAJOR GAWLER and SIR H. VIVIAN. *United Service Journal*. July, 1833.

military spirit of the French people, and precipitated the nation into that career of conquest which led them to Cadiz and the Kremlin (1).

United with the great qualities of Napoléon's character was a selfish thirst for glory, and consequent jealousy of any one who had either effectually thwarted his designs, or rendered him such services as might diminish the lustre of his own exploits. His undying jealousy of Wellington was an indication of the first weakness; his oblivion of Kellermann's inappreciable service, an instance of the second. When this young officer was brought into the presence of the First Consul after the battle, he coldly said, "You made a good charge this evening;" and immediately turning to Bessieres, added, "The guard has covered itself with glory."—"I am glad you are pleased," replied Kellermann, "for it has placed the crown on your head." He repeated the same expression in a letter, which was opened at the post-office and brought to Napoléon. The obligation was too great to be forgiven. Kellermann was not promoted like the other generals, and never afterwards enjoyed the favour of the chief on whose brow he had placed the diadem (2).

Melas proposes a suspension of arms.

While nothing but congratulation and triumph were heard in the French lines, the Austrian camp exhibited the utmost consternation. The night was spent in re-forming the regiments, repairing the losses of the artillery, and replenishing the exhausted stores of ammunition. A council of war was summoned; the majority, thunderstruck by the magnitude of the disaster and the hopeless nature of their situation, inclined for a treaty to evacuate the Piedmontese territory. "If we cut our way through," said they, "supposing us to be successful, we must sacrifice ten thousand men left in Genoa, and as many in the fortresses of Piedmont, and shall not be the less compelled to take refuge under the cannon of Mantua. It is better to save these twenty thousand men than to preserve towns for the King of Sardinia." In conformity with these views, a flag of truce was dispatched on the following morning to the French headquarters, to propose terms of capitulation. He arrived at their outposts just at the time when an attack on the *têtes-de-pont* on the Bormida was preparing; and, after some difficulty, the terms of the treaty were agreed upon between the two generals (3).

Armistice of Alexandria.

By this convention it was provided that "there should be an armistice between the two armies till an answer was obtained from the Court of Vienna. That in the mean time the Imperial army should occupy the country between the Mincio and the Po; that is, Peschiera, Mantua, Borgoforte, and from it the left bank of the Po, and on its right bank, Ferrara, Ancona, and Tuscany; that the French should occupy the district between the Chiesa, the Oglio, and the Po, and the space between the Chiesa and the Mincio should not be occupied by either army. That the fortresses of Tortona, Milan, Turin, Pizzighittone, Arona, Placentia, Ceva, Savona, Urbia, Coni, Alexandria, and Genoa, should be surrendered to the French, with all their

(1) Nap. i. 294. Jom. xiii. 295, 296. Dum. iii. 328, 329. Bot. iv. 32, 34. Austrian Official Account, Gaz. Mil. d'Autriche, 1823. Mémorial du Dépôt de la Guerre, iv. 333. Bul. 280, 281.

In the preceding account of the battle of Marengo, the author has corrected the various French and German accounts of the engagement hitherto published, by some Manuscript Notes by General Kellermann, who had so great a share in achieving the success, written on the margin of the collection of the various accounts of the battle, contained in the "Mémorial du Dépôt de la Guerre," iv. 269, 343. For these valuable manuscript notes, the author is

indebted to the kindness of his esteemed friend, Captain Basil Hall.

(2) Bour. iv. 125. Bot. iv. 34.

Napoléon, at the same time, was perfectly aware of the immense service rendered by the charge of Kellermann; for he said in the evening to Bourrienne, "That little Kellermann made a happy charge. He struck in at the critical moment; we owe him much. On what trivial events do affairs depend!"—Bourrienne, iv. 124.

(3) Jom. xiii. 296, 297. Nap. i. 294. Bul. 281. 287.

artillery and stores, the Austrians taking with them only their own cannon." The evacuation of all these places, and the final retreat of the Austrian army, were to be completed by the 24th June (1).

Its immense results. Thus the complete reconquest of Piedmont and the Milanese, the cession of twelve fortresses, armed with fifteen hundred pieces of cannon, and the advance of the Republican eagles to the Mincio, were the immediate effect of the stubborn resistance of Desaix and the happy charge of Kellermann. A few battalions and eight hundred horse changed the face of the world. But Napoléon must not be deprived of his share in these glorious results. These incidents were but the last steps in a chain of causes which his genius had prepared, and his skill brought to bear upon the final issue of the campaign. He had thrown himself upon his adversary's communications without compromising his own, and thence its astonishing consequences. Defeated at Marengo, Napoléon could still have retired upon an equal force detached in his rear, and, in the worst event, have retired over the St.-Gothard and the Simplon, with no other sacrifice but his artillery. To have achieved such results, at so inconsiderable a risk, is the greatest triumph of genius in the science of war (2).

Is faithfully observed by the Austrians. The convention of Alexandria was religiously observed by the Austrian commanders. The English expedition under Abercromby, with twelve thousand men, arrived in the bay of Genoa just in time to see that important city surrendered to the Republican commanders; but, notwithstanding that important succour, German integrity swerved nothing from its good faith. Had this important reinforcement, instead of lying inactive at Minorca, arrived a fortnight sooner with the troops which so soon afterwards conquered in Egypt, what important effects might it have had upon the fortune of the war! But the English at that period were ignorant of the importance of time in military operations, and but novices in the art of war. The time was yet to come when they were to appear in it as masters (3).

Napoléon returns to Milan— Napoléon, after this great victory, appointed Jourdan regent in the continental dominions of the King of Sardinia until their destiny was determined by a general peace, and returned to Milan to enjoy his triumph. He was received with extraordinary demonstrations of joy by the inconstant populace, and Italian adulation lavished on him those splendid epithets which, during three centuries of servitude, they have learned to bestow upon their rulers. He discoursed there much on peace, religion, literature, and the sciences. The Ligurian republic was immediately re-organized, and regained its nominal independence. He shortly after returned by Mont Cenis and Lyon to Paris. When passing through that town, he laid, with extraordinary pomp, amidst an immense concourse of spectators, the first stone of the new Place Bellecour, erected on the site of that which had been destroyed by the barbarity of the Convention. Napoléon was And thence to Paris. in high spirits during the remainder of the journey; but his triumphs, great as they were, appeared to him but as nothing in comparison of those which he yet desired to achieve. "Well," said he, "a few more great events like those of this campaign, and I may really descend to posterity: but still it is little enough; I have conquered, it is true, in less than two years, Cairo, Paris, Milan; but were I to die to-morrow, half a page of general history would, after ten centuries, be all that would be devoted to my ex-

(1) Nap. i. 295, 296. Jom. xlii. 300.

(2) Jom. xlii. 301, 302.

(3) Jom. xlii. 304, 305.



exploits." He reached Paris during the night; and nothing could exceed the universal transports on the following day when his arrival was known.

July 2. The people had been kept in a cruel state of suspense during his absence; the first news they received of the battle of Marengo was from a mercantile traveller who left the field at one o'clock, and reported that all was lost (1). Rich and poor now vied with each other in their demonstrations of joy; all business was suspended; nothing but songs of triumph were heard in the streets; and at night a general illumination gave vent to the universal transports.

Such was the memorable campaign of Marengo. Inferences of the most important kind, both in a moral and political view, may be drawn from the events which occurred during its progress.

Reflections on this campaign. I. Great changes in human affairs never take place from trivial causes. The most important effects, indeed, are often apparently owing to inconsiderable springs; but the train has been laid in all such cases by a long course of previous events, and the last only puts the torch to its extremity. A fit of passion in Mrs. Masham arrested the course of Marlborough's victories, and preserved the tottering kingdom of France; a charge of a few squadrons of horse, under Kellermann, at Marengo, fixed Napoléon on the consular throne; and another, with no greater force, against the flank of the old guard at Waterloo, chained him to the rock of St.-Helena. Superficial observers lament the subjection of human affairs to the caprice of fortune or the casualties of chance; but a more enlarged observation teaches us to recognise in these apparently trivial events the operation of general laws; and the last link in a chain of causes which have all conspired to produce the general result. Mrs. Masham's passion was the ultimate cause of Marlborough's overthrow, but that event had been prepared by the accumulating jealousy of the nation during the whole tide of his victories, and her indignation was but the drop which made the cup overflow; Kellermann's charge, indeed, fixed Napoléon on the throne, but it was the sufferings of the Revolution, the glories of the Italian campaigns, the triumphs of the Pyramids, which induced the nation to hail his usurpation with joy; the charge of the 10th and 18th hussars broke the last column of the Imperial array, but the foundation of the triumph of Wellington had been laid by the long series of his peninsular victories and the bloody catastrophe of the Moscow campaign.

Extraordinary resurrection of France on the accession of Napoléon. II. The sudden resurrection of France, when Napoléon assumed the helm, is one of the most extraordinary passages of European history, and singularly descriptive of the irresistible reaction in the favour of a firm government which inevitably arises from a long course of revolutionary convulsions. Let not future ages be deluded by the idea that a period of democratic anarchy is one of national strength; it is, on the contrary, in the end, the certain forerunner of public calamity. The glories of the Revolutionary wars were achieved under the despotic rule of the Convention, wielding ten times the power which was ever enjoyed by Louis XIV; the effects of democratic anarchy appeared upon its dissolution, in the disasters of the Directory. After the fall of the Committee of Public Safety, the triumphs of France centred in Napoléon alone; wherever he did not command in person, the greatest reverses were experienced. In 1795 the Republicans were defeated by Clairfait on the Rhine; in 1796 by the Archduke Charles in Germany. In 1799 their reverses were unexampled both in

(1) Nap. i. 301, 303. Bour. iv. 164, 171, 181. Bot. v. 36.

Italy and Germany; from the 9th Thermidor to the 18th Brumaire, a period of above five years, the fortunes of the Republic were singly sustained by the word of Napoléon and the lustre of his Italian campaigns. When he seized the helm in November, 1799, he found the armies defeated and ruined; the frontier invaded, both on the sides of Italy and Germany, the arsenals empty, the soldiers in despair deserting their colours, the royalists revolting against the government, general anarchy in the interior, the treasury empty, the energies of the Republic apparently exhausted. Instantly, as if by enchantment, every thing was changed; order re-appeared out of chaos, talent emerged from obscurity, vigour arose out of the elements of weakness. The arsenals were filled, the veterans crowded to their eagles, the conscripts joyfully repaired to the frontier, la Vendée was pacified, the exchequer began to overflow. In little more than six months after Napoléon's accession, the Austrians were forced to seek refuge under the cannon of Ulm, Italy was regained, unanimity and enthusiasm prevailed among the people, and the revived energy of the nation was finally launched into the career of conquest. Changes so extraordinary cannot be explained by the influence of any one man. Great as the abilities of Napoléon undoubtedly were, they could not be equal to the Herculean task of reanimating a whole nation. It was the transition from anarchy to order, from the tyranny of demagogues to the ascendant of talent, from the weakness of popular to the vigour of military government, which was the real cause of the change. The virtuous, the able, the brave, felt that they no longer required to remain in obscurity; that democratic jealousy would not now be permitted to extinguish rising ability; financial imbecility crush patriotic exertion; private avarice exhaust public resources; civil weakness paralyse military valour. The universal conviction that the reign of the multitude was at an end, produced the astonishing burst of talent which led to the glories of Marengo and Hohenlinden.

Cause of the disasters of the campaign to the Imperialists. III. The disastrous issue of the German campaign to the Imperialists, is not to be entirely ascribed either to the genius of Moreau, or the magnitude of the force which the first consul placed at his command. It was chiefly owing to the ruinous dispersion of the Austrian army and their obstinate adherence to the system of a cordon, when, by the concentration of their enemy's troops, it had become indispensably necessary to accumulate adequate forces on the menaced points. Kray, at the opening of the campaign, had nearly one hundred and ten thousand men at his command; but this immense force, irresistible when kept together, was so dispersed over a line above two hundred miles in length, from the Alps to the Maine, that he could not collect forty-five thousand men to resist the shock of the French centre, of nearly double that strength, at Jagen or Biberach. The loss of these battles, by piercing the Allied line, compelled the whole body to fall back, and thus seventy thousand men abandoned Swabia and Franconia without firing a shot, while half their number, added to the Austrian centre, would have prevented the Republicans ever crossing the Black Forest. The brief campaign of 1815 afforded another example of the same truth; the Allied forces, quartered over all Flanders, though greatly superior, upon the whole to the army of Napoléon were inferior to their assailants, both at Ligny and Waterloo; and the intrepid daring of Wellington, joined to the devoted heroism of his troops, alone prevented in that struggle the continued disasters of Biberach and Moeskirch. The successful stand, on the other hand, made by the Austrian army when concentrated under the cannon of Ulm, and the effec-

tual covering which, in that confined spot, they gave to the whole Hereditary States, affords the clearest proof of the superior efficacy of such an assembled force to any cordon, however skilfully disposed, in arresting an invading enemy. No army will ever advance into an enemy's country, leaving sixty or eighty thousand men together in their rear; for, in such a case, they are exposed to the danger of losing their communications, and being compelled, as at Marengo, to peril all upon the issue of a single battle; but nothing is easier than to make double that force, dispersed over a long line, abandon a whole frontier, by striking decisive blows with a superior force at a part of its extent. In fifteen days, the Imperial cordon was driven back, by attacks on its centre, from the Rhine to the Danube; for six weeks its concentrated force in position at Ulm, not only arrested the victor, but covered the Imperial frontier, and gained time for the revival of the spirit of the monarchy.

IV. The successful stand which Kray, with a defeated army, made against the vast forces of Moreau for six weeks, under the cannon of Ulm, demonstrates the wisdom and foresight of the Archduke Charles in fortifying, at the close of the preceding campaign, that important central position, and the justice of his remark, that it is in the valley of the Danube that the blows are to be struck which are decisive of the fate of France or Austria (1). The long check which this single fortress gave to the powerful and victorious army of Moreau, suggests a doubt, whether central are not more serviceable than frontier fortifications; or, at least, whether a nation, in contemplation of invasion by a powerful and ambitious enemy, should not always be provided with some strongholds in the interior, to the shelter of which a defeated army may retire, and where it may both recruit its losses and recover its spirit. Certain it is, that it is the want of some such *points d'appui* that the sudden prostration of Austria, after the defeats of Ulm and Eckmühl; of Prussia, after that of Jena; and of France, after the disasters of 1814 and 1815, are mainly to be ascribed. But for the fortifications of Vienna, Austria, before the arrival of John Sobieski, would have been overwhelmed by the arms of Soliman; without those of Genoa, the conquest of Italy would have been complete, and the victorious Austrians grouped in irresistible strength in the plains of Piedmont before the Republican eagles appeared on the St.-Bernard; and but for those of Torres Vedras, the arms of England, instead of striking down the power of France on the field of Waterloo, would have sunk, with lustre for ever tarnished into the waters of the Tagus. A mere fortified position, like that of the Drisa, to which Barclay de Tolly retired in 1812, is not sufficient; it is an intrenched camp, connected with a strong fortress, which forms the real formidable obstacle. The defeat of the Prussians, in the first attack on Warsaw in 1794, and the astonishing stand made by Shrynecki, with forty thousand regular troops, against the whole forces of the Russian empire in 1831, prove the inestimable effect of central fortresses, such as Warsaw and Modlin, in forming a nucleus to the national strength, and enabling an inconsiderable to withstand the forces of a powerful monarchy. The difference between central and frontier fortresses in this respect is great and important. The former constitute so many secure asylums, round which the national strength is agglomerated, in the last struggle for national independence, and the retreating army finds itself strengthened in the heart of the empire by the garrisons of the interior fortresses and the new levies who are disciplined within their

Great effect  
of central  
fortifications  
in a state.

(1) Archduke li. 264. *Strategie*, 1796.

walls, while their fortifications form an imposing stronghold, to the siege of which the largest armies are hardly adequate : the latter prove an impassable barrier only to armies of inconsiderable magnitude; and if, by an overwhelming force, the protecting army is compelled to retire, it too often finds itself severely weakened by the great detachments doomed thereafter to useless inactivity in the frontier fortresses. When Napoléon was struck to the earth in 1814, he still held the fortresses on the Elbe and the Rhine : above a hundred thousand veteran troops were there immured, when he maintained an unequal conflict with fifty thousand in the plains of Champagne; and that which he boasted triple line of fortresses could not do for France, would have been certainly effected by an intrenched camp, like that at Ulm, on Montmartre and Belleville. The conclusion to be drawn from that is, not that frontier fortresses are totally useless and central ones are alone to be relied on, but that the combination of the two is requisite to lasting security; the former to cover the provinces and impede an inconsiderable enemy, the latter to repel those desperate strokes which are directed by a gigantic foe at the vitals of the state.

Merits of  
Napoléon in  
the cam-  
paign. V. The march of Napoléon across the St.-Bernard, and his consequent seizure of the Austrian line of communication, is one of the greatest conceptions of military genius, and was deservedly crowned by the triumph of Marengo; but, in the execution of this design, he incurred unnecessary hazard (1), and all but lost his crown by the dispersion of his troops before the final struggle. The forces at his command, after he debouched on the plains of Piedmont, were, including Moncey's division, sixty thousand men; while the Imperialists by no exertions could have brought forty thousand into the field to meet them, so widely were their forces dispersed over the vast theatre of their conquests (2); whereas, when the die came to be cast on the field of Marengo, the Austrians had thirty-one thousand, and the French only twenty-nine thousand in line. This but ill accords with the principle which he himself has laid down, that the essence of good generalship consists, with equal or inferior forces, in being always superior at the point of attack. The march to Milan was the cause of this weakness; while Lannes and Victor, with twenty thousand men, struggled with an overwhelming enemy on the banks of the Bormida, twenty-nine thousand were in position or observation on the Mincio and the Po. So great a dispersion of force to secure the rear was altogether unnecessary; for, in case of disaster, the French army, after the fort of Bard had capitulated on the 1st June, could have retreated as well by the St.-Bernard and Mont Genis, as the Simplon and St.-Gothard. A forward movement, in conjunction with Thureau, after the army, numbering forty thousand combatants, was concentrated at Ivrea on the 24th May, would have delivered Masséna, who did not capitulate till the 4th June, and added his troops, ten thousand strong, to the invading army, while Moncey, with sixteen thousand would have adequately protected the rear; and the retreat of Melas, then far advanced in the defiles of the Maritime Alps, would have been equally cut off. The astonishing consequences which followed the battle of Marengo, afford no proof that the campaign in this particular was not based on wrong principles; the same results might have been gained without the same risk; and it is not the part of a prudent general to commit to chance what may be gained by combination. Had the torrent of the Scrivia not swollen, and stopped the march of the French army on the evening of June 13; had Desaix advanced an hour

(1) Nap. i. 230.

(2) Rapport Officiel d'Autriche, Gaz. Mil. 1823.

later on the 14th; had Kellermann not opportunely charged an unsuspecting foe when concealed by luxuriant vines; had Melas not detached his cavalry to the rear to observe Suchet, the fate of the action would probably have been reversed, and Marengo been Pavia. No scruple need be felt at making these observations, even in reference to so great a commander. The military art, like every other branch of knowledge, is progressive; the achievements of one age illuminate that which succeeds it, and mediocrity can, in the end, judge of what genius only could at first conceive. A school-boy can now solve a problem, to which the minds of Thales and Archimedes alone were adequate in the commencement of geometry.

And of the Austrian commander. VI. If the conduct of the Austrian commander is examined, it will be found to be not less open to exception, previous to the battle of Marengo, than that of the First Consul. The desire to retain every thing, to guard at once all the points which had been gained, was the cause of a dispersion, on his part so much the more reprehensible than that of Napoléon, as, being in a conquered country, with all the fortresses in his possession, it was the less necessary. Two thousand men would have sufficed for the garrison of Tortona, as many for that of Coni. The surplus troops thus acquired, with the cavalry detached to observe Suchet, would have formed a force considerably superior to the reserve of Desaix, which would have ensured the victory. Of what avail were the four thousand men in either of these fortresses the next morning, when all the strong places of Piedmont were surrendered to the enemy? Thrown into the scale when the beam quivered after the repulse of Desaix, they would have hurled Napoléon from the consular throne (1).

Propriety of the convention of Alexandria considered. VII. The conduct of the Austrian commander, during and after the battle, has been the subject of much severe animadversion from the German writers. Bulow, in particular, has charged him with having unnecessarily surrendered the fortresses of Piedmont on the following day, when he had still at command a force capable of breaking through the enemy, and regaining his communications with Mantua (2). Certain it is that Melas, whose conduct in the outset of the action is worthy of the highest praise, did not follow up his first successes so vigorously as seems to have been possible; that his detachment of cavalry to the rear was unnecessary and eminently hurtful; and it is more than probable that, if Napoléon had been in his place, Marengo would have been the theatre of as great a reverse to the Republicans as Salamanca or Vittoria. But, in agreeing to the armistice on the following day, his conduct appears less liable to exception. He had then only twenty thousand men on whom he could rely in the field, and these, with the garrisons in the Piedmontese fortresses, formed the chief defence of the Austrian possessions in Italy. His chief duty was to preserve this nucleus of veteran troops for the monarchy, and transport them from a situation where they were cut off from their communications and could be of little service to their country, to one in which they were restored to both. Perched on the Apennines, or shut up in the walls of Genoa, they would have been exposed to the whole weight of the army of reserve, which might thus have been raised, by the concentration of its forces from the rear, to forty-five thousand men, besides the victorious troops of Suchet, with the garrison of Genoa, nearly twenty-five thousand more. It is doubtful whether the whole force of Melas, aided as it would have been by the expedition of Abercromby and the English fleet, could have successfully withstood such a

(1) Jom. xiii. 303, 304.

(2) Bul. Feldzug, 1800, 292.



concentration of seventy thousand combatants, flushed with victory, and headed by Napoléon; and if they failed, disasters tenfold greater awaited the monarchy. Thirty thousand men might have been made prisoners at once, and the walls of Genoa witnessed as great a catastrophe as the heights of Ulm (1).

Inter-  
dence of  
receiving  
battle in the  
oblique or-  
der.

VIII. The oblique *attack*, or the attack by column coming up after column by echelon, has frequently achieved the most decisive success in war; and the victories of Leuthen by Frederic, and Salamanca by Wellington, were chiefly owing to the skilful use of that method of action. But to *receive* battle in that position is a very different matter. To do so is to expose the successive columns to be overwhelmed by a superior enemy, who, by the defeat of the first, acquires a superiority which it becomes afterwards a matter of extreme difficulty to counterbalance. The action of Montebello was an instance of the successful application and great effect of an attack in this order; the narrow escape from a catastrophe at Marengo, an example of the peril to which troops themselves attacked in such a situation are exposed. The difference between the two is important and obvious. When the attacking army advances in echelon, if it can overthrow the first column of the enemy, it throws it back upon the one in rear, which soon finds itself overpowered by a torrent of fugitives, or shaken by the sight of its comrades in disorder; while, if it is stubbornly resisted, it is soon supported by fresh troops advancing on its flank, in perfect order, to the attack. But when the troops in echelon stand still, all these advantages are reversed; the disorder created in front speedily spreads to the rear, and the successive columns, instead of coming up to the aid of an advancing, too often find themselves overwhelmed by the confusion of a retreating army (2). Napoléon was perfectly aware of these principles; he never intentionally received an attack in echelon; at Marengo, as at Eylau, he was assailed unawares in that position by the enemy, and his ultimate extrication from destruction in both battles was owing to the opportune arrival of troops, whom his first orders had removed far from the scene of action, or upon events on which no human foresight could have calculated at the commencement of the struggle.

IX. When it is recollected that Abercromby's corps, twelve thousand strong, lay inactive at port Mahon in Minorca during this interesting and important crisis, big as the event proved with the fate not only of the campaign but of the war, it is impossible not to feel the most poignant regret at its absence from the scene of action; or to avoid the reflection, that England at that period partook too much of the tardiness of her Saxon ancestors; and that, like Athelstane the Unready, she was never ready to strike till the period for successful action had passed. What would have been the result if this gallant force had been added to the Imperialists during their desperate strife around Genoa, or thrown into the scale, when victory was so doubtful, to meet the troops of Kellermann and Desaix at Marengo! When it is recollected what these very men accomplished in the following year, when opposed to an equal force of Napoléon's veterans on the sands of Alexandria, it is impossible to doubt that their addition to the Allied forces in Italy at this juncture would in all probability have been attended with decisive effects. But, notwithstanding all this, it is impossible to say that the British government were to blame for this apparently inexcusable inactivity of so important a

(1) Rap. Off. d'Autriche, 1823. Mém. du Dép. de la Guerre, iv. 337, 339.

(2) Jom. xiii. 271, 272.

reserve. The equality of force at Marengo, it must always be recollected, was not only unforeseen, but could not have been calculated upon by any degree of foresight. At the outset of the campaign the Imperialists were not only victorious, but greatly superior to their antagonists in Italy; and even after Napoléon and the formidable army of reserve were thrown into the balance, their advantage was so marked, that, but for a ruinous and unnecessary dispersion of force, they must have crushed him on that well-contested field. In these circumstances, no crisis in which their co-operation was likely to be attended with important consequences was to be anticipated in the north of Italy; there was no apparent call upon them to alter the direction of a force destined for important operations either on the shores of Provence or on the banks of the Nile; and the British historian must therefore absolve the English government from any serious blame in this matter, however much he may lament the absence of a band of veterans stationed so near the scene of action, which was adequate, as the event proved, to have turned the scales of fortune and altered the destinies of the world.

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## CHAPTER XXXII.

## CAMPAIGN OF HOHENLINDEN.

FROM THE ARMISTICE OF ALEXANDRIA TO THE PEACE OF LUNEVILLE.

JUNE, 1800—FEB. 1801.

## ARGUMENT.

Universal joy in France at the victory of Marengo—Treaty previously signed between Austria and England—Good faith of the Imperial Government in adhering to it—Count St.-Julien arrives at Paris and signs preliminaries, which are disavowed by the Imperial Cabinet—Negotiations with England for an armistice, which fail from the unreasonable demands of France—Conspiracy to assassinate Napoléon—Preparations of France for a renewal of hostilities—And of Austria—But Russia and Prussia keep aloof from the contest—English expedition under Sir James Pulteney fails at Ferrol—And from dread of the plague declines to attack Cadiz—Surrender of Malta to the British blockading squadron—Affairs of Italy—Election of Pope Pius VII at Venice—Hostility of Naples and insurrection of Piedmont against France—The French crush the insurrection in the Tuscan States with great cruelty—Leghorn is seized and the English merchandise confiscated—Last remnant of Swiss independence is destroyed—Capture of Surinam and Demerara by the English squadrons—Permanent incorporation of the Netherlands with France—Description of the line of the Inn—Project of the Imperialists—Hostilities on the Lower Rhine.—The Austrians advance into Bavaria—Movements of Moreau—Great success of the Austrians in the outset—French retire to Hohenlinden—Description of the field of battle—Able plans of Moreau—Battle of Hohenlinden—Dreadful struggle at the entrance of the Forest—Decisive charge of Richepanse—The Austrian line of communication is intercepted—Great victory gained by the French—Its prodigious consequences—Merit of Moreau in gaining it—The Austrians retire behind the Inn—Skillful manœuvre by which the passage of that river was effected by Moreau—Rapid advance of the French towards Salzburg—They are defeated by the Austrian Cavalry in front of that town—But the Imperialists are nevertheless obliged to retire—Moreau pushes on towards Vienna—Great successes gained by his advanced guard—The Archduke joins the army, but cannot arrest the disaster—An armistice is agreed to—Operations of the army on the Main—And in the Grisons—Designs of Napoléon there—Description of the ridges to be surmounted—Napoléon's design for the passage of that mountain—Preparations of Macdonald for crossing it—Description of the passage of the Splügen—Extreme difficulties experienced by the French troops in the passage—Heroism of Macdonald in persisting notwithstanding—He arrives at Chiavenna, on the Lake of Como—Unworthy jealousy of this passage displayed by Napoléon—He is placed under the orders of Brune—Difficult passage of the Col Apriga—Attack on the Mont Tonol—In which the French are repulsed—Positions and forces of the French and Austrians in Italy—First operations of Brune—Passage of the Mincio—Desperate conflict of the troops who had passed over—Brune at length relieves them, and the passage is completed—Great losses of the Imperialists—Bellegarde retires to Caldiero—Advance of the Republicans in the valley of the Adige—Alarming situation of Laudon on the Upper Adige—Macdonald makes his way into the Italian Tyrol—Laudon is surrounded at Trent—He escapes by a lateral path to Bassano—Bellegarde retires to Bassano and Treviso—Armistice concluded at the latter place—Insurrection breaks out in Piedmont—Neapolitans invade the Roman states, and are totally defeated—Queen of Naples flies to St.-Petersburg to implore the aid of Paul—Napoléon willingly yields to his intercession—Peace between France and Naples at Foligno—Its conditions—French take possession of the whole Neapolitan territories—Siege of Elba—Its gallant defence by the English garrison—Treaty of Lunéville—The Emperor subscribes for the empire as well as Austria—Extravagant joy excited by this peace at Paris—Important consequences of this treaty on the internal situation of Germany—Reflections on this campaign—The real object of the war was already gained by the Allies—Evidence of Napoleon's implacable hostility to England—Increasing and systematic pillage of the people by the Republican armies—Symptoms of patriotic and general resistance spring up.

FRANCE soon experienced the beneficial results of the triumphs in Italy and the successes in Germany. More passionately desirous than any other

Universal joy in France at the victory of Marengo. people in Europe of military glory, its citizens received with the utmost enthusiasm the accounts of their victories; and the angry passions of the Revolution, worn out by suffering, willingly turned into joyful comparison of their present triumphs with the disasters which had preceded the return of the first consul. The battle of Marengo fixed Napoléon on the consular throne. The Jacobins of Paris, the Royalists of the west, were alike overwhelmed by that auspicious event; and two English expeditions, which appeared, as usual too late, on the coast of Brittany and la Vendée, under Sir Edward Pellew and Sir James Pulteney (1), were unable to rouse the inhabitants to resistance against the triumphant authority of the capital.

June 20. Treaty previously signed between Austria and England. Two days before intelligence was received of the battle of Marengo, a treaty for the further prosecution of the war had been signed at Vienna, between Austria and Great Britain. By this convention it was provided, that within three months England was to pay to Austria a loan of L.2,000,000 sterling, to bear no interest during the continuance of the war, and that neither of the high contracting parties should make any separate peace with the enemy, during the period of one year from its date (2).

Good faith of the Imperial government in adhering to it. The disastrous intelligence of the defeat at Marengo, and the armistice of Alexandria, followed up as it soon was by similar and still more pressing calamities in Germany, could not shake the firmness or good faith of the Austrian cabinet. The inflexible Thugut, who then presided over its councils, opposed to all the representations with which he was assailed, as to the perils of the monarchy, the treaty recently concluded with Great Britain, and the disgrace which would attach to the Imperial government if, on the first appearance of danger, engagements of such long endurance and so solemnly entered into were to be abandoned. Nor did the situation of affairs justify any such desponding measures. If the battle of Marengo had lost Piedmont to the allied powers, the strength of the Imperial army was still unbroken; it had exchanged a disadvantageous offensive position in the Ligurian mountains for an advantageous defensive one on the frontiers of Lombardy; the cannon of Mantua, so formidable to France in 1796, still remained to arrest the progress of the victor, and the English forces of Abercromby, joined to the Neapolitan troops and the Imperial divisions in Ancona and Tuscany, would prove too formidable a body on the right flank of the Republicans to permit any considerable advance towards the Hereditary States. Nor were affairs by any means desperate in Germany. The advance of Moreau into Bavaria, while Ulm and Ingolstadt were unreduced, was a perilous measure; the line of the Inn furnished a defensive frontier not surpassed by any in Europe, flanked on one side by the mountains of Tyrol, and on the other by the provinces of Bohemia, both in the possession of the Imperial forces; the strength of the monarchy would be more strongly felt, and reinforcements more readily obtained, when the enemy approached its frontiers, and the ancient patriotism of the inhabitants were called forth by the near approach of danger; and the disastrous issue of the campaign of 1796 to the Republican forces proved how easy was the transition from an unsupported advance to a ruinous retreat. Finally, the treaty of Campo Formio had only been signed after a whole campaign of disasters, and when the standards of France were almost within sight of Vienna; and it would be disgraceful to

(1) Ann. Reg. 1800, 212, 213. *Journ.* xiv. 4, 5.(2) Ann. Reg. 1800, 241. *State Papers.*

subscribe the same conditions when the Imperial banners were still on the Mincio, or lose the fruits of a long series of triumphs in the terror produced by a single misfortune (1).

Count St.-Julien arrives at Paris, and signs preliminaries. Influenced by these considerations, the Austrian cabinet resolved to gain time; and if they could not obtain tolerable terms of peace, run all the hazards of a renewal of the war. Count St.-Julien arrived at Paris on the 21st July, as plenipotentiary on the part of Austria, bearing a letter from the Emperor, in which he stated: "You will give credit to every thing which Count St.-Julien shall say on my part, and I will ratify whatever he shall do." In virtue of these powers, preliminaries of peace were signed at Paris in a few days by the French and Austrian ministers. The "treaty of Campo Formio was taken as the basis of the definitive pacification, unless where changes had become necessary; it was provided that the frontier of the Rhine should belong to France, and the indemnities stipulated for Austria by the secret articles of the treaty of Campo Formio were to be given in Italy instead of Germany (2)."

Which are disavowed by the Imperial cabinet. As this treaty was signed by Count St.-Julien in virtue of the letter from the Emperor only, and without an exchange of full powers, it was provided that "these preliminary articles shall be ratified, and that they shall not bind their respective governments till after the ratification." The cabinet of Vienna availed themselves of this clause to avoid the ratification of these preliminary articles, in subscribing which their plenipotentiary had not entered into the views of his government. He was accordingly recalled, and the refusal to ratify notified on the 15th August, the appointed time, by Count Lehrbach, accompanied, however, by an intimation of the wish of the Imperial cabinet to make peace, of the treaty which bound them not to do so without the concurrence of Great Britain, and of the readiness of the latter power to enter into negotiations, on authority of a letter from Lord Minto, the British ambassador at Vienna, to Baron Thugut (3).

Negotiations with England for an armistice. Napoléon either was, or affected to be, highly indignant at the refusal by Austria to ratify the preliminaries, and he immediately gave notice of the termination of the armistice on the 10th September, and sent orders for the second army of reserve, which was organizing at Dijon, to enter Switzerland on the 5th of that month, and ordered Augereau, with eighteen thousand men from Holland, to take a position on the Rhine, in order to co-operate with the extreme left of Moreau's army. But he soon returned to more moderate sentiments, and dispatched full powers to M. Otto, who resided at London as agent for the exchange of prisoners, to conclude a *naval armistice* with Great Britain. The object of this proposal, hitherto unknown in European diplomacy, was to obtain the means, during the negotiations, of throwing supplies into Egypt and Malta, the first of which stood greatly in need of assistance, while the latter was at the last extremity from the vigilant blockade maintained for nearly two years by the British cruisers (4).

No sooner was this proposal received by the English government, than they proceeded to signify their anxious desire to be included in the general pacification, and proposed, for this purpose, that passports should be forwarded for Lord Grenville's brother to proceed, in the character of plenipotentiary of Great Britain, to the congress at Lunéville; but they declined

(1) Jom. xiv, 7, 8.

(2) 28th July, 1800. State Papers, Ann. Reg. 1800, 278.

(3) Dum. v. 8, 9. Nap. ii. 2, 3.

(4) Parl. His. xxxv. 540, 542. Jom. xiv. 3, 4. Dum. 9, 10. Ann. Reg. 1800, 214.



to agree to a naval armistice, as a thing totally unknown, till the preliminaries of peace had been signed. Napoléon, however, resolutely bent on saving Malta and Egypt, continued to insist on the immediate adoption of a naval armistice as a *sine qua non*, and signified that, unless it was agreed to before the 11th September, he would recommence hostilities both in Italy and Germany (1).

The urgency of the case, and the imminent danger which Austria would run, if the war were renewed on the continent at so early a period, induced the cabinet of London to forego the advantages which a declinature of the proposals of the First Consul promised to afford to the maritime interests of Great Britain. On the 7th September, therefore, they presented to M. Otto a counter project for the general suspension of hostilities between the belligerent powers. By this it was proposed that an armistice should take place by sea and land, during which the ocean was to be open to the navigation of trading vessels of both nations; Malta and the harbours of Egypt were to be put on the same footing as Ulm, Philipsburgh, and Ingolstadt, by the armistice of Parsdorf; that is to say, they were to be provisioned for fourteen days, from time to time, during the dependence of the negotiation. The blockade of Brest and the maritime ports was to be raised, but the British squadrons were to remain on their stations off their mouths, and ships of war were not to be permitted to sail. Nothing could be more equitable towards France, or generous towards Austria, than these propositions. They compensated the recent disasters of the Imperialists by land with concessions by the British at sea, where they had constantly been victorious, and had nothing to fear; they placed the blockaded fortresses which the French retained on the ocean, on the same footing with those which the Imperialists still held in the centre of Germany, and abandoned to the vanquished on one element those advantages of a free navigation, which they could not obtain by force of arms, in consideration of the benefits accruing from a prolongation of the armistice to their allies on another (2).

Napoléon, however, insisted upon a condition which ultimately proved fatal to the negotiation. This was, that the French ships of the line only should be confined to their ports, but that frigates should have free liberty of egress; and that six vessels of that description should be allowed to go from Toulon to Alexandria without being visited by the English cruisers. He has told us in his "Memoirs" what he intended to have done with these frigates. They

20th Sept. were to be armed *en flûte*, and to have carried out three thousand six hundred troops, besides great military stores, to Alexandria. What

Which fell, from the unreasonable demands of France. rendered this condition peculiarly unreasonable was, that at the moment (20th September) when M. Otto declared to the British Government that the condition as to these frigates was a *sine qua non* for the continuation of the negotiation, he addressed to Moreau

a telegraphic despatch, "not to agree to a prolongation of the armistice but on condition that Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philipsburg, were placed in the hands of the French as a guarantee." Thus, at the very time when the first consul made a condition for the *preservation* of the maritime blockaded fortresses a *sine qua non* with the British Government, he made the immediate *cession* of the corresponding blockaded ones on the continent an indispensable condition of a continuation of the armistice with the Austrian Cabinet. In these simultaneous propositions is to be seen little of that spirit of moderation

(1) Parl. His. xxxv. 544, 550. Dum. v. 10, 11. Ann. Reg. 1800.

(2) Parl. His. xxxv. p. 551, 555. Dum. v. 11, 12. Ann. Reg. 1800, 215.

which he so loudly professed, but much of that inflexible desire for aggrandisement, which so long was attended with success, but ultimately occasioned his ruin (1).

The Imperialists, with the dagger at their throats, were in no condition to resist the demands of the victor. A new convention was therefore concluded 28th Sept. at Hohenlinden, on the 28th September, by which the cession of the three German fortresses was agreed to, and the armistice was prolonged for forty-five days. A similar convention, signed at Castiglione a few days afterwards, extended the armistice for the same period to the Italian peninsula (2).

The English Government, however, was under no such necessity; and as 9th Oct. Napoléon peremptorily refused to abandon his condition as to despatching six frigates to Egypt, the negotiation was broken off, the Cabinet of the Tuileries having declared that they would treat only with each of the two courts separately. This was equivalent to its total abandonment, as both the allied powers had intimated to France, that they were bound by the recent convention to treat only in concert with each other (3).

8th Oct. Conspiracy to assassinate Napoléon. No sooner was it evident that Great Britain would not consent to the demands of the first consul, than he resolved to prosecute the war with vigour against Austria. On the 8th October, accordingly, the portfolio of the war office was put into the hands of Carnot, with instructions to redouble his exertions to put all the armies immediately on a footing to resume hostilities. On the same day on which this took place, a plot to assassinate Napoléon at the opera was discovered by the police; Ceracchi and Demerville, the leaders of the conspiracy, and both determined Jacobins, were arrested and executed. It originated in the remains of the democratic faction, and served to increase the already formed exasperation of the first consul at that party (4).

Preparations of France for a renewal of hostilities. During the interval of hostilities, both parties made the most indefatigable efforts to put their armies on a respectable footing, and prepare for a vigorous prosecution of the war. A corps of fifteen thousand men was formed at Dijon, under the name of the second army of reserve, the command of which was intrusted to General Macdonald, already well known by his campaigns in Naples, and the battle of the Trebbia. The official reports gave out that it was to consist of thirty thousand, and even Macdonald himself was led to believe it amounted to that force; the object in spreading this delusion was to augment the troops, which the Austrians, recollecting what the first army of reserve had effected, would deem it necessary to watch his operations. It was destined to penetrate through the Grisons into the Tyrol, and threaten the flank of the Imperialists either in Italy or Germany, as circumstances might render advisable. Another army, 20,000 strong, was assembled, under Augereau, on the Maine; it was intended to advance along the course of that river to Wurtzburg, and threaten Bohemia, so as to prevent the troops in that province from undertaking any thing against the flanks or rear of the grand army under Moreau in Bavaria. That army was raised to above 110,000 men, all in the highest state of discipline and equipment; the soldiers were all newly clothed, the artillery and cavalry remounted, and all the *matériel* in the finest possible state; the Republic had never, since the commencement of the war, had on foot an army so perfect in its composition, so admirably organized, and so completely furnished with all the appointments requisite for carrying on a campaign. The army of Italy

(1) Parl. His. xxxv. 566, 583. Nap. ii. 8, 9. Dum. v. 12, 14. Ann. Reg. 1800, 215.

(2) Jom. xiv. 15.

(3) Dum. v. 13, 14. Nap. ii. 9.

(4) Jom. xiv. 24.

was reinforced to 80,000 men; its cavalry and artillery were in an especial manner augmented; and, besides these great forces, a reserve of 10,000 chosen troops was formed at Amiens, to watch the movements of the English expeditions; and which, as soon as they proceeded to the coast of Spain, was moved to the south to support the army of Italy or the Grisons. In all, the Republic had 240,000 men in the field, ready for active operations (1); and besides this, there was nearly an equal force in Egypt, Malta, in the *dépôts* of the interior, or stationed along the coasts.

And of Austria. Austria on her part had made good use, during the four months of the armistice, of the resources of the monarchy, and the subsidies of England. Never on any former occasion had the patriotic spirit of her inhabitants shone forth with more lustre, nor all ranks co-operated with more enthusiastic zeal, in the measures for the common defence. No sooner was it announced, by the refusal of Napoléon to treat with either court separately, that peace was no longer to be hoped for, than the generous flame, like an electric shock, burst forth at once in every part of the monarchy. The Archduke Palatine repaired to Hungary, decreed the formation of a levy *en masse*, and threw himself on those generous feelings which, in the days of Maria Theresa, had saved the throne. The Emperor announced his resolution to put himself at the head of the army, and actually repaired to the Inn for that purpose. His presence excited to the highest degree the spirit of the people and the soldiers. The Archduke Charles, in his government of Bohemia, pressed the organization of twelve thousand men, destined to co-operate with the army on the Inn in resisting the menaced invasion; and the Empress sent to that accomplished prince a helmet set with magnificent jewels. These warlike measures excited the utmost enthusiasm among all classes; the peasantry every where flew to arms; the nobles vied with each other in the equipment of regiments of horse, or the contribution of large sums of money; every town and village resounded with the note of military preparation. But unfortunately the jealousy, or erroneous views of the Aulic Council, were but ill calculated to turn to the best account this general burst of patriotic spirit; the Archduke Charles, indeed, in accordance with the unanimous wishes of the army, was declared generalissimo, but instead of being sent to head the forces on the Inn, he was retained in his subordinate situation of the government of Bohemia. Kray, whose talents at Ulm had so long arrested the progress of disaster, was dismissed to his estates in Hungary, while the command of his army was given to the Archduke John, a young man of great promise and thorough military education, but whose inexperience, even though aided by the councils of Lauer, the grand-master of artillery, was but ill calculated to contend with the scientific abilities of Moreau (2).

Before the renewal of hostilities, Austria had greatly augmented her forces in all quarters. Five thousand additional troops in the English pay had been obtained from Bavaria; the cession of Philipsburgh, Ulm, and Ingolstadt, had rendered disposable 18,000 more; and the recruits from the interior amounted to 15,000 men. These additions had so far counterbalanced the heavy losses sustained during the campaign by sickness, fatigue, and the sword, that the Imperialists could reckon upon 110,000 effective men on the Inn, to defend the frontiers of the Hereditary States. But this great force, after the usual system of the Austrians, was weakened by the vast extent of country over which it was spread. The right, 27,000 strong, occupied Ratisbon and the

(1) Nap. ii. 20, 21. Dum. v. 16, 17. Jon. xiv. 63, 65.

(2) Dum. v. 21, 27, 80, 81. Jon. xiv. 13, 14.

Palatinate; the left, consisting of 18,000 men, under Hiller, was stationed in the German Tyrol: so that not more than 60,000 combatants could be relied on to maintain the important line of the Inn. In Italy, Field-marshal Bellegarde had 100,000 under his command, but they too were weakened by the immense line they had to defend; 15,000 were in the Italian Tyrol, under Davidowich; 10,000 in Ancona and Tuscany; 20,000 were formed of the Neapolitan troops, who could be little relied on: so that, for the decisive shock on the Mincio, not more than 60,000 effective men could be assembled (1).

But Russia and Prussia keep aloof. Nor was the Imperial Cabinet less active in its endeavours to awaken the northern powers to a sense of the dangers which menaced them, from the great abilities and evident ambition of the first consul. Special envoys were despatched to St.-Petersburg and Berlin to endeavour to rouse the Russian and Prussian cabinets into activity, but in vain. Frederick William persisted in the system of neutrality which he had so long pursued, and was destined so bitterly to expiate; and the Emperor Paul, intent upon his newly-acquired ideas of the freedom of the seas, refused to embroil himself with France, and in the pursuit of the imaginary vision of maritime independence, fixed upon Europe the real evils of territorial slavery. He retained a hundred and twenty thousand men inactive, under Kutusoff and Count Pahlen, on the frontiers of Lithuania, who, if thrown into the scale at this critical moment, might have righted the balance when it was beginning to decline, and saved Russia from the rout of Austerlitz and the conflagration of Moscow (2).

It is painful to be obliged to add, that the military efforts of England, though intended to follow out the true spirit of the alliance, were not better calculated to aid the common cause. On the 4th June an attack was made on the forts in Quiberon bay, by the squadron under the command of Sir Edward Pellew; but after gaining a trifling success, and dismantling the fortifications, they embarked without making any permanent impression.

English expedition of Sir James Pulteney fails at Ferrol. July 8. Early in July a secret expedition, under the command of Sir James Pulteney, consisting of eight thousand men, sailed for the coast of France. It first appeared off Belle-Isle; but as the strong works on that island rendered any attack a difficult enterprise, it shortly made sail from the coast of France, and landed in the neighbourhood of Ferrol. After two skirmishes, in which the Spaniards were defeated, the British took possession of the heights which overlook the harbour, and every thing promised the immediate reduction of that important fortress, with the fleet within its walls, when the English commander, intimidated by the rumour of reinforcements having reached the town, withdrew his forces, and made sail for Gibraltar, where Abercromby, with the expedition which had so long lain inactive at Port Mahon, awaited his arrival (3).

And from dread of the plague, declines to attack Cadiz. The union of two squadrons, having on board above twenty thousand English troops, in the straits of Gibraltar, excited the utmost alarm through the whole Peninsula. This armament, the greatest which had yet sailed from the British shores during the whole war, menaced alike Carthagera, Seville and Cadiz. Reinforcements from all quarters were hastily directed to the lines of St.-Roch in front of Gibraltar; vessels were sunk at the entrance of the harbour of Cadiz, and all the means adopted which could be thought of to repel the threatened attack. The British com-

(1) Nap. ii. 19, 20. Jom. xiv. 72, 73. Dum. v. 20, 21.

(2) Dum. v. 21, 22. Jom. xiv. 23, 24.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1800, 212, 213. Jom. xiv. 46, 47. Dum. v. 42.

manders, instead of making sail, the moment they arrived, for the isle of St.-Leon, lay above a fortnight inactive in the straits of Gibraltar, and at length appeared off Cadiz on the 5th October. Never was a more formidable armament assembled; the naval forces consisted of twenty sail of the line, twenty-seven frigates, and eighty-four transports, having on board above twenty thousand foot soldiers. As far as the eye could reach, the ocean was covered by the innumerable sails of the British armada, which seemed destined to revenge upon Spain the terrors of the celebrated armament which had been baffled by the firmness of Elizabeth. Noways intimidated by the formidable spectacle, the Spanish governor wrote a touching letter to the British commanders, in which he adjured them not to add to the calamities which already overwhelmed the inhabitants from an epidemic which carried off several hundreds of persons daily. They replied, that the town would not be attacked if the ships of war were delivered up; and as this was not acceded to, preparations were made for landing the troops; but before they could debark, the accounts, received of the yellow fever within its walls were so serious, that the British commanders apprehended that if the city were taken, the ulterior objects of the expedition might be frustrated by the effect of the contagion among the troops, and withdrew from the infected isle to the straits of Gibraltar (1).

**Surrender of Malta to the British blockading squadron.** But while the honour of the British arms was tarnished by the failure of such mighty forces on the western coast of Europe, an event of the utmost importance to the future progress of the maritime war occurred in the Mediterranean. Malta, which for above two years had been closely blockaded by the British forces by land and sea, began, in the course of this summer, to experience the pangs of hunger. Two frigates sailed from the harbour in the end of August with part of the garrison, one of which was speedily taken by the British cruisers. At length, all their means of subsistence having been exhausted, a capitulation was entered into in the middle of September, in virtue of which the French were to be conveyed as prisoners of war, not to serve till regularly exchanged, to Marseille; and this noble fortress, embracing the finest harbour in the world within its impregnable walls, long the bulwark of Christendom against the Turks, and now the undisputed mistress of the Mediterranean, was permanently annexed to the British dominions (2).

**Affairs of Italy. Election of Pius VII at Venice.** The hopes of the Imperial cabinet, in the event of a renewal of the war, were not a little founded on the hostile attitude of the south of Italy, to which, it was hoped, the arrival of the English expedition under Abercromby would give a certain degree of consistency. Pope Pius VI had sunk under the hardships of his captivity in France, and died in March of this year. The choice of the Roman Conclave, assembled, under the Imperial influence, at Venice, fell on the Cardinal Chiaramonte, who assumed the tiara, under the title of Pius VII. At the same time when he ascended the Papal throne the inhabitants of Rome were suffering severely under the exactions of the Neapolitans, and he wisely resolved to do his utmost to alleviate their misfortunes. Without, therefore, engaging openly in the war, he lent a willing ear to the propositions which the first consul, who was extremely desirous of the support of the supreme pontiff, instantly made to him. But the other parts of Italy were in the most hostile state. A body of ten thousand Neapolitans had taken a position on the Tronto between the Upper

(1) Ann. Reg. 1800, 210. Jom. xiv, 47, 48. Dum. iv, 342, 347.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1800, 215. Jom. xiv. 13, 14. Rel. iv. 49, 50.



Hostility of  
Naples, and  
insurrections  
in Piedmont  
against  
France.

Abruzzo and the march of Ancona; a Neapolitan division, under Count Roger de Damas, was in the Roman states; Piedmont, in consternation at the recent annexation of the Novarese territory to the Cisalpine republic, and the innumerable oppressions of the French armies, was in so agitated a state, that a spark might blow it into open combustion; while the peasants of Tuscany, in open insurrection to support the Imperial cause, presented a tumultuary array of seven or eight thousand men. These bands, it is true, were little formidable to regular troops in the field; but as long as they continued in arms, they required to be watched by detachments, which diminished the strength of the army; and it was one of the motives which induced Napoléon to accede to the prolongation of the armistice with Austria, that it would give him time, during its continuance, to clear his flank of these troublesome irregulars (1).

The French  
crush the  
Tuscan  
states with  
great  
cruelty.

As the armistice, by a strange oversight, did not extend to the Italian powers, and the English expedition was detained in useless demonstrations on the coast of Spain, it was no difficult matter for the French troops to effect this object. General Sommariva, to whom the Grand Duke of Tuscany had intrusted the military forces of his states, was rapidly proceeding with the organization of the peasants in the Apennines, when Dupont, early in October, intimated to him, that unless the insurrection was forthwith disbanded, he would move against Tuscany with a formidable force. As these summonses met with no attention, the French troops advanced in great force, in three columns. After a vain attempt to defend the Apennines, Florence was occupied on the 13th. The Austrians, under Sommariva, retired towards Ancona, and the greater part of the insurgents retired to Arezzo, where they resolved to defend themselves to the last extremity. An attempt to force open the gates having failed, the French General Meunier made preparations for a general assault, which took place on the following morning at five o'clock. Nothing could resist the impetuosity of the French columns; the grenadiers mounted the scaling ladders amidst a shower of balls; quickly they made themselves masters of the rampart, and chasing the unhappy peasants from house to house, and street to street, soon filled the town with conflagration and carnage. The slaughter was dreadful; a few escaped by subterraneous passages, and made good their flight into the country; others retired into the citadel, which was soon obliged to surrender at discretion, and was razed to the ground; but by far the greater number perished in the town, under the sword of an irritated and relentless victor (2).

Leghorn is  
sacked, and  
the English  
merchandise  
confiscated.

This bloody stroke proved fatal to the Tuscan insurrection. The fugitives who escaped the carnage, spread far and wide the most dismal accounts of the fate of their unhappy comrades, and the peasants, thunderstruck with the rapidity and severity of the blow, lost no time in deprecating the wrath of an enemy who appeared irresistible. Sommariva, fettered by the armistice with Austria, retired entirely from the Tuscan states, and the inhabitants, left to their own means of defence, had no resource but in immediate submission. A strong division was immediately despatched to Leghorn, which entered the place without opposition, and after the barbarous method of carrying on war now adopted by the first consul, instantly confiscated the whole English property in the harbour and town. Forty-six vessels, with their cargoes, besides 750,000 quintals of wheat

(1) Rot. iv. 40, 50. Dum. v. 62, 63. Nap. ii. 11. Jom. xiv. 141, 142.

(2) Rot. iv. 50, 55. Dum. v. 67, 68. Jom. xiv. 144, 145. Nap. ii. 18, 19.

and barley, and 90,000 quintals of dried vegetables, were thus obtained for the use of the army, an acquisition of great importance to its future operations (1); but which, like all other ill-gotten gains, in the end recoiled upon the heads of those who acquired them, and contributed to form that deep and universal hatred at the French dominion, which at length precipitated Napoléon from the throne.

Oct 16. At the same period the Swiss, whose divisions and democratic transports had exposed their country to the severities of Republican conquest, were doomed to drain to the dregs the cup of misery and humiliation. The shadow even of their independence vanished before the armed intervention of the first consul. The numerous insurrections of the peasants against the enormous requisitions of the Republican agents; the obstinate resistance of the partizans of the ancient constitutions; the general anarchy and dissolution of government which prevailed, loudly called for a remedy. Napoléon applied it, by causing his minister Reinhard to declare to the democratic despots who ruled the country, that he would recognise no authority but that of the executive commission to whom he transmitted his orders; a declaration which at once brought the whole country under the immediate sway of the central government at the Tuileries (2).

Capture of Surinam and Demerara. Permanent incorporation of the Netherlands with France. The English in the course of this year made themselves masters of Surinam, Berbice, St.-Eustache, and Demerara, Dutch settlements on the mainland and in the islands of the West Indies. At the same time Napoléon published an edict, permanently incorporating the provinces acquired by the Republic on the left bank of the Rhine, and extending the French laws and institutions to these valuable acquisitions. Thus, while England was extending its mighty arms over both hemispheres (3), France was laying its iron grasp on the richest and most important provinces of Europe. The strife could not be other than desperate between two such powers.

28th Nov. Such was the state of Europe when the armistice of Hohenlinden was denounced by the first consul, and hostilities recommenced at all points in the end of November.

Description of the line of the Inn. Had the Aulic Council determined to remain on the defensive, no line was more capable of opposing an obstinate resistance to the invader than that of the Inn. That river, which does not yield to the Rhine either in the impetuosity or the volume of waters which it rolls towards the Danube, meanders in the Tyrol, as far as Kufstein, between inaccessible ridges of mountains, whose sides, darkened with pine forests, are surmounted by bare peaks, occasionally streaked, even in the height of summer, with snow. From thence to Mubldorf it flows in a deep bed, cut by the vehemence of the torrent through solid rock, whose sides present a series of perpendicular precipices on either bank, excepting only in a few well-known points, which were strongly guarded, and armed with cannon. This powerful line, supported on the left by the fortress of Kufstein, and on the right by that of Braunau, both of which were in a formidable state of defence, was flanked on either side by two immense bastions, equally menacing to an invading enemy, the one formed by the Tyrol, with its warlike and devoted population and inaccessible mountains, the other by Bohemia and the chain of the Bohmerwald, which skirts the Danube from Linz to Straubing, where the Archduke Charles was organizing a numerous body of forces (4).

(1) Dum. v. 69. Nap. ii. 18. Jom. xiv. 145, 146.

(2) Dum. v. 71.

(3) Dum. v. 24, 25.

(4) Personal observations. Jom. xiv. 73, 74. Dum. v. 82. Nap. ii. 27.

Had the Austrians, headed by the Archduke Charles, remained on the defensive in this strong position, it is probable that all the disasters of the campaign would have been avoided. It was next to impossible to force such a central line, defended by eighty thousand men, under the direction of that great commander; while to attempt to turn it, either by the Tyrol or Bohemia, would have been equally perilous. To detach thirty thousand men into the defiles leading into Bohemia would have been imminently hazardous, when so large a force threatened the centre of the invader; while a similar movement into the Tyrol, besides being attended with the same danger, would have incurred the hazard of being defeated by the Prince of Reuss, who occupied the impregnable passes and fortresses which guarded the entrance into that difficult country. But from these difficulties the French were relieved by the resolution of the Imperialists to cross the Inn, and carry the war vigorously into the heart of Bavaria, a project which might have led to victory if conducted by the experience and ability of the Archduke Charles, but terminated in nothing but disaster in the hands of his brave but inexperienced successor (1).

Project of the Imperialists. Although the offensive movement of the Imperialists led to such calamitous results, it was skilfully combined, and promised in the outset the most brilliant success. The Republican right, under Lecourbe, stretched through the Voralberg mountains to Feldkirch in the Tyrol; the centre, under Moreau in person, was in position at Ebersberg, on the high road leading from Munich to Haag; the left, commanded by Grenier, was stationed at Hohenlinden, on the road to Muhl Dorf. The project of the Imperialists was to detach Klenau from Ratisbon towards Landshut, where he was to be joined by Keinmayor with twenty thousand men (2); meanwhile the centre was to advance by echellons towards Hohenlinden, and bear the weight of their forces on the Republican left, where the least resistance might be expected.

24th Nov. Hostilities were commenced by Augereau, who was at the head of the Gallo-Batavian army. He denounced the armistice four days before his colleagues, and advanced, at the head of twenty thousand men, from Frankfort by the course of the Maine towards Wurtzburg. Though the Imperial forces in that quarter were nearly equal to his own, they opposed but a feeble resistance, from being composed chiefly of the troops recently levied in Bohemia and the states of Mayence, little calculated to resist the French

Operations on the Lower Rhine. veterans. After a slight combat, the Imperialists were repulsed at all points; the Baron Albini, after an ephemeral success at Aschaffenburg, was driven with loss out of that town and forced back to Schweinfurth, while Dumonceau pushed on to Wurtzburg, and summoned the garrison, which shut itself in the citadel. The first effect of these disasters was to dissolve the insurrectionary troops of Mayence under Albini, who never appeared again during the campaign. The Austrian general Simbschen, reduced by this defection to thirteen thousand men, took a position at

24 Dec. Bourg-Eberach to cover Bamberg; he was there attacked on the following day by Augereau, and after an obstinate conflict driven back to Pommersfeld. Satisfied with this success, the French general established his troops behind the Regnitz to await the fall of the citadel of Wurtzburg, which Dumonceau was beginning to besiege in regular form (3). These advantages were much more important upon the issue of the campaign than might have

(1) Jom. xiv. 76.

(2) Jom. xiv. 79. Dum. v. 96, 97.

(3) Dum. v. 86, 95. Nap. ii. 23, 24. Jom. xiv. 81, 85.

been supposed from the quality and numbers of the troops engaged; for by clearing the extreme left of Moreau they permitted him to draw his left wing, under Sainte Suzanne, nearer to his centre, and reinforce the grand army on the Inn, in the precise quarter where it was menaced by the Imperialists.

27th Nov.  
The Aus-  
trians ad-  
vance into  
Bavaria.

Meanwhile, operations of the most decisive importance had taken place on the Inn. On the 27th November the Imperialists broke up to execute their intended concentration on the right towards Landshut; but the heavy rains which fell at that time retarded considerably the march of their columns; and it was not till the 29th that their advanced guard reached that place. At the same time Moreau concentrated his forces in the centre, and advanced by Haag towards Ampfing and Muhldorf. Fearful of continuing his flank movement in presence of a powerful enemy, who threatened to fall perpendicularly on his line of march, the archduke arrested his columns, and ran the hazard of a general battle on the direct road to Munich. They accordingly, on the 30th, retraced their steps, and moved through cross roads towards Ampfing and Dorfen. This lateral movement performed amidst torrents of rain, and in dreadful roads, completed the exhaustion of the Austrian troops, but it led, in the first instance to the most promising results (1).

Move-  
ments of  
Moreau.

By a singular accident, Moreau had heard nothing of the advance of the Imperialists towards Landshut, far less of their cross movement to Ampfing; but some confused accounts had merely reached the Republican head-quarters of considerable assemblages of the enemy towards Muhldorf, and the French general, desirous to explore his way, pushed forward strong reconnoitring parties in that direction. His right occupied Rosenheim, his left and centre were gradually approaching the Austrian columns by Haag and Wasserbourg. The effect of this movement was to bring the Imperial army, sixty thousand strong, and massed together, perpendicularly against the left of the French, who, ignorant of their danger, were advancing in straggling and detached columns to discover where they were (2).

The effect of this state of things, and of the able manœuvre of the archduke, speedily shewed itself. The French army, turned and out-generaled, was exposed to be cut up in detail, while separated in a line of march by an enemy

Dec. 1.

drawn up in battle array on one of its flanks. Grenier, who was the first in advance, was leisurely approaching Ampfing, when he was suddenly assailed by vast masses of the enemy, in admirable order and battle array; he was speedily thrown into confusion, and put to the rout. In vain

Great suc-  
cess of the  
Austrians  
in the out-  
set.

Ney displayed all his talent and resolution to sustain the weight of the Imperial columns; his troops, after a brave resistance, were broken and driven back upon the division of Grandjean, while that of Hardy, which advanced to its support, shared the same fate. At the same time Legrand, after a sharp conflict in the valley of the Issen, was constrained to fall back to the neighbourhood of Dorfen. The Imperialists were every where successful. They had attacked, in compact and regular masses, the enemy's divisions while in march and separated, and spread alarm and discouragement from the general's tent to the sentinels' outposts (3).

French re-  
tire to Ho-  
benlinden.

So far the most brilliant success had attended the Austrian advance, and if it had been vigorously followed up by a general capable of appreciating the immense advantages which it offered, and forcing back the enemy's retreating columns without intermission upon those which

(1) Jom. xiv. 85, 87. Dum. v. 100, 105.

(2) Nap. ii. 30. Jom. xiv. 88, 90. Dum. v. 104, 105.

(3) Jom. xiv. 90, 91. Nap. ii. 30, 31. Dum. v.

came up to their support, it might have led to the total defeat of the French army, and changed the whole fortune of the campaign. But the Archduke John, satisfied with this first advantage, allowed the enemy to recover from their consternation. On the following day no forward movement was made, and Moreau, skilfully availing himself of that respite, retired through the forest of HOHENLINDEN to the ground which he had originally occupied, and carefully studied as the probable theatre of a decisive conflict (1).

*Description  
of the  
field of  
battle.*

The space which lies between the Inn and the Isar, which is from twelve to fifteen leagues in breadth, is intersected in its centre by this forest, now celebrated not less in history than poetry (2). Pa-

rallel to the course of the two rivers its woods form a natural barrier or stockade, six or seven leagues long, and from a league to a league and a half broad. Two great roads only, that from Munich to Wasserbourg, and from Munich to Muhl Dorf, traverse that thick and gloomy forest, where the pine-trees approach each other so closely, as in most places to render the passage of cavalry or artillery, excepting on the great roads, impossible. The village of Hohenlinden is at the entrance on the Munich side of the one defile, that of Matenpot at the mouth of that leading to Muhl Dorf. The village of Ebersberg forms the entrance of the other defile leading to Wasserbourg. Between these two roads the broken and uneven surface of the forest is traversed only by country paths, almost impracticable during the storms of winter even to foot soldiers (3).

*Abbe plan  
of Moreau.*

Moreau with his staff had carefully reconnoitred this ground; and as soon as it became evident that the archduke was to advance through its dangerous defiles, he prepared, with the art of a consummate general, to turn it to the best account. Rapidly concentrating his forces in the plain at the entrance of the defiles on the Munich side, he at the same time gave orders to Richepanse, with his division, to advance across the forest, so as to fall, early on the morning of the 3d, perpendicularly on the line of the great road from Hohenlinden to Muhl Dorf. He naturally anticipated that this movement would bring him on the flank of the Austrian centre, when entangled in the defile, with its long train of artillery and chariots; and that if the Republican force at the entrance of the pass could only maintain its ground till this side attack took place, the ruin of the whole column, or at least the capture of all its cannon, would be the result. To effect this object, he concentrated all the forces he could command at the mouth of the defile; but so unforeseen was the attack, that not above two-thirds of his army could take a part in the action; neither the right-wing under Lecourbe, nor the half of the left, under Sainte Suzanne, could be expected to arrive so as to render any assistance (4).

*Battle of  
Hohenlin-  
den, Dec. 2.*

The Imperialists had committed the great error of allowing the surprised Republicans all the 2d to concentrate their scattered forces, but they did not on the following day repeat their mistake. Early on the morning of the 3d, a day ever memorable in the military annals of France, all their troops were in motion, and they plunged, in three great columns, into the forest to approach the enemy. The centre, forty thousand strong, advanced by the great road from Muhl Dorf to Munich, the only road which was practicable, in the dreadful state of the weather, for artillery; above a hundred pieces of cannon and five hundred chariots encumbered its

(1) Nap. ii. 31. Dum. v. 107, 108. Jom. xiv. 91, 92.

(2) The reader will recollect Mr. Campbell's noble Ode to Hohenlinden.

(3) Dum. v. 109, 110. Personal observation.

(4) Nap. ii. 31, 32. Jom. xiv. 94, 96. Dum. v. 111, 112. Mém. du Dépôt de la Guerre, v. 242.



movements. The infantry marched first; then came the long train of artillery and caissons; the cavalry closed the procession. The right wing, under the command of general Latour, consisting of twenty-five thousand men, followed the inferior road leading from Wasserbourg to Munich; Keimayer moved on the flank of that column, with his light troops, through the forest; while the left wing, under Riesch, was directed to proceed by a cross path by Albichen to St.-Christophe. The Imperial columns, animated by their success on the preceding days, joyfully commenced their march over the yet unstained snow two hours before it was daylight, deeming the enemy in full retreat, and little anticipating any resistance before their forces were united and disposed in battle array, in the open plain, on the Munich side of the forest (1).

From the outset, however, the most sinister presages attended their steps. During the night the wind had changed; the heavy rain of the preceding days turned into snow, which fell, as at Eyleau, in such thick flakes as to render it impossible to see twenty yards before the head of the column, while the dreary expanse of the forest presented, under the trees, a uniform white surface, on which it was impossible to distinguish the beaten track (2). The cross-paths between the roads which the troops followed, bad at any time, were almost impassable in such a storm; and each body, isolated in the snowy wilderness, was left to its own resources, without either receiving intelligence or deriving assistance from the other. The central column, which advanced along the only good road, outstripped the others; and its head had traversed the forest, and approached Hohenlinden about nine o'clock. It was there met by the division of Grouchy, and a furious conflict immediately commenced; the Austrians endeavouring to debouche from the defile and extend themselves along the front of the wood, the French to coerce their movements and drive them back into the forest. Both parties made the most incredible efforts; the snow which fell without interruption, prevented the opposing lines from seeing each other; but they aimed at the flash which appeared through the gloom, and rushed forward with blind fury to the deadly charge of the bayonet. Insensibly, however, the Austrians gained ground; their ranks were gradually extending in front of the wood, when Generals Grouchy and Grandjean put themselves at the head of fresh battalions, and by a decisive charge drove them back into the forest. The imperial ranks were broken by the trees, but still they resisted bravely in the entangled thickets; posted behind the trunks, they kept up a murderous fire on the enemy; and the contending armies, broken into single file, fought, man to man, with invincible resolution (3).

While this desperate conflict was going on in front of Hohenlinden, the leading ranks of the Austrian right began to appear at the entrance of the forest on the other road. Ney instantly repaired with his division to the scene of danger, and by a vigorous charge on the flank of the enemy's column, which was in the act of deploying, not only drove it back into the wood, but captured eight pieces of cannon, and a thousand prisoners (4).

The effect of these vigorous efforts on the part of Moreau, in preventing the

(1) Nap. ii. 33. Mém. v. 251. Dum. v. 114, 116. Jom. xiv. 95, 97.

(2) "On Linden, when the sun was low,  
All bloodless lay the untrodden snow,  
And dark as winter was the flow  
Of ice rolling rapidly."

(3) Dum. v. 117, 118. Jom. xiv. 96, 97. Mém. v. 260, 267. Nap. ii. 32, 33.

"'Tis morn, but scarce you level sun  
Can pierce the war clouds rolling down  
Where furious Frank and fiery Han,  
Shout in their sulphurous canopy."

(4) Ney's Mém. ii. 48, 57. Nap. ii. 34. Dum. v. 118.

deploying of the heads of the Imperial columns from the forest, was to introduce vacillation and confusion into the long train in their centre, which, unable to advance from the combat in its front, and pressed on by the crowd in its rear, soon began to fall into confusion. They were in this state, jammed up amidst long files of cannon and waggons, when the division of Richepanse, which had broken up early in the morning from Ebersberg, on the Munich side of the one defile, and struggled on with invincible resolution through dreadful roads across the forest, arrived in the neighbourhood of Matenpot, on the Muhlendorf side of the other, directly in the rear of the centre

Decisive  
Charge of  
Riche-  
panse.

of the Austrian army, and at the close of its protracted array. But just as it was approaching this decisive point, and slowly advancing in open column through the forest, this division was itself

pierced through the centre, near St.-Christophe, by the Austrian left wing, under Riesch, which, moving up by the valley of Albichen, to gain the chaussée of Wasserbourg, by which it was destined to pierce through the forest, fell perpendicularly on its line of march. Thus Richepanse, with half his division, found himself irretrievably separated from the remainder; the manœuvre which he was destined to have performed on the centre of the Imperialists was turned against himself, and with a single brigade he was placed between that immense body and their left wing. An ordinary general, in such alarming circumstances, would have sought safety in flight, and thus, by allowing the Imperial centre to continue its advance, endangered the victory; but Richepanse, whose able mind was penetrated with the importance of his mission, bravely resolved to push on with the single brigade which remained under his command, and fall on the rear of the grand column of the enemy. He sent orders, therefore, to his separated brigade to maintain itself to the last extremity at St.-Christophe, and advanced with the utmost intrepidity towards Matenpot and the line of march of the grand Austrian column (1).

The Aus-  
trian line of  
communi-  
cation is in-  
tercepted.

When the troops approached the great road, they came upon the cuirassiers of Lichtenstein who formed part of that vast body, who had dismounted, and were reposing leisurely under the trees until

the great park of artillery and the reserves of Kollowrath had passed the defile. It may easily be imagined with what astonishment they beheld this new enemy on their flank, who was the more unexpected, as they knew that their left wing, under Riesch, had passed through the forest, and they deemed themselves perfectly secure on that side. They made, in consequence, little resistance, and were speedily driven off the chaussée. Not content with this success, Richepanse left to his cavalry the charge of keeping off the Imperial cuirassiers, and advanced himself with the two remaining regiments of infantry to attack the rear of the Imperial centre in the forest of Hohenlinden. The appearance of this force, amounting to nearly three thousand men, behind them, excited the utmost alarm in the Austrian column. The troops of that nation are proverbially more sensitive than any in Europe to the danger of being turned when in a line of march. A brigade of the Bavarian reserve was speedily directed to the menaced point, but it was overwhelmed in its advance by the crowds of fugitives, and thrown into such disorder by the overturned cannon and caissons which blocked up the road, that it never reached the enemy. Three Hungarian battalions were next brought up, but after resisting bravely, amidst the general consternation around them, they too at length were broken and fled. This little action

(1) Nap. ii. 34, 35. *Jom.* xiv. 97, 99. *Dum.* v. 119, 120. *Mém.* v. 270, 274.

decided the victory; the whole Austrian artillery lay exposed to the attacks of the victor in a situation where it was incapable of making any resistance (1).

Moreau, at the entrance of the defile in front of Hohenlinden, was still maintaining an anxious conflict, when the sound of cannon in the direction of Matenpot, and the appearance of hesitation and confusion in the enemy's columns, announced that the decisive attack in the chaussée behind them, by Richepanse, had taken place. He instantly directed Grouchy and Ney to make a combined charge in front on the enemy. The French battalions, which had so long maintained an obstinate defence, now commenced a furious onset, and the Austrian centre, shaken by the alarm in its rear, was violently assailed in front. The combined effort was irresistible. Ney, at the head of the Republican grenadiers, pressed forward in pursuit of the fugitives, along the chaussée, until the loud shouts of the troops announced that they had joined the victorious Richepanse, who was advancing along the same road to meet him, as fast as its innumerable incumbrances would permit. No words can paint the confusion which now ensued in the Austrian column. The artillery-drivers cut their traces, and galloped in all directions into the forest; the infantry disbanded and fled; the cavalry rushed in tumultuous squadrons to the rear, trampling under foot whatever opposed their passage; the waggons were abandoned to their fate, and amidst the universal wreck, 97 pieces of cannon, 300 caissons, and 7000 prisoners fell into the enemy's hands (2).

Great victory gained by the French.

While this decisive success was gained in the centre, the column of Latour and Keimayer, who had succeeded in debouching from the forest and united in the plain on its other side, violently assailed the Republican left, where Grenier, with inferior forces, defended the other road to Munich. Notwithstanding all his efforts, and the assistance of a part of the division of Ney, he was sensibly losing ground, when the intelligence of the defeat of the centre compelled the enemy to abandon his advantages, and retire precipitately into the forest. Grenier instantly resumed the offensive, and by a general charge of all his forces, succeeded in overwhelming the Austrians while struggling through the defile, and taking six pieces of cannon and fifteen hundred prisoners. At the same time, General Decaen, with a fresh brigade, disengaged the half of Richepanse's division, cut off during his advance, which was hard pressed between General Riesch's corps and the retiring columns of the centre, who still preserved their ranks. Before night, the Republicans, at all points, had passed the forest. Four of their divisions were assembled at Matenpot, and the head-quarters were advanced to Haag, while the Imperialists, weakened by the loss of above 100 pieces of cannon, and 14,000 soldiers, took advantage of the night to withdraw their shattered forces across the Inn (3).

Its prodigious consequences.

Such was the great and memorable battle of Hohenlinden, the most decisive, with the exception of that of Rivoli, which had yet been gained by either party during the war, and superior even to that renowned conflict in the trophies by which it was graced, and the immense consequences by which it was followed. The loss of the French on that and the preceding days was 9000 men, but that of the Imperialists was nearly twice as great, when the deserters and missing were taken into account; they lost two-thirds of their artillery, and the moral consequences of the defeat were fatal to the campaign. The victory of Marengo itself was less moment-

(1) Nap. ii. 35, 36. Jom. xiv. 99, 100. Dum. v. 121, 122.

(2) Jom. xiv. 99, 101. Mém. v. 272, 284. Dum. v. 121, 124. Nap. ii. 36, 37.

(3) Nap. ii. 36, 37. Dum. v. 127, 128. Jom. xiv. 101, 105. Mém. v. 280, 285.

ous in its military consequences. It merely gave the Republicans possession of the Sardinian fortresses and the Cisalpine republic; but the disaster of Hohenlinden threw the army of Germany without resource on the Hereditary States, and at once prostrated the strength of the monarchy (1).

Merit of Moreau in gaining it. Common justice must award to Moreau the merit of skilful combination, and admirable use of the advantages of ground in this great victory; but it is at the same time manifest that he owed much to chance, and that fortune crowned a well-conceived plan of defence by a decisive offensive movement. The whole arrangements of the French general were defensive; he merely wished to gain time, in order to enable his right and left wings, under Lecourbe and Sainte-Suzanne, to arrive and take a part in the action. By the movements on previous days, he was so far out-generaled, that, though his army on the whole was greatly superior to that of his opponents, he was obliged to fight at Ampfing with an inferiority of one to two, and at Hohenlinden on equal terms. The movement of General Richepanse, however well conceived to retard or prevent the passage of the forest by the Austrian army, could not have been reckoned upon as likely to produce decisive success; for if he had advanced half an hour later, or if Riesch's column, which it should have done, according to the Austrian disposition, had arrived half an hour sooner, he would have fallen into the midst of superior forces, and both his division and that of Decaen, which followed his footsteps, would probably have perished. The imprudence of the Austrians in engaging in these perilous defiles in presence of the enemy's army, and not arranging matters so that all their columns might reach the enemy at the same time, undoubtedly was the principal cause of the disaster which followed; but although Moreau's arrangements were such as would probably at all events have secured for him the victory, it was the fortunate accidents which occurred during the action which occasioned its decisive result (2).

The Austrians retire behind the Inn. Thunderstruck by this great disaster, the whole Imperial army retired behind the Inn, and made a show of maintaining itself on that formidable line of defence. But it was but a show. From the first the disposition of its columns, disposed in part in echelon along the road to Salzburg, indicated an intention of retreating in that direction. After maturely weighing all the circumstances of the case, Moreau resolved to force the passage of the Upper Inn, on the road to Salzburg; but in order to deceive the enemy, he caused all the boats of the Iser to be assembled at Munich, collected the bulk of his forces in that direction, and gave out that he was about to cross the lower part of the river. By adopting this line of advance, the French general had the prospect of cutting off the Imperialists from their left wing, hitherto untouched, in the Tyrol; menacing Upper Austria and Vienna, and endangering the retreat of Bellegarde from the plains of Italy. These advantages were so important, that they overbalanced the obvious difficulties of the advance in that direction, arising from the necessity of crossing three mountain streams, the Inn, the Alza, and the Salza, and the obstacles that might be thrown in their way from the strength of the mountain ridges in the neighbourhood of Salzburg (3).

(1) Jom. xiv. 107. Nap. ii. 131. Dum. v. 129.

(2) Jom. xiv. 106, 107. Nap. ii. 52, 54.

Napoleon's observations on this battle, and the whole campaign of Moreau, have been here adopted only in so far as they appear to be consonant to reason and justice. They are distinguished by his usual ability, but strongly tinged by that envenomed feeling towards his great rival, which

formed so powerful a feature in his character. Jealousy towards every one who had either essentially injured or rivalled his reputation, and a total disregard of truth when recounting their operations, are two of the defects in so great a man, upon which it is at once the most necessary and the most painful duty of the historian to dwell.

(3) Jom. xiv. 111, 112. Dum. v. 133, 134, 135.

Skillful  
manœuvre,  
by which  
the passage  
of that  
river was  
effected by  
Moreau.

While the boats of the Iser were publicly conducted, with the utmost possible *éclat*, to the lower Inn, Lecourbe caused a bridge equipage to be secretly transported in the night to Rosenheim, on the road to Salzburg, and having collected thirty-five thousand men in the neighbourhood, established a battery of twenty-eight pieces during the night of the 8th December at Neuperen, where the Inn flows in a narrow channel, and which is the only point in that quarter where the right bank is commanded by the left. At six o'clock on the following morning, while it was still pitch-dark, the French cannon, whose arrival was wholly unknown to the Austrian videttes, opened a furious fire, so well directed that the Imperialists were obliged to retire; and the Republicans instantly constructed a bridge, and threw across so strong a body of troops as gave them a solid footing on the left bank. At the same time a battery was placed in front of the bridge at Rosenheim, in order to prevent the burning of the remaining arches of that wooden structure, of which one only had been destroyed; but the corps of the Prince of Condé, which was stationed on the opposite bank, faithfully discharged its duty, and the whole bridge was soon consumed. In consequence of this circumstance, Lecourbe's troops were obliged to make a circuit by the passage at Neuperen, but so dilatory were the movements of the Imperialists, that no sufficient force could be collected to oppose their progress; a second bridge of boats was constructed near Rosenheim, by which Richepanse's division was passed over, and the Austrians, abandoning the whole line of the Upper Inn, retired behind the Salza. Thus was one of the most formidable military lines in Europe broken through in the space of a few hours, without the loss of a single man (1).

This extraordinary success was chiefly owing to the Imperialists having been led, by the demonstrations of Moreau against the Lower Inn, to concentrate the right wing of their army, which had suffered least in the disastrous battle of Hohenlinden, in that quarter, which removed it three or four marches from the scene where the real attack was made. No sooner did they receive intelligence of the passage of Lecourbe over the Upper Inn, than they hastily moved all their disposable troops towards the menaced point; but finding that the enemy were established on the right bank in too great force to be dislodged, they fell back on all sides, and abandoning the whole line of the Inn, concentrated their army behind the Alza, between Altenmarkt and the lake of Sine, to cover the roads to Salzburg and Vienna (2).

Rapid advance of  
the French  
towards  
Salzburg.

Moreau, conceiving with reason that the spirit of the Austrian army must be severely weakened by such a succession of disasters, resolved to push his advantages to the utmost. The Austrians now experienced the ruinous consequences attending the system of extending themselves over a vast line in equal force throughout, which, since the commencement of the war, they had so obstinately followed; they found themselves unable to arrest the march of the victor at any point, and by the rapid advance of Lecourbe were irrecoverably separated from their left wing in the Tyrol. Moreau having resolved not to allow them to establish themselves in a solid manner behind the Salza, pushed rapidly forward across the Achen Dec. 12. and the Traun to Salzburg. He experienced no considerable opposition till he reached the neighbourhood of that town, but when Lecourbe, with the advanced guard, approached the Saal, he found the bulk of the Austrian army, thirty thousand strong, including ten thousand cavalry, posted in a strong position covering the approach to Salzburg. Its front was

(1) Dum. v. 134, 140. Jom. xiv. 112, 115. Nap. (2) Jom. xiv. 114, 116. Dum. v. 141, 143. ti. 38, 39.



covered by the Saal, the rapid course of which offered no inconsiderable obstacle to an attacking force; its right rested on inaccessible rocks, and its left was protected by the confluence of the Saal and the Salza. But this position, how strong soever, had its dangers; it was liable to be turned by a passage of the Salza, effected below the town between Lauffen and Salzbouurg, in which case the army ran the risk of being cut off from Vienna, or thrown back in disorder upon the two bridges of boats which preserved its communication with the right bank of the river (1).

**13th Dec.** Lecourbe commenced the attack with his accustomed vigour; Gudin carried the village of Salzbouurg-hoffen, and made six hundred prisoners; but Montrichard was so rudely handled by the Imperial cavalry, that he was driven back in disorder, with the loss of five hundred men. But this success was of little avail, for Moreau ordered Decaen to cross the Salza at Lauffen, an operation which was most successfully performed. While the attention of the Imperialists was drawn to the broken arches of the bridge by a violent cannonade, this able general directed four hundred chosen troops to a point a little lower down, who, undeterred by the violence and cold of the winter torrent, threw themselves into the stream, swam across, and made themselves masters of some boats on the opposite side, by which the passage was speedily effected. Moreau was no sooner informed of this success, than he pushed Richepanse, with two fresh divisions, across at this place, and advanced against Salzbouurg by the right bank. Encouraged by this sup-

**14th Dec.**  
They are  
defeated by  
the Austrian  
cavalry in  
front of that  
town.

port, Lecourbe, on the day following, renewed his attack on the Austrian rear-guard, commanded by the Archduke John in person, posted in front of Salzbouurg. His troops advanced in two columns, one by the road of Reichenthal, the other formed in front of Vaal; a thick fog covered the ground, and the French tirailleurs advanced inconsiderately to the attack, deeming the Austrians in full retreat, and desirous of having the honour of first reaching Salzbouurg. They were received by the fire of thirty pieces of cannon, whose discharges soon dissipated the mist, and discovered two formidable lines of cavalry drawn up in battle array. Lecourbe brought up his horse, but they were overwhelmed by the first line of the Imperial cavalry, which broke into a splendid charge when the Republicans approached their position. Lecourbe finding himself unequal to the task of opposing such formidable forces, drew back his wings behind the Saal, and posted his infantry in the rear of the village of Vaal. He there maintained himself with difficulty till the approach of night, glad to purchase his safety by the loss of two thousand men left on the field of battle (2).

But the  
Imperial-  
ists are  
neverthe-  
less obliged  
to retire.

Had it not been for the passage of the river at Lauffen, this brilliant achievement might have been attended with important consequences; but that disastrous circumstance rendered the position at Salzbouurg no longer tenable. Moreau, at the head of twenty thousand men, was rapidly advancing up the right bank, and the Archduke John, unable to oppose such superior forces, was compelled to retire during the night, leaving that important town to its fate. Decaen, with the advanced guard of Moreau, took possession of Salzbouurg, without opposition, on the following morning, and the Republican standards for the first time waved on the picturesque towers of that romantic city (3).

The occupation of Salzbouurg, and the abandonment of the line of the Salza, decided the fate of the monarchy. The shattered remains of the grand army,

(1) Jom. xiv. 115, 116. Dum. v. 195, 197. Nap. ii. 39, 40.

(2) Nap. ii. 40, 41. Jom. xiv. 116, 120. Dum. v. 198, 206.

(3) Nap. ii. 40. Dum. 200, 207.

**Moreau**  
pushes on  
towards  
Vienna. which had been unable to maintain the formidable lines of two such rivers, broken in numbers, subdued in spirit, were unable thereafter to make any head against a numerous enemy, flushed with victory, and conducted with consummate military skill. Emboldened by the unexpected facility with which he had passed these considerable rivers, Moreau resolved to give the enemy no time to recover from his consternation, but to push on at once towards Vienna, and decide the war in the centre of the Hereditary States, before the other French armies had begun seriously to skirmish on the frontier. He disquieted himself little about the forces in the Tyrol, deeming the troops in that province sufficiently occupied with the invasion of Lombardy by Brune, and the march of Macdonald through the Grisons, which shall immediately be noticed. Satisfied with the precautions, therefore, of leaving on the right small bodies as he advanced, to mark the principal passes into that mountainous region, and on the left of detaching Sainte-Suzanne with his wing to watch the motions of Klenau, who was threatening the Gallo-Batavian army at Wurtzburg, he himself pushed on with his whole centre and right wing in pursuit of the enemy (1).

**Dec. 16.** Richepanse, who conducted his advanced guard, marched with so much expedition, that he came up with the Austrian rear at Herdorf. Notwithstanding the fatigue of his troops, who the day before had marched  
**Dec. 17**  
**and 18.** twelve leagues, he attacked the enemy at daybreak, routed them, and made a thousand prisoners. The two following days was a continued running fight; the Austrians retired, combating all the way, to Schwanstadt. This indefatigable leader was closely followed by Decaen and Grouchy, who came up to his support the moment that any serious resistance arrested his columns; while Lecourbe, at the head of the other wing of the invading army, advanced by the mountain road, in order to turn the streams where they were easily fordable, and constantly menace the left flank of the enemy. In  
**Great suc-**  
**cesses gain-**  
**ed by his**  
**advanced**  
**guard.** front of Schwanstadt the Imperialists made an effort to arrest this terrible advanced guard. Three thousand cavalry, supported by rocky thickets, lined with tirailleurs on either flank, stood firm, and awaited the onset of the Republicans; but they were now in a state of exultation which nothing could resist. The infantry advanced to within three hundred paces of that formidable mass of cavalry, without noticing the tirailleurs, who rattled incessantly on either flank, and then breaking into a  
**Dec. 19.** charge, approached the horse with levelled bayonets with so much resolution, that the Austrians broke and fled, and nearly a thousand men were killed or made prisoners. On the following day, a scene of dreadful confusion ensued, when the Austrian rear-guard crossed the Traun. A column of twelve hundred, under Prince Lichtenstein, stationed in front of the town of Lambach, where the passage was going forward, made such a heroic resistance as gave time to the greater part of the cannon and baggage to defile over the bridge; but at length it fell a victim to its devotion, and was almost all slain or made prisoners. Immediately the whole remaining Imperialists who had not passed fled towards the defile: they were rapidly followed by the Republicans. A scene of indescribable horror ensued; in the *mêlée* of fugitives, carriages, and trampling squadrons, the arches were fired, and multitudes threw themselves into the stream; but such was the resolution of the French grenadiers, that, regardless alike of the flames and the discharges of grape from the opposite bank, they rushed across; by their exertions the

(1) Jom. xiv. 121, 123. Dum. v. 207, 208.

bridge was preserved from destruction, and was speedily passed by the triumphant French battalions (1).

Dec. 20.  
The Arch-  
duke joins  
the army,  
but cannot  
arrest the  
disaster.

Affairs were in this disastrous state when the Archduke Charles, whom the unanimous cries of the nation had called to the post of danger, as the only means left of saving the monarchy, arrived, and took the command of the army. The arrival of that distinguished leader, who brought with him a few battalions, for a moment revived the spirits of the soldiers; but that gleam was of short duration. He had flattered himself that he would be able to arrest the progress of the enemy in upper Austria, while Klenau made a diversion on the side of Bohemia, and Hiller on that of Tyrol, so as to menace his communications in Bavaria and Swabia. But the appearance of the army as it crossed the Traun rendered it evident to his experienced eye that it was too late to calculate on the success of these movements. Instead of the proud battalions whom he had led to victory at Stockach and Zurich, the archduke beheld only a confused mass of infantry, cavalry, and artillery covering the roads; the bands of discipline were broken; the soldiers neither grouped around their colours nor listened to the voice of their officers; dejection and despair were painted in every countenance. Even the sight of their beloved chief, the saviour of Germany, could hardly induce the extenuated veterans to lift their eyes from the ground. He saw that it was too late to remedy the disorder, but still he bravely resolved to do his utmost to arrest it, and rather give battle under the walls of Vienna, than purchase, by an ignominious peace, the retreat of the conqueror (2).

An armis-  
tice is  
agreed to.

The spirits of the troops, revived for a moment by the arrival of their favourite leader, were irretrievably damped by the order to continue the retreat, after the passage of the Traun, to Steyer. The archduke gave the most pressing orders to hasten the advance of the Hungarian insurrection, and urge forward the armaments in the capital; but in the midst of these energetic measures, the rout of the rear-guard under Prince Schwartzemberg, who was overwhelmed at Kremsmunster on the Steyer, with the loss of twelve hundred men, gave him melancholy proof that the troops were so completely dejected, that no reliance could be placed on their exertions. Penetrated with grief at this disaster, he despatched a messenger to Moreau, soliciting an armistice, which, after some hesitation, was signed on the 25th by the French general, and repose given to the troops, worn out by a month's incessant marching and misfortunes (3).

Dec. 21.

Operations  
of the army  
on the  
Maine.

To complete the picture of the memorable campaign of 1800 in Germany, it only remains to notice the concluding operations of the Gallo-Batavian army on the Maine. After the action at Bourgebrach and the investment of the citadel of Wurtzburg, Augereau endeavoured to put himself in communication with the grand army under Moreau. His situation soon became critical when the advance of that army after the battle of Hohenlinden left him entirely to his own resources; and it was rendered doubly so by the approach of Klenau with ten thousand regular Austrian troops on his right flank, while Simbschen with twelve thousand troops menaced his left. The danger soon became pressing; a division of his troops was attacked on the 18th in front of Nuremberg by Klenau, and after a gallant resistance, forced to retreat; while his left with difficulty maintained itself against Simbschen. Disconcerted by these simultaneous attacks, the French general on the two following days retired behind the

Dec. 18.

(1) Nap. ii. 40, 41. Dum. v. 208, 214. Jom. xiv. 125, 128.

(3) Dum. v. 221, 222. Nap. ii. 41, 42. Jom. xiv. 130, 131.

(2) Jom. xiv. 129. Dum. v. 217, 218.

Dec. 21. Rednitz. On the 21st he was again attacked and defeated at Neukirchen by the united Imperial generals; but they were unable to follow up their advantages, from having received orders on the night of their victory to retire to Bohemia, in order to succour the heart of the monarchy, now violently assailed by the enemy (1). They were in the course of executing these orders, when the armistice of Steyer put a period to their operations.

Thus the Republican army, in a short campaign of little more than three weeks, in the middle of winter, and in the most severe weather, marched ninety leagues; crossed three considerable rivers in presence of the enemy; made twenty thousand prisoners; killed, wounded, or dispersed as many; captured 150 pieces of cannon, 400 caissons, and 4000 carriages; and never halted till its advanced guard, arrested by an armistice, was within twenty leagues of Vienna. Such results require no eulogium; the annals of war have few such triumphs to recount, and they deservedly placed Moreau in the very highest rank of the captains of the eighteenth century (2).

**Operations in the Grisons. Designs of Napoléon there.** While these great events were in progress in Germany, operations inferior indeed in magnitude, but equal in the heroism with which they were conducted, and superior in the romantic interest with which they were attended, took place in the snowy amphitheatre of the Alps. It has been already noticed, that the second army of reserve, consisting of fifteen thousand men, was moved forward in October to the valley of the Rhine, in the Grisons; and that it was destined to menace the rear of the Imperial army on the Mincio, while Brune attacked it in front. This auxiliary corps would probably have rendered more essential service if it had been directed to the grand army of Moreau, which was destined to operate in the valley of the Danube, the true avenue to the Austrian states; but such a disposition would ill have accorded with the views of the first consul, who was little anxious to put a preponderating force, so near their frontier, into the hands of a dreaded rival, and destined for himself the principal part in the campaign, with the troops which he was to lead by the Noric Alps to Vienna. Independently of this secret feeling, which undoubtedly had its weight, Napoléon was misled by the great results of the Italian campaigns of 1796 and 1797, and the paralysing effect of the march of the army of reserve across the St.-Bernard in the present year. He conceived that Italy was the theatre where the decisive events were to take place, and had yet to learn the superior importance of the valley of the Danube, in which he himself on future occasions was destined to strike such redoubtable blows (3). It is fortunate for the historian, that this destination of Macdonald's corps took place, as it brought to light the intrepidity and heroism of that gallant officer, of whose descent Scotland has so much reason to be proud; while it led to the interesting episode of the passage of the Splugen, perhaps the most wonderful achievement of modern war, and which has been portrayed by one of its ablest leaders, with the fidelity of Xenophon, and the pencil of Livy (4).

The army of Macdonald, which was announced to consist of forty thousand men, and was furnished with staff and other appointments adequate to that number, in reality amounted only to fifteen thousand troops. Macdonald no sooner discovered this great deficiency than he made the most urgent representations to the first consul, and requested that the chosen reserve of ten

(1) Nap. ii. 25, 26. Dum. v. 229, 241. Jom. xiv. 131, 137.

(2) Jom. xiv. 137, 139.

(3) Jom. xiv. 64. Arch. i. 264. Nap. ii. 61.

(4) Count Mathieu Dumas.

thousand men, which Murat was leading from the camp at Amiens to the plains of Italy, should be put under his orders. But Napoléon, who intended this corps in the Alps to operate on the campaign, more by the apprehensions it excited among the Imperialists than its actual achievements in the field, refused to change the destination of Murat's division, and it continued its route for the banks of the Mincio. He still believed that the frontier of the Inn would sufficiently cover the Hereditary States on that side, and that it was by accumulating ninety thousand men in the southern Tyrol and Italy, that the decisive blow against the Austrian power was to be struck. The command of this great army, destined to dictate peace under the walls of Vienna, he ultimately designed for himself (1).

Description of the road over the Splügen. Of all the passages from Switzerland to Italy, there was none which presented more serious natural obstacles, and was more carefully guarded by the enemy, than that which leads over the

Splügen into the Italian Tyrol. It is first necessary to pass from the valley of the Rhine, near its source, over the Splügen into that of the Adda, which descends in a rapid course from the Julian Alps to Chiavenna and the lake of Como; from thence, if an advance to the eastward is required, the Col Apriga, a steep ridge entangled with wood and lofty chesnuts, must be surmounted, which brings the traveller into the valley of the Oglio; between which and the stream of the Adige there is interposed the rugged ridge of the Monte Tonal, whose snowy summit was occupied and had been carefully fortified by the Austrian troops (2). Macdonald no sooner was made acquainted with these obstacles than he despatched his chief of the staff, General Mathieu Dumas, to lay before the first consul an account of the almost insuperable difficulties which opposed his progress. No man could be better qualified than the officer whose graphic pencil has so well described the passage to discharge this delicate mission; for he was equally competent to appreciate the military projects of the general-in-chief, and to portray the physical obstructions which opposed their execution. Napoléon Napoléon's designs for the passage of that mountain. listened attentively to his statement; interrogated him minutely on the force and positions of Hiller's corps, and the divisions of Laudon, Davidowich, and Wukassowich, which were stationed near the head of the valleys which in that part of the Alps separate Italy from Germany; and then replied, "We will wrest from them without a combat that immense fortress of the Tyrol; we must manœuvre on their flanks; menace their last line of retreat, and they will immediately evacuate all the upper valleys. I will make no change on my dispositions. Return quickly; tell Macdonald that an army can always pass, in every season, where two men can place their feet. It is indispensable that, in fifteen days after the commencement of hostilities, the army of the Grisons should have seen the sources of the Adda, the Oglio, and the Adige; that it should have opened its fire on the Monte Tonal which separates them; and that, having descended to Trent, it should form the left wing of the army of Italy, and threaten, in concert with the troops on the Mincio, the rear of Bellegarde's army. I shall take care to forward to it the necessary reinforcements; it is not by the numerical force of an army, but by its destination and the importance of its operations, that I estimate the merit due to its commander (3)."

Having received these verbal instructions, Macdonald prepared, with the devotion of a good soldier, to obey his commands. His troops advanced the

(1) Dum. v. 148, 149. Nap. ii. 61.

(2) Personal observation.

(3) Dum. v. 153, 154.



**Preparations of Mardouald for crossing the Splugen.** moment the armistice was denounced, into the upper Rheinthal, and concentrated between Coire and Tüsis, at the entrance of the celebrated defile of the Via Mala, which is the commencement of the ascent of the Splugen, while, at the same time, to distract the enemy, and conceal his real designs, demonstrations were made towards Feldkirch, as if it was intended to break into the Tyrol in that quarter. A few days were spent at Tüsis in organizing the army, and making the necessary preparations for the formidable undertaking which awaited them, of crossing in the depth of winter the snowy summits of the mountains. All the artillery was dismounted, and placed on sledges constructed in the country, to which oxen were harnessed; the artillery ammunition was divided, and placed on the backs of mules, and in addition to his ordinary arms, ball cartridge and knapsack, every soldier received five days' provisions, and five packets of cartridges to bear on his shoulders over the rugged ascent. Had he lived to see the French infantry preparing, in the middle of December, under the weight of these enormous burdens, to cross the snow-clad ridges of the Rhetian Alps, by paths hardly accessible at that season to the mountaineers of the country, the eloquent historian of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire would have expunged from his immortal work the reflection on the comparative hardihood of ancient and modern times (1).

**Description of the passage of the Splugen.** Tüsis is situated at the confluence of the Albula and the Rhine, at the foot of a range of pine-clad cliffs of great elevation, which run across the valley, and in former times had formed a barrier, creating a lake in the valley of Schams, a few miles farther up its course. Through this enormous mass, three or four miles broad, the Rhine has, in the course of ages, found its way in a narrow bed, seldom more than thirty or forty, sometimes not more than eight or ten yards broad, shut in on either side by stupendous cliffs which rise to the height of two or three thousand feet above its rocky channel. The road, conducted along the sides of these perpendicular precipices, repeatedly crosses the stream by stone bridges, of a single arch, thrown from one cliff to the other, at the height of three or four hundred feet above the raging torrent. Innumerable cascades descend from these lofty precipices, and are conducted in subterraneous channels under the road, or lost in the sable forests of pine which clothe their feet. Impetuous as the Rhine is in this extraordinary channel, the roar of its waters is scarcely heard at the immense elevation above it at which the bridges are placed. The darkness of the road, overshadowed by primeval pines of gigantic stature, conducted through galleries cut out of the solid rock, or on arches thrown over the awful abyss; the solitude and solemnity of the impenetrable forests around, the stupendous precipices above and beneath, which make the passenger feel as if he were suspended in middle air, conspire to render this pass the most extraordinary and sublime in the whole amphitheatre of the central Alps (2).

Emerging from this gloomy defile, the road traverses for two leagues the open and smiling valley of Schams; it next ascends by a winding course the pine-clad cliffs of La Rofla, and at length reaches in a narrow and desolate

(1) Dum. v. 154, 161. See Gibbon, chap. i. Jom. xiv. 146, 147.

(2) Personal observations. Dum. v. 151. Ebel. Art. Via. Mala.

The defile of the Via Mala is not so celebrated as its matchless features deserve; but the admirable road which is now conducted through its romantic cliffs, and over the Splugen, must ultimately bring it into more general notice. It exceeds in sublimity

and horror any scene in the Alps. There is no single pass in the Simplon, Mont Cenis, the Great St.-Bernard, the Little St.-Bernard, the St.-Gothard, the Bernhardin, the Brenner, or the Col de Tende, which can stand in comparison. It approaches more nearly to the savage character of the Breach of Roland, or the Circle of Gabarnie in the Pyrenees, but exceeds in stupendous features either of these extraordinary scenes.

pastoral valley the village of Splugen, situated at the foot of the ascent of the mountain of the same name. Here the road, leaving the waters of the Rhine, which descend cold and clear from the glaciers of Hinter Rhin, turns sharp to the left hand, and ascends a lateral valley as far as its upper extremity, when it emerges upon the bare face of the mountain above the region of wood, and by a painful ascent, often of forty-five degrees elevation, reaches the summit in an hour and a half. This description applies to the old road as it stood in 1800. The new road, over the same ground, is wound gradually up the ascent, with that admirable skill which has rendered the works of the French and Italian engineers in the Alps the object of deserved admiration to the whole civilized world. The wearied traveller then beholds with joy the waters flowing towards the Italian streams, in a narrow plain about four hundred yards broad, situated between two glaciers at the base of overhanging mountains of snow. From thence to Isola, on the Italian side of the declivity, is a descent of two leagues, conducted in many places down zig-zag slopes, attended with great danger. On the right, for several miles, is a continued precipice, or rocky descent, in many places three or four hundred feet deep, while, on the left, the road is cut out of the solid rock, on the bare face of the mountain, exposing the traveller to be overwhelmed by the avalanches, which, loosened on the heights above by the warmth of the southern sun, often sweep with irresistible violence to the bottom of the declivity (1).

In summer, when the road is well cleared, it is possible to go in three hours from the village of Splugen to the hospice on the summit; but when the newly fallen snow has effaced all traces of the path in those elevated regions, above the zone of the arbutus and rhododendron; when the avalanches or the violence of the winds have carried off the black poles which mark the course of the road, it is not possible to ascend with safety to the higher parts of the mountain. The traveller must advance with cautious steps, sounding, as he proceeds, as in an unknown sea beset with shoals; the most experienced guides hesitate as to the direction which they should take; for in that snowy wilderness the horizon is bounded by icy peaks, affording few landmarks to direct their steps, even if they should be perceived for a few minutes from amidst the mantle of clouds which usually envelope their summits (2).

It may easily be conceived, from this description, what labours are requisite during the winter season to open this passage. It is necessary for an extent of five leagues, from the village of Splugen, to that of Isola, either to clear away the snow, so as to come to the earth, or to form a passable road over its top; and the most indefatigable efforts cannot always secure success in such an enterprise. The frequent variations of the atmosphere, the clouds which suddenly rise up from the valleys beneath, the terrible storms of wind which arise in these elevated regions, the avalanches which descend with irresistible force from the overhanging glaciers, in an instant destroy the labour of weeks, and obliterate, by a colossus of snow, the greatest efforts of human industry (3).

Such were the difficulties which awaited Macdonald in the first mountain ridge which lay before him in the passage of the Alps. He arrived with the Nov. 26 advanced guard, on the evening of the 26th, at the village of Splugen, the point where the mountain passage, properly speaking, begins, with a company of sappers, and the first sledges conveying the artillery.

(1) *Dugl.* v. 164, 165. Personal observation.  
(2) *Dugl.* v. 164.

(3) *Ibid.* v. 165.

Extreme difficulties experienced by the French troops in the passage.

Nov. 27.

The country guides placed poles along the ascent; the labourers followed and cleared away the snow; the strongest dragoons next marched to beat down the road by their horses' feet; they had already, after incredible fatigue, nearly reached the summit, when the wind suddenly rose, an avalanche fell from the mountain, and sweeping across the road, precipitated thirty dragoons at the head of the column into the gulph beneath, where they were dashed to pieces between the ice and the rocks. General La Riboissière, who led the van, was a-head of the cataract of snow, and reached the hospice; but the remainder of the column, thunderstruck by the catastrophe, returned to Splugen; and the wind, which continued for the three succeeding days to blow with great violence, detached so many avalanches, that the road was entirely blocked up in the upper regions, and the guides declared that no possible efforts could render it passable in less than fifteen days (1).

Macdonald, however, was not to be daunted by any such obstacles. Independently of his anxiety to fulfil his destined part in the campaign, necessity forced him on, for the unwonted accumulation of men and horses in those elevated Alpine regions promised very soon to consume the whole

Dec. 1.

subsistence of the country, and expose the troops to the greatest dangers from actual want. He instantly made the best arrangement which circumstances would admit for re-opening the passage. First marched four of the strongest oxen that could be found in the Grisons, led by the most experienced guides; they were followed by forty robust peasants, who cleared or beat down the snow; two companies of sappers followed and improved the track; behind them marched the remnant of the squadron of dragoons, which had suffered so much on the first ascent, and who bravely demanded the post of danger in renewing the attempt. After them came a convoy of artillery and a hundred beasts of burden, and a strong rear-guard closed the party. By incredible efforts the head of the column, before night, reached the hospice, and although many men and horses were swallowed up in the ascent, the order and discipline so necessary to the success of the enterprise were maintained throughout. They here joined general La Riboissière, who continued the same efforts on the Italian side; and led this adventurous advanced guard in safety to the sunny fields of Campo Dolcino at the southern base of the mountain. Two other columns, arrayed in the same order, followed on the 2d and 3d December, in clear frosty weather, with much less difficulty, because the road was beaten down by the footsteps of those who had preceded them; but several men died of the excessive cold on the higher parts of the mountain (2).

Heroism of Macdonald in persisting, notwithstanding.

Encouraged by this success, Macdonald advanced with the remainder of his army to Splugen on the 4th December, and leaving only a slight rear-guard on the northern side of the mountain, commenced his march on the morning of the 5th, at the head of seven thousand men. Though no tempest had been felt in the deep valley of the Rhine, the snow had fallen during the night in such quantities, that from the very outset the traces of the track were lost, and the road required to be made anew, as at the commencement of the ascent. The guides refused to proceed; but Macdonald insisted upon making the attempt, and after six hours of unheard-of fatigues, the head of his column succeeded in reaching the summit. In the narrow plain between the glaciers, however, they

(1) Jom. xiv. 154, 155. Dum. v. 168, 169.

(2) Dum. v. 170, 171. Jom. xiv. 156. Hist. iv. 58, 59.

found the road blocked up by an immense mass of snow, formed by an avalanche newly fallen, upon which the guides refused to enter, and in consequence the soldiers returned, unanimously exclaiming that the passage was closed. Macdonald instantly hastened to the front, revived the sinking spirits of his men, encouraged the faltering courage of the guides, and advancing himself at the head of the column, plunged into the perilous mass, sounding every step as he advanced with a long staff, which often sunk deep into the abyss. "Soldiers," said he, "the army of reserve has surmounted the St.-Bernard; you must overcome the Splugen; your glory requires that you should rise victorious over difficulties to appearance insuperable. Your destinies call you into Italy? advance and conquer, first the mountains and the snow, then the plains and the armies (1)." Put to shame by such an example, the troops and the peasants redoubled their efforts; the vast walls of ice and snow were cut through, and although the hurricane increased with frightful rapidity, and repeatedly filled up their excavations, they at length succeeded in rendering the passage practicable. The tempest continued to blow with dreadful violence during the passage to the hospice and the descent of the Cardinal; the columns were repeatedly cut through by avalanches, which fell across the road (2), and more than one regiment was entirely dispersed in the icy wilderness. At length, by the heroic exertions of the officers, whom the example of their general had inspired with extraordinary ardour, the head-quarters reached Isola, and rested there during the two succeeding days, to rally the regiments, which the hardships of the passage had broken into a confused mass of insulated men, but above one hundred soldiers, and as many horses and mules, were swallowed up in the abysses of the mountains, and never more heard of (3).

(1) A parallel incident occurred in ancient times, and, what is very extraordinary, during the decay of Roman virtue. "The Emperor Majorian," says Gibbon, "led his troops over the Alps in a severe winter. The Emperor led the way on foot, and in complete armour, sounding with his long staff the depth of the ice or snow, and encouraging the Scythians, who complained of the extreme cold, by the cheerful assurance that they should be satisfied with the heat of Africa."—*Decline and Fall*, c. xxxvi.

(2) Bot. iv. 59. Jom. xiv. 156, 157. Dum. v. 171, 174.

(3) Bot. iv. 59. Jom. xiv. 156, 157. Dum. v. 171, 174.

Unworthy jealousy of this passage displayed by Napoleon. The passage of the Splugen by Macdonald is the most memorable and extraordinary undertaking of the kind recorded in modern war, so far as the obstacles of nature are concerned. It yields only to the march of Suwarrow over the St.-Gothard, the Schachenthal, and the Engiberg, where, in addition to similar natural difficulties, the efforts of an able and indefatigable enemy were to be overcome. The passage of the St.-Bernard by Napoleon in fine weather, and without opposition, will bear no comparison with either the one or the other. That he himself was conscious of this, is obvious from the striking terms of disparagement in which he speaks of Macdonald's exertions in this passage; an instance of that jealousy of every rival in any of his great achievements, which is almost inconceivable in so great a man. "The passage of the Splugen," says he, "presented, without doubt, some difficulties; but winter is by no means the season of the year in which such operations are conducted with most difficulty; the snow is then firm, the weather settled, and there is nothing to fear from the avalanches, which constitute the true and only danger to be ap-

prehended in the Alps. In December, you often meet with the finest weather, on these elevated mountains, or dry frost, during which the air is perfectly calm."—*Napoleon*, ii. 61, 62. Recollecting that this was written after the first consul had received the full details from Macdonald of the extraordinary difficulties of the passage, it is inexcusable, and clearly betrays a consciousness of the inferiority of his own passage over the St.-Bernard. In his official despatch, by orders of the first consul, to Macdonald, Berthier says, "I have received the relation which the chief of your staff has transmitted to me relative to the passage of the Splugen by the army which you command. I have communicated the details to the consuls, and they have enjoined me to make known to you their high satisfaction at the intrepidity and heroic constancy which the officers, and soldiers, and generals, have evinced in this passage, which will form a memorable epoch in our military annals. The consuls, confident in your talents, behold with interest the new position of the army of the Grisons. I impatiently expect the details of the celebrated passage of the Splugen, and the losses which it occasioned, to enable them to appreciate the admiration and gratitude which is due to the chiefs and soldiers of your army." [14th Dec. 1800. See Dum. v. 255. *Pièces Just.*]

It was equally unworthy of Napoleon to say in his *Memoirs*:—"The march of Macdonald produced no good effect, and contributed in no respect to the success of the campaign; for the corps of Baraguay d'Hilliers, detached into the Upper Engadine, was too weak to effect any thing of importance. Macdonald arrived at Trieste on the 7th January, when the enemy was already chased from it by the left of the army of Italy, by the corps under the orders of Moncey and Rochambeau." [Nap. ii. 62, 63.] Had

Dec. 7.  
He arrives  
at Chiavenna on  
the lake of  
Como.

Late on the evening of the 6th December, the greater part of the troops and a large part of the artillery had passed the mountain, and head-quarters were advanced to Chiavenna, at the upper extremity of the lake of Como. No sooner did Hilliers hear of this advance, than he moved forward his columns towards the head of the valley of the Inn to assail him; but the intelligence of the disastrous battle of Hohenlinden arrived that very day, and by rendering it evident that all the forces of the monarchy would be required to defend the capital, precluded the possibility of following up any distant enterprises. The Austrians therefore took post on the summits of the Albula, the Julierberg, and the Broglio, the three ridges which separate the Italian from the German side of the mountains in that quarter, and strongly reinforced the division on the Tonal, the only pass between the valley of the Oglio, to which Macdonald was hastening, and that of the Adige, which was the ultimate object of his efforts (1).

He is  
placed un-  
der the  
orders of  
Brune.

While still on the banks of the Adda, the French general had the misfortune to receive intelligence of the capture of a battalion of dismounted hussars, which negligently lay in the elevated valley at its upper extremity, by a well-concerted surprise from the Imperial forces in the Engadine. At the same time, he received orders from the first consul to place himself under the command of General Brune, of whose army he was to form the left wing; a mortifying circumstance to a general who had just achieved so important a service in a separate command as the passage of the Splugen, but which abated nothing of his zeal in the public cause. He suggested to Brune that two divisions should be detached from the army of Italy to reinforce his corps, and thus with a body of twenty-four thousand men he would advance across the mountains to Trieste, and effect a decisive operation on the rear of the Imperial army. But the general-in-chief refused to comply with this request, which was evidently hazardous, as exposing to overwhelming attacks in detail two separate armies, too far severed from each other to be able to render any effectual assistance in case of need (2).

Difficult  
passage of  
the Col  
Apriga.

Napoléon's orders had directed Macdonald to penetrate as soon as possible into the valley of the Adige, in order to threaten the flank and rear of the Imperialists on the Mincio. For this purpose it was necessary to cross the Col Apriga, which lay between the valley of the Adda and that of the Oglio, and afterwards surmount the icy summit of Mont Tonal, between the latter stream and that of the Adige. The passage of the Monte Apriga, though considerably less elevated than the Splugen, was even more difficult by reason of the extreme steepness of the ascents, the entangled wood which encumbered its lower region, and the dreadful nature of the road, which in many places is little better than the bed of a torrent. In seven hours, however, all these difficulties were overcome; the army found itself on the banks of the Oglio, and extended its outposts as far as Bornio at the upper extremity of the valley (3).

Attack on  
the Mont.  
Tonal.

There still remained, however, the Herculean task of surmounting the Tonal, a mountain ridge of great elevation, which could be reached at that rude season only by a path through the snow, in which the

Napoléon forgotten that Macdonald's advance, by paralysing Laudon and Wukassowich, enabled Brune to achieve the passage of the Mincio; and that, if it had not been for the credulity of Moncey, he would have compelled the surrender of the former at La Pietro with 7000 men? The great truth, "*Magna est veritas et prævalebit*," does not seem ever to have crossed Napoléon's mind; he never contemplated the minute examination to which his

account of transactions would be exposed by posterity, and thought he could deceive future ages, as he did his own, by means of sycophantish writers and an enslaved press.

(1) Jom. xiv. 158, 159. Dum. v. 174, 175.

(2) Jom. xiv. 159, 161. Dum. v. 176, 178, 184, 185.

(3) Jom. xiv. 158, 159. Dum. v. 180, 182. Bel. iv. 61.



troops were confined to single files. The summit, as usual in these elevated regions, consisted of a small plain three hundred yards broad, situated between two enormous and inaccessible glaciers. Across this narrow space the Austrians had drawn a triple line of intrenchments, faced for the most part by enormous blocks of ice, cut in the form of regular masonry, and even more difficult to scale than walls of granite. Notwithstanding these obstacles, the French grenadiers, after a painful ascent by the narrow and slippery path, reached the front of the intrenchments. Though received by a shower of balls, they succeeded in forcing the external palisades; but all their efforts were ineffectual against the walls of ice which formed the inner strength of the works. They were in consequence obliged to retreat, and brought back the disheartening report that this important position was impregnable (1).

Dec. 31. In which the French are repulsed. Sensible, however, of the vital importance of forcing this passage, Macdonald resolved to make another attempt. Eight days afterwards, another column was formed, under the command of Vandamme, and approached the terrible intrenchments. The Austrians had in the interval added much to the strength of the works; but they were assaulted with so much vigour, that two external forts were carried; still, however, when they approached the principal intrenchment, the fire from its summit, and from a block-house on an elevated position in its rear, was so violent, that all the efforts of the Republicans were again ineffectual, and they were forced to retire, after staining with their bravest blood the cold and icy summit of the mountain. Macdonald was in some degree consoled for this disaster by the success of his left wing, which spread itself into the Engadine, driving the Imperialists before it, and made itself master of the well-known stations of Glurens and Martinsbruck, on the Tyrolean side of the mountains (2).

The importance of these operations, and the obstinacy with which the attack and defence of the inhospitable Alpine ridges were conducted at this inclement season, will be best understood by casting a glance over the positions and movements of the contending armies in the Italian plains at this period.

Positions and forces of the French and Austrians in Italy. When hostilities were recommenced to the south of the Alps by the denunciation of the armistice, the Imperial army, sixty-five thousand strong, of which fifteen thousand were cavalry, occupied the formidable line of the Mincio, covered by a hundred pieces of cannon, flanked on the one extremity by the Po, on the other by the lake of Garda, and strengthened by the strong fortress of Mantua, and the inferior fortifications of Peschiera and Borghetto, which gave them the immense advantage of being able to debouche at pleasure on either side of the river (3). The Imperialists had received orders to remain on the defensive in this excellent position until their flanks were secured, and the prospect of an advantageous attack was afforded by the advance of the Neapolitan troops over the hills of Tuscany, and the descent of Laudon and Wukassowich from the mountains of Tyrol.

The French forces in Italy were immense. In the peninsula altogether there were 95,000 men, besides 27,000 who encumbered the hospitals. Of this great body, 64,000 infantry, 9,000 cavalry, and 178 pieces of cannon, were ready for active operations on the Mincio, while the remainder occupied

(1) Jom. xiv. 161, 162. Dum. v. 186, 188. Bot. iv. 61. Personal observation.

(2) Jom. xiv. 162, 163. Dum. v. 188, 191. Bot. iv. 61.

(3) Dum. v. 243, 244. Jom. xiv. 166, 167. Bot. iv. 63.

Tuscany, Lombardy, Piedmont, and Liguria. During the five months that these troops had occupied the fertile plains of the Po, they had profited to an extraordinary degree by the resources of the country. The soldiers had been completely new clothed, the artillery horses renewed, the cavalry was admirably mounted, the magazines were full, the troops in the highest state of discipline, spirits, and equipment. But these vast supplies, wrung by the terrors of military execution from an unhappy and impoverished people, had excited the utmost discontent in the peninsula. The inhabitants compared the high-sounding proclamations of the invaders with the sad consequences which had followed their footsteps, and, rendered more sullen by the disappointment of their hopes than even the serious injuries they had undergone, were ready upon any reverse to have risen unanimously upon their oppressors. This state of things was well known to the French commanders, and to secure their flanks and rear they were obliged to detach twenty-five thousand from the grand army on the Mincio, how well soever they were aware that it was there the fate of Italy was to be decided (1).

Dec. 16.  
First operations of  
Brune.

Hostilities were first commenced by Brune, who found the spirit of his troops so much elevated by the intelligence of the battle of Hohenlinden, and the passage of the Splügen by Macdonald, that their ardour could no longer be restrained. The firing commenced on the 16th, but nothing except inconsiderable skirmishes ensued before the 28th. The Mincio, in its course of twenty miles from the lake of Guarda to Mantua, though fordable in many places in summer, was absolutely impassable in winter; and the five bridges which were thrown over its current at Peschiera, Salconzo, Valleggio, Volta, and Goito were either within the walls of fortifications, or strongly intrenched and barricaded. The left bank, in the hands of the Austrians, was generally more elevated than the right, in the possession of the Republicans; but at Mozambano and Molino, near Pozzuolo, the right had the advantage, which evidently pointed out these stations as the most advantageous for forcing a passage. For these reasons they had been fortified with care by the Austrian engineers, who had pushed their intrenchments, which were occupied by twenty thousand combatants under Hohenzollern, to a considerable distance from the right bank of the river; and against these advanced works it first behoved Brune to direct his efforts (2).

Passage of  
the Mincio.  
Dec. 20.

On the 20th the whole French army approached the Mincio in four columns. The right, under Dupont, moved towards the shores of the Mantuan lake: the centre, under Suchet, advanced direct upon Volta; the third column, destined to mask Peschiera, was ordered to take post near Ponti; the left and the reserve were directed against Mozambano. The French general had intended to have made feigned attacks only on the centre and right, and to have attempted to force the passage in good earnest near the lake of Guarda, and at the foot of the mountains; but the course of events fell out otherwise. As the Republicans approached the Mincio, the Imperialists, who had orders not to engage in any serious affair on the right bank, seeing they had the whole French army on their hands, successively abandoned all the positions they had fortified with so much care, and withdrew to the other side, leaving only detachments to occupy Valleggio and the *tête-de-pont* of Borghetto, on the Republican side. The French patrols, in consequence, every where approached the river; and Dupont, ignorant that the attack on his side was intended only to be a feint, and that the left was the real point

(1) *Eot.* iv. 62, (3. *Jom.* xiv. 164, 166. *Nap.* ii. 64, 65.

(2) *Nap.* ii. 66, 67. *Eot.* iv. 62, 63. *Jom.* xiv. 174, 176. *Dum.* v. 243, 244.

of attack, made the most active preparations for effecting a passage. He succeeded so well, that, early on the morning of the 25th, he had thrown a battalion over, near Molino, which speedily established a bridge, and soon enabled a whole division to obtain a firm footing on the left bank.

Dec. 25. Hardly was the passage completed, when orders arrived from the commander-in-chief to cover, by a fire of cannon, merely the bridge which had been established, and allow no troops to pass over to the other side. But this despatch arrived too late; the division of Watrin was already over; the enemy's troops opposed to it were hourly and rapidly increasing, and any attempt to fall back to the bridge would have exposed it to certain and irremediable ruin. In these trying circumstances Dupont conceived that the execution of his orders had become impossible, and resolved to retain the advantage he had gained, by aiding Watrin with his remaining troops. In this resolution he was confirmed by Suchet, who was no sooner informed that the passage was irrevocably engaged on the right, than he resolved to support it with all his forces, and hastening to the bridge at Molino, crossed over with his whole corps. On their side, the Imperialists, who had judiciously placed the bulk of their army in mass, a little in the rear of the centre of the line, no sooner

Desperate conflict of the troops who had crossed over. heard of the passage at Molino than they directed an overwhelming force to assail the advanced guard of the enemy. But for the timely assistance afforded by Suchet, Dupont's troops would have been totally destroyed; as it was, a furious combat ensued, which continued with various success till night, in which the Republicans only maintained their ground by the sacrifice of the bravest of their men. For long the French infantry repulsed with invincible firmness the repeated and vehement charges of the Austrian cavalry; but at length they were driven, by a desperate effort of the Hungarian grenadiers, out of the village of Pozzuolo, and forced in disorder to the water's edge. All seemed lost; when the Imperialists, checked by a terrible discharge of grape from the batteries on the French side, hesitated in their advance; and Dupont took advantage of their irresolution to animate his men, and lead them back to the charge, which was executed with such vigour, that Pozzuolo was regained, and the Imperialists repulsed with the loss of seven hundred prisoners and five pieces of cannon. The Austrians, however, brought up fresh troops; Pozzuolo was again carried at the point of the bayonet; Suchet advanced with his division and retook it; it was again carried by the Imperialists, and continued to be alternately conquered and reconquered till nightfall, when it finally remained in the hands of the Austrians (1). Even the darkness of a winter night could not suspend this terrible combat: between eleven and twelve the fitful gleams of the moon, through a tempestuous and cloudy sky, enabled the Republicans to perceive two deep masses of grenadiers who silently approached their intrenchments. They were received with a general discharge of fire-arms of all sorts; the batteries thundered from the opposite bank; for a few minutes a volcano seemed to have burst forth on the shore of the Mincio, but all the efforts of the Imperialists were unavailing; and after a gallant struggle they were obliged to retire, leaving the French in possession of their blood-stained intrenchments (2).

Brune, during this bloody conflict, remained in a state of the greatest irresolution, hesitating between his original design of effecting a passage at Mo-

(1) Bellegarde says it remained in the hands of the Austrians: Oudinot affirms it was ultimately carried by the French. The well-known veracity of

the German character makes it probable the former was the true account.

(2) Nap. ii. 67, 75. Bot. iv. 63, 64. Dum. v. 251, 266. Jom. xiv. 175, 185.

zambano, and the new project to which he was urged, of supporting the ground, won at so dear a price, in the lower part of the stream. He thus ran the risk of losing his whole right wing, which was in truth only saved by the desperate valour of the troops of whom it was composed (1). At length he resolved to pursue his original design, and form a passage at Mozambano.

Dec. 26. For this purpose, Marmont, at daybreak, on the 26th December, established a battery of forty pieces of cannon on the heights above that place, which commanded the left bank, and despatched orders to Dupont and Suchet to keep themselves within their intrenchments until they heard

Brune at length relieves them, and the passage is completed.

the firing warmly engaged on their left. Under cover of a thick fog, the passage was speedily effected, and the French advanced guard soon after came to blows with the enemy. It was evident, however, that they fought only to cover their retreat; Oudinot, at the head of the Republican grenadiers, bravely resisted till sufficient reinforcements passed over, to enable them to resume the offensive, which they did with such vigour, that the Imperialists were driven back to Valleggio, from whence they continued their retreat in the night, leaving Borghetto to its fate, which, next day, after repulsing an assault with great loss, surrendered with the garrison of eight hundred men. In effect, Bellegarde, conceiving the passage of the river effected by the bridge established at Molino, had resolved upon a general retreat; his troops fell back in all quarters towards the Adige, leaving garrisons in Mantua, Verona, Legnago, and Peschiera, which reduced his effective force to forty thousand combatants (2).

Great losses of the Imperialists.

In the passage of the Mincio, the Austrians lost above seven thousand men, of whom one-half were prisoners, and forty pieces of cannon, but its moral consequences, as is generally the case with a first decisive success, determined the fate of the campaign. The French resumed the career of victory with their wonted alacrity; the Imperialists fell into the despondency which is the sure prelude to defeat; and the disastrous intelligence they received from the Bavarian frontier contributed to spread the disheartening impression that the Republicans were invincible under their new leader, and that no chance of safety remained to the monarchy, but in a speedy submission to the conqueror (3).

Bellegarde retires to Caldiero.

Brune, however, advanced cautiously after his victory. Leaving detachments to mask Mantua, Verona, and Peschiera, he approached the Adige in the end of December. To effect the passage of that river, the French general made use of the same stratagem which had been attempted for the passage of the Mincio, viz., to make demonstrations both against the lower and upper part of the stream; and while the enemy were distracted in their attention by a multiplicity of attacks, the artillery and bridge equipage were secretly conducted to Bassolengo. Sixty pieces of cannon were established there in battery, on the heights of the right bank, on the morning of the 1st January, which opened their fire at daybreak, under cover of which a bridge was speedily constructed without opposition from the enemy. The troops passed over, and established themselves on the left bank without firing a shot; the Imperialists were much less solicitous about interrupting their operations than effecting a junction with the corps of Wukassowich and Laudon, which were hastening by the defiles of the Brenta towards the plain of Bassano. Bellegarde withdrew his forces on all

(1) For this he incurred the just and merited censure of the first consul.—See *NAPOLEON*, ii. 75, 76.

(2) *Jom.* xiv. 188, 192. *Dum.* v. 268, 275. *Nap.* ii. 76, 78. *Bot.* iv. 64, 65.

(3) *Dum.* v. 275, 276. *Jom.* xiv. 192, 193. *Nap.* ii. 80.

sides, and concentrated them in the strong position of Caldiero, already signalized by a victory over Napoléon, while the Republicans closely followed his footsteps, and extending their left up the rocky gorge of the Adige, made themselves masters, after severe combats, of the narrow defile of Corona and the immortal plateau of Rivoli (1).

Advance of the Republicans in the valley of the Adige. The Republicans, under Moncey, pursued their advantages; the Imperialists, under Laudon, long and obstinately defended the town of Alta, in the valley of the Adige, but were driven from it with the loss of five hundred prisoners; they again held firm in the intrenchments of S.-Marco, but were at length forced to retreat, and took refuge in the defile of Calliano, already celebrated by so many combats. At the same time, the Italian division of Count Theodore Lecchi ascended the valley of the Oglio, and entered into communication with Macdonald's corps immediately after its repulse from the icy ramparts of Mont Tonal; while detachments in the rear formed the blockade of Mantua, Peschiera, Verona, and Legnago. Laudon retired with six thousand men to Roveredo, from whence he was soon after driven, and fell back, disputing every inch of ground, to the foot of the fort of Pietra, overhanging the deep and rapid stream of the Adige between that town and Trent (2).

Bellegarde, finding his force so materially weakened by the garrisons which he was obliged to throw into the fortified towns on the Mincio, and the losses sustained in the passage of that river, had given orders to Wukassowich and Laudon, whose united forces exceeded twenty thousand men, to fall back from the Italian Tyrol, through the defiles of the Brenta, and join him in the plains of Bassano, in the rear of Calliano; and it was to give them time to accomplish this junction that he took post on the almost impregnable heights of Calliano.

Alarming situation of Laudon on the Upper Adige. Laudon was commencing this movement when he was rudely assailed by the division of Moncey, and harassed in his retreat up the valley of the Adige in the manner which has been mentioned. But a greater danger awaited him. On the very day on which he retired to the castellated defile of La Pietra, he received the alarming intelligence that Trent, directly in his rear, and by which he required to pass to gain the upper extremity of the Brenta, was occupied by Macdonald, at the head of nine thousand men! To understand how this happened, it is necessary to resume the narrative of the army of the Grisons, after its repulse from the glaciers of Mont Tonal (3).

Macdonald makes his way into the Italian Tyrol. After that check, Macdonald had collected in the Val Camonica, including the Italian division of Lecchi, above nine thousand men; and with them he eagerly sought for some defile or mountain-path by which to penetrate across the rocky chain which separates that valley from that of the Sarca, from whence he could reach Trent and the banks of the Adige. But these rugged cliffs, which push out, with hardly any declivity, almost to Brescia, in the plain of Lombardy, defeated all his efforts; and it became necessary to turn their southern extremity by Pisogno, at the head of the lake of Iseo, from thence cross the Col di San Zeno, into the valley of Sabia, and again surmount another ridge into the Val Trompia, in order to ascend by the beautiful sides of the Chiesa into the valley of Sarca. This long circuit, which would have been completely avoided by forcing the passage of Mont Tonal, irritated to the highest degree the French troops, who had expected at once, after surmounting the Splugen, to take a part in the glories

(1) Jom. xiv. 196, 197. Dum. v. 276, 290. Nap. ii. 78, 79. Bot. iv. 66.

(2) Jom. xiv. 198, 199. Dum. v. 288, 290.

(3) Bot. iv. 66, 67. Jom. xiv. 198, 199. Dum. v. 284, 285.



of the campaign. Their impatience increased when, at their arrival at Pisono, Macdonald received and published the account of the passage of the Minicio, and the retreat of the Imperial army towards the Adige. He was there joined by General Rochambeau with three thousand men from Brune's army, who had at length become sensible of the importance of the operations in the Alps on the flanks and rear of the retreating army, and received the most pressing invitation to accelerate his march so as to cut off some of its detached columns. The difficulties of the ridge of San Zeno, however, had almost arrested the soldiers whom the snows of the Splügen had been unable to overcome; a few horses only could be got over by cutting through blocks of ice as hard as rock on the summit, and the greater part of the cavalry and artillery required to descend by the smiling shores of the lago Iseo to Brescia, and ascend again the vine-clad banks of the Chiesa. Such, however, was the vigour of the Republican troops, that they overcame all these obstacles; on the 6th January they arrived at Storo in the Italian Tyrol; while the left wing, under Baraguay d'Hilliers, surmounted the higher ridges at the sources of the Adige, and following the retreating Austrian columns, descended by Glurens and Schlanders upon Meran on the banks of the Upper Adige (1). Thus, after surmounting incredible difficulties, the object of the first consul was at length gained; the whole mountain ridges were crossed, and the Imperialists turned by the upper extremity of all the valleys where their forces in the Italian Tyrol were situated.

Laudon is  
surrounded  
at Trent.

The approach of these different columns, amounted in all to twenty-five thousand men, and conducted with equal skill and vigour, from the north, south, and west, convinced the Austrian general that they had not a moment to lose in concentrating their troops at Trent, and regaining, by the defile of the Brenta, the army of Bellegarde at Bassano. If Wukassowich ascended towards Bolzano to aid in repelling Baraguay d'Hilliers, who was descending the Adige, he ran the risk of leaving Laudon to be overwhelmed by Moncey; if he moved towards Roveredo to the support of the latter general, he abandoned the avenues of Trent and the line of communication in his rear to Macdonald. In these critical circumstances he rapidly withdrew his right to Trent, ordered the troops who covered La Sarca to defend that city against Macdonald as long as possible, and enjoined Laudon to maintain himself till the last extremity in the important defile of La Pietra. But Macdonald, who was now fully aware of the situation of Laudon, made incredible exertions; in one day he marched forty miles; crossed the Col Vezzano; forced the passage of the Adige, and entered Trent. Wukassowich hastily retired by the great road to the defiles of the Brenta; but Laudon, with seven thousand men, who was still posted at La Pietra, was left to his fate, with a superior enemy in his front, and the army of the Grisons in his rear, occupying the only road by which he could retreat (2).

He escapes  
by a lateral  
path to  
Bassano.

The only remaining chance of safety to Laudon was by a rugged path, which leads over the mountains from Pietra to Levico on the Brenta. It was impossible that his corps could retire by this defile, passable only by single file, if they were attacked either by Moncey or Macdonald, and Laudon was well aware that the former, with fifteen thousand men, was preparing to assail him on the following morning, and that the latter, notwithstanding the fatigue of his troops, had already pushed a patrol beyond Trent, on the road to Roveredo, and would advance to the sup-

(1) Dum. v. 285, 287. Jom. xiv. 198, 199. Bot. iv. 67.

(2) Dum. v. 285, 292. Jom. xiv. 201, 202. Bot. iv. 67.

port of his comrade the moment that the combat was seriously engaged. In this extremity he made use of a *ruse de guerre*, if that name can properly be applied to a fabrication inconsistent with the proverbial German faith. He sent an officer of his staff to Moncey, announcing the conclusion of an armistice between Brune and Bellegarde, similar to that already concluded in Germany, and proposing a suspension of arms. Moncey suspecting no deceit, fell into the snare; he agreed to the proposal, upon condition that the pass of La Pietra and the town of Trent should be placed in his hands, which being agreed to, and its execution prepared for the following day, Laudon in the meantime, in the night, withdrew his troops, man by man, through the narrow straits of Caldonazzo by paths among the rocks, where two file could not pass abreast, to Levico on the shores of the Brenta in the Val Sugana, and the French advanced guard, proceeding next day to take possession of Trent, was astonished to find it already in the hands of Macdonald, and discover the extent of the danger from which their unsuspecting honesty had delivered the Imperial general (1).

Jan. 10. Bellegarde, finding that Wukassowich and Laudon had effected their junction in the valley of the Brenta, deemed it no longer necessary to retain his position on the heights of Caldiero, but retired leisurely, and facing about at every halt, to Bassano, where he effected his junction with the divisions which had descended from the Tyrol. This great reinforcement gave him a marked superiority over his adversary: and though he fell back to the neighbourhood of Treviso, he was making preparations to give battle in front of that town, when operations on both sides were concluded by the armistice of Treviso, which at length put a period to this murderous contest.

Jan. 16. Armistice of Treviso. By this convention, the Austrians agreed to give up Peschiera, Verona, Legnago, Ancona, and Ferrara, which gave Brune an excellent base for future operations; but they retained possession of Mantua, the key of Lombardy, and the great object of the first consul's desires. This was the more irritating to Napoléon, as Murat's corps, twelve thousand strong, had already reached the Italian plains, and Brune himself had written to Government only three days before, that he would agree to no armistice, unless Mantua, as well as the other fortresses, were put into his hands. The truth is, that in the interval circumstances had changed; the Imperialists were concentrated in the immense plains of Treviso, where their cavalry could act with peculiar effect; the divisions from Tyrol had joined their ranks; while Brune, whose army was severely weakened by the numerous blockading divisions left in his rear, could not oppose to them an equal force. But Napoléon, whose impatient spirit, fed by repeated victories, could brook no obstacle, was indignant at this concession to the Imperialists; he manifested his high displeasure at Brune, whom he never again employed in an important command, and announced to his ministers at Lunéville that he would instantly resume hostilities, both in Germany and Italy, unless Mantua were abandoned. The disastrous state of affairs in the former country had taken away from the Austrians all power of resistance; they yielded to his desires, and a few days afterwards the peace of LUNÉVILLE put an end to the disastrous war of the second coalition (2).

Before proceeding to the conditions of this celebrated treaty, it is necessary to resume the thread of the events in the southern part of the Italian peninsula previous to the general pacification.

(1) Bot. iv. 67. Dum v. 292, 295. Jom. xiv. 202, 203.

(2) Nap. ii. 80, 82. Bot. iv. 68, 69. Jom. xiv. 209, 210. Dum. v. 300, 303.

Insurrec-  
tion breaks  
out in  
Piedmont,  
Jan. 15,  
1801.

At the moment when this double armistice consolidated the French power in Italy and Germany, a dangerous insurrection broke out in Piedmont. The people of that country were exasperated to the highest degree at the endless and vexatious requisitions of the French troops; the most ardent democrats were thunderstruck by the annexation of the territory of Vercelli to the Cisalpine republic, and the clergy and nobles justly apprehensive of the extinction of their rights and properties, from the continued ascendant of France. Fed by so many sources, the flame of discontent, though long smothered, at length broke out; the peasants of the Valley of Aosta took up arms, expelled the French detachments, and shut up their depôt of conscripts in the fortress of Ivrea, while symptoms of insurrection appeared at Turin (1). But the vigour of Soult overcame the danger; he speedily surrounded and disarmed the insurgent quarter of the capital, and the appearance of Murat, who at that moment descended from the mountains in their rear, extinguished the revolt in the Alpine valleys. The revolutionary party of Piedmont found themselves inextricably enveloped in a despotic net from which it was impossible to escape.

Neapolitans  
invade  
the Roman  
states, and  
are totally  
defeated.

The cannon of Marengo had shaken the throne of the Two Sicilies; the court of Naples was conscious that the sanguinary executions which had disgraced its return to the shores of Campania, had exposed it to the utmost danger from the vengeance of the popular party; and that it had little to hope from the mercy of the first consul, if the Imperial standards were finally chased from Italy. Feeling its very existence thus endangered, the Cabinet of Ferdinand IV had made exertions disproportioned to the strength of the kingdom. An army, sixteen thousand strong, splendid in appearance, and formidable, if numerical strength only were considered, under the command of Count Roger de Damas, had advanced through the Roman states, and taken post on the confines of Tuscany, ready to foment the discontent of its inhabitants, which the enormous requisitions of the French authorities had exasperated to the greatest degree, and act in conjunction with the Imperialists at Sommariva, whose head-quarters were

Jan. 10.

at Ancona. The weakness of Miollis, the French commander in Tuscany, whose forces had been reduced, by the garrisons left in Lucca, Leghorn, and Florence, to four thousand men, encouraged them to attempt an offensive movement. They advanced to Sienna, which rose in insurrection against the French, while Arezzo, supported by detachments from Ancona, again displayed the standard of revolt. But on this, as on every other occasion during the war, the utter loss of military character by the Neapolitans was painfully conspicuous. Miollis collected six thousand veterans from the neighbouring garrisons, and advanced against the invaders. The vanguard

Jan. 14.

of Ferdinand fled at the bare sight of the enemy. In vain the infantry were formed into squares and encouraged to stand; they broke at the first charge of the Piedmontese columns, supported by a single squadron and three companies of French grenadiers: the superb hussars fled in confusion, trampling under foot their own flying regiments; and the whole army soon became a useless crowd of fugitives, which hastened, like a flock of sheep, towards the Roman frontier, without having sustained any serious loss. On this occasion the French hardly fired a shot, and the Neapolitans were discomfited by the mere sight of the Piedmontese levies; a striking proof how much more rapidly military virtue had declined in the south than the north of the peninsula (2).

(1) *Jom.* xiv. 210, 211. *Bot.* iv. 69. *Dum.* v. 321, 322.

(2) *Bot.* iv. 70. *Dum.* v. 314, 329. *Jom.* iv. 214, 215. *Nap.* ii. 84, 85.

Even, however, if the Neapolitan troops had combated with the valour of the ancient Samnites, the result would have been the same. Sommariva no sooner heard of this disaster at Sienna than he retraced his steps towards Ancona; the insurgents at Arezzo made haste to offer their submission to the conqueror; Murat's corps, ten thousand strong, was approaching Parma; Jan. 16. and the armistice of Treviso, a few days after, put a final period to the co-operation of the Imperialists. Ancona was delivered up agreeably to the convention; Ferras passed into the hands of the Republicans; southern Italy lay open to the invader; and the unwarlike Neapolitans were left alone Jan. 20. to combat a power before which the veteran bands of Austria and Russia had fallen (1). Napoléon openly expressed his determination to overturn the throne of the Two Sicilies, and Murat, at the head of an army of twenty-eight thousand men, composed of his own corps, that of Miollis, and two divisions of veterans from the Mincio, soon after crossed the Apennines, to carry into execution the mandates of Republican vengeance.

Queen of Naples flies to St.-Petersburg to implore the aid of Paul. But the Court of Naples had not trusted merely to its military preparations; the address of the queen extricated the throne from the imminent danger to which it was exposed, and gave it a few years longer of a precarious existence. No sooner had the battle of Marengo and the armistice of Alexandria opened the eyes of this able and enterprising, though vehement and impassioned woman to the imminence of the danger which threatened the Neapolitan throne, if it were left alone to resist the redoubtable forces of France, than she adopted the only resolution which could ward off the impending calamities. Setting off in person from Palermo, shortly before the winter campaign commenced, she undertook a journey to St.-Petersburg to implore the powerful intercession of the Czar, should events prove adverse, to appease the wrath of the conqueror. It soon appeared how prophetic had been her anticipations. The Emperor Paul, whose chivalrous character and early hostility to the principles of the Revolution had been by no means extinguished by his admiration for Napoléon, was highly flattered by this adventurous step. The prospect of a queen setting out in the depth of winter to undertake the arduous journey from Palermo to St.-Petersburg to implore his aid, was as flattering to his vanity as the renown of upholding a tottering throne was agreeable to his romantic ideas of government (2). He warmly espoused the cause of the unfortunate princess, and not only promised to intercede with all his influence in her favour with the first consul, but forthwith despatched M. Lowascheff, an officer high in his household, and who enjoyed his intimate confidence, to give additional weight to his mediation with the Cabinet of the Tuileries.

Napoléon willingly yields to his intercession. Napoléon had many reasons for yielding to the efforts of the northern emperor. A conqueror, who had recently usurped the oldest throne in Europe, was naturally desirous to appear on confidential terms with its greatest potentate; and the sovereign who had just placed himself at the head of the northern maritime coalition against England could hardly be expected to intercede in vain at the court of its inveterate enemy. For these reasons, M. Lowascheff was received with extraordinary distinction at Paris. On the road to Italy he was treated with the honours usually reserved for crowned heads; and the Italians, who recollected the desperate strife between the Russians and Republicans, beheld with astonishment the new-born harmony which had risen up between their envoys. He arrived at Florence at the same time that General Murat made his entry. The

(1) Nap. ii. 84, 85. Dum. v. 328, 331. Jom. xiv. 215, 217. Bot. iv. 70, 71.

(2) Bot. iv. 71. Dum. v. 317, 319. Jom. xiv. 211, 212.

city was brilliantly illuminated in the evening; every where in public they appeared together, overshadowed by a tri-colour and a Russian standard; and the Russian envoy declared to the bewildered Florentines, "that two great nations should for ever be united for the repose of mankind (1)."

Peace be-  
tween  
France and  
Naples at  
Foligno.  
Feb. 9.

Backed by such powerful influence, and the terrors of thirty thousand French soldiers on the Tiber, the negotiation was not long of being brought to a termination. Napoléon had directed that the affairs of Naples should be altogether excluded from the articles of the armistice at Treviso, in order that he might alone regulate the destinies of a kingdom, the old ally of England, and the impassioned enemy of the Revolution. The terms prescribed to Murat, and embodied in the armistice of Foligno, were less distinguished by severity towards the Neapolitans than hostility to the English; and this treaty is remarkable as containing the first official enunciation of the CONTINENTAL SYSTEM, to which, through the whole remainder of his career, he so inflexibly adhered, and which had so large a share, through the misery which it occasioned, in bringing about his ultimate overthrow (2).

Its condi-  
tions.

By the armistice of Foligno it was provided that the Neapolitan troops should forthwith evacuate the Roman states, but that, even after their retreat, the Republicans should continue to occupy Narni and the line of the Nera, to its junction with the Tiber; that "all the ports of Naples and Sicily should instantly be closed against English vessels of merchandise as well as war, and remain shut till the conclusion of a general peace; that all prosecutions on account of political offences should cease, and the scientific men, unworthily detained at Naples on their return from Egypt, should be instantly set at liberty (3)."

March 28,  
1801.  
French  
take pos-  
session of  
the whole  
Neapolitan  
territories.

By the treaty of Foligno, which was signed soon afterwards, the ambitious projects of the first consul were more completely developed, and the first indications were manifested of that resolution to envelope the continent in an iron net, which was afterwards so completely carried into effect. By this treaty it was provided, that "all the harbours of the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily should be closed to all English or Turkish vessels until the conclusion of a general peace; that Porto Longone in the island of Elba, Piombino in Tuscany, and a small territory on the sea-coast of that duchy, should be ceded to France; that all political prosecutions should cease, and the sum of 50,000 francs be paid by the Neapolitan Government to the victims of former disorders on the return of the court of Sicily; that the statues and paintings taken from Rome by the Neapolitan troops should be restored; and that, in case of a menaced attack from the troops of Turkey or England, a French corps, equal to what should be sent by the Emperor of Russia, should be placed at his disposal." Under these last words was veiled the most important article in the treaty, which was speedily carried into effect, and revealed the resolution of the French Government to take military possession of the whole peninsula. On the 1st April, only three days after the signature of this treaty, and before either any requisition had been made by the Neapolitan Government or any danger menaced their dominions, a corps of twelve thousand men, under the command of General Soult, set out from the French lines, and before the end of the same month took possession of the fortresses of Tarentum, Otranto, Brindisi, and all the harbours in the extremity of Calabria. By a secret article

(1) Jom. xiv. 217, 218. Dum. v. 333, 334. Rot. iv. 71.

(2) Jom. xiv. 219, 220. Dum. v. 341, 342. Rot. iv. 72, 73.

(3) Dum. v. 341.



in the treaty, the Neapolitan Government were to pay 500,000 francs (L.20,000) a-month for the pay and equipment of this corps, besides furnishing gratis all the provisions it might require (1). The object of this occupation was to facilitate the establishment of a communication with the army in Egypt, and it excited the utmost solicitude in the breast of Napoléon. His instructions to Soult are extremely curious, as proving how early he had embraced the new political principles on which his government was thereafter founded. Among other things, he directed that the general "should engage in no revolution, but, on the contrary, severely repress any appearance of it which might break out; that he should communicate to all his officers that the French Government had no desire to revolutionize Naples; that with all his staff he should go to mass on every festival with military music, and always endeavour to conciliate the priests and Neapolitan authorities; that he should maintain his army at the expense of Tuscany and Naples, as the Republic was so overwhelmed by the return of its armies to the territory of France, that he could not send them a single farthing." Finally, he gave minute directions for the reduction of porto Ferraio and the island of Elba, little anticipating that he was seeking to acquire for the Republic his own future place of exile (2).

Siege of  
Elba,  
July, 1801.

This little island, which has since acquired such interest from the residence of Napoléon in 1814, was at first deemed an easy conquest by the French general. But he soon found that he had a very different enemy to deal with from the pusillanimous troops of Naples. The English garrison of porto Ferraio consisted merely of three hundred British soldiers, of eight hundred Tuscan troops, and four hundred Corsicans in the pay of Great Britain; but into this motley assemblage the governor, Colonel Airley, had infused his own undaunted resolution. At first the French commenced the siege with fifteen hundred men only; but finding that number totally inadequate, they gradually augmented their force to six thousand men, while three frigates maintained a strict blockade, which soon reduced the garrison to great straits from want of provisions. But in the end of July, Sir John Borlase Warren hove in sight with an English squadron; the French cruizers instantly took refuge in the harbour of Leghorn; and the Republicans, in their turn, began to experience the hardships of a blockade. Three French frigates were captured in endeavouring to convey supplies across the straits of Piombino to the besiegers, but as in spite of these disasters the labours of the siege advanced, a general effort was made on the 13th September to destroy the works. Two thousand men, consisting of the Swiss regiment of Watteville and detachments from the marines of the fleet, were landed, and

Its gallant  
defence by  
the English  
garrison.

attacked the Republicans in rear, while Airley, by a vigorous sortie, assailed them in front. The attack was at first successful, and some of the batteries which commanded the entrance of the harbour were taken and spiked; but the Republicans having returned in greater force, the besieged were obliged to retire, and the troops who had landed were again embarked. Notwithstanding this, however, the most vigorous defence was made; the terrors of a bombardment were tried in vain to shake the resolution of the garrison; and after a siege of five months, the governor had the glory of surrendering the fortress intrusted to his charge only in consequence of an express condition in the treaty of Amiens (3). This successful resistance by a handful of men to the troops who had vanquished the greatest military monarchies of Europe, excited a great sensation both in England and on the continent, and served as a presage of that desperate struggle which

(1) Dum. vi. 268. *Pièces Just.*

(2) Dum. vi. 270, 280. *Pièces Just.* Nap. ii. 89.

(3) Article 7, Treaty of Amiens.

awaited them, when, after trampling under foot the southern hosts, they encountered the stubborn valour of northern freedom. "It was," says the impartial French historian, "an extraordinary spectacle in the midst of the triumphal songs, and in the bosom of a continental peace, so long desired, so painfully acquired, to behold an island, of easy access and almost touching the continent, the scene of a long-continued and doubtful strife (1); and Europe beheld with amazement, in that island, a single fortress arrest the arms which the forces of the coalition had been unable to subdue."

Feb. 9,  
1801.

Treaty of  
Lunéville.

By the treaty of Lunéville, which the Emperor Francis was obliged to subscribe, "not only as Emperor of Austria, but in the name of the German empire," Belgium and all the left bank of the Rhine were again formally ceded to France; Lombardy was erected into an independent state, and the Adige declared the boundary betwixt it and the dominions of Austria; Venice, with all its territorial possessions as far as the Adige, was guaranteed to Austria; the Duke of Modena received the Brisgau in exchange for his duchy, which was annexed to the Cisalpine republic; the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the emperor's brother, gave up his dominions to the infant Duke of Parma, a branch of the Spanish family, on the promise of an indemnity in Germany; France abandoned Kehl, Cassel, and Ehrenbreitzen, on condition that these forts should remain in the situation in which they were when given up; the princes dispossessed by the cession of the left bank of the Rhine were promised an indemnity in the bosom of the Empire; the independence of the Batavian, Helvetic, Cisalpine, and Ligurian republics was guaranteed, and their inhabitants declared "to have the power of choosing whatever form of government they preferred (2)."

These conditions did not differ materially from those contained in the treaty of Campo Formio, or from those offered by Napoléon previous to the renewal of the war; a remarkable circumstance, when it is recollected how vast an addition the victories of Marengo, Hohenlinden, and the Mincio had since made to the preponderance of the French arms.

Emperor  
subscribes  
for the em-  
pire as well  
as Austria.

The article which compelled the Emperor to subscribe this treaty, as head of the empire as well as Emperor of Austria, gave rise in the sequel, as shall be shown, to the most painful internal divisions in Germany. By a fundamental law of the empire, the Emperor could not bind the electors and states of which he was the head, without either their concurrence or express powers to that effect previously conferred. The want of such powers had rendered inextricable the separate interests referred to the Congress at Rastadt; but Napoléon, whose impatient disposition could not brook such formalities, cut the matter short at Lunéville, by throwing his sword into the scale, and insisting that the emperor should sign for the empire as well as himself; leaving him to vindicate such a step as he best could to the princes and states of the Imperial Confederacy. The Emperor hesitated long before he subscribed such a condition, which left the seeds of interminable discord in the Germanic body; but the conqueror was inexorable, and no means of evasion could be found. He vindicated himself to the electors in a dignified letter, dated 8th February, 1801, the day before that when the treaty was signed, in which, after premising that his Imperial authority was restrained by the Germanic constitutions on that point in a precise manner, and therefore that he had been compelled to sign, as head of the empire, without any title so to do, he added, "But, on the other hand, the consideration of the melancholy situation in which, at that period,

(1) Dum. v. 358, 359. Ann. Reg. 1801, p. 179. Jom. xiv. 371, 374.

(2) See the Treaty in Dumas, vi. 232, et seq. Pièces Just.

a large part of Germany was placed, the prospect of the still more calamitous fate with which the superiority of the French menaced the empire if the peace was any longer deferred (1); in fine, the general wish, which was loudly expressed, in favour of an instant accommodation, were so many powerful motives which forbade me to refuse the concurrence of my minister to this demand of the French plenipotentiary." The electors and princes of the empire felt the force of this touching appeal; they commiserated the situation of the first monarch in Christendom, compelled to throw himself on his subjects for forgiveness of a step which he could not avoid; and one of the first steps of the Diet of the empire, assembled after the treaty of Lunéville was signed, was to give it their solemn ratification, grounded on the extraordinary situation in which the Emperor was then placed. But the question of indemnities to the dispossessed princes was long and warmly agitated. It continued for above two years to distract the Germanic body; the intervention both of France and Russia was required to prevent the sword being drawn in these internal disputes; and by the magnitude of the changes which were ultimately made, and the habit of looking to foreign protection which was acquired, the foundation was laid of that league to support separate interests which afterwards, under the name of the CONFEDERATION OF THE RANK, so well served the purposes of French ambition, and dissolved the venerable fabric of the German empire (2)."

Reflections  
on this  
campaign.

The winter campaign of 1800 demonstrates, in the most striking manner, the justice of the observation by the Archduke Charles, that the valley of the Danube is the quarter where vital blows against the Austrian monarchy are to be struck, and the importance of frontier or central fortifications to arrest the march of a victorious invader. The disaster of Marengo was soon repaired, and did not prevent the Austrians again taking the field at the head of an army which almost balanced the Republican forces; but the battle of Hohenlinden at once laid open the vitals of the monarchy. The reason is to be found in the numerous fortresses which covered the Imperial frontiers in Lombardy, and the total want of any such barrier between Austria and Bavaria. After the passage of the Mincio, the army of Brune was so severely weakened, by the detachments left in the rear to blockade the fortresses on that river, that he was unequal to any farther offen-

(1) See the original, Dum. vi. 298. *Pièces Just.*

(2) Dum. vi. 29, 30. Hard. viii. 52.

March 20, 1801. Extra-  
vagant joy  
at this peace  
in Paris.  
This glorious peace excited, as might well have been expected, the most enthusiastic joy in Paris. It was announced in these terms to the inhabitants by Napoléon:—"A glorious peace has terminated the continental war. Your frontiers are extended to the limits assigned to them by nature; nations long separated from you rejoin their brethren, and increase by a sixth your numbers, your territory, and your resources. This success you owe chiefly to the courage of your soldiers, to their patience in fatigue, their passion for liberty and glory: but you owe it not less to the happy restoration of concord, and that union of feelings and interests, which has more than once saved France from ruin. As long as you were divided, your enemies never lost the hope of subjugating you; they hoped that you would be vanquished by yourselves, and that the power which had triumphed over all their efforts would crumble away in the convulsions of discord and anarchy. Their hope has been disappointed; may it never revive. Remain for ever united by the recollection of your domestic misfortunes, by the sentiment of your present grandeur and force. Beware of lowering by

base passions a name which so many exploits have consecrated to glory and immortality.

"Let a generous emulation second our arts and our industry; let useful labours embellish that France which external nations will never mention but with admiration and respect; let the stranger who hastens to visit it, find among you the gentle and hospitable virtues which distinguished your ancestors. Let all professions raise themselves to the dignity of the French name; let commerce, while it reforms its relations with other people, acquire the consistency which fixes its enterprises, not on hazardous speculations, but constant relations. Thus our commerce will resume the rank which is due to it; thus will be fortified the bonds which unite us to the most enlightened people of the continent; thus will that nation, even, which has armed itself against France, be taught to abjure its excessive pretensions, and at length learn the great truth, that, for people as individuals, there can be no security for real prosperity but in the happiness of all." [Dum. vi. 298. *Pièces Just.*] It is curious to observe how early, amidst his continental triumphs, the ambition of the first consul was directed to commercial and maritime greatness, in the effort to attain which he was led to indulge in such implacable hostility to this country

sive movements, and if the war had continued, he would probably have been compelled to retreat; but, after the battle of Hohenlinden, the undiminished battalions of Moreau poured in resistless strength into the undefended Hereditary States. The Archduke Charles had long before foreseen this; by the fortifications of Ulm he enabled Kray for six weeks to arrest the victor in the middle of his career; and so sensible was Napoléon of their importance, that his first measure, when they fell into his hands, was to level them with the ground.

The peace of Lunéville was the first considerable pause in the continental strife; and already it had become manifest that the objects of the war had been changed, and that hostilities were now to be carried on, for the subjugation of a different power from that which was at first contemplated.

The real  
object of  
the war  
was already  
gained by  
the Allies.

The extinction of the revolutionary spirit, the stoppage of the insidious system of propagandism, by which the French democracy were shaking all the thrones, and endangering all the institutions and liberties of Europe, was the real object of the war. The restoration of the Bourbons was never considered of importance, farther than as affording a guarantee, and what at first appeared the best guarantee, against that tremendous danger. By the result of a struggle of nine years' duration, this object had been gained, not indeed in the way which at first would have been deemed most likely to effect it, but in a manner which experience soon proved was far more efficacious. The restoration of a brave and honourable, but weak and unwarlike race of monarchs, would have been but a feeble barrier against the turbulent spirit of French democracy; but the elevation of an energetic and resolute conqueror to the throne, who guided the army by his authority and dazzled the people by his victories, proved perfectly sufficient to coerce its excesses. Napoléon said truly, "that he was the best friend which the cause of order in Europe ever had, and that he did more for its sovereigns, by the spirit which he repressed in France, than evil by the victories which he gained in Germany." The conquests which he achieved affected only the external power or present liberty of nations; they did not change the internal frame of government, or prevent the future resurrection of freedom; and when his military despotism was subverted, the face of European society reappeared from under the mask of slavery without any material alteration; but the innovations of the National Assembly totally subverted the fabric of a constitutional monarchy, and by destroying all the intermediate classes between the throne and the peasantry, left to the people of France no alternative for the remainder of their history but American equality or Asiatic despotism. The cause of order and freedom, therefore, gained immensely by the accession of Napoléon to the throne. Great as were the dangers to the independence of the surrounding states from the military power which he wielded, they were trifling in comparison of the perils to the very existence of liberty, which arose from the democratic innovations of his predecessors.

Evidence  
of Napo-  
léon's im-  
placable  
hostility to  
England.

But though the cause of liberty was thus relieved from its most pressing dangers, the moment that the first consul seized the helm, the peril to the independence of the surrounding states, and of England in particular, became extreme. His conduct soon shewed what his memoirs have since confessed, that he had formed, from the very commencement, a resolution to make France the first of European powers, and turn all the energies of their combined forces against the existence of Great Britain. Already his measures were all directed to this end; he made it the first condition of peace to all the vanquished nations, that they should

exclude English ships from their harbours, and he had contrived, by flattering the vanity of the Emperor of Russia, and skilfully fomenting the jealousy of the neutral states, to combine a formidable maritime league against England in the north of Europe. Thus, as time rolled on, the war totally altered its object; and the danger of subjugation changed sides. Commenced to stop the revolutionary propagandism of France, it terminated by being directed against the maritime preponderance of Great Britain; and England, which set out with heading the confederacy, ended by finding herself compelled to combat for her existence against the power of combined Europe.

Increasing  
and system-  
atic pillage  
by the Re-  
publican  
armies.

In the progress of the conflict also, a change not less important in the mode of carrying on the war had arisen; and the Revolutionary armies, compelled by the penury of their domestic resources, had adopted a system of extorting supplies from the vanquished states,

hitherto unknown in modern warfare. It is the boast of the philosophic historian that civilisation had softened even the rude features of war in modern Europe; that industry securely reaped its harvest amidst hostile squadrons, and the invaded territory felt the enemy's presence rather by the quickened sale for its produce than the ruthless hand of the spoiler (1). But though this was true when Gibbon wrote, the French Revolution had introduced a very different system, and made war retrograde to the rapine and spoliation of barbarous times. The Revolutionary armies issued from the Republic as the Goths from the regions of the north, powerful in numbers, destitute of resources, starving from want, but determined to seek for plenty, at the sword's point, from the countries through which they passed; the principle on which they uniformly acted was to make war maintain war, and levy in its theatre, whether a hostile or neutral territory, the means of carrying on the contest. They formed no magazines; brought with them no money; paid for nothing; but by the terrors of military execution wrung from the wretched inhabitants the most ample supplies. "The army of Moreau," says General Mathieu-Dumas, "ransacked the country between the Rhine and the Inn, devoured its subsistence, and reduced the inhabitants to despair, while it maintained the strictest discipline. The devastation of war for centuries before, even that of the Thirty Years, was nothing in comparison. Since the period when regular armies had been formed, the losses occasioned by the marches and combats of armies were passing evils; the conquest of a country did not draw after it its ruin. If a few districts or some towns carried by assault were abandoned to the fury of the soldiers, the inexorable pen of history loaded with reproaches the captains who permitted, or the sovereigns who did not punish such outrages. But Moreau's army levied, in a few months, above twenty millions in requisitions; enormous contributions were unceasingly exacted; the people were overwhelmed; the governments of the oppressed states entirely exhausted. It was reserved for our age to witness, in the midst of the rapid progress of civilization, and after so many eloquent declamations in favour of humanity, the scourge of war immeasurably extended; the art of government become in the hands of the conqueror an instrument of extortion, and systematic robbery be styled, by the leaders of regeneration, the right of conquest (2)."

Symptoms  
of patriotic  
and general  
resistance  
springing  
up.

Even in this gloomy state of the political horizon, however, the streaks of light were becoming visible which were destined to expand into all the lustre of day. The invasion of the French troops, their continued residence in other states, had already gone far to

(1) Gibbon.

(2) Dumas, v. 72, 73.



dispel those illusions in their favour, to which, even more than the terror of their arms, their astonishing successes had been owing. Their standards were no longer hailed with enthusiasm by the people who had experienced their presence; the declaration of war to the palace and peace to the cottage had ceased to deceive mankind. The consequences of their conquests had been felt; requisitions and taxes—merciless requisitions, grievous taxes—had been found to follow rapidly in the footsteps of these alluring expressions; penury, want, and starvation were seen to stalk in the rear of the tri-color flag. Already the symptoms of POPULAR RESISTANCE were to be seen; the peasantry even of the unwarlike Italian peninsula had repeatedly and spontaneously flown to arms; the patriotic efforts of Austria had recalled the glorious days of Maria Theresa, and the heroic sacrifices of the Forest Cantons had emulated the virtues, if not the triumphs, of Sempach and Morgarten. Unmarked as it was amidst the blaze of military glory, the sacred flame was beginning to spread which was destined to set free mankind; banished from the court and the castle, the stern resolution to resist was gathering strength among the cottages of the poor. It is in such reflections that the philosophic mind best derives consolation for the many evils arising from the ambition of the rulers, and the wickedness of the agitators of mankind; and by observing how uniformly, when oppression becomes intolerable, an under current begins to flow, destined ultimately to correct it, that the surest foundation is laid for confidence in the final arrangements of Supreme Wisdom, amidst the misfortunes or the vices of the world.

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## CHAPTER XXXIII.

## FROM THE PEACE OF LUNEVILLE TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE NORTHERN MARITIME CONFEDERACY.

NOVEMBER 1799—MAY, 1801.

## ARGUMENT.

Origin of the difference between the laws of war at sea and land—Early usages of war on both elements—Gradual change at land—Original customs still kept up at sea—Common maritime law of Europe as to neutral vessels—Principles of that law—It was universal in Europe prior to 1780—But these rights were sometimes abated by special treaty—Origin of resistance to them—Armed neutrality—Subsequently abandoned by the Northern Powers in their own case—Treaties with Russia, Sweden, and America since 1780, recognising this right to England—But neutrals suffered severely in the close of the war—Excessive violence of the Directory against America—Napoléon terminates the differences of France with that power—Maritime treaty between France and America—Revival of the principles of the armed neutrality—Lord Whitworth is sent to Copenhagen—And enters into an accommodation—Growing irritation of the Emperor Paul at the Allies—Politick conduct of Napoléon—Difference about Malta—Violent Proceedings of Paul against England—He is joined by Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia—His warm advances to Napoléon—General maritime confederacy signed on 16th December—Its threatening consequences to England—Measures of retaliation by Mr. Pitt—Diplomatic debate with the neutral powers—Hanover is invaded by Prussia—Meeting of Parliament—Perilous situation of England—Debates on the neutral question—Mr. Pitt resigns in consequence of the Catholic claims—But this was only the ostensible ground—Vigorous measures of his successors for the prosecution of the war—Prosperous state of Great Britain at this period—Its income, expenditure, exports and imports—Naval forces of the confederacy—Energetic measures of the British Government—Nelson appointed second in command of the fleet destined for the Baltic—British fleet sails from the Downs—And approaches the Sound—Splendid appearance of that strait—Undaunted spirit of the Danes—Passage of the English fleet—Preparations of the Danes—Nelson's plan of attack—Great difficulty experienced by the pilots in conducting the fleet to the enemy—Battle of Copenhagen—Heroic deeds on both sides—Nelson's proposal for an armistice—Melancholy appearance of the Danes after the battle—Armistice agreed on for fourteen weeks—Hanover overrun by Prussia—Designs of Paul and Napoléon against British India—Death of the Emperor Paul—Causes of that catastrophe—General irritation at the Czar—Symptoms of insanity in his conduct—Conspiracy among the nobles for his dethronement—Particulars of his assassination—Accession of Alexander—Immediate approach to an accommodation with England—His character and early pacific and popular measures—Nelson sails for Cronstadt—His conciliatory steps there—Peace with Russia, and abandonment of the principles of the armed neutrality—Napoléon's indignation at it—Dissolution of the naval confederacy—Reflections on these events.

Origin of the difference of the laws of war at sea and land. **THERE** arises, from the very nature of the elements on which they are respectively exercised, an essential difference between the laws of war at sea and at land. Territorial conquests are attended by immediate and important advantages to the victorious power; it gains possession of a fruitful country, of opulent cities, of spacious harbours, and costly fortresses; it steps at once into the authority of the ruling government over the subject state, and all its resources in money, provisions, men, and implements of war are at its command. But the victor at sea finds himself in a very different situation. The most decisive sea-fights draw after them no acquisition of inhabitants, wealth, or resources; the ocean is unproductive alike of taxes or tribute, and among the solitary recesses of the deep you will search in vain for the populous cities or fertile fields which reward the valour

of terrestrial ambition. The more a power extends itself at land, the more formidable does it become, because it unites to its own the forces of the vanquished state; the more it extends itself at sea, the more is it weakened, because the surface which it must protect is augmented, without any proportional addition to the means by which its empire is to be maintained.

In the infancy of mankind the usages of war are the same on both elements. Alike at sea as on shore the persons and property of the vanquished are at the disposal of the conquerors; and from the sack of cities and the sale of captives the vast sums are obtained which constitute the object and the

Early  
usages of  
war on both  
elements.

reward of such inhuman hostility. The liberty for which the Greeks and Romans contended was not mere national independence or civil privileges, but liberation from domestic or predal servitude, from the degradation of helots, or the lash of patricians. Such is to this day the custom in all the uncivilized portions of the globe, in Asia, Africa, and among the savages of America, and such, till comparatively recent times, was the practice even among the Christian monarchies and chivalrous nobility of modern Europe. But with the growth of opulence, and the extension of more humane ideas, these rigid usages have been universally softened among the European nations. As agriculture and commerce improved, it was found to be as impossible as it was inhuman to carry off all the property of the vanquished people, the growth, perhaps, of centuries of industry. The revenue and public possessions of the state furnished an ample fund to reward the conquering power, while the regular pay and fixed maintenance at the public expense of the soldiers took away the pretext for private pillage as a measure of necessity. All nations, subject in their turn to the vicissitudes of fortune, found it for their interest to adopt this lenient system, which so

Gradual  
change at  
land.

materially diminished the horrors of war; and hence the practice became general, excepting in the storming of towns, and other extreme cases, where the vehemence of passion bid defiance to the restraints of discipline, to respect private property in the course of hostilities, and look for remuneration only to the public revenue, or property of the state. It is the disgrace of the leaders of the French Revolution, amidst all their declamation in favour of humanity, to have departed from these beneficent usages, and, under the specious names of contributions, and of making war support war, to have restored at the opening of the nineteenth the rapacious oppression of the ninth century.

Original  
usages still  
kept up at  
sea.

Humanity would have just reason to rejoice, if it were practicable to establish a similar system of restrained hostility at sea; if the principle of confining the right of capture to public property could be introduced on the one element as well as the other, and the private merchant were in safety to navigate the deep amidst hostile fleets in the same manner as the carrier at land securely traverses opposing armies. But it has never been found practicable to introduce such a limitation, nor has it ever been attempted, even by the most civilized nations, as a restraint upon their own hostilities, however loudly they may sometimes have demanded it as a bridle upon those of their enemies. And when the utter sterility of the ocean, except as forming a highway for the intercourse of mankind, is considered, it does not appear probable, that until the human heart is essentially changed, such an alteration, how desirable soever by the weaker states, ever will be adopted. It may become general when ambition and national rivalry cease to sway the human heart, but not till then. Certain it is, that of all nations upon earth, revolutionary France had the least title to contend for such a change; she having not only introduced new usages of

unprecedented rigour in modern times, at least in her warfare at land, but issued and acted upon edicts for her maritime hostility on principles worthy only of Turkish barbarity (1).

Common  
maritime  
law of Eu-  
rope as to  
neutral  
vessels.

But it is not merely with the subjects of nations in a state of hostility that belligerents are brought in contact during modern warfare; they find themselves continually in collision also with

NEUTRAL VESSELS trading with their enemies, and endeavouring,

from the prospect of high profits, to furnish them with those articles which they are prevented from receiving directly from the trade of their own subjects. Here new and important interests arise, and some limitation of the rigour of maritime usage evidently becomes indispensable. If the superior power at sea can at pleasure declare any enemy's territory in a state of blockade, and make prize of all neutral vessels navigating to any of its harbours, it will not only speedily find itself involved in hostilities with all maritime states, but engaged in a species of warfare from which itself at some future period may derive essential injury. On the other hand, it is equally impossible to maintain that the vessels of other states are to be entirely exempted from restraint in such cases; or that a belligerent power, whose warlike operations are dependent perhaps upon intercepting the supplies in progress towards its antagonist, is patiently to see all its enterprises defeated, merely because they are conveyed under the cover of a neutral flag instead of its enemy's bottoms. Such a pretension would render maritime success of no avail, and wars interminable, by enabling the weaker power, under fictitious cover, securely to repair all its losses. These considerations are so obvious, and are brought so frequently into collision in maritime warfare, that they early introduced a system of international law, which for centuries has been recognised in all the states of Europe, and is summed up in the following propositions by the greatest masters of that important branch of jurisprudence that ever appeared in this or any other country.

Principles  
of that law.

1. That it is not lawful for neutral nations to carry on, in time of war, for the advantage or on the behalf of one of the belligerent powers, those branches of their commerce from which they are excluded in time of peace.

2. That every belligerent power may capture the property of its enemies wherever it shall meet with it on the high seas, and may for that purpose detain and bring into port neutral vessels laden wholly or in part with any such property.

3. That under the description of contraband of war, which neutrals are prohibited from carrying to the belligerent powers, the law of nations, if not restrained by special treaty, includes all naval as well as military stores, and generally all articles serving principally to afford to one belligerent power the instrument and means of annoyance to be used against the other.

4. That it is lawful for naval powers, when engaged in war, to blockade the ports of their enemies by cruising squadrons *bona fide* allotted to that service, and duly competent to its execution. That such blockade is valid and legitimate, although there be no design to attack or reduce by force the port, fort, or arsenal to which it is applied; and that the fact of the blockade,

(1) The decree of the Directory, 18th January, 1798, declares, that all vessels found on the high seas with any English goods whatever on board, to whomsoever belonging, shall be good prize; that neutral sailors found on board English vessels shall be put to death, and that the harbours of France shall be

shut against all vessels which had touched at an English harbour; and it requires certificates of origin, under the hands of French consuls, exactly as the Berlin and Milan decrees afterwards did.—*ROBINSON'S Admiralty Reports*, i. 341.

with due notice given thereof to neutral powers, shall affect not only vessels actually intercepted in the attempt to enter the blockaded port, but those also which shall be elsewhere met with, and shall be found to have been destined to such port, under the circumstances of the fact and notice of the blockade.

5. That the right of visiting and searching neutral vessels is a necessary consequence of these principles; and that, by the law of nations (when unrestrained by particular treaty), this right is not in any manner affected by the presence of a neutral ship of war, having under its convoy merchant ships, either of its own nation or of any other country (1).

In these propositions are contained the general principles of the maritime code of the whole European nations, as it has been exercised by all states towards each other, and laid down by all authorities on the subject from the dawn of civilisation. The special application of these principles to the question immediately at issue between the contending powers in 1801 is contained in the following propositions, laid down as incontestable law by that great master of maritime and international law, Sir William Scott:—

Sir William Scott's exposition of the maritime law. 1. "That the right of visiting and searching merchant ships upon the high seas, whatever be the ships, whatever be the cargo, whatever be the destinations, is an incontestable right of the lawfully commissioned cruisers of a belligerent nation (2).

2. "That the authority of the sovereign of the neutral country being interposed in any matter of mere force cannot legally vary the rights of a legally commissioned belligerent cruiser, or deprive him of his right to search at common law (3).

3. "That the penalty for the violent contravention of this right, is the confiscation of the property so withheld from visitation and search (4).

4. "That nothing farther is necessary to constitute blockade, than that there should be a force stationed to prevent communication, and a due notice or prohibition given to the party (5).

5. "That articles tending probably to aid the hostilities of one of the belligerents, as arms, ammunition, stores, and, in some cases, provisions, are contraband of war, and as such liable to seizure by the vessels of the other party, with the vessel in which they are conveyed (6).

(1) Lord Grenville's speech, 13th Nov. 1801, on the convention with Russia. *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 211, 212.

(2) "This right of search," says Sir William Scott, "is clear in practice, which is uniform and universal upon the subject. The many European treaties which refer to this right refer to it as pre-existing, and merely regulate the exercise of it. All writers upon the law of nations unanimously acknowledge it, without the exception even of Hubner himself, the great champion of neutral privileges. In short, no man, in the least conversant in subjects of this kind, has ever, that I know of, breathed a doubt upon it."—Robinson's *Admiralty Reports*, i. 60.—*The Maria*.

(3) Two sovereigns may agree, as in some instances they have agreed by special covenant, that the presence of one of their armed ships along with their merchant ships, is to be held as a sufficient guarantee that nothing is to be found in that convoy of merchant ships inconsistent with amity or neutrality; but no sovereign can, by the common law of nations, legally compel the acceptance of such a security by mere force, or compel the belligerent to forego the only security known in the law of nations upon this subject, independent of special covenant, the right of personal visitation.

(4) Sir William Scott in the *Maria*. Robinson's *Admiralty Reports*, i. 359, 363.

(5) *Ibid.* i. 86.

(6) The *Jonge Margaritta*, *Ibid.* i. 190, 191.

The judgments of Sir William Scott are here referred to with perfect confidence, as explaining not merely the English understanding of the maritime law, but that which for centuries has been recognised and admitted by all the European states. "In forming my judgments," says that great authority, "I trust it has not for one moment escaped my anxious recollection that the duty of my station calls me to consider myself not as stationed here to deliver occasional and shifting opinions to serve present purposes of particular national interest, but to administer with indifference that justice which the law of nations holds out, *without distinction*, to independent states—some happening to be neutral and some belligerent. The seat of judicial authority is indeed locally here in the belligerent country, according to the known law and practice of nations; but the law itself has no locality. It is the duty of the person who sits here to determine the question exactly as he would determine it if sitting at Stockholm; *to assert no pretension on the part of Great Britain, which he would not allow to Sweden in the same circumstances*, and to impose no duties on



This law  
universal  
in Europe  
prior to  
1780.

These rights had never formed any peculiar or exclusive privilege, which the English claimed alone of all other nations. On the contrary, under the equitable modifications introduced by the common maritime law, they had, from the dawn of European civilisation, been universally acknowledged and maintained equally by the courts and the lawyers of Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, and England (1). Authors there were indeed who contended in their studies for a different principle, and strenuously asserted that the flag should cover the merchandise; but these innovations never received any sanction from the maritime law or practice of Europe, or the practice, independent of express treaty, of belligerent states; and, accordingly, various treaties were entered into among different powers, restraining or limiting the right of search between their respective subjects (2), precisely because they knew that but for that special stipulation the common maritime law would admit it. So strongly was this felt by the English lawyers, who, in the House of Commons, espoused the cause of the neutral powers previous to the maritime confederacy in 1800, that they admitted the right of Great Britain to search neutral ships for the goods of an enemy, and that the northern confederacy contended for a principle which militated against the established law of nations, as laid down with universal assent by that great master of the maritime law, Lord Mansfield; and maintained merely that it would be prudent to abate somewhat of former pretensions in the present disastrous crisis of public affairs (3).

Sweden as a neutral country, which he would not admit to belong to Great Britain in the same character." [Robinson's Reports, i. 350.] And of the impartiality with which this great duty at this period was exercised by this distinguished judge, we have the best evidence in the testimony of another eminent statesman, the warm advocate of neutral rights, and certainly no conceder of undeserved praise to his political opponents. "Nothing," says Lord Chancellor Brougham, "can be more instructive than the decisions of our prize courts on this point (the right of search), and nothing can give us more gratifying views of the purity with which those tribunals administer the law of nations, and their impartiality in trying the delicate questions which come before them, between their own sovereign or their own countrymen, and the rulers or the people of other states. It is with pleasure, therefore, that we have to consider how anxiously and rigorously at this period (1799-1800) the principles for which we are contending have been enforced in the High Court of Admiralty under the presidency of Sir William Scott."—*Edin. Review*, vol. xix. 298, 299.

(1) Sir William Scott. Robinson, i. 360. Lord Eldon. *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 886.

(2) Per Sir W. Grant. *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 922.

(3) See Sir William Grant, *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 922; and Dr. Lawrence, 919, 920.

The hardihood with which it is constantly asserted by the foreign diplomatists and historians, that the principles of maritime law for which England contends, are a usurpation on her part, founded on mere power, and unsanctioned, either by the usage of other states, or the principles of maritime jurisprudence, renders it important to lay before the reader a few of the authorities of foreign legal writers on the subject.

Eineccius says "Idem statuendum arbitramus, si res hostiles, in navibus amicorum reperiantur. Illas capi posse nemo dubitat, quia hosti in res hostiles omnia licent, eatenus ut eas ubicunque repertas sibi possit vindicari."—*De Navibus* ob. vict. c. ii. sec. 9.

"I believe it cannot be doubted," says President

Jefferson, "that by the general law of nations, the goods of a friend found in the vessels of an enemy, are free; and the goods of an enemy found in the vessels of a friend are good prize."—*Jefferson's Letter to GENET*, 24th July, 1797.

"The ordinances of the old French marine, under the monarchy, direct that not only shall the enemy's property, found on board a neutral vessel, be confiscated, but the neutral ship itself be declared lawful prize." The practice of England has always been to release all neutral property found on board an enemy's ship; but France always considered it as lawful prize.—*Ordonnance de Marine*. Art. 7. *Valin*. 284.

"Les choses qui sont d'un usage particulier pour la guerre, et dont on empêche le transport chez un ennemi, s'appellent marchandises de contrebande. Telles sont les armes, les munitions de guerres, les bois, et tout ce qui sert à la construction et à l'armement des vaisseaux de guerre."—*Vattel*, c. 7, sect. 112.

In their letter to M. Pinckney, January 16, 1797, the American Government expressly declare that, "by the law of nations, timber and other naval stores are contraband of war."—See *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 213, note.

"On ne peut empêcher le transport des effets de contrebande. Si l'on ne visite pas les vaisseaux neutres que l'on rencontre en mer, on est donc en droit de les visiter."—*Vattel*, c. 3, sec. 114.

"Tout vaisseau qui refusera d'amener ses voiles après la sommation qui lui en aura été faite par nos vaisseaux ou ceux de nos sujets, armés en guerre, pourra y être contraint par artillerie ou autrement, et en cas de résistance et de combat, il sera de bonne prise."—*Ordonnance de la Marine de France*.—Tit. Procès, Art. 12. The Spanish ordinance of 1718, has an article to the same effect.

"Other nations," says Heeren, "advanced similar claims in maritime affairs to the English; but as they had not the same naval power to support them, this was of little consequence."—*European States System*, ii. 41.

The claims of neutrals for the security of their commerce are stated by Bynkershoek, as limited to

From motives of policy, indeed, England had repeatedly waived or abated this right of search in favour of particular states by special agreement. This Dec. 11, 1674. was done towards Holland in 1674, to detach that power from France, and in the belief that the United States would never be neutral when England was at war; and to France, by the commercial treaty of 1787, under

But these  
rights were  
sometimes  
abated by  
special  
treaty.

the influence of the same idea that she would never be neutral when Great Britain was in a state of hostility. But in the absence of such express stipulation, these rights were invariably exercised both by England towards other nations, and other nations towards England; particularly by Lord Chatham during the whole course of the seven years, and the ministers of Anne during the long war of the succession, without any complaint whatever from neutral states (1). And of the disposition of England to submit in her turn to the maritime law which she requires from others, no better instance can be desired than occurred during the Duke of Wellington's administration, when the English Government declined to interfere in the capture of a British merchantman trying to elude the blockade of Terceira, though a few English frigates would have sent the whole Portuguese navy to the bottom.

Origin of  
resistance  
to these  
rights.

The obvious disadvantage, however, to which such a maritime code must occasionally expose neutral states, by sometimes depriving them of a trade at the very time when it is likely to be most lucrative; and the natural jealousy at the exercise of so invidious a right as that of search, especially when put in force by the stronger against the weaker power, had long led to complaints against belligerent states. In 1740, the King of Prussia disputed the right of England to search neutral vessels, though without following up his protest with actual resistance; and in 1762 the Dutch contended, that it could not be admitted by their vessels when sailing under convoy. But nothing serious was done to support these novel pretensions till the year 1780, when the Northern Powers, seeing England hard pressed by

Armed  
Neutrality.

the fleets of France and Spain at the close of the American war, deemed the opportunity favourable to establish by force of arms a new code of maritime laws; and, accordingly, entered into the famous confederacy, known by the name of the ARMED NEUTRALITY, which was the first open declaration of war by neutral powers against Great Britain and the old system of maritime rights. By this treaty, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark proclaimed the principles, that free ships make free goods, that the flag covers the merchandise, and that a blockaded port is to be understood only when such a force is stationed at its entrance as renders it dangerous to enter (2).

this, that they may continue to trade in war as they did in peace. But this claim, he adds, is limited by the rights of a belligerent. "*Quaeritur quid facere aut non facere possunt inter duos hostes; omnia forte inquires quæ potuerant ansi pax esset inter eos, quos inter nunc est bellum.*"—*Bynkershock, Quaest. Juris. Pub. i. 9.*

These principles were fully recognised in various treaties between England and other maritime states. In article 12 of the treaty, 1661, between Sweden and England, it was provided, "But lest such freedom of navigation and passage of the one confederate should be of detriment to the other while engaged in war, by sea or land, with other nations, and lest the goods or merchandises of the enemy should be concealed under the name of a friend and ally, for the avoiding all suspicion and fraud of such sort, it is agreed, that all ships, carriages, wares, and men, belonging to either of the confederates, shall be furnished in their voyages with certificates, specifying

ing the names of the ships, carriages, goods, and masters of the vessels, together with such other descriptions as are expressed in the following form, etc., and if the goods of an enemy are found on such ship of the confederate, that part only which belongs to the enemy shall be made prize, and what belongs to the confederate shall be immediately restored." There is a similar clause in article 20 of the treaty between England and Denmark in 1700. See *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 226.

(1) Per Sir W. Grant. *Parl. Hist.* xxv. 922.

(2) *Ann. Reg.* 1780, 205. 348.

The words of the proclamation are. 1. That all neutral ships may freely navigate from port to port, and on the coasts of nations at war. 2. That the effects belonging to the subjects of the said warring powers shall be free in all neutral vessels, except contraband merchandise. 3. That the articles are to be deemed contraband which are mentioned in the 10th and 11th articles of her treaty of com-

So undisguised an attack upon the ancient code of European law, which England had so decided an interest to maintain, because its abandonment placed the defeated in as advantageous circumstances as the victorious power, in fact amounted to a declaration of war against Great Britain; but her Cabinet were compelled to dissemble their resentment at that time, in consequence of the disastrous state of public affairs at the close of the American contest. They contented themselves, therefore, with protesting against these novel doctrines at the northern capitals, and had influence enough at the court of the Hague, soon after (1), to procure their abandonment by the United States.

The Baltic Powers, however, during the continuance of the American war, adhered to the principles of the armed neutrality, although no allusion was made to it in the peace which followed; but they soon found that it introduced principles so much at variance with the practice of European warfare, that they were immediately obliged, when they in their turn became belligerents, to revert to the old

system. In particular, when Sweden went to war with Russia in 1787, she totally abandoned the principles of the armed neutrality, and acted invariably upon the old maritime code. Russia, in the same year, reverted to the old principles, in her war with the Turks, and in 1793 entered into a maritime treaty with Great Britain, in which she expressly gave up the principles of the year 1780, and engaged to use her efforts to prevent neutral powers from protecting the commerce of France on the high seas, or in the harbours of that country. Both Denmark and Sweden were bound, by the treaties of 1661 and 1670, with England, to admit the right of search, and give up the pretension to carry enemy's property; and by a convention entered into between these two powers in 1794, which was communicated by them to the British Government, they bound themselves "to claim no advantage, which is not clearly and unexceptionably founded on their respective treaties with the powers at war, and not to claim, in cases not specified in their treaties, any advantage which is not founded on the universal law of nations, hitherto acknowledged and respected by all the powers and all the sovereigns of Europe, and from which they can as little suppose that any of them will depart, as they are incapable of departing from it themselves (2)." Farther, both Russia (3) and Denmark had issued

Subsequently abandoned by the Northern Powers in their own case.

Treaties with Russia, Sweden, and America, recognising this right to England.

merce with Great Britain. 4. That to determine what is meant by a blockaded port, this only is to be understood of one, which is so well kept in by the ships of the power which attacks it, and which keep their places, that it is dangerous to enter into it. See *Declaration of Russia*, 23d April 1780. *Ann. Reg.* xxxv. 348. *State Papers*. It is worthy of observation, as Sir William Scott observes, that even in this manifesto no denial of the right of search is to be found, at least to the effect of determining whether or not the neutral has contraband articles on board.—See *Robinson's Reports*, i. 360.—*The Maria*.

(1) *Ibid.* 206, 207.

(2) Convention, 27th March, 1794. *Ann. Reg.* 1794, 238.

(3) In 1793, the Empress of Russia herself proposed and concluded a treaty with Great Britain in which she expressly engaged to unite with his Britannic Majesty "all her efforts to prevent other powers not implicated in this war from giving any protection whatever, directly or indirectly, in consequence of their neutrality, to the commerce and property of the French on the sea, or in the ports of France;" and, in execution of this treaty, she sent a fleet into the Baltic and North seas, with express orders "to seize and capture all the ships

bearing the pretended French flag, or any other flags which they may dare to hoist; and to stop also and to compel all neutral vessels bound to or freighted for France, according as they shall deem it most expedient either to sail back or enter some neutral harbour."—*Note*, 30th July, 1793, by the Russian Ambassador to the High Chancellor of Sweden, *Ann. Reg.* 1793. p. 175. *State Papers*. A similar note was presented to the Court of Denmark at the same date, and both Denmark and Sweden, in their treaty with each other, on July 6, 1794, Prussia in her treaty with America in 1797, Russia in her war with the Turks in 1787, and Sweden in her war with Russia in 1789, promulgated and acted upon these principles, diametrically opposite to the doctrines of the armed neutrality. [*Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 203.] With such ardour was this system acted upon by the Emperor Paul, that he threatened the Danes with immediate hostilities in 1799, on account "of their supplying assistance and protection to the trade of France, under the neutral colours of the Danish flag;" and he was only prevented from carrying these threats into immediate execution by the amicable interference of Great Britain: A seasonable interposition, which Denmark repeatedly acknowledged with becoming gratitude.—*Ann. Reg.* 1800, p. 91. In the following year the same

edicts, at the commencement of the war, in which they prohibited their subjects from taking on board contraband articles (1); while America, in the same year, had entered into a maritime treaty with England, in which the right of search was expressly admitted (2). Both by the common maritime law, and by the force of recent and subsisting treaties, therefore the right of search, claimed by Great Britain, was founded on an unquestionable basis.

But neu-  
trals suffer-  
ed severely  
in the close  
of the war.

But this pacific state of matters was totally altered by the result of the maritime war, and especially the decisive battle of the Nile. These great events, by entirely sweeping the French flag from the ocean, left them dependent on other powers for the supplies necessary for their navy; and the Republican Government saw the necessity of relaxing the rigour of their former proceedings against neutrals, in order, through their intervention, to acquire the means of restoring their marine. The intemperate conduct of the Directory, and the arbitrary doctrines which they enforced in regard to neutrals, had all but involved the Republic in open hostilities with America, Denmark, and Sweden; and on the accession of the first consul, he found an embargo laid on all the ships of these powers in the French harbours (3). The *arrêts* of the Directory of 18th January, and 29th October, 1798, were, to the last degree, injurious to neutral commerce, for they deemed every vessel good prize which had on board any quantity, however small, of British merchandise; and in virtue of that law, numbers of American vessels were seized and condemned in the French harbours. Adding insult to injury, the Directory, in the midst of these piratical proceedings, gravely proposed to the Americans that they should lend them 48,000,000 francs; insinuating at the same time, that the loan should be accompanied with the sum of 1,200,000 francs (L.48,000), to be divided between Barras and Talleyrand. These extravagances so irritated the Americans, that, by an act of the Legislature, they declared the United States “liberated from the stipulations in the treaty 1778 with France, and authorized the president to arm vessels of war to defend their commerce against the French cruisers;” grounding these extreme measures upon the narrative that the French had confiscated the cargoes of great numbers of American vessels having enemy’s property on board, while it was expressly stipulated, by the treaty 1778, that the flag should cover the cargo; had equipped privateers in the ports of the Union contrary to the rights of neutrality, and treated American seamen found on board enemy’s ships, as pirates. This led, in its turn, to an embargo in the French harbour, on all American vessels (4), and nothing but the Atlantic which rolled between

July 7, 1798.  
Excessive  
violence of  
the Direc-  
tory against  
America.

system was farther acted on. In 1794 the Empress notified to the Swedish Court, that “the Empress of Russia has thought proper to fit out a fleet of twenty-five sail of the line, with frigates proportional, to cruise in the North Seas, for the purpose (in conjunction with the English maritime forces) of preventing the sending of any provisions or ammunition to France; the Empress therefore requests the King of Sweden not to permit his ships of war to take any Swedish merchantmen laden with any such commodities under their convoy. Her Imperial Majesty farther orders all merchant ships which her squadron may meet in those seas to be searched, to see if their cargoes consist of any such goods.” A similar declaration was made by the Court of Russia to that of Denmark. both dated August 6, 1794.—*Ann. Reg. 1794, p. 241, State Papers.*

(1) We, Christian VII, King of Denmark, order, that “should any vessel bound to a neutral harbour take in such goods or merchandise as, if they were consigned to any harbour of the belligerent powers,

would be contraband, and as such stipulated in the treaties between those powers and us, and mentioned in our orders and proclamations of 22d and 25th February, 1793, besides the oath of the master and freighter of the ships, there shall be made a special declaration conformable to the invoice and bill of lading,” to shew the destination of the said ship.—*Ibid, p. 240—241.*

(2) “In the event of vessels being captured, or detained on suspicion of having enemy’s property on board, such property alone is to be taken out, and the vessels are to be permitted to proceed to sea with the remainder of their cargo.”—Art. 17. *Treaty between Great Britain and America, 19th May, 1795.*—Art. 18, specifies what articles are to be deemed contraband.—*Ann. Reg. 1795, p. 296—297, State Papers.*

(3) Bignon’s Hist. de France, i. 260.

(4) Nap. i. 109, ii. 110, 111. iii. 112. Nig. i. 275, 276.

them, and the British cruisers which prevented them reaching each other, prevented these two democratic states from engaging in fierce hostility with each other.

But this state of mutual hostility was soon terminated after the accession of the first consul to the helm. He at once perceived the extreme impolicy of irritating, by additional acts of spoliation, a power recently at war with Great Britain, and still labouring under a strong feeling of hostility towards that state; the firm ally in better times of France, and one of the most important in the maritime league which he already contemplated

Feb. 9, 1800. against the English naval power. He received therefore with distinguished honour the American envoys who were despatched from New York, in the end of 1799, to make a last effort to adjust the difference between the two countries; and published a warm eulogium on the great Washington, when intelligence arrived in France, early in the spring following, of the death of that spotless patriot. At the same time the embargo on American

Napoleon terminates the differences of France with America. vessels was taken off in the French harbours, and every possible facility given to the commencement of negotiations between the two powers. Prospective arrangements were readily agreed on, both parties having an equal interest to establish the new maritime

code of the armed neutrality; but it was not found so easy a matter to adjust the injuries that were past, or reconcile the consular Government to those indemnities which the Americans so loudly demanded for the acts of piracy long exercised upon their commerce. At length it was agreed to leave these difficult points to ulterior arrangement in a separate convention, and conclude a treaty for the regulation of neutral rights in future times. By this

Sept. 30, 1800. Maritime treaty with America. treaty, signed at Morfontaine on the 30th September, 1800, the new code was fully established. It was stipulated, 1st, That the flag should cover the merchandise. 2d, That contraband of war should

be understood only of warlike stores, cannon, muskets, and other arms. 3d, That the right of search to ascertain the flag and examine whether there were any contraband articles on board should be carried into effect, out of cannon-shot of the visiting vessel, by a boat containing two or three men only; that every neutral ship should have on board a certificate, setting forth to what country it belonged, and that that certificate should be held as good evidence of its contents; that if contraband articles were found on board they only should be confiscated, and not the ship or remainder of the cargo; that no vessels under convoy should be subject to search, but the declaration of the commander of the convoy be received instead; that those harbours only should be understood to be blockaded where a sufficient force was stationed at their mouth to render it evidently dangerous to attempt to enter; and that enemy's property on board neutral vessels should be covered by their flag, in the same manner as neutral goods found on board enemy's vessels. So far the French influence prevailed in this convention; but they failed in their attempt to get the Americans openly to renounce the treaty concluded in 1794 with Great Britain, which could not have been done without at once embroiling them with the British Cabinet (1). A similar convention had previously been entered into on the same principles between the United States and the Prussian Government (2).

Circumstances at this period were singularly favourable to the revival of the principles of the armed neutrality. A recurrence of the same political

(1) Treaty Articles 18, 19. Ann. Reg. 1800, 288, 289. Nap. II. 122, 123. Big. I. 277, 278. Dum. vi. 96.

(2) On July 11, 1799, See State Papers, Ann. Reg. 1800, 294, 295. Articles 13, 14, 15.



**Revival of the principles of the armed neutrality.** relations had restored both the grievances and the ambition which, at the close of the American war, had led to that formidable confederacy. Neutral vessels, endeavouring to slide into the lucrative trade which the destruction of the French marine opened up with that country, found themselves perpetually exposed to inquisition from the British cruisers; and numerous condemnations had taken place in the English courts, which, though perfectly agreeable to the law of nations and existing treaties, were naturally felt as exceedingly hard by the sufferers under them, and renewed the ancient and inextinguishable jealousy of their respective governments at the British naval power. In December, 1799, an altercation took place in the straits of Gibraltar between some English frigates and a Danish ship, the *Hausenan*, in which the Dane refused to submit to a search of the convoy under his command; but the conduct of the captain in this instance was formally disavowed by his government, and the amicable relations of the two countries continued unchanged. But the next collision of the same kind which took place occasioned more serious consequences. On 25th July, 1800, the commander of the Danish frigate, *Freya*, refused to allow his convoy to be searched, but, agreeably to the recent stipulations in the treaties between France and America, offered to show his certificates to the British officer; intimating, at the same time, that if a boat was sent to make a search it would be fired upon. The British captain upon this laid his vessel alongside the Dane, and resistance being still persisted in, gave her a broadside, and, after a short action, brought her into the Downs (1).

**Lord Whitworth is sent to Copenhagen Aug. 23. 1800.** The English Cabinet at this time had received intelligence of the hostile negotiations which were going on in the northern courts relative to neutral rights, and deeming it probable that this event would be made the signal for openly declaring their intentions, they wisely resolved to anticipate an attack. For this purpose, Lord Whitworth was sent on a special message to Copenhagen; and to give the greater weight to his representations, a squadron of nine sail of the line, four bombs, and five frigates, was despatched to the Sound, under the command of Admiral Dickson. They found four Danish line-of-battle ships moored across that strait, from Cronberg castle to the Swedish shore; but the English fleet passed without any hostilities being committed on either side, and cast anchor off the harbour of Copenhagen. The Danes were busily employed in strengthening their fortifications; batteries were erected on advantageous situations near the coast, and three floating bulwarks moored across the mouth of the harbour; but their preparations were not yet complete, and the strength of the British squadron precluded the hope of successful resistance. An accommodation was therefore entered into, the principal conditions of which were, "that the frigate and convoy carried into the Downs should be repaired at the expense of the British Government; the question as to the right of search was to be adjourned for farther consideration to London. Until this point was settled, the Danish ships were to sail with convoy only in the Mediterranean, for the purpose of protection from the Barbary cruisers, and in the mean time their other vessels were to be liable to be searched as heretofore (2)."

**And enters into an accommodation. Aug. 29.**

Situated as Great Britain was, this treaty was a real triumph to her arms, and reflected no small credit on the vigour and ability of the Government by which this delicate matter had been brought to so favourable a conclusion.

(1) Ann. Reg. 1800, 94, 95. Nap. ii. 117, 118. Bign. i. 292. Hard. vii. 444, 445.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1800, 93, 97. Nap. ii. 117, 118. Bign. i. 292.

It might have been adjusted without any further effusion of blood, had it not been for a train of circumstances which, about the same time, alienated the vehement and capricious Emperor of Russia from the British alliance. The northern autocrat had been exceedingly irritated at the ill success of the combined operations both in Switzerland and Holland; the first of which he ascribed to the ill conduct of the German, the latter of the British auxiliaries. This feeling was increased by the impolitic refusal of the British Government to include Russian prisoners with English in the exchange with French; a proposal which, considering that they had fought side by side in the Dutch campaign, in which English interests were mainly involved, it was perhaps imprudent to have declined, although the dubious conduct of Paul, in having withdrawn his troops from the German alliance, and broken with Austria, gave him no title to demand such an act of generosity. Napoléon, as already observed, instantly and adroitly availed himself of this circumstance to appease the Czar. He professed the utmost indignation that the gallant Russians should remain in captivity from the refusal of the British Government to agree to their liberation for French prisoners; set them at liberty without exchange, and not only sent them back to their own country, but restored to them the arms and standards which they had lost, and clothed them anew from head to foot in the uniform of their respective regiments. These courteous proceedings produced the greatest impression on the Czar, the more so as they were contrasted with the imprudent refusal of the English Government to include them in their exchange; they led to an interchange of good offices between the two courts, which was soon ripened into an alliance of the strictest kind, in consequence of the impetuous character of the Emperor, and the unbounded admiration which he had conceived for the first consul (1).

Growing irritation of the Emperor Paul at the Allies.  
Political conduct of Napoléon.  
 Another circumstance at the same time occurred, which contributed not a little to widen the breach between the Cabinets of St.-Petersburg and London. Disengaged from his war with France, and ardently desirous of warlike renown, the Emperor had revived the idea of the armed neutrality of 1780, and made proposals, in May and June, 1800, to the Cabinets of Stockholm and Copenhagen to that effect, which had produced the sudden change in the Danish instructions to their armed vessels to resist the search of the British cruisers. The island of Malta, it was foreseen, would soon surrender to the British squadron, and it was easy to anticipate that the English Cabinet would not readily part with that important fortress; while the Emperor conceived that, as Grand Master of the order of St.-John of Jerusalem, to which it had formerly belonged, he was bound to stipulate its restoration to that celebrated order (2).

Aug. 28, 1800. Violent proceedings of Paul against England. Nov. 5, 1800.  
 Matters were in this uncertain state at the court of St.-Petersburg, when the arrival of the British squadron in the Sound brought them to a crisis. The Czar, with that vehemence which formed the leading feature of his character, instantly ordered an embargo on all the British ships in the Russian harbours; and in consequence nearly three hundred vessels, most of them with valuable cargoes on board, were forcibly detained till the frost had set in, and the Baltic had become impassable. Nor was this all. Their crews were, with Asiatic barbarity, in defiance of all the usages of civilized states, marched off into prisons in the interior, many of them above a thousand miles from the coast; while the

(1) Bign. i. 287, 289. Journ. xiv. 234. Nap. ii. (2) Bign. i. 287, 290. Hard. vi. 446.

whole English property on shore was put under sequestration. Several British vessels at Narva weighed anchor and escaped the embargo; this so enraged the autocrat, that he ordered the remaining ships in the harbour to be burnt; and in the official gazette, published a declaration that the embargo

Nov. 21. should not be taken off till Malta was given up to Russia. This demand was rested on the allegation, that the restitution of that island to the

Malta sur-  
rendered to  
England  
on Sept.  
25, 1800. Order of Jerusalem was agreed upon in the convention, December, 1798, between Great Britain and Russia, whereas that treaty contained no such stipulation. These proceedings on the part of the

Emperor Paul were in a peculiar manner arbitrary and oppressive, not merely as contrary to the general practice of civilized states, which never authorizes such severity against the crews of merchant ships or goods on shore, but as directly in the face of an express article in the existing treaty, 1793, between Great Britain and Russia, in which it was stipulated that, "in the event of a rupture between the two powers, there should be no embargo laid on vessels in the harbours of either, but the merchants on both sides have a year to convey away or dispose of their effects (1).

He is joined  
by Sweden,  
Denmark,  
and Prussia. Nothing more than the support of Russia was necessary to make the northern powers, who derived such benefits from the lucrative neutral trade which had recently fallen into their hands, combine

for the purpose of enforcing a new maritime code, which might extend its advantages to the whole commerce of the belligerent states. The King of Sweden, young and high-spirited, entered, from the very first, warmly and readily into the views of the Emperor; but Denmark, which, during the long continuance of the war, had obtained a large share of the carrying trade, and whose capital lay exposed to the first strokes of the English navy, was more reserved in her movements. The arrogance with which an immediate accession to their views was urged upon the Court of Copenhagen by the Cabinets of St.-Petersburg and Stockholm, for some time defeated its own object, and Denmark even hesitated whether she should not throw herself into the arms of England, to resist the dictation of her imperious neighbours, and preserve the lucrative trade from which her subjects were deriving such immense advantages. But the Russians soon found means to assail her in the most vulnerable quarter. Prussia had lately become a considerable maritime power, and from the effect of the same interests, she had warmly embraced the views of the northern confederacy. Her influence with Denmark was paramount, for the most valuable continental possessions of that power lay exposed, without defence, to the Prussian troops. In the beginning of October,

Oct. 3. a Prussian vessel, the Triton, belonging to Emden, laden with naval stores, and bound for the Texel, was taken and carried into Cuxhaven, a port belonging to Hamburg, by a British cruiser. The Prussian Government eagerly took advantage of that circumstance to manifest their resolution; they marched a body of two thousand men into the neutral territory, and took possession of Cuxhaven; and although the senate of Hamburg purchased the vessel from the English captain and restored it to the owners, and Lord Carysfort, the British ambassador at Berlin, warmly protested against the occupation of the neutral territory after that restitution, the Prussian troops were not withdrawn. A month before, a more unjustifiable act had been committed by the British cruisers off Barcelona, who took possession of Sept. 4. a Swedish brig, and under its neutral colours sailed into the har-

(1) Big. i. 296, 297. Ann. Reg. 1801, 237, 99. State papers. Dum. vi. 127.

bour of that town, and captured by that means two frigates which the King of Spain had built for the Batavian republic (1).

His words  
advances to  
Napoleon.

Though every thing was thus conspiring to forward the views of France, and augment the jealousy of the maritime powers of Great Britain, the course of events by no means kept pace with the impatient disposition of the Czar. He suspected Prussia of insincerity, and openly charged Denmark with irresolution, because they did not embark headlong in the projects which he himself had so recently adopted. Impatient of delay, he wrote in person to the first consul in these terms:—"Citizen first consul—I do not write to you to open any discussion on the rights of men or of citizens; every country chooses what form of government it thinks fit. Wherever I see at the head of affairs a man who knows how to conquer and rule mankind, my heart warms towards him. I write to you to let you know the displeasure which I feel towards England, which violates the law of nations, and is never governed but by selfish considerations. I wish to unite with you to put bounds to the injustice of that government (2)." At the same time, with that candour and vehemence which distinguished his character, he published a declaration in the St.-Petersburg Gazette, in which he stated:—"Being disappointed in his expectations of the protection of commerce by the perfidious enterprises of a great power which had sought to enchain the liberty of the seas by capturing Danish convoys, the independence of the northern powers appeared to him to be openly menaced: he consequently considered it to be a measure of necessity to have recourse to an armed neutrality, the success of which was acknowledged in the time of the American war." And Oct. 29, 1800. shortly after he published a ukase, in which he directed, that all the English effects seized in his states, either by the sequestration of goods on land or the embargo on goods afloat, should be *sold*, and their produce divided among all Russians having claims on English subjects! Napoleon Nov. 17, 1800. was not slow in turning to the best account such an unlooked-for turn of fortune in his favour, and redoubled his efforts with the neutral Dec. 4, 1800. powers to induce them to join the maritime confederacy against Great Britain. To give the greater *éclat* to the union of France and Russia, an ambassador, Count Kalitchef, was despatched from St.-Petersburg to Paris, and received there with a degree of magnificence well calculated to captivate the Oriental ideas of the Scythian autocrat (3).

General  
maritime  
confederacy  
signed  
on Dec. 16,  
1800.

Pressed by Russia on the one side and France on the other, and sufficiently disposed already to regard with a jealous eye the maritime preponderance of Great Britain, the fears and irresolution of the northern powers at length gave way. On the 16th December a maritime confederacy was signed by Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, and on the 19th of the same month by Prussia as an acceding party. The principles of this league were in substance the same as those of the armed neutrality in 1780, with a slight variation in favour of belligerent powers. A minute specification was given of what should be deemed contraband articles, which included only arms of all sorts, with saddles and bridles, "all other articles not herein enumerated shall not be considered as war or naval stores, and shall not be subject to confiscation, but shall pass free and without restraint." It was stipulated, "that the effects which belong to the subjects of belligerent powers in neutral ships, with the exception of contraband goods, shall be free;" that no harbour shall be deemed blockaded unless the

(1) Dum. vi. 88. Bign. i. 296.

(2) Nap. ii. 129.

(3) Dum. vi. 121, 123. Ann. Reg. 1801, 98, and 1800, 260. State papers.

disposition and number of ships of the power by which it is invested shall be such as to render it apparently hazardous to enter; that the declaration of the captains of ships of war having convoy, that the convoy has no contraband goods, shall be deemed sufficient; that "the contracting parties, if disquieted or attacked for this convention, shall make common cause to defend each other," and that "these principles shall apply to every maritime war by which Europe may unhappily be disquieted (1)."

Its threat-  
ening con-  
sequences  
to England.

This convention was naturally regarded with the utmost jealousy by the British Government. Under cover of a regard for the rights of humanity and the principles of justice, it evidently went to introduce a system hitherto unheard of in naval warfare, eminently favourable to the weaker maritime power, and calculated to render naval success to any state of little avail, by enabling the vanquished party, under neutral colours, securely to repair all its losses. It was evident that, if this new code of maritime law were introduced, all the victories of the British navy would go for nothing; France, in neutral vessels, would securely regain her whole commerce; under neutral flags she would import all the materials for the construction of a navy, and in neutral ships safely exercise the seamen requisite to navigate them. At the close of a long and bloody war, waged for her very existence, and attended with unexampled naval success, England would see all the fruits of her exertions torn from her, and witness the restoration of her antagonist's maritime strength, by the intervention of the powers for whose behoof, as well as her own, she had taken up arms.

Measures  
of retalia-  
tion of Mr.  
Pitt.

England at this period was not, as at the close of the American war, obliged to dissemble her indignation at a proceeding which was evidently prejudicial to her national interests, and the first stroke levelled by continental jealousy at her national independence. The statesman who still held the helm was a man who disdained all temporary shifts or momentary expedients; who, fully appreciating the measure of national danger, boldly looked it in the face; who knew that from humiliation to subjugation in nations is but a step; and that the more perilous a struggle is, the more necessary is it to engage in it while yet the public resources are undiminished, and the popular spirit is not depressed by the appearances of vacillation on the part of government. On these prudent not less than resolute principles, Mr. Pitt was no sooner informed of the signature of the armed neutrality, than he took the most decisive steps for letting the northern powers feel the disposition of the nation they had thought fit to provoke. On the 14th January, 1801, the British Government issued an order for a general embargo on all vessels belonging to any of the confederated powers, Prussia alone excepted, of whose accession to the league intelligence had not as yet been received. Letters of marque were at the same time issued for the capture of the numerous vessels belonging to these states who were working to the Baltic; and with such vigour were these proceedings followed up, that nearly the one-half of the merchant-ships belonging to the northern powers at sea found their way into the British harbours (2).

These hostile proceedings led to a warm debate between the British ambassadors and those of the neutral powers, which was conducted with great ability on both sides. That between Lord Carysfort, the English ambassador at Berlin, and Count Haugwitz, the minister for foreign affairs at that capital, embraced the principal arguments urged in this important controversy.

(1) Convention, Dec. 16, 1800. Ann. Reg. 1800, 266, 270. State papers.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1801. 103.



Diplomatic  
debates  
with the  
neutral  
powers.

It was stated by the British Government, "That a solemn treaty had been entered into between Russia and Great Britain calculated completely to secure their trade, in which it was stipulated that, in case of a rupture, not only no embargo should be laid on, but the subjects on both sides should have a year to carry away their effects; that in violation of these sacred stipulations the ships of British merchants had been seized, their crews sent to prison in the interior, and their property sequestered and sold by Russia; that these acts of violence, as well as the conclusion of a hostile confederacy, which the Emperor of Russia has formed for the express and avowed purpose of introducing those innovations into the maritime code which England has ever opposed, have led to an open war between Great Britain and Russia; that these measures openly disclose an intention to prescribe to the British empire, on a subject of the greatest importance, a new code of laws, to which she never will submit, that the confederacy recently signed by the Baltic powers, had for its object the establishment of these novel principles of maritime law, which never had been recognised by the tribunals of Europe, which the Russian Court, since 1780, had not only abandoned, but, by a treaty still in force, she had become bound to oppose, and which were equally repugnant to the express stipulations of the treaties which subsist between the courts of Stockholm and Denmark and the British empire; that in addition to this, the parties to the confederacy were pursuing warlike preparations with the utmost activity, and one of them had engaged in actual hostilities with Great Britain. In these circumstances, nothing remained to the British Government but to secure some pledge against the hostile attacks which were meditated against their rights, and therefore they had laid an embargo on the vessels of the Baltic powers, but under such restraints as would guard to the utmost against loss and injury to individuals; that the King of Great Britain would never submit to pretensions which were irreconcilable to the true principles of maritime law, and strike at the foundation of the greatness and maritime power of his kingdoms; and that being perfectly convinced that his conduct towards neutral states was conformable to the recognised principles of law and justice, and the decisions of the admiralty courts of all the powers of Europe, he would allow of no measures which had for their object to introduce innovations on the maritime law now in force, but defend that system in every event, and maintain its entire execution as it subsisted in all the courts of Europe before the confederacy of 1780(1)."

On the other hand it was answered by Prussia and the neutral powers,—  
"The British Government has in the present, more than any former war, usurped the sovereignty of the seas, and by arbitrarily framing a naval code, which it would be difficult to unite with the true principles of the law of nations, it exercises over the other friendly and neutral powers a usurped jurisdiction, the legality of which it maintains, and which it considers as an imprescriptible right, sanctioned by all the tribunals of Europe. The neutral sovereigns have never conceded to England the privilege of calling their subjects before its tribunals, and of subjecting them to its laws, but in cases in which the abuse of power has got the better of equity, which, alas! are but too frequent. The neutral powers have always taken the precaution to address to its cabinet the most energetic remonstrances and protests; but experience has ever proved them to be entirely fruitless; and it is not surprising if, after so many repeated acts of oppression, they have resolved to find a remedy

(1) Lord Carysfort's notes, Jan. 27 and Feb. 1, 1801. Ann. Reg. 1801, 229, 237. State papers.

against it, and for that purpose to establish a well-arranged convention, which fixes their rights, and places them on a proper level with the powers at war. The naval alliance, in the manner in which it has just been consolidated, was intended to lead to this salutary end; and the King hesitates not to declare, that he recognises in its own principles; that he is fully convinced of its necessity and utility; that he has formally acceded to the convention of the 16th December, and has bound himself not only to take a direct share in all the events which interest the cause of the neutral powers, but, in virtue of his engagements, to maintain that connexion by such powerful measures as the impulse of circumstances may require. It is not true that the confederated powers have for their object to introduce a new code of maritime rights hostile to the interests of Great Britain; the measures of the Danish Government are purely defensive, and it cannot be considered as surprising that they should have adopted them, when it is recollected what menacing demonstrations that court had experienced from Great Britain, on occasion of the affair of the Freya frigate (1). The Prussian Government concluded by urging the English Government to take off the embargo on the Danish and Swedish vessels, as the first and necessary step to an amicable settlement of the difficult question, without making any such stipulation in regard to that laid on Russian ships, and thereby in effect admitting the justice of the measure of retaliation adopted in regard to the latter power (2).

Hanover is  
invaded by  
Prussia.

These hostile declarations were soon followed up by measures which demonstrated that Prussia was not inclined to be merely a passive spectator of this great debate. On the 30th March a declaration was issued by the King of Prussia to the Government of Hanover, in which he stated that he was to take possession provisionally of the English dominions in Germany; and the Hanoverian States being in no condition to resist such an invasion, they submitted, and the Prussian troops entered the country, laid an embargo on British shipping, and closed the Elbe and the Weser against the English flag. At the same time a body of Danish troops took possession of Hamburgh, and extended the embargo to that great commercial emporium, while Denmark and Sweden had a short time before also laid an embargo on all the ports of their dominions. Thus the British flag was excluded from every harbour, from the North Cape to the straits of Gibraltar; and England, which a year before led on the coalition against France, found herself compelled to make head against the hostility of combined Europe (3), with an exhausted treasury and a population suffering under the accumulated pressure of famine and pestilence (4).

Meeting of  
Parliament.  
Perilous  
situation of  
England.

Never did a British Parliament meet under more depressing circumstances than that which commenced its sittings in February 1801. After ten years of a war, costly and burdensome beyond example, the power of France was so far from being weakened,

(1) Baron Haugwitz's answer. Ann. Reg. 1801, 241. State papers.

(2) Baron Haugwitz's answer. Ann. Reg. 1801, 241. State papers. Nap. ii. 133.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1800, 107.

(4) It deserves to be recorded to the credit of Prussia in this transaction, that being well aware how severely Great Britain was suffering at this time under an uncommon scarcity of provisions, she permitted the vessels having grain on board to proceed to the places of their destination, notwithstanding the embargo—a humane indulgence, which forms a striking contrast to the violent and cruel

proceedings of the Emperor Paul on the same occasion. The conduct of the neutrals, with the exception of Russia, in this distressing contest, was distinguished by a moderation and firmness worthy of states contending for the introduction of a great general principle. That of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg was widely different; but it would be unjust to visit upon that gallant people the sins of their chief, who about that period began to give symptoms of that irritability of disposition and mental alienation, which so soon brought about the bloody catastrophe which terminated his reign. [Dum. vi. 167. Ann. Reg. 1800, 107.]

that she had extended her sway over all the south of Europe. The strength of Austria was, to appearance at least, irrecoverably broken; Italy and Switzerland crouched beneath her yoke, Spain openly followed her banners, and Holland was indissolubly united with her fortunes. Great Britain, it is true, had been uniformly, and to an unparalleled extent, victorious at sea, and the naval forces of her adversary were almost destroyed; but the northern confederation had suddenly and alarmingly altered this auspicious state of things, and not only were all the harbours of Europe closed against her merchant vessels, but a fleet of above a hundred ships of the line in the Baltic was preparing to assert principles subversive of her naval power. To crown the whole, the excessive rains of the two preceding autumns had essentially injured two successive crops; the price of all sorts of grain had reached an unprecedented height (1), and the people, at the time when their industry was checked by the cessation of commercial intercourse with all Europe, were compelled to struggle with famine of unusual severity (2).

Arguments on the subject in Parliament. This subject of the northern coalition was fully discussed in the parliamentary debates which took place on the King's speech at the opening of the session. It was urged by Mr. Grey and the Opposition, "That although without doubt the Emperor of Russia had been guilty of the grossest violence and injustice towards Great Britain in the confiscation of the property of its merchants, yet it did not follow that ministers were free of blame. He accuses them of having violated a convention in regard to the surrender of Malta to him as a reward for his co-operation against France: did such a convention exist? The northern powers have, along with Russia, subscribed a covenant, the professed object of which is to secure their commerce against the vexations to which they have hitherto been subject; and it is impossible to discover any thing either in the law of nations or practice of states, any law or practice universally acknowledged, the denial of which is tantamount to a declaration of war against this country. It is a mistake to assert that the principles of the armed neutrality were never heard of till they were advanced in the American war. In 1740 the King of Prussia disputed the pretensions of this country on the same grounds as the armed neutrality; and in 1762 the Dutch resisted the claim of right to search vessels under convoy. In 1780 these objections assumed a greater degree of consistency, from their principles being publicly announced by all the powers in Europe.

"There is one principle which should ever be considered as the leading rule by which all questions of this sort should be determined, and that is the maxim of *justice*. Can, then, the pretensions of Great Britain bear the test of this criterion? Our naval ascendancy, indeed, should ever be carefully preserved, as the source of our glory and the bulwark of our safety; but sorry should I be, if, to preserve the rights and interests of the British nation, we should be compelled to abandon the rules and maxims of justice, in which alone are to be found true and permanent greatness, true and permanent security.

"Even supposing the pretensions of England to be just, are they expedient? Its maritime superiority is of inestimable value, but is this claim, so odious to our neighbours, essential to its existence? Let the advantage, nay, the necessity, of the privilege be clearly demonstrated before we engage in a uni-

(1) In the winter 1800-1801, wheat rose to L. 1, 4s. the bushel; being more than quadruple what it had been at the commencement of the war; and all other species of food were high in proportion. Large

quantities of maize and rice were imported, and contributed essentially to relieve the public distress.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1801, 117.

versal war for its defence and purchase it at the price of blood. Admitting even that the right was just and useful, circumstances may occur which justify and warrant a relaxation in its rigour. Supposing even the concession of the claim of the northern powers would have enabled them to supply France with many articles necessary for their navy, what would have been the inconvenience thence arising? France, destitute of seamen, her fleets without discipline, what the better would she be of all the naval stores of the north of Europe? What, on the other hand, is the consequence of our dispute with the northern powers? Do we not in a moment double her marine, and supply her with experienced sailors? Do not the navies of Europe now outflank us on every side; and has not France, therefore, gained the inestimable advantage of acquiring the seamen from the Baltic, which could not otherwise be obtained, and is not that the real object which she requires? And if our commerce is excluded from every harbour in Europe, if every market is shut against us, what is to become of the invaluable sources of our splendour and security? Independently of naval stores can we forget how important it is, in the present distressed and starving situation of the country, that the supply from the Baltic should not be lost. A little moderation in the instructions to our naval officers would have avoided all these dangers. Lord North was never arraigned as a traitor to his country, because he did not drive matters to extremities in 1780; and in the peace of 1783 the questions of the armed neutrality was wholly omitted. In subsequent commercial treaties with different countries, the question of neutral rights has been settled on the principles of the armed neutrality; and there is at least as much reason for moderation now as there was at the close of the American war."

To these arguments Mr. Pitt and Sir William Grant replied: "It has only been stated as doubtful whether the marine code contended for by Great Britain is founded in justice; but can there be the smallest hesitation on a subject which has been acknowledged and acted upon by the whole courts, not only of this country, but of Europe, and on which all the wars, not of this island merely, but of every belligerent state in Europe, have been constantly conducted? The advocates for the neutral powers constantly fall into the error of supposing that every exception from the general law by a particular treaty proves the law to be as stated in that treaty; whereas the very circumstance of making an exception by treaty, proves that the general law of nations would be the reverse but for that exception. We made a concession of this description to France, in the commercial treaty of 1787, because it was supposed that that power would never be neutral when we were at war; but was it ever for one moment imagined, that by so doing, we could be understood to have relinquished our maritime rights with reference to other states?

"With respect to the Baltic powers, the case of the neutral advocates is peculiarly untenable. Nobody here has to learn, that the treaties of 1661 and 1670 are in full force with respect to Sweden and Denmark, and in those treaties the right of carrying enemy's property is expressly given up. With respect to Russia, the right of search was never abandoned. On the contrary, in the convention signed between this country and that power, at the commencement of the present war, the latter bound herself not merely to observe this principle herself, but to use her efforts to prevent neutral powers from protecting the commerce of France on the seas or in its harbours. Even, therefore, if the general principles of the maritime law were as adverse, as in reality they are favourable to Great Britain, still the treaties with the Baltic powers are in full force, and how can they now contend for a code of laws against England, in opposition to that to which they are expressly bound with her?

“Denmark, in August last, with her fleets and her arsenals at our mercy, entered into a solemn pledge, not again to send vessels with convoy until the principle was settled; and yet she has recently bound herself by another treaty, founded upon the principles of 1780, one of the engagements of which treaty is, that its stipulations are to be maintained by force of arms. Is this, or is it not, war? When all these circumstances are accompanied by armaments, prepared at a period of the year when they think they have time for preparation without being exposed to our navy, can there be the slightest doubt, that in justice we are bound to take up arms in our own defence?

“As to the question of expenditure, the matter is if possible, still less doubtful. The question is, whether we are to permit the navy of our enemy to be supplied and recruited; whether we are to suffer blockaded forts to be furnished with warlike stores and provisions; whether we are to allow neutral nations, by hoisting a flag upon a sloop or a fishing-boat, to convey the treasures of South America to the harbours of Spain, or the naval stores of the Baltic to Brest or Toulon? The honourable gentleman talks of the destruction of the naval power of France; but does he imagine that her marine would have decreased to the degree which it actually has, if, during the whole of the war, this very principle had not been acted upon? And if the commerce of France had not been destroyed, does he believe, that if the fraudulent system of neutrals had not been prevented, her navy would not now have been in a very different situation from what it actually is? Does he not know, that the naval preponderance which we have by this means acquired, has since given security to this country amidst the wreck of all our hopes on the Continent? If it were once gone, the spirit of the country would go with it. If in 1780, we were not in a condition to assert the right of this country to a code of maritime law, which for centuries has been acted upon indiscriminately by all the European states, we have not now, happily, the same reason for not persisting in our rights; and the question now is, whether, with increased proofs of the necessity of acting upon that principle, and increased means of supporting it, we are for ever to give it up (1)?”

The House of Commons supported ministers, by a majority of 245 to 63 (2).

Mr. Pitt resigns in consequence of the Catholic claims. The union of Ireland with England, from which such important results were anticipated, proved a source of weakness rather than strength to the empire at this important crisis. By a series of concessions, which commenced soon after, and continued through the whole reign of George III, the Irish Catholics had been nearly placed on a level with their Protestant fellow subjects, and they were now excluded only from sitting in Parliament, and holding about thirty of the principal offices in the state. When Mr. Pitt, however, carried through the great measure of the Union, he gave the Catholics reason to expect that a complete removal of all disabilities would follow the Union, not indeed as a matter of right, but of grace and favour. This understood pledge, when the time arrived, he found himself unable to redeem. The complete removal of Catholic disabilities, it was soon found, involved many fundamental questions in the constitution; in particular, the Bill of Rights, the Test and Corporation Acts, and, in general, the stability of the whole Protestant Church establishment; and for that reason it might be expected to meet with a formidable opposition from the aristocratic party in both houses; and in addition to this, it was discovered, when the measure was brought forward in the Cabinet, that the King entertained scruples of conscience on the subject, in conse-

(1) *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 895, 915.

(2) *Ibid.* 931.



quence of his oath at the coronation "to maintain the Protestant religion established by law," which the known firmness and integrity of his character rendered it extremely improbable he would ever be brought to abandon. In these circumstances, Mr. Pitt stated that he had no alternative but to resign Feb. 10.

his official situations. On the 10th February, it was announced in Parliament that ministers only held the seals till their successors were appointed, and shortly after Mr. Pitt, Lord Grenville, Earl Spencer, Mr. Dundas, and Mr. Windham resigned, and were succeeded by Mr. Addington, then Speaker of the House of Commons, as First Lord of the Treasury, Lord Hawkesbury, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a new Ministry, taken, however, entirely from the Tory party (1).

But this was only the ostensible ground. It has long been the practice of the Administration of Great Britain, not to resign upon the real question which occasions their retirement, but select some minor point, which is held forth to the public as the ostensible ground of the change; and this custom is attended with the great advantage of not implicating the Crown or the Government openly in a collision with either House of Parliament. From the circumstance of Mr. Pitt having so prominently held forth the Catholic question as the reason for his retirement, it is more than probable that this was not the real ground of the change; or, that if it was, he readily caught at the impossibility of carrying through any farther concessions to the Catholics of Ireland as a motive for resignation, to prevent the approach to other and more important questions which remained behind. There was no necessity for bringing forward the Catholic claims at that moment, nor any reason for breaking up an Administration at a period of unparalleled public difficulty, merely because the scruples in the Royal breast prevented them from being at that time conceded. But the question of peace or war stood in a very different situation. Mr. Pitt could not disguise from himself that the country was now involved in a contest, apparently endless, if the principles on which it had so long been conducted were rigidly adhered to; that the dissolution of the continental coalition, and the formation of the northern confederacy had immensely diminished the chances, not merely of success, but of salvation during its future continuance. As it was possible, therefore, perhaps probable, that England might be driven to an accommodation at no distant period, and the principles he had so long maintained might prove an obstacle to such a necessary measure, Mr. Pitt took the part of retiring with the leading members of his Cabinet, and was succeeded by other inferior adherents of his party, who, without departing from his principles altogether, might feel themselves more at liberty to mould them according to the pressure of external circumstances. In doing this, the English minister acted the part of

(1) *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 966. *Ann. Reg.* 1801, 117, 121.

In a paper circulated at this period, in Mr. Pitt's name, it was stated, "The leading part of his Majesty's ministers finding innumerable obstacles to the bringing forward measures of concession to the Catholic body while in office, have felt it impossible to continue in office under their inability to propose it, with the circumstances necessary to carry the measure with all its advantages; and they have retired from his Majesty's service, considering this line of conduct as most likely to contribute to its ultimate success. The Catholic body may with confidence rely on the zealous support of all those who retire, and of many who remain in office, where it can be given with a prospect of success. They may be assured that Mr. Pitt will do his utmost to establish their cause in the public

favour, and prepare the way for their finally attaining their objects." In his place in the House of Commons on February 16, Mr. Pitt said, "With respect to the resignation of myself and some of my friends, I have no wish to disguise from the House that we did feel it an incumbent duty upon us to propose a measure on the part of Government, which, under the circumstances of the Union so happily effected between the two countries, we thought of great public importance, and necessary to complete the benefits likely to result from that measure; we felt this opinion so strongly, that when we met with circumstances which rendered it impossible for us to propose it as a measure of Government, we equally felt it inconsistent with our duty and our honour any longer to remain a part of that Government."—*See Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 966, 970.

a true patriot. “He sacrificed himself,” says the chosen historian of Napo-  
léon, “to the good of his country and a general peace. He showed himself  
more than a great statesman, a good citizen (1).”

**Vigorous measures of his successors to prosecute the war.** But though Mr. Pitt retired, he left his mantle to his successors;  
neither timidity nor vacillation appeared in the measures of Go-  
vernment towards foreign states. For both the land and sea-forces  
a larger allowance was provided than in any previous year since  
the commencement of the war. For the navy there was voted 139,000 seamen  
and marines, and 120 ships of the line were put in commission. The land-  
troops altogether amounted to 300,000 men (2); and the navy, in service  
and ordinary, amounted to the prodigious force of above 200 ships of the  
line and 250 frigates (3). Mr. Pitt, on February 18th, brought forward the  
budget immediately before he surrendered the seals to his successors. The  
charges of the army and navy were each of them above L.15,000,000; and  
the total expenditure to be provided for by the United Kingdom amounted  
to L.42,000,000, besides above L.20,000,000 as the interest of the debt.  
To provide for these prodigious charges, war-supplies to the amount of  
L.17,000,000 existed; and to make up the difference he contracted a loan  
of L.25,500,000 for Great Britain; while Ireland, according to the agreement  
at the Union, was to provide 2-17ths of the whole expense, or L.4,300,000.  
To provide for the interest of the loan, and the sinking fund applicable to  
its reduction, new taxes, chiefly in the excise and customs, were imposed  
to the amount of L.1,794,000. These additional taxes, according to the  
admirable system of that great financier, were almost all laid on in the  
indirect form, being intended to be a permanent burden on the nation till  
the principal was paid off; and a sinking-fund of L.100,000 a-year was  
provided for this purpose in the excess of the additional taxes above the  
interest of the debt (4).

**Prosperous state of Great Britain at this period.** Notwithstanding the unexampled difficulties which had beset the  
British empire in the years 1799 and 1800, from the extreme  
severity of the scarcity during that period, and the vast expen-  
diture which the campaigns of these two years had occasioned, the condition

(1) Bign. i. 406. Ann. Reg. 1800, 119, 120.  
(2) Viz—Regular Forces, . . . . . 193,000  
Militia, . . . . . 78,000  
Fencibles, . . . . . 31,000  
Total, . . . . . 302,000

The expense of maintaining which was estimated  
at L.12,940,000. The total forces, both of land and  
sea, in 1792, was not 120,000; a signal proof what  
much greater efforts than she was generally sup-  
posed capable of, England could really make, and  
of the overwhelming force with which, at the com-  
mencement of the war, she might, by a proper exer-  
tion of her strength, have overwhelmed the revolu-  
tionary volcano.—See *Ann. Reg.* 1800, p. 142, and  
*JOMINI*, xiv. 251.

(3) Ships of the line, in commission and  
ordinary, . . . . . 205  
Building, . . . . . 36  
Fifty-gun ships, . . . . . 27  
Frigates, . . . . . 257  
Brigs and sloops, . . . . . 312  
Total, . . . . . 837

—See *JAMES’S Naval Hist.* iii. Table ix; and *JOMINI*,  
xiv. 252.

(4) *Parl. Deb.* xxxv. 974, 978.  
Mr. Pitt stated the War Revenue of the Nation,  
for the year 1801, as follows:—

Sugar, Malt, and Tobacco, . . . . .	L.2,750,000
Lottery, . . . . .	300,000
Income Tax, . . . . .	4,260,000
Duty on Exports and Imports, . . . . .	1,250,000
Surplus of the Consolidated Fund, . . . . .	3,300,000
Irish Taxes and Loan, . . . . .	4,324,000
Balance not issued for Subsidies, . . . . .	500,000
Surplus of Grants, . . . . .	60,000
	<hr/>
	L.16,744,000
Loan, . . . . .	25,500,000
	<hr/>
Ways and Means, . . . . .	L 42,244,000
	<hr/>
Charges.	
Navy, . . . . .	L.15,800,000
Army and Extraordinary, . . . . .	15,902,000
Ordnance, . . . . .	1,938,000
Miscellaneous, . . . . .	757,000
Unforeseen Emergencies, . . . . .	800,000
Permanent charges of Ireland, . . . . .	390,000
Deficiency of Income-Tax, . . . . .	1,000,000
Discount on Loan, . . . . .	200,000
Deficiency of Malt Duty, . . . . .	400,000
Deficiency of Assessed Taxes, . . . . .	350,000
Deficiency of Consolidated Fund, . . . . .	150,000
Exchequer Bills of 1779, . . . . .	3,800,000
Sinking Fund, . . . . .	200,000
Interest of Exchequer Bills, . . . . .	460,000
	<hr/>
Charges, . . . . .	L.42,147,000

of the empire in 1801 was, to an unprecedented degree, wealthy and prosperous. The great loan of twenty-five millions of that year was borrowed at a rate of interest under six per cent., although loans to the amount of above two hundred millions had been contracted in the eight preceding years; the exports, as compared with what they were at the commencement of the war, had tripled, and the imports more than tripled, in addition to the vast sums of money which the nation required for its loans to foreign powers, and payments on account of its own forces in foreign parts. Nearly a fourth had been added to the tonnage of the shipping and the seamen employed in it during the same period; while the national expenditure had risen to above sixty-eight millions, of which nearly forty millions were provided from permanent or war-taxes (1). Contrary to all former prece-

(1) Mr. Chancellor Addington, on June 29, 1801, brought forward a series of finance resolutions, which, as fully explaining the situation of the British empire at that period, are well deserving of attention. Their material parts are as follow:—

#### 1. Expenditure for 1801.

Interest of debt and sinking fund, . . .	L.20,144,000
Additional interest on loans of 1801. . .	1,812,000
Civil list, share of Great Britain, . . .	1,876,000
Civil government pensions, charges, etc., in Scotland, . . . . .	635,000
Charges of Collection, . . . . .	1,851,000
Great Britain's share of the war charges of 1801, . . . . .	39,338,000
Advances to Ireland from England, . .	2,500,000
Interest on Imperial loans, . . . . .	497,000
<b>Total charges, . . . . .</b>	<b>L.68,153,000</b>

#### 2. Income for 1801.

Permanent Revenue, as in 1800, . . .	L.27,419,000
Produce of first quarter's taxes, 1801, . .	1,000,000
Income tax, . . . . .	5,822,000
Exports and Imports, . . . . .	1,200,000
Repayments from Grenada, . . . . .	800,000
Loan, . . . . .	25,500,000

Loan for Ireland, . . . . .	2,500,000
Exchequer bills charged on supplies of 1802, . . . . .	2,000,000
Additional produce of taxes deficient in 1800, . . . . .	1,100,000
Unpaid part of German loan, . . . .	500,000
Redeemed land-tax, . . . . .	62,000

**Total income, . . . . . L 67,981,000**

#### 3. Public Debt.

Public debt on the 5th January, 1793, . . . . .	L.227,000,000
Annuities at same period, . . . . .	1,293,000
Public debt created from 5th Jan. 1793 to 1st Feb. 1801. . . . .	214,661,000
Annuities created since the same period, . . . . .	302,000
Debt redeemed from 1793 to 1801, . .	52,281,000
Drawn by land tax redeemed, . . . .	16,023,000
Total public debt on 1st February, 1801, . . . . .	400,709,000
Annuities existing then, . . . . .	1,540,000
Annual charge of debt incurred before 1793, with sinking fund, . . .	10,325,000
Annual charge of debt incurred since 1793, with do, . . . . .	10,395,000

#### 4. Sinking Fund.

Amount of sinking fund in 1786, . . . . .	L.1,000,000, or 1—238 of debt.
... .. in 1793, . . . . .	1,427,000, or 1—160 of do.
... .. in 1801, . . . . .	5,300,000, or 1—76 of do.

#### 5. Produce of Taxes.

Years.	Permanent Taxes.	Years.	Permanent Taxes.
Ending 5th Jan. 1793, . . . . .	L.14,284,000	1798, . . . . .	L.13,332,000
... .. 1794, . . . . .	13,941,000	1799, . . . . .	14,275,000
... .. 1795, . . . . .	13,858,000	1800, . . . . .	15,743,000
... .. 1796, . . . . .	13,557,000	1801, . . . . .	14,194,000
... .. 1797, . . . . .	14,292,000		

War Taxes of 1801, L.8,079,000.

#### 6. Imports and Exports.

Average of six years ending 5th Jan. 1784, . . . . .	L.13,122,000
... .. 1793, . . . . .	18,635,000
... .. 1801, . . . . .	25,259,000
Real value of imports in 1801, . . . . .	54,500,000

	Foreign Goods Exported.	British Manufactures Exported.
Average of six years ending 5th Jan. 1784, . . . . .	L. 4,263,080	L. 8,616,000
... .. 1796, . . . . .	5,468,000	14,771,000
... .. 1801, . . . . .	17,166,000	20,085,000
Real value of exports in 1801, . . . . .	16,300,000	39,500,000

#### 7. Shipping.

	Registered vessels.	Tonnage.	Seamen.
1788, . . . . .	13,827	1,363,000	107,500
1792, . . . . .	16,079	1,540,000	118,000
1800, . . . . .	18,877	1,905,000	143,000

The vast increase of exports, imports, and shipping, between 1793 and 1800, and especially since the Bank Restriction Act in 1797, is particularly worthy of observation.—See *Parl. Hist.* xxv. 1561, 1567.

dent, the country had eminently prospered during this long and arduous struggle. Notwithstanding the weight of its taxation, and the immense sums which had been squandered in foreign loans or services, and of course lost to the productive powers of Great Britain, the industry of the nation in all its branches had prodigiously increased, and capital was to be had in abundance for all the innumerable undertakings, both public and private, which were going forward. Agriculture had advanced in a still greater degree than population; the dependence of the nation on foreign supplies was rapidly diminishing; and yet the united kingdom, which had added nearly a sixth to its inhabitants since 1791, numbered above fifteen million of souls in the British isles (1). The divisions and disaffection which prevailed during the earlier years of the war had almost entirely disappeared; the atrocities of the French Revolution had weaned all but a few inveterate democrats from Jacobinical principles; the imminence of the public danger had united the great body of the people in a strong attachment to the national colours; the young and active party of the population had risen into manhood since the commencement of the contest, and imbibed with their mother's milk the enthusiastic feelings it was calculated to awaken; while the incessant progress and alarming conquests of France had generally diffused the belief that no security for the national independence was to be found but in a steady resistance to its ambition. A nation animated with such feelings and possessed of such resources, was not unreasonably confident in itself when it bade defiance to Europe in arms.

England, however, had need of all its energies, for the forces of the maritime league were extremely formidable. Russia had eighty-two sail of the line and forty frigates in her harbours, of which forty-seven line-of-battle ships were in the Baltic and at Archangel, but of these not more than fifteen were in a state ready for active service; and the crews were extremely deficient in nautical skill. Sweden had eighteen ships of the line and fourteen frigates, besides a great quantity of small craft, in much better condition, and far better served, than the Russian navy; while a numerous flotilla, with ten thousand men on board, was prepared to defend its shores, and twenty thousand troops, stationed in camps in the interior, were ready to fly to any menaced point. Denmark had twenty-three ships of the line and fourteen large frigates, which the brave and energetic population of Zealand had made the utmost efforts to equip and man, to resist the attack which was shortly anticipated from the British arms. Could the three powers have united their forces, they had twenty-four ships of the line ready for sea, which might in a few months have been raised with ease to fifty, besides twenty-five frigates, a force which, combined with the fleet of Holland, might have raised the blockade of the French harbours, and enabled the confederated powers to ride triumphant in the British Channel (2).

In these circumstances every thing depended on England striking a decisive blow in the outset, and anticipating by the celerity of her movements that combination of force which otherwise might

(1) Population in 1801 :—

England, . . . . .	8,331,000
Wales, . . . . .	541,000
Scotland, . . . . .	1,599,000
Ireland, . . . . .	4,500,000
Army and navy, . . . . .	470,000

15,441,000

—See PERRIN'S *Tables*, 332, and *Population Returns*.

(2) *Ann. Reg.* 1801, 109. *Dum.* vi. 169, 172. *Nap.* ii. 137, 138. *Sonthey's Life of Nelson*, ii. 94.

prove so threatening to her national independence. Fortunately the Government were fully aware of the necessity of acting vigorously at the commencement, and by great exertions a powerful squadron was assembled at Yarmouth in the beginning of March. It consisted of eighteen ships of the line, four frigates, and a number of bomb vessels, in all fifty-two sail.

Nelson appointed second in command of the fleet destined for the Baltic.

This powerful force was placed under the command of Sir Hyde Parker, with Nelson for his second in command. The hero of the Nile had good reason to be dissatisfied at finding himself placed under the command of an officer who, though respectable, and his superior in rank, was comparatively unknown in the annals of naval glory; but he was not a man to allow any personal feelings to interfere with his duty to his country. Though sensible of the slight, therefore, he cheerfully accepted the subordinate command. When he arrived at Yarmouth he "found the admiral a little nervous about dark nights and fields of ice; but we must brave up," said he, "these are not times for nervous systems. I hope we shall give our northern enemies that hail-storm of bullets which gives our dear country the dominion of the sea. All the devils in the north cannot take it from us, if our wooden walls have fair play (1)."

March 12.  
British  
fleet sails  
from the  
Downs.

The British fleet sailed from Yarmouth on the 12th March; but soon after putting to sea, it sustained a serious loss in the wreck of the *Invincible*, which struck on one of the sand banks in that dangerous coast, and shortly sunk with a large part of the crew. Mr. Vansittart accompanied the squadron in the capacity of plenipotentiary, to endeavour to arrange the differences by negotiation, which unfortunately proved totally impossible. It arrived on the 27th off Zealand, and Sir Hyde immediately despatched a letter to the governor of Cronenberg castle, to inquire whether the fleet would be allowed without molestation to pass the Sound. The governor having replied that he could not allow a force, whose intentions were unknown, to approach the guns of his fortress, the British admiral declared that he took this as a declaration of war. By the earnest advice of Nelson it was determined immediately to attempt the passage; a resolution which, in the state of the northern powers, was not only the most gallant but the most prudent that could have been adopted (2). On the 30th March the British fleet entered the Sound, with a fair wind from the northwest; and spreading all sail, proudly and gallantly bore up towards the harbour of Copenhagen (3).

And passes  
the Sound.

Splendid  
appearance  
of the Sound

The scene which opened upon the British fleet when it entered this celebrated passage was every way worthy of the cause in which it was engaged, and the memorable events of which it was soon to become the theatre. Nothing in the north of Europe can be compared to the prospect afforded by the channel which lies between the opposite shores of Sweden and Denmark. On the left, the coast of Scandinavia exhibits a beautiful assemblage of corn lands, pastures and copses, rising into picturesque and varied hills; while on the right, the shores of Zealand present a continued succession of rich plains, woods, meadows, orchards, villas and all the accompaniments of long established civilization. The isles of Huen, Saltholm, and

(1) Southey, ii. 95.

(2) Nelson on this occasion addressed Sir Hyde as follows.—"The more I have reflected, the more I am confirmed in my opinion, that not a moment should be lost in attacking the enemy. They will every day be stronger and stronger; we shall never be so good a match for them as at the present moment. Here you are with almost all the safety, cer-

tainly all the honour of England, more intrusted to you than ever yet fell to the lot of a British officer. On your decision depends whether our country shall be degraded in the eyes of Europe, or rear her head higher than ever."—See Southey, ii. 98, 99.

(3) Southey, ii. 100, 104. Ann. Reg. 1801, 103, 110.



Amack appear in the widening channel; the former celebrated as bearing the observatory of the great Tycho Brahe, and where most of his discoveries were made, the latter nearly opposite to Copenhagen. At the foot of the slope, on the Swedish side, is situated the old city of Helsingborg, with its picturesque battlements and mouldering towers; while on the south, the castle of Cronenberg and city of Elsinore rise in frowning majesty to assert the dominion of Denmark over the straits. Both are associated with poetic and historical recollections. Elsinore is familiar to every reader of Hamlet, and has recently been celebrated in thrilling strains by the greatest of modern lyric poets (1); while Cronenberg castle was the scene of a still deeper tragedy. There Queen Matilda was confined, the victim of a base court intrigue, and enlivened the dreary hours of captivity in nursing her infant; there she was separated from that, the last link that bound her to existence; and on those towers her eyes were fixed, as the vessel bore her from her country, till their highest pinnacle had sunk beneath the waves, and her aching sight rested only on the waste of waters (2).

To one approaching from the German ocean, the fortresses of Helsingborg, Elsinore, and Cronenberg seem to unite and form a vast castellated barrier on the north-east of an inland lake; but as he advances the vista opens, the Baltic is seen, and the city of Copenhagen, with its Gothic spires and stately edifices, appears crowding down to the water's edge. Its harbour, studded with masts; its arsenals, bulwarks, and batteries; its lofty towers and decorated buildings, render it one of the most striking cities in the north of Europe. During summer, the Sound exhibits an unusually gay and animated spectacle; hardly a day elapses in which an hundred vessels do not pass the straits, and pay toll to Denmark at Elsinore; and in the course of the season, upwards of ten thousand ships, of different nations, yield a willing tribute in this manner to the keeper of the beacons which warn the mariner from the dangerous shoals of the Cattegat. But never had so busy or brilliant a spectacle been exhibited there as on this day, when the British fleet prepared to force a passage where till now all ships had lowered their topsails to the flag of Denmark. Fifty vessels, of which seventeen were of the line, spread their sails before a favourable wind, and pressing forward under a brilliant sun, soon came abreast of Cronenberg castle. The splendour of the scene, the undefined nature of the danger which awaited them, the honour and safety of their country intrusted to their arms, the multitude who crowded every headland on the opposite shores, conspired to awaken the most thrilling emotions in the minds of the British seamen. Fear had no place in those dauntless breasts; yet was their patriotic ardour not altogether unmixed with painful feelings. The Danes were of the same lineage, and once spoke the same language as the English; the two nations had for centuries been united in the bonds of friendship; and numbers who now appeared in arms against them were sprung from the same ancestors as their gallant opponents. The effect of this common descent has survived all the divisions of kingdoms and political interest; alone, of all the continental states, an Englishman finds himself at home in that part of Jutland from whence the Angles originally sprung (3); and even the British historian, in recounting the events in this melancholy contest, feels himself distracted by emotions akin to those of civil

(1) Now joy, old England, raise!  
For the tidings of thy might,  
By the festal cities' blaze,  
While the wine cup shines in light;  
And yet amidst that joy and uproar,  
Let us think of them that sleep,

Full many a fathom deep,  
By thy wild and stormy steep,  
Elsinore!

CAMPBELL'S *Battle of the Baltic*.

(2) Southey, i. 108, 109. Ann. Reg. 1801, 111.

(3) Clarke's Travels, i. 284.

warfare, and dwells with nearly the same exultation on the heroism of the vanquished as the prowess of the victors (1).

<sup>Undaunted spirit of the Danes.</sup> Though they had enjoyed profound peace for nearly a century, and during that time had been ruled by a government in form absolute, the Danes had lost none of the courage or patriotism by which their ancestors, in the days of Canute and the Sea-kings, had been distinguished. Never was the public spirit of the country evinced with more lustre than in the preparations for, and during the perils of, this sanguinary struggle. All classes made the utmost exertions to put their marine in a respectable condition; the nobles, the clergy, the burghers, and the peasant vied with each other in their endeavours to complete the preparations for defence. The Prince Royal set the example by presiding at the labours of his subjects; workmen presented themselves in crowds to take a share in the undertakings; children even concealed their age in order to be permitted to join in the patriotic exertion; the university furnished a corps of twelve hundred youths, the flower of Denmark; the merchants, including those whose fortunes were at stake from the English embargo, came forward with liberal offers; the peasants flocked from the country to man the arsenals; the workmen in the dock-yards refused to leave their station, and continued labouring by torch-light during the whole night, with relays merely of rest, as in a man-of-war. Battalions were hastily formed; batteries manned with inexperienced hands; muskets made, and all kinds of warlike stores provided with astonishing celerity (2). History has not a more touching example of patriotic ardour to commemorate, nor one in which a more perfect harmony prevailed between a sovereign and his subjects for the defence of rights naturally dear to them all.

<sup>Passage of the Sound.</sup> From a praiseworthy, but ill-timed desire to avoid coming to extremities, the British armament had given a long delay to the Danes, which was turned to good account by their indefatigable citizens, and occasioned in the end an unnecessary effusion of blood. They had arrived in the Cattegat the 20th March, and on the same day, Mr. Vansittart proceeded ashore, with a view to settle matters without having recourse to extremities; but nevertheless it was not till the 30th that the passage of the Sound was attempted. In the interval, the Danes had powerfully strengthened their means of defence; the shore was lined with batteries, and Cronenberg castle opened a heavy fire, from above a hundred pieces of cannon, upon the leading ships of the squadron when they came within range. Nelson's division led the van, Sir Hyde's followed in the centre, while Admiral Graves brought up the rear. At first, they steered through the middle of the channel, expecting to be assailed by a destructive fire from both sides; but finding as they advanced, that the batteries of Helsingborg did not open upon the squadron, they inclined to the Swedish shore, and were thus enabled to pass almost without the reach of the Danish guns. The cannon balls and shells fell short of the line-of-battle ships, and did little injury even to the smaller craft, which were placed nearer the Danish coast, affording no small merriment to the sailors, whose minds were in an unusual state of excitement, from the novel and perilous enterprise on which they had entered. The passage lasted four hours, and about noonday the fleet came to anchor opposite the harbour of Copenhagen (3).

(1) Ann. Reg. 1801, 111. Southey, ii. 108.

(2) Dum. vi. 172. Jom. xiv. 252, 253. Southey, i. 115, 130.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1801, 110. Southey, ii. 108, 111.

Dum. vi. 183, 184. Jom. xiv. 252, 253.

Prepara-  
tions of the  
Danes.

The garrison of this city consisted of ten thousand men, besides the battalions of volunteers, who were still more numerous. All possible precautions had been taken to strengthen the sea defences; and the array of forts, ramparts, ships of the line, fire-ships, gun-boats, and floating batteries, was such as would have deterred any other assailant but the hero of the Nile. Six line-of-battle ships, and eleven floating batteries, besides a great number of smaller vessels, were moored in an external line to protect the entrance to the harbour, flanked on either side by two islands, called the Crowns, on the smaller of which fifty-six, while on the larger, sixty-eight heavy cannon were mounted. To support these, four other sail of the line were moored within across the harbour mouth; and a fort, mounting thirty-six heavy cannon, had been constructed in a shoal, supported on piles. The fire of these formidable works crossed with that of the batteries on the island of Amack and the citadel of Copenhagen; it seemed hardly possible that any ships could endure, for a length of time, so heavy and concentric a discharge. But tremendous as these dangers appeared, they were neither the only nor the greatest with which the British fleet had to contend. The channel by which alone the harbour could be approached, was little known, and extremely intricate; all the buoys had been removed, and the sea on either side abounded with shoals and sand-banks, on which, if any of the vessels grounded, they would instantly be torn to pieces by the fire from the Danish batteries. The Danes considered this obstacle insurmountable, deeming the narrow and winding channel impracticable for a large fleet in such circumstances. Nelson was fully aware of the difficulty of the attempt; and a day and a night were occupied by the boats of the fleet in making the necessary soundings, and laying down new buoys in lieu of those which had been taken away. He himself personally assisted in the whole of this laborious and important duty, taking no rest night or day till it was accomplished. "It had worn him down," he said, "and was infinitely more grievous than any resistance he could experience from the enemy (1)."

Nelson's  
plan of  
attack.

No sooner were the soundings completed than Nelson, in a council of war, suggested the plan of operations, which was, to approach from the south and make the attack on the right flank of the enemy. The approach of the Danish exterior line was covered by a large shoal, called the Middle Ground, exactly in front of the harbour, at about three quarters of a mile distant, which extended along the whole sea front of the town. As this sand bank was impassable for ships of any magnitude, he proposed to follow what is called the King's channel, lying between it and the town, and thus interpose, as at Aboukir, between the Danish line and the entrance of the harbour. On the morning of the 1st April the whole fleet anchored within two leagues of the town, off the north-west end of the Middle Ground, and Nelson, having completed his last examination, hoisted the signal to weigh anchor. It was received with a loud shout from his whole division of the fleet, which consisted of twelve sail of the line, besides some smaller vessels. The remainder, under Sir Hyde Parker, were to menace the Crown batteries on the other side, threaten the four ships of the line at the entrance of the harbour, and lend their aid to such of the attacking squadron as might come disabled out of action. The small craft, headed by Captain Riou, led the way, most accurately threading their dangerous and winding course between the island of Saltholm and the Middle Ground; the whole squadron followed with a fair wind, coasting along the outer edge of the shoal, doubled its farther extremity,

(1) Southey, ii. 112, 113. Ann. Reg. 1801, 112, 113. Dom. vi, 186, 187. Jom. xiv. 256, 257.

and cast anchor, just as darkness closed, off Draco Point, not more than two miles from the right of the enemy's line. The signal to prepare for action had been made early in the evening, and the seamen passed the night in anxious expectation of the dawn which was to usher in the eventful morrow (1).

This was a night of anxiety and trepidation, but not of unmanly alarm, in Copenhagen. The citizens saw evidently that the attack would be made on the following day, and, amidst the tears of their mothers and children, bravely repaired to their appointed stations. Few eyelids were closed, save among those about to combat, in all its peopled quarters, so strongly was the solemnity of the occasion, and the coming dangers to all they held dear, impressed on the minds of the citizens. Nelson sat down to supper with a large party of his officers. He was, as he was ever wont to be on the eve of a battle, in high spirits; the mortal fatigue of the preceding days seemed forgotten, and he drank to a leading wind, and the success of the morrow. After supper, Captain Hardy went forward in a boat to examine the channel between them and the enemy. He approached so near as to sound round their leading ship with a pole, lest the noise of throwing the lead should alarm its crew, and returned about four with a valuable report to the admiral. Meanwhile Nelson, though he lay down, was too anxious to sleep. He dictated his orders till past one, and during the remainder of the night incessantly enquired whether the wind was south. At daybreak it was announced that it had become perfectly fair; the order was given for all the captains to come on board, and when they had received their final instructions he made the signal for action (2).

The pilots who were to conduct the fleet soon showed by their indecision that, in the absence of the buoys to which they had been accustomed to look, they hardly knew what course to follow; and Nelson experienced the utmost agony of mind from their failure, as the wind was fair, and there was not a moment to lose. At length the master of the *Bellona* declared he was prepared to lead the fleet, and put himself at its head accordingly. Captain Murray in the *Edgar* led the line-of-battle ships. The *Agamemnon* was next in order; but, in attempting to weather the shoal, she struck aground, and became immovable, at the time her services were most required. The *Bellona* and *Russell* soon after grounded also, but in a situation which enabled them to take a part, though not the one assigned them, in the battle. The want of these three ships at their appointed stations was severely felt in the action, as they were intended to have silenced the Crown batteries, and would have thereby prevented a heavy loss on board the *Defiance* and *Monarch*, who were exposed to their fire without the possibility of making any return. In advancing to take up their ground, each ship had been ordered to pass her leader on the starboard, because the water was supposed to get shallower on that side. Nelson, while advancing in the *Elephant* after these two ships which had struck on the sand bank, made a signal to them to close with the enemy, not knowing that they were aground; but when he perceived they did not obey the signal, he ordered the *Elephant's* helm to starboard, and passed within these ill-fated vessels. By this happy act of presence of mind he saved the whole fleet from destruction, for the other ships followed the admiral's track, and thereby keeping in deep water, arrived opposite to their

(1) Southey, ii. 113, 115. Ann. Reg. 1801, 112.  
Dun. vi. 187. Jom. xiv. 257, 258. James iii. 99,  
100.

(2) Southey, ii. 117, 119. Ann. Reg. 1801, 112.  
James iii. 99, 100.

appointed stations, anchored by the stern, and presented their broadsides, at the distance of half a cable's length from the Danes (1).

Battle of  
Copen-  
hagen.

The action began at five minutes past ten, and was general by eleven. Nine only of the line-of-battle ships could reach the station allotted to them; only one of the gun-brigs could stem the current so as to get into action; and only two of the bomb-vessels were enabled to take up their appointed position on the Middle Ground. Captain Riou, with his squadron of frigates, undertook the perilous task of fronting the Crown batteries—a duty to which the three standard ships of the line would have been hardly adequate—and in the discharge of which that gallant and lamented officer lost his life. Nelson's agitation was extreme when, at the commencement of the action, he found himself deprived of three of his best ships of the line; but no sooner had he reached the scene of danger, where his squadron was assailed with the fire of above a thousand guns, than his countenance brightened, and he became animated and joyous. The cannonade soon became tremendous; above two thousand pieces of cannon on the two sides poured forth death within a space not exceeding a mile and a half in breadth; from the city on the one side, and the remainder of the squadron, under Sir Hyde, on the other, the hostile fleets seem wrapped in one dazzling conflagration. For three hours the fire continued without any appearance of diminution on either side; and Sir Hyde, seeing three ships aground under the iron tempest of the Crown batteries, and being unable, from the wind and current, to render any assistance, made the signal of recall; generously supposing that, if Nelson was in a situation to continue the contest, he would disobey the order; but that if he was not, his reputation would be saved by the signal for retreat having been made by his superior officer (2).

In the midst of this terrific cannonade Nelson was rapidly walking the quarter deck. A shot through the mainmast scattered splinters around; he observed to one of his officers with a smile, "This is warm work; and this day may be the last to any of us in a moment: but mark me, I would not be elsewhere for thousands." About this time the signal-lieutenant called out that the signal for discontinuing the action had been thrown out by the commander-in-chief, and asked if he should repeat it. "No," he replied; "acknowledge it." He then continued walking about in great emotion; and meeting Captain Foley, said, "What think you, Foley, the admiral has hung out No. 39 (3). You know I have only one eye; I have a right to be blind sometimes;" and then putting the glass to his blind eye, he exclaimed, "I really don't see the signal. Keep mine for closer battle still flying. That's the way I answer such signals. Nail mine to the mast." Admiral Graves and the other ships, looking only to Nelson, continued the combat with unabated vigour; but the order to retire was seen in time to save Riou's little squadron, though not to preserve its gallant commander. "What will Nelson think of us," was that brave man's mournful exclamation, as with a heavy heart he gave orders to draw off. His clerk was soon after killed by his side, and several marines swept away, by a discharge from the Crown batteries. "Come then, my boys, let us all die together," said Riou; and just as the words were uttered, he was cut in two by a chain-shot (4).

(1) Southey, ii. 119, 123. Ann. Reg. 1801, 112. Dum. vi. 189. James, iii. 101.

(2) Southey, ii. 125. Ann. Reg. 1801, 112. Dum. vi. 189, 190. Jom. xiv. 259. James, iii. 101, 104.

"The fire," he said, "is too hot for Nelson to oppose; a retreat must be made. I am aware of the consequences to my own personal reputation, but it

would be cowardly in me to leave Nelson to bear the whole shame of the failure, if shame it should be deemed."—See Southey, ii. 125.

(3) The signal for discontinuing action.

(4) Southey, ii. 126, 129. Jom. xiv. 259. Ann. Reg. 1801, 112. James, iii. 104, 107.

It is needless to say from whom the chief inci-



Heroic  
deeds on  
both side.

But it was not on the English side alone that heroic deeds were performed; the Danes in that trying hour sustained the ancient reputation of the conquerors of the north. From the prince royal, who, placed on one of the principal batteries, was the witness of the glorious resistance of his subjects, to the humblest citizen, one heroic mind and purpose seemed to animate the whole population. As fast as the crews of the guard-ships were mowed down by the English fire, fresh bands of undaunted citizens crowded on board, and, unappalled by the dreadful spectacle, calmly took their station on decks choked by the dying and flooded with blood. Captain Lassen, in the *Provensten*, continued to fight till he had only two pieces standing on their carriages, and a few men to work them; he then spiked these guns, and throwing himself into the sea, swam at the head of his brave followers towards the isle of Amack. Captain Thura, in the *Indosforetten*, fell early in the action; her colours were shot away; and a boat was despatched to the prince royal to inform him of her situation, "Gentlemen," said he, "Thura is killed, which of you will take the command?"—"I will," exclaimed Schroedersee, a captain who had recently resigned on account of extreme ill health, and instantly hastened on board. No sooner had he arrived on the deck than he was struck on the breast by a ball and perished; a lieutenant, who had accompanied him, then took the command, and fought the ship to the last extremity. The *Dannebrog* sustained for two hours with great constancy the terrible fire of Nelson's ship; at length, after two successive captains and three-fourths of the crew had been swept away, she took fire, and the gallant survivors precipitating themselves into the sea, left the vessel to its fate, which soon after blew up with a tremendous explosion (1). But all these efforts, how heroic soever, were of no avail; the rapidity and precision of the British fire were irresistible; at one o'clock the cannonade of the Danish fleet began to slacken; loud cheers from the English sailors announced every successive vessel which struck; and before two the whole front line, consisting of six sail of the line and eleven huge floating batteries, was all either taken, sunk, burnt, or destroyed (2).

In this desperate battle the loss on board the British fleet was very severe, amounting to no less than 1200; a greater proportion to the number of seamen engaged than in any other general action during the whole war. On board the *Monarch*, there were 210 killed and wounded; she had to support the united fire of the *Holstein* and *Zealand*, besides being raked by the *Crown* battery (3). But the situation of the crews of the Danish vessels was still more deplorable. Their loss in killed and wounded had been above double that of the British; including the prisoners, it amounted to 6000; and the line had completely ceased firing; but the shot from the *Crown* batteries and the isle of Amack still continued to fall upon both fleets, doing as much injury to their friends as enemies; while the English boats sent to take posses-

dents in the actions of Nelson are taken. Mr. Southey's incomparable life is so deservedly popular, that its descriptions have become almost as firmly rooted in the public memory as the events they describe, and deviation from the one is as unpardonable as from the other.

(1) The gallant Welmoes, a stripling of seventeen, stationed himself on a small raft, carrying six guns, with twenty-four men, right under the bows of Nelson's ship; and though severely galled by the musketry of the English marines, continued, knee-deep in dead, to keep up his fire to the close of the heroic conflict. Nelson embraced him at the repast which followed in the palace ashore; and said to the

crown prince he should make him an admiral. "If, my lord," replied the prince, "I were to make all my brave officers admirals, I should have no captains or lieutenants in my service."—*Naval Chronicle*, xiv. 308.

(2) *Jom.* xiv. 259, 260. *Southey*, ii. 130, 131. *Dum.* vi. 190. *Ann. Reg.* 1801, 112. *James*, iii. 106, 111.

(3) A singular piece of coolness occurred on board this vessel. A four-and-twenty pounder from the *Crown* battery struck the kettle and dashed the peas and pork about; the sailors picked up the fragments and ate while they were working the guns.—*Southey*, ii. 130.

sion of the prizes were fired on by the Danish batteries, and were unable to extricate them from destruction. In this extremity, Nelson retired into the stern gallery, and wrote to the crown prince in these terms: "Lord Nelson

Nelson's proposal for an armistice. has been commanded to spare Denmark when she no longer resists. The line of defence which covered her shores has struck to the British flag; but if the firing is continued on the part of Denmark, he

must set fire to all the prizes he has taken, without having the power of saving the men who have so nobly defended them. The brave Danes are the brothers, and should never be the enemies, of the English." A wafer was brought him; he ordered a candle from the cockpit, and sealed the letter deliberately with wax. "This is no time," said he, "to appear hurried and informal." At the same time the Ramillies and Defence, from Sir Hyde's squadron, worked up near enough to silence the remainder of the Danish line to the eastward of the Trekroner battery; but that tremendous bulwark was comparatively uninjured, and to the close of the action continued to exert with unabated vigour its giant strength (1).

In half an hour the flag of truce returned; the Crown batteries ceased to fire; and the action closed after four hours' continuance. The Crown prince enquired what was the English admiral's motive for proposing a suspension of hostilities. Lord Nelson replied—"Lord Nelson's object in sending the flag of truce was humanity; he therefore consents that hostilities shall cease, and that the wounded Danes may be taken ashore. And Lord Nelson will take his prisoners out of the vessels, and burn or carry off the prizes as he shall think fit. Lord Nelson will consider this the greatest victory he has ever gained, if it shall be the means of re-establishing a good understanding between his own Sovereign and the King of Denmark." The Danish prince made a reply, which was forwarded to the commander-in-chief; and Nelson, skilfully availing himself of the breathing time thus afforded, made the signal for the squadron to weigh anchor in succession. The Monarch led the way, and touched in rounding the shoal, but was got off by being taken in tow by two other ships; but Nelson's own ship, the Elephant, and the Defiance, grounded about a mile from the Crown batteries, and remained fast, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of their wearied crews. With these two exceptions, however, the whole fleet got clear off from the perilous shoals, and rejoined Sir Hyde's squadron in the middle of the straits; a fact which demonstrates that, though some of the British ships might have been lost if the action had continued, it could have made no difference on the ultimate result after the Danish line of defence had been destroyed (2).

Melancholy appearance of the Danes after the battle. The scene which now presented itself was heart-rending in the highest degree. The sky, heretofore so brilliant, became suddenly overcast; white flags were flying from the mast-heads of the Danes; guns of distress were occasionally discharged from those scenes of woe; while the burning vessels which had floated to a distance threw an awful and lurid light over the melancholy scene (3). The English boats, with generous but not undeserved humanity, covered the sea, rendering all the assistance in their power to the Danes who had escaped from the flaming wrecks; and the wounded men, as fast as the ships could be evacuated, were

(1) Southey, ii. 135, 137. Ann. Reg. 1801. 113. Jon. xiv. 260. Dum. vi. 191, 192. James, iii. 109, 111.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1801, 113. Southey, ii. 140, 141. Jon. xiv. 261. James, iii. 115.

(3) Again, again, again,  
And the havoc did not slack,

Till a feeble cheer the Dane  
To our cheering sent us back:  
Their shots along the deep slowly boom:—  
Then ceas'd and all is wail,  
As they strike the shattered sail,  
Or, in conflagration pale,  
Light the gloom.

CAMPBELL'S *Battle of the Baltia*.

sent ashore; but great numbers perished, for such had been the unprepared ardour of the enemy that hardly any surgeons were provided to stanch the wounds of the numerous victims to patriotic duty. At daybreak on the following morning, the Elephant, to the infinite joy of Nelson, was got afloat; and the boats of the fleet being all manned, the prizes were brought away, including the Zealand of seventy-four guns, from under the cannon of the redoubted Trekroner battery. Thus terminated this murderous battle, one of the most obstinately contested ever fought by the British navy. Nelson said, "he had been in above a hundred engagements, but that of Copenhagen was the most terrible of them all (1)."

Next day was Good Friday; but all distinctions were forgotten in the universal grief which prevailed in the capital of Denmark. Every house was filled with mourners; the streets were occupied with the weeping crowds which attended the dead to their long home, or the still more distracted bands, which bore the wounded back to the hearths which they had so nobly defended. At mid-day, Nelson landed, attended by Captains Hardy and Fremantle; he walked slowly up from the quay through the crowded and agitated streets. The behaviour of the people was such as became a gallant nation, depressed, but not subdued by misfortune. "They did not," says the Danish chronicler, "either disgrace themselves by acclamations, nor degrade themselves by murmurs; the admiral was received as one brave enemy ever should receive another; he was received with respect." During the repast which followed, the particulars of the convention, which ultimately took place, were arranged. Nelson told the prince the French fought bravely, but they could not have stood for one hour the fight which the Danes had supported for four. Melancholy tributes were paid by the people of Copenhagen to the brave men who had fallen in the conflict; a public mausoleum was erected on the spot where the slain had been interred; a monument raised in the principal church, surmounted by the Danish colours; young maidens, clothed in white, stood round its base, with the widows or the orphans of those who had fallen; while a funeral sermon was delivered, and suitable patriotic strains were heard. The people were in that state of mingled grief and exultation, when the bitterness of individual loss is almost forgotten in the sympathy of general distress, or the pride of heroic achievement (2).

Armistice  
agreed on  
for fourteen  
weeks.

Of all these vessels taken, the Holstein, of sixty-four guns, was alone brought to England; the remainder being rendered un-serviceable by the fire, were sunk or burnt in the roads of Copenhagen. The negotiation which followed was attended with considerable difficulty, and Nelson was obliged to threaten to renew hostilities that very night unless the armistice was concluded. The Danes candidly stated their fears of Russia; and the English admiral avowed, that his object in wishing to make the armistice as long as possible, was, that he might have time to go to Cronstadt before returning to Copenhagen. At length it was agreed that it should last for fourteen weeks, and not be broken without a fortnight's previous notice; that the armed ships of Denmark should remain, during its continuance, *in statu quo*; that the principles of the armed neutrality should, in the mean time, be suspended as to Danish vessels; that the British fleet should obtain supplies of every sort from the island of Zealand (3); and that the prisoners and wounded should be sent ashore, to be carried to the credit of England, in the event of hostilities being renewed.

(1) Southey, ii. 143, 147. Ann. Reg. 1801, 113.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1801, 114. Southey, ii. 146, 147.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1801, 114. Southey, ii. 146, 151.  
Dum. vi. 193, 194.

Handover  
overrun by  
Prussia.  
March 25.

On the same day on which the English fleet forced the passage of the Sound, the Prussian Cabinet made a formal demand on the regency of Hanover, to permit the occupation of the electorate, and disband a part of their forces, and supported the proposition by an army of twenty thousand men. The Hanoverian Government, being in no condition to withstand an invasion from such a force, was compelled to submit, and Hanover, Bremen, and Hameln were immediately occupied by the Prussian troops. At the same time, the Danes took possession of Hamburgh and Lubeck, so as to close the mouth of the Elbe against the English commerce, while, on the other hand, a British squadron, under Admiral Duckworth, reduced all the Swedish and Danish islands in the West Indies (1).

Designs of  
Paul and  
Napoléon  
against  
British In-  
dia.

During the brief period the alliance between Paul and Napoléon lasted, they had made great progress in maturing the favourite project of both these powers, for the overthrow of the British power in India. A formal agreement for this purpose had been made between the two Cabinets; thirty-five thousand French, under Masséna, were to have embarked at Ulm, on the Danube, and to have been joined by as many Russian troops, and fifty thousand Cossacks. The King of Persia had agreed to give them a passage through his dominions; and they were to have proceeded by land, or embarked in the Persian gulf according to circumstances. Whether this plan would have succeeded, if attempted entirely with land forces, must always be considered extremely doubtful, when it is recollected what formidable deserts and mountains must have been overcome, which have never been attempted by an army encumbered with the artillery and caissons necessary for modern warfare; but that it was perfectly practicable, if accomplished by embarking in the Persian gulf, is self-evident; and it is extremely doubtful, whether, if the northern confederacy had not been dissolved, Great Britain could have relied upon maintaining a permanent naval superiority in the Indian seas (2).

(1) Jem. xiv. 261, 262. Ann. Reg. 1801, 114. Southey, ii. 151, 153.

(2) Nap. in O'Mea. i 381. Hard. vii. 479.

The plan agreed on was in these terms:—  
Feb. 28, 1802. "A French army, 35,000 strong, with light artillery, under the command of Masséna, shall be moved from France to Ulm, from whence, with the consent of Austria, it shall descend the Danube to the Black Sea.

"Arrived there, a Russian fleet will transport it to Taganrok, from whence it shall move to Taritzin, on the Volga, where it shall find boats to convey it to Astrakan.

"There it will find a Russian army of 35,000 men, composed of 15,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 10,000 Cossacks, amply provided with artillery and the horses necessary for its conveyance.

"The combined army shall be transported by the Caspian Sea, from Astrakan to Astrabat, where magazines of all sorts shall be established for its use.

"This march from the frontiers of France to Astrabat will be made in eighty days; fifty more will be requisite to bring the army to the banks of the Indus, by the rout of Herat, Ferah, and Candahar." Paul afterwards agreed to increase the Cossacks to 50,000.—See HARDENBERG, vii. 427.

In forming an opinion on the probable result of such an expedition, no conclusion can be drawn from the successful irruptions of Alexander, Timour, Gengis Khan, or Nadir Shah, because their armies were unincumbered with the artillery and ammunition waggons indispensable to modern warfare. It appears from Colonel Connolly's Travels over this country, that for ten days' journey the army must

subsist only on chopped straw, carried with itself, and that in that desert there is little or no water, and no road for wheel carriages. Still the difficulties of the transit, according to him, are great rather than insuperable. [Connolly, ii. *ad fin.*] The point is most ably discussed in a learned article in the *United Service Journal*, where all the authorities and historical facts bearing on the subject are accumulated, and the conclusions drawn apparently equally just and irresistible. [United Service Journal, No 52.] In considering the probable success of Russia in such an undertaking, it is worthy of notice, that she never brought more than 35,000 men into the field at any one point in the late war with Turkey nor so many as 10 000 in that with Persia; facts singularly illustrative of the difficulty of pushing forward any considerable force to such distant regions by overland passage. On the other hand, the red-coats, natives and Europeans, assembled for the siege of Blurtpore, were as numerous as those which fought at Waterloo (36,000 men), and 188 cannons were planted in the trenches, and that too during the hottest of the struggle in the Burmese empire. Still, as the population of Russia is doubling every half century, and she will soon have the force of Persia at her command, the British government cannot too soon take measures, by alliance and otherwise, to guard against such a danger. Perhaps, however, the real peril lies nearer home, and our splendid Indian empire is destined to be dissolved by domestic rather than foreign causes. Considering the slender tenure which we have of that magnificent dominion, and its direct exposure, since the dissolution of the India Company, to

Death of  
Paul.

But while every thing thus announced the commencement of a desperate and bloody war between England and the northern powers, an event took place within the palace of St.-Petersburg, which at once dissolved the northern confederacy, defeated the sanguine hopes of Napoléon, and changed the face of the world. This was the death of the Emperor Paul, which took place on the night of the 23d March, and led immediately to the accession of his son ALEXANDER, and a total change of policy on the part of the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg.

Napoléon announced this important event to the French in these words, "Paul I died on the night of the 23d March. The English fleet passed the Sound on the 30th. History will unveil the connexion which may have existed between these events." In truth there was a connexion, and an intimate one between them, though not in the way insinuated by the first consul. The connexion was that between flagrant misgovernment and Oriental revolution (1).

Causes of  
that catas-  
trophe,

In every country, how despotic soever, there is some restraint on the power of government. When oppression or tyranny have reached a certain height, a spirit of resistance is inevitably generated, which leads to convulsion, and this is the case equally in Oriental as European monarchy; in the age of Nero as that of James II. It is the highest glory and chief benefit of representative governments, to have given a regular and constitutional direction to this necessary element in the social system, to have converted a casual and transitory burst of revenge into a regular and pacific organ of improvement; and instead of the revolutions of the seraglio, introduced the steady Opposition of the British Parliament.

General ir-  
ritation at  
the Czar.

In Russia, this important element was unknown. No regular or useful check upon the authority of government existed; the will of the Czar was omnipotent. Measures the most hurtful might emanate from the palace without any constitutional means of redress existing, and if the conduct of the Emperor had risen to a certain degree of extravagance, no means of arresting it existed but his destruction. Many concurring causes had conspired to irritate the Russian noblesse at the Emperor Paul, and yet the vehemence of his character precluded all hope of a return to more rational principles of administration. The suspension of the commercial intercourse with England, by cutting off the great market for their rude produce, had injured the vital interests of the Russian landed proprietors; the embargo on English shipping, laid on in defiance of all the laws of war as well as the usages of humanity, had inflicted as deep a wound on their mercantile classes. The aristocracy of the country beheld with undisguised apprehension all the fixed principles of Russian policy abandoned, and a close alliance formed with a formidable revolutionary continental state, to the exclusion of the maritime power on whom they depended for the sale of almost all the produce which constituted their wealth, while the merchants felt it to be impossible to enter into any safe speculation, when the conduct of the Czar was so variable, and equal vehemence was exhibited in conducting war against an old ally, as in forming peace with a deadly foe. The internal administration of the empire was, in many respects, tyrannical and capricious; and although that might not by itself have led to a revolt in a country so habituated to submission as Muscovy, yet, combined with other and deeper causes of irritation,

British Legislation, in an assembly where its interests are neither directly nor indirectly represented, it is impossible to contemplate without alarm the probable effect upon its future destinies of the de-

mocratic influence which has recently received so great an increase.

(1) Dum. vi. 193. Jom. xiv. 263. Ann. Reg. 1801, 115. Bigu. i. 47.



it produced a powerful effect. The French dress had been rigidly proscribed at the capital; the form of a coat might bring the wearer into peril of a visit to Siberia; and the Czar had renewed the ancient custom, which the good sense of preceding sovereigns had suffered to fall into disuetude, of compelling the noblesse, of whatever rank or sex, to stop their carriages and alight when they met any of the Imperial family. These causes, affecting equally the interests, the habits, and the vanity of the most powerful classes, had produced that general feeling of irritation at the Government, which in free states leads to a change of ministers, in despotic, to a dethronement of the sovereign (1).

Symptoms  
of insanity  
in his con-  
duct.

Latterly, the conduct of the Emperor had been so extravagant, as to have given rise to a very general belief that he laboured under a certain degree of insanity. This was confirmed, not less by his private than his public conduct. The state papers and articles in the St.-Petersburg Gazette, which avowedly issued from his hand, or were prepared under his direction, bore evident marks of aberration. When despatches of importance were presented to him from the British Government, containing terms of conciliation, he returned them unopened, after piercing them with his penknife. In the Court Gazette of December 30, 1800, he published an invitation to all the sovereigns of Europe to come to St.-Petersburg, and settle their disputes by a combat in a *champs clos*, with their ministers, Pitt, Thugut, Bernstorff, and Talleyrand, for esquires (2). He was so much enraged at Prussia for not instantly falling into his vehement hostility towards Great Britain, that he threatened some months before to put a stop to all intercourse between his subjects and the north of Germany, and immediately before his death entertained seriously the project of closing all the harbours in Europe against the British commerce, and overwhelming her Indian possessions by a cloud of Tartars and Kalmucks (3).

Conspiracy  
among the  
nobles for  
his de-  
thronement.

Alarmed at this perilous crisis of public affairs, several of the leading nobles in Russia entered into a conspiracy, the object of which, at first, was to dethrone the Czar merely, without depriving him of life; but experience in every age has confirmed the adage, that from the prisons to the grave of princes is but a step. The governor of St.-Petersburg, Count Pahlen, a minister high in the confidence of the Emperor, was deeply implicated in the conspiracy; and General Bennigsen, who afterwards bore a distinguished part in the war against France, is supposed to have taken a leading share in carrying it into execution. The plot was communicated to Paul's two sons, the Grand Duke Alexander, and Constantine, though without any insinuation that it would be attended with danger to their father's life, it being merely held out that the safety of the empire indispensably required that the Emperor's insanity should be prevented from doing any farther detriment to the public interests. The apprehension of private danger induced the young princes to lend a more willing ear than they might otherwise have done to these proposals; for, independent, of the natural violence of their father's temperament, with which they were well acquainted, they were aware that he had become lately prejudiced against his nearest relations, and had dropped hints to the Princess Gagarin, the object of his chivalrous devotion, of his intention of sending Alexander to Siberia, immuring Constantine in a fortress, and the empress-mother in a cloister. But notwithstanding this danger, it was with great difficulty that the young princes could be brought to

(1) Bign. i. 430, 433. Nap. ii. 152, 153.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1801, 114, 115. Jom. xiv 265.

(2) "Latterly," said Napoleon, "I think Paul

was mad."—O'MEARA, 380.

Hard. vii. 41.

give their consent to the conspiracy ; and Alexander in particular, the eldest son, only yielded on condition that his father's life should be spared (1).

His assassination. Its particulars. On the evening before his death, Paul received a note, when at supper with his mistress, warning him of the danger with which he was threatened. He put it in his pocket, saying he would read it on the morrow (2). He retired to bed at twelve. At two in the morning Prince Subof, whose situation and credit in the palace gave him access at all times to the imperial chambers, presented himself with the other conspirators at the door. A hussar, who refused admission, was cut down on the spot, and the whole party entered, and found the royal apartments empty. Paul, hearing the noise, had got up, and hid himself in a press. "He has escaped," said some of the conspirators. "That he has not," return Bennigsen. "No weakness, or I will put you all to death." At the same time Pahlen, who never lost his presence of mind, put his hand on the bed-clothes, and feeling them warm, observed that the Emperor could not be far off, and he was soon discovered, and dragged from his retreat. They presented to the Emperor his abdication to sign. Paul refused. A contest arose, and in the struggle an officer's sash was passed round the neck of the unhappy monarch, and he was strangled after a desperate resistance (3). The two grand dukes were in the room below. Alexander eagerly inquired, the moment it was over, whether they had saved his father's life. Pahlen's silence told too plainly the melancholy tale, and the young prince tore his hair in an agony of grief, and broke out into sincere and passionate exclamations of sorrow at the catastrophe which had prepared the way for his ascent to the throne. The despair of the empress and the Grand Duke Constantine was equally vehement ; but Pahlen, calm and collected, represented that the empire indispensably required a change of policy, and that nothing now remained but for Alexander to assume the reins of government (4).

The evident symptoms of insanity which this ill-fated monarch evinced towards the close of his reign, his fickleness of conduct, tyrannical usage of British seamen, and general extravagance of demeanour, must not throw into the shade the good qualities which at an earlier period he displayed, and the important ameliorations which he effected in his country. He first established the hereditary succession to the crown ; a matter of infinite importance in a government partaking so largely of the Oriental character. His improvements in the administration of the army were immense, and laid the foundation of the rapid strides which it made under his more fortunate successor. His prodigalities even contributed to the circulation of wealth, and sensibly augmented the public improvement. He was vehement, inconstant, and capricious, but not without a large intermixture of generous feeling, and occasionally capable of heroic actions (5).

The influence of the causes which had occasioned this violent and frightful revolution speedily appeared in the measures which the young Emperor pursued on his accession to the throne. The conspirators were invested with the chief offices of state, and the Czar was compelled to take counsel from those

(1) Bign. i. 434, 435. Hard. viii.

(2) Prince Mechercki wrote a letter to Paul in the early part of that day to warn him of his danger, and reveal the names of the conspirators. He delivered the letter into the hands of Koutaitsoff, another courtier, who put it in his coat pocket, and forgot it there when he changed his dress to dine with the emperor. He returned to get it ; but Paul growing impatient, sent for him in a hurry, and the

trembling courtier came back without the epistle on which so much depended. — Hæro. viii. 6.

(3) The dress of Ouvaroff, one of the conspirators, caused him to be mistaken by the Emperor for his son Constantine ; and the last words which the unhappy monarch uttered were, "And you too, my Constantine !"

(4) Bign. i. 438, 439. O'Meara. i. 380. Hard. viii. 86, 87.

(5) Hard. viii. 91.

Accession  
of Alexan-  
der, and  
immediate  
approach to  
an accom-  
modation  
with Eng-  
land.

whose hands had recently been imbrued in his father's blood, in every thing connected with the government of the empire (1). The new Emperor, on the day succeeding his elevation to the throne, issued a proclamation declaring his resolution to govern according to the maxims and system of his august grandmother, Catherine; and one of the first acts of his reign was to give orders that the British sailors and captains, who had been taken from the ships laid under sequestration, and marched into the interior, should be set at liberty, and carefully conducted, at the public expense, to the ports from which they had been severally taken. At the same time all prohibitions against the export of corn were removed; a measure of no small importance to the famishing population of the British isles, and hardly less material to the gorged proprietors of Russian produce. The young Emperor shortly after wrote a letter with his own hand to the King of England, expressing in the warmest terms his desire to re-establish the amicable relations of the two empires; a declaration which was received with equal shouts of joy in London as St.-Petersburg (2).

His charac-  
ter.

Perhaps no sovereign since the days of the Antonines ever was called to higher destinies, or more worthily filled an important place in the theatre of the world than the Emperor Alexander. Placed at the head of the most powerful and rising empire in existence, stationed midway between ancient civilisation and barbaric vigour, he was called to take the lead in the great struggle for European freedom; to combat, with the energy and enthusiasm of the desert, the superiority of advanced information, and meet the condensed military force of a revolution, which had beat down all the strength of continental power, with the dauntless resolution and enduring fortitude which arise in the earlier ages of social existence. Well and nobly he fulfilled his destiny.—Repeatedly defeated, never subdued, he took counsel, like his great predecessor, from misfortune, and prepared in silence those invincible bands which, in the day of trial, hurled back the most terrible array which ambition had ever marshalled against the liberties of mankind. A majestic figure, a benevolent expression of countenance, gave him that sway over the multitude which ever belongs to physical advantages in youthful princes; while the qualities of his understanding and the feelings of his heart secured the admiration of all whose talents fitted them to judge of the affairs of nations. Misunderstood by those who formed their opinion only from the ease and occasional levity of his manner, he was early formed to great determinations, and evinced in the most trying circumstances, during the French invasion and the Congress of Vienna, a solidity of judgment equalled only by the strength of his resolution. A disposition naturally generous and philanthropic, moulded by the precepts of La Harpe, had strongly imbued his mind with liberal principles, which shone forth in full lustre when he was called on to act as the pacificator of the world after the fall of Paris; but subsequent experience convinced him of the extreme danger of prematurely

(1) A lady of rank and wit wrote to Fouché, on occasion of a public ceremony at which the Emperor was present soon after his accession—"The young Emperor walked, preceded by the assassins of his grandfather, followed by those of his father, and surrounded by his own."—"There," said Fouché, "is a woman who speaks Tacitus."—See Bign. i. 445 HARD. vii. 103.

(2) Jom. xiv. 268, 269. Ann. Reg. 1801, 116.  
The empress-mother, a woman of heroic spirit and noble character, and who possessed the greatest influence through life over her son, openly and uniformly avowed her horror at Paul's murder; and

shortly after that event, had a picture painted, representing him on his deathbed, and publicly exposed at the Foundling Hospital, which was under her peculiar charge. Prodigious crowds having been attracted by the sight, Count Pahlen became alarmed at the consequences, and prevailed on Alexander to request his mother to have it removed. But the princess was not to be shaken. "My son," said she, "you must choose between Pahlen and me." The painting remained, and the minister was soon after dismissed from his situations.—D'Az. vi. 342.

transplanting the institutions of one country into another in a different stage of civilisation; and his latter years were chiefly directed to objects of practical improvement(1), and the preparation of his subjects, by the extension of knowledge and the firmness of government, for those privileges which, if suddenly conferred, would have involved in equal ruin his empire and himself.

His early  
peace and  
popular  
measures.

The first measures of his administration were eminently calculated to win that popularity which, notwithstanding the proverbial fickleness of the multitude, never afterwards forsook him. By an ukase, published on the 14th April, he restored to the nobility their privileges, and prerogatives, such as they had been in the time of the Empress Catherine, re-established the rights of municipalities, abolished secret proceedings in criminal cases, awarded a general amnesty, and stopped all the state prosecutions which had been commenced. Indulgences were at the same time granted to the clergy, and measures taken to re-open those vents for the rude produce of the state, the closing of which had occasioned so much alarm. Independent of his letter to the King of England, the Emperor wrote to Sir Hyde Parker, expressing an anxious wish to close with the amicable propositions made by the British Government to his predecessor, provided it could be done without violating his engagements to his allies, and entreating him in the mean time to suspend hostilities, and conveying the pleasing intelligence that orders had been given that the British seamen sent to prison by Paul were set at liberty (2). At the time when this letter arrived at the British fleet, Sir Hyde had not been recalled by the English ministry, and Nelson, wisely judging that the best way of forwarding a pacific negotiation was to support it by a hostile demonstration, made sail with all his squadron to Carls-crona, where, in answer to a message inquiring whether the Swedish Government was willing to be included in the armistice concluded with Denmark, he received an answer that they "could not listen to separate proposals, but would close with any equitable offers made by Great Britain to the united

April 18,  
Nelson sails  
for Cronstadt.

northern powers." This reply, coupled with the well-known pacific inclinations of the Court of Stockholm, led the English admiral to conclude that he would experience no difficulty in arranging an accommodation with the whole Baltic states, if the disputes with the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg could be adjusted; and therefore he proposed instantly to sail for Revel, where a large portion of the Russian fleet lay in an open bay, exposed to his attacks, and unable from the ice to make their escape. But Sir Hyde, who trusted that the death of Paul would immediately lead to a settlement of all the differences, insisted upon returning to Kioge bay, where he cast anchor, and remained till the 5th May, when he was recalled by the British Government, and Nelson appointed to the command in chief. No sooner was he the unfettered master of his own actions, than he set sail for the gulf of Finland. But when he arrived there he found that in the interval the enemy had escaped; they had cut through the ice in the mole, six feet

His concilia-  
tory measures  
there.

thick, on the 3d May, and were now safe under the cannon of Cronstadt. Thither they were followed by the indefatigable Nelson, who saluted the forts when he approached, and wrote to the Emperor congratulating him on his accession, and urging the immediate release of the British subjects and property. A friendly intercourse was immediately established between the British admiral and the Russian authorities; but as the

(1) Jom. xiv. 270. Hard. viii. 96, 104.

(2) Ukase, April 7, 1801. State papers, 1801. 256.

Emperor expressed great uneasiness at the presence of the English squadron, and it was evident that the negotiation would proceed more favourably if this cause of irritation was removed, Nelson stood out to sea, and proceeded down the Baltic, leaving only a brig to bring off the provisions which had been contracted for. This judicious and conciliatory conduct was met with a corresponding disposition on the part of Russia. When at anchor off Rostock, he received an answer to his letter to the Emperor, couched in the most flattering terms, and containing the important intelligence, that the British vessels and crews which had been detained were ordered to be liberated. On his return to Copenhagen, he found that the conduct of Denmark during his absence had been actuated by very different principles; the most hostile preparations had been going forward, in defiance of the treaty, and ample grounds existed, if the English Government had been inclined, to renew hostilities, and utterly destroy the Danish naval power. But the death of Paul had dissolved the confederacy; conciliatory measures were now the most prudent course which could be adopted, and Nelson, wisely dissembling his resentment, proceeded to England to receive the thanks of a grateful nation, which his valour and skill had brought victorious out of a state of unprecedented danger (1).

Peace with  
Russia, and  
abandon-  
ment of the  
principles  
of the arm-  
ed neutral-  
ity.

The British Cabinet immediately sent Lord St.-Helens to St.-Petersburg; and soon after his arrival at that capital, he signed a treaty as glorious to England as it was confirmatory of the correctness of the view she had taken of the law of nations in this great question. By this convention it was provided, "That the

right of searching merchant-ships belonging to the subjects of one of the contracting powers, and navigating under a ship-of-war of the same power, shall only be exercised by ships-of-war of the belligerent party, and shall never extend to the fitters out of privateers or other vessels which do not belong to the imperial or royal fleet of their majesties, but which their subjects shall have fitted out for war; that the effects on board neutral ships shall be free, with the exception of contraband of war and of enemy's property; and it is agreed not to comprise in the number of the latter the merchandise of the produce, growth, or manufacture of the countries at war, which should have been acquired by the subjects of the neutral power, and should be transported for their account." And the contraband articles between the two powers were declared to be the same as those specified in the treaty 10th February 1797; viz. "cannons, mortars, fire-arms, pistols, bombs, grenades, balls, bullets, firelocks, flints, matches, sulphur, helmets, pikes, swords, sword-belts, pouches, saddles and bridles, excepting such quantity of the said articles as may be necessary for the defence of the ship and crew." And "that, in order to determine what shall be deemed a blockaded port, that denomination only is given to such a one where there is, by the disposition of the power which attacks it, with ships stationary or sufficiently near, an evident danger in entering (2)." By this treaty the right of search was placed upon its true footing; it was divested of the circumstances most likely to occasion irritation in neutral vessels, and not stipulated in favour of either party as a new right, but merely recognised as a privilege already existing, necessarily inherent by the practice of maritime states in every belligerent power, and subjected to such restraints as the enlarged experience of mankind had proved to be expedient.

(1) Southey, ii. 162, 171. Bign. i. 443, 446.  
Journ. xiv. 272, 274. Nap. ii. 154, 156.

(2) Convention, June, 17, 1801. Articles 3, 4.  
State papers, 213. Ann. Reg. 1801.



Napoléon's indignation at it. Napoléon has observed upon this agreement, "Europe beheld with astonishment this ignominious treaty signed by Russia, and which, by consequence, Denmark and Sweden were compelled to adopt. It was equivalent to an admission of the sovereignty of the seas in the British Parliament, and the slavery of all other states. This treaty was such that England could have desired nothing more, and a power of the third order would have been ashamed to have signed it." A stronger panegyric could not have been pronounced on this memorable convention, or a more valuable eulogium on the firmness of the Cabinet and the intrepidity of the seamen, by whom these important advantages had been secured. The first consul early despatched Duroc to St.-Petersburg to endeavour to counterbalance the influence of Great Britain, and bring Alexander back to the footsteps of his predecessor; but though he received the most flattering reception, he could effect nothing against the ascendant of Nelson; and the treaty was signed, to the universal joy of both nations (1).

May 19. Dissolution of the naval confederacy. Sweden and Denmark were not expressly included in the convention of the 17th June; but they were compelled to follow the example of Russia. Unable of themselves to contend with the naval power of England, the anticipated loss of all their colonies, and the certainty of being deprived of their whole commerce, if they continued the contest, ultimately overcame the influence of France, and the recollection of their recent wounds at Copenhagen. On the 20th May, a convention was agreed to by the Danish Government, in virtue of which the city of Hamburgh was, three days afterwards, evacuated by the Danish troops, and the free navigation of the Elbe restored; and on the 19th, the embargo was raised both in Russia, Sweden, and Denmark. These measures were immediately met by corresponding steps on the part of the British Government; the embargo on all the ships of the Baltic powers in the harbours of Great Britain was raised; and the expense both of putting it on and taking it off, so far as Danish vessels were concerned, defrayed by the English treasury. Prussia had been unwillingly drawn into the struggle, and took the first opportunity of escaping from its effects. Under the mediation of Russia, an arrangement was concluded, by which the Prussian troops were to evacuate Hanover, and restore the free navigation of the Weser (2).

Reflections on these events Thus was dissolved, in less than six months after it had been formed, the most formidable confederacy ever arrayed against the English maritime power. Professedly contracted in order to obtain the liberty of the seas, it was really directed against the grandeur and prosperity of Great Britain; breathing only the sentiments of freedom and justice, it was, in truth, intended to divide among the coalesced states the power and the ascendancy of a more fortunate rival. The rapidity with which this powerful alliance was broken up by England, at the conclusion of a long and burdensome war, and when her people were labouring under the combined pressure of severe want and diminished employment, is one of the most remarkable features of this memorable contest; and, perhaps more than any other, characteristic of the vast ascendancy, moral as well as political, which she has acquired among the other nations in the world. It is in vain to say, the dissolution of the confederacy was owing to the death of Paul; the revolution at St.-Petersburg was itself the result of the influence of Great Britain; of that vast commerce, which has made her intercourse essential to the very

(1) Nap. ii. 159. Bign. i. 451, 452. Hard. viii. 62.

(2) Join. xiv. 275, 276. Bign. i. 451, 452. Ann. Reg. 1801, 116.

existence of the most haughty continental states; and that moral sway, which ranges under her banners the most powerful and important classes of distant nations. The conduct of the English Government and people, during this trying crisis, was a model of firmness and moderation, and was deservedly crowned by one of the most glorious triumphs recorded in their history. Disdaining to submit to the menaces even of combined Europe, they boldly fronted the danger; anticipated by the rapidity of their movements the junction of their adversaries, paralysed by the thunder of their arms the first of their opponents, and at the same time holding out the olive branch, succeeded in detaching the greatest power from the confederacy, and ultimately dissolving it, without the abandonment of one principle for which the war had been undertaken. The convention of 17th June fixed the maritime question upon its true basis; it arrogated no peculiar privilege to Great Britain, subjected to no exclusive humiliation the neutral states, but prescribing one equal rule for all belligerent powers, and imposing one equal obligation upon all neutrals, settled the right of search and blockade upon that equitable footing, which, alike obligatory upon England and inferior nations, must ever remain the law of the seas, while ambition and revenge continue to desolate the world.

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## CHAPTER XXXIV.

## EXPEDITION TO EGYPT—CONCLUSION OF THE WAR.

AUGUST, 1799—OCTOBER, 1801.

## ARGUMENT.

State of the Egyptian army when left by Napoléon—Desponding letter of Kléber to the Directory—It falls into the hands of the English, who forward it to Napoléon—Mourad Bey issues from the Desert, and is defeated—Advance of the Turkish force—Defeat of a detachment at the mouth of the Nile—Convention of El-Arish—The British Government had previously prohibited such a convention—Hostilities are in consequence resumed—Battle of Heliopolis—Total defeat of the Turks—Desperate situation of the garrison at Cairo—Storm and massacre at Boulak—Cairo is retaken—Defeat of the Turks in every quarter—Improved condition of the French army—Assassination of Kléber—His designs when he fell—Menou takes the command—Preparations for the English expedition—Magnificent conception of the attack—Whole contest falls on Abercromby's corps—Sir Ralph resolves to make the attack alone—Arrival of the expedition on the coast of Egypt—Landing of the troops—Severe action on the Sand-hills, and defeat of the French there—Cautious measures of the English general—Bloody encounter with the French advanced guard—Description of the ground now taken up by the British Army—Position of the French—Interesting recollections connected with the spot—Battle of Alexandria—Wound and death of Sir Ralph Abercromby—Immense moral effects of this victory; but its first results are not equally decisive—Surrender of Damietta—Divisions break out among the French generals—Indecisive measures of Menou—General Hutchison assumes the command of the English army, and advances towards Cairo—Capture of Ramanieh—General Belliard is repulsed near Cairo—Which is invested—Advance of Sir David Baird's division from the Red Sea—Their march from Cosier to Thebes across the Desert—General Hutchison moves against Menou at Alexandria—Progress of the Siege—Surrender of Menou—Change in the Government of Egypt—Which falls into the hands of the Turks—Extravagant rejoicings in Constantinople and London at these events—Great maritime exertions of Napoléon to preserve Egypt—Naval action in the bay of Algesiraz—The English are worsted—Second battle of Algesiraz—Terrible catastrophe of the Spanish vessels, and defeat of the French—Attack of Napoléon on Portugal—Treaty with Spain for this purpose—The Portuguese apply to the English for aid—But can make no resistance to France—Peace concluded, which the First Consul refuses to ratify—A French army invades Portugal—Peace purchased by enormous pecuniary spoliation—Napoléon offers Hanover to Prussia—which declines the proposal—Preparations for the invasion of England—Apprehensions of the British Government—Attack on the flotilla at Bologne, by Lord Nelson, which is defeated—Negotiations for peace between France and England—First proposals of England—which are refused—Preliminaries signed at London—Transports of joy on the occasion, both in France and England—But it is severely stigmatized by many in England—Arguments urged against it in the country—Arguments urged in support of it by the Administration—Peace between France and Turkey—And treaties between France, and Bavaria, and America—Important treaty between France and Russia—Debates on the peace in the British Parliament—Arguments urged against it by the Opposition—Answer made by the Government and Mr. Pitt—Reflections on the peace, which appears to have been expedient—Vast increase of the naval and military resources of England during the war, as compared with those of France—Comparative increase in revenue of France and England during its continuance—Public debt, exports, imports, and shipping, of the two countries during its continuance—General result of these details—Reflections on the immense efforts made by England at the close of the war—Compared with the niggardly exertions at its commencement—Great part of this prosperity was owing to the paper currency—Its effects on prices—Glorious state and character of England at the conclusion of the contest.

State of  
the Egyptian  
army  
when left  
by Napoléon.

WHEN Napoléon quitted the Egyptian shores, and the career of Asiatic glory, to follow his fortunes on the theatre of Europe, he left Kléber in the command of the army, and addressed to him a long letter, containing minute directions for the regulation of his conduct in all possible emergencies which might occur. As it was evident

that the victory of the Nile had completely cut off all chance of maintaining a regular intercourse with France, and it was therefore more than probable that the Egyptian army would be compelled to capitulate, he distinctly authorized his successor to conclude a convention for the evacuation of Egypt, if he received no succours or assistance from France during the following year, and the deaths by the plague should amount to above fifteen hundred persons. Immediately after being invested with the command, Kléber wrote a letter to the Directory, in which he gave the most desponding view of the situation of the army; asserted that it was reduced to half its former amount; was destitute of every thing, and in the lowest state of depression; that the manufactories of powder and arms had totally failed; that no resources existed to replace the stores which had been expended; that General Bonaparte, so far from leaving any money behind him to maintain the troops, had bequeathed to them only a debt of 12,000,000 of francs (L.480,000), being more than a year's revenue of the province; that the soldiers were 4,000,000 (L.160,000) in arrear of their pay; that the Mamelukes were dispersed, not destroyed; and that the Grand Vizier and Djezzar Pacha had arrived at Acre at the head of 30,000 men. He concluded in these terms: "Such are, citizen directors, the circumstances under which General Bonaparte has laid upon me the enormous burden of the Army of the East. He saw the fatal crisis was approaching; your orders doubtless prevented him from attempting to surmount it. That the crisis was at hand is attested equally by his letters, his instructions, his negotiations. It is notorious to all the world, and unhappily as well known to our enemies as to the French in Egypt. In these circumstances, I think the best thing I can do is to continue the negotiations commenced by Bonaparte, even if it should lead to no other result than to gain time. I have annexed the letter I have written to the Grand Vizier, sending him at the same time the duplicate of that of Bonaparte (1)."

Despond-  
ing letter of  
Kléber to  
the Direc-  
tory.

(1) Napoléon and Kléber's letters, in Dum. iv. 110, 125.

Aug. 17, 1799. The letter which Napoléon had addressed to the Grand Vizier previous to his departure from the East, is one of the most characteristic of all his compositions. "Alas!" said he, "why are the Sublime Porte, and the French nation, after having been friends for so many years, now at war with each other? Your excellency cannot be ignorant that the French nation has ever been warmly attached to the Sublime Porte. Endowed as your excellency is with the most distinguished talents, it cannot have escaped your penetration, that the Austrians and Russians are united in a perpetual league against the Turkish empire, and that the French, on the other hand, have done every thing in their power to arrest their wicked designs. Your excellency knows that the Russians are the enemies of the Mussulman faith; and that the Emperor Paul, as Grand-Master of Malta, has solemnly sworn enmity to the race of Osmanlis. The French, on the other hand, have abolished the Order of Malta, given liberty to the Mahometan prisoners detained there, and profess the same belief as themselves, 'That there is no God but the true God.' Is it not strange then, that the Sublime Porte should declare war on the French, its real and sincere friend, and contract alliance with the Russians and Germans, its implacable enemies?"

"As long as the French were of the sect of the Messiah they were the friends of the Sublime Porte; nevertheless that power declares war against them. This has arisen from the error into which the Courts of England and Russia have led the Turkish Divan.

We had informed it by letter of our intended expedition into Arabia; but these Courts found means to interrupt and suppress our letters; and although I had proved to the Sublime Porte that the French Republic, far from wishing to deprive it of any part of its dominions, had not even the smallest intention of making war on it, his most Glorious Majesty, Sultan Selim, gave credit to the English, and with unaccountable precipitance declared war on the French his ancient allies. Though informed of this war, I despatched an ambassador to avert it; but he was seized and thrown into prison, and I was obliged, in spite of myself, to cross the Desert and carry the war into Syria.

"Though my army is as innumerable as the sands of the sea, full of courage; though I have fortresses and castles of prodigious strength; though I have no fear or apprehension of any sort; yet, out of commiseration to the human race, and above all from a desire to be reunited to the first and most faithful of our allies, the Sultan Selim, I now make known my disposition for peace. If you wish to have Egypt, tell me so. France never entertained an idea of taking it out of the hands of the Sublime Porte and swallowing it up. Give authority to your minister who is at Paris, or send some one to Egypt with full powers, and all shall be arranged without animosity, and agreeably to your desires."

Under such a specious guise did Napoléon conceal his ambitious designs on the East; his resolution, so early formed and steadily adhered to, of making Egypt a French colony; his unprovoked seizure of that country while at peace with the Ottoman empire, and his attempt which, but for the repulse at

It falls into  
the hands  
of the Eng-  
lish, who  
forward it  
to Napoléon.

That this letter contained an exaggerated picture of the circumstances and sufferings of the army, is abundantly proved by the condition in which it was found by the English troops when they landed at Alexandria eighteen months afterwards. In truth, Kléber wrote under a bitter feeling of irritation at Napoléon for having deserted the Egyptian army; and his letter is tinged by those gloomy colours in which all exiles, but in an especial manner the French, regard the country of their banishment. It fell into the hands of the English during its passage across the Mediterranean, and was by their Government forwarded to the first consul after his accession to supreme authority; and it is not the least honourable trait in that great man's character, that he made allowance for the influence of the desponding feelings which he had so repeatedly witnessed in the Egyptian officers, and never sought to revenge upon his absent lieutenant the spiteful expressions which, in an official despatch to Government, he had used towards himself (1).

Mourad  
Bey issues  
from the  
Desert, and  
is defeated.  
Aug. 6,  
1799.

But although Kléber, under the influence of these gloomy views, addressed proposals of accommodation to the Grand Vizier, he made the most vigorous preparations to repel the attack with which he was threatened from the Ottoman army. The greater part of the French troops were stationed at El-Arish and the eastern frontier to watch the motions of the Syrian host, while six thousand were scattered along the course of the Nile, from the cataracts to the ocean, to overawe the Mamelukes, and guard the sea-coast from Turkish invasion. Encouraged by the approach of the Grand Vizier's army, the indefatigable Mourad Bey again issued from the Desert, at the head of two thousand Mamelukes; but he was attacked by Desaix, early in August, at Syout, and obliged to fall back. Following up his success, the French general mounted his infantry on dromedaries, and, at the head of a chosen band, pursued the Mameluke chief into his farthest recesses. The latter, conceiving he had only to deal with horsemen, charged the attacking column with great impetuosity; but the cavaliers instantly dismounted, placed their dromedaries in the centre, and formed a square, with the front rank kneeling, as at the battle of the Pyramids. The Mamelukes were received with the murderous rolling fire of Sultan Kebir, and, after charging repeatedly on every side, they fled in disorder into the Desert, and did not again appear on the theatre of Egyptian warfare (2).

Advance of  
the Turk-  
ish force.  
Defeat of  
a detach-  
ment at the  
mouth of  
the Nile.  
Nov. 1.

The Turkish army which Napoléon destroyed at Aboukir, was but the advanced guard of the vast force which the Sublime Porte had collected to recover Egypt from the Republican arms. Their main body, consisting of twenty thousand Janizaries and regular soldiers, and twenty-five thousand irregular troops, arrived in the end of October in the neighbourhood of Gazah, on the confines of the Desert which separates Syria from Egypt. At the same time a corps of eight thousand Janizaries, under the convoy of Sir Sidney Smith, arrived at the mouth of the Nile, to effect a diversion in that quarter. The leading division, consisting of four thousand men, landed, and made themselves masters of the tower of Bogaz, at the mouth of the Nile, where they immediately began to fortify themselves; but before their works had made any progress, they were attacked by General Verdier, at the head of a thousand French, routed, and

Acre, would in all probability have succeeded, of revolutionizing the whole of Asia Minor, and mounting himself on the throne of Constantine.—See the *Original Letter in Ann. Reg.* 1800, 218, 219.

(1) Dum. iv. 130, 131. Jom. iv. 376. Nap. in Month. ii. 215.

(2) Jom. xiv. 377, 378. Dum. iv. 151. Berth. 194.



driven into the sea, with the loss of five pieces of cannon, and all their standards (1).

Convention  
of El-Arish.

Relieved by this decisive victory from all apprehensions in that quarter, Kléber turned his whole attention to the great array which was approaching from the Syrian Desert. The check at the mouth of the Nile rendered the Grand Vizier more disposed to enter into negotiations, while the declining numbers and desponding spirits of the French rendered them desirous on any terms to extricate themselves from a hopeless banishment, and revisit their beloved country. Napoléon had made propositions for an accommodation so early as 17th August; and Sir Sidney Smith had warned Kléber that, in virtue of the treaty, 5th January, 1799, Turkey could no longer make peace with France, but in concert with Russia and Great Britain. An unexpected reverse facilitated the negotiation; the Grand Vizier having crossed the Desert laid siege to El-Arish. The operations were conducted by Major Douglas and other British officers, and the fort carried, during a tumult

Dec. 29.

of insubordination on the part of the garrison, on the 29th December. After their means of defence were exhausted, the garrison capitulated; but the terms were disregarded by the unruly crowd of Mussulmans, and in spite of the utmost efforts of the British officers, above three hundred French were put to the sword. The capture of this stronghold, which Napoléon termed one of the keys of Egypt, and the proof it afforded of the degree to which the spirit of the troops had been shaken, had a powerful effect in

Jan. 24. 1800.

accelerating the negotiations; and a convention was signed at El-Arish about a month afterwards, by which it was stipulated, that the French army should return to Europe with its arms and baggage, on board its own vessels, or those furnished by the Turkish authorities; that all the fortresses of Egypt, with the exception of Alexandria (2), Rosetta, and Aboukir, where the army was to embark, should be surrendered within forty-five days; that the prisoners on both sides should be given up, and that the Grand Vizier should pay L.120,000 during the three months that the evacuation was going forward.

This convention was not signed by the British admiral, Sir Sidney Smith; nor was he vested either with express authority to conclude such a treaty, nor with such a command as necessarily implied such a power. It was, however, entered into with his concurrence and approbation, and like a man of honour, he felt himself as much bound to see it carried into effect, as if his

The British Government had previously prohibited such a convention.

signature had been affixed to the instrument. But the British Government had, three months before, sent out orders to Lord Keith, commanding the English fleet in the Mediterranean, not to consent to any treaty in which it was not stipulated that the French army were to be prisoners of war; and Lord Keith, on the 8th January,

a fortnight before the convention of El-Arish was signed, had sent a letter from Minorca, to Kléber, warning him that any vessels having on board French troops, returning home in virtue of a capitulation, other than an unconditional surrender, would be made prisoners of war (3). No sooner was

Hostilities in consequence resumed.

this letter received by General Kléber, in February following, than he was filled with indignation, despatched instant orders to put a stop to the evacuation of the country, which had commenced, and resolved to resume hostilities. In an animated proclamation to his troops, he declar-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1799, 217. Dumas, iv. 132, 133. Jom. xiii. 396, 397.

(2) Jom. xiv. 402. Ann. Reg. 1800, 219. State papers, 223. Berth. 310, 313.

(3) See Lord Keith's letter in Berthier, 391.

ed :—"Soldiers! we can only answer such insolence by victories—prepare to combat (1)." This announcement was received with loud shouts by the troops, who had already become highly dissatisfied at the humiliating convention which had been concluded, and they joyfully prepared to forget all their cares in the excitement of a battle (2).

March 20,  
1800.  
Battle of  
Heliopolis. Kléber drew up his army, which had now arrived from all parts of Egypt, and was twelve thousand strong, by moonlight, on the night of 19th March, in four squares, in the plain of Koubbe, in front of the ruins of Heliopolis. The heavens ever serene in those latitudes, enabled them to perform the movement with precision, though the light was too feeble to permit the enemy to perceive what was going forward. In front were stationed the four squares, with artillery at the angles, and the cavalry in the intervals. Companies of grenadiers doubled the corners of each square, and were ready to be employed either in resisting an attack, or offensive movements. Order, silence, and regularity prevailed in the European army; the solemnity of the occasion had subdued the usual vivacity of the French character; they felt that the moment had arrived when they must either conquer or die. The Turks, on the other hand, were encamped, after the manner of Asiatics, in confused masses, in the neighbourhood of El-Hanka; six thousand Janizaries lay in the village of Matarieh, where they had thrown up some rude fortifications; their numerous cavalry, with the Mamelukes of Ibrahim Bey, extended on the right of that advanced guard as far as the banks of the Nile. Their whole force amounted to nearly fifty thousand men; but more than half of this array consisted of irregulars, upon whom little reliance was to be placed; and the situation of the regular corps in the village of Matarieh suggested the hope that they might be cut off before the remainder of the army could come up to their support. For this purpose, General Friant advanced before daybreak straight towards that village, while Regnier, with his division, moved forward in front of the ruins of Heliopolis to cut off the communication between their detached corps and the bulk of the Turkish army. No sooner did the Janizaries perceive that the enemy were approaching their intrenchments, than they sallied forth with their redoubtable scimitars in their hands, and commenced a furious attack

(1) *Jom.* xiv. 404, 405. *Dan.* iv. 136. *Berth.* 392.

(2) The continental historians of every description are loud in their abuse of the English Government for what they call their bad faith in refusing to ratify the convention of El Arish. The smallest attention to dates must be sufficient to prove that these censures are totally destitute of foundation. The convention was signed at El-Arish, on January 24th, 1800, and Lord Keith's letter, announcing that the British Government would agree to no capitulation, was dated Minorca, January, 8th, 1800, or sixteen days before the signature of the treaty. This letter was founded on instructions sent out by the English Cabinet to Lord Keith, dated December 17th, in consequence of the intercepted letters of Kléber, which had fallen into their hands immediately after Napoleon's return. Kléber no sooner received Lord Keith's letter than he resumed hostilities, and fought the battle of Heliopolis with his wonted precipitance, without once reflecting on the fact, that the letter on which he founded so much, was written not only long before intelligence of the treaty had reached England, but from Minorca, sixteen days before the treaty itself was signed. "No sooner, however," said Mr. Pitt in his place in Parliament, was it known in England that the French general had the faith of a British officer pledged to him, and was disposed to act upon it, than instructions were sent

out to have the convention executed, though the officer in question had, in fact, no authority to sign it." [*Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 590.] Orders accordingly were sent out to execute the treaty, and they arrived in Egypt, in May 1800, long after the battle of Heliopolis; and Kléber had consented to a renewal of the treaty, when it was interrupted by his assassination at Grand Cairo, on June 14, 1800. [*Jom.* xii. 421.] Sir Sidney Smith had no authority to agree to the convention, nor was he the commanding officer on the station, in whom that power necessarily resided, but a mere commodore in command of a ship of the line and two frigates, Lord Keith being the head of the squadron in the Mediterranean. This conduct, in agreeing, contrary to their obvious interests, to restore to France a powerful veteran army, irrecoverably separated from the Republic at the very time when it most stood in need of its assistance, in consequence of a convention acceded to without authority by a subordinate officer, is the strongest instance of the good faith of the English Cabinet; and affords a striking contrast to the conduct of Napoleon soon after, in refusing to ratify the armistice of Treviso, concluded with full powers by his general, Brune, a proceeding which the French historians mention, not only without disapprobation, but manifest satisfaction. —See *Ann. Reg.* 1800, 220, and *Napoleon*, ii. 124.

on the French squares. But Asiatic valour could effect nothing against European steadiness and discipline; the Ottomans were received in front by a murderous rolling fire, and charged at the same time, while disordered by their rush forward, in flank. In a few minutes they were mown down and destroyed; the ditches filled by their wounded fugitives, and over the breathing and bleeding mass the French grenadiers pressed on and scaled the works. Instantly the camp of the Janizaries was carried; cannon, ammunition, tents, all fell into the hands of the victors; and the small remnant who fled towards the main army were swept away by the fire of Friant's division, or cut down by the charges of the French cavalry (1).

Total defeat of the  
Turks.

The Grand Vizier no sooner saw his advanced guard destroyed than he moved forward with his whole army to avenge their loss.

The French were reposing after the fatigues of their first onset, when the rays of the newly-risen sun were intercepted by a cloud of dust in the east. It was the Ottoman army, still forty thousand strong, which was approaching to trample under their horses' hoofs the diminutive band of Franks which had dared to await their charge. Immediately the French order of battle was formed; the troops were drawn up in squares, Friant on the left, Régnier on the right; the cannon advanced into the intervals between the masses; the cavalry remained close behind, ready to break through the moment a favourable opportunity occurred. The cannonade soon became extremely warm on both sides; but the balls of the Ottomans, ill-directed, flew over the heads of the Republicans, while their own artillery was rapidly dismounted by the well directed fire of their adversaries, and even the Grand Vizier's staff was melting away under the deadly tempest of bombs. Torn to pieces by the hail-storm of bullets, the Osmanlis prepared for a general charge. The concentration of their standards along their whole line gave the French warning that it was approaching; a cloud of dust filled the sky, the earth trembled as if shaken by an earthquake, and the roar of twenty thousand horsemen at full speed was enough to have struck terror into the most dauntless breasts. But nothing could break the firm array of the Republicans. As the enemy approached, they were received by a terrible discharge of grape-shot; their front rank almost all fell under the fatal storm; the rear wheeled about and fled, and in a few minutes the mighty array had disappeared, without a single musket having been fired by the French infantry. The Vizier rallied his troops, and brought them up again to the attack; but they were unable to break those flaming citadels, from which a devouring fire issued on every side. Surrounded by an innumerable multitude, not one of the balls from the French squares fell without effect, and in a short time the carnage became intolerable, and the Ottomans fled in indescribable confusion towards the desert. Kléber, following up his success, advanced rapidly to El-Hanka; the Turks fled the moment the French bayonets appeared; the whole army pressed forward, and before nightfall they had made themselves masters of the Ottoman camp, and reposed in the splendid tents, where the luxury of the East had displayed all its magnificence (2).

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While these important events were going forward in the plain of Helio-  
polis, the garrison of Cairo were reduced to the last extremity. Two thousand men had been left in that city, under the command of Generals Verdier and Zayoncheck, with orders, if a general insurrection broke out, to retire

(1) Berth. 399, 400. Journ. xiii. 406, 407. Dum. iv. 137, 138.

(2) Berth. 400, 403. Journ. xiii. 407, 408. Dum. iv. 138.

into the forts which had been constructed to overawe its turbulent population. A corps of Mamelukes and Turks was detached during the battle, and by a circuitous route reached Cairo, where it excited a revolt. **Desperate situation of the garrison at Cairo.** The French were shut up in the forts, and it was only by a vigorous defence that they maintained themselves against the furious attacks of the Mussulmans. When the firing had ceased on the plain of Heliopolis, the sound of a distant cannonade, in the direction of Cairo, informed the victors of what was going forward at the capital. They instantly despatched a corps at midnight, which, traversing the Desert by starlight, arrived in time to rescue the brave garrison from their perilous situation. Kléber at the same time pursued the broken army, to Balbier, which surrendered, though strongly garrisoned, at the first summons; and soon after, the Grand Vizier, abandoning all his artillery, baggage, and ammunition, retired across the Desert, actively pursued by the Arabs, and his mighty host was speedily reduced to a slender train of followers (1).

The Turks, under Ibrahim Bey, who had been detached to Cairo, agreed to evacuate the town when they were informed of the result of the battle of Heliopolis; but it was found impracticable to bring the insurgent population to terms of surrender, and it was necessary, at all hazards, to strike terror into the country, by a sanguinary example near the capital. **Storm and massacre at Boulak.** Boulak, a fortified suburb of Cairo, was surrounded, and the inhabitants having refused to capitulate, it was carried by storm, and every soul

within the walls put to the sword. The French troops, who came back from the pursuit of the Grand Vizier, soon after surrounded the city of Cairo, and summoned it to surrender. A refusal having been returned, a severe bombardment and cannonade was kept up for some hours, until several practicable breaches were made, when a general assault took place.

**April 18.** In vain the Mussulmans defended the walls with the courage which they have so often displayed in similar situations; after a bloody contest, the

French entered on all sides, and a deperate struggle took place in the streets and houses, which was only terminated by the approach of night. On the following morning, however, the Turkish leaders, seeing

their defences forced, and being apprehensive of meeting with the fate of Boulak, if the resistance was any longer continued, made terms of capitulation; and Kléber, delighted at the prospect of terminating so bloody a strife, granted them favourable terms, and soon after the division of the army which had entered Cairo, took the route of the Desert, escorted by the French troops, and the insurgents of the capital purchased their lives by

consenting to an enormous contribution. At the same time, the **Defeat of the Turks in every quarter.** Turks, who had landed in the Delta, were driven into Damietta, where they surrendered to General Beliard; and Mourad Bey, seeing all hope at an end, concluded an honourable convention with Kléber, in virtue of which he was permitted to retain the command of Upper Egypt. Within a month after the battle of Heliopolis the crisis was entirely surmounted and the French had quietly resumed possession of all their conquests (2).

**Improved condition of the French army.** This great victory completely re-established the French affairs on the banks of the Nile. The troops, recently so gloomy and depressed, returned to their quarters joyous and triumphant; the stores and ammunition were repaired from the spoils of the defeated army, the

(1) Berth. 403, 405. Jom. xiii. 409, 410. Dum. iv. 140, 142.

(2) Berth. 413, 427. Jom. xiii. 414, 415. Dum. iv. 141, 142.

booty obtained by the soldiers was immense, and from the contributions levied on the rebellious cities funds were obtained to clothe and equip the whole troops anew. Cairo expiated its offence by a contribution of twelve millions francs, of L.480,000; the other towns paid in the same proportion, and from the money thus acquired means were obtained, not only to discharge all the arrears due to the troops, but to remount the cavalry and artillery, restore the hospitals, and replace all the other establishments requisite for the comfort of the soldiers. Such was the affluence which prevailed at head-quarters, that Kléber was enabled to make his captives participate in his good fortune; and by promising half-pay to the Turks made prisoners at Aboukir and Heliopolis, recruited his army by a crowd of active horsemen, anxious to share in the fortunes of the victorious army. The Egyptians, confounded by the astonishing successes of the French, quietly resigned themselves to a fate which seemed inevitable, and their dominion was more firmly established than it had ever been since the disastrous expedition into Syria (1).

Assassination of Kléber. It was in the midst of these pacific labours, and when he was just beginning to reap the fruits of his intrepidity and judicious conduct, that Kléber was cut off, by an obscure assassin, named Souleyman. This fanatic was stimulated to the atrocious act by religious persuasion, and the prospect of obtaining a sum of money to liberate his father who was in confinement. He remained a month in Cairo watching his opportunity, and at length concealed himself in a cistern in the garden of the palace which the general occupied, and darting out upon him as he walked with an architect, June 16, 1800. stabbed him to the heart. The assassin was brought before a military commission, and ordered to be impaled alive; a shocking punishment, the disgrace of the French generals, which he endured with unshrinking fortitude for three days together, evincing alike in his examinations and his last moments a mixture of fanatical spirit and filial piety, which would be deemed incredible if it had not occurred in real life (2).

The premature death of this distinguished general was a clap of thunder to the Egyptian army, and was attended with important effects upon the issue of the war. He had formed many important designs for the regulation of his colony, which, if they could have been carried into effect, might perhaps have long preserved that important acquisition to the French empire. It was his Designs of Kléber when he fell. intention to have distributed the lands of the conquered country among his soldiers, after the manner of the Roman veterans; to have enlisted the Greeks, Mamelukes, and Copts, extensively in his service; disciplined them after the Western fashion; and on the stock of a formidable European infantry, engrafted the fire and celerity of the Asiatic horse. These designs were calculated unquestionably to have formed a native force on the banks of the Nile, which might in time have rivalled that which England has brought to such perfection on the plains of Bengal; and the revenue of Egypt, under a regular government, would soon have been equal to the support of 30,000 or 40,000 auxiliary troops of that description (3); but it is extremely doubtful whether, by these or any other measures, it would have been possible to have preserved this colony while England held Malta, and retained the command of the sea, if she were resolutely bent upon rescuing it from their hands (4).

(1) Berth. 427, 433. Jom. xiii. 416, 417. Dum. v. 145, 146. Reg. 81.

(2) Sir Robert Wilson's Egyptian Campaign, 184. Dum. vi. 148.

(3) The revenue obtained by Menou from Egypt,

even after all the disasters of the war, amounted to 21,000,000 francs, or L.840,000. The present Pacha has raised it to L.2,500,000.—See Rizonia, 122.

(4) Jom. xiii. 422. Regn. 85, 86.



Menou  
takes the  
command.

Upon Kléber's death, Menou, the governor of Cairo, and the oldest of the generals of division, assumed the command. Intoxicated with the prosperity of his situation, and carried away by the idea that he would succeed in amalgamating the French and Egyptians, so as to render them impervious to any foreign attacks, he declined all steps towards an accommodation, rejected the new overtures of the Grand Vizier to evacuate the country at the conclusion of a general peace, and refused to listen to the proposals of Sir Sidney Smith, who was now empowered by his government to carry into effect the unauthorized convention of El-Arish. At the same time he exasperated the inhabitants by the imposition of additional imposts to meet the expenses of government, which had increased 400,000 francs (L.16,000) a-month since the death of his predecessor, and vainly flattered himself that, by assuming the title of Abdallah (the servant of God), wearing the Oriental costume, and embracing the religion of Mahomet, which he publicly did, he would succeed in maintaining the country against the united hostility of the Turks and English (1).

But the time was now approaching when the Republicans were to pay dear for their resolution to maintain themselves in Egypt, and that glorious train of military triumphs was to commence, which was destined to throw into the shade the disasters of former years, and terminate in the final overthrow of Napoléon on the field of Waterloo. The English Government no sooner re-

Prepara-  
tions for  
the English  
expedition.

ceived intelligence of the resolution of Menou to decline the execution of the convention of El-Arish than they put in motion all their resources to effect the expulsion of the French from that important settlement. For this purpose their ambassador at Constantinople, Lord Elgin, received orders to use his utmost efforts to induce the Turks to make a grand exertion, in conjunction with the forces of Great Britain; the corps of Abercromby, so long doomed to hurtful inactivity in the Mediterranean, was to bear the brunt of the contest, and an English expedition from India was to ascend the Red Sea, cross the Desert, descend by the waters of the Nile, and display the standards of Brama on the shores of Alexandria. So great and

(1) Dum. iv. 150, 151. Regn. 93, 97. Jom. xiv. 312. Bign. ii. 28.

The admission of the French themselves will show with whom the blame of resiling from the convention of El-Arish really rests. The convention was signed at El-Arish on January 24, 1800; and Lord Keith's letter, announcing that he could agree to no capitulation, was dated Minorca, January 31st, more than a fortnight before the convention was signed, founded on orders dated 15th December, 1799, from the British Government. Sir Sidney Smith, on the 21st February, 1800, stated, in a letter to General Kléber, that he had received such instructions as prevented him from acquiescing in the convention of El-Arish. He adds, "You will observe that the despatches I enclose are of old date (1st January), written after orders transmitted from London on the 15th or 17th December, evidently dictated by the idea that you were about to treat separately with the Turks, and to prevent the execution of any measure contrary to our treaty of alliance. But now that my Government is better informed, and that the convention is really ratified, I have not the slightest doubt that the restriction against the execution of the treaty will be removed before the removal of the transports." [Berth. 351, 355] In this expectation of what he might expect from the probity of the English Cabinet, Sir Sidney was not mistaken; for Mr. Pitt stated in Parliament, that though they had previously resolved to agree to no treaty between the Turks and French, in which the latter did not surrender as prisoners of

war, yet "the moment we found that a convention had been assented to by a British officer, though we disapproved of it, we sent orders to conform to it." [Parl. Hist. xxxv. 596, 597.] Lord Keith communicated the *previous* orders he had received, not only to the Turks, but to the French on the same day; but the English did nothing to dissolve the treaty; the French broke the armistice, and the battle of Heliopolis was the consequence. These orders to ratify the treaty as soon as they heard it had been assented to by an English officer, arrived in due time in Egypt, and were communicated by Sir Sidney Smith to General Menou. Let us hear his conduct from the mouth of General Regnier. "On the 9th Messidor (22d August) M. Wright, lieutenant on board the *Tiger*, arrived with a flag of truce from the Desert, with despatches from the Grand Vizier and Sir Sidney Smith. He announced that England had delivered to him passports necessary to carry into execution the treaty of El-Arish. He had presented himself at Alexandria, but was refused admittance, and he had come round by the Desert. He had endeavoured to induce the troops to revolt against the generals who refused to lead them back to France. *He was sent back.*" And this is what the French call the British want of faith in refusing to ratify the treaty of El-Arish: and yet their declamations on this subject received frequent and able support from the Opposition in the English Parliament.—See *Parl. Debates*, xxiv. 105, 598, and 1436, 1438.

Magnificent conception of the attack.

extensive a project had never been formed by any nation, ancient or modern; and it was not the least marvellous circumstance of this eventful period, that a remote province of the Roman empire should have assembled at the foot of the Pyramids the forces of Europe, Asia, and Africa, in one combined enterprise, and brought to the shores of the Nile tribes unknown to the arms of Cæsar and Alexander (1).

Agreeably to this plan, the corps of SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY, which had so long been tossed about by the winds in the bay of Biscay and the Mediterranean sea, set sail from Malta on December 10th, and after a tedious voyage of six weeks, and remounting two hundred of its cavalry with Turkish horse, arrived at Marmarice in the Levant in the beginning of February. Eight thousand men, under Sir David Baird, were to embark at Bombay at the same time, and proceed by the Red Sea to Suez, while the army of the Grand Vizier, which was to be reinforced since its late disasters, was to break up from Acre, and again cross the Desert which separates Egypt from Syria. The project was magnificently conceived, but it presented almost insurmountable difficulties in the execution, and it was easy to perceive that the weight of the contest would fall upon Abercromby's forces. To combine an attack with success from various quarters, on an enemy in possession of a central position from whence he can at pleasure crush the first which approaches, is at all times a difficult and hazardous operation. But what must it be, when the forces brought together for the enterprise are drawn from different quarters of the globe, and the tumultuary levies of Asia Minor were to be supported by the infantry of England and the sable battalions of Hindostan (2)?

Whole contest falls on Abercromby's corps. The English army had long delayed the commencement of operations in Egypt, in order to await the reorganization of the Turkish forces, and give time to the Grand Seignior to collect an armament of the promised strength on the Syrian side of the Desert. But when the fleet approached the Levant, they learned that no reliance could be placed on any co-operation in that quarter. The Ottoman forces, notwithstanding all the levies ordered in Asia Minor, did not yet amount to twelve thousand men, and they were all in the most wretched state of discipline and equipment. So completely had their spirit been broken by the recent disasters, that they anticipated with the utmost dread a renewal of the contest, and it was extremely doubtful whether they ever could be brought to face the French infantry. To complete their inefficiency, the plague had broken out in the camp, and rendered their co-operation a subject of dread rather than ambition; a frightful epidemic ravaged Palestine; the most violent discord raged between the Grand Vizier and the Pacha of Acre, and a reinforcement of ten thousand men, who had been collected at Aleppo to repair their losses, received a different destination, from the alarming rebellion of Oglou Pacha, one of the eastern satraps of the Turkish empire (3).

Deprived of all hope of co-operation in this quarter, and unable to rely on the distant and uncertain aid of the Red Sea expedition, Sir Ralph Abercromby perceived that the success of this great enterprise, on which the hopes of the nation had so long been set, and on which, in some measure, the fate of the war was involved, would depend on his own troops. Fortunately, he was of a character not to be intimidated by the prospect of danger, and although the forces at his disposal were little more than half of

(1) Wilson's Egypt, 3. Jom. xiv. 308.

(3) Wils. 6. Dam. iv. 154. Regn. 146.

(2) Wils. 4, 5. Ann. Reg. 1801, 226. Jom. xiv.

Sir Ralph  
resolves to  
make the  
attack  
alone.  
Feb. 23, 1801.

those which it was ultimately proved were in the hands of his adversary, he gallantly resolved, alone and unaided, to make the attempt. Orders, therefore, were given to the fleet to weigh anchor; and although the weather was still very tempestuous, and the Greek pilots unanimously declared that it was impracticable to attempt a landing on the Egyptian coast till the equinoctial gales were over, the admiral stood out to sea, bearing with him a noble array of two hundred ships (1).

March 1.  
Arrival of  
the expedi-  
tion on the  
coast of  
Egypt.

On the 1st March the leading frigate made a signal for land, and on the following morning the whole fleet anchored in Aboukir bay, precisely on the spot where Nelson's great victory had been gained three years before. The remains of that terrible strife were still visible, the Foudroyant chafed her cables against the L'Orient's wreck, and soon after fished up her anchor. A nobler sight could hardly be imagined; two hundred vessels covered the ocean almost as far as the eye could reach; the sand-hills of Egypt were already covered with cannon and hostile troops; while every heart beat high with exultation at the prospect of soon measuring their strength with the enemy, and engaging in a contest on which the whole eyes of the world were fixed. The state of the weather for several days prevented the possibility of landing; but at length the wind having abated, the preparations were completed on the evening of

March 8.  
Landing of  
the troops.

the 7th, and on the morning of the 8th, at two o'clock, the first division, five thousand five hundred strong, assembled in the boats, one hundred and fifty in number, which were prepared to convey them to the shore. The clear silence of the night, the solemnity of the scene, the magnitude of the enterprise on which they were engaged, the unknown dangers to which they were approaching, filled every mind with anxious suspense; and thousands of brave hearts then throbbed with emotion, who were yet destined to astonish Europe by their gallant bearing, when the hour of trial approached. But not a vestige of confusion or trepidation appeared in the conduct of the debarkation; silently the troops descended from their transports, and took their places assigned them in the boats; and not a sound was heard as they approached the coast, but the measured dip of thousands of oars in the water, incessantly urging towards the shore the flower of the British empire (2).

(1) Wils. 7. Ann. Reg. 1801, 226.

The forces on board the fleet, and those to which they were opposed in Egypt, stood as follows:—

English.		French.	
Infantry, . . . . .	15,463	Infantry, . . . . .	23,000
Cavalry, . . . . .	472	Cavalry, . . . . .	1,250
Artillery, . . . . .	578	Artillery, . . . . .	1,100
		Dismounted Cavalry, . . . . .	400
	16,513		26,520
Sick, . . . . .	999	Sick, . . . . .	996
			27,516
Total, . . . . .	17,512		

[Sir Ralph Abercromby's return. Wilson, 270, 273.]

There were 999 sick in the British army when it landed, and 996 in the French, so that this diminution left the relative forces of the two nations the same as before.

The French troops who capitulated at	
Cairo were, . . . . .	13,672
And at Alexandria, . . . . .	10,508
	24,180

So that, supposing 4,000 had been lost in killed and wounded, and prisoners, during the campaign, the total force at its commencement must have been

[Jom. xiv. 316]

from 27,000 to 28,000 men. The force under Sir David Baird, which ultimately landed at Suez, was 5,500 men, and as they could not be entirely neglected, and the French required to maintain garrisons in the interior, the active forces that could be relied on for immediate operations were nearly equal, and they proved exactly so in the decisive battle of Alexandria.—See JOMINI, xiv. 316 —SIR R. WILSON, 167, and BROUHA, p. 412.—Tableau, No. 2.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1801, 227. Wils. 12, 13. Jom. xiv. 322.

Severe  
action on  
the sand-  
hills.

The French on the heights were about two thousand strong, posted in a concave semicircle, about a mile in length, supported by twelve pieces of artillery on the one side, and the castle of Aboukir on the other. The boats remained for some time in the middle of the bay, menacing different points of the coast, and at length the whole being assembled, the signal was made to advance at nine o'clock. One hundred and fifty boats, each filled with fifty men, instantly moved forward with extraordinary rapidity, while the armed vessels, which covered their flanks, began to cannonade the batteries on shore. The French allowed them to approach within easy range, and then opened at once so heavy a fire that the water seemed literally to be ploughed up with shot, and the foam raised by it resembled a surf rolling over breakers. Silently the boats approached the tempest, the sailors standing up and rowing with uncommon vigour, the soldiers sitting with their arms in their hands anxiously awaiting the moment to use them. When they reached the fire, several boats were sunk, and the loss among their crowded crews was very severe; but notwithstanding this the line pressed forward with such precision, that the prows of almost all the first division struck the sand at the same time. The troops instantly jumped out into the water, and rapidly advancing to the beach, formed before they could be charged by the enemy; the 42d, 23d, and 40th regiments rushed up the steep front of the heights with fixed bayonets, and carried them in the most gallant style; the guards followed, and though disordered for a moment by a charge of horse before their formation was completed, made good their ground, and drove back the enemy; while the 5th and Royals landed in time to defeat a column which was advancing through a hollow against the flank of their newly established line. In an hour the whole division was established on the heights, though weakened by five hundred men killed and wounded; the enemy retired with the loss of three hundred, and left eight pieces of cannon in the hands of the victors (1).

And defeat  
of the  
French  
there.

This brilliant opening had the most important effects on the fate of the campaign. The gallant conduct of the troops, the splendid spectacle which their landing in presence of the enemy had afforded, the rapidity of their success in the sight of the whole fleet, filled both the soldiers and sailors with exultation, and already began to produce that confidence in their own prowess which in military affairs, as well as elsewhere in life, is not the least important element in success. Sir Ralph Astenson profited by his good fortune, by landing the other divisions of the army, which was effected in the remainder of the day with the greatest expedition. Some uneasiness was at first experienced by the want of water, but Sir Sidney Smith soon relieved their anxiety by telling them that wherever date-trees grew water must be near; a piece of grateful information which, like every other furnished by that enterprising officer, proved to be correct (2).

It is now ascertained, that if the English army had pushed vigorously on before the enemy had time to recover from their consternation, they might have taken Alexandria with very little difficulty; and had they been as well aware of their prowess as they have since become, they would probably have done so (3). But they were then only novices in the military art, and

(1) Regn. 205, 209. Wils. 14, 15. Ann. Reg. 1801, 227, 228.

"This debarkation," said General Bertrand, "was admirable; in less than five or six minutes they presented 5,500 men in battle array; it was like a

movement on the opera stage; three such completed the landing of the army."—LAS CASES, i. 242.

(2) Wils. 17, 18. Ann. Reg. 1801, 228.

(3) Regn. 209. Dum. iv. 157.

naturally distrustful of themselves when opposed to the far-famed veterans of France. Abercromby, therefore, advanced with caution. His first care was to complete the disembarkation of the troops, cannon, and stores, a service of considerable difficulty and danger, from the tempestuous state of the weather, and which occupied the three following days. The castle of Aboukir was at the same time invested, and intrenchments thrown up round the camp. It then appeared how much reason the British had to congratulate themselves on the supineness of Menou in retaining his principal force at Cairo, when so formidable an enemy was establishing himself in his colony; for had he appeared with eighteen thousand men on the heights of Aboukir, the only point on the coast where a descent was practicable, the landing could never have been attempted, or if it had, it would in all probability have terminated in disaster. The truth was, the French general like all his contemporaries at that period, greatly underrated the British military forces, and he gladly heard of their debarkation, from a belief that they would soon become prisoners of war. Thus, while the English, from not being aware of their own strength, lost the opportunity of taking Alexandria in the outset of the campaign, the French, from an overweening confidence in theirs, reduced themselves, in the end, to the humiliation of the Caudine Forks (1).

The preparations being at length completed, the army moved forward, on the evening of the 12th, to Mandora tower, where they encamped in three lines. The enemy had by this time been considerably reinforced from Cairo and Rosetta, so that their force amounted to five thousand four hundred infantry, six hundred cavalry, and twenty-five pieces of cannon. Notwithstanding the smallness of their numbers, Generals Friant and Lanusse resolved to make good their ground against the invaders, trusting to their great superiority in cavalry, the strength of their position in front of an old Roman camp, and the facility of retiring to Alexandria in case of disaster. The English general advanced cautiously, at day-break on the morning of the 13th, in three lines; the enemy's force was unknown, and it was in an especial manner necessary to take precaution against his decided superiority in horse. The first line, when it came within range of the enemy, was received with a heavy fire of grape and musketry, while a regiment of cavalry impetuously charged its flank; but both attacks were gallantly repulsed by the 90th and 92d regiments, and the advance of the second line soon compelled the Republicans to retreat. Then was the moment to have followed up their success, and by a rapid charge completed the defeat of the enemy, in which case Alexandria would probably have fallen an easy conquest, but the English were still ignorant of their own powers, and the want of cavalry prevented them from taking the advantage which they might have derived from their victory. They contented themselves, therefore, with occupying the ground so easily won, and halted within cannon-shot of their second line of defence; and it was not till the enemy had established themselves on the heights in their rear in front of Alexandria, that they again moved forward to the charge. They then advanced with admirable coolness, and in parade order, under a murderous fire of cannon shot; but the attack was not conducted with the vigour and rapidity necessary to ensure decisive success, nor was any attempt made to turn a position which his great superiority of numbers would have enabled the English general so easily to outflank. The consequence was that the British sustained a

Cautious  
measures of  
the English  
general.

Bloody en-  
counter  
with the  
French  
vanguard.

(1) Dum. iv. 158. Wils. 18, 19. Jom. xiv. 321, 325.



loss double of that of their adversaries (1); and though the second position was at length abandoned by the French, who withdrew the bulk of their forces within the walls of the town, yet this was done in perfect order, and without any loss of artillery; whereas had Abercromby possessed the confidence in himself and his soldiers which subsequent triumphs gave to Wellington or Picton, he would have carried the position of the enemy, by a combined attack in front and flank (2), in half an hour, and entered Alexandria along with their broken battalions.

*Description of the ground now taken up by the British army.*

The position now occupied by the British was by nature strong; the right was advanced before the rest of the line nearly a quarter of a mile, on high ground, and extended to the large and magnificent ruins of a Roman palace within fifty yards of the sea; their left rested on the lake Maadieh; the intervening space, about a mile in breadth, consisted of a succession of low sand-hills. In front of the position was a level sandy surface, which commenced before the left, and extended as far as the French lines; on this plain cavalry could act, but as they approached the British videttes, they found the ground strewed with large stones, the remains of Roman edifices which formerly had covered all that part of the shore. Gun-boats in the sea and the lake Maadieh, protected each flank; on the left, in front of the lines occupied by the troops, was a redoubt mounted by twelve pieces of cannon; two were placed on the ruins of the Roman palace, and in the centre slight works were thrown up to aid the fire of the musketry. In this position the British army, now reduced by sickness, the sword, and detachments to the rear, to 11,500 men, with thirty-six pieces of cannon, awaited the attack of the enemy (3).

*Position of the French.*

The position of the French was still stronger. A high ridge of hills extended from the sea to the canals of Alexandria; along this elevated ground their troops were placed, with fort Cretin rising in deceitful grandeur in the centre, and fort Caffarelli in the rear of the left. Their generals were at first fearful that the advance of the English had cut off the dikes which formed their line of communication with Menou; but that commander discovered a circuitous route, by which he was enabled to reach Alexandria, and on the evening of the 19th, the whole disposable French troops, 11,000 strong, including 1400 cavalry, with 46 pieces of cannon, were drawn up on this imposing position. Every thing conspired to recommend early and decisive operations; the ancient fame and tried prowess of the Egyptian army left no room for doubt that they would speedily drive the presumptuous islanders into the sea; while by protracting operations, time would be afforded for the Grand Vizier to cut off the garrisons on the frontier of Syria, and the Indian army to menace their rear from the Red Sea (4).

*Interesting recollections connected with the spot.*

The ground occupied by the two armies was singularly calculated to awaken the most interesting recollections. England and France were here to contend for the empire of the East in the cradle of ancient civilisation, on the spot where Pompey was delivered up to the victorious arms of Cæsar, and under the walls of the city which is destined to perpetuate to the latest generation the prophetic wisdom of Alexander.

(1) The English lost 1,200, the French 500 men in this affair. It is impossible to refuse a tribute of admiration to the skill of the generals and valour of the soldiers, which, with such inferior forces, enabled the Republicans, at so slight a cost, to inflict so serious a loss upon their adversaries — See WILSON, 23; REGNIER, 217, 219; and *Ann. Reg.* 1801, 227.

(2) Wils. 20, 23. Regn. 215, 219. Jom. xiv. 327, 328. *Ann. Reg.* 1801, 229.

(3) Wils. 24, 25, 30. Regn. 220, 222. Jom. xiv. 330. *Ann. Reg.* 1801, 232.

(4) Wils. 25. Jom. xiv. 329, 330. Regn. 222, 223. Hard. viii. 152.

Every object which met the eye was fraught with historic renown. On the right of the French line rose Pompey's Pillar, on the left Cleopatra's Needle; in the distance were seen the mouldering walls and Eastern domes of Alexandria, while on the extreme horizon, stretching into the sea, appeared the far-famed tower of Pharos. The British, as well as their antagonists, felt the influence of the scene and the grandeur of the occasion; and these ancient rivals in military renown prepared to join in their first serious contest since the Revolution (1), with a bravery worthy of the cause in which they were engaged, and the animating presence in which they stood.

Battle of  
Alexan-  
dria.

On the 20th, the castle of Aboukir, with its garrison of 190 men, surrendered. On the morning of the 21st, the army was under arms at three o'clock, eagerly expecting the attack which the movements of the preceding evening had led them to anticipate. A gloomy mist covered the plain, through which every eye was painfully striving to pierce; every ear was straining to catch the smallest sound; the eastern horizon was anxiously regarded, but though the grey of the morning was perceptible, it seemed reluctant to break. Suddenly the report of a musket was heard, followed by two cannon shots on the left; the officers, thinking the attack was to commence there, were already galloping in that direction, when a sharp rattle broke out on the right, followed by the loud shouts which too surely announced that the attack had begun in that quarter. In fact the enemy, under Lanusse, were advancing in great force against the Roman ruins, where the 58th and 23d regiments were placed; the English officers no sooner saw the glazed hats of the Republicans emerging through the mist, than they poured in a fire by platoons, so heavy and well-directed, that the French were compelled to swerve to their left, and in making this movement the brave Lanusse received a mortal wound. His division was so disconcerted by this event, and the fire of the English, which was kept up with uncommon vigour, both on their front and flank, that they broke and fled in confusion behind the sand-hills. But at this instant, General Rampon advanced at the head of a fresh column, two thousand strong, and joining the broken remains of Lanusse's division, renewed the attack with greater force, and succeeded in turning the Roman ruins so as to take the troops who defended them both in front and flank. Menou supported this attack by a grand charge with all his cavalry. No sooner did Sir Ralph perceive it advancing than he moved up the 42d and 28th regiments from the second line to the support of the menaced wing, but soon after it arrived in the fire, the first of these corps was suddenly charged in flank by the Republican horse, and broken. Notwithstanding this, the brave Highlanders formed in little knots, and standing back to back, resisted the cavalry when they endeavoured to cut them down. The 28th regiment was maintaining a severe action in front, when they were startled by hearing French voices behind their line, the rear rank had just time to face about, when it was assailed by a volley from a regiment which had got round under cover of the mist; and these gallant troops, without flinching, stood back to back, and maintained this extraordinary contest for a considerable time. But this bold irruption of the French soon exposed them to the same dangers with which they had threatened the English. The British reserve advanced in admirable order, and threw in a close and well-directed fire upon the attacking column; the Republicans, in their turn, were assailed at once in front and flank, and driven into the ruins, where a battalion which, by its great success in the Italian wars, had acquired the surname of the Invincibles, was obliged

(1) Wils. 25.

to lay down its arms, after having lost above two-thirds of its numbers. The French cavalry also, having now lost half their force by the close and murderous fire of the English infantry, prepared to cut their way back to their own lines. For this purpose they charged the English reserve with the utmost fury; but those steady men with admirable coolness opened their ranks so as to let the squadrons sweep through, and instantly closing them again, and wheeling about, threw in so deadly a fire upon the disordered horsemen, that they almost all, with their commander Roize, perished on the spot. The remnant, both foot and horse, of the force which had made this formidable attack, escaped in confusion from the scene of slaughter, and regained in dismay the French position (1).

**Retreat of the French.** The defeat of this desperate attack terminated the important operations of this eventful day. On the left of the English position the operations of the Republicans were confined to a distant cannonade; and a more serious attack on the centre was repulsed by the close and destructive fire of the English guards. At length Menou, finding that all his efforts had proved unsuccessful, ordered a general retreat, which was effected in the best order, to the heights of Nicopolis on his rear, under cover of the cannon placed on that formidable position. The loss of the English amounted to 1500 in killed and wounded; that of the French to above 2000; but this was of comparatively little importance. They had lost the character of invincibles; the charm which had paralysed the world was broken; and on the standards taken by the victors, they pointed with exultation to the names, "Le Passage de la Scrivia, le Passage du Tagliamento, le Passage de l'Isonzo, la Prize de Gratz, le Pont de Lodi (2)."

**Wound and death of Sir Ralph Abercromby.** But this important triumph was mingled with one mournful recollection. Sir Ralph Abercromby, who had the glory of first leading the English to decisive victory over the arms of revolutionary France, received a mortal wound in the early part of the day, of which he died a few days afterwards. No sooner did that gallant veteran hear of the furious irruption of the French cavalry into the lines on the right, than he mounted his horse, and galloped in that direction; he arrived while it was yet dark, when almost unattended by his aides-de-camp, whom he had despatched in various directions, on the ground over which the cavalry were weeping, and was assailed by the French dragoons, one of whom he disarmed in a personal conflict; but soon after he received a wound from a musket-shot on the thigh, which compelled him to dismount, and walk to the redoubt on the right of the guards, where he remained for the rest of the day, walking about, exposed to a terrible cannonade, insensible alike to the pain of his wound and the danger of his situation. With anxious hopes he watched the progress of the action, every part of which was visible from that elevated position, and had the satisfaction of seeing the French retire and the victory finally decided before the loss of blood began to darken his eyes. He lived till the morning of the 29th, expressing no solicitude but for the issue of the contest; he bore a painful operation for the extraction of the ball with the greatest firmness; but it could not be reached by the skill of the surgeons, and he sunk at length in the arms of glory, leaving a name enshrined in the grateful recollection of his country (3).

The battle of Alexandria not only delivered Egypt from the Republican yoke; it decided, in its ultimate consequences, the fate of the civilized

(1) Wils. 31, 33. Ann. Reg. 1801, 230, 231. 1801, 232. Jom. xiv. 335, 337. Hard. viii. 153, 154. Regn. 226, 227. Jom. xiv. 334, 335.

(3) Wils. 48. Ann. Reg. 1801, 232.

(2) Wils. 33, 38. Regn. 228, 231. Ann. Reg.

Immense  
moral con-  
sequences  
of this vic-  
tory.

world. The importance of a triumph is not always measured by the number of troops engaged; twenty-four thousand Romans, under Cæsar at Pharsalia, changed the face of antiquity; thirty thousand Republicans, at Marengo, seated Napoléon on the consular throne, and established a power which overturned all the monarchies of Europe. The contest of twelve thousand British, with an equal number of French, on the sands of Alexandria, in its remote effects overthrew a greater empire than that of Charlemagne, and rescued mankind from a more galling tyranny than that of the Roman emperors. It first elevated the hopes and confirmed the resolution of the English soldiers; it first broke the charm by which the continental nations had so long been enthralled; it first revived the military spirit of the English people, and awakened the pleasing hope that the descendants of the victors at Crécy and Agincourt had not degenerated from the valour of their fathers. Nothing but the recollection of this decisive trial of strength could have supported the British nation through the arduous conflict which awaited them on the renewal of the war, and induced them to remain firm and unshaken amidst the successive prostration of every continental power, till the dawn of hope began over the summit of the Pyrenees, and the eastern sky was reddened by the conflagration of Moscow. The continental nations, accustomed to the shock of vast armies, and to regard the English only as a naval power, attached little importance to the contest of such inconsiderable bodies of men on a distant shore; but the prophetic eye of Napoléon at once discerned the magnitude of its consequences, and he received the intelligence of the disaster at Alexandria with a degree of anguish equalled only by that experienced from the shock of Trafalgar (1).

Its first  
effects are  
not very  
decisive.

But though destined in its ultimate effects to produce these important consequences, the victory of Alexandria was not at first attended by results at all commensurate to the ardent anticipations of the English people. The movements of the English army were for long cautious and dilatory; but, though their operations were not brilliant, they were skilful, and ultimately produced the desired results. For some days after the battle they remained on the ground where they had so bravely combated, and the French occupied the heights of Nicopolis—both parties being busied in repairing their losses, and restoring the strength of their forces. At length a reinforcement of six thousand Albanians having arrived in the bay of Aboukir, they were joined by a British detachment of a thousand men, and the combined forces approached Rosetta, situated on one of the mouths of the Nile. On their approach, the French garrison retired to Damietta, leaving a hundred and fifty men in fort Julien, who, after a spirited resistance, surrendered on the 19th April. Shortly after the English army was reinforced by three thousand men, who landed at Aboukir in the beginning of May, and General Hutchison (2), who had now succeeded to the command, resolved to commence offensive operations.

April 19.  
Surrender  
of Dami-  
etta.  
May 9.

Meanwhile divisions, the natural result of such unwonted disasters, broke

(1) Bour. iv. 299. D'Abr. v. 202. Jom. xiv. 336. "I can with safety affirm," said Junot, "that Napoléon's design was to have made Egypt the point from which the thunderbolt was to issue which was to overwhelm the British empire. I can easily sympathize, therefore, with the cruel agony which he underwent when he pronounced these words, 'Junot, we have lost Egypt.' The first consul never let those around know to what a degree he was afflicted by the stroke which he received from England on that occasion. Junot alone was fully

acquainted with it; it was only to the eyes of those who had enjoyed his early intimacy that he raised the veil which concealed the anguish of his heart. Junot wept like a child when he recounted what the first consul had said during the two hours that he was with him after he received intelligence of that disastrous event. "My projects alike with my dreams have been destroyed by England," said that great conqueror.—DUCREUX ON ABRAHAM, v. 202, 203.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1801, 233. Jom. xiv. 338, 339.

Divisions  
break out  
among the  
French ge-  
nerals.

out among the French generals. General Regnier strongly urged the expedience of leaving garrisons only in Alexandria, Cairo, and other important points, and concentrating the mass of the troops

at Ramanieh, in a situation either to fall upon the English army, if they should leave their lines to attack Rosetta or Alexandria, or crush the Grand Vizier if he should attempt to cross the Desert. But nothing could induce Menou to adopt any thing but half measures. He detached four thousand troops to relieve Rosetta, who arrived on the Nile too late to disengage that place, and retired to El-Aft, where they threw up intrenchments, and awaited the movements of the English; but himself remained at Alexandria, obsti-

Indecisive  
measures of  
Menou.

nately persisting in the belief that the Grand Vizier would never cross the Desert, that the English would not venture to quit their position, and that if he remained firm a little longer, they would again betake

April 13.

themselves to their vessels. Meanwhile General Hutchison was rapidly circumscribing his limits at Alexandria; he cut the isthmus which separated the lake Maadieh from the dried bed of the lake Mareotis, and filled with the sea that monument of ancient industry, which in a great degree isolated Alexandria from the rest of Egypt; while the British flotilla ascended the Nile, and captured an important convoy descending that river for the use of its garrison. These disasters produced the greatest discouragement in the French army (1); the dissensions among the officers increased in vehemence, and General Regnier's language in particular became so menacing that the commander-in-chief, apprehensive that he might, with the concurrence of the army, assume the command, had him arrested and sent back to France (2).

General  
Hutchison  
assumes  
the com-  
mand, and  
advances  
towards  
Cairo.

The detachment of La Grange, with four thousand men, having reduced the garrison of Alexandria to little more than six thousand, General Hutchison at length moved forward, with the main body of his forces, towards Ramanieh, in order to menace Cairo, and carry the war into the upper parts of Egypt. Four thousand

British and six thousand Turks, in the first instance, advanced against the intrenched position of La Grange at El-Aft. On the approach of such considerable forces, he retired to the fortified position of Ramanieh, an important post on the Nile, from which the canal branches off which connects it with Alexandria, where he collected four thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and forty pieces of cannon. After a sharp skirmish, however, this position was abandoned, and the advance of Hutchison having cut off their retreat to Alexandria, the Republicans were compelled to fall back upon

May 7.

Cairo, which they reached a few days afterwards. The capture of Ramanieh was an important step in the campaign, as it completely isolated the troops at Cairo from those at Alexandria, cut off the chief supplies from the latter city, and rendered all attempt at co-operation impossible between them. The fruits of this acquisition soon appeared in the capture of a convoy of four hundred men and six hundred camels, bound for Alexandria, which, in the pathless solitude of the Desert, fell a prey to the activity and vigilance of the English cavalry (3).

Capture of  
Ramanieh.

Cairo, which they reached a few days afterwards. The capture of Ramanieh was an important step in the campaign, as it completely isolated the troops at Cairo from those at Alexandria, cut off the chief supplies from the latter city, and rendered all attempt at co-operation impossible between them. The fruits of this acquisition soon appeared in the capture of a convoy of four hundred men and six hundred camels, bound for Alexandria, which, in the pathless solitude of the Desert, fell a prey to the activity and vigilance of the English cavalry (3).

(1) *Jom.* xiv. 339, 340. *Regn.* 235, 252. *Wils.* 56.

(2) The characters of Menou and Regnier are thus given by Napoléon:—"Menou appeared to have all the qualities fitted for the command; he was learned, upright, and an excellent civil governor. He had become a Mussulman, which, how ridiculous soever, was agreeable to the natives of the country; a doubt hung over his military capacity, but none over his personal courage; he had acted well in la Vendée and at the assault of

Alexandria. General Regnier was more habituated to war; but he wanted the chief quality in a general-in-chief; excellent when second in command, he was unfit to take the lead. His character was silent and solitary; having no knowledge of the means of electrifying, ruling, or guiding mankind."—*NAP. IN MONTEN.* i. 73, 74.

(3) *Jom.* xiv. 339, 341. *Wills.* 84, 96. *Ann. Reg.* 1801, 234.



General  
Belliard is  
defeated  
near Cairo

Meanwhile the Grand Vizier, encouraged by the unwonted intelligence of the defeat of the French forces, and relieved by the cessation of the plague in his army, one great cause of his weakness, mustered up courage to cross the Desert, and in the middle of April drew near to the French fortified position, on the frontiers of Syria, at the head of twelve thousand men. At his approach, the Republicans evacuated Salahieh and Balbeis, on the edge of the Desert, and Damietta, at the mouth of one of the branches of the Nile, and drew back all their forces to Cairo. the arrival of La Grange with the troops from Ramanieh having increased the disposable force of general Belliard to ten thousand veterans, he moved forward at the head of six thousand chosen troops to El-Hanka, to meet the Turkish force. But the Mussulmans were now under very different direction from that which led them to destruction at Heliopolis. Major Hope, afterwards one of the most distinguished lieutenants of Wellington, was with the artillery, and Major Holloway directed all the movements of the Grand Vizier. These able officers brought up the Turkish artillery and infantry to the fight in a wood of date-trees, where the superiority of European discipline was not so decisive as in the open plain; while a skilful movement of the cavalry towards their rear threatened to cut off the enemy's retreat to Cairo. The consequence was, that after an indecisive action of five hours, Belliard retreated to the capital; a result so different from any which had yet attended their warfare with the Republicans, that it elevated immensely the spirits of the Ottomans, and what was of still greater consequence, disposed them to resign themselves implicitly to the guidance of the British officers attached to their staff (1).

This important advantage having thrown the enemy on all sides back into the capital, and the success of the Turks having proved that under proper guidance some reliance could be placed upon them in active operations,

Cairo is  
invested.

General Hutchison resolved to advance immediately against Cairo, although the promised co-operation of the troops from the Red Sea could not be calculated upon, as, from the prevalence of contrary winds in that dangerous strait, they had been detained much beyond the appointed time. The English army invested Cairo on the 20th May on the left,

while the Grand Vizier did the same on the right bank of the Nile. The fortifications of the town, begun by Kléber, had been assiduously continued by Menou; but they were too extensive, stretching over a circumference of fourteen miles, to be adequately guarded by nine thousand men, to which the effective part of the garrison was now reduced; and although General Baird, with the Indian army, had not yet arrived, there could be no doubt that they would make their appearance in the rear if the siege were continued for any

Capitula-  
tion of  
Cairo.

length of time. Impressed with these considerations, and fearful that by delay he might not obtain equally favourable terms, Belliard, on the day following, proposed a capitulation, on the same conditions as had been agreed to the year before at El-Arish, viz. that the army should be conveyed to France within fifty days, with their arms, artillery, and baggage. This was immediately agreed to. The troops embarked on the Nile in virtue of this capitulation, amounted to 13,672, besides the civil servants, and they left in the hands of the British 320 pieces of heavy cannon, besides the field pieces of the corps which they carried with them; an astonishing conquest to have been achieved by a European force of smaller amount, and

May 22.

(1) Jom. xiv. 342, 343. Ann. Reg. 1801, 235. Wils. 110, 111.

a lasting monument of the important triumph gained by the British arms on the sands of Alexandria (1).

Advance of  
Sir David  
Baird's di-  
vision from  
the Red  
Sea. Shortly after this capitulation was signed, the army of General Baird, six thousand four hundred strong, of whom 3600 were British and 2800 sepoy, appeared on the banks of the Nile from India (2). They had sailed from Bombay in the end of December,

but unfortunately the monsoon had set in before they arrived at the mouth of the Red Sea, which rendered it impossible for them to reach their original destination, which was Suez, in time to operate as a diversion to the British

July 9. force when it first landed at the mouth of the Nile. After struggling hard with contrary winds for above two months, in the course of which two transports were lost, the expedition arrived at Cosseir, in Upper Egypt, in the beginning of July, and preparations were instantly made for crossing the Desert which separates the Red Sea from Thebes. This passage is one hundred and forty miles long; and as it was the first instance recorded in history of a European army, with the artillery and encumbrances of modern warfare, crossing one of the Eastern deserts, it is in a peculiar manner worthy of

July 29.  
Their  
march from  
Cosseir to  
Thebes  
across the  
Desert. observation. The first detachment began its march from Cosseir, and in nine days it arrived at Kinneh on the Nile. The road across the arid wilderness lies almost the whole way through a succession of ravines, winding amongst hills varying from five to fifteen hundred feet in height. These hills are very remarkable, rising often perpendicularly on either side of the valley, as if they had been scarped by art, here again rather broken and overhanging, as if they were the lofty banks of a mighty river, and the traveller traversing its dry and naked bed. Now you are quite land locked; now again you open on lateral valleys, and see upon heights beyond small square towers. Dépôts of provisions had been provided at the eight stations where the army halted, and wells dug by the Arabs, from which a tolerable supply of water was obtained, though in many places rather of a brackish quality. Not a dwelling was to be seen, and hardly any traces of vegetation were discovered along this dreary tract; nothing met the eye but bare and arid rocks in the mountains, and loose sand or hard gravel in the hollows. The sufferings of the soldiers from heat and thirst were very great; for though they marched only during the night, yet the atmosphere, heated to 115 degrees of Fahrenheit in the shade during the day, was at all times sultry and oppressive in the highest degree. It was soon found that it was impossible by drinking to allay the thirst, and that indulgence in that respect only augmented the desire; a little vinegar mixed with water proved the only effectual relief. Every where the cannon and ammunition waggons passed with facility, drawn by oxen brought from India. No words can describe the transports of the soldiers when at Rensch they first came in sight of the Nile, flowing in a full majestic stream in the green plain at their feet; the bonds of discipline were unavailing to prevent a tumultuous rush of men, horses, camels, and oxen, when they approached its banks, to plunge into the waves. At length by great efforts the army was assembled at Thebes with very little loss, considering the arduous service they had undergone. They were gazed with wonder at the avenues of sphinxes and stately temples which are destined to transmit to the latest posterity the wonders of ancient Egypt, and embarking on the Nile, fell down in boats in nine days, a distance of three hundred miles, to Grand Cairo, where they arrived on the 10th

(1) Journ. xiv. 345, 346. Wils. 157, 265. Ann. (2) Wils. 168, 189.  
p. 1801, 236. 237.

August. There, for the first time in the history of the world, the sable Hindoos from the banks of the Ganges, the swarthy Asiatics from the plains of the Euphrates, and the blue-eyed English from the shores of the Thames, met in arms at the foot of the Pyramids (1).

General  
Hutchison  
moves  
against  
Menou at  
Alexan-  
dria.

When Menou was informed of the capitulation of Cairo, he professed himself highly incensed at its conditions, and loudly proclaimed his resolution to bury himself under the ruins of Alexandria.

He refused to take advantage, in consequence, of the proposal made to him to accede to the capitulation of the capital, and embark on the same terms for France. This determination was founded on intelligence he had received by the brig *Lodi*, which had eluded the vigilance of the English cruisers and penetrated into Alexandria, of the approach of Admiral Gantheaume with seven sail and five thousand men, accompanied with the most peremptory orders from the first consul to hold out to the last extremity. Finding that the reduction of this last stronghold could only be effected by force, General Hutchison, after the embarkation of General Belliard and his division, brought down the greater part of his troops from Cairo; and, in the beginning of August, commenced active operations, at the head of sixteen thousand men, against Alexandria. A flotilla was rapidly collected on the lake Mareotis, but to complete the investment of the place, it was necessary to reduce fort Marabon, situated on a tongue of land which unites the town to the opposite side of the lake, and by which alone the garrison received supplies of provisions from the Arabs. Four thousand men were embarked on August. 17. the flotilla, and landed near the fort on the 17th, while a feint was made of a general attack on the heights of Nicopolis by General Hutchison. These operations were completely successful; the landing of the troops was effected with very little opposition; batteries were rapidly constructed, and so heavy a fire kept up, both by land and sea, that the fort was soon reduced to a heap of ruins; and the garrison, consisting of a hundred and

Progresses of  
the siege.

sixty men, was compelled to capitulate. At the same time, some of the advanced batteries of the Republicans were carried on the heights near the sea; and a column of six hundred men, detached by Menou to recover them, driven back by Colonel Spencer, at the head of seven companies of the 30th, with the most distinguished gallantry. In endeavouring to set fire to the English flotilla, the French burnt their own schooners on the lake; while the light vessels of the fleet boldly sailed into the harbour of Alexandria, and opened a cannonade upon the enemy's squadron in the inner port. On the following day, General Coote followed up his success; and advancing along the isthmus beyond Marabon, opened his trenches in form against fort

Aug. 27. Le Turc, which was soon breached by a formidable artillery. These disasters at length wakened Menou from his dream of security; he forgot his

Aug. 31. resolution to conquer or die, and agreed to a capitulation, in virtue of which the French were to surrender Alexandria, with all its artillery, and

Surrender  
of Menou. be transported back to France, with their arms, baggage, and ten pieces of cannon only. It was agreed between the military commanders that the collections of antiquities and drawings which had been made by the artists and learned men who accompanied the expedition should be surrendered to the British; but as they made the most vigorous remon-

(1) Scherer's *Egypt*, 68, 69. Wils. 171, 173. Ann. Reg. 1801, 237.

A singular incident occurred on this occasion. When the Sepoy regiments came to the monuments of ancient Egypt, they fell down and worshipped

the images; another proof among the many which exist, of the common origin of these early nations. I have heard this curious fact from several officers who were present on the occasion.

stances against such a condition, and threatened to destroy them rather than that they should fall into the hands of the victors, General Hutchison, with a generous regard to the interests of science and the feelings of these distinguished persons, agreed to depart from the stipulation, and allow those treasures of art to be forwarded to France. The sarcophagus of Alexander, however, was retained by the British, and formed the glorious trophy of their memorable triumph (1).

The military results of this conquest were very great. Three hundred and twelve pieces of cannon, chiefly brass, were found upon the works of Alexandria, besides seventy-seven on board the ships of war. No less than 195,000 pounds of powder, and 14,000 gun cartridges were taken in the magazines; while the soldiers who capitulated were 10,041, independent of 500 sailors and 655 civil servants. The total troops who capitulated in Egypt were nearly 24,000, all tried veterans of France; an astonishing success to have been achieved by a British force which had hardly ever seen a shot fired, and even including those who came up from India six weeks after Cairo had surrendered, never amounted to the same numerical strength (2).

(1) Ann. Reg. 1801, 238, 239. Wils. 194, 212. Jom. xiv. 850, 853. Regu. 280, 288.  
(2) Wils. 179, 216, 217. Ann. Reg. 1801, 239; Jom. xiv. 352, 353. Regu. 280, 289.

The troops who capitulated at Cairo, exclusive of civil servants, were:—	13,672
At Alexandria	10,528
	<hr/> 24,200

[Wils. 179, 217.] which, supposing 4000 lost in the previous engagement, leaves a total of 28,000 men, to oppose the British in Egypt, having at their command in heavy cannon and field pieces, above 700 guns. The amount of the force which the French had in this contest, is ascertained by the best possible evidence, that of an unwilling witness, perfectly acquainted with the facts, and never disposed to exaggerate the amount of his beaten troops. "In March, 1801," says Napoléon, "the English disembarked an army of 18,000 men, without artillery or cavalry horses; it should have been destroyed. The army, vanquished after six months of false manœuvres, was disembarked on the shores of Provence still 24,000 strong. When Napoléon quitted it, in the end of August 1799, it amounted in all to 28,500 men. As the British and allied forces did not enter simultaneously into action, but on the contrary, at an interval of several months from each other, the victory must have remained with the French if they had had a general of capacity at their head, who knew how to avail himself skilfully of the advantages of his central position." [Nap. in Month. i. 80, 81, and ii. 216.] The British forces which came with Sir Ralph Abercromby were

Landed in April,	3,000
Came with Sir David Baird,	5,919
	<hr/>
Total British and Indian troops,	25,518

[Wils. 270, 308.] The army of the Grand Vizier, which advanced against Cairo after the battle of Alexandria, was only 14,000 strong, and in such a state of disorganization as to be capable of effecting very little in the field; [Wils. 116.] and the corps which landed at Rosetta was only 6000 men, and effected very little against the enemy. When, therefore, it is recollected that the campaign was really concluded by the capitulation of General Belliard at Cairo on the 26th June, that the forces from the Red Sea only landed at Cosseir on the 8th July, and arrived at Cairo on the 10th August, and consequently that the contest was decided by

19,500 British against 28,000 French, having the advantage of a central position and possession of all the fortified places in the country, it must be admitted that modern history has few more glorious achievements to commemorate.

This being the first great disaster which the Republicans had sustained by land since the commencement of the revolution, and it having fallen on so distinguished a portion of their army as that which had gone through the Italian and Egyptian campaigns, they have been indefatigable in their endeavours to underrate the credit due to the English troops on the occasion; forgetting, that if the British acted feebly, what must the French have been when, with such a superiority of force, they were compelled to capitulate. It is true, that the movements of Hutchison after the battles of 21st March were slow and cautious; but that they were not unreasonably so, is proved by the consideration that he had to advance with less than half his army against a force at Grand Cairo, which amounted to 13,000 men, and could send 10,000 into the field, and that even after all he arrived at the scene of action, and concluded the capitulation of Cairo, six weeks before the arrival of the troops from the Red Sea, with no more than 4,500 Europeans, and a disorderly rabble of 25,000 Turks, hardly provided with any battering train. [Wils. 158.] All the ingenuity of the French cannot obviate the important fact that, by Hutchison's advance to Ramachie, he separated their armies at Cairo and Alexandria from each other, and enabled him, with a force greatly inferior to the two taken together, to be superior to both at the point of attack, the surest test, as Napoléon justly observes, of a good general. The British officers, after Alexandria was taken, discovered that the works on the heights of Nicopolis, and, in particular, forts Cretin and Caffarelli, were in such a state that they could have opposed no effectual resistance to a vigorous attack, and they were thus led to regret that they had been induced by their imposing appearance to relinquish the active pursuit of their advantages before Menou's arrival on the 13th March: [Wils. 212] but if they had done so, and Alexandria had thereby fallen, it is doubtful whether the ultimate success of the expedition would not have been endangered; as it would have only deprived the enemy of 4000 men, and led to the concentration of the remainder, above 20,000 strong, in the central position at Cairo, from whence they might have destroyed either the grand Vizier, Sir D. Baird, or General Hutchison, as they successively approached the in-

After the reduction of Alexandria, the greater part of the army, with General Hutchison, returned to England, leaving twelve thousand men, including the Indian troops, to secure the country, until a general peace. The European officers and soldiers were much struck by the luxury of their comrades in the Indian service, and, accustomed to sleep on the bare sand, with no other covering than a tented canopy, beheld with astonishment the numerous retainers and sumptuous equipages which attested the magnificence of Asiatic warfare. But Sir David Baird soon showed that if they had adopted the pacific habits of the soldiers of Darius, they had not forgotten the martial qualities of those of Alexander, and their morning exercises in the camp of Alexandria exhibited a combination of activity and discipline never surpassed by the finest troops of the Western world (1).

**Attempted treachery of the Turks.** The expulsion of the French from Egypt was followed by a piece of treachery on the part of the Ottomans, which, if not firmly resisted by the English commander, would have brought indelible disgrace on the British name. The Turkish Government, aware of the insecure tenure by which their authority in Egypt was held, as long as the Beys retained their ascendancy in the country, had secretly resolved upon extirpating them; and in order to carry their design into effect, seven of the chiefs were invited to Alexandria, to hold a conference with the Capitan Pacha, by whom they were received with every demonstration of respect, and invited on board a British vessel. But when they got into the boats which were to convey them thither, they took fright, and desired to be returned ashore, and this having been refused, a struggle ensued, in the course of which three of the Beys were killed, and four wounded. This frightful violation of all public faith, though by no means unusual among Asiatic despots, excited the most lively indignation in the British army; General Hutchison immediately put his troops under arms, and made such energetic remonstrances to the Capitan Pacha, that he was obliged to surrender up the four Beys who had been wounded, and the bodies of the slain, who were interred with military honours at Alexandria. This resolute conduct completely cleared the British from all imputation of having been accessory to the intended massacre, though it was far from allaying the indignant feelings of the English officers, many of whom openly declared the Capitan Pacha should have been seized in the centre of his camp, and hung by the yard-arm of the frigate to which he intended to have conveyed the victims of his treachery (2).

**Change in the government of Egypt, which falls to the Turks.** When left to their own resources, however, the Mameluke chiefs were totally unable to maintain their former government in Egypt. Many of them had fallen in the contest with France, their redoubtable cavalry had perished; and out of the whole militia of the province scarce two thousand could be mustered in arms, when the Europeans withdrew. They were compelled to relinquish, therefore, their old feudal sovereignty on the banks of the Nile, and accept the offer of the Grand Seignior, to surrender on favourable terms the province into the hands of the Osmanlis. A pacha was established, who soon became the real sovereign of the country, and long contrived, by the regular payment of his tribute, to maintain himself undisturbed in his dominions. Under his able and undivided administration, order began to reappear out of chaos; life became comparatively secure, though excessive taxation was established, and the national

terior of Egypt, whereas, by the retention of Alexandria, that dispersion of force was occasioned, which ultimately proved fatal to them in the campaign,

(1) Wils. 177. Ann. Reg. 1801, 239.

(2) Wils. 245. Ann. Reg. 1801, 240. *See* it. 173, 174,



resources were prodigiously augmented. By this means one singular and lasting consequence resulted from the French residence in Egypt. The oldarchical tyranny of the Mamelukes was destroyed; a powerful government established on the banks of the Nile, which, in the end, crushed the Wahabees in Arabia, extended itself over Syria, as far as the defiles of mount Taurus, and was only prevented, by the intervention of France and Russia, from utterly overturning the dominion of the Osmanlis. Thus every thing conspired to bring about the great Oriental Revolution of the nineteenth century; the power of the Turks, the chief bulwark of Mahometanism, was weakened like by the victories of the French and the conquests of their opponents, and the Crescent, long triumphant in the East, was at length struck down, not less by the ultimate effects of the ambition of the Republicans, who ridiculed every species of devotion, than the devout enthusiasm of the Moscovites, who sought an entrance to Paradise through the breach of Constantinople.

Extra-  
gant re-  
joicings in  
Constanti-  
nople and  
London at  
these  
events. But neither of the victorious states foresaw those remote consequences, which as yet lay buried in the womb of fate, and the demonstrations of joy at the surrender of Alexandria were as ardent on the shores of the Bosphorus as the banks of the Thames.

The cannon of the seraglio were fired, the city was splendidly illuminated, medals were struck to be distributed among the English who had served in Egypt, and a palace built for the British ambassador at Pera, as a lasting monument of the gratitude of the Ottoman empire. In London, the public thankfulness, if less noisy, was still more sincere. The people of England hailed this great achievement as a counterpoise to all the disasters of the war; as a humiliation of France on that element where it had been so long victorious, and a check to its ambition in that quarter where its hopes had been most sanguine; and as the harbinger of those greater triumphs which would await them, if the enemy should carry into execution their long threatened invasion of the British islands. Under the influence of these sentiments the early disasters of the war were forgotten; the fears, the asperity of former times were laid aside; and the people, satisfied with having redeemed their honour in military warfare by one great triumph, looked forward without anxiety to the cessation of the contest, in the firm belief that they could renew it without apprehension whenever the national safety required that it should be resumed (1).

Jan. 7.  
Great naval  
exertions of  
Napoléon  
to preserve  
Egypt. Although the French were thus expelled from Egypt, it was not without the greatest efforts on the part of Napoléon to preserve so important an acquisition, that it eluded his grasp. By great exertions a squadron of seven ships of the line and five frigates, having on board six thousand men and vast supplies of all sorts, was made ready for sea, and sailed from Brest in the beginning of January; it eluded the vigilance of two British squadrons which were detached in pursuit under Sir John Jervis and Sir Richard Bickerton, passed the straits of Gibraltar, and kept along the coast of Africa, almost to within sight of the Pharos of Alexandria; but there one of its frigates, the *Africaine*, was encountered, and captured by the English frigate *Phœbe*, of equal force; and the admiral, discouraged by this disaster, and alarmed at the accounts he received of the strength of Lord Keith's squadron off the coast of Egypt, which, united to that of Bickerton, now amounted to seventeen sail of the line, renounced his enterprise, and returned to Toulon. One of his frigates, however, the *Régé-*

néré, passed, under false colours, through the British fleet, and made its way into Alexandria; and this the first consul considered as decisive evidence that the whole, if directed with equal skill, might have reached the same destination. Gantheaume, therefore, received positive orders to put again to sea, and at all hazards to attempt the relief of Egypt. He set sail accordingly on March 20.

the 20th March, avoided Sir John Borlase Warren's squadron, which he met off Sardinia, and continued his route towards the coast of Africa; but Warren instantly made sail in the same direction, and arrived off Alexandria on the 23d April. No sooner was Gantheaume informed of this than he again turned about, and regained Toulon without any disaster. Irritated beyond measure by these repeated failures, Napoléon transmitted peremptory orders to the admiral to put to sea a third time, and endeavour, at all hazards, to convey the reinforcements he had on board into Alexandria; he

May 20. set sail accordingly on the 20th May, threw succours in passing to the Republican force besieging porto Ferraio in the isle of Elba; increased his squadron by three frigates prepared for him by General Soult at Brundisium, and arrived in sight of the coast of Egypt, for the third time, on the 8th June. One of his brigs, the Heliopolis, reached Alexandria on the day following; but when Gantheaume was making preparations for landing the troops on the sands to the westward of that town, his look-out frigates made signals that the English fleet, consisting of forty sail, of which eighteen were of the line, was approaching. It was no longer possible to effect the object of the expedition; in a few hours longer the squadron would be enveloped in the enemy's fleet, and the landing of the troops in the desert shore without stores or provisions, would expose them to certain destruction. Gantheaume, therefore, refused to accede to the wishes of the officers of the army, who were desirous to incur that perilous alternative, and made sail again for the June 24. coast of France. On his route homewards he fell in with the

Switsure, of seventy-four guns, which Captain Hollowell defended long with his accustomed gallantry, but he was at length obliged to surrender to the vast superiority of the Republican force, and with this trophy the admiral regained the harbour of Toulon. The French journals, long accustomed to continued disasters at sea, celebrated this gleam of success as a memorable triumph, and loudly boasted of the skill with which their fleet had traversed the Mediterranean and avoided the English squadrons; "a melancholy reflection," says the historian of Napoléon, "for a country and its admirals when skill in avoiding a combat is held equivalent to a victory. (1)."

This effort, however, was not the only one made by the first consul for the relief of Egypt. His design was to support Gantheaume by a combined squadron of fifteen ships of the line, drawn from the harbours of France and Spain. For this purpose great efforts had been made by the Spanish marine; six ships of the line at Cadiz had been placed under the orders of the French admiral Dumanoir, and six others had reached that harbour from Ferrol, while the English blockading squadrons, under Sir John Borlase Warren and Sir Richard Bickerton, had left their stations off these harbours in search of Admiral Gantheaume; and Admiral Linois, with three ships of the line, was to join them from Toulon. The British Government, justly alarmed at such a concentration of force in the isle of Leon, hastily despatched Sir James Saumarez with seven ships of the line and two frigates, to resume the block- June 13. ade of Cadiz; and he had hardly arrived off the harbour's mouth, when advices were received that Amiral Linois, with three ships of the line

(1) Big. ii. 34, 36. Jom. xiv, 363, 365. Dum. vii. 108, 112. Ann. Reg. 1801, 248.

and one frigate, was approaching from the Mediterranean. No sooner did the French admiral find that the blockade of Cadiz had been re-established by a force superior to his own, than he abandoned all hope of effecting the prescribed junction, and fell back to Algesiraz bay, where he took shelter under the powerful batteries which defend its coast. Thither he was followed by Sir James Saumarez, whose squadron was now reduced to six ships of the line by the detachment of one of his vessels to the mouth of the Guadalquivir; and the British admiral resolved upon an immediate attack notwithstanding that the forts and batteries and gun-boats, now manned by gunners from the French ships, presented the most formidable appearance. The British fleet stood into the bay, headed by Captain Hood in the *Venerable*, with springs on their cables, and in a short time the action began, the *Audacious* and *Pompey* successively approaching, and taking their stations alongside of the French vessels, between them and the batteries on shore. The wind, however, fell shortly after the leading ships got into action, so as to prevent the remainder of the squadron from advancing to their support; and when at length a light breeze from the south enabled the *Hannibal* to work into the scene of danger, she grounded in such a situation as to be exposed to the shot of the French squadron on one side, of the formidable batteries of *Almirante* and *St. Jago* on the other, while fourteen gun-boats, securely posted under her stern, kept up with great vigour a destructive raking fire. To complete the disaster, the wind totally failed soon after, so as to render it impossible for the other vessels, notwithstanding the utmost efforts, to render any effectual assistance; and the boats, which had been destined to storming the batteries on the islands, were all required to tow the line-of-battle ships which were still afloat, so as to bring their broadsides to bear upon the enemy. After several gallant attempts, therefore, on the part of Sir James Saumarez and his squadron, to throw themselves between the batteries and the grounded vessel, they were compelled to draw off, leaving her to her fate, and after an honourable resistance, she was obliged to strike her colours (1).

The loss of the British in killed and wounded in this action was 361; that on the part of the French and Spaniards, 586; but the unwonted occurrence of the retreat of the former, and the capture of one of their line-of-battle ships, diffused the most extraordinary joy throughout France, in which the first consul warmly participated (2). It was publicly announced at their theatres and in the gazette published on the occasion, that three French sail of the line had completely defeated six British, and captured one of their number, without the slightest mention of

(1) James, iii. 164, 172. Ann. Reg. 1801, 249. *Ann.* vii. 118, 121. *Jom.* xiv. 366, 368.

An incident, highly characteristic of the English sailors, occurred in this action. In its voyage through the Mediterranean, the French fleet had fallen in with, and captured, the brig *Speedy*, of thirteen guns, commanded by Captain Lord Cochrane, and that gallant officer, with his little crew, was on board the *Formidable* when the action took place in the bay of Algesiraz. At every roadside the vessel received from the English, these brave men gave three cheers, regardless alike of the threats of instant death from the French if they continued so unseemly an interruption, and the obvious danger that they themselves might be sent to the bottom by their friendly discharges.

(2) "The first consul," says the Duchess of Brantes, "recounted this triumph to us with the most lively satisfaction, with eyes literally over-

flowing with joy at this unlooked-for event. Naval victories were rare at that period, and Napoleon felt the full satisfaction arising from this one. Admiral Linois received the sole recompense which it was in his power at that period to bestow, a sabre of honour. All those who have narrowly studied the character of Napoleon, must have seen that the ruling passion of his great mind was the humbling of England. It was his constant object of study; and I can safely affirm that during the fourteen years that he held the reins of power, during which I certainly saw him very frequently, he was constantly set upon that object, and passionately desirous of the glory which it would produce. He constantly thought that he could give France the means of combatting that power on equal terms, and subduing it; all his measures tended towards that end."—D'ANNALES, v. 254, 256.

the batteries on shore, to which the Spanish official account, with more justice, ascribes the failure of the attack (1). But these transports were of short duration, and an awful catastrophe was destined to close the naval strife between the two nations. After the battle, the English fleet repaired to Gibraltar, and the utmost efforts were made night and day, to get the squadron ready for sea, but it was found that the Pompey was so much damaged that she could not be set afloat in time, and therefore her crew were distributed through the other vessels, and the fleet stood out to sea to avenge the affront they had received on the morning of the 12th July. Meanwhile, the Spanish squadron at Cadiz, consisting of six ships of the line and three frigates, two of which bore 112 guns each, had joined the shattered French fleet in Algesiraz bay, and the combined force was moving towards the isle of Leon, at the time that the English squadron, consisting of five ships of the line and one frigate, were working out of the harbour of Gibraltar (2).

Nothing in war could be conceived more animating than the circumstances under which the British fleet then set forth to redeem the honour of their flag. The combined squadron, consisting of nine ships of the line and four frigates, was proudly and leisurely moving towards Cadiz, with all sails set and a favourable wind, bearing with them their prize, the Hannibal, which they had contrived to get afloat, in tow of the Indienne frigate; the anxiety of the sailors to rescue her from their hands was indescribable; the day was clear, the rock covered with spectators, and loud shouts announced every successive British vessel which cleared the pier-head of Gibraltar to proceed on the perilous service. The mole, the quays, the batteries, the cliffs, were crowded with anxious multitudes, eager to witness the approaching conflict; the band of the Admiral's ship, the Cæsar, played the popular air, "Come, cheer up, my lads, 'tis to glory we steer," while the military bands of the garrison made the rock re-echo with the notes of "Britons, strike home!" So thrilling was the interest of the scene, so overpowering the feelings which it excited, that the foreigners who witnessed it wished they had been Englishmen; and even the wounded begged to be taken on board to share in the honours of the approaching conflict (3).

The British fleet again sails from Gibraltar.

It was in truth a proud sight for the English garrison to behold their fleet, of five ships of the line, only ten days after a bloody encounter, again put to sea to give chase to an enemy's squadron of line-of-battle ships, six of whom were perfectly uninjured, and which contained two three-deckers of stupendous magnitude. The Hannibal soon fell astern, and with the frigate which had her in tow, returned to Algesiraz; but the remainder of the squadron cleared Cabritta point, and stood away, as darkness set in, with all sail towards Cadiz. At ten at night, a fresh breeze filled the sails of the English fleet; they gained rapidly on the enemy, and Sir James gave orders that they should engage the first vessels which they could overtake. At eleven, the leading ship, the Superb, opened its fire upon the Real Carlos, of 112 guns, and after three broadsides she was seen to be on fire. Deeming this gigantic adversary so far disabled, that she must fall into the hands of the remainder of the fleet as they came up, the

Second battle of Algesiraz.

(1) "The action," says the Madrid Gazette extraordinary, "was very obstinate and bloody on both sides, and likewise on the part of our batteries, which decided the fate of the day. It is to the hot and sustained fire of fort St. Jago that we owe the capture of the English ship, for her bold manœuvre of attempting to pass between the French admiral's ship and the shore, made her ground, and notwith-

standing the utmost exertions to get her afloat, it was found impossible, and the fire of the batteries very soon compelled her to strike."—See JAMES, iii. 173.

(2) James iii. 179, 181. Ann. Reg. 1801, 232. Jom. xiv. 369. Dum. vii. 128.

(3) Braston, iii. 369. James, iii. 180.

Superb passed on, and in half an hour overtook and engaged the St.-Antoine, of 74 guns, which soon struck her colours. The Cæsar and Venerable came up in succession, and the chase was continued all night, in the midst of a tempestuous gale, by the light of the discharges which at intervals flashed through the gloom. But while the sailors were making the greatest efforts, and constantly nearing the enemy, a terrible catastrophe occurred, which for a moment daunted the stoutest hearts. The Superb, after having disabled the Real Carlos on her starboard, passed on, poured a broadside on the larboard into the San Hermenegildo, also of 112 guns, and soon outstripped both her first-rate antagonists. In the darkness of the night these two Spanish ships mutually mistaking each other for the enemy, were involved in a mortal combat; the violence of the winds spread the flames from the one to the other, the heavens were illuminated by the awful conflagration, and at midnight they both blew up with an explosion so tremendous as to shake Cadiz to its foundation, and spread a thrill of horror through every soul that witnessed it. Out of two thousand men, of which their crews consisted, not more than 250 were saved by the English boats, the remainder were blown into the air, or perished in the waves on that tempestuous night (1).

When morning dawned, both fleets were extremely scattered, the Venerable and Thames were far a-head of the rest of the British squadron, and the Formidable, of eighty guns, was seen in the rear of the French fleet. The British ships instantly gave chase, and soon brought her to action. It began within musket shot; and shortly the two ships were abreast of each other within pistol range, and a tremendous fire was kept up on both sides. Undismayed by the magnitude of the force brought against him, the French captain, made the most gallant resistance, which was soon rendered equal by the Thames unavoidably falling behind, and dropping out of the action. The fire of the Venerable, however, directed at the hull of her opponent, was beginning to tell severely on the enemy's crew, when the French gunners, by a fortunate discharge, succeeded in bringing down her mainmast, and with it most of her rigging, so that she fell behind, and soon after her other masts went by the board, and she struck on the shoals of San Pedro. In this desperate situation Captain Hood still maintained a contest with the stern chasers of the Formidable (2), and gave time for two other ships of the line to come up; upon the appearance of which the enemy relinquished their design of attacking the disabled vessel, and crowding all sail, stood in for Cadiz harbour, where they were soon after moored in safety.

The intelligence of this bold and fortunate engagement, in which a British fleet so severely handled an enemy's squadron of nearly double its own force, excited the greater joy in Great Britain, that the preceding failure in Algiers bay had somewhat mortified a people, nursed by long continued success to unreasonable expectations of constant triumph on their favourite element. On the other hand, the frightful catastrophe of their two first-rate men-of-war spread the utmost consternation through the Spanish peninsula, and increased that strong repugnance which the Castilian youth had long manifested for the naval service (3).

Attack of  
Napoléon  
on Portu-  
gal.

Contemporaneous with these maritime operations was a measure, from which Napoléon anticipated much more in the way of forming a counterpoise to the vast colonial acquisitions made by Great

(1) James, iii. 180, 183. Ann. Reg. 1801, 253. Jom. xiv. 368, 371. Dum. vii. 132, 135. Bign. ii. 38, 39.  
Jom. xiv. 369. Dum. vii. 130, 132.  
(2) James iii. 184, 185. Ann. Reg. 1801, 258. (3) Jom. xix. 371. Ann. Reg. 1801, 253, 254.



Britain during the war; and this was an attack upon Portugal, the ancient and tried ally of England. The French, according to their own admission, had no cause of complaint against that power; the only motive of the war was to provide an equivalent to the maritime conquests of England. "We only wished," says Bignon, "to enter into that kingdom in order to leave it, and stipulate for that retreat some considerable concession from Great Britain." The most obvious means of effecting this object was to interest Spain in its execution, and this was adroitly managed by the first consul. In the treaty of Lunéville, as already observed, it was stipulated that the grand duchy of Tuscany should be ceded by the Austrian family, and erected into a separate principality in favour of Don Louis, a prince of the Spanish family; and that the duchy was soon after erected into royalty, under the title of the kingdom of Etruria. Europe was at a loss at first to divine what was the motive for this sudden condition in favour of the Spanish house of Bourbon; but it was soon made manifest, when it appeared that a treaty had been concluded between France and Spain, the object of which was, "to compel the court of Lisbon to separate itself from the alliance of Great Britain, and cede, till the conclusion of a general peace, a fourth of its territory to the French and Spanish forces (1)."

This flagrant and unprovoked invasion of the rights of a pacific state, took place at the very time when France was loudly proclaiming the principles of the armed neutrality, and the utter injustice of one belligerent interfering with the trade or alliances of independent powers. But it soon appeared that the first consul's tenderness for neutral rights was all on one element, where he was weakest; and that on the other, where his power was well nigh irresistible, he was prepared to go the utmost length of belligerent aggression, and compel every other state to enter into his projects of universal hostility against Great Britain. So early as December 1800, when the victory of Hohenlinden had relieved him of all anxiety on the side of Germany, he had given orders for the formation of an army of observation at Bordeaux, which gradually drew towards the Pyrenees, and was increased to twenty thousand men; and this was followed some months afterwards by a declaration of war on the part of Spain, against the Court of Lisbon. The ostensible grounds of complaint on which this step was rested, were the refusal by the Court of Lisbon to ratify a peace with France, signed by its plenipotentiary in 1797; accompanied with a complaint that she had furnished protection to the English fleets and sailors, and insulted the French in the harbour of Carthagen. The real reasons for the war were very different. "The Courts of Lisbon and Madrid," says the French historian, "united by recent intermarriages, had no real subjects of dispute. They were drawn into the contest because the one was attached to the political system of France, the other to that of Great Britain (2)". Spain was at this time entirely under the guidance of the Prince of Peace, a vain and ambitious favourite who had risen from an obscure origin, by court intrigue, to an elevation little short of the throne, and threw himself willingly into the arms of France, in order to seek an effectual support against the pride and patriotism of the Castilian noblesse, who were exceedingly jealous of his authority. Guided by such a ruler, Spain made herself the willing instrument of France in this tyrannical aggression. She afterwards expiated her faults in oceans of blood (3).

In this extremity the Portuguese Government naturally turned to England

(1) Bign. ii. 10. Ann. Reg. 1801, 256.

(2) Bign. ii. 11.

(3) Jom. xiv. 289, 290. Ann. Reg. 1801, 256. Dum. vii. 61, 62.

The Por-  
tuguese ap-  
ply to Eng-  
land for aid.

for support, and offered, if she would send an army of twenty-five thousand men, to give her the command of the native forces.

Had it been in the power of Great Britain to have acceded to this offer, the desperate struggle of the peninsula might have been accelerated by eight years, and the triumphs of Busaco and Vimiera graced the conclusion of the first part of the war. But it was impossible to make such an effort; her only disposable force was already engaged in Egypt, and the great contest in the north, as yet undecided required all the means which were at the disposal of her government. All that could be done, therefore, was to send a few regiments to Lisbon, with a loan of L.300,000, in order if possible to procure a respite from the impending danger till the general peace, which it was already foreseen could not be far distant (1).

Deprived in this manner of any effectual external aid, the Portuguese Government, to appearance at least, was not wanting to its ancient renown. An animated proclamation was put forth, in which the people were reminded of their ancestors' heroic resistance to the Romans, and their imperishable achievements in the southern hemisphere; new armaments were ordered, works hastily constructed, a levy *en masse* called forth, and the plate borrowed from the churches to aid Government in carrying on the means of de-

The Por-  
tuguese  
make no  
resistance.  
May 20.

fence. But during all this shew of resistance, there was a secret understanding between the courts of Lisbon and Madrid; the regular troops on the frontier, about twenty thousand strong, were

hardly increased by a single soldier; and when, in the end of May, the Spanish army of thirty thousand combatants invaded the country, they experienced hardly any resistance. Jurumenha and Olivenza at once opened their gates; Campo Mayor, though amply provided with every thing requisite to sustain a siege, only held out a fortnight; and the Portuguese, flying in disorder, made haste to throw the Tagus between them and the enemy. Even

June 6.  
Peace con-  
cluded.

Elvas, which never lowered its colours in a more glorious strife, surrendered, and in a fortnight after the war commenced, this

collusive contest was terminated by the signature of preliminaries of peace at Abrantes. By this treaty, which was ratified on September 29th, Olivenza, with its circumjacent territory, was ceded to Spain, and the ports of Portugal were shut against the English flag (2).

Which the  
first consul  
refuses to  
ratify.

No sooner were the terms of this treaty known in France than the first consul refused to ratify them. Not that he had either any animosity or cause of complaint against the Cabinet of Lisbon, but that

by this pacification the main object of the war was missed, namely, the occupation of such a portion of the Portuguese territory by the French troops, as might give weight to the demands of France for restitution of her conquered colonies from Great Britain (3). The French army of observation, accordingly, under Leclerc and St.-Cyr, five-and-twenty thousand strong, which had advanced to Ciudad Rodrigo, entered Portugal, invested Almeida, and threatened both Lisbon and Oporto. The Portuguese Government now

June 28.  
A French  
army in-  
vades Por-  
tugal.

made serious preparations; six sail of the line were detached from Lisbon to reinforce the English blockading squadron off Cadiz, and

such efforts as the time would admit made to reinforce the army on the frontier. But the contest was too unequal, and England, anticipating the seizure of the continental dominions of the house of Braganza, had already taken possession of the island of Madeira, to secure its colonial dominions from insult,

(1) Ann. Reg. 256, 257. Dum. vii. 63. Jom. x.v. 1801, 258.

(2) Big. ii. 12, 13. Jom. xiv. 228, 299. Ann. Reg. 1801, 258.

(3) Big. ii. 13.

when the tempest was averted by external events. The near approach of an accommodation between France and England, made it a greater object for the first consul to extend his colonial acquisitions, than enlarge his conquests on the continent of Europe; while the arrival of a convoy with a great supply of silver from Brazil, gave the Portuguese Government the means both of satisfying his pecuniary demands, and gratifying the cupidity of his inferior agents. To use the words of a French historian—"The Portuguese Government holding the purse, threw it at the feet of the robbers, and thus saved itself from destruction (1)." Bribes were liberally bestowed on the French generals (2), and so completely did this seasonable supply remove all difficulties, that a treaty was soon concluded, in virtue of which, Olivenza, with its territory, was confirmed to Spain, the harbours of Portugal were closed against English ships, both of war and commerce, one half of Guiana, as far as the Carapanatuba stream, was ceded to France, and the commerce of the Republic was placed on the footing of the most favoured nations (3). By a less honourable and secret article, the immediate payment of 20,000,000 francs was made the condition of the retreat of the French troops (4).

As the war approached a termination, the anxiety of Napoléon to procure equivalents for the English transatlantic acquisitions became more vehement. With this view, he made propositions to Prussia to seize Hanover; an insidious though tempting offer, which would have rendered that power permanently a dependent on France, and totally altered the balance of European politics. But the Prussian Cabinet had good sense enough, at that time at least, to see that no such gratuitous act of spoliation was likely to prove a permanent acquisition, and to decline the proposal (5).

Meanwhile, Napoléon, relieved by the treaty of Lunéville, from all apprehensions of a serious continental struggle, bent all his attention to the shores of Great Britain, and made serious preparations for invasion on his own side of the Channel. Though not of the gigantic character which they assumed in a later period of the contest, after the renewal of the war, these efforts were of a kind to excite the serious attention of the English Government. From the mouth of the Scheldt to that of the Garonne, every creek and headland was fortified, so as to afford protection to the small craft which were creeping round the shore from all the harbours of the kingdom, to the general rendezvous of Dunkirk and Boulogne. The latter harbour was the general point of assemblage; gun-boats and flat-bottomed praams were collected in great quantities, furnaces heated for red-hot shot, immense batteries constructed, and every preparation made, not only for a vigorous defence, but the most energetic offensive operations. By an ordinance of July 12th, the flotilla was organized in nine divisions; and to them were assigned all the boats and artillerymen which had been attached to the armies of the Rhine and the Maine, which had been brought down those streams to the harbours on the Channel. The immensity of these preparations was studiously dwelt upon in the French papers; nothing was talked of but the approaching descent upon Great Britain; and fame, ever the first to sound the alarm, so magnified their amount, that when a few battalions pitched their tents on the heights of Boulogne, it was universally credited

(1) Bign. ii. 13, note.

(2) Leclerc got 5,000,000 francs, or L.200,000, for his own share.—HARD. viii. 136.

(3) See the treaty in Dum. vii. 264. *Pièces Just.*

(4) Bign. ii. 14. HARD. viii. 136.

(5) Bign. ii. 17, 18. HARD. viii. 34, 35.

in England that the army of invasion was about to take its station preparatory to the threatened attempt (1).

Apprehensions of the British Government. Though not participating in the vulgar illusion as to the imminence of the danger, the English Government had various weighty reasons for not disregarding the preparations on the southern coast of the Channel. The fleets of Great Britain in the narrow seas were indeed so powerful that no attempt at invasion by open force could be made with any chance of success (2); but it was impossible to conceal the alarming fact, that the same wind which wafted the French flotilla out of its harbours might chain the English cruisers to theirs; and the recent expeditions of Lantheaume in the Mediterranean, and of Hoche to the coast of Ireland, had demonstrated that, notwithstanding the greatest maritime superiority, it was impossible at all times to prevent a vigilant and active enemy from putting to sea during the darkness of autumnal or winter months. It was easy too to foresee, that even although ultimate defeat might attend a desultory, incalculable confusion and distress would necessarily follow it in the first instance. It was to be expected also, that the destruction of the armament might influence the issue of the negotiations for peace; and that if the first consul saw that his flotilla was not secure from insult even in his own harbours, he would probably abate of the pretensions which his extraordinary successes had induced him to bring forward (3).

Attack on the flotilla at Boulogne by Nelson. Influenced by these views, the British Government prepared a powerful armament of bombs and light vessels in the Downs, and intrusted the command to Lord Nelson, whose daring and successful exploits at Aboukir and the Nile pointed him out as peculiarly fitted for an enterprise of that description. On the 1st August he set sail from Deal at the head of three ships of the line, two frigates, and thirty-five bombs, brigs, and smaller vessels, and stood over to the French coast. He himself strongly urged that the expedition, aided by a few thousand troops, should be sent against Flushing; but the Cabinet resolved that it should proceed against Boulogne, and thither accordingly he went, much against his inclination. After a reconnoissance, attended with a slight cannonade on both sides, soon after his arrival, a more serious attack took place on the night of the 15th August. But in the interval the French line of boats had which is delicate been rendered wellnigh unassailable. Every vessel was defended by long poles headed by iron spikes projecting from their sides; strong nettings were braced up to their lower yards; they were moored head and stern across the harbour-mouth in the strongest possible manner, chained to the ground and each other, and on board each was from fifty to an hundred soldiers, each provided with three muskets, as in defending a breach threatened with assault. In addition to this the whole were immediately under the guns of the batteries on shore, and every eminence capable of bearing a cannon had been armed with a powerful array of artillery. Notwithstanding these formidable circumstances, Nelson commenced the attack at midnight in four divisions of boats. The second division, under Captain Parker, first closed with the enemy; and in the most gallant style instantly endeavoured to board. But the strong netting baffled all their efforts, and as they were vainly endeavouring to cut their way through it, a discharge of musketry from the soldiers on board killed or wounded above half their number,

(1) Dum. vii. 140, 144. Jom. xiv. 380, 381. Ann. Reg. 1801, 263.

(2) England at this period had fourteen ships of the line under Admiral Cornwallis off Brest, and

seventeen in the German Ocean observing the Dutch harbours."—JAMES, iii. Ap. No. 2, and DUMAS, vii. 144.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1801, 266. Jom. xiv. 385.

including their gallant leader Captain Parker, who was desperately maimed while cheering on his men. The darkness of the night, and the rapidity of the tide, which prevented the other divisions from getting into action at the same time as Captain Parker's, rendered the attack abortive, notwithstanding the most gallant efforts on the part of the seamen and marines engaged in the service. One of the commanders of the French division behaved like a generous enemy. He hailed the boats as they approached, and called out in English, "Let me advise you, brave Englishmen, to keep off; you can do nothing here, it is only shedding the blood of brave men to attempt it." After four hours gallant but unequal combat, the assailants were obliged to retire, with the loss of 172 men killed and wounded; but Nelson declared that, "If all the boats could have arrived at their destined points at the periods assigned to them, not all the chains in France could have prevented our men from bringing off the whole of the vessels (1)."

A singular circumstance occurred at this time, which demonstrates how little the clearest intellect can anticipate the ultimate result of the discoveries which are destined to effect the greatest changes in human affairs. At the time when all eyes in Europe were fixed on the Channel, and the orators in the French tribunate were wishing for "a fair wind and thirty-six hours," an unknown individual (2) presented himself to the first consul, and said, "The sea which separates you from your enemy gives him an immense advantage. Aided alternately by the winds and the tempests, he braves you in his inaccessible isle. This obstacle, his sole strength, I engage to overcome. I can, in spite of all his fleets, at any time, in a few hours, transport your armies into his territory, without fearing the tempests, or having need of the winds. Consider the means which I offer you." The plan and details accompanying it were received by Napoléon, and by him remitted to a commission of the most learned men which France could produce, who reported that it was visionary and impracticable, and in consequence it, at that time, came to nothing (3). Such was the reception which STEAM NAVIGATION received at the hands of philosophy; such is the first success of the greatest discovery of modern times since the invention of printing, of one destined in its ultimate effects, to produce a revolution in the channels of commerce, alter the art of naval war, work out the overthrow of empires, change the face of the world. The discovery seemed made for the age; and yet genius and philosophy rejected it at the very time when it was most required, and when it seemed calculated to carry into effect the vast projects which were already matured by its great leader. But the continental writers were in error when they suppose that this vast acquisition to nautical power would, if it had been fully developed at that time, have led to the subjugation of Britain; the English maritime superiority would have appeared as clearly in the new method of carrying on naval war as the old; Albion would have been encircled by steam vessels; if the French boats, aided by such auxiliaries, could have braved the wind and the tide, the English cruisers would have been equally assisted in the maintenance of their blockade; the stoutest heart and the last guinea would have finally carried the day, whatever changes occurred in the mode of carrying on the contest; and even if their wooden walls had been broken through, the future conquerors of Vittoria and Waterloo had no cause for despondency, if the war came to be conducted by land forces on their own shores.

(1) Southey, ii. 176, 180. Ann. Reg. 1801, 271.  
Jom. xiv. 387. Dam. vii. 149, 159. Big. ii. 59, 60.

(2) Fulton.

(3) Big. ii. 61, 62.



But these warlike demonstrations were a mere cover on both sides to the real intentions of the two Cabinets; and in the midst of the hostile fleets and armies which covered the Channel and the coasts of France, couriers were incessantly passing, carrying despatches containing the negotiations for a general peace. In truth, the war had now ceased to have any present or de-

Negotiations for peace between France and England. finitive object with both the powers by whom it was maintained, and they were driven to an accommodation from the experienced impossibility of finding any common element in which their hostilities could be carried on. After the loss of all her colonies, the ruin of her commerce, and the disappearance of her flag from the ocean, it was as impossible for France to find a method of annoying Great Britain, as it was for England to discover the means of reducing the continental power of her enemy, after the peace of Lunéville had prostrated the last array of the military monarchies of Europe. Even if their mutual hostility were inextinguishable, still both had need of breathing-time to prepare for a renewal of the contest; the former that she might regain the commerce and colonies on which her naval strength depended, the latter that she might restore the finances which the enormous expenses of the contest had seriously disorganized.

March 21. So early as the 21st March, the British Cabinet had signified to M. Otto, who still remained in London to superintend the arrangements for the exchange of prisoners, that they were disposed to renew the negotiations which had so often been opened without success; and it was agreed between the two governments that, without any general suspension of arms, the basis of a treaty should be secretly adjusted. When the terms, however, came to be first proposed, there appeared to be an irreconcilable difference between them; nor was this surprising, for both had enjoyed a career of almost unbroken success upon their separate elements, and each was called on to make sacrifices for peace, which it was quite evident could not be exacted from them by force of arms if the contest was continued. Lord Hawkes-

April 2. First proposals of England, which are refused. bury's first proposals were, that the French should evacuate Egypt, and that the English should retain Malta, Ceylon, Trinity, and Martinique, and evacuate all the other colonies which they had conquered during the war; acquisitions which, how great soever, did not seem disproportionate to the vast continental additions received by France in the extension of her frontier to the Rhine, and the establishment of a girdle of affiliated republics round the parent state. But to these conditions the first consul refused to accede. "The resolution of the first consul," says the historian of his diplomacy, "was soon taken. France could neither surrender any part of its ancient domains nor its recent acquisitions (1)."

July 23. The views of Napoléon were developed in a note of M. Otto, on the 23d July, after the dissolution of the northern confederacy had relieved England of one of the greatest of her dangers, and disposed France to proceed with more moderation in the negotiation; and their defeat in Egypt had deprived them of all hopes of retaining that colony by force of arms. He proposed that Egypt should be restored to the Porte; that the republic formed of the seven Ionian islands should be recognised; that the harbours of Italy should be restored to the Pope and the King of Naples; port Mahon ceded to Spain, and Malta to the Knights of Jerusalem, with the offer to raze its fortifications. In the East Indies, he offered to abandon Ceylon to Great Britain, upon condition that all the other colonial conquests of England in both he-

(1) *Jom.* xiv. 379. *Big.* ii. 68.

mispheres should be restored, and in that event agreed to respect the integrity of Portugal (1). Lord Hawkesbury, in answer, suggested some arrangement by which Malta might be rendered independent of both parties, and insisted for the retention of some of the British conquests in the West Indies (2). The negotiations were prolonged for several months, but at length the difficulties were all adjusted, and the preliminaries of a general peace signed at London on the 1st October (3).

Oct. 1, 1801. By these articles it was agreed that hostilities should immediately cease by land and sea between the contracting parties; that Great Britain should restore its colonial conquests in every part of the world, Ceylon in the East and Trinidad in the West Indies alone excepted, which were ceded in entire sovereignty to that power; that Egypt should be restored to the Porte, Malta and its dependencies to the order of St.-John of Jerusalem, the Cape of Good Hope to Holland, but opened alike to the trade of both the contracting powers; the integrity of Portugal guaranteed; the harbours of the Roman and Neapolitan states evacuated by the French, and Porto Ferrario by the English forces; a compensation provided for the house of Nassau; and the republic of the Seven Islands recognised by the French Republic. The fisheries of Newfoundland were restored to the situation in which they had been before the war, reserving their final arrangement to the definitive treaty (4).

Though the negotiations had been so long in dependence, they had been kept a profound secret from the people of both countries, and their long continuance had sensibly weakened the hope of their being brought to a satisfactory result. Either from accident or design, this impression had been greatly strengthened, recently before the signature of the preliminaries, and the very day before, the report had gone abroad in London, that all hope of an amicable adjustment was at an end, and that interminable war was likely again to break out between the two nations. In proportion to the desponding feelings occasioned by this impression, were the transports of joy excited by the appearance of a London Gazette Extraordinary on the 2d October, announcing the signature of the preliminaries on the preceding day. The 3 per cents instantly rose from 59 to 66; the *tiers consolidé* at Paris from 48 to 55.

Universal joy pervaded both capitals. These feelings rapidly spread through the whole British nation, as the arrival of the post announced the joyful intelligence; and the public satisfaction was at its height, when on the 12th of the same month Colonel Lauriston arrived, bearing the ratification of the treaty by the French Government. Never since the restoration of Charles II. had such transports seized the public mind. The populace insisted on drawing the French envoys in their carriage; and they were conducted by this tumultuary array, followed by a guard of honour from the household brigade, through Parliament Street to Downing Street, where the ratifications were exchanged, and at night a general illumination gave vent to the feelings of universal exhilaration. Nor was the public joy manifested in a less emphatic manner at Paris. Hardly had the cannon of the Tuileries and the Invalides announced the unexpected in-

(1) Note, 23d July.

(2) Note, 5th August.

(3) Big. ii. 73, 76. Jom. xiv. 383.

(4) Big. ii. 77. Jom. xiv. 393, 394.

The clause regarding Malta, which became of so much importance in the sequel, from being the ostensible ground of the rupture of the treaty, was in these terms: "The island of Malta, with its de-

pendencies, shall be evacuated by the English troops, and restored to the order of St.-John of Jerusalem. To secure the absolute independence of that isle from both the contracting parties, it shall be placed under the guarantee of a third power to be named in the definitive treaty."—Dumas, vii. 319, and *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 18, 19.

telligence, when every one stopped in the streets and congratulated his acquaintance on the news; the public flocked in crowds to the theatres, where it was officially announced, and in the evening the city was universally and splendidly illuminated. There seemed no bounds to the prosperity and glory of the Republic, now that this auspicious event had removed the last and most inveterate of its enemies (1).

But it is  
severely  
stigmatized  
in En. land  
by many.

But while these were the natural feelings of the inconsiderate populace, who are ever governed by present impressions, and were for the most part destitute of the information requisite to form a

rational opinion on the subject, there were many men gifted with greater sagacity and foresight in Great Britain, who deeply lamented the conditions by which peace had been purchased, and from the very first prophesied that it could be of no long endurance. They observed that the war had been abruptly terminated, without any one of the objects being gained for which it was undertaken; that it was entered into in order to curb the ambition, and stop the democratic propagandism of France, and in an especial manner prevent the extension of its authority in the Low Countries, whereas by the result its power was immensely extended, its frontier advanced to the Rhine, its influence to the Niemen, and a military chieftain placed at its head,

Arguments  
urged  
against it in  
the coun-  
try.

capable of wielding to the best advantage its vast resources. That supposing the destruction of some, and the humiliation of other powers, had absolved England from all her ties with the continental

states, and left her at full liberty to consult only her own interest in any treaty which might be formed, still it seemed at best extremely doubtful whether the preliminaries which had been signed were calculated to accomplish this object; that they contributed nothing towards the coercion of France on one element, while they gave that power the means of restoring its fleets, and recruiting the sinews of war on another; and that then the result necessarily would be, that England would be compelled to renew the contest again, and that too at no distant period, in order to maintain her existence, and she would then find her enemy's resources as much strengthened as her own were weakened during its cessation; that during the struggle we had deprived France of all her colonies, blockaded her harbours, ruined her commerce, and almost annihilated her navy, and therefore had nothing to fear from her maritime hostility; but could this be affirmed, if, in pursuance of this treaty, we restored almost all her colonial possessions, and enabled her, by a successful commerce, in a few years to revive her naval power? If, therefore, the principle, so long maintained by Great Britain, had any foundation, and the hostility of revolutionary France was implacable, it was evident that she has every thing to fear and nothing to hope from this pacification; and while England unlooses her own armour, and lays aside her sword, she will in truth place in the hands of her redoubtable adversary the weapons, and the only weapons, by which ere long she will be enabled to aim mortal strokes at herself.

Arguments  
urged in  
support of  
it by the  
Adminis-  
tration.

The partisans of administration, and the advocates for peace throughout the country, opposed to these arguments, considerations of another kind, perhaps still more specious. They contended

that the real question was not, what were the views formed, or the hopes indulged, when we entered into the war, but what were the prospects which could rationally be entertained, now that we had reached its tenth year? That without pretending to affirm that the resources of Great

(1) *Dum.* vii. 208, 209. *Ann.* Reg. 1801, 277. *Jom.* xiv. 394, 395.

Britain were worn out, or peace had become a matter of necessity, still it was impossible to dispute that, in consequence of the cessation of continental hostilities and the dissolution of the last coalition, the prospect of effectually reducing the military power of France had become almost hopeless; that thus the question was, whether, after it had become impossible, by the disasters of our allies, to attain one object of the war, we should obstinately and single-handed maintain the contest, without any definite end to be gained by its prosecution; that though the frontiers of France had been extended, and her power immensely increased, still the revolutionary mania, by far the greatest evil with which Europe was threatened, had been at length effectually extinguished. That thus the contest had ceased to be, as at first, one of life and death to England, and returned to the usual state of warfare between regular governments, in which the cost of maintaining it was to be balanced by the advantages to be gained from its prosecution; that without doubt the return of peace, and the restoration of her colonies would give France the means of increasing her naval resources, but it would probably do the same in an equal or greater degree to Great Britain, and leave the maritime power of the two countries in the same relative situation as before; that it was impossible to remain for ever at war, lest your enemy should repair the losses he had sustained during the contest, and the enormous expenses with which the struggle was attended would, if much longer continued, involve the finances of the country in inextricable embarrassment; that it was surely worth while trying, now that a regular government was established in the Republic, whether it was not possible to remain with so near a neighbour on terms of amity; and it would be time enough to take up arms again, if the conduct of the first consul demonstrated that he was not sincere in his professions, and that a renewal of the contest would be less perilous than a continuance of peace (1).

The termination of hostilities between France and England speedily drew after it the accommodation of the differences of the minor powers engaged in the war. No sooner were the preliminaries signed with Great Britain, than Napoléon used his utmost efforts to conclude a treaty on the most favourable terms with the Ottoman Porte. On this occasion the finesse of European diplomacy prevailed over the plain sense and upright dealing of the Osmanlis. The news of the surrender of Alexandria reached Paris on the 7th October, six days after the preliminaries had been signed with England; instantly the Turkish ambassador, Esseyd Ali Effendi, who had long been in a sort of confinement, was sent for, and before he was aware of the important success which had been gained by his countrymen, persuaded to agree to a treaty, which was signed two days afterwards. In this negotiation, the French diplomatists made great use of their alleged moderation in agreeing to the restoration of Egypt, which they knew was already lost, and so worked upon the fears of the ambassador by threats of a descent from Ancona and Otranto, that he agreed to give to the Republican commerce in the Levant the same advantages which the most favoured nations enjoyed; and, at the same time, the Republic of the Seven Ionian Islands was recognised. Thus, by the arts of M. Talleyrand, were the French, who, in defiance of ancient treaties, had done all in their power to wrest Egypt from the Turks, placed on the same footing with the English, by whose blood and treasure it had been rescued from their grasp (2).

Oct. 9.  
Peace be-  
tween  
France and  
Turkey,  
and treaties  
with Bavaria  
and America.

(1) An Reg. 1801, 278, 279.

(2) Jom. xiv. 398. Ann. Reg. 1801, 299, and State Papers, 292.

**Aug. 24.** In the end of August, a definitive treaty was concluded between France and Bavaria, by which the latter power renounced in favour of the former all their territories and possessions on the left bank of the Rhine, and received, on the other hand, a guarantee for its dominions on the right bank (1). The preliminaries, signed at Morfontaine on September 30, 1800, between France and America, were ratified by a definitive treaty which somewhat abridged the commercial advantages stipulated in favour of the Republic, although it placed the French on the footing of the most favoured nations (2). But notwithstanding all his exertions, the first consul was obliged to forego the peculiar advantages which, in the treaty of 1778, the gratitude of the Americans to Louis XVI had granted to the subjects of France. Finally, a treaty of peace was, on October 8th, concluded between France and Russia, and on December 17th, between the same power and the bey of Algiers (3).

The preliminary articles of peace underwent a protracted discussion in both Houses of Parliament, immediately after the opening of the session in November 1801. The eyes of all the world were fixed on the only assembly in existence, where the merits of so important a treaty, and the mighty interests it involved, could receive a free discussion.

**Debates in Parliament on the peace.** It was urged by Lord Grenville, Mr. Windham, and the war party in both houses, "By the result of this treaty we are in truth a conquered people. Bonaparte is as much our master as he is of Spain or Prussia, or any of those countries which, though nominally independent, are really subjected to his control. Are our resources exhausted? Is the danger imminent, that such degrading terms are acceded to? On the contrary, our wealth is unbounded, our fleets are omnipotent, and we have recently humbled the veterans of France, even on their own element! We now make peace, it seems, because we foresee a time at no distant period, when we shall be obliged to do so; we capitulate, like General Menou, when we have still some ammunition left. The first question for every independent power inheriting a glorious name to ask itself is, 'Is the part I am about to act consonant to the high reputation I have borne in the world?' Judging by this standard, what shall we say of the present treaty? France gives up nothing, for Egypt, at the time of its conclusion, was not hers to give. England, with the exception of Trinidad and Ceylon, gives up every thing. By

(1) State Papers. Ann. Reg. 1801, 297.

(2) Jom. xiv. 399.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1801. State Papers, 291, 300.

**Important treaty between France and Russia.** The public articles of this treaty merely re-established the relations of the two empires on the footing on which they stood prior to the commencement of hostilities; but they contained also several secret articles, which ultimately became of the greatest importance in the complicated system of European diplomacy. The first article related to the division of the indemnities provided by the treaty of Lunéville for the princes possessed on the left bank of the Rhine. The cabinets bound themselves "to form a perfect concert, to lead the parties interested to adopt the same principles, which are to preserve a just equilibrium between the houses of Austria and Russia." The second article provided, that the contracting parties should come to an understanding terminate on amicable terms the affairs of Italy and of the Holy See. The sixth article provides, that the first consul and the Emperor of Russia shall act in concert in relation to the King of Sardinia, and with all the regard possible to the actual state

of affairs." The ninth article guaranteed the independence of the republic of the Seven Islands; "and it is specially provided, that those isles shall contain no foreign troops." Finally, the eleventh article, the most important of the whole, declares:—"As soon as possible after the signature of the present treaty, and these secret articles, the two contracting parties shall enter upon the consideration of the establishment of a general peace, upon the following basis: 'To restore a *just equilibrium in the different parts of the world, and to ensure the liberty of the seas, binding themselves to act in concert for the attainment of these objects by all measures, whether of conciliation or vigour, mutually agreed on between them, for the good of humanity, the general repose, and the independence of governments*'" So early had these great potentates taken upon themselves to act as the arbiters of the whole affairs of the civilized world! These secret articles were in the end the cause of all the differences which ensued between those powers, and brought the French to Moscow and the Russians to Paris. So often does overweening ambition outvault itself, and fall on the other side.—*See BRUXON, ii. 90, 93.*



the result of the treaty, France possesses in Europe all the continent, excepting Austria and Prussia; in Asia, Pondicherry, Cochin, Negapatam, and the Spice Islands; in Africa, the Cape of Good Hope, Goree, and Senegal; in the Mediterranean, every fortified port, excepting Gibraltar, so that that inland sea may now be truly called a French lake; in the West Indies, part at least of St.-Domingo, Martinique, Tobago, St.-Lucie, Guadaloupe, Curacoa; in North America, St.-Pierre and Miguelon, Louisiana, in virtue of a secret treaty with Spain; in South America, Surinam, Demerara, Berbice, Essequibo, and Guiana, as far as the river of the Amazons. Such is the power which we are required to contemplate without dismay, and under the shadow of whose greatness we are invited to lie down with perfect tranquillity and composure. What would the Marlboroughs, the Godolphins, the Somers, or such weak and deluded men, as viewed with jealousy the power of Louis XV, have said to a peace which not only confirms to France the possession nearly of the whole of Europe, but extends her empire over every other part of the globe?

“But it is said that France and the first consul will stop short in the career of ambition; that they will be satisfied with the successes they have gained, and that the progress of the Revolution will stop at the elevation it has already attained. Is such the nature of ambition? Is it the nature of French revolutionary ambition? Does it commonly happen that either communities or single men are cured of the passion for aggrandisement by unlimited success? On the contrary, if we examine the French Revolution, and trace it correctly to its causes, we shall find that the scheme of universal empire was, from the beginning, what was looked forward to as the consummation of its labours; the end first in view, though the last to be accomplished; the *primum mobile* that originally set it in motion, and has since guided and governed all their movements. The authors of the Revolution wished, in the first instance, to destroy morality and religion, but they wished these things, not as ends, but as means in a higher design. They wished for a double empire, an empire of opinion, and an empire of political power, and they used the one of these as the means of effecting the other. When there is but one country intervenes between France and universal dominion, is it to be supposed that she will stop of her own accord, and quietly surrender all the fruits of her efforts, when they are just within her grasp?

“But the peace is founded, it would appear, on another hope; on the idea that Bonaparte, now that he has become a sovereign, will no longer be a supporter of revolutionary schemes, but do his utmost to maintain the rank and authority which he has so recently acquired. But although nothing seems more certain than that, in that quarter at least, the democratic mania is for the present completely extinguished, yet it by no means follows from that circumstance that it does not exist, and that too in a most dangerous form, in other states in close alliance with the present ruler of France. Though the head of an absolute monarchy in that kingdom, he is adored as the essence of Jacobinism in this country; and maintains a party here, only the more dangerous that its members are willing to sacrifice to him not only the independence of their country, but the whole consistency of their previous opinions. If any doubt could exist in any reasonable mind that the grand object of the first consul, as of all preceding governments in France, has been the destruction of this country, it would be removed by the conduct which has been pursued, and the objects that have been insisted for in this very treaty. What can be the object of demanding so many settlements in South America and the West Indies, the Cape, and Cochin-China, and Malta, so re-

cently won by our arms, if not of building up a maritime and colonial power, which may in time come to rival that of this country? It does not augur very favourably of the intentions of a party in any transaction, that his conduct throughout has been marked by the clearest proofs of duplicity and fraud. Now, what shall we think of the candour and fairness which, in a treaty with us, proposes the evacuation of Egypt at the very time when they knew, though we did not, that at that moment all their soldiers in Egypt were prisoners of war? Where was their good faith to the Turks, when in the same circumstances they, knowing the fact and the Turks not, took credit from them for this very evacuation? What is this but ensuring the lottery-ticket at the moment when they know it to be drawn?

“What, it is said, are we to do? War cannot be eternal, and what prospect have we of reaching a period when it may be terminated under circumstances upon the whole more favourable? The extent to which this delusion has spread, may truly be said to have been the ruin of the country. The supporters of this opinion never seem to have apprehended the important truth, that if France is bent upon our destruction, there must be perpetual war till one or other is destroyed. This was the conduct of the Romans, who resolved that Carthage should be destroyed, because they were sensible that if that was not done, it would speedily be their own fate. If we are to come at last only to an armed truce, would it not have been better to have suspended the war at once in that way, that taken the roundabout course which has now been adopted? The evils of war are indeed many; but what are they compared to those of the armed, suspicious, jealous, peace which we have formed? Against all its own dangers war provided; the existence of our fleets upon the ocean, shut up at once all those attempts which are now let loose upon our possessions in every quarter of the globe. In peace, not the least part of our danger will arise from the irreligious principles and licentious manners which will be let loose upon our people, and spread with fatal rapidity, from the profligacy of the neighbouring capital. French Jacobinism will soon break through stronger bulwarks than the walls of Malta. The people of this country have enjoyed, in such an extraordinary degree, all the blessings of life during the war, public prosperity has increased so rapidly during its continuance, that they have never been able to comprehend the dangers which they were engaged in combating. If they had, we never should have heard, except among the ignorant and disaffected, of joy and exultation throughout the land, at a peace such as the present. When a great military monarch was at the lowest ebb of his fortunes, and had sustained a defeat which seemed to extinguish all his remaining hopes, we wrote from the field of battle: ‘We have lost all except our honour.’ Would to God that the same consolation, in circumstances likely to become in time not less disastrous, remained to Great Britain!

“France, it is true, has made great acquisitions; she has made the Rhine the boundary of her empire; but on our side we have gained successes no less brilliant and striking; we had multiplied our colonies, and our navy was triumphant. We had rescued Egypt, we had captured Malta and Minorca, and the Mediterranean was shut up from the ships of France and Spain. In the East Indies we had possessed ourselves of every thing except Batavia, which we should have taken, if it had been worth the cost of an expedition. We had made ourselves masters of the Cape, an important and necessary step towards Eastern dominion. In the West Indies, we had every thing desirable, Martinique, Trinidad, St.-Lucie, and Guadeloupe; while on the continent of South America we had an absolute empire,

under the name of Surinam and Demerara, almost equal to the European power to whom we have now restored it. But what have we done with these immense acquisitions, far exceeding in present magnitude, and ultimate importance, all the conquests of France on the continent of Europe? Have we retained them as pledges to compel the restoration of the balance of European power, or, if that was impossible, as counterpoises in our hands to the acquisitions of France? No! we have surrendered them all at one fell swoop to our implacable enemy, who has thus made as great strides towards maritime supremacy in one single treaty as he had effected toward continental dominion in nine successful campaigns (1).”

Answer  
made by the  
Govern-  
ment and  
Mr. Pitt.

To these powerful and energetic arguments it was replied by Lord Hawkesbury and Mr. Addington, who on this occasion found an unexpected but powerful ally in Mr. Pitt, “That after the conclusion of peace between France and the great continental powers; after the dissolution of the confederacy of the European monarchies, a confederacy which Government had most justly supported to the utmost of their power, the question of peace became merely one of time, and of the terms to be obtained for ourselves. With regard to the terms which were obtained, they were perhaps not so favourable as could have been wished, but they were decidedly preferable to a continuance of the contest, after the great objects for which it was undertaken were no longer attainable; and the difference between the terms we had obtained, and those of retaining all we had given up, would not have justified us in protracting the war. Minorca was a matter of little importance, for experience has proved that it uniformly fell to the power which possessed the preponderating naval force in the Mediterranean; and although it was certainly a matter of regret that we could not have retained so important an acquisition as Malta, yet, if we could not do this, no better arrangement could have been made as to its future destination, than had been made in the present treaty. Ceylon, in the East, and Trinidad in the West Indies, are both acquisitions of great value, and although it would be ridiculous to assert that they afforded any compensation for the expense of the war, yet, if, by the force of external events, over which we had no control, the chief objects of the struggle have been frustrated, it becomes a fit subject of congratulation, that we have obtained acquisitions and honourable terms for ourselves at the termination of a contest, which to all our allies had been deeply checkered by disaster.

“The great object of the war on the part of Great Britain was security; defence of ourselves and our allies in a war waged against most of the nations of Europe, and ourselves in particular, with especial malignity. In order to obtain this, we certainly did look for the subversion of the government which was founded on revolutionary principles; but we never insisted as a *sine qua non* on the restoration of the old government of France; we only said, at different times, when terms of accommodation were proposed, there was no government with which we could treat. It doubtless would have been more consistent with the wishes of Ministers and the interest and security of this country, if such a restoration could have taken place, and it must ever be a subject of regret that efforts corresponding to our own were not made by the other powers of Europe for the accomplishment of that great work; but in no one instance did we ever insist upon restoring the monarchy. There were periods during the continuance of the

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 86, 139, 165, 174.

war in which we had hopes of being able to put together the scattered fragments of that great and venerable edifice; to have restored the exiled nobility of France; to have re-established a government, certainly not free from defects, but built upon regular foundations instead of that mad system of innovation which threatened, and had nearly effected, the destruction of Europe. This, it was true, had been found not attainable, but we had the satisfaction of knowing that we had survived the revolutionary fever, and we had seen the extent of its principles abated. We had seen Jacobinism deprived of its fascination; we had seen it stript of the name and pretext of liberty; it had shown itself to be capable of destroying only, but not of building, and that it must necessarily end in military despotism.

“But being disappointed in our hopes of being able to drive France within her ancient limits, and to make barriers against her future incursions, it became then necessary with the change of circumstances to change our plans; for no error could be more fatal than to look only at one object, and obstinately pursue it, when the hope of accomplishing it no longer remained. If it became impossible for us to obtain the full object of our wishes, wisdom and policy both required that we should endeavour to obtain that which was next best. In these propositions there was no inconsistency, either in the former conduct or language of Ministers, in refusing to treat with the person who now holds the destiny of France; for it was even then announced, that if events should take the turn they have since done, peace would no longer be objectionable.

“Much exaggeration prevails as to the real amount of the additional strength which France has acquired during the war. If, on the one hand, her territorial acquisitions are immense, it must be recollected, on the other, what she has lost in population, commerce, capital, and industry. The desolation produced by convulsions such as France has undergone, cannot be repaired even by large acquisitions of territory. When, on the other hand, we contemplate the immense wealth of this country, and the natural and legitimate growth of that wealth, so much superior to the produce of rapacity and plunder, it is impossible not to entertain the hope, founded in justice and nature, of its solidity. When to these we add the great increase of our maritime power, the additional naval triumphs we have obtained, the brilliant victories of our armies, gained over the flower of the troops of France, we have the satisfaction of thinking, that if we have failed in some of our wishes, we have succeeded in the main object, of adding strength to our security, and at the same time shed additional lustre over our national character. Nor are our colonial acquisitions to be overlooked in estimating the consolidation of our resources. The destruction of the power of Tippoo Saib in India, who has fallen a victim to his attachment to France and his perfidy to us, cannot be viewed but as an important achievement. The union with Ireland, effected at a period of uncommon gloom and despondency, must be regarded as adding more to the power and strength of the British Empire than all the conquests of France have effected for that country. If any additional proof were required of the increase of national strength to England, it would be found in the unparalleled efforts which she made in the last year of the war, contending at once against a powerful maritime confederacy in the north, and triumphing over the French on the sands of Egypt; while at the same time the harbours of Europe were so strictly blockaded, that not a frigate even could venture out to sea but under the cover of mist or darkness. Finally, we have seen that proud array of ships, got together for the invasion of this country, driven for shelter under their own batteries, and only preserved

from destruction by the chains and nets thrown over them at their harbour mouths.

“After nine years of ceaseless effusion of blood; after contracting an increase of debt to the amount of above two hundred millions; after the indefatigable and uninterrupted exertions of this country, and, it may be added, after its splendid and unexampled achievements, there is no one who can deny that peace is eminently desirable, if it can be purchased without the sacrifice of honour. This country never volunteered into a war with France; she was drawn into it against her will by the intrigues of the Republicans in her own bosom, and the disaffection, sedition, anarchy, and revolt which they propagated without intermission in all the adjoining states; but that danger has now totally ceased; the revolutionary fervour of France is coerced by a military chieftain far more adequate to the task than the exiled race of monarchs would have been; and the only peril that now exists is that arising from her military power. But if war is to be continued till adequate security against that danger is obtained, when will it terminate? Where are the elements to be found of a new coalition against France; and how can Great Britain, burdened as she is with colonial possessions in every part of the world, descend single-handed into the continental arena with her first-rate antagonist?

“Peace can now, for the first time since the commencement of the war, be obtained without compromising the interests of any existing ally of England. Austria, Sardinia, Russia, Prussia, Spain, Holland, the original parties to the alliance, have successively at different periods, dropped out of it, and requested to be liberated from their engagements. We did not blame them for having done so; they acted under the influence of irresistible necessity; but unquestionably they had thereafter no remaining claim upon Great Britain. In so far, therefore, as we stipulated any thing in favour of powers which had already made peace, we acted on large and liberal grounds, beyond what we were bound to have done either in honour or honesty. In this respect the stipulations in favour of Naples, who had not only excluded our shipping from her harbours, but joined in an alliance against us, were highly honourable to the British character. The like might be said of the stipulations in favour of Portugal; while the Ottoman Porte, the only one of our allies who remained fighting by our side at the conclusion of the contest, has obtained complete restitution. The seven islands of the Adriatic, originally ceded by France to Austria, and again transferred by Austria to France, might, from their situation, have been highly dangerous in the hands of the latter power to the Turkish dominions, and therefore they have been erected into a separate republic, the independence of which is guaranteed. We have even done something in favour of the House of Orange and the King of Sardinia, although, from having left the confederacy, they had abandoned every claim excepting on our generosity. And thus having faithfully performed our duties to all our remaining allies, and obtained terms, which, to say the least of them, took nothing from the security of this country, was it expedient to continue the contest for the sake of powers who had abandoned our alliance, and themselves given up as hopeless the objects we had originally entertained, and in which they were more immediately interested than ourselves? Compare this peace with any of those recorded in the former history of the two nations, and it will well bear a comparison. By the treaty of Ryswick and Aix-la-Chapelle we gained nothing; by that of Versailles we lost considerably: it was only by the peace of Utrecht in 1713, and that of Paris in 1763, that we made any acquisitions; but if we compare the present treaty with either of



these, it will be found that it is by no means inferior either in point of advantage or the promise of durability. Minorca and Gibraltar, obtained by the former, and Canada and Florida, by the latter, will not bear a comparison with Ceylon, the Mysore, and Trinidad, the glorious trophies of the present contest (1)."

In the Commons no division took place on the preliminaries. In the Lords the house divided, 114 to 40, in favour of the Ministers; but in the minority were found the names of Earls Spencer, Grenville, and Caernarvon (2).

The definitive treaty of peace was signed at AMIENS, on the 27th March, 1802. Its conditions varied in no material circumstance from the preliminaries agreed to at London nine months before. The fisheries in Newfoundland were replaced in the condition in which they were before the war (3); an "adequate compensation" was stipulated for the House of Orange (4), and it was agreed that Malta should be placed in a state of entire independence of both powers; that there should be neither English nor French *langues*, or branches of the order; that a Maltese *langue* shall be established, and the King of Sicily invited to furnish a force of 2000 men to form a garrison to the fortresses of the island and its dependencies, along with the Grand Master and Order of St.-John; and that "the forces of his Britannic Majesty shall evacuate the island and its dependencies within three months after the exchange of the ratifications, or sooner if it can be done." The cession of Ceylon and Trinidad to Great Britain, and the restoration of all the other conquered colonies to France and Holland, the integrity of the Ottoman dominions, and the recognition of the republic of the Seven Islands, were provided for as in the preliminary articles (5).

A long debate ensued in both Houses on the definitive treaty, in which the topics already adverted to were enlarged on at great length. Government were supported by a majority of 276 to 20 in the Lower, and 122 to 16 in the Upper House (6).

Such was the termination of the first period of the war, and such the terms on which Great Britain obtained a temporary respite from its perils and expenses. On calmly reviewing the arguments urged both in the legislature and in the country on this great question, it is impossible to resist the conclusion, that the advocates of peace were well founded in the views they entertained of the interests of the country at that period. Even admitting all that Mr. Wyndham and Lord Grenville so strongly advanced as to the magnitude of the sacrifices made by Great Britain, and the danger to which she was exposed from the territorial acquisitions and insatiable ambition of France to be well founded, still the question remained, was it not incumbent on a prudent government to make at least the trial of a pacification, and relieve the country for a time even from the burdens and anxiety of a war, on the faith of a treaty solemnly acceded to by its new ruler. The government of the first consul, compared to any of the revolutionary ones which had preceded it, was stable and regular; and the revolutionary fervour, the continuance of which had so long rendered any safe pacification out of the question, had exhausted itself, and given place to a general and anxious disposition to submit to the ruling authority. The dissolution of the last coalition had rendered hopeless, at least for a very long period, the reduction of the military power of France; and the maritime superiority of

(1) Parl. Hist. xxvi. 36, 38.

(2) Ibid. 191.

(3) Art. 15.

(4) Art. 18.

(5) See the treaty in Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 559. Ann. Reg. 1802. State papers, 62.

(6) Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 733, 827.

England was ~~so~~ <sup>enabled</sup>, as to render any danger to her own independence a distant and problematical contingency. In these circumstances, it seems indisputable that it was the duty of Government, if it could be done without dishonour, to bring to a conclusion a contest of which the burdens were certain and immediate, and the advantages remote, if not illusory, and put the sincerity of the first consul's professions of moderation to such a test as might relieve them of all responsibility, in the event of their being obliged, at a subsequent period, to renew the contest. The fact of this having ultimately been found to be the case, and of the peace of Amiens having turned out only an armed truce, is no impeachment whatever of the justice of these views; it, on the contrary, affords the strongest corroboration of them, for England lost none of her means of defence during the intermission of hostilities, and she avoided the heavy responsibility which otherwise would have lain upon her to the latest generation, of having obstinately continued the war, when peace was within her power, and compelled Napoléon, although otherwise inclined, to continue a contest which ultimately brought such unparalleled calamities on the civilized world. Nor could the terms of the treaty be impugned as disgraceful, with any degree of justice towards Great Britain, when she terminated a strife, which had proved so disastrous to the greatest continental states, with her constitution untouched, and without the cession of a single acre which belonged to her at its commencement; while France, accustomed to such larged acquisitions at every pacification, was compelled to surrender territories belonging to herself, or her allies, larger than the whole realm of England, and even, in their existing state, of first-rate importance.

Vast increase of the naval and military resources of England during the war, as compared with France.

For these important advantages, Great Britain was indebted to the energy of her population, and the happy circumstances of her maritime situation, which enabled her to augment her commerce and increase her resources at the very time when those of all the other belligerent powers were wasting away under the influence of a protracted and desolating contest. The increase of the wealth, population, commerce, and industry of these islands, was unprecedented during its whole continuance, and was so great as fully to justify Mr. Pitt's observation, that it left the relative strength of the two powers nearly the same at its termination as at its commencement (1). Great as the increase of the French army was, that of the British had been still greater, and but for the immense

(1) On the 1st February, 1793, the British navy consisted of 135 sail of the line and 133 frigates; whereas at its close it numbered no less than 202 sail of the line and 277 frigates, manned by 120,000 seamen and marines (\*). The navy of France was, at the commencement of the war, 73 sail of the line and 67 frigates, manned by 80,000 seamen; at its termination it consisted only of 39 sail of the line and 35 frigates. [Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 47.] That is, at the outset, the English sail of the line and frigates together were not double those of the enemy; whereas at its close they were above six times their number. [Stat. de la France, 591.] Napoléon calculates a fleet of 30 ships of the line, and frigates in proportion, as equal to an army of 120,000 men: measured by that standard, the British navy in

1801 was equivalent to a land force of above 800,000 men.

Nor had the military resources of the empire increased in a less striking manner. In 1793, the army amounted only to 64,000 regular soldiers and 12,000 fencibles in the British isles and its colonial dependencies; [Ann. Reg. xxxiii. 250.] whereas in 1801 they had increased to the immense force of 168,000 men and 80,000 militia, [Parl. Hist. Dec. 31. 1800.] exclusive of the Sepoys in the service of the East India Company, who amounted to 130,000 men, and above 100,000 volunteers in the British islands. [Parl. Hist. xxxv. 15.] The French army in 1793 consisted of 150,000 infantry, 20,000 cavalry, and 10,000 artillery, [Jom. i. 224. St. Cyr. i. 36. Introd. état de France, 573.] exclusive of

(\*) The total navy on 1st October, 1801, was—

Line in commission . . . . .	104
Line in ordinary, and building . . . . .	98
Frigates in commission . . . . .	126
Frigates in ordinary, and building . . . . .	131
Sloops, brigs, etc. . . . .	302
Total . . . . .	761

— See JAMES, vol. iii. tab. 10, and *fn.*

surface which she had to defend, and the vast colonial possessions to protect, England might have descended with confidence into the continental arena, and measured her strength, single-handed, with the conqueror of Europe (1).

General result of these details.

During the war the British navy increased a half, while the French declined to a half. The British army was more than doubled, and the French increased in nearly the same proportion. The French revenue, notwithstanding all its territorial acquisitions, was diminished, while the permanent income of England was nearly doubled; the French debt, by the destruction of a large proportion of its proprietors, was diminished, while that of England was doubled; the French exports and imports were almost annihilated, while the British exports were doubled, and the imports had increased more than fifty per cent; the French commercial shipping was almost destroyed, while that of England had increased nearly a third (2).

77,000 provincial troops; in 1801, they amounted to 350,000 regular soldiers, exclusive of the national guards. [Dum. vi. 70, 71.]

(1) General Mathieu Dumas estimates the regular force of France, after the peace of Luneville, at 277,000 men, exclusive of the coast guards, the gendarmerie, the depots of the corps, and the national guard, on active service. It is a most moderate computation to take them at 73,000 more

In 1805 the military establishment of France consisted of the following forces:—

Infantry of the line, . . . . .	341,000
Light infantry, . . . . .	100,000
Infantry, . . . . .	441,000
Light cavalry, . . . . .	60,500
Heavy cavalry, . . . . .	17,000
Cavalry, . . . . .	77,500

Foot and horse artillery, pontonniers engineers, etc. . . . .	53,500
Imperial guard, . . . . .	8,500
Gendarmerie, . . . . .	15,600

This would amount to a total of—

Infantry, . . . . .	441,000
Cavalry, . . . . .	77,500
Artillery and Engineers, . . .	53,500
Imperial Guard, . . . . .	8,500
Gendarmerie, . . . . .	15,600

Total, . . . . . 596,100 men.

See DUMAS, vi. 70-71; and PEUCHET, *Statistique de la France*, 576, 580.

Comparative increase in revenue of France and England during the war.

(2) The regular revenue of France in 1780 (for no approximation even to a correct estimate can be formed of its amount during the period of confiscation and assignats) had reached 469,000,000 francs, or L.18,800,000; [Loc. vi. 110. *Etat de la Dette Pu-*

blique, 8. Young, i. 577.] while that of England amounted to L.16,382,000. At the termination of the war, the revenue of France was 450,000,000 fr., or L.18,000,000, and its total expenditure 580,000,000 francs, or L.22,400,000; while the permanent revenue of England at the same period amounted to L.28,000,000 exclusive of L.8,000,000 war taxes, and its total expenditure to L.61,617,000. [Ann. Reg. 1793, 250. Moreau and Pebrer's Tables. Feb. 154. Bigu ii 130, 131.] (\*)

The public debt of France, which, at the commencement of the Revolution, was 5,587,060,000 fr., or . 249,000,000, and occasioned an annual charge of 259,000,000 francs, or L.10,450,000, was still very considerable, amounting to 1,380,000,000 fr. or L.55,000,000, and occasioning an annual charge of 69,000,000 francs, or L.2,800,000, at the termination of the war, notwithstanding the extinction of two thirds of its amount during its continuance, and the unexampled measures of spoliation by which its expenses had been defrayed. [*Etat de la Dette Pub.* 8. 9. Gaëta, i 199. Peuchet, 500. Young, ii. 578.] Public debts. The public debt of England, in 1792, exports and imports was L.244,440,000, and occasioned an annual charge, including the sinking-two countries. fund, of L.9,317,000; while, at the termination of the war in 1801, it had risen to L.484,465,000, funded and unfunded, of which L.447,000,000 was funded, and L.37,318,000 unfunded. The annual charge of this immense burden had swelled to L.21,661,000, of which L.8,653,000 was for the debt existing before 1792. L.13,025,000 for that created since that period, and L.4,649,000 for the sinking fund. [Moreau's tables. Feb. 154, 246.] (\*\*)

The imports of France in 1787, amounted to 349,725,000 francs, or about L.14,000,000; the exports to 310,000,000 francs, or L.12,500,000. [Young's Travels, ii. 561.] At the same period the exports of British manufactures were L.14,700,000, and of foreign merchandise L.5,460,000, and the imports L.18,680,000. [Mr. Addington's finance re-

(\*) M. Necker, in 1788, estimated the total revenue of Old France at 585,000,000 francs: whereas, in 1801, notwithstanding the great addition to its territory which the Republic had received from the Low Countries, Savoy, Nice, and the frontier of the Rhine, which yielded an addition of 100,000,000 francs yearly, it had fallen to 450,000,000 francs, a striking proof how immensely the resources of the country had diminished during the Revolution. Before the increase of its territory, the territorial revenue of France was 1,200,000,000; after it had been swelled by a fifth of superficial surface, it was only 850,000,000. Greater lightness of taxation was certainly not the cause of the diminution, for the direct land and window tax of that latter year amounted to 265,000,000, or L. 10,750,000, a sum equivalent to at least double that amount in the British Islands, if the dif-

ference of the value of money in the two countries is taken into account. Dupin estimates the income derived from the soil in France in 1828, at 1,626,000,000 francs, or L65,000,000. Supposing the increase of cultivation between 1801 and 1828 to counterbalance the reduction of territory by the peace of Paris in 1815, it follows that the French landholders in 1801 paid about a sixth, or sixteen per cent. on their incomes.—See NECKER'S *Compte Rendu*, 1785; *Stat. de la France*, 514; GARTIA, i. 189, 210; BIGNON, ii. 130; and DUPIN, *Force Commerciale de France*, ii. 266.

(\*\*) In 1789, according to the Duke of Gaëta, a deficit of 54,000,000 francs, or L.2,150,000 yearly, was made "the apology for the Revolution." In 1801, when it was closed, it was above 200,000,000 francs annually, or L.4,000,000 sterling—GARTIA, i. 189.

Reflections on the immense efforts made by England during the war.

Nothing but this continual and rapid increase in the resources of the British empire, during the course of the struggle, could have accounted for the astonishing exertions which she made towards its close, and the facility with which, during its whole continuance, the vast supplies required for carrying it on were raised without any sensible inconvenience to the country. When we reflect that, during a war of nine years' duration, the yearly expenditure of the nation varied from forty to sixty millions; that loans to the amount of twenty or thirty millions were annually contracted; and that the British fleets covered the seas in every quarter of the globe, we are lost in astonishment at the magnitude of the efforts made by a state so inconsiderable in extent, and with a population, even at the close of the period, and including Ireland, not exceeding fifteen millions (1). But the phenomenon becomes still more extraordinary when the efforts made at the termination of the struggle are considered; and the British empire, instead of being exhausted by eight years' warfare, is seen stretching forth its giant arms at once into every quarter of the globe, striking down the throne of Tippoo Saib by as great a force as combated under the standards of Napoléon at Marengo (2); while it held every hostile harbour in Europe blockaded by its fleets, and sending forth Nelson to crush the confederacy of the northern powers at the very moment that it accumulated its forces in Europe and Asia against the Republican legions on the sands of Egypt. It had been frequently asserted that the naval forces of England were equal to those of the whole world put together; but the matter was put to the test in spring 1801, when, without raising the blockade of a single harbour from the Texel to Calabria, she sent eighteen ships of the line with Abercromby to the mouth of the Nile, while nineteen under Nelson dissolved by the cannon of Copenhagen the northern confederation. The annals of Rome contain no example of a similar display of strength, and few of equal resolution in exerting it.

solutions. Parl. Hist. xxxv. 1563.] In 1801, the French imports and exports were almost annihilated; the imports from the West Indies had fallen to L.61,000, and the exports to the same quarter to L.41,000; [Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 787.] whereas the British exports in that year were L.24,440,000 manufactures, and L.17,166,000 foreign and colonial produce, and the imports L.29,900 000; amounting in real value to about L.54,000 000. [Parl. Hist. xxxv. 1563. Pebrer's tables, 340] Nor had the British shipping undergone a less striking increase; the tonnage, which, at the commencement of the war, was 1,600 000 tons, having risen, in 1801, to 2,100,000; and the mercantile seamen who, at the former period, were 118,000, having at the latter increased to 143,000, exclusive of 120,000 seamen and marines employed in the royal navy. [Parl. Hist. xxxv. 1563, and xxxvi. 787.] (\*)

(1) Population of Great Britain in  
1801, . . . . . 10,942,000  
Ireland, about, . . . . . 4,000,000  
14,942,000

—See PEBRER'S Tables, 332.

(2) Thirty-five thousand British and Sepoy troops formed the siege of Seringapatam in May 1799. Thirty-one thousand French combated under the first consul at Marengo.

(\*) The revenue and charges of the Indian Empire in the years 1793, and 1799, and 1800, were as follow :—

	1793.	1799.	1800 and 1801.
Revenues— Bengal,	L.5,454,000	L.6,259,000	L.6,339,000
Madras,	1,396,000	2,004,000	3,273,000
Bombay,	147,000	346,000	300,475
	<hr/> L.6,997,000	<hr/> L.8,609,000	<hr/> L.9,912,475
Charges — Bengal,	L.3,131,000	L.3,954,000	L.4,422,000
Madras,	1,578,000	2,857,000	3,723 000
Bombay,	524,000	996,000	1,051,000
	<hr/> L.5,233,000	<hr/> L.7,807,000	<hr/> L.9,196,000
Surplus,	1,664,000	802,000	716,475

[ Parl. Hist. xxxv. 15. East India Budget, and Ann. Reg. 1793, p. 78, and 1801, p. 164, Ap. to Chronicle.

**Compared with the niggardly exertions at its commencement.** The contemplation of this astonishing display of strength at the close of the struggle, compared with the feeble and detached exertions made at its commencement, is calculated to awaken the most poignant regret at the niggardly use of the national resources so long made by government, and the inexplicable insensibility to the magnitude of the forces at their command, which so long paralysed the might of England, during the earlier years of the war. From a return laid before the House of Commons, it appears that the number of men that had been raised for the service of the army from the commencement of hostilities down to the close of 1800, was 208,808, being at the rate of 26,000 a-year on an average during its continuance (1). France, with a population hardly double that of Great Britain, raised 1,500,000 men in 1793 alone. It is in the astonishing disproportion of the land forces of this country either to her naval armaments, her national strength, or the levies of her antagonist, that the true secret of the long duration, enormous expenditure, and numerous disasters of the war is to be found. Secure in her insular situation, protected from invasion by invincible fleets, and relieved from the most disastrous consequences which resulted from defeat to the continental powers, England was at liberty to employ her whole disposable force against the enemy, yet she never brought 25,000 native troops into the field at any one point. Had she boldly levied 100,000 men in 1793, and sent them to Flanders after the route in the camp of Cæsar, when the French troops were shut up in their entrenched camps, and could not be brought by any exertions to face the allies in the field, she would beyond all question have encamped under the walls of Paris in two months, and the royalists of the south and west would have obtained a decisive superiority over the anarchical faction in the capital. During the nine years of the war, upwards of L.100,000,000 was paid in army, and a still larger sum in naval expenses, while in 1793 the military charges were not L.4,000,000, and in the latter and more expensive years of the war, only amounted annually to L.12,000,000. If a fifth part of this total sum had been expended in any one of the early years in raising the military force of England to an amount worthy of her national strength and ancient renown, triple the British force which overthrew Napoléon at Waterloo, might have been assembled on the plains of Flanders, and the war terminated in a single campaign (2).

**Great part of this prosperity was owing to the paper currency.** If the rapid growth of wealth, power, and prosperity in the British islands during this memorable contest, had been all grounded on a safe and permanent foundation, it would have presented a phenomenon unparalleled in such circumstances in any age or country. But though part of this extraordinary increase was undoubtedly a real and substantial addition to the industry and resources of the empire, arising from the vast extension of its colonial possessions, and the monopoly

(1) Parl. Ret. Dec. 31, 1800. Ann. Reg. 1800, 40.

(2) The expenses of the army and navy, during the war, were as follow :—

	Army.	Ordnance.	Navy.
1792, ...	L.1,819,000	L.422,000	L.1,485,000
1793, ...	3,993,000	783,000	3,971,000
1794, ...	6,641,000	1,345,000	5,525,000
1795, ...	11,610,000	2,321,000	6,315,000
1796, ...	14,911,000	1,954,700	11,832,000
1797, ...	15,488,000	1,643,000	13,033,000
1798, ...	12,852,000	1,303,000	13,449,000
1799, ...	11,840,000	1,500,000	13,642,000
1800, ...	11,941,000	1,695,000	13,619,000
1801, ...	12,117,000	1,639,000	15,857,000



of almost all the trade of the world in its hands (1), yet part was to be ascribed to other causes, attended in the outset with deceptive and temporary advantages, and in the end with real and permanent evils. Like an extravagant individual who squanders in the profusion of a few years, the savings of past centuries, and the provision of unborn generations, the Government of England threw a fleeting lustre over its warlike administration, by trenching deep on the capital of the nation, and creating burdens little thought of at the time when the vast expenditure was going forward, but grievously felt in subsequent years, when the excitation of the moment had passed away, and the bitter consequences of the debt which had been contracted, remained. But this was not all. England, during those eventful years, drank deep at the fountains of paper currency, and derived a feverish and unnatural strength from that perilous but intoxicating draught. From the accounts laid before Parliament, it appears that the notes of the Bank of England in circulation, had increased upwards of a half, from 1793 to 1801, and that the commercial paper under discount at the same establishment, during the same period, had more than tripled (2). The effect of this great increase speedily appeared in the prices of grain, and every other article of life. Wheat which, on an average of five years prior to 1792, had sold at 5s. 4d. a-bushel, had risen, on an average of five years, ending with 1802, to 10s. 8d., and on an average of five years, ending 1813, to 14s. 4d. a-bushel (3). Thus, during the progress of the war, the prices of the necessaries of life were at one time nearly tripled, and even at the peace of Amiens had permanently more than doubled. The effect of this of course was, that the money price of all the other articles of life rapidly rose in the same proportion; rents advanced; all persons who lived by buying and selling found their commodities constantly rising in value; credit, both public and private, immensely improved; industry was vivified by the progressive rise

(1) The operation of these causes appeared, in an especial manner, in the vast increase of our export of foreign and colonial merchandise during the war, which, on an average of six years, ending 5th January, 1793, was L.5,468,000; and in the year

ending 5th January, 1801, had risen to the enormous sum of L.17,166,000; being more than triple its amount at the commencement of the contest.—See Mr. ADDINGTON'S *Finance Resolutions*, 1801.—*Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 1584.

(2) Circulation in Bank of England Notes.

1792,	...	L.11,006,000
1793,	...	11,888,000
1794,	...	10,744,000
1795,	...	14,017,000
1796,	...	10,729,000
1797, Feb. 28,	...	9,674,000
1798, August 31,	...	11,114,000
1798,	...	13,095,000
1799,	...	13,389,000
1800,	...	16,844,000
1801,	...	16,213,000

Commercial Paper discounted at the Bank. Gold Coin.

			L.1,171,000
	No account kept.		2,747,000
			2,358,100
...	L.2946,000	...	493,000
...	3,505,000	...	464,000
...	5,350,000	...	2,000,000
...	5,870,000	...	2,067,000
...	4,490,000	...	449,000
...	5,403,000	...	189,000
...	6,401,000	...	450,000
...	7,905,000	...	437,000

See *Appendix to Report on Bank*, 1832, and PARKER'S *Tables*, 254, 260, and 279.

The slightest consideration of this most instructive Table is sufficient to demonstrate to what source the crisis of February 1797 was owing. The paper of the bank was then contracted from fourteen millions, its amount in 1795, to nine millions. This

was doubtless owing to necessity, but it unavoidably brought about the general panic which rendered the suspension of cash-payments in that month unavoidable, and landed the nation in the bottomless pit of paper currency, inconvertible into gold, and all the prodigious change of prices with which it was necessarily attended.

(3) Lords' Report on Banks, Ap. No. 39, and Lords' Report on Corn, 1814, No. 12.

The prices of wheat from 1790 to 1801 were as follow:—

	Per Quarter.
1790,	... L. 2 13 2
1791,	... 2 7 0
1792,	... 2 2 4
1793,	... 2 8 8
1794,	... 2 11 0
1795,	... 4 7 0

	Per Quarter.
1796,	... 3 12 0
1797,	... 2 12 0
1798,	... 2 9 8
1799,	... 3 7 4
1800,	... 5 12 8 scarcity.
1801,	... 5 18 0 scarcity.

See *Ann. Reg.* 1801, 167, *App. to Chron.*

in the value of its produce; and difficulties were overcome by the rapid diminution in the weight of money debts. It is to the influence of this cause, combined with the vast expenditure of Government, and the concentration of almost all the colonial trade of the world in Great Britain, in consequence of her maritime superiority, that the extraordinary prosperity of the empire during the latter years of the war is to be ascribed. But it was not unmixed good which accrued to the nation, even for a time, from these violent changes; the whole class of annuitants, and all dependent on a fixed money income, suffered as much as the holders of commodities gained by their effects; creditors were defrauded as much as debtors were relieved, and almost as great a transference of property was ultimately effected by the silent operation of the alternation of prices which followed this great experiment, as was produced in other countries by the direct convulsions of a revolution.

But without anticipating these ultimate effects, which as yet lay buried in the womb of time, and might perhaps have been avoided by a more manly adherence to the principles of Mr. Pitt's financial policy than was deemed practicable in later times, it is impossible to conclude the history of this first period of the war without rendering a just tribute to the memory of those illustrious and high-minded men who bore the British nation victorious through the greatest perils which had assailed it since the Norman Conquest; who clearly perceiving, amidst all the delusion of the times, the disastrous tendency of the revolutionary spirit, "struggled with it when it was strongest, and ruled it when it was wildest;" who amidst the greatest perils disdained to purchase safety by submission, and undismayed alike by foreign disaster and domestic treason, held on their glorious way conquering and to conquer. No other monument is required to the memory of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Burke but the British empire, as they left it at the peace of Amiens, unconquered by force, undivided by treason, unchanged in constitution, untainted in faith, the bulwark of order, the asylum of freedom; the refuge of religion, contending undauntedly against the world in arms, covering the ocean with its fleets, encircling the earth in its grasp, the ark to which the fortunes of humanity were committed amidst the waves of the Deluge, the polar star to which alone the eye of hope was turned, from all the suffering realms of the earth (1).

Glorious  
state and  
character of  
England at  
the conclusion  
of the  
contest.

(1) In making these observations, the author is fully aware of the burdens consequent on Mr. Pitt's administration, and the disastrous effects which have in the end followed the change of prices begun in 1797. What he rests upon is, that this change was forced upon the British statesmen by overwhelming necessity, and that Mr. Pitt had provided

a system of finance, which, if steadily adhered to by his successors, as it might have been, would have discharged the whole debt contracted in the revolutionary war before the year 1835, that is, in the same time that it was created.—See below, on Mr. Pitt's financial policy, chapter 39.

## CHAPTER XXXV.

## RECONSTRUCTION OF SOCIETY IN FRANCE BY NAPOLEON.

## FROM THE CONTINENTAL PEACE TO HIS ASSUMPTION OF THE IMPERIAL CROWN.

OCTOBER, 1801—MARCH, 1804.

## ARGUMENT.

Deplorable internal state of France when Napoleon succeeded to the helm—Means which were at his disposal to reconstruct society—and difficulties which he had to encounter—He resolves to make the attempt—Constitutional freedom was then impossible in France—Explosion of the Infernal Machine—Napoleon at once ascribes it to the Jacobins—Speech which he made on the occasion to the authorities of Paris—He refuses to listen to any attempts to exculpate them—A *coup d'état* is resolved on against the Jacobins—Terms of the *Senatus-Consultum* ordaining it—And 120 persons are transported—It is afterwards discovered that the Chouans were the really guilty parties—Napoleon creates the King of Etruria—Parallel of Cæsar, Cromwell, and Napoleon—Debate on the lists of Eligibility in the Council of State—Decision on it by the Legislature—Legion of honour—Napoleon's argument in favour of it in the Council of State—Argument against it by Thibaudcau—Napoleon's reply—It is adopted by the Legislature—General opposition which it experienced—but it is nevertheless carried into execution—Napoleon is created First Consul for ten years additional—Grounds set forth in the *Senatus-Consultum* on the occasion—State of religion in France at this period—Napoleon's views on this subject—Arguments in the Council of State against an Established Church—Napoleon's reply—Concordat with the Pope—Its provisions in favour of the Gallican church—General dissatisfaction which it occasioned—Ceremony on the occasion in Notre-Dame, and general discontent which it produced—Constrained religious observances at Paris—Great joy at the change in the rural departments—Prudence of Napoleon in restraining the High Church party—His admirable proclamation on the subject to the people of France—General satisfaction which the measure excited in foreign countries—Subsequent views of Napoleon on the subject—Renewed indulgence towards the emigrants—*Senatus-Consultum* proclaiming a general amnesty—Inadequacy of these measures to heal the evils of revolutionary confiscation—Immense extent of this evil in France, and its irremediable effects—Measures to promote public instruction—Trial of public feeling by the Royalists—Measures for recruiting the army and navy—Debate on that subject in the Council of State—Discussion there on the *École militaire*—Speech of Napoleon on the government of the colonies—Finances of France—General valuation, or *cadastre*—Statistical details—Indignation of Napoleon at the language used in the Tribune—Important change in the municipal government carried in spite of that body—Debate on the Tribune in the Council of State—Napoleon's speech on the subject—He resolves to make himself Consul for life—Incessant efforts of Government to spread monarchical ideas—Strong opposition of Joséphine to these attempts—The project at first fails in the Council of State—Means adopted to ensure its success—The question is directly submitted to the people—Result of the appeal, and great satisfaction which it gave—Letter of Lafayette when he declined to vote for it—Answer of the First Consul to the address of the Senate on the occasion—His ideas on the lists of Eligibility—Great changes on the constitution—Their acceptance by the Senate—Aspect of Paris and its society at this period—Generous conduct of Mr. Fox in defending Mr. Pitt to the First Consul—Great satisfaction which these changes give in foreign courts—Rapid increase of the central executive power—Infamous proposals made to Joséphine regarding an heir to the throne—Suppression of the ministry of police—and disgrace of Fouché—Changes in the constitution of the Senate—Renewed correspondence between Louis XVIII and Napoleon—Formation of the Code Napoleon—Reflections on the difficulty of this subject—Discussions on it in the Council of State—Law of succession as finally fixed by Napoleon—Sketch of the French revolutionary system of inheritance—Prodigious effects of this change in subdividing land in France—Singular attachment of the modern French to this law, which precludes the possibility of real liberty—Law regarding divorce—Great effects of these salutary changes of Napoleon—Magnificent public works set on foot in France—Vast improvements of Paris.

WHEN Napoleon seized the reins of power in France, he found the institutions of civilization and the bonds of society dissolved to an extent of which

Deplorable  
internal  
state of  
France  
when Na-  
poleon suc-  
ceeded to  
the helm.

the previous history of the world afforded no example. Not only was the throne overturned, the nobles exiled, their landed estates confiscated; the aristocracy destroyed; but the whole institutions of religion, law, commerce, and education, had been overturned. There remained neither nobles to rule, nor priests to bless, nor teachers to instruct the people; commerce no more spread its benign influence through the realm, and manufacturing industry, in woful depression, could not maintain its numerous inhabitants. The great cities no longer resounded with the hammer of the artisan, and the village bells had ceased to call the faithful to the house of God; the chateaux in ruins existed, only to awaken the melancholy recollection of departed splendour, and the falling churches to attest the universal irreligion of its inhabitants; the ocean was no more whitened by the sails of its commerce, nor the mountains enlivened by the song of its shepherds. Even the institutions of charity, and the establishments for the relief of suffering, had shared in the general wreck; the monastery no longer spread its ample stores to the poor; and the hospital doors were closed against the numerous supplicants who laboured under wounds or disease; hardened by want and steeled against pity by the multiplicity of its objects, humanity itself seemed to be closing in the human heart; and every one, engrossed in the cares of self-preservation, and destitute of the means of relieving others, turned with callous indifference from the spectacle of general misery. In one class only the spirit of religion glowed with undecaying lustre, and survived the wreck of all its institutions. Persecuted, reviled, and destitute, the Sisters of Charity still persevered in their pious efforts to assuage human suffering; and sought out the unfortunate alike among the ranks of the Republicans who had overturned, as the Royalists who had bled for the faith of their fathers (1).

Means  
which were  
at his dis-  
posal to re-  
construct  
society.

To restore the institutions which the insanity of former times had overturned, and draw close again the bonds which previous guilt had loosened, was the glorious task which awaited the first consul.

The powers which he possessed for it were great, but the difficulties attending its execution were almost insurmountable. On the one hand, he was at the head of a numerous, brave, and experienced army, flushed by victory, and obedient to his will; the whole remaining respectable classes of the state had rallied round his standard; and all ranks, worn out with revolutionary contention and suffering, were anxious to submit to any government which promised them the first of social blessings, peace and protection. On the other, almost all the wealth and all the nobility of the state had disappeared during the Revolution; the church was annihilated; and great part of the landed property of the country had passed into the hands of several millions of little owners, who might be expected to be permanently resolute in maintaining them against the dispossessed proprietors. That society could not long go on, nor any durable government be established, without some national religion or some connexion between the throne and the altar, was sufficiently evident; but how was either to be reconstructed in the midst of an infidel generation, and by the aid of the very men who had contributed to their destruction? That a constitutional mo-

And diffi-  
culties  
which he  
had to en-  
counter.

(1) It is not to be supposed that the revolutionary governments had done nothing for education. On the contrary, the Polytechnic School, and many other institutions, particularly a school of medicine, and the Institute itself, were owing to their exertions. But in the distracted state of the country, and when the care of self-preservation came home to

every one, little attention could be paid to the education of the young; and by destroying every sort of religious tuition, the Convention had cut off the right hand of public instruction, the only branch of it which is of paramount importance to the poor.— See Tais. 123.

narchy could not exist without a representative system, founded on all the great interests of the state, and tempered by the steadiness of an hereditary aristocracy, was indeed apparent; but where were the elements of it to be found, when the former had almost all been crushed during the convulsions of the Revolution, and the latter, destitute and exiled, was the object of inveterate jealousy to the numerous classes who had risen to greatness by its overthrow?

He resolves  
to make the  
attempt.

These difficulties were so great that they would probably have deterred any ordinary conqueror from the attempt; and he would have been content to accept the crown which was offered him, and leave to others the Herculean task of closing the wounds of the Revolution. But Napoléon was not a man of that character. He believed firmly that he was the destined instrument in the hand of Providence to extinguish that terrible volcano, and he was conscious of powers equal to the undertaking. From the very outset, accordingly, he began, cautiously indeed, but firmly and systematically, to coerce the democratic spirit, and reconstruct those classes and distinctions in society which had disappeared during the preceding convulsions, but were the indispensable bulwarks of the throne. The success with which his efforts were attended is a more glorious monument to his memory than all the victories which he won.

Constitutional freedom was then impossible in France.

Those who reproach Napoléon with establishing a despotic government, and not founding his throne on the basis of a genuine representation of the people, would do well to show how he could have framed a counterpoise to democratic ambition, or a check on regal oppression, out of the representatives of a community from which all the superior classes of society had been violently torn; how the turbulent passions of a Republican populace could have been moulded into habitual subjection to a legislature, distinguished in no way from their own members, and a body of titled senators, destitute of wealth, consideration, or hereditary rank; how a constitutional throne could have subsisted without either any support from the altar, or any foundation in the religious feelings of its subjects; and how a proud and victorious army could have been taught that respect for the majesty of the legislature which is the invaluable growth of centuries of order, but which the successive overthrow of so many previous governments in France had done so much to destroy. After its patricians had been cut off by the civil wars of Sylla and Marius, Rome sunk necessarily and inevitably under the despotic rule of the emperors. When Constantine founded a second Rome on the shores of the Bosphorus, he perceived it was too late to attempt the restoration of the balanced constitution of the ancient republic. On Napoléon's accession to the consular throne, he found the chasms in the French aristocracy still greater and more irreparable. The only remaining means of righting the scale was by throwing the sword into the balance. The total failure of all subsequent attempts to frame a constitutional monarchy out of the elements which the Revolution had left in the society of France, proves that Napoléon rightly appreciated its political situation, and seized upon the only means of restoring order to its troubled waters (1).

(1) "There is, in the English constitution," said Napoléon, "a body of noblesse which unites to the lustre of descent a great part of the landed property of the nation. These two circumstances give it a great influence over the people, and interest attaches it to the government. In France, since the Revolution, that class is totally wanting. Would you re-

establish it? If you compose it of the men of the Revolution, it would be necessary to concentrate in their hands a large portion of the national property, which is now impossible. If it were composed of the ancient noblesse, it would soon lead to a counter revolution."—See TAUBMAN, 291.



Circumstances soon occurred which called forth the secret but indelible hatred of the first consul at the Jacobin faction. The conspiracy of Arena and Ceracchi, which failed at the opera, had been traced to some ardent enthusiasts of that class; and soon after a more formidable attempt at his assassination gave rise to a wider proscription of their associates. On the day on which the armistice of Steyer was signed, Napoléon went to the opera. Ber-  
Dec. 24. 1800. thier, Lannes, and Lauriston were with him in the carriage. In going from the Tuileries to the theatre, in the rue de Richelieu, his carriage passed through the rue St.-Nicaise; an overturned chariot in that narrow thoroughfare almost obstructed the passage, but the coachman, who was driving rapidly, had the address to pass it without stopping. Hardly had he got through when a terrible explosion broke all the windows of the carriage, struck down the last man of the guard, killed eight persons, and wounded twenty-eight, besides occasioning damage to the amount of 200,000 francs (L.8000), in forty-six adjoining houses. Napoléon drove on without stopping to the opera, where the audience were in consternation at the explosion, which was so loud as to be heard over all Paris; every eye was turned to him when he entered, but the calm expression of his countenance gave not the slightest indication of the danger which he had escaped. Speedily, however, the news circulated through the theatre, and the first consul had the satisfaction of perceiving, in the thunders of applause which shook its walls, the most fervent expressions of attachment to his person (1).

Before the piece had terminated, Napoléon returned to the Tuileries, where a crowd of public functionaries were assembled from every part of Paris to congratulate him on his escape. He anticipated all their observations by commencing in a loud voice, "This is the work of the Jacobins; it is they who have attempted to assassinate me. Neither the nobles, nor the priests, nor the Chouans had any hand in it. I know on what to form my opinion, and it is in vain to seek to make me alter it. It is the Septembrisers, those wretches steeped in crime, who are in a state of permanent revolt, in close column against every species of government. Three months have hardly elapsed since you have seen Ceracchi, Arena, and their associates attempt to assassinate me. Again, it is the same clique, the bloodsuckers of September, the assassins of Versailles, the brigands of 31st May, the authors of all the crimes against government, who are at their hellish work. It is the tribes of artizans, and journalists who have a little more instruction than the people, but live with them, and mingle their passions with their own ardent imaginations, who are the authors of all these atrocities. If you cannot chain them you must exterminate them; there can be no truce with such wretches; France must be purged of such an abominable crew." During this vehement harangue, delivered with the most impassioned gesticulations, all eyes were turned towards Fouché, the well-known leader of that party, and stained, at Lyon and the Loire, with some of its most frightful atrocities. Alone, he stood in a window recess, pale, dejected, hearing every thing, answering nothing. The crowd of courtiers broke into exclamations, the echo of the first consul's sentiments. One, gifted with more courage than the rest, approached, and asked the minister of police why he made no reply, "Let them go on," said he: "I am determined not to compromise the safety of the state. I will speak when the proper time arrives. He laughs securely who laughs the last (2)."

(1) Thib. 23, 24. Bour. iv. 199, 200. D'Ab. iv. 103, 110.

(2) Thib. 27, 28. Bour. iv. 201, 202. D'Ab. iv. 110, 114.

Explosion  
of the in-  
fernal ma-  
chine.

Napoléon  
at once as-  
cribes it to  
the Jaco-  
bins.

Speech  
which he  
made on  
the occa-  
sion to the  
authorities  
of Paris.

On the following day a public audience was given to the prefect of the Seine, and the twelve mayors of Paris. Napoléon said: "As long as that handful of wretches attacked me alone, I left to the laws the charge of chastising their offences; but since, by a crime without example, they have endangered the lives of a part of the population of Paris, their punishment must be as rapid as extraordinary. They consist of an hundred miscreants who have brought disgrace on liberty by the crimes committed in its name; it is indispensable that they should be forthwith deprived of the means of inflicting farther injuries on society." This idea was more fully unfolded at a meeting of the Council of State which took place on the same day. It was proposed to establish a special commission to try the offenders; but this was far from meeting Napoléon's views, who was resolved to seize the present opportunity of inflicting a deathblow on the remnant of the Jacobin faction. "The action of a special tribunal," said he, "would be too slow; we must have a more striking punishment for so extraordinary an offence; it must be as rapid as lightning; it must be blood for blood. As many of the guilty must be executed as there fell victims to their designs, say fifteen or twenty; transport two hundred, and take advantage of this event to purge the Republic of its most unworthy members. This crime is the work of a band of assassins, of Septembrisers (1), whose hands may be traced through all the crimes of the Revolution. When that party sees a blow struck at its head-quarters, and that fortune has abandoned its chiefs, every thing will return to established order; the workmen will resume their labours; and ten thousand men, who, in France, are ranged under its colours, will abandon it for ever. That great example is necessary to attach the middling classes to the throne; the industrious citizens can have no hope as long as they see themselves menaced by two hundred enraged wolves, who look only for the proper moment to throw themselves on their prey.

"The metaphysicians are the men to whom we owe all our misfortune. Half measures will no longer do; we must either pardon every thing, like Augustus, or adopt a great measure which may be the guarantee of the social order. When after the conspiracy of Catiline, Cicero caused the guilty to be strangled, he said he had saved his country. I should be unworthy of the great task which I have undertaken, and of my mission, if I evinced less firmness on this trying occasion. We must regard this affair as statesmen, not as judges. I am so convinced of the necessity of making a great example, that I am ready to call the accused before me, interrogate them, and myself subscribe their condemnation. It is not for myself that I speak; I have braved greater dangers; my fortune has preserved me, and will preserve me; but we are now engaged with the social order, with the public morality, the national glory."

In the midst of this energetic harangue, it was evident that Napoléon was losing sight of the real point to be first considered, which was, who were the guilty parties. Truguet alone had the courage to approach this question, by suggesting that there were different classes of guilty persons in France; that there were fanatics as well as Jacobins who misled the people, and that the priests, whose denunciations against the holders of the national domains, had already appeared in several recent publications, might possibly be the authors of the infernal project. Napoléon warmly interrupted him, "You will not make me alter my opinion by such vain declamations; the wicked are known; they are pointed out by the nation. They are the Septembrisers, the authors

(1) In allusion to the massacres in the prisons in September, 1792.

He refuses to listen to any attempt to exculpate them.

of every political crime in the Revolution, who have ever been spared or protected by the weak persons at the head of affairs. Talk not to me of nobles or priests. Would you have me proscribe a man for a title, or transport ten thousand grey-haired priests! Would you have me prosecute a religion, still professed by the majority of Frenchmen and two-thirds of Europe! La Vendée never was more tranquil; the detached crimes which still disgrace its territory are the result merely of ill-extinguished animosities. Would you have me dismiss all my counsellors excepting two or three; send Portalis to Sinnamary, Devaine to Madagascar, and choose a Council from the followers of Babœuf. It is in vain to pretend that the people will do no wrong but when they are prompted to it by others. The people are guided by an instinct, in virtue of which they act alone. During the Revolution they frequently forced on the leaders who appeared to guide them; the populace is a tiger when he is unmuzzled. I have a dictionary of the men employed in all the massacres. The necessity of the thing being once admitted, our duty is to attain it in the most efficacious way. Do they take us for children? Do not hope, citizen Truguet, that you would, in the event of their success, be able to save yourself by saying, 'I have defended the patriots before the Council of State.' No, no. These patriots would sacrifice you as well as 'us all.'" He then broke up the Council, and when passing Truguet, who was endeavouring to say something in his vindication, said aloud, "Come now, citizen, all that is very well for the *soirées* of Madame Condorcet or Maille-Garat, but it won't do in a council of the most enlightened men of France (1)."

These vehement apostrophes from a man vested with despotic authority cut short all discussion, and the Council found itself compelled, notwithstanding a courageous resistance from some of its members, to go into the arbitrary designs of the first consul. The public mind was prepared for some great catastrophe by repeated articles in the public journals, drawn up by Fouché, in which that astute counsellor, suppressing his private information, directed the thunders of the executive against his former associates (2). But while these measures were in preparation, Fouché and the first consul received decisive information that it was the Royalists, and not the Jacobins, who were the real authors of the conspiracy, and a clue was obtained which promised soon to lead to the discovery of the guilty parties. The minister of police, therefore, received secret instructions not to allude in his report against the Republicans to the affair of the infernal machine, but to base the proposed *coup-d'état* generally on the numerous conspiracies against the public peace, and on this report Napoléon urged the immediate delivery to a military commission of eighteen, and transportation of above an hundred persons, without either trial or evidence taken against them. In vain Thibaudeau and Roederer urged in the Council of State, that there was

A coup-d'état is resolved on against the Jacobins.

(1) Thib. 33, 34.

(2) In one of these, the minister of police addressed the following report to the first consul:—

"It is not against ordinary brigands, for whose coercion the ordinary tribunals are sufficient, and who menace only detached persons or articles of property, that the Government is now required to act; it is the enemies of entire France, who are now at the bar; men who threaten every instant to deliver it up to the fury of anarchy.

"These frightful characters are few in number, but their crimes are innumerable. It is by them that the Convention has been attacked with an armed force in the bosom of the sanctuary of the laws; it is

they who have endeavoured so often to render the committees of Government the agents of their atrocious designs. They are not the enemies of this or that government, but of every species of authority.

"They persist in an atrocious war, which cannot be terminated but by an extraordinary measure of the supreme police. Among the men whom the police has denounced, many were not found with the poniard in their hands; but all were equally capable of sharpening and using it. In disposing of them, we must not merely punish the past, but look to a guarantee of social order in future."—See THIBAudeau, 43, 44, and BOURAIGNES, iv. 204, 205.

no evidence against the suspected persons, and that it was the height of injustice to condemn a crowd of citizens untried and unheard, to the severe punishment of transportation. The first consul, though well aware that they had no connexion with the late conspiracy, was resolved not to let slip the opportunity of getting quit at once of so many dangerous characters. "We have strong presumptions, at least," said he, "if not proofs against the Terrorists. The Chouannerie and emigration, are maladies of the skin, but terrorism is a malady of the vital parts. The minister of police has purposely omitted the mention of the late conspiracy, because it is not for it that the measure is proposed. If that reserve were not observed, we would compromise our character. The proposed step is grounded upon considerations independent of the late event; it only furnished the occasion for putting them in force. The persons included in the lists will be transported for their share in the massacres in the prisons on September 2d; for their accession to the Jacobin revolt of 31st May; for the conspiracy of Babœuf, and all that they have done since that time. Such a step would have been necessary without the conspiracy, but we must avail ourselves of the enthusiasm it has excited to carry it into execution." In pursuance of these views, an arrest was proposed by the Council of State, and adopted by the Senate, which condemned to immediate transportation no less than a hundred and thirty individuals, among whom were nine persons who had been engaged in the massacres of September, and several members of the Convention, Choudien, Taillefer, Thirion, and Talot, Félix-Lepelletier, and Rossignol, well known for his cruelty in the war of la Vendée. The decree was forthwith carried into execution, and thus did the arbitrary tyranny which the Jacobins had so long exercised over others, at length, by a just retribution, recoil upon themselves (1).

And one hundred and thirty persons are transported.

It is afterwards discovered that the Chouans were the really guilty parties.

In less than a month afterwards, Fouché made a second report upon the conspiracy of the infernal machine, in which he admitted, that when these measures of severity were adopted against the Jacobins, he had other suspicions; that George Cadoudal and other emigrants had successively disembarked from England; and that the horse attached to the machine had furnished a clue to its authors, who had at length been detected in the house of certain females of the Jan. 13, 1801. Royalist party. Saint Regent and Carbon accordingly, the really guilty persons, were tried by the ordinary tribunals, condemned, and executed. Not a shadow of doubt could now remain that the conspiracy had been the work of the Royalists; but Napoléon persisted, though he saw that as clearly as any one, in carrying into effect the sweeping decree of transportation against the Jacobins. "There is not one of them," he said to those who petitioned for a relaxation of the sentence in favour of certain individuals, "who has not deserved death an hundred times over, if they had been judged by their conduct during the Revolution; these wretches have covered France with scaffolds, and the measure adopted in regard to them is

(1) Thib. 42, 51. Bour. iv. 205, 206.

Terms of the *Senatus Consultum* was in these terms:—"Considering that the constitution has not determined measures necessary to be taken in certain emergencies; that in the absence of any express directions, the Senate is called upon to give effect to the wishes of the people, expressed by that branch of the constitution of which it is the organ; that according to that principle, the Senate is the natural judge of any conservative measures proposed in perilous circumstances by the Government; and considering that the mea-

sure proposed by the Council of State seems to be based on necessity and public expedience, the Senate declares that that measure is conservative of the constitution." Upon this decree being obtained, the Council of State decided that their resolution was obligatory on the constituted authorities, and that it should be promulgated, like the laws and acts of the Governments, but without receiving the sanction of the Legislative Body and the Tribunate; and it was immediately put in force without their concurrence.—See THILAUDREAU, 51, 52.

rather one of mercy than severity; the attempt of the infernal machine is neither mentioned as a motive nor the occasion of the *Senatus-Consultum*; with a company of grenadiers I could put to flight the whole faubourg St.-Germain, with its Royalist *coteries*; but the Jacobins are men of determined character, whom it is not so easy to make retreat. As to the transportation of the Jacobins, it is of no sort of consequence; I have got quit of them; if the Royalists commit any offence, I will strike them also (1)."

May, 1801. The next important step of Napoléon was the exhibition of a king of his own creation, to the astonished Parisians. By a convention with Spain,

Napoléon  
creates the  
King of  
Etruria.

it was stipulated that the province of Tuscany, ceded to the Infanta of Spain, Marie-Louise, third daughter of Charles IV, and the Duke of Parma, her husband, should be erected into a monarchy, under

the title of the kingdom of Etruria. In May, 1801, the newly-created king, Louis I, with his young bride, arrived in Paris, on his way from Madrid to Florence, and was received with extraordinary distinction both on the road and in the capital. Numerous *fêtes* succeeded each other in honour of the royal pair, among which those of M. Talleyrand, in his villa at Neuilly, was remarked as peculiarly magnificent. The young King early evinced symptoms of that imbecility of character by which he was afterwards distinguished; but it was deemed of importance to accustom the court of the first consul to the sight of royalty, and the Parisians to the intoxicating idea that, like the Roman Senate, they were invested with the power of making and unmaking kings. Napoléon received the reward of this policy in the transports with which, when he was present, the celebrated line of OEdipus was received at the theatre (2)—

" J'ai fait des souverains, et n'ai pas voulu l'être."

But it was not merely by such exhibitions of royalty that Napoléon endeavoured to prepare the French nation for his own assumption of the crown. At the time when the public mind was strongly excited by the danger which the state had run from the success of the infernal machine, a pamphlet appeared,

Parallel be-  
tween Cæ-  
sar, Crom-  
well, and  
Napoléon.

with the title, "Parallel between Cæsar, Cromwell, and Bonaparte," in which the cause of royalty and hereditary succession was openly advocated. It excited at first a great sensation, and numerous

copies were sent to the first consul from the prefects and magistrates, with comments on the dangerous effects it was producing on the public mind. Fouché, however, soon discovered that it had issued and been distributed from the office of the minister of the interior, and shortly after that it came from the pen of Lucien Bonaparte. Napoléon affected to be highly indignant at this discovery, and reproached Fouché with not having instantly sent his imprudent brother to the Temple; but the cautious minister was too well informed to put the hint in execution, as Lucien had shown him the original manuscript corrected by the hand of the first consul himself. However, it was necessary to disavow the production, as its effect proved that it had prematurely disclosed the designs of the fortunate usurper, and therefore Lucien was sent into an

(1) Thib. 51, 62. Bour. iv. 212, 213, 214.

It is a curious and instructive fact, that no sooner was the determination of the first consul, in regard to the Jacobins, known, than a multitude of revelations flowed in from the prefects, mayors, and magistrates over all France, implicating the Republicans still farther in the conspiracy, and detailing discoveries of the vast Jacobin plot which was to have burst forth in every part of the country the

moment intelligence was received of the leading stroke given in the capital! A striking instance of the distrust with which the officious zeal of such authorities should be received, and of the necessity of the executive not letting their wishes be known, if they would in such circumstances preserve the semblance even of justice in their proceedings.—See THIBAUDEAU, 53, 63; BOURBONNE, iv. 212.

(2) Thib. 64, 69. Bour. iv. 270, 273.



honourable exile, as ambassador at Madrid, with many reproaches from Napoléon for having allowed the device to be discovered. "I see," said Napoléon to his secretary, "that I have been moving too fast; I have broken ground too soon; the pear is not yet ripe." He received secret instructions to exert all his influence at the court of Spain, to induce that power to declare war against Portugal, in order to detach the whole peninsula from the alliance with England, and shut its harbours against the British flag (1).

Debate on  
the lists of  
eligibility  
in the  
Council of  
State.

The numerous complaints against the lists of eligibility which formed so important and remarkable an effect in the constitution under the consulate, induced Napoléon to bring them again under the consideration of his state council. It was justly objected against this institution, that it renewed, in another and a more odious form, all the evils of privileged classes which had occasioned the Revolution; that to confine the seats in the legislation, and all important offices under government, to five thousand individuals, out of above thirty millions of souls, was to the last degree unjust, and seemed peculiarly absurd at the close of a Revolution, the main object of which had been to open them indiscriminately to all the citizens. It became necessary to consider whether these complaints should be attended to, as the time was approaching when a fifth of the legislative body and tribunate were to be renewed, in terms of the constitution, and therefore the lists, already formed, were about to be forwarded to the electors. It was urged by the advocates for a change in the Council of State, that "public opinion had strongly pronounced itself against these lists, because they at once deprive a great body of citizens of that result of the Revolution which they most prized, eligibility to every public function. Out of delicacy to five thousand persons, who are inscribed on the highest class of these lists, you leave the seeds of a dangerous discontent in a hundred times that number. Doubtless it is not impossible from these lists to make for a few years a suitable choice of representatives; but such a result would only the more confirm a system radically vicious, and augment the difficulty which will hereafter be experienced in correcting it."

The first consul replied:—"The institution of the lists is objectionable. It is an absurd system, the growth of the ideology which, like a malady, has so long overspread France. It is not by such means that a great nation is reorganized. Sovereignty is inalienable. Nevertheless, bad as the system is, it forms part of the constitution; we are only intrusted with its execution. It is impossible, besides, to let the people remain without any species of organization: better a bad one than none at all. It is an error to suppose that the people are organized merely because the constitution has created the powers of government. The supreme authority must have intermediate supports, or it has neither any stability nor any hold of the nation. We must not think, therefore, of abandoning the lists without substituting something else in their room. It is admitted that they form at present a sufficient body out of which to choose the Legislature; the constitution has established them; they form an organic law of the state; all France has aided in their construction; in the rural districts in particular they are universally approved of. Why, then, should we overlook the people of France, and their expressed approbation, merely because Paris has made a bad choice for her share of the list; and her citizens reckon the departments as nothing? It is better for the Government to have to deal with a few thousand individuals than a whole nation. What harm can there be in going on for two or three years longer with these

(1) Bour. iv, 217, 220.

lists? They form the sole channel by which the influence of the people is felt on the Government. It will be time enough at the close of that period to consider what changes should be made on it." Guided by these considerations, the Council resolved that the lists should remain unchanged. They were already regarded as the nucleus of a new nobility instead of that which had been destroyed, and as an indispensable attendant on the throne which was anticipated for the first consul (1).

**Legion of Honour.** But Napoléon's views in this important particular went much farther, and he resolved to establish an order of nobility, under the title of the **LEGION OF HONOUR**, which should gradually restore the gradation of ranks in society, and at the same time attach the people to its support. This important matter was brought before the Council of State in May, 1801. It met with more opposition than any other measure of the consulate; the debates on it in the Council of State were in the highest degree curious and instructive.

**May 4, 1801.** "The eighty-seventh article of the constitution," said Napoléon, "sanctions the establishment of military honours, but it has organized nothing. An *arrêt* has established arms of honour, with double pay as a consequence; others with a mere increase; there is nothing formal or regular constructed. The project I propose to you gives consistence to the system of recompenses; it is the beginning of organization to the nation." It was proposed by General Mathieu-Dumas that the institution should be confined to military men, but this was strongly combated by the first consul. "Such ideas," said he, "might be well adapted to the feudal ages, when the chevaliers combated each other man to man, and the bulk of the nation was in a state of slavery; but when the military system changed, masses of infantry, and phalanxes constructed after the Macedonian model, were introduced, and after that it was not individual prowess, but science and skill which determined the fate of nations. The kings themselves contributed to the overthrow of the feudal *régime*, by the encouragement which they gave to the commons; finally, the discovery of gunpowder, and the total change it induced in the art of war, completed its destruction. From that period the military spirit, instead of being confined to a few thousand Franks, extended to all the Gauls. It was strengthened rather than weakened by the change; it ceased to be exclusive in its operation, and from being founded solely on military prowess, it came to be established also on civil qualities. What is it now which constitutes a great general? It is not the mere strength of a man six feet high, but the *coup-d'œil*, the habit of foresight, the power of thought and calculation; in a word, civil qualities, not such as you find in a lawyer, but such as are founded on a knowledge of human nature, and are suited to the government of armies. The general who can now achieve great things is he who is possessed of shining civil qualities; it is their perception

(1) Thib. 69, 74.

The subject of the lists was warmly debated both in the Council of State and before the Legislature, and the maintenance of the existing system only carried by a majority of 56 to 26 in the Tribunate, and 239 to 36 in the Legislative Body. Decision on it by the Legislature. It is not surprising that it excited a violent opposition in the popular party, seeing that it overturned the whole objects for which the nation had been fighting during the Revolution. "The law," says Thibaudeau, "called to the honours and the advantages of eligibility for offices in the communes, 50,000 individuals; to eligibility for offices in the departments, 50,000; to

eligibility for the legislature or national offices, 5,000. The whole of the other inhabitants were altogether excluded both from the rights of election and eligibility. The partisans of representative governments regarded this as far too narrow a circle in a country embracing thirty millions of souls. But the public in general took very little interest in this matter, justly observing, that as the electors were no longer intrusted with the choice of representatives, or of persons to fill any offices, but only of a large body of candidates from whom the selection was to be made by the government, it was of very little consequence whether this privilege was confined to many or few hands."—THIBAUDEAU, 200.

of the strength of his talents which makes the soldiers obey him. Listen to them at their bivouacs; you will invariably find them award the preference to mental over physical qualities. Mourad Bey was the most powerful man among his Mamelukes; without that advantage he never could have been their leader. When he first saw me, he could not conceive how I could preserve authority among my troops, but he soon understood it, when he was made acquainted with our system of war.

“In all civilized states force yields to civil qualities. Bayonets sink before the priest who speaks in the name of Heaven, or the man of science who has gained an ascendancy by his knowledge. I predicted to all my military followers that a government purely military would never succeed in France till it had been brutalized by fifty years of ignorance. All their attempts to govern in that manner accordingly failed, and involved their authors in their ruin. It is not as a general that I govern; but because the nations believe me possessed of the ability in civil matters necessary for the head of affairs; without that I could not stand an hour. I knew well what I was about, when, though only a general, I took the title of member of the Institute; I felt confident of being understood by the lowest drummer in the army.

“We must not reason from ages of barbarity to these times. France consists of 30,000,000 of men, united by intelligence, property, and commerce. Three or four hundred thousand soldiers are nothing in such a mass. Not only does the general preserve his ascendancy over his soldiers chiefly by civil qualities, but when his command ceases he becomes merely a private individual. The soldiers themselves are but the children of citizens. The tendency of military men is to carry every thing by force; the enlightened civilian, on the other hand, elevates his views to a perception of the general good. The first would rule only by despotic authority; the last subject every thing to the test of discussion, truth, and reason. I have no hesitation, therefore, in saying, that if a preference was to be awarded to the one or the other, it belongs to the civilian. If you divide society into soldiers and citizens, you establish two orders in what should be one nation. If you confine honours to military men, you do what is still worse, for you sink the people into nothing (1).”

Moved by these profound observations, the Council agreed that the proposed honours should be extended indiscriminately to civil and military distinction.

But the most difficult part of the discussion remained, the consideration of the expedience of the institution itself, even in its most extended form. Great opposition was manifested to it in the capital, from its evident tendency to counteract the levelling principles of the Revolution. It was strongly opposed, accordingly, in the Council of State, the Tribunate, and the Legislative Body, and all the influence of the first consul could only obtain in these different assemblies a feeble majority (2).

(1) Thib. 75, 81.

Arguments (2) It was urged in the Council of State against it by Thibaudeau, and the opponents of Thibaudeau. the measure,—“That it was diametrically opposed to all the principles of the Revolution. The abolition of titles did not take place during those disastrous days which threw into discredit every thing, even of the best character, which was then established; it was the Constituent Assembly who made the change at one of the most enlightened periods of the Revolution. The nation is profoundly influenced by the feeling of honour; but that principle, strong as it is, yields to the universal passion for equality. It was these two powerful mo-

tives, combined with the love of freedom and the feelings of patriotism, which gave its early astonishing victories to the republic. I do not see that the Legion of Honour could have made the public spirit greater. Considered as a guarantee of the Revolution, the institution appears to me to run counter to its object; and as laying the foundation of an intermediate body between the throne and the people, to involve a principle inconsistent with the representative system, which can recognise no distinction but that which flows from the choice of the citizens. I fear that the desire of possessing these ribbons may weaken the feelings of duty and of honour, instead of strengthening them. I have the

General  
opposition  
it met with,  
but is car-  
ried into  
execution.

Notwithstanding the profound and unanswerable observations by which he supported it, it was by a very slender majority that the institution of the Legion of Honour passed the great bodies of the

highest respect for the motives which have led to this proposition, but I have still great doubts, and it seems highly desirable that such an institution should not be established but after the decided approbation of the great bodies in the state.

"In the theory which is presented for our consideration on this subject, representative governments are confounded with monarchical. It is quite true, that distinctions of rank are indispensable in a monarchy, in order to counterbalance, by intermediate bodies, the weight of the throne; but in a republic they are a never-failing source of irritation, because they destroy that equality among the citizens which is the foundation of all such institutions. In a monarchy, the safeguard of the people is to be found in a multitude of obstacles which restrain the inclinations of the ruler; in representative states, sovereign power is divided, the people are subjected only to magistrates of their own selection, and know of none but those whom the constitution recognises. By placing in the state the proposed institution, you voluntarily admit a patriciat, of which the immediate and inevitable tendency will be, to run into a military and hereditary nobility. [Dum. viii. 105.]

"The Legion of Honour involves within itself all the elements which have elsewhere led to a hereditary nobility, individual distinction, power, honours, titles, and fixed revenues. Hardly any where has a hereditary noblesse commenced its career with such advantages. It is in vain to pretend that the progress of intelligence and the lights of the age are a sufficient guarantee against any such abuse. The human heart is ever the same; a renewal of the same circumstances will reproduce the same errors and the same desires. From the institution of the Legion will spring up afresh all the ancient prejudices, and these prejudices will fortify the military spirit and the respect for nobility, and introduce a separate in the midst of the general interest. Under pretence of effacing the last traces of nobility, it will establish a new one, and strongly confirm the old. Considered as an intermediate body, the Legion is, to say the least of it, a perfect superfluity. Such intermediate bodies are of some use in despotic countries; but in a representative state, and among a nation fortunate enough to possess a free discussion on public affairs, the sole intermediate body which is required, or should be tolerated, is the representatives of the people. The institution proposed is alike contrary to the principles of the Revolution and the text of the constitution. The proposed order leads directly to a monarchy. Crosses and ribbons are the pillars of the hereditary throne: they were unknown to the Romans who conquered the world."

Napoleon's reply. Napoleon replied:—"We are always referred by the Opposition to the Romans. It is singular that, as an argument against distinctions, reference should so frequently be made to the nation that ever existed in which they were most firmly established. The Romans had patricians, the equestrian order, citizens, and knights; for each class they had a separate costume, different habits. To reward achievements, they awarded all sorts of distinctions, surnames recalling great services, mural crowns, triumphs. Superstition was called in to lend her aid to the general impression. Take away the religion of Rome, and nothing remains. When that fine body of patricians was des-

troyed, Rome was torn in pieces; there successively arose the fury of Marius, the proscriptions of Sylla, the tyranny of the emperors. Brutus is continually referred to as the enemy of tyrants; and yet Brutus was the greatest of all aristocrats. He slew Caesar only because he wished to degrade the influence of the senate, and exalt that of the people. This is the use which the spirit of party makes of history (\*).

"I defy you to show me a republic, ancient or modern, where distinctions have not prevailed. They call them baubles,—well, it is with baubles that you govern mankind. I would not say that at the tribune; but in a Council of State nothing should be concealed. I have no conception that the passion for liberty and equality is to be lasting in France. The French have not been so far changed by ten years of revolution; they are still as gallant and volatile as their Gaulish ancestors. They have but one prevailing sentiment, and that is honour; every thing should be done therefore to nourish and encourage that principle. Observe how forcibly the people have been struck by the decorations of the strangers amongst us; that revealed their secret predilections.

"Voltaire called soldiers Alexanders at five sous a-day. He was right; they really are so. Do you believe that you would ever make a man fight by abstract principles? Never; such views are fit only for the scholar in his study. For the soldier, as for all men in active life, you must have glory and distinction; recompenses are the food which nourish such qualities. The armies of the Republic have done such great things, because they were composed of the sons of labourers and substantial farmers, and not the mere rabble; because the officers stepped into the situations of those of the old régime, and were animated by the same sentiments of honour. It is the same principle which led to all the triumphs of Louis XIV. You may call, if you please, the Legion of Honour an order: it matters not, names will not alter the nature of things. For ten years you have been constantly speaking of institutions, and what, after all, have you done? Nothing. The moment had not yet arrived. The Republicans proposed to unite the people to the country, by assembling them in churches, where, dying of cold, they were made to listen to the reading and exposition of the laws; it may easily be imagined what effect such an institution had in attaching them to their government. I am well aware, that, if you judge of this institution according to the prejudices produced by ten years of a revolution, it must appear worse than useless; but if you consider that we are placed *after* a revolution, and called upon to reconstruct society, a very different opinion will be formed. Every thing has been destroyed; we must commence the work of creation. We have, indeed, a nation and a government; but they are united by a rope of sand. There exist at the same time amongst us several of the old privileged classes, organized from the unity of their principles and interests, and who will always pursue one definite object. But we are scattered, without union, system, or lasting bond of connexion. As long as I survive I will answer for the Republic; but we must consider what is likely to occur after my death. Do you suppose the Republic is definitely established? You never were more mistaken.

(\*) These observations of Napoleon are very remarkable. They show how much more clearly his natural sagacity, even amidst all the tumult of camps, had ap-

prehended the truth of ancient history, than the numerous declaimers who, through the whole of the Revolution, had despatched on its examples.

state (1). So strongly implanted were the principles of the Revolution, even in the highest functionaries of the realm, and so difficult was it to extinguish that hatred at distinctions or honours, which formed so leading a feature in the passions by which it was at first distinguished. No measure during the consulate experienced nearly so powerful an opposition. Napoléon was much struck with this circumstance, and confessed in private that he had precipitated matters, and that it would have been better to have waited before so obnoxious a change was introduced (2).

It was carried into execution, however, with all those circumstances of pomp and ceremony which Napoléon well knew are so powerful with the multitude. The inauguration of the dignitaries of the order took place, with extraordinary magnificence, in the church of the Hôtel des Invalides, in presence of the first consul and of all the great functionaries of the Republic; and the decorations soon began to be eagerly coveted by a people whose passion for individual distinction had been the secret cause of the Revolution (3).

The event, however, proved that Napoléon had rightly appreciated the true character of the revolutionary spirit. The leading object in the Revolution was the extinction of *castes* not of *ranks*; equality of rights and not of classes; the abolition of hereditary not personal distinction (4). "Vanity," as Napoléon elsewhere observed, "is the ruling principle of the French, and was at the bottom of all the convulsions of the Revolution; it was the sight of the noblesse enjoying privileges and distinctions to which they could not aspire, which filled the Tiers-État with inextinguishable and natural animosity (5). But an institution which conferred lustre on individuals and not on families, and led to no hereditary distinctions, was so far from running counter to this desire, that it afforded it the highest gratification, because it promised the objects of this passion to any, even the humblest of the citizens, who was worthy of receiving it. The Legion of Honour accordingly, which gradually extended so as to embrace two thousand persons of the greatest eminence in every department, both civil and military, in France, became an institution in the highest degree both useful and popular; and served as the forerunner to that new nobility which Napoléon afterwards created as safeguards to his imperial throne.

When so many institutions were successively arising which pointed to the establishment of a regular government, it was impossible that its head could remain in a precarious situation. Napoléon accordingly was created by the obsequious legislature first consul for ten years, beyond the first ten fixed at his original appointment; an appointment which, although far from coming up to the anticipations and wishes of the first consul, was yet important as a

We have the means of doing so, but we have not yet done it, and never will do it, till we have scattered over the surface of France some masses of granite. Do you suppose you can trust the people for the preservation of your institutions? Believe me, you are mistaken. They will exclaim in a short time, 'Vive le Roi!' or, 'Vive la Ligue!' with as

much alacrity as they now cry, 'Vive la République!' It is necessary therefore to give a lasting direction to the public impulse, and to prepare instruments for that purpose. In the war of Vendée, I have seen forty men obtain the absolute direction of a department; that is the system that we must make use of." [Thib. 83, 85.]

(1) The numbers were :—

It is adopted by the legislature.	In the Council of State, . . . . .	Ayes.		Noes.
	Tribunate. . . . .	14	...	10
	Corps Législatif, . . . . .	56	...	38
		166	...	110
		286		158
	Majority, . . . . .			78 [Thib. 82.]

(2) Thib 91, 92. Bour. (v. 357, 358.

(3) D'Ab. vi. 21.

(4) Jom. Vie de Nap. i. 326.

(5) D'Ab. vii. 169, 170.



step to the establishment of perpetual and hereditary succession in his family (1).

But all these measures, important as they were, yielded to the great step which at the same time was adopted of re-establishing the Catholic religion in France, and renewing those connexions with the Pope, which had been violently broken during the fury of the French Revolution.

State of religion in France at this period.

Although the institutions of religion had been abolished, its ministers scattered, and its property confiscated, by the different revolutionary assemblies who had governed the country, yet a remnant of the Christian faith still lingered in many parts of the rural districts. When the horrors of Robespierre ceased, and a government comparatively lenient and regular was established under the Directory, the priests obtained leave to open their churches, provided they undertook to maintain them at their own expense, and a considerable number returned from exile, and commenced in poverty and obscurity the reconstruction of religious observances. They were again exposed to persecution and danger after the 18th Fructidor, and being destitute of any species of property, and entirely dependent upon the voluntary contributions of their flocks, they were totally unequal to the Herculean task of combating the irreligious spirit which had acquired such strength during a revolutionary interregnum of ten years. A remnant of the faithful, composed for the most part of old women, attended the churches on Sunday, and marked by their fidelity an institution which might otherwise have been totally forgotten; but they were hardly observed amidst the crowds who had discarded every species of devotion; and a great proportion of the churches, both in the towns and the country, had either been pulled down, or converted to secular purposes during the Revolution; while of those which remained, a still greater number were in such a state of dilapidation, from the total absence of any funds for their support, as to threaten speedily to become unserviceable for any purpose whatever. In this general prostration of the Christian faith, the bewildered multitude had sought refuge in other and extravagant creeds; the sect of the Theophilanthropists had arisen, whose ravings amidst fruits and flowers, were listened to by a few hundreds, perhaps thousands, of the credulous or enthusiastic of Paris; while the great majority of the people, educated without any religious impressions, quietly passed by on the other side, and lived altogether without God in the world (2).

Napoléon's views on this subject.

Although neither a fanatic nor even a believer in Christianity, Napoléon was too sagacious not to perceive that such a state of things was inconsistent with any thing like a regular government. He had early, accordingly, commenced a negotiation with the Pope; and the head of the Church, delighted at finding such a disposition in a revolutionary chief, had received the advances with the utmost cordiality. Cardinal Gon-

(1) Bour. iv. 361.

Grounds set forth in the thus ably set forth in the *Senatus Consultum* which introduced it:—*Senatus Consultum* on the occasion. "Considering that in the existing circumstances of the Republic, it is the first duty of the Conservative Senate to employ all the means in its power in order to give to the government the stability which can alone augment the national resources, inspire confidence without, establish credit within, reassure our allies, discourage our secret enemies, remove the evils of war, bring to maturity the fruits of peace, and leave to the wisdom of administration the selection of the proper period for bringing forward all the designs

which it may have in view for the happiness of a free people," etc. Napoléon replied in the following words, which subsequent events rendered prophetic:—"Fortune has hitherto smiled on the Republic, but she is inconstant; and how many are there whom she has overwhelmed with her favours have lived too long by a few years! The interests of my glory and happiness seem to have marked as the termination of my public career the moment when a general peace was signed. But you deem a new sacrifice necessary on my part. I will not scruple to undertake it, if the wishes of the people prescribe what your suffrages authorize.—DUMAS, viii. 98, 99.

(2) D'Abr. vi. 38, 41. Thib. 151, 152. Jom. Vie de Nap. i. 489.

zalvi, who with singular ability directed the conclave, had, in the name of the supreme Pontiff, written to General Murat, when advancing towards the Roman states, after the armistice of Treviso, to express "the lively admiration which he felt for the first consul, to whose fortunes were attached the tranquillity of religion not less than the happiness of Europe." The views of Napoléon on that matter were strongly expressed to the counsellors of state with whom he conversed on the subject. "Yesterday evening," said he, "when walking alone in the woods, amidst the solitude of nature, the distant bell of the church of Ruel struck my ear. Involuntarily I felt emotion; so powerful is the influence of early habits and associations. I said to myself, if I feel thus what must be the influence of such impressions on simple and credulous men? Let your philosophers, your *idéologues* answer that if they can. It is absolutely indispensable to have a religion for the people; and not less so, that that religion should be directed by the government. At present, fifty bishops in the pay of England, direct the French clergy; we must forthwith destroy their influence; we must declare the Catholic the established religion of France, as being that of the majority of its inhabitants; we must organize its constitution. The first consul will appoint the fifty bishops; the Pope will induct them. They will appoint the parish priests; the people will defray their salaries. They must all take the oath; the refractory must be transported. The Pope will, in return, confirm the sale of the national domains. He will consecrate the Revolution; the people will sing, God save the Gallican Church. They will say I am a Papist; I am no such thing. I was a Mahometan in Egypt; I will become a Catholic here for the good of my people. I am no believer in particular creeds; but as to the idea of a God, look to the heavens, and say who made that (1)."

Concordat, July 15, 1801. Negotiations with the Court of Rome were attended with considerable difficulty, and proved very tedious. At length, however, they were brought to a conclusion, and, despite the opposition of

(1) Thib. 152, 153. Nap. ii. 88.

"To discuss the necessity of a religion," replied the opponents of the establishment, "is to mistake the question. There can be no doubt on that subject; but the point is, cannot religion exist without an established Church? There is to be found in the clergy one hierarchy, one spirit, one object. If this colossus had for its head the chief of the state, the evil would exist only in half; but if a foreign potentate, the Pope, is its leader, a schism is introduced into the community. Never will you attach the clergy sincerely to the new order of things. The Revolution has despoiled them both of their honours and their property; they will never pardon these injuries; eternal war is sworn between the rival powers. The clergy will be less dangerous when they are detached from each other than when organized in one body. It is not necessary either to persecute or transport a single individual; all that is required is to let them say mass as they choose, and allow every citizen to go either to church or the philanthropic temples, as suits his inclination. If the incompatibility between priests and the Republic becomes so evident as to disturb the public tranquillity, we must never hesitate to banish them; you must either proscribe them or the Revolution. The spirit of the age is wholly opposed to a return to Catholicism. We are nearer the truths of Christianity than the priests of Rome. You have but to say the word, the Papacy is ruined, and France takes its place as a Protestant state."

"You are deceived," said Napoléon; "the clergy

exist, and ever will exist; they will exist as long as the people are imbued with a religious spirit, and that disposition is permanent in the human heart.

Napoléon's reply. We have seen republics and democracies; history has many examples of such governments to exhibit, but none of a state without an established worship, without religion, and without priests. Is it not better to organize the public worship, and discipline the priests, than to leave both entirely emancipated from the control of the state? At present the clergy openly preach against the Republic, because they experience no benefit from it. Should we transport them? Eququestionably not! for what alone constitutes their authority in the wreck of their fortunes is the fidelity with which they adhere to the church of their fathers, and that will be increased rather than diminished by all the sufferings they undergo. You may send into exile the English or the Austrians, for they are bound by no ties to our country; but the French, who have families here, and are guilty of no offence but an adherence to their religious opinions, must be treated differently. You cannot extinguish their opinions; you must therefore attach them to the Republic. If the Protestant faith is proclaimed, one half of the country will adopt that creed and the other half remain Catholic; we shall have the Huguenot wars over again, and interminable divisions. We have nothing to take from the clergy, and as little to ask from them. The affair is entirely a political matter, and the line I have adopted appears the safest that could have been chosen." [Thib. 152, 153.]

large portion of the Council, and a still larger proportion of the Legislature, the concordat with the Pope passed into a law, and the Christian religion was re-established through the French territory (1).

Concordat  
with the  
Pope.

By this memorable law the Catholic religion was declared that of the French people. Ten archbishops and fifty bishops were established, the former with a salary of 15,000 francs (L.600) a-year, the latter with one of 10,000, or L.400. It was provided that there should be at least a parish priest in every district of a *juge de paix*, with as many additional ministers as might be deemed necessary; the bishops and archbishops were to be appointed by the first consul; the bishops nominated the parish priests and inferior clergy, subject to the approbation of the same authority. The salary of the priests in the larger parishes was fixed at 1500 francs, or L.60 a-year; in the smaller, 1200, or L.48. The Departmental Councils were charged with the procuring of houses, or lodgings and gardens, for the bishops, priests, and curates. The churches which had survived the Revolution were placed at the disposal of the bishops, and provision made for the repair, at the expense of the department, of such as were ruinous. Such was the establishment which in France emerged from the chaos of the Revolution, and such the provision for the ministers of religion made by the nation which, in the outset of the convulsions, had confiscated the vast possessions of the church, on the solemn assurance contained in the decree of the Constituent Assembly, that it "committed the due and honourable maintenance of religion and its ministers to the honour of the French people (2)."

General  
dissatisfac-  
tion which  
it occasion-  
ed.

Although the opposition in the Legislature was not nearly so formidable to the concordat as to the Legion of Honour, a much stronger feeling of discontent was excited by the change in the Revolutionary party and the army. "Bonaparte," said they, "is striving in vain to destroy the remains of the Revolution, and to close every avenue against the anti-revolutionary party, when by his concordat he opens to the latter an ample gateway, and with his own hands digs the mine which is to blow his edifice into the air." In truth, such was the extraordinary and unprecedented extent to which irreligion had spread under the Republican Government, that "two-thirds of the French people," according to the admission of their own historians, "were ignorant of the principles on which

(1) The numbers were,—

	For.	Against.
Tribunate, . . . .	78	7
Legislative Body, . . . .	228	21
	<hr/> 306	<hr/> 28

Its provi-  
sions in fa-  
vour of the  
Gallican  
Church.

or elsewhere, any function relative to the affairs of the Gallican Church.

3. That the decrees of foreign convocations, not excepting even those of general councils, should not be published in France, without a previous examination by the Government, to ascertain whether they were in harmony with the laws and institutions of the French Republic, or were in any way calculated to affect the public tranquillity. 4. That no national or metropolitan council, diocesan synod, or other deliberative assembly, should be held without the express authority of government. 5. That an appeal should lie to the Council of State in every case of alleged abuse or misgovernment on the part of the superior ecclesiastical authorities; and that under this head should be included every infraction of the rules established in the Councils of the Church, every attempt calculated to injure the liberties of the Gallican Church, every infringement on the liberty of public worship, or of the rights which the laws secured to its ministers." [Nap. Mélanges, i. 301.] By these articles, the Church in France was practically rendered nearly as independent of the Papal authority as the Protestant establishment of Great Britain.

whereas the Legion of Honour was only carried by a majority of 236 to 158; a striking proof how much more strenuous the opposition was to any approach towards the re-establishment of a nobility, than even the Christian religion, which was held forth as so much the object of obloquy.—TALPOT, 210.

(2) See the Concordat and Articles Organiques, in Nap. Mélanges. i. 297, et seq.

Some very important articles were included in the same treaty relative to the independence of the Gallican Church. It was provided, "1. That no bull, brief, rescript, decree, mandate, or provision, or other writing whatever, emanating from the Court of Rome, even concerning individuals, should be received, published, printed, or put in execution, without the authority of government. 2. That no individual announcing himself as legate, vicar, or commissioner of the Holy See, should, without the same authority, exercise on the French territory

such a measure was founded, and regarded it as a strange and dangerous innovation." The opposition which it experienced was indeed almost inconceivable, and afforded the clearest evidence of the pernicious tendency of those measures of extermination which former governments had adopted against the possessions of the established church, and how rapidly the confiscation of ecclesiastical property, founded on the pretence of applying it to purposes of beneficence and public instruction, leads to the total destruction of every species of religious belief. Universally the opinion prevailed that the restoration of the altar was but a prelude to that of the throne, and that the concordat was to be regarded as a solemn pledge for the speedy re-establishment of the ancient *régime*, a manifesto against all the principles of the Revolution. These feelings were in an especial manner prevalent among the military and democratic parties. Moreau, Lannes, Oudinot, Victor, and many others, openly expressed their repugnance to the measure, and declined to join the ceremony which took place in Notre-Dame on the occasion of its solemn proclamation. "Never," said the soldiers, "have the Republican arms been adorned by so many laurels as since they ceased to receive the benediction of the priests (1)."

Napoléon, however, remained firm, notwithstanding all the opposition which took place, and the loud discontents of the capital; the re-establishment of public worship was announced by a proclamation of the consuls, and on the following day a grand religious ceremony took place, in honour of the April 11, 1802. occasion, in Notre-Dame. All the great bodies in the state, all the constituted authorities attended, and proceeded in great pomp to the cathedral.

**Ceremony** On this occasion, for the first time, the servants of the first consul appeared in livery; the foreign ambassadors were invited to appear on the occasion in Notre-Dame. with all their attendants arrayed in the same manner, and a similar recommendation was addressed to such of the public functionaries as had

carriages of their own; but so few of them were possessed of that luxury, that the equipages made a very indifferent appearance. The military, however, were obliged to attend in great numbers, and the brilliancy of their uniforms more than compensated the want of civil decoration. Such, however, was the repugnance of many of the generals to the ceremony, that it required all the authority of the first consul to make Lannes and Augereau remain in the carriage, when they perceived they were going to hear mass. It proceeded, nevertheless, with great *éclat* in the cathedral of Notre-Dame, which only eight years before had been polluted by the orgies of the Goddess of Reason. "What thought you of the ceremony?" said Napoléon to General Delmas, who stood near him when it was concluded. "It was a fine piece of mummary," replied he. "Nothing was wanting but the million of men who have perished in order to destroy what you have now re-established." It was at first intended to have had the standards blessed by the archbishop, but the government were obliged to abandon the design, from being given to understand, that if this was done, the soldiers would trample them under their feet (2). So difficult is it to eradicate the passions which have been nursed up during the frenzy and convulsions of a revolution, and so obstinately do mankind, under the influence of prejudice, sometimes resist the establishment of those very institutions from which they are themselves destined to receive the most unalloyed advantages (3).

(1) Big. ii. 198, 199. Norv. ii. 166, 167. Jom. xiv. 404.

(2) Thib. 163, 164. Bour. iv. 279. Big. ii. 199.

(3) Rapp, one of Napoléon's aides-de-camp, who

was a Protestant, positively refused to attend the ceremony, even when requested to do so by the first consul himself. "Provided," said he, "you do not make these priests your aides-de-camp or your

Constrained religious observances at Paris.

Immediately after this great change, the observance of Sunday was to a certain degree resumed. It was provided in the concordat, that the government offices should be closed on Sunday, and this was immediately done. Shortly after, a decree of the consuls directed that all marriages should be proclaimed on that day, and the daily service of mass began in the Tuileries. Encouraged by so many symptoms of returning favour, the clergy made the utmost efforts to induce the first consul to join publicly in the more solemn duties which the church prescribed; but to this he never could be brought to consent. "We are very well as we are," said he; "do not ask me to go farther: you will never obtain what you wish: I will not become a hypocrite: be content with what you have already gained." Mass, however, was regularly performed at the Tuileries in the morning. The first consul went to it on Sunday, and remained during the service, which seldom exceeded ten minutes, in an adjoining apartment, with the door open, looking over papers, or engaged in his usual occupations. He had considerable difficulty in preserving the balance so imperiously required in the head of the state, during the first return to religious observances after the revolutionary fever, yet by great firmness he succeeded, during his whole reign, in maintaining a just equilibrium between the impassioned characters on both sides (1).

Great joy at the change in the rural departments.

But although the opposition which the restoration of religion met with in the corrupted population and revolutionary circles of Paris was very powerful, it was viewed in a very different light in the rural districts of France. The peasants beheld with undisguised delight the re-establishment of the priests, from whose labours and beneficence they had gained so much in former times; and the sound of the village bells again calling the faithful to the house of God, was hailed by millions, as the dove with the olive branch, which first announced peace to the "green undeluged earth." The restoration of Sunday, as a day of periodical rest, was felt as an unspeakable relief by the labouring population, who had never been able to establish the exemption from work on the tenth day, which the Convention had prescribed, and were borne down by years of continued and unbroken toil (2). But the pernicious effect of the total cessa-

books, you may do with them what you please." The well-known devotion of Rapp to his general procured him impunity for these sort of speeches, which he very frequently made; but Delmas was not so fortunate. The first consul was extremely irritated at his reply, which made a great noise at the time, and he was soon after sent into exile in consequence.—See TRIBAUDAU, 164.

(1) Bour. iv. 281, 282. Thib. 166.

Prudence of Napoleon in restraining the high church party. The wisdom with which Napoleon restrained the imprudent zeal of the church party appears in the proceeding which took place on the death of Mademoiselle Chameroy, a celebrated opera dancer. The priest of St.-Roch refused to receive the body into his church, or celebrate over it the solemnities of interment, and this gave rise to a vehement dispute between the artists who accompanied the body and the clergy. It came to be discussed in the Council of State, "It amounts to nothing," said the Senator Monge, "but a dispute of one set of comedians with another."—"What!" said the first consul, with a severe air. "Yes, citizens-consuls," replied Monge, "we may say that when the grand crosses do not bear us." But Napoleon viewed the matter in a very different light; and on the following day an article appeared in the *Moniteur* which bore internal marks of his composition.

"The curate of St.-Roch, in a moment of hallucination, has refused to pray for Mademoiselle Chameroy, or to admit her body into the church. One of his colleagues, a man of sense, received the procession into the church of the Filles Saint-Thomas, where the service was performed with all the usual solemnities. The Archbishop of Paris has suspended the curate of St.-Roch for three months, to give him time to recollect that Jesus-Christ commanded us to pray even for our enemies; and that being recalled by meditation to a proper sense of his duties, he may learn that all these superstitious observances, the offspring of an age of credulity, or of crazed imaginations, tend only to the discredit of true religion, and have been proscribed by the recent concordat of the Gallican Church."—TRIBAUDAU, 166, 168.

April 14, 1802. (2) The conclusion of the concordat His admirable was announced in these eloquent proclamation words in a proclamation issued by the first consul. "An insane policy has sought during the Revolution to smother religious dissensions under the ruins of the altar, under the ashes of religion itself. At its voice all those pious solemnities ceased in which the citizens called each other by the endearing name of brothers, and acknowledged their common equality in the sight of heaven. The dying,



tion of all religious instruction and observances for nine years could not so easily be eradicated. A generation had been educated, who were ignorant of the very elements of the Christian faith; the frenzy of the Revolution had snapped asunder a chain which had descended unbroken from the Apostolic ages. The consequences of this chasm have been to the last degree pernicious to the existing generation, and are, it is much to be feared, now irreparable. It is to this cause that we are to ascribe the spirit of irreligion which has since been so peculiarly the characteristic of the higher and urban classes of French society, and which has worked out its natural consequences throughout all the subsequent periods of the empire and the Restoration. A nation, which, in its influential classes at least, has lost all respect for religion, is incapable of freedom, and can be governed only by force. "*Natura, tamen,*" says Tacitus, "*infirmittatis humanæ, tardiora sunt remedia quam mala, et ut corpora, lente augescunt, cito extinguuntur, sic ingenia studiaque oppresseris facilius quam revocaveris.*"

To foreign nations, however, who could not foresee the deplorable internal effects of this long interruption in religious instruction, the spectacle of France again voluntarily returning to the Christian faith was in the highest degree acceptable. Contrasting it with the monstrous profanations and wild extravagances of the irreligious fanaticism which had prevailed during the Revolution, they deemed it the harbinger of tranquillity to its distracted people, and peace to Europe. It contributed more than any circumstance to weaken the horror with which the Revolutionary Government had so long been regarded, and opened the way to the establishment of more kindly relations, not only with the governments, but the people of foreign states. The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia publicly expressed their satisfaction at the auspicious event; forgetting in their joy at the restoration of so important a member to the Christian family, the jealousy with which a change so likely to consolidate the power of the first consul might possibly have been regarded. The Emperor of Austria styled it, with great felicity of expression, "*a service truly rendered to all Europe.*" And the thoughtful and religious every where justly considered the voluntary return of a great nation to the creed of its fathers, from the experienced impossibility of living without its precepts, as the most signal triumph to the Christian faith which had occurred since it ascended the Imperial throne, under the banners of Constantine (1).

It was as the first step in a great political improvement, and as closing the door against the worst principles of the Revolution, that Napoléon, in spite of so much opposition from his own subjects, undertook and carried through the concordat with Rome. Many persons urged him to complete the system; separate the church of France from the Pope, and at once declare himself its head. These persons, however, did not know the real state of the country, and still less the character of the first consul. So far from thinking that he could dispense with the court of Rome in settling this matter, he openly declared—"That if the Pope had not existed, it would have been well to have

left alone in his agonies, no longer heard that consoling voice which calls the Christian to a better world. God himself seemed exiled from the face of nature. Ministers of the religion of peace, let a complete oblivion veil over your dissensions, your misfortunes, your faults; let the religion which unites you bind you by indissoluble cords to the interests of your country. Let the young learn from your precepts that the God of peace is also the God of arms, and that he throws his shield over those who

combat for the liberties of France. Citizens of the Protestant faith, the law has equally attended its solicitude to your interests, let the morality, so pure, so holy, so brotherly, which you profess unite you all in love to your country, and respect for its laws; and, above all, never permit disputes on doctrinal points to weaken that universal charity which religion at once inculcates and commands."—*See Dumas, viii. 95, 96.*

(1) *Big, ii. 200, 201.*

Subsequent  
opinions of  
Napoleon  
on the sub-  
ject.

created him for that occasion, as the Roman consuls created a dictator in difficult circumstances. The concordat indeed recognised a foreign authority in religious matters, which might possibly disturb the republic on some future occasion; but it did not create it, and, on the contrary, brought it under restraints more favourable than could possibly have been expected to the interests of the reigning power in France. By connecting the church with the state, Napoléon hoped to withdraw it from foreign or English influence, while by the conquest of Italy he expected to make the Pope the ready instrument of his will. He has himself told us, that he never repented of this great step.—“The concordat of 1801,” says he, “was necessary to religion, to the republic, to the government; the churches were closed, the priests persecuted, part of the bishops were in exile, and in the pay of England, part merely apostolic vicars, without any bond to unite them to the state. The concordat put an end to these divisions, and made the Catholic apostolic church emerge from its ruins. Napoléon restored the altars, caused the disorders to cease, directed the faithful to pray for the republic, dissipated the scruples of the purchasers of national domains, and broke the last thread by which the exiled dynasty communicated with the country; by dismissing the bishops who resisted the reconciliation with the court of Rome, and holding them out as rebels to the holy see, who preferred their temporal interests to the eternal concerns of religion (1).”

Connected with the revival of religion was a great and generous design of the first consul, which it would have been well for him if he could have carried completely into effect, viz. the complete restoration of all the unalienated national property to the original proprietors. His first project was to make the restitution to that extent complete, with the single exception of the buildings devoted to public establishments; and even to restore the two-thirds which had been cut off from the public creditors by the barbarous decree of 1797. He never contemplated, however, the restoration of the alienated property, being well aware of the inextricable difficulties in which that question was involved. But when the subject was brought forward in the Council of State, he found the opposition so great that he was compelled to modify the project so much as amounted almost to its total abandonment. The severity of the laws against the emigrants had been gradually relaxed by suc-  
Nov. 26, 1800 cessive edicts. An important change was first made by the *arrêt* of 28th of Vendémiaire (26th November, 1800), which divided the emigrants into two classes, from the first and most numerous of which the prohibition was removed (2). They returned in consequence, in crowds; and the gates were opened still more widely by the lenient policy of the Government, which directed the minister of police to grant passports of admission to almost all who applied for them, without regard to the formal distinctions established by the decree of the first consul. In granting these indulgences,

(1) Nap. i. 115. *Mélanges*.

Mr. Fox, after the peace of Amiens, ventured to blame Napoleon in conversation for not having permitted the marriage of priests in his dominions. “I then had,” replied he, “and still have, need to pacify. It is with water, and not oil, that you must extinguish theological volcanoes. I would have had less difficulty in establishing the Confession of Augsburg in my empire.”—NAPOLÉON, *Mélanges*, i. 121.

(2) When this *arrêt* was under discussion in the Council of State, Napoléon observed, “There are above 100,000 names on these unhappy lists; it is enough to turn one’s head. In the general calamity the most elevated and dangerous characters can

alone extricate themselves; they possess the means of purchasing testimony in their favour. Thus the practical result is, that a duke is struck off the list, while a poor labourer is kept on it. We must extricate the matter by classing the emigrants according to certain distinctions, which may admit equally persons of all descriptions. The lists must be reduced by three-fourths of its number to the names of such as are known to be hostile to the Government. Having effected such a diminution, we shall be the better enabled to distinguish the really dangerous characters; they will no longer escape notice in the troubled flood of misfortune.”—TAL-LEPÉRE, 95.

Napoléon was influenced by more than a feeling of pity for the exiled families; he already looked forward to them as the firmest support of his throne. But it was not without difficulty that these concessions were made to the aristocratic party; the executive even was divided, and the second consul said to him, at the Council of State;—"The existence of the Government will be always precarious when it has not around itself several hundred revolutionary families, uniting in themselves the principal fortunes and offices of the state, to counterbalance the influence of the emigrant noblesse (1)."

Renewed  
indulgence  
towards the  
emigrants.

April 29, 1802. On the 29th April, 1802, a general amnesty was published by a *senatus consultum*, which reduced the exiled persons to about a thousand, and the melancholy list was, by the indulgence of the police, soon after reduced to a few hundreds. Above a hundred thousand emigrants, in consequence, returned to their native country, happy again to tread the soil and breathe the air of France, though deprived for the most part of all their possessions, and in a deplorable state of destitution. The *senatus consultum* restored to every emigrant who was permitted to return, such part of his former property as had not been alienated by the state; but as it was soon found that they began in consequence to cut the forests to a great extent, in order to relieve their necessities, it became necessary to put a restriction upon this liberality, and a subsequent *arrêt* prohibited the removal of the sequestration on the woods belonging to emigrants, amounting to three hundred arpents and upwards (2). By a subsequent decree of the legislature, it was provided, through the urgent representations of the first consul, that all successions to which the republic had acquired right as coming in place of the emigrants prior to the 1st September, 1802, and were unalienated, should be restored to the persons having right to them; that all claims of the republic on the emigrants prior to the amnesty should be extinguished; and that the goods of emigrants which had devolved to the republic, and were unalienated, should be declared liable to the claims of their creditors (3).

*Senatus  
Consultum  
proclaim-  
ing a general  
amnesty.*

Inadequacy  
of these  
measures to  
heal the  
evils of re-  
volutionary  
confisca-  
tion.

These measures, how humanely and wisely soever designed by Napoléon, proved almost totally inadequate to remedy the dreadful evils produced by the barbarous confiscation of property during the Revolution. He admits this himself. "My first design," says he "was to have thrown the whole unalienated property of the emigrants into a mass, or *syndicat*, and divided it according to a certain proportional scale among the restored families. I met with so much resistance, however, that I was induced to abandon that design; but I soon found that, when I came to restore individually to each what belonged to him, I made some too rich and many too insolent. Those who had received the greatest fortunes proved the most ungrateful. It was a sense of this which induced me to pass the *arrêt*, which suspended the operation of the restitution contained in the act of amnesty as to all woods above a certain value. This was a deviation undoubtedly from the letter of the law; but circumstances imperiously

(1) Thib. 96, 103. Bour. iv. 333, 334.

(2) On this occasion the first consul said in the Council of State, "The emigrants who have been struck out of the lists are cutting their woods, partly from necessity, partly to transport their money to foreign states. We cannot allow the greatest enemies of the Republic, the defenders of old prejudices, to recover their fortune, and despoil France. I am quite willing to receive them; but the nation is interested in the preservation of the forests.

The navy requires them; their destruction is contrary to every principle of good government. We must not, however, keep the woods without giving an indemnity to their proprietors; but we will pay them gradually, and as we acquire funds, and the delay of payment will prove a powerful means of rendering the claimants obedient to the Government."—TALBAUDRAU, 98.

(3) Thib. 98, 105.

required it; our error consisted in not having foreseen it before the original law was framed. This reaction, however, on my part, destroyed all the good effect of the recall of the emigrants, and alienated from me all the great families. I would have avoided all these evils if I had followed out my original design of a syndicat; instead of one discontented great family, I would have made an hundred grateful provincial nobles, who, being all dependent on my government for their subsistence, could have been relied on to the last. It is evident that the emigrants had lost their all; that they had embarked their property on board the same vessel, and what was rescued from the waves should have been proportionally divided. It was a fault on my part not to have done so, which is the more unpardonable that I had entertained the idea; but I was alone, surrounded by thorns; every one was against me, time pressed, and still more important affairs imperiously required my attention (1)."

Immense  
extent of  
this evil,  
and irre-  
parable ef-  
fects.

But in truth, even if the projects of Napoléon could have been carried into complete effect, they would have remedied but a small part of the evils consequent on the frightful confiscation of private property which took place during the Revolution. From a report made by M. Ramel on the finances of the Republic, it appears that before the year 1801 there had been sold national domains to the enormous amount of 2,555,000,000 francs, or above L.100,000,000 sterling; and that there remained to sell property to the amount of 700,000,000 francs, or L.28,000,000 sterling (2). When it is recollected that during the greater part of this period, the national domains, from the insecure tenure by which they were held, and the general confusion, were sold for a few years' purchase, it may be conceived what a prodigious mass of landed property must have been torn from the rightful proprietors in this way, and how fatal was the wound thus inflicted on the social system of France. Mr. Burke declared at the outset of the Revolution, that without complete restitution or indemnification to all the dispossessed proprietors, it would be impossible to construct a stable constitutional monarchy in France (3), and the result has now completely established the justice of his opinion. The want of a landed aristocracy to coerce the people, on the one hand, and restrain the executive on the other, has ever since been felt as the irreparable want in the monarchy; its absence was bitterly lamented by Napoléon (4), and all the attempts of subsequent

(1) Las Cas. ii. 221, 222.

Considerable alarm was excited among the holders of national domains by these proceedings in favour of the emigrants. To allay them, the following article appeared in the *Moniteur*:—The first duty of the French people, the first principle of the republic, ever must be, to preserve untouched, and with-

out any sort of distinction, the purchasers of national domains. In truth, to have trusted the fortunes of the republic, when it was assailed with the united forces of Europe, to have united their private fortunes to those of the state in such a period of anxious alarm, must ever constitute a claim on the gratitude of the state and the people."—THIBAUDEAU, 176.

(2) *Compte rendu*, par Ramel. *Stat. de la France*, 545.

The periods during which this prodigious confiscation of private property took place were as follow:—

From 17th May, 1790, to 18th Jan. 1795, the sales of national domains, chiefly church property, produced,	1,500,000,000, or L. 60,000,000
From Jan. 18, 1795, to Sept. 20, 1795,	611,438,000, or 24,500,000
From Sept. 20, 1795, to Nov. 25, 1797,	316,464,000, or 12,750,000
From Nov. 25, 1797, to June 30, 1801,	127,231,000, or 5,800,000
	<hr/> 2,555,133,000 or L.103,050,000

—See *Compte Rendu de Ramel*, *Stat. de la France*, 545.

(3) Burke v. 289, et seq.

(4) "I am now convinced," said he, "that I was in the wrong in my arrangements with the faubourg St.-Germain. I did too much and too little; enough to excite jealousy in the opposite party, and not enough to attach to my interest the restored no-

blesse. There were but two lines to take; that of extirpation or fusion. The first could not for a moment be entertained; the second was by no means easy, but I do not think it was beyond my strength. I was fully aware of its importance. It was incumbent on us to complete the fusion; to cement the

governments to construct a constitutional throne, or establish public freedom on a durable basis, have failed from the absence of that element. Neither Napoléon nor the Bourbons were ever strong enough to attempt the restitution of the confiscated estates at the expense of the four millions of landed proprietors among whom they were now divided. The conclusion, to be drawn from this, however, is not that Mr. Burke's and Napoléon's opinion were erroneous, or that the fabric of liberty can be erected on the basis of robbery and spoliation; but that the national sins of France had been so great, that reparation or restitution was impossible, and she has received the doom of perpetual servitude in consequence.

Measures  
to promote  
public in-  
struction.

When so many great ideas were passing through the mind of the first consul, the important subject of public instruction, and the progress of science, could not long remain unnoticed. Insatiable in his desire for every species of glory, he aspired, like Charlemagne, not only to extend the frontiers, and enhance the renown of the republic, but to construct a monument to science, which should perpetuate its fame to the latest generation. When he ascended the consular throne, the state of knowledge and public instruction was in the highest degree deplorable. The old establishments of education, which were for the most part in the hands of the clergy, and endowed from ecclesiastical foundations, had shared the fate of all the feudal institutions, and perished alike with their blessings and their evils. During the long interregnum of ten years which intervened under the revolutionary government, public instruction was generally neglected, and religious education, by far its most important department, entirely ceased, except in a small and persecuted class of society. Not that the Convention had overlooked this great subject of general instruction; on the contrary, they were fully aware of its importance, and had done their utmost, during the distracted and stormy period that they held the reins of government, to fill up the chasm. They established several seminaries of medicine, the Polytechnic school, which afterwards attained such deserved celebrity, various schools of rural economy, and a complete system for the instruction of the young men destined for the artillery, the engineers, the mines, and the naval service. Central schools were also introduced by their exertions in each department; and to them is due the formation of the Institute; which so long kept alive the torch of science during the melancholy night of modern civilisation. But these efforts, how meritorious soever, were wholly inadequate to remedy the evils which the Revolution had produced. The distracted state of the country, after the subversion of all its institutions, caused no education to be of any value but such as tended at once to military advancement; and the abolition of religious instruction, rendered all that was, or could be, taught to the great body of the people, of little practical benefit. Under de-

union at all hazards: with it we should have been invincible. The want of it has ruined us, and will for long prolong the misfortunes and agony of unhappy France. An aristocracy is the true support of the throne; its moderator, its lever, its fulcrum; the state without it is a vessel without a rudder; a balloon in the air. But the whole advantage of an aristocracy, its magic, consists in its antiquity; that was the precise thing, and the only thing, which I could not create: I did not possess the intermediate elements. A reasonable democracy will not seek more than equal capacity in all to rise to the highest dignities; the true course would have been to have employed the remains of the aristocracy with the forms and spirit of democracy. Above all, it was desirable to have assembled together the ancient fa-

milies, the names celebrated in our history; that was the only way to have conferred an air of grandeur on our modern institutions."—LAS CASES, iii. 23. How exactly have all men of a certain elevation of thought concurred, in all ages and countries, in the same opinion on this subject. "With the government of the multitude, and the destruction of the aristocracy," says Polybius, "commences every species of violence; they run together in tumultuous assemblies, and are hurried into every excess, assassinations, banishments, and divisions of lands, till, being reduced at last to a state of savage anarchy, they once more find themselves under a master and monarch, and submit to arbitrary sway."—POLYBIUS, vi. ex. i.



mocratic rule; France, amidst incessant declamations in favour of general illumination, and pompous eulogies on the lights of the times, was rapidly sinking into a state of darkness, deeper than the gloom of the middle ages (1).

By directions from the first consul, Chaptal presented to the Council of State a project for a general system of public instruction. It was founded on singular principles; distrust of the general education of the people, especially in the rural districts, and an anxiety to train up a body of favoured young men in the interest of the government, were its leading features. Schools of primary instruction in the communes were every where permitted, but Government contributed nothing to their support, and the teachers were left to such remuneration as they could obtain from their scholars. Secondary schools, the next in gradation, were placed on the same footing, with this difference, that they could not be established without the special authority of Government. The favour of the executive was reserved for academies of the higher kind, which, under the name of lyceums and special schools, were established to the number of thirty in different parts of the Republic, and at which not only were the masters paid by the state, but the scholars, 6400 in number, were also maintained at the public expense. The teachers in these institutions were required to be married; a regulation intended to exclude the priests from any share in the higher branches of tuition; and no mention whatever was made of religion in any part of the decree; a striking proof of the continued influence of the infidel spirit which had grown up during the license and sins of the Revolution, and which rendered the whole establishment for education of little real service to the labouring classes of the community (2).

Oct. 4, 1802. Following out the same plan of concentrating the rays of government favour upon the higher branches of knowledge, the sum of 60,000 francs (L.2400) was set aside to encourage the progress of French philosophy in electricity and galvanism; a galvanic society was instituted; a senatus consultum awarded the rights of French citizenship to every stranger who had resided a year in its territory, and had deserved well of the Republic by important discoveries in science or art; the Institute was divided into four classes, and each member received a pension of 1500 francs, or L.60 a-year; while a chamber of commerce was established in each considerable city of the Republic, and a council-general of commerce at Paris (3).

Trial of public feeling by the Royalists. The rapid succession of objects, tending to monarchical ideas, encouraged the Royalists in the capital to make a trial of their influence over the public mind. Duval composed a play, entitled "Edward in Scotland," which Napoléon resolved to see performed before he determined whether or not it should be allowed to be represented. He Oct. 9, 1802. listened attentively to the first act, and appeared even to be in-

(1) Thib. 122, 125. Big. ii. 211.

These observations apply to France as a nation. The splendid discoveries and vast talent displayed in mathematics and the exact sciences by the Institute, throughout all the Revolution, can never be too highly eulogized, and will be fully enlarged upon, in treating of the French literature during its progress.

(2) Thib. 134, 135. Big. ii. 212.

It was a fundamental rule of these establishments to admit no young man whose family was not attached to the principles of the Revolution. "We must never," said Napoléon, "admit into these schools any young man whose parents have

combated against the Republic. There could be no concord between officers of such principles and the soldiers of the army. I have never appointed even a sub-lieutenant, to my knowledge, unless he was either drawn from the ranks, or was the son of a man attached to the Revolution. The lion of the Revolution sleeps; but if these gentlemen were to waken him, they would soon be compelled to fly with their best speed." How much attached soever to his favourite system of fusing together the opposite parties in the Revolution, Napoleon had no notion of extending it to the armed force of the state. —THIBAUDEAU, 130, 131.

(3) Thib. 134, 141. Norv. ii. 189, 190.

interested in the misfortunes of the exiled prince; but the warm and enthusiastic applauses which ensued as the piece advanced, convinced him that it could not be permitted without risk. It was interdicted, and the author counselled to improve his health by travelling; he retired to Russia, and remained there for a year (1).

A general system was now set on foot for the maintenance of the requisite forces by sea and land, and the instruction of the young officers in the rudiments of the military art. A levy of 120,000 men was ordered; one-half of which was destined to replace the discharged veterans, and the other to form an army of reserve (2). At the same time, a project was discussed for the formation of a fixed body of seamen, divided into regiments, and allotted to each vessel in the navy. Truguet observed, "If you have only commerce you will never want sailors, and they will cost nothing; it is only when a nation has no trade that it is necessary to levy sailors; much longer time is required to form a sailor than a soldier; the latter may be trained to all his duties in six months."

Measures  
for recruit-  
ing the  
army and  
navy.

Debates on  
that subject  
in the  
Council of  
State.

Napoléon replied, "There never was a greater mistake; nothing can be more dangerous than to propagate such opinions; if acted upon, they would speedily lead to the dissolution of our army. At Jemappes, there were fifty thousand French against nine thousand Austrians; during the first four years of the war all the hostile operations were conducted in the most ridiculous manner. It was neither the volunteers nor the recruits who saved the Republic; it was the 180,000 old troops of the monarchy, and the discharged veterans whom the Revolution impelled to the frontiers. Part of the recruits deserted, part died; a small proportion only remained, who, in process of time, form good soldiers. Why have the Romans done such great things? Because six years' instruction were with them required to make a soldier. A legion composed of three thousand such men was worth thirty thousand ordinary troops. With fifteen thousand men such as the guards, I would any where beat forty thousand. You will not soon find me engaging in war with an army of recruits.

"In this great project we must not be startled by expense. No inland boatmen will ever voluntarily go to the sea-ports. We must make it a matter of necessity. The conscription for the marine should commence at ten or twelve years of age; the men should amount to twelve thousand, and serve all their lives. We are told there is no such naval conscription in England; but the example is not parallel. England has an immense extent of coasts which furnish her with abundance of seamen. We have a comparatively small coast, and but few seamen. Nature has been niggardly to us in this particular; we must supply its defects by artificial means." In

Oct. 4, 1802. pursuance of these principles an *arrêt* appeared upon the 4th October, which laid the foundation of the conscription for the naval service of France (3).

About the same time a project was brought before the Council for the

(1) Thib. 147, 148. Bour. v. 257.

(2) Thib. 107, 109.

Discussion (3) The establishment of the Ecole on the Ecole Militaire at the same time underwent Militaire a discussion at the Council of state. Napoléon observed—"This institution diminishes the severity of the conscription. It enables the young man to complete his education, which the conscription would otherwise prevent, at the same time that he is learning the rudiments of the military art. I know of no other school equally well

constituted; it will raise the organization of our army to the very highest point. The army under the Republic was for long supported by the youths who in 1793 issued from this establishment. All the commanders of corps feel the want of skilled young men; I can appoint them, but if they are ignorant of the duties of the private soldier, it is felt as an injustice by the common men. The Ecole Militaire furnishes scholars instructed in both departments, and therefore its great excellence."

Establishment of Chambers of agriculture in the colonies. They were decreed; but the war which soon afterwards broke out, prevented the plan being carried into execution. The principles, however, advanced by Napoléon in support of the proposal, are admirable for their wisdom and sagacity.

Nov. 9, 1802.  
Speech of  
Napoléon  
on the go-  
vernment  
of the colo-  
nies.

“Doubtless,” said he, “you must govern the colonies by force; but there can be no force without justice. Government must be informed as to the real situation of the colonies, and for this purpose, it must patiently hear the parties interested; for it is not sufficient to acquire the character of justice, that the ruling power does what is right. It is also necessary that the most distant subjects of the empire should be convinced that this is the case, and this they will never be, unless they are sensible that they have been fully heard. Were the Council of State composed of angels or gods, who could perceive at a glance every thing that should be done, it would not be sufficient unless the colonists had the conviction that they had been fully and impartially heard. All power must be founded on opinion; it is in order to form it that an institution similar to that proposed is indispensable. At present there is no constitutional channel of communication between France and the colonies; the most absurd reports are in circulation there as to the intentions of the central government, and it is as little informed as to the real wants and necessities of its distant possessions. If Government had, on the other hand, a colonial representation to refer to, it would become acquainted with the truth, it would proclaim it, and transmit it in dispatches to its colonial subjects.

“Commerce and the colonies have opposite interests; the first is that of purchasers and consumers, the latter that of raisers and producers. No sooner is it proposed to impose duties on colonial produce than I am besieged with memorials from all the chambers of commerce in France, but no one advances any thing in behalf of the colonies; the law, whatever it is, arrives there in unmitigated rigour, without the principles which led to it being explained, or their receiving any assurance that their interests have been balanced with those of the other side. But the colonists are Frenchmen, and our brothers; they bear a part of the public burdens, and the least that can be done for them in return is to give them such a shadow of a representation.

“Many persons here see only in the colonies the partisans of the English; that is held out merely as a pretext for subjecting them to every species of insult. Had I been at Martinique, I should have espoused the cause of the English; for the first of social duties is the preservation of life. Had any of your philanthropic liberals come out to Egypt to proclaim liberty to the blacks or the Arabs, I would have hung him from the masthead. In the West Indies similar enthusiasts have delivered over the whites to the ferocity of the blacks, and yet they complain of the victims of such madness being discontented. How is it possible to give liberty to the Africans when they are destitute of any species of civilisation, and are ignorant even of what a colony or a mother country is. Do you suppose that had the majority of the Constituent Assembly been aware what they were doing, they would have given liberty to the blacks? Certainly not; but few persons at that time were sufficiently far-sighted to foresee the result, and feelings of humanity are ever powerful with excited imaginations. But now, after the experience we have had, to maintain the same principles cannot be done in good faith; it can be the result only of overweening self-confidence or hypocrisy (1).”

(1) *Thib.* 177, 121.

Words of true political wisdom, which demonstrate how admirably qualified Napoléon was to have held, with just and even hands, the reins of power in a vast and varied empire, and which have since become of still greater value from the contrast they afford to the measures subsequently pursued by another state, in regard to far greater colonial dependencies, and with the lamentable result of former rashness even more forcibly brought before its eyes (1).

**Finances of France.** France, both under the monarchy and during the course of the Revolution, like every other country which has fallen under despotic power, had become burdened with an enormous and oppressive land-tax. The clear produce of the direct contributions in the year 1802 was 273,600,000 francs, or L.11,000,000 sterling, which, on the net amount of agricultural labour in the Republic, was about twenty per cent (2). This immense burden was levied according to a scale, or "cadastre," at which it was estimated the land was worth; and as the smiles of government favour were bestowed on the official persons employed in making the surveys in a great degree in proportion to the amount to which they contrived to bring up the revenue of their districts, the oppression exercised in many parts of the country was extreme, and the less likely to be remedied, that it fell on a numerous body of detached little proprietors, incapable of any effective or simultaneous effort to obtain redress. The "cadastre," or scale of valuation, had been of very old standing in France, as it regulated the *taille* and *vingtièmes*, which constituted so large a portion of the revenue of the monarchy (3). By a decree of the National Assembly of 16th September 1791, sanctioned by the King on the 23d September in the same year, the method prescribed for fixing the valuation was as follows:—"When the levy of the land-tax in the territory of any community shall commence, the surveyor charged with the operations shall make out a scheme in a mass which shall exhibit the general result of the valuation, and its division in sections. He shall then make out detailed plans which shall constitute the parcelled valua-

(1) It is observed by Mr. Hume, that the remote provinces and colonial dependencies of a despotic empire, are always better administered than those of a popular government, and that the reason is, that an uncontrolled monarch being equally elevated above all his subjects, and not more dependent on one class than another, views them all, comparatively speaking, with equal eyes; whereas a free state is ruled by one body of citizens who have obtained the mastery of an other, and govern exclusively the more distant settlements of the empire, and are consequently actuated by personal jealousy or patrimonial interests, in their endeavours to prevent them from obtaining the advantage of uniform and equal legislation. The admirable

wisdom of the principles of colonial government thus developed by Napoléon, compared with the unjust and partial principles of administration which have so long been adopted by Great Britain towards her West Indian settlements, afford a striking illustration of the justice of this remark. England will ultimately lose her splendid colonial empire, from the same cause which proved fatal to that of Athens, Carthage, and Venice; viz. the selfish system of legislation, exclusively adapted to the interest, or directed by the prejudices of the holders of political power in the centre of the state, and the general neglect of the wishes of its remote and unrepresented colonial dependencies.

	Francs.	
(2) MM. Lavoisier and Peuchot estimate the total agricultural produce of France in 1805 at, . . . . .	2,750,000,000	or L.110,000,000
Statistical de- Net produce, deducting cost of production, . . . . .	1,200,000,000	or 48,000,000
tails. Direct Taxes falling on land, . . . . .	250,000,000	or 10,000,000
Indirect Taxes, . . . . .	350,000,000	or 14,000,000
Drawn by the owners of the soil, . . . . .	600,000,000	or 24,000,000

So that of the net produce of the soil one-half was absorbed in taxation and no less than 20 per cent taken from the proprietors in a *direct form*; a signal proof how little the French peasantry had gained, in alleviation of burdens at least, by the result of the Revolution.—See *PERCET, Stat. de la France*, 286, 287.

The committee of the Constituent Assembly, who reported in 1790 on this subject, estimated the net territorial revenue of France at 1,500 millions, or L.60,000,000. M. Ganihl, after various laborious calculations, estimates it in 1816, at 1,300,000,000,

or L.52,000,000; while the Duke de Gaëta, in 1817, fixed it at 1,323,000,000, or L.53,000,000.—See *Duc de Gaëta*, ii. 299.

(3) The Constituent Assembly in 1790 estimated the territorial revenue at 1,500,000,000 francs, or L.60,000,000 annually, but took the cadastre, or valuation at 1,200,000,000 francs, or L.48,000,000, and fixed the land-tax at 240,000,000 francs, or L.9,200,000, and, with the expenses of collection, 300,000,000 francs, or L.12,000,000, being a fourth of the income of every landed proprietor" [*Duc de Gaëta*, ii. 288. *Peuchet, Stat. de France*, 524.]

tions of the community." These directions were justly and impartially conceived; but the difficulty of forming just and equal valuations in a country so immensely subdivided, and of such vast extent as France, was extreme; and, during the license and tyranny of the Revolution, the most flagrant inequality prevailed in the land-tax paid in different parts of the country. We have the authority of Napoléon's finance minister in 1802 for the assertion, that in every district of France, "there were some proprietors who were paying the fourth, the third, and even the half, of their clear revenue, while others were only rated at a tenth, a twentieth, a fiftieth, or an hundredth (1)." The gross injustice of such a system naturally produced the most vehement complaints, when the restoration of a regular government afforded any prospect of obtaining redress. The consular government, during the whole of 1802, was besieged with memorials from all quarters, setting forth the intolerable injustice which prevailed in the distribution of the land-tax, the utter inefficacy of all attempts which had been made in preceding years to obtain from the councils or prefects of the departments any thing like equality in the valuation, and the complete disregard which both the Convention and Directory had evinced towards the loud and well-founded complaints of the country (2).

The matter at length became so pressing, that it was brought before the Council of State.—The magnitude of the evil did not escape the penetration of the first consul (3). The formation of a valuation was decreed, proceeding on a different principle. This was to adopt as the basis of the scale, a valuation, laid, not on parcels of ground, but on masses of the same kind of cultivation. This system, however, although in appearance the most equitable, was found by experience to be attended with so many difficulties, that its execution did not proceed over above a fifth of the territory of the Republic, and it was at length abandoned from the universal complaints of its injustice. The discussion of the "cadastre" was again brought forward, and made the subject of anxious consideration in 1817, but the inequality of the valuation still continued, and is the subject of loud and well-founded complaints at this hour. In truth, such are the obstacles thrown in the way of an equal valuation by individual interests, and such the difficulties with which the execution of such a task is attended, from the variation in the amount of the produce of the soil, and the prices which can be got for it at different times

(1) Duc de Gaeta, ii. 261.

(2) Duc de Gaeta, ii. 257.

(3) "Your system of land-tax," said he, in the Council of State, "is the worst in Europe. The result of it is, that there is no such thing as property or civil liberty in the country; for what is freedom without security of property? There can be no security in a country where the valuation on which the tax proceeds can be changed at the will of the surveyors every year. A man who has 3,000 francs of rent a-year (L.120) cannot calculate upon having enough next year to exist; every thing may be swept away by the direct tax. We see every day questions about fifty or a hundred francs gravely pleaded before the legal tribunals, and a mere surveyor can, by a simple stroke of the pen, surcharge you several thousand francs. Under such a system there cannot be said to be any property in the country. When I purchase a domain, I know neither what I have got, nor what I should do in regard to it. In Lombardy and Piedmont there is a fixed valuation; every one knows what he is to pay; no extraordinary contributions are levied but on extraordinary occasions, and by the judgment of a solemn tribunal. If the contribution is augmented,

every one, by applying it to his valuation, knows at once what he has to pay. In such a country, therefore, property may truly be said to exist. Why is it that we have never had any public spirit in France? Simply because every proprietor is obliged to pay his court to the tax-gatherers and surveyors of his district; if he incurs their displeasure he is ruined. It is in vain to talk of appealing; the judgments of the courts of review are arbitrary. It is for the same reason that there is no nation so servilely submissive to the government as France, because property depends entirely upon it. In Lombardy, on the other hand, a proprietor lives on his estate without feeling any disquietude as to who succeeds to the government. Nothing has ever been done in France to give security to property. The man who shall devise an equal law on the subject of the cadastre will deserve a statue of gold." [Bign. i. 221. Thib. 179.] What an instructive testimony as to the amount of security which the Revolution had conferred upon property in France, and the degree of practical freedom which had been enjoyed, or public spirit developed, under its multifarious democratic administrations!



and seasons, that it is not going too far to pronounce it to be impossible. Inequality, severity, and oppression are the invariable and inevitable attendants of direct taxation wherever established, and even under the very best system of local administration. The only taxes which are, comparatively speaking, equal, just, and unfelt, are indirect burdens, which, being laid on consumption, are voluntarily incurred, disguised under the price of the article, and accurately proportioned to the amount of expenditure of each individual (1).

Indigna-  
tion of Na-  
poléon at  
the lan-  
guage used  
in the Tri-  
bunate.

But in the midst of these great designs of Napoléon for the reconstruction of society in France, he experienced the greatest annoyance from the independent, and sometimes cutting language used by the popular orators in discussing the projects sent from the Council of State to the Tribunate. Though friendly to a free and unreserved discussion of every subject in the first of these bodies, which sat with closed doors, the first consul was irritated to the last degree by the opposition which his measures experienced in the only part of the legislature which retained a shadow even of popular constitution, and openly expressed his resolution to get quit of an institution which reminded the people of the dangerous powers which they had exercised during the anarchy of the Revolution. He loved unfettered arguments in presence only of men competent to judge of the subject, but could not endure the public harangues of the tribune, intended to catch the ears, or excite the passions of an ignorant populace (2). On various occasions, during the course of 1802, his displeasure was strongly excited by the ebullitions of republican spirit or spleen which occasionally took place in the Tribunate. An expression in the treaty with Russia roused the indignation of the veteran democrats of the Revolution. It was provided that "the two contracting parties should not permit their respective subjects to entertain any correspondence with foreign powers." When the treaty came to be discussed at the Tribunate, this expression gave rise to an angry discussion. Thibaut exclaimed, "The French are citizens, and not subjects." Chenier observed, "Our armies have combated ten years that we should remain citizens, and we have now become subjects. Thus are accomplished the wishes of the two coalitions." Napoléon was highly displeased with these symptoms of a refractory spirit. "What," said he, "would these declaimers be at? It was absolutely necessary that my government should treat on a footing of equality with that of Russia. I would have become contemptible in the eyes of all foreign nations if I had yielded to these absurd pretensions on the part of the Tribunate. These gentlemen annoy me to such a degree that I am strongly tempted to be done at once with them (3)."

Important  
change in  
municipal  
govern-  
ment car-  
ried in  
spite of  
that body.

Another law was brought forward about the same time, which excited a still more vehement opposition on the part of the public orators. It related to certain changes in the constitution of the judges intrusted with the arrest of individuals and the municipal police. These powers were, by the existing law, invested in the hands of the *juges de paix*, who were still appointed by the people; the proposed change took this branch of jurisdiction from these functionaries, and vested it in a small number of judges appointed for that special purpose by the government, who were to take cognizance of the crimes of robbery,

(1) Gaeta, ii. 258.

(2) Bour. v. 85. Thib. 198.

He often said to the leading orators of the Tribunate,—"Instead of declaiming from the tribune, why do you not come to discuss the points

under deliberation with me in my cabinet. We should have family discussions as in my Council of State."—THIBAudeau, 198.

(3) Bour. i. 85, 87. Thib. 198, 207.

housebreaking, and some others, without a jury. The importance of this change, which so nearly concerned the personal liberty of every individual, was at once seen, and the public indignation, in an especial manner, roused by a clause which subjected every citizen to arrest by the simple authority of the minister of police, and took away all personal responsibility on the part of the members of administration, on account of any acts infringing on the liberty of the subject which they may have committed. The storm was so violent, and the complaints on this point especially, so well founded, that government was obliged to withdraw the obnoxious article; but the necessity of the case, and the universal knowledge which prevailed of the total insecurity to life and property, from the height to which outrage and violence still existed in the interior, prevailed over the opposition, and the law passed

Dec. 11, 1802. after a strenuous resistance. Napoléon's displeasure was so great, that he could not conceal it, even in an audience to which the Senate was admitted on this subject. Speaking of the Tribunal, he said with the utmost energy. "There are assembled within its walls a dozen or fifteen metaphysicians; they are fit only to be thrown into the Seine. They are a kind of vermin, who have overrun my dress. But don't let them imagine I will suffer myself to be attacked like Louis XVI; I will never allow matters to come to that (1)."

Debates on  
the Tribu-  
nate in the  
Council of  
State.

His opinions on this subject were emphatically expressed, and the grounds of them powerfully urged in the Council of State, when the project for the renewal of the constitution was brought forward.

"We must make a change," said he, "the example of England must not mislead us; the men who compose its opposition are neither emigrants who regret the feudal *régime*, nor democrats who seek to revive the Reign of Terror. They feel the natural weight of talent, and are chiefly desirous to be bought at a sufficient price by the crown. With us the case is very different; our opposition is composed of the remnant of the privileged classes, and of the outrageous Jacobins. They by no means limit their ambition to an accession to place or office; the one half would be satisfied with nothing but a return to the ancient *régime*; the other the reign of democratic clubs. No two things are more opposite than the effects of free discussion among a people long habituated to its excitement, and in a country where freedom has only commenced. Once admitted into the Tribunal, the most honourable men aim only at success, without caring how violently they shake the fabric of society? What is Government? Nothing, if deprived of the weight of opinion. How is it possible to counterbalance the influence of a Tribunal always open for the most inflammatory speeches? When once the patrician classes are destroyed, the freedom of the tribune must of necessity be suppressed. The circumstances were widely different at Rome; yet, even there, the tribunes of the people did infinite mischief. The constituent assembly placed the king in a secondary position; they were right, for he was the representative of the feudal *régime*, and was supported by all the weight of the nobles and the clergy. At present the government is the representative of the people. These observations may appear foreign to the subject in hand, but in reality they are not so; they contain the principles on which I am persuaded government must now be conducted, and I willingly throw them out in order that they may be more largely disseminated by the intelligent circle which I see around me."

In conformity with these principles, the first consul brought forward his

(1) Thib. 204.

plan, which was to divide the Tribunate into five sections, corresponding to the divisions of the Council of State; that the proposed laws should be *secretly* transmitted from the section of the Council of State to the corresponding section of the Tribunate; that they should be *secretly* discussed in the Tribunate, and between the Tribunate and the Council of State by three orators appointed on both sides; and no public discussion take place except by three orators, mutually in like manner chosen, between the Tribunate and the Government pleaders before the legislature. It was strongly objected to this change, that it tended to destroy the publicity of proceedings in the only quarter where it still existed, and eradicated the last remnants of a free constitution. Napoléon replied: "I cannot see that. Even if it were so, a constitution must be moulded by circumstances, modified according to the results of experience, and ultimately constructed in such a way as not to impede the necessary action of Government. My project secures a calm and rational discussion of the laws, and upholds the consideration of the Tribunate. What does the Tribunate mean? nothing but the tribune, that is, the power of rational discussion. The Government has need of such an addition to its means of information: but what is the use of an hundred men to discuss the laws introduced by thirty? They declaim, but do nothing of real utility. We must at length organize the constitution in such a manner as to allow the Government to advance. No one seems yet sufficiently impressed with the necessity of giving unity to the executive; until that is effected, nothing can be done. An universal disquietude prevails; speculation, exertion of every kind is arrested. In a great nation the immense majority of mankind ever are incapable of forming a rational opinion on public affairs. Every one must contemplate, at some period or another, the death of the first consul; in that case, without a cordial union of the constituted authorities, all would be lost (1)."

The opposition, however, was very powerful against these great alterations; and Napoléon, whose prudence in carrying through political changes was equal to his sagacity in conceiving them, contented himself, at the annual renewal of the constitution, with an *arrêt* of the Senate, that thenceforward the duties of the Tribunate and the Legislative Body should be exercised only by the citizens who were inscribed on the two lists as the first elected to continue the exercise of the national functions. The great change of the constitution involved in the mutilation of the Tribunate, was reserved for the period when Napoléon was to be elected first consul for life; an event which soon afterwards took place (2).

He resolves  
to make  
himself  
consul for  
life.

Influenced not merely by ambition, but a profound and philosophic view of the existing state of France, Napoléon had firmly resolved to convert the republic into a monarchy, and not only seat himself on the throne, but render the dynasty hereditary in his family, or those whom he might designate as his successors. Nothing could be more apparent to an impartial spectator of the state of France, and the adjoining nations, than that it was utterly impossible that republican institutions could exist in a country so situated. Destitute of any of the elevated or ennobled classes which alone in a great and powerful community can give stability to such institutions; exposed to all the sources of discord and corruption arising from a powerful military force, selfish and highly civilised manners, and the influence of a vast revenue; placed in the midst of the great military monarchies of Europe, who were necessarily hostile to such institutions, from

(1) *Trib.* 229, 234.

(2) *Ibid.* 232.

the experience they had had of the evils with which they were attended to all the adjoining states, France could not by possibility avoid falling under the government of a single individual. Napoléon had no alternative but to restore the Bourbons, or seat himself on the throne (1).

Incessant efforts of Government to spread monarchical ideas.

During the whole of 1802, the efforts of Government were incessant to extend monarchical ideas by means of the press, and the private influence of all persons in official situations. Lucien Bonaparte has been already noticed as one of the earliest and most zealous propagators of these new opinions a year before; but as they came forth at too early a period, and somewhat startled the public, he was rewarded for his services by an honourable exile as ambassador at Madrid. But in the succeeding season, the change of the public mind had become so evident, that it was no longer necessary to veil the real designs of Government; and the appointment of Napoléon to the consulship for life was accordingly zealously advocated by all persons in prominent situations. Roederer supported it with all the weight of his acute metaphysics; Talleyrand gained for it the suffrages of the whole diplomatic body. Arbitrary power advanced with rapid steps in the midst of general declamations in favour of order and stability; whoever spoke of liberty or equality was forthwith set down as a Jacobin, a Terrorist, and looked on with suspicious eyes by all the servants of Government. The partisans of revolution, finding themselves reduced to a miserable minority, retired into the obscurity of private life, or consoled themselves for the ruin of their republican chimeras, by the personal advantages which they derived from situations round the consular throne (2).

The attempt at first fails in the Senate.

The project for appointing Napoléon consul for life had failed a few months before, when the prorogation of that appointment for ten years took place. Napoléon affected at that period to decline such an elevation; the two other consuls, acquainted with his real desires, insisted that it should be forced upon him; and it was so carried in the Council of State by a majority of ten to seven. Lanfrede, who brought up the report of the committee of the Senate on the subject, and was not in the secret, proposed only a temporary prorogation; Despinasse moved that it should be for life. But Tronchet, who was president, and whose intrepidity nothing could overcome, held firm for the first proposal, and it was carried by a majority of sixty to one, Languinais alone voting in the minority. Tronchet was neither a republican nor a courtier; he preferred a monarchy, but notwithstanding his admiration for Napoléon, he feared his ambition. He said of Napoléon, in a company where several senators were assembled:—"He is a young man; he has begun like Cæsar, and will end like him; I hear him say too frequently,

(1) Big. ii. 231 Thib. 236.

(2) Big. ii. 231, 232. Thib. 236.

Strong opposition of Joséphine to these attempts.

It is remarkable, that while all around the first consul beheld with undisguised satisfaction his approaching elevation to the throne, the individual in existence who, next to himself, was to gain most by the change, was devoured with anxiety on the subject. All the splendour of the throne could not dazzle the good sense of Joséphine, or prevent her from anticipating in the establishment of the Napoléon dynasty, evident risk to her husband, and certain downfall to herself. "The real enemies of Bonaparte," said she to Roederer, who was advocating the change, "are those who put into his head ideas of hereditary succession, dynasty, divorce, and marriage." She employed all the personal influence which she possessed with the first consul and his most intimate

counsellors to divert him from these ideas, but in vain. "I do not approve the projects of Napoléon," said she; "I have often told him so; he hears me with attention, but I can plainly see that I make no impression. The flatterers who surround him soon obliterate all I have said. The new honours which he will acquire will augment the number of his enemies; the generals will exclaim that they have not fought so long to substitute the family of the Bonapartes for that of the Bourbons. I no longer regret the want of children; I should tremble for their fate. I will remain attached to the destiny of Bonaparte, how dangerous soever it may be, as long as he continues to me the regard which he has hitherto manifested; but the moment that he changes I will retire from the Tuileries. I know well how much he is urged to separate from me." See BOURAIGNES, v. 44, 47; THIBAudeau, 237, 242.

that he will mount on horseback and draw his sword (1).” What a glorious distinction for the same individual to have with equal courage pleaded the cause of Louis XVI. in the Temple, and restrained the career of Napoléon on the throne; and how noble a contrast to the baseness of so many of the popular faction, who then showed as great vehemence in the persecution of a falling, as they now displayed servility in the adulation of a rising monarch (2).

The design of making Napoléon consul for life, having thus failed in the Senate, probably from mis-apprehension of what he really desired, the method of attaining the object was changed. He began, as he usually did in such cases, to blame severely those who had been most prominent in urging forward the plan, and in an especial manner animadverted on Roederer, whose efforts to procure his elevation had been peculiarly conspicuous. But in the midst of his seeming displeasure at the proposal which had been made, the most efficacious means were taken to secure its adoption. In reply to the address of the Senate, which prorogated his power for ten years beyond the

Means  
adopted to  
ensure its  
success.

term originally assigned, he observed—“The suffrages of the people have invested me with the supreme authority; I should not deem myself sufficiently secured in the new proof which you have given me of your esteem, if it were not sanctioned by the same authority.” Under cover of this regard for popular sovereignty, the partisans of Napoléon veiled a design of conferring on him hereditary power. It was proposed in the Council of State, that the people should be consulted on the question whether the consulship for *life* should be conferred upon him. Roederer said—“A prorogation of the consulship for ten years gives no stability to Government. The interests of credit and of commerce loudly demand a stronger measure. The Senate has limited its appointment to ten years, because it conceived it did not possess power to confer authority for a longer period; but we should submit to the people the question, whether the first consul should be nominated for life, and invested with the right to appoint his successor (3). So clearly was the design seen through, that the proposal was carried without a division, though some of the popular members abstained from voting. In conformity with this resolution of the Council of State, and without any authority from the other branches of the Legislature, the question was forthwith submitted to the people,—“Shall Napoléon Bonaparte be consul for life?” Registers were directed to be opened in every commune, to receive the votes of the citizens. Napoléon declined the addition of the question, whether he should be invested with the right to nominate his successor, deeming the inconsistency too glaring between a refusal to accept a prorogation for ten years from the Senate, if not confirmed by the people, and the demand of a right to nominate a successor to the throne of France (4).

Aug. 2,  
1802. The result of this appeal was announced by the *Senatus Consultum* of August 2. It appeared that 3,557,885 citizens had voted, of whom 3,368,259 were for the affirmative. This is one of the most remarkable events recorded in the history of the Revolution, and singu-

(1) Thib. 245. Bour. v. 17, 18.

(2) So far did the spirit of servility proceed among the courtiers of the Tuileries, that they seriously proposed to Napoleon to restore the ancient titles of honour, as being more in harmony than republican forms with the power with which he was now invested. But Napoléon had too much sense to disclose at once the whole of his designs. “The pear,” said he to Bourrienne, “is not yet ripe. All that will come in good time; but it is essentially re-

quisite that I myself, in the first instance, assume a title, from which those which I bestow on others may naturally flow. The most difficult part is now over; no one can be deceived; every body sees there is but a step which separates the consulship from the throne. Some precautions are still requisite; there are many fools in the Tribunate, but let me alone, I will overcome them.”—BOURRIENNE, v. 17.

(3) Bour. v. 17. Thib. 34. Bign. ii. 233.

(4) Thib. 250, 253, 265. Bour. v. 17.



Result of  
the appeal,  
and great  
satisfaction  
which it gave.

larly descriptive of that longing after repose, that invincible desire for tranquillity which uniformly succeeds to revolutionary convulsions, and so generally renders them the prelude to despotic power. The rapid rise of the public funds demonstrated that this feeling was general among the holders of property in France. They advanced with every addition made to the authority of the successful general; as low as eight before the 18th Brumaire, they rose at once to sixteen when he seized the helm, and after the consulship for life was proclaimed, reached fifty-two. Contrast this with the rise of the public securities, thirty *per cent*, on the day on which Necker was restored to the ministry on the shoulders of the people (1), to carry through the convocation of the States-General, and observe the difference between the anticipation and the experience of a revolution (2).

Answer of  
the first  
consul to  
the address  
of the Sen-  
ate on the  
occasion.

The answer of the first consul to the address of the Senate on this important occasion is valuable, as illustrating the great views which he already entertained of his mission, to extinguish the discord which had preceded him, and restore the reign of order upon earth. "The life of a citizen," said he, "belongs to his country; the French people have expressed their wish that mine should be solely devoted to it; I obey their will. In bestowing upon me a new, a permanent pledge of their confidence, the nation has imposed upon me the duty of moulding the system of its laws, so as to bring it into harmony with durable institutions. By my exertions, aided with your assistance, citizen-senators, by the concurrent voice of all the authorities, by the trust and the will of the whole people, the liberty, the prosperity, the equality of France will be established beyond the reach of chance. The most distinguished of people will be the most fortunate, and their prosperity will secure that of all Europe. Content to have been called by the will of Him, from whom every thing emanates, to bring back the reign of justice, order, and equality upon the earth, I will hear the voice which summons me hence without regret, and without disquietude on the opinion of future generations (3)."

Napoléon's  
ideas on the  
limits of eli-  
gibility.

Important changes in the constitution followed this alteration in the character of the executive authority; they were preceded by memorable discussions on the principles of government in the Council of State (4).

(1) Bour. v. 55. Norv. ii. 129. Thib. ii. 81.

Letter of Lafayette declining to vote for it. (2) In the midst of the general unanimity, M. Lafayette had the courage to vote against the appointment of the first consul for life. He added to his vote these words: "I cannot vote for such a magistracy, until public freedom is sufficiently guaranteed; when that is done I give my voice to Napoléon Bonaparte." In a letter, addressed to the first consul, he fully expressed the grounds of his jealousy:—"When a man," said he, "penetrated with the gratitude which he owes you, and too much enamoured with glory, not to admire that which encircles your name, has given only a conditional vote, it is the less suspected that no one will rejoice more than himself to see you the first magistrate for life, in a free republic. It is impossible that you, general, the first in that class of men who occasionally arise at the interval of ages, should wish that such a revolution, illustrated by so many victories, stained by so many crimes, should terminate only in the establishment of arbitrary power: patriotic and personal motives would lead me to desire for you that compliment to your glory which the consulship for life would afford; but the principles, the engagements, the actions of my life forbid me to wish for any such appointment if not founded on a basis worthy of you." In a private conversation with the first consul, he added:—"A

free government, and you at its head; that comprehends all my desires." The veteran republican did not perceive, what indeed none of the enthusiasts of his age were aware of, that the establishment of the freedom to which he was so warmly attached had been rendered impossible by the crimes of the Revolution in which he had borne so conspicuous a part. He was taught the same truth in a still more striking manner thirty years afterwards by the result of the Revolution which overturned the restoration; but it is seldom that political fanatics, how sincere or respectable soever, are taught even by the most important lessons of contemporaneous history. [Big. ii. 235, 236.]

Napoléon said on this occasion:—"In theory Lafayette is perhaps right; but what is theory? a mere dream when applied to the masses of mankind. He thinks he is still in the United States, as if the French were Americans. He has no conception of what is required for this country. The Catholic religion has still its root here; I have need of the Pope. He will do all I desire." From that period all communication between the general and the first consul ceased. Napoléon tried repeatedly afterwards to regain him to his government, but in vain. [Bour. v. 81, 62.]

(3) Thib. 287. Norv. ii. 193.

(4) Napoléon did not attempt to disguise his contempt for the venal revolutionists who now fawned

Aug. 4, 1802. On the views taken by Napoléon the new constitution was framed, which was proclaimed on the 4th August. The chief changes were, that the Tribune was reduced from one hundred to fifty members; a diminution of importance, which was regarded at the time, as it really was, as a prelude merely to its total extinction, and which so completely deprived that remnant of freedom of consideration, as to render it from thenceforward, no obstacle whatever to the despotic tendency of the government. The legislative body was reduced to 258 members, and divided into five divisions, each of which was annually renewed; the electors also retained their functions for life. The Senate was invested with the power to dissolve the Legislative Body and the Tribune, declare particular departments *hors de la constitution*, and modify the fundamental institutions of the Republic. The first consul received the right to nominate his successor, and pardon offences. In return for so many concessions to the executive, a shadow of privilege was conferred on the electors; the electoral colleges were allowed each to present two citizens for the functions of the municipality department and nation. In all but name, the consulship was already a despotic monarchy (1). So evident did this soon become, that even the panegyrists of Napoléon have not scrupled to assert that the consular and imperial institutions were "fraudulent constitutions, systematically intended by servile hands to introduce despotic power." Subsequent experience has warranted the belief that how arbitrary soever, they were the only institutions under which France could enjoy any degree of tranquillity, and that

on the sceptre of the consulate. "How contemptible are these men," said he; "all your virtuous Republicans are at my service, if I will condescend to put gilt lace on their coats."—BOUAPART, v. 10, 11. "All the powers of the state," said Napoléon, "are in the air; they have nothing to rest upon. We must establish relations between them and the people, a particular in which the constitution was essentially defective. The lists of those eligible to particular offices, have by no means answered the desired end. If they were for life, they would establish the most fearful aristocracy that ever existed; if temporary, they would keep the nation in a continual ferment for an imaginary advantage. What flatters and captivates the people in democratic institutions is the real and practical exercise of their powers; but in the existing system the people who discover only 5000 persons eligible to the higher offices of state, cannot flatter themselves that they possess such a share in the elections as to have any influence on the administration. To ensure the stability of government, the people must have a larger share in the elections, and feel themselves really represented.

"The electoral colleges attach the people to the government, and *vice versa* They are a link, and a most important one, between the authorities and the nation. In that link it is indispensable to combine the class of proprietors with the most distinguished of those who have not that advantage; the former, because property must be the basis of every rational system of representation; the latter, because the career of ambition must not be closed to obscure or indigent genius.

"We are told to look at the English constitution for a model; I am of opinion that it is inapplicable to this country, situated as it now is; and my reasons for that opinion are these:—England embraces in the bosom of society a body of nobles who hold the greatest part of the property of the nation, and are illustrated by ancient descent. In France that body is totally wanting; it cannot be created; if you compose it of the men of the Revolution, it could

only be brought about by a concentration in their hands of the whole property of the nation, which is impossible; if of the ancient noblesse, a counter-revolution would immediately ensue. Besides this, the character of the two people is different; the Englishman is brutal, the Frenchman is vain, puffed, inconsiderate. Look at the elections; you will see the English swilling for forty days at the expense of the nobles; never would the French peasantry disgrace themselves by similar excesses. Their passion is for equality. For these reasons I am clearly of opinion that the English constitution is inapplicable to France.

"The constitution may be aptly compared to a vessel; if you abandon it to the winds with all its sails set, no one can tell where it may be drifted. Where are now the men of the Revolution? the moment they were expelled from office, they sunk into oblivion. This will happen in all cases if precautions are not taken to prevent it; it was with that design that I instituted the Legion of Honour; among all people, in every republic that ever existed, classes are to be found. At present nothing has a lasting reputation but military achievement; civil services are less striking, more open to differences of opinion. Hereditary succession to the first consul is absurd; not in itself, for it is the best guarantee for the stability of the state, but because it is incompatible with the present state of France. It long existed in the ancient monarchy; but with institutions which rendered it feasible, which exist no longer, and cannot be restored. Hereditary succession is founded on the idea of civil right; it presupposes property; it is intended to ensure its transmission from the dead to the living. But how is it possible to reconcile hereditary succession in the chief magistrate with the principle of the sovereignty of the people? When the crown was hereditary, the chief situations in the kingdom were hereditary also; the fiction on which it was founded was but a branch of the general law. At present there is no longer any of that. [Thib. 293, 299]

(1) Norv. ii. 193. Bour. v. 56. Bign. ii. 242, 246. Thib. 289, 297.

if they were calculated to extinguish freedom, it was because the sins of the Revolution had rendered her people neither worthy of receiving, nor capable of enjoying that first of blessings.

Aug. 8. 1802. A few days after the constitution was published, the first consul presided at the Senate, and received the congratulations of the constituted authorities, the public bodies, and the foreign ambassadors, on his appointment for life. This was remarkable as the first occasion on which he openly displayed the pomp and magnificence of regal power. The soldiers formed a double line from the Tuileries to the Luxembourg; the first consul was seated in a magnificent chariot, drawn by eight horses; the two other consuls followed in carriages drawn by six. A splendid *cortège* of generals, ambassadors, and public functionaries followed, whose gorgeous appearance captivated the Parisian multitude, more passionately devoted than any in Europe to spectacles of that description. Enthusiastic applause from the inconstant populace rent the heavens; they did not manifest greater rapture when the Constituent Assembly began the work of demolishing the monarchy, than they now did when the first consul restored it (1).

Aspect of Paris and its society at this period. The aspect of Paris at this period was sufficient to have captivated a nation gifted with a less volatile imagination than the French, the more especially coming as it did after the sad and melancholy scenes of the Revolution. The taste for luxury and pleasure had spread rapidly in a capital where they had all the charms of novelty; while the people, captivated with the return of enjoyments, to which they had long been strangers, drank deep and thankfully of the intoxicating draught. The vast influx of strangers, especially English and Russians, filled the streets with brilliant equipages; while the gay and party-coloured liveries dazzled the inhabitants, from the contrast they afforded to the sombre appearance of the Jacobins' costume. The whole population of Paris flocked to the Place Carrousel, where their eyes were daily dazzled by splendid reviews, attended by a concourse of strangers, which recalled the prosperous days of Louis XIV; while the higher classes of citizens were not less captivated by the numerous and brilliant levees and drawing-rooms, where the court of the first consul already rivalled the most sumptuous displays of European royalty (2). M. de Markoff, who had succeeded Kalitscheff as ambassador from Russia, Lord Whitworth, the English ambassador, and the Marquis Luchisini, the representative of Prussia, were in an especial manner distinguished by the magnificence of their retinues, and the eminent persons whom they presented to the first consul. Among the illustrious Englishmen who hastened to Paris to satiate their curiosity by the sight of the remains, and the men of the Revolution, was Mr. Fox, whom Napoléon received in the most distinguished manner, and for whom he ever after professed the highest regard; but the praises of an enemy are always suspicious, and the memory of that able man would have been more honoured if the determined foe of England had bestowed on him some portion of that envenomed hatred which he so often expressed towards Pitt or Wellington, and all the British leaders who had advanced the real interests and glory of their country (3).

(1) Thib. 305, 306.

(2) The court of Napoleon at this period was happily characterised by the Princess Dolgorucki, who then resided in Paris. "The Tuileries," said she, "is not, properly speaking, a court; and yet it is as little a camp: The consulship is a new institution. The first consul has neither a *chapeau bas* under his arm, nor do you hear the clank of a sabre at his side."—*LAS CASES*, iii. 244.

(3) Bour. v. 55. D'Abr. vi. 136, 140.

Generous To the honour of Mr. Fox it must be conduct of mentioned, that during his intercourse Mr. Fox in with the first consul he never failed to defending impress upon him the absurdity and Mr. Pitt to falsehood of those ideas in regard to the first the privity of Mr. Pitt to any designs consul. against his life, or any desire for his destruction, which were then so prevalent in the Tuileries. Alone

**Formation of the lower gallery.** Nor was the French metropolis less illustrated by the spoils which were collected there from the vanquished states in every part of Europe. Already the *Vénus de Médicis*, torn from her sanctuary in the tribune of Florence, diffused over the marble halls of the Louvre her air of matchless grace; the *Pallas of Velletri* attested the successful researches of the French engineers in the Roman states; while the *St.-Jerome of Parma*, the transfiguration of Rome, and the last communion of the Vatican, exhibited to wondering crowds the softness of Correggio's colouring, the grandeur of Raphael's design, and the magic of Dominichino's finishing. Dazzled by the brilliant spectacle, the Parisians came to regard these matchless productions, not as the patrimony of the human race, but their own peculiar and unalienable property (1), and thus prepared for themselves that bitter mortification which afterwards ensued on the restoration of these precious remains to their rightful owners.

**Great satisfaction which these changes gave in foreign courts.** In foreign states the re-establishment of a regular government in France, and its settlement, under the firm and able guidance of Napoléon, diffused as great contentment as among its own inhabitants. In London, Vienna, and Berlin, the consulship for life gave unalloyed satisfaction. All enlightened persons in these capitals perceived that the restoration of the feudal régime and the property of the emigrants had already become impossible, and that the fury of the Revolution, under which they had already suffered so severely, was never so likely to be stilled as under the resolute and fortunate soldier who had already done so much to restrain its excesses. The Queen of Naples, a woman endowed with masculine spirit and great penetration, expressed the general feeling at Vienna, where she then was, in these words: "If I had possessed a vote in France, I would have given it to Napoléon; and written after my signature, I name him consul for life, as being the man most fitted to govern the country. He is worthy of the throne since he knows how to fill it (2)."

Public opinion, after this change, ran so strongly in favour of the centralization of influence and hereditary succession, that if the first consul had not repressed the general transports, he would have received at once the unlimited gift of absolute power. The agents of Government pursued with unrelenting severity the last remains of democratic fervour. It was generally suggested that authority should be concentrated in the same hands, from the consulship for life to the appointment of mayor to the lowest village in France; and that the citizens should as rapidly as possible be estranged from any exercise of powers which they were evidently incapable of using to advantage.

**Rapid increase of the central executive power.** Innumerable projects were set on foot for reducing the number of the communes, the prefectures, and the tribunals; the old parliaments were held up as models of the administration of justice; the old intendants of provinces as a perfect system of local administration. So powerful was the reaction against the ideas and the changes of the Revolution (3).

and unaided, in the midst of the officers and generals of Napoléon, Mr. Fox undertook the defence of his illustrious opponent, and pleaded his cause with a warmth and generosity which excited the admiration even of the most envenomed enemies of the English administration.—See *DICKENS D'ABRANTES*, vi. 136, 143.

He said frequently, in his bad French, "Premier consul, ôtez cela de votre tête."—See *LAS CASES*, iv. 172.

(1) *Bour.* v. 55. *D'Abr.* vi. 259.

(2) *Bign.* ii. 250.

(3) *Thib.* 344, 342.

Infamous proposals made to Joséphine regarding an heir. So strong was the desire generally felt at this time for perpetuating the dynasty in the descendants of Napoléon, that the persons around his throne went the length of proposing to Joséphine that she should palm off a stranger or bastard child upon the nation. "You are going to the waters of Plombières," said Lucien to her. "You must have a son, if not of him, of some one else." And when she expressed her indignation at the proposal,—"Well," says he, "if you will not consent

Suppression of the ministry of police;

Shortly after Napoléon was appointed to the consulship for life, several changes in the administration took place. The most important of these was the suppression of the ministry of police, and the

transference of Fouché to a comparatively insignificant situation in the Conservative Senate. This austere but able statesman, notwithstanding his share in the massacres of the Loire and the fusillades of Lyon, had now become one of the most important supporters of the consular throne. His great value consisted in his perfect knowledge of the revolutionary characters, and the clear guidance which he afforded to the first consul on all the delicate points where it was necessary to consult the inclinations, or yield to the prejudices of the immense body of men who had risen to importance on the ruins of the ancient proprietors. He formed the same link between the Government and the revolutionary interests which Talleyrand did between them and the ancient *régime*. The honours and fortune to which he had risen, had in no respect changed the simplicity of his former habits; but with the possession of power he had acquired a taste for its sweets, and became little scrupulous as to the means by which it was to be exercised. Ambition had become his ruling passion; he loved office and the wealth which it brought with it, not for the enjoyments which it might purchase, but the importance which it conferred. Such was his dissimulation, that he never suffered his real views to escape either from his lips or his countenance; and by the extraordinary hypocrisy of which he was master, inspired parties the most at variance with a sense of his importance, and a desire to propitiate his good-will (1). The Republicans beheld in the ancient Jacobin who had voted for the death of Louis, and presided over the executions of Nevers and Lyon, the representative of their party in the state; the ancient noblesse lavished on him their praises, and acknowledged with gratitude the favours he had conferred on many of the most illustrious of their body. Joséphine made him her confidant in all her complaints against the brothers of her husband, and received large sums of money from his coffers to reveal the secrets she had elicited from the first consul; while he himself yielded to a fascination which seemed to extend alike over the greatest men and most powerful bodies in the state (2).

And disgrace of Fouché.

Napoléon, however, at length perceived, that the immense influence which Fouché enjoyed as head of the police, might one day become formidable even to the Government. He had the highest opinion of the importance of that branch of the Administration; but he began to conceive inquietudes as to its concentration in the hands of so able an individual. It was impossible to disguise the fact that its members had conspired in favour

comply. Bonaparte must have a child by some other woman, and you must adopt it; for a family is indispensable to him, and it is for your interest that he should have one; you can be at no loss to understand why."—"Lucien," replied she, "you are mad. Do you suppose France would ever submit to be governed by a bastard?" Shortly after she recounted this extraordinary scene to one of the counsellors of state. "You may depend upon it," said she, "they have not abandoned their idea of hereditary succession, and that it will be brought about some day, one way or other. They wish that Bonaparte should have a child of some other woman, and that I should adopt it; but I told them I would never lend myself to such an infamous proposal. They are so blinded as to believe that the nation would permit a bastard to succeed. They are already beginning to hint at a divorce and a large pension to me. Bonaparte even is carried away by their ideas. The other day, when I expressed my

fears in regard to the Princess Hortense, on account of the infamous reports which are in circulation about her infant being his son, he answered, 'These reports are only accredited by the public, from the anxiety of the nation that I should have a child.' He is more weak and changeable than is generally imagined. It is owing to that circumstance that Lucien has got such an extraordinary dominion over him." [Thib. 309, 310.] Napoléon at St. Helena alluded to this proposal, though, with his usual disregard of truth, he made it come from Joséphine herself; an assertion which his secretary most properly denies, and which is completely disproved by the event. If Joséphine had been willing to adopt an illegitimate son of Napoléon, and pass it off as her own offspring, she would have lived and died Empress of France. [Bour. v. 21, 19]

(1) His ruling maxim was, that the chief use of words was to conceal the thoughts.

(2) Bour. v. 32, 33. Thib. 325, 326.



of the Consulate against the Directory, and the powerful machinery which was then put in motion to support Napoléon, might with equal facility be directed to his overthrow. Influenced by these considerations, the first consul lent a willing ear to the party at the Tuileries who were adverse to Fouché, at the head of which was Talleyrand, who openly opposed and cordially hated his powerful rival. Yet such was the ascendancy of the minister of police, even over the powerful mind of Napoléon, that he long hesitated before he took the decisive step; and, after it had been resolved on, felt the necessity of veiling it under a professed measure to increase the popularity of Government. He represented to Fouché, therefore, that the office of minister of police was one which might now be dispensed with and that the Government would derive additional popularity from the suppression of so obnoxious a branch of the Administration. Fouché saw through the device; but, according to his usual policy, yielded to a power which he could not brave, and expressed no dissent to the first consul, though he was far from

Sept. 12. supposing the storm was so soon to break on his head. The *arrêt* for his dismissal was signed when he was on a visit to Joseph Bonaparte at Morfontaine. Fouché was named a senator, and loaded with praises by the Government which deemed him too powerful to be retained in his former situation; and at the same time the ministry of police was suppressed, and united to that of justice, in the person of Regnier (1).

Aug. 15, 1802. Soon after, an important change took place in the constitution of the Senate. It had been originally provided that those elevated  
Changes in the constitution of the Senate. functionaries should, after their appointment, be incapable of holding any other situation; but it was subsequently enacted that the senators might hold the offices of consuls, ministers, inspectors of public instruction, be employed in all extraordinary missions, and receive the decoration of the Legion of Honour. Subsequently a munificent provision was made for the Senate, and every member on his nomination received an  
Jan. 14, 1803. appointment for life. Pensioned by the executive, nominated by the first consul, surrounded by every species of seduction, this branch of the Government in reality served thereafter no other purpose but to throw a thin veil over the omnipotence of the executive. Napoléon was careful, however, to keep up its name, and bring forward all his despotic measures under the sanction of its authority, as the Roman emperors retained the venerable letters S. P. Q. R. on their ensigns, and the preamble “*ex auctoritate Senatus*,” to the most arbitrary acts of their administration (2).

Renewed correspondence between Louis XVIII and Napoléon.

An event occurred at this period, which tended in a remarkable manner to illustrate the dignity with which the exiled family of the Bourbons bore the continued rigours of fortune. When Napoléon was pursuing his projects for the establishment of a hereditary dynasty in his family in France, he caused a communication to be

(1) Bour. v. 36, 87. Thib. 325, 329.

The letter of the first consul to the Senate, announcing the suppression of the ministry of police, was conceived in these terms:—“Appointed minister of police in the most difficult times, the Senator Fouché has fully answered by his talents, his activity, and his attachment to the Government, altho the circumstances demanded of him. Placed now in the bosom of the Senate, he is called to equally important duties; and if ever a recurrence of the same circumstances should require a restoration of the office of minister of police, it is on him that the eyes of Government would first be fixed to discharge its functions.” These consolatory words opened to Fouché a ray of hope in the midst of his disgrace; all

his efforts were from that moment directed to bring about his restoration to office; and at length, as will appear in the sequel, he attained his object.”—See BOURBONNE, v. 37; and THIBAudeau, 328.

(2) Thib. 335.

Another *arrêt* at the same period regulated the costume of the persons employed in the legal profession. The robes of the judges were ordered to be red, and those of the bar black. During the Revolution, all the distinguishing marks had been abolished. The black robe which Molière had so exquisitely ridiculed, had given way to the costume of the *sans-culottes*. At the same time, the old habiliments at the *Messe Rouge* were re-established; and the service was celebrated by the Archbishop of Paris.

made to the Count de Lille, afterwards Louis XVIII, then residing, under the protection of the Prussian King at Königsberg, offering, in the event of his renouncing in his favour his right to the throne of France, to provide for him a principality, with an ample revenue, in Italy. But Louis answered in these dignified terms, worthy of the family from which he sprung:—"I do not confound M. Bonaparte with those who have preceded him. I esteem his valour, his military talents; I am gratified by many acts of his administration, for the happiness of my people must ever be dear to my heart. But he deceives himself, if he imagines that he will prevail upon me to surrender my rights. So far from it, he would establish them himself, if they could admit of doubt, by the step which he has taken at this moment. I know not the intentions of God to my family or myself, but I know the obligations which he has imposed upon me. As a Christian, I will discharge the duties which religion prescribes to my last breath; son of St. Louis, I will make myself be respected even in fetters; successor of Francis I, I wish ever to be able to say with him, 'All is lost except our honour (1).'"

It was at the same period that Napoléon commenced the great undertaking which has so deservedly covered his memory with glory, and survived all the other achievements of his genius, the formation of a Civil Code, and the concentration of the heterogeneous laws of the monarchy and republic into one consistent whole. In contemplating this great work, it is difficult whether to admire most the wisdom with which he called to his assistance the ablest and most experienced lawyers of the old *régime*, the readiness with which he apprehended the difficult and intricate questions which were brought under discussion, or the prudence with which he steered between the vehement passions and contending interests which arose in legislating for an empire composed of the remains of monarchical and republican institutions. It is no longer the conqueror of Rivoli or Austerlitz whom we recognise; it is Solon legislating for a distracted people; it is Justinian digesting the treasures of ancient jurisprudence, that arises to our view; and the transient glories even of the imperial reign fade before the durable monument which his varied genius has erected in the permanent code of half of Europe.

It is observed by Lord Bacon, that when "laws have been heaped upon laws, in such a state of confusion as to render it necessary to revise them, and collect their spirit into a new and intelligible system, those who accomplish such an heroic task, have a good right to be named among the benefactors of mankind." Never was the justice of this observation more completely demonstrated than by the result of the labours of the first consul in the formation of the Code Napoléon. The complication of the old laws of France, the conflicting authority of the civil law, the parliaments of the provinces, and the local customs, had formed a chaos of confusion which had suggested to many statesmen before the Revolution, the necessity of some attempt to reduce them to an uniform system. By an astonishing effort of mental vigour, Pothier had contrived to extract out of this heterogeneous mass, the elements of general jurisprudence, and followed out the principles of the Roman law, with a power of generalization and clearness of expression to which there is nothing comparable in the whole annals of legal achievement. But his lucid works had not the weight of

Every thing breathed a return to the ancient *régime*. Cambacérès was the great promoter of these changes; well aware of the importance of whatever

strikes the eye on the inconsiderate multitude.—TRÉBAUDEAU, 338.

(1) Bour. v. 147. Bign. iii. 283, 287.

general law; they could not be referred to as paramount on every question; they contained principles to be followed from their equity, not rules to be obeyed from their authority. The difficulty of the task was immensely increased by the Revolution; by the total change in the most important branches of jurisprudence, personal liberty, the rights of marriage, the descent of property, and the privileges of citizenship, which it occasioned; and the large inroads which revolutionary legislation had made on the broken and disjointed statutes of the monarchy.

To reform a system of law without destroying it is one of the most difficult tasks in political improvement, and requiring, perhaps more than any other change, a combination of practical knowledge with the desire of social amelioration. To retain statutes as they are, without ever modifying them according to the progress of society, is to make them fall behind the great innovator, Time, and often become pernicious in their operation; to new model them, in conformity with the wishes of a heated generation, is almost certainly to incur unforeseen and irremediable evils. Nothing is more easy than to point out defects in established laws, because their inconvenience is felt, and the people generally lend a ready ear to those who vituperate existing institutions; nothing is more difficult than to propose safe or expedient remedies, because hardly any foresight is adequate to estimate the ultimate effects which any considerable legal changes produce. They are in general calculated to remedy some known and experienced evil, and in so far as they effect that object, they are salutary in their operation; but they too often go beyond that limit, and in the pursuit of speculative good, induce unforeseen inconveniences much greater than those they remove. The last state of a nation, which has gone through the ordeal of legal innovation, is in general worse than the first.

The only way in which it is possible to avoid these dangers, is to remedy experienced evils, and extend experienced benefits only, without advancing into the tempting but dangerous regions of speculative improvement. It is the clearest proof that the Code of Napoléon was formed on these wise principles, that it has not only survived the empire which gave it birth, but continues, under new dynasties and different forms of government, to regulate the decisions of many nations who were leagued to bring about the overthrow of its author. Napoléon has said, "that his fame in the eyes of posterity would rest even more on the code which bore his name than all the victories which he won;" and its permanent establishment, as the basis of the jurisprudence of half of Europe, has already proved the truth of the prophecy.

Discussions on that subject in the Council of State.

Deviating altogether from the rash and presumptuous innovations of the Constituent Assembly, which took council of its own enthusiasm only, Napoléon commenced his legislative reforms, by calling to his councils the most distinguished lawyers of the monarchy. Tronchet, Roederer, Portalis, Thibaudeau, Cambacérès, Lebrun, were his chief coadjutors in this Herculean task (1); but although he required of these eminent legal characters the benefit of their extensive experience, he joined in the discussions himself, and struck out new and important views,

(1) Their respective merits were thus stated by Napoléon: "Tronchet is a man of the most enlightened views, and a singularly clear head for his advanced years. Portalis would be the most eloquent orator, if he knew when to stop. Thibaudeau is not adapted for that sort of discussion; he is too cold. He requires, like Lucien, the animation and fire of

the Tribune. Cambacérès is the Advocate-General; he pleads sometimes on one side, sometimes on another. The most difficult part of the duty is the reduction of their ideas into the *procès verbal*; but we have the best of *réducteurs* in Lebrun."—THIBAUDEAU, 415.

on the most abstract questions of civil right, with a facility which astonished the counsellors who had been accustomed to consider only his military exploits. To the judgment of none did the first consul so readily defer as that of Tronchet; notwithstanding his advanced age, and monarchical prepossessions, he deemed no one so worthy as the illustrious defender of Louis XVI to take the lead in framing the code for the empire. "Tronchet," said he, "was the soul of the commission, Napoléon its mouthpiece. The former was gifted with a mind singularly profound and just; but he soared above those around him, spoke indifferently, and was seldom able to defend his opinions." The whole council, in consequence, was in general adverse to his propositions when they were first brought forward; but Napoléon, with the readiness and sagacity which he possessed in so remarkable a degree, saw at a glance where the point lay, and with no other materials than those which Tronchet had furnished, and hardly any previous acquaintance with the subject, brought forward such clear and lucid arguments as seldom failed to convince the whole assembly. He presided at almost all the meetings of the commission for the formation of the civil code, and took such a vivid interest in the debates, that he frequently remained at them six or eight hours a-day. Free discussion in that assembly gave him the highest gratification; he provoked it, sustained it, and shared in it. He spoke without preparation, without embarrassment, without pretensions; in the style rather of free and animated conversation than premeditated or laboured discussion. He never appeared inferior to any members of the council, often equal to the ablest of them, in the readiness with which he caught the point at issue, and the logical force with which he supported his opinions, and not unfrequently superior to any in the originality and vigour of his expressions. The varied powers and prodigious capacity of Napoléon's mind nowhere appeared in such brilliant colours as on those occasions; and would hardly appear credible, if authentic evidence on the subject did not exist in the *procès-verbaux* of those memorable discussions (1).

The limits of a work of this description render it impossible to enter into a survey of the many important subjects brought under review in the formation of the Code Napoléon. Two only can be noticed, as those on which the interests of society chiefly depend, the laws of succession, and those regarding the dissolution of marriage.

Law of succession, as finally fixed by Napoléon.

How clearly soever Napoléon saw and expressed the dangers of the minute subdivision of landed estates, and consequent destruction of a territorial noblesse, arising from the establishment of an equal division of property, whether in land or money, among the heirs of a deceased person, he found this system too firmly established to venture to shake it. It was identified in the eyes of all the active and energetic part of the nation with the first triumphs of the revolution; it had been carried by Mirabeau in the Constituent Assembly, with the general concurrence of the people, and had since become the foundation of so many private interests and individual prospects, that it was universally regarded as the great charter of the public liberties, and any infringement on it the first step towards a restoration of feudal oppression. Great as was the power, apparently unbounded the in-

(1) Thib. 412. Bour. v. 122, 123. Las Cases, iii. 241, 242.

Bertrand de Moleville, formerly minister of Marine to Louis XVI, and a man of no ordinary capacity, said, in reference to these discussions, "Napoléon was certainly an extraordinary man; we were very far indeed from appreciating him on the other

side of the water. From the moment that I looked into the discussions on the civil code, I conceived the most profound admiration for his capacity. It is utterly inconceivable where he acquired so much information on these subjects."—Las Cases, iii. 249, 250.

fluence, of Napoléon, it would have been instantly shattered by any attempt to break in upon this fundamental institution. Wisely abstaining, therefore, from change, where he could not introduce improvement, he contented himself with consolidating the existing laws on the subject, and establishing in the Code Napoléon a general system of succession, fundamentally at variance with that in all the other states of Europe, and of which the ultimate consequences are destined to be more important than any of the other changes brought about by the Revolution.

By this statute, which may be termed the revolutionary law of succession, the right of primogeniture, and the distinction between landed and moveable property were taken away, and inheritance of every sort divided in equal portions among those in an equal degree of consanguinity to a deceased person (1). This indefeasible right of children to their parents' succession was declared to be a half, if one child was left; two thirds, if two; three-fourths, if three or more; all entails or limitations of any sort were abolished. The effects of such a system, co-operating with the immense subdivision of landed estates which took place from the sale of the forfeited properties during the

Sketch of the French revolutionary system of succession. (1) By the decree April 19. 1803, the law of succession was established in the following manner:—  
1. 1. The law pays no regard either to the nature of property, or the quarter from which it comes, in regulating succession.

2. Every succession which devolves to ascendants or collaterals, is divided into two equal parts; the one for the relations by the father's side, the other for those of the mother.

3. The proximity of relations is determined by the number of generations by which they are separated from the deceased; in the line direct, by the number of descents; in the collateral, by the number which separates each from the common ancestor, up and down again. Thus two brothers are related in the second degree; the uncle and nephew in the third; cousins-germain in the fourth.

4. In all cases where representation is admitted, the representatives enter as a body into the place, and enjoy the rights of the person represented. This right obtains *ad infinitum* in the direct line of descendants, but not in that of ascendants. In the collateral line, it is admitted in favour of the children of a brother or sister deceased, whether they are called to the succession concurrently with their uncles or aunts, or not. In all cases where representation is admitted, the succession is divided *per stirpes*; and if the same branch has left several descendants, the subdivision in the same manner takes place *per stirpes*, and the members of each subdivision divide what devolves to them *per capita*.—*Code Civil*, § 731-745.

II Children or their descendants succeed to their father or mother, grandfather, grandmother, or other ascendants, without distinction of sex or primogeniture, and whether of the same or different marriages. They succeed *per capita*, when they are all related in the first degree; *per stirpes*, when they are called in whole or in part by representation. If the defunct leaves no issue or descendants, his succession divides according to the following rules:—

III. 1. In default of descendants, the brothers and sisters are called to the succession, to the exclusion of collaterals or their descendants. They succeed either *per capita* or *stirpes*, in the same way as descendants,

2. If the father and mother of a deceased person survive him, his brothers and sisters, or their descendants, are only called to half of the succession; if the one or the other, only to three-fourths,

3. The division of this half, or three-fourths, is made on the same principles as that of descendants, if the collaterals are of the same marriage; if of different, the succession is divided equally between the paternal and maternal lines.—*Code Civil*, § 750, 755.

IV. In default of collaterals, or their issue, ascendants succeed according to the following rules:—

1. The succession divides into two equal parts; of which the one half ascends to the father's side, the other to the mother's.

2. The ascendant, the nearest in degree, receives the half belonging to his line, to the exclusion of the more remote.

3. Ascendants in the same degree, take *per capita*, there being no representation in the ascending line.

4. If the father and mother of a deceased person, who dies without issue, survive him, and he leaves brothers and sisters, or their descendants, the succession is divided into two parts; one to the ascendants, one to the collaterals. But if the father and mother have predeceased him, their share accretes to that of the collaterals.—*Code Civil*, § 746, 749.

V. 1. Voluntary gifts, whether by deeds *inter vivos*, or by testament, cannot exceed the half of the deceased's effects if he leaves one child; the third, if two; the fourth, if three or more.

2. Under the description of children in this article, are included descendants in whatever degree; estimating these, however, *per stirpes*, not *per capita*.

3. Voluntary gifts, either by deeds *inter vivos*, or testamentary deeds, cannot exceed the half of the effects of the deceased if he leaves no descendants, but ascendants in both the paternal and maternal line, or three-fourths, if one of these only.—*Code Civil*, § 913, 915.

VI. Natural children have a right of succession to their parents alone, if they have been legally recognised, but not otherwise.

1. If the father or mother have left legitimate issue, the natural child has a right to a third of what he would have had right to if he had been legitimate.

2. It extends to a half, if the deceased left no descendants, but ascendants, or brothers or sisters.

3. It extends to three-fourths, when he leaves neither descendants nor ascendants, nor brothers nor sisters; to the whole when he leaves neither.—*Code Civil*, § 756, 758.



Revolution, have been incalculable. It is estimated by the Duke de Gaeta, long minister of finance to Napoléon, that, in 1815, there were 15,059,000 individuals in France belonging to the families of agricultural proprietors, and 740,500 belonging to the families of proprietors not engaged in agriculture, all living on the revenue of profit derived from their properties (1) As may be supposed, where so extreme a subdivision of property has taken place, the situation of the greater part of these little proprietors is indigent in the extreme. It appears from the authority of the same author, that there were in 1815 no less than 10,400,000 of persons taxed in France; and that of this immense number only 17,000 paid direct taxes to the amount of 1000 francs, or L.40 a-year each (2); while no less than 8,000,000 were taxed at a sum below twenty-one francs, or sixteen shillings. Direct taxes to the amount of sixteen shillings correspond to an income of five times the amount, or L.4 a-year; to the amount of L.40 a-year, to one at the same rate of L.200. Thus the incomes of only 17,000 proprietors in France exceeded L.200 a-year, while there were nearly 8,000,000 who were worth in property only L.4 per annum (3).

It is a singular fact, pointing apparently to an important law in the moral world, that when men yield to the seductions of passion, and engage in the career of iniquity, they are led by an almost irresistible impulse to covet the very changes which are to lead to their own destruction, and cling with invincible tenacity to the institutions which are calculated to defeat the very objects on account of which all these crimes have been committed. The confiscation of property in France was the great and crying sin of the Revolution, because it extended the consequences of present violence to future ages, and injured the latest generations on account of the political differences of the present

(1) Gaeta, ii. 335.

(a) Taxed at	Number of Persons taxed.	Produce of Tax. France.
1000 francs, or L.40	17,745	31,649,468 or L. 1,300,000
500 to 1000, or from 20 to L. 40,	40,773	27,653,016 or 1,140,000
101 to 500, or from 4 to 20,	459,937	90,411,706 or 3,500,000
51 to 100, or from 2 to 4,	594,648	41,181,488 or 1,650,000
31 to 50, or from 25s. to 2,	699,637	27,229,518 or 1,200,000
21 to 30, or from 16s. to 25s.	704,871	17,632,083 or 750,000
Below 21 frs. or below 16s. 10d.	7,897,110	47,178,649 or 1,900,000
	10,414,721	282,935,928 or L.11,440,000

[Gaeta, ii. 327.]

When it is recollected that the contribution *foncière* in France is fully 20 per cent, [Peuchet, 287, *Ante*, iv.] upon all estates without exception, this table gives the clearest proof of the changes in property brought about by the Revolution. It results from it, that in 1815 there were only 17,000 proprietors in the whole country who were worth L.200 a-year and upwards; a fact incredible, if not stated on such indisputable authority, and speaking volumes on the disastrous effects of that convulsion.

(3) Duc de Gaeta, ii. 327. Peuchet, 246, 247.

From the report to the minister of the finances, published in 1817, by the commissioners on the cadastre, it appears that at that period there were 10,083,000 separate properties assessed to the land-tax in France. This number has since that time been constantly increasing, as might be expected under the revolutionary order of succession. The numbers were,—

1816, . . . . .	10,083,751
1826, . . . . .	10,296,693
1835, . . . . .	10,814,799

Allowing that there are several separate properties often accumulated in the same individuals, this implies in the estimation of the French writers at least 8,000,000 separate proprietors. The total clear produce of the agriculture of France is estimated by Dupin at 4,500,000,000 francs, or L.180,000,000 sterling. Supposing that the half of that sum, or L.90,000,000 sterling, is the annual clear profit of cultivation, after defraying its charges, it follows that the average income of the eight millions of French proprietors, including all the great estates, is about £.11 a-year! Nothing more is requisite to explain the experienced impossibility of constructing a durable free government in that country. It exhibits Asiatic, not European civilisation. —See SARRANS'S *Contre-Révolution de 1830*, ii. 273, 274.—*Deux Ans de Règne de Louis-Philippe*, 271.—And DUPIN, *Force Commerciale de France*, i. 7.

time; and it is precisely that circumstance which has rendered hopeless all the efforts for freedom made by the French people. By interesting so great a number of persons in the work of spoliation, and extending so far the jealousy at the nobles, by whom the confiscated properties might be resumed, it has led to the permanent settlement of the law of succession, on the footing of equal division and perfect equality. Opinion there as elsewhere, founded on interest, has followed in the same direction. No doctrine is so generally prevalent in France as that this vast change is the leading benefit conferred upon the country by the Revolution; and yet nothing can be so evident to an impartial spectator, as that it is precisely the circumstance which has ever since rendered nugatory all attempts to establish public freedom there, because it has totally destroyed the features and the elements of European civilisation, and left only Indian ryots engaged in a hopeless contest with a metropolis wielding the influence of a central government, and the terrors of military power. The universality of the illusion under which the French labour on this subject is owing to the wide extent of the instinct which leads the Revolutionary party to shun every thing that seems to favour an approach even to the restoration of the dispossessed proprietors; and in their terror of this remote and chimerical evil they have adopted measures which, by preventing the growth of any hereditary class between the throne and the peasant, have rendered the establishment of constitutional freedom utterly impracticable, and doomed the first of European monarchies to the slavery and decrepitude of Oriental despotism. By such mysterious means does human iniquity, even in this world, work out its merited punishment; and so indissoluble is the chain which unites guilty excess with ultimate retribution.

Law re-  
garding di-  
vorce.

The principle of admitting divorce in many cases was too firmly established in the customs and habits of France to admit of its being shaken. Important deliberations, however, took place on the subject of the causes which should permit it. The first consul, who entertained very singular ideas on the subject of marriage and the proper destiny of women (1), warmly supported the looser side; and it was at length agreed,

March 21,  
1803. 1. That the husband might in every case sue out a divorce on the account of the adultery of his wife. 2. That she might divorce her husband for adultery in those cases only where he brought his concubine into their common habitation. 3. Divorce was permitted for severe and grave injuries inflicted by the one spouse on the other; for the condemnation of either to an infamous punishment. 4. The mutual consent of the spouses steadily adhered to, and expressed in a way prescribed by law, is also a sufficient cause of divorce (2). The only limitations in the last case were, that it could not take place until two, nor after twenty years of married life had elapsed, or after the wife had attained the age of forty-five; that the parents or other ascendants of the spouses should concur, and that the

(1) When the article in the code, "The husband owes protection to his wife, she obedience to him," was read out, Napoléon observed, "The angel said so to Adam and Eve,—the word *obedience* is in an especial manner of value in Paris, where women consider themselves at liberty to do whatever they please; I do not say it will produce a beneficial effect on all, but on some it may. Women in general are occupied only with amusement and the toilet. If I could be secure of never growing old, I would never wish a wife. Should we not add, that a woman should not be permitted to see any one who is displeasing to her husband? Women have constantly

the words in their mouths—'What, would you pretend to hinder me from seeing any one whom I choose?'—THIBAudeau, 436.

In these expressions it is easy to discern that Napoléon's thoughts were running on Josephine, whose extravagance in dress and passion for amusement knew no bounds. But independent of this, he had little romance or gallantry in his disposition, and repeatedly expressed his opinion, that the Oriental system of shutting up women was preferable to the European, which permitted them to mingle in society.

(2) Code civil, 229, 233.

husband should be above twenty-five, and the wife above twenty-one years of age (1). It may easily be conceived what a wide door such a facility in dissolving marriage opened for the introduction of dissolute manners and irregular connexions; and in its ultimate effects upon society this change is destined to be not less important, or subversive of public freedom, than the destruction of the landed aristocracy by the revolutionary law of succession (2). In such a state of society, the facility of divorce and dissolution of manners act and react upon each other. Napoléon admitted this himself.—"The foundlings," says he, "have multiplied tenfold since the Revolution (3)." But it is not in so corrupted a source that we are to look for the fountains either of public freedom or durable prosperity.

Great effects of these salutary changes of Napoléon. The effects of these great measures carried into execution by Napoléon are thus justly and emphatically summed up in his own words:—"In the course of the four years of the consulship, the first consul had succeeded in uniting all the parties who divided France; the list of emigrants was infinitely reduced; all who chose to return had received their pardon; all their unalienated property had been restored, excepting the woods, of which, nevertheless, they were permitted to enjoy the life-rent; none remained exiled but a few persons attached to the Bourbon princes, or such as were so deeply implicated in resistance to the Revolution as to be unwilling to avail themselves of the amnesty. Thousands of emigrants had returned under no other condition but that of taking the oath of fidelity to the constitution. The first consul had thus the most delightful consolation which a man can have, that of having reorganized above thirty thousand families, and restored to their country the descendants of the men who had illustrated France during so many ages. The altars were raised from the dust; the exiled or transported priests were restored to their dioceses and parishes, and paid by the Republic. The concordat had rallied the clergy round the consular throne; the spirit of the western provinces was essentially changed; immense public works gave bread to all the persons thrown out of employment during the preceding convulsions; canals every where were formed to improve the internal navigation; a new city had arisen in the centre of la Vendée; eight great roads traversed that secluded province, and large sums had been distributed to the Vendéens, to restore their houses and churches, destroyed by orders of the Committee of Public Safety (4)."

The difficulty with which the restoration of order in a country recently emerging from the fury of a revolution was attended, cannot be better stated than by the same masterly hand. "We are told, that all the first consul had to look to was to do justice: but to whom? to the proprietors whom the Revolution had violently despoiled of their properties, for this only, that they had been faithful to their legitimate sovereign and the principle of honour which they had inherited from their ancestors? Or to the new proprietors, who had adventured their money on the faith of laws flowing from an illegitimate authority? Justice; but to whom? To the soldiers mutilated in the fields of Germany, la Vendée, and Quiberon, who were arrayed under the white standard or the English leopards, in the firm belief that they were serving the cause of their king against an usurping tyranny; or to the

(1) Ibid. 275, 278.

(2) From the returns lately made, it appears that, in the year 1824, out of 28,812 births, only 18,591 were legitimate; 2378 being of children born in concubinage, and 7843 children brought to the

foundling hospitals.—DUPIN, *Force Com. de France*, 99, 100.

(3) *Las Cas.* v. 41.

(4) *Nap. in Mouth.* ii. 225.

million of citizens, who, forming round the frontiers a wall of brass, had so often saved their country from the inveterate hostility of its enemies, and bore to so transcendent a height the glory of the French eagle? Justice! but for whom? For that clergy, the model and the example of every Christian virtue, stript of its birthright, the reward of fifteen hundred years of beneficence; or the recent acquirers, who had converted the convents into workshops, the churches into warehouses, and turned to profane uses all that had been deemed most holy for ages (1)?”

Great public works set on foot in France.

Amidst these great undertakings, the internal prosperity of France was daily increasing. The budget for the year 1803 presented a considerable increase over that of 1802 (2). Various public works calculated to encourage industry were every where set on foot during that year; chambers of commerce established in all the principal cities of the Republic; a grand exhibition of all the different branches of industry formed at the Louvre, which has ever since continued with signal success; the Hôtel des Invalides received a new and more extended organization, adapted to the immense demands upon its beneficence, which the wounds and casualties of the war had occasioned (3); a portion of the veterans settled in national domains as a reward for their services during the war (4); a new establishment was formed at Fontainebleau for the education of youths of the higher class for the military profession (5); and the great school of St.-Cyr, near Paris, opened gratuitously to the children of those who had died in the service of their country (6); an academy was set on foot at Compiègne for five hundred youths, where they were instructed in all the branches of manufactures and the mechanical arts (7); the Institute received a new organization, in which the class of moral and political science was totally suppressed; a change highly symptomatic of the resolution of the first consul to put an end to those visionary speculations from which so many calamities had ensued to France (8); while the General Councils of the departments were authorized, in cases where it seemed expedient, to increase the slender incomes of the bishops and archbishops, a power which received a liberal interpretation, under the empire, and rapidly led to the cordial support of the clergy throughout all France to the consular government (9).

April 8, 1803.

Vast improvements of Paris.

Nor was it only in measures of legislation that the indefatigable activity and beneficent intentions of the first consul were manifested. Then were projected or commenced those great public improvements which deservedly rendered the name of Napoléon so dear to the French, and still excite the admiration even of the passing traveller in every part of the kingdom. That extensive inland navigation was set on foot, which, under the name of the canal at St.-Quentin, was destined to unite the Scheldt and the Oise; other canals were begun, intended to unite the waters of the Saône to the Yonne, the Saône to the Rhine, the Meuse to the Rhine and the Scheldt, the Rance to the Villaine, and thereby open an internal communi-

(1) Nap. in Month. ii. 225.

(2) The budget for that year stood thus, being an increase of 17,000,000 francs, or L.700,000 over the preceding year:—

Direct taxes, . .	305,105,000 francs,	or	L.12,300,000
Registers, . . .	200,106,000	— or	8,100,000
Customs, . . .	36,924,000	— or	1,400,000
Post-office, . .	11,205,000	— or	450,000
Lottery, . . .	15,328,000	— or	620,000
Salt tax, . . .	2,300,000	— or	92,000
	<hr/> 570,968,000		<hr/> or L.22,942,000

—See BICRON, iii. 246; and GAYRA, i. 303.

(3) July 8, 1803.

(4) June 15, 1803.

(5) Jan. 28, 1803.

(6) Oct. 8, 1803.

(7) April 1803.

(8) Jan. 1803.

(9) Big. ii. 252, 268.

cation between the channel and the ocean; the canals of Arles and Aigues-Mortes were opened, and an inexhaustible supply of fresh water was procured for the capital by the canal of Ourcq. This great step led to farther improvements. Paris had long suffered under the want of that necessary element, and the means of cleaning or irrigating the streets were miserably deficient; but, under the auspices of Napoléon, this great want was soon supplied. Numerous fountains arose in every part of the city, alike refreshing to the eye, and salutary to the health of the inhabitants; the beautiful cascade of the Château-d'Eau cooled the atmosphere on the Boulevard du Temple, while the water-works and lofty *jets d'eau* in the gardens of the Tuileries, attracted additional crowds to the shady alleys and marbled parterres of that splendid spot. Immense works, undertaken to improve and enlarge the harbours of Boulogne, Havre, Cherbourg, Rochelle, Marseille, Antwerp, and Ostend, sufficiently demonstrated that Napoléon had not abandoned the hope of wresting the sceptre of the seas from Great Britain; while the order to erect in the centre of the place Vendôme, a pillar, in imitation of the column of Trajan, to be surmounted by the statue of Charlemagne, already revealed the secret design of his Imperial successor to reconstruct the Empire of the West (1).

(1) Dig. ii. 252, 264.

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## CHAPTER XXXVI.

## NAPOLEON'S ASSUMPTION OF THE IMPERIAL THRONE.

JAN.—MAY.—1804.

## ARGUMENT.

Favourable prospects of Napoleon's Government in the beginning of 1804—Discontent, however, of the Republican part of the army—Pichegru in London—Royalist movements in France—Project of Fouché for getting up a conspiracy composed of Royalists and Republicans—The Royalist leaders are landed on the French coast—Artful measures of Fouché to draw them on—He reveals the plot to Napoleon and is in consequence restored to power—Arrest of Moreau—Consternation which it excites in Paris—Seizure of Pichegru—and of Georges Cadoudal—History and character of the Duke d'Enghien—Generous conduct of his father on receiving a proposal to assassinate Napoleon—His arrest is unjustly resolved on by Napoleon and the Council of State—Occupations of the Prince at that time—He is seized and conducted to Strasbourg—Fruitless intercession of Joséphine—He had been vainly warned of his danger—Is removed to Paris and sent to Vincennes—Where he is delivered over to a military commission by Napoleon's orders—Gross iniquity committed towards him—He is convicted upon his declaration only, without any evidence—His noble demeanour before the judges—Sentence and execution—His innocence is completely established after his death—Napoleon's vindication of himself on this subject at St.-Helena—Remarkable retribution which reached all the actors in this murder—Consternation which it excited in Paris—and in the foreign ambassadors there—Courageous conduct of M. Chateaubriand—Opinion which Napoleon entertained of him—Death of Pichegru—Sergeon's report on his body—Reflections on the probable privy of the First Consul to his death—Napoleon's defence of himself on this subject at St.-Helena—Intense interest excited at Paris—Letter of Moreau to Napoleon—Stoical indifference of Georges—Condemnation of the prisoners—Public feeling on the subject—Clemency of the First Consul after the convictions were obtained—His lenity to Moreau—Death of Captain Wright in prison at Paris—Napoleon resolves to assume the Imperial Crown—This explains his murdering the Duke d'Enghien—First broaching of the project to the Senate—The Tribunate is put forward to make the proposal in public—Speech of the mover on the occasion—Honourable resistance of Carnot—Universal adulation with which Napoleon was surrounded—His answer to the address of the Senate—Key which it affords to his whole conduct on the throne—He is declared Emperor of the French—General concurrence of the nation—Rank conferred on his family—Absolute power vested in the Emperor—Creation of the Marshals of the empire—Rapid progress of court etiquette—Dignified protest of Louis XVIII—Reflections on these events—Difference between the English and French Revolutions—Which was all owing to the violence and injustice of the French convulsion—Vast concentration of influence at this period in the hands of Government—Total destruction of the liberty of the Press—Inference in political science to which this leads.

It were well for the memory of Napoleon if the historian could stop here; and after having recounted the matchless glories of his military exploits, conclude with the admirable wisdom of his civil administration, and the felicity with which, amidst so many difficulties, he reconstructed the disjointed members of society after the Revolution. But history is not formed of panegyric; and after discharging the pleasing duty of recording the great and blameless achievements which signalized that consulate, there remains the painful task of narrating the foul transactions, the dark and bloody deeds which ushered in the empire.

Favourable prospects of Napoleon's government in the beginning of 1804.

Every thing seemed to smile upon Napoleon. In the civil administration all were reconciled to the consulate for life, or submitted in silence to an authority which they could not resist. The army, dazzled by his brilliant exploits, rallied round his standard, and sought only to give expression to its admiration for the illustrious

chief who had raised to such an unprecedented height the glory the republican eagles. The people, worn out with the sufferings and anxieties of the Revolution, joyfully submitted to a government which had given them that first of blessings, security and protection, and forgetting the dreams of enthusiasm and the fumes of democracy, returned to their separate pursuits, and sought in the enjoyments of private life a compensation for the experienced vanity of their political anticipations (1).

Discontent  
of the Re-  
publicans of  
the army.

But among the generals and higher officers of the army the same unanimity by no means prevailed. Bernadotte, though brother-in-

law to Joseph Bonaparte, was constantly in opposition to the first

consul. Early attached to republican principles, he viewed with undisguised jealousy the evident approaches which the chief magistrate was making to arbitrary power; and in consequence of his influence, a number of officers in his staff and in the garrison of Rennes voted against the consulate for life. Moreau, however, was the head of the malecontent party. On every occasion he made it a point to oppose, to the increasing splendour of military dress and uniformity of court etiquette, the simplicity and uniformity of republican costume. The conqueror of Austria traversed, amidst crowds of brilliant uniforms, the place Carousel or the saloons of the Tuileries, in the plain dress of a citizen, without any sort of decoration. He declined on various pretences repeated invitations to the Tuileries, and at length was no longer asked to appear. He often manifested to the first consul, when they met in public, a degree of coldness, which must have estranged persons even less jealous of each other's reputation than the heroes of Marengo and Hohenlinden. Nothing could induce him to attend the ceremony performed in Notre-Dame on occasion of the concordat; and at a dinner of military men at his house on the same day, he openly expressed the greatest contempt for the whole proceeding. Female jealousy added to the many causes of discord which already existed between these rival chiefs; Madame Hulot, his mother-in-law, and Madame Moreau, his wife, were influenced with the most violent jealousy at the elevation of Joséphine, and unceasingly urged Moreau to step forward, and openly claim that place in society and the state to which his dignity and services so well entitled him. So far did this spirit of rivalry proceed, that Madame Moreau could not be prevented from breaking out into unseemly expressions, when, on one occasion of a visit, she was detained a few minutes waiting in the antechambers of Joséphine; and on one occasion she was only prevented by force from taking the precedence, at a public assembly, of the wife of the first consul (2).

Pichegru in  
London.

While Moreau was thus insensibly and unavoidably becoming the leader of the discontented Republicans in Paris, circumstances were preparing for another distinguished general of the Revolution the chief direction of the royalist party. Escaped from the deserts of Sinnamari, Pichegru had found an asylum in London, where he entered into close correspondence with the French emigrants who endeavoured in that capital to uphold the sinking cause of the monarchy. His great abilities and acknowledged reputation procured for him the confidence of the British Government, and he was occasionally consulted by them, especially in 1799, as to the probability of a Royalist movement declaring itself in the south of France (3).

Royalist  
movements  
in France.

On the renewal of the war, various attempts were made by the Royalist emigrants in London to effect an insurrection in favour of

(1) Thib. 321.

(3) Big. iii. 318. Norv. ii. 272.

(2) Thib. 321, 323. Bour. v. 232. Las Cas. vii.

the exiled family in different parts of France (1). The object of these attempts was the restoration of the Bourbons, and to effect the expulsion of the first consul from the throne; but it formed no part of the plan of any design, at least in which Louis XVIII, or any of the royal family were participants, to embroil their hands in his blood, or do aught to him that he had not repeatedly done to every state with which he was in hostility. The celebrated Chouan chief, Georges, was the soul of the conspiracy. He had resisted all the offers of the first consul, who was anxious to engage him in his service; and in a secret interview the elevation and disinterestedness of his character excited the admiration of that keen observer of human character (2). Since that time he had resided chiefly in London, and was deeply implicated, along with Pichegru, in a conspiracy, which had for its object to rouse the Royalist party in France, and overturn the government of the first consul (3).

On the existence of these opposite elements of conspiracy, emanating from the extremes of the Republican and Royalist parties, Fouché founded the project of uniting them in a conspiracy which might at once prove ruinous to both, and restore him to that consideration in the eyes of the first consul, which it had been his unceasing object to regain since his dismissal from office. The words of the *Senatus Consultum* were constantly present to his mind, that "if difficult circumstances should again arise, there was no one to whom the ministry of police might so fitly be entrusted;" and if he could only engage the two greatest generals in the Republic, next to the first consul, in a conspiracy against his government, there seemed to be no doubt that he would attain the object of his ambition. With this view, in the end of 1803, he began to instigate some of their mutual friends to effect a reconciliation between these illustrious characters. The Abbé David was the first person employed in this service; but having been arrested and sent to the Temple, his place was supplied by General Lajolais, a relation of Generals Klingin and Wurmser, who came to London, arranged with Pichegru the period of his departure for Paris, and returned soon after to the French capital to prepare matters for his reception there (4).

Project of Fouché for getting up a conspiracy of Republicans and Royalists.

The Royalist leaders are landed on the French coast, Jan. 16, 1804.

Meanwhile Georges, Polignac, Lajolais, and the other conspirators, had been landed on the coast of Normandy, and had cautiously and secretly advanced to Paris, not with the view of engaging in any plot at that time, but to obtain accurate information as to the real state of the Royalist party in the capital. All their measures were known to the police by means of secret information communicated by Lajolais and other traitors in the party; the points of their descent, the places where they were to sleep every night, were regularly detailed to Fouché. Every thing was made easy by the agents of the police. They were allowed to come to the capital, and remain there for a considerable time unmolested.

(1) "I must do Louis XVIII" said Napoléon, "the justice to say, that I never discovered his participation in any plot against my life, although it was permanent elsewhere; his operations were confined to systematic plans and ideal changes."—LAS CASES, ii. 368.

(2) "You cannot be permitted," said Napoléon in 1800, "to remain in the North; but I offer you the rank of lieutenant-general in my armies."—"You do me injustice," replied Georges; "I have taken an oath of fidelity to the house of Bourbon, which I will never violate." The first consul then offered him a pension of 100,000 francs if he would abandon the cause of the King and remain quiet; but he was proof also against this temptation. He

learned soon after that an order for his arrest had been given, and set off the same day for Boulogne, from whence, with M. Hyde Neuville, he reached England in safety. [Beauch iv. 512.] Napoléon, alluding to this interview, observed,—"Georges evinced that elevation of character which belongs to a great mind; but he was so enthusiastic in favour of his own party, that we could come to no understanding. His mind was cast in the true mould; in my hands he would have done great things. I know how to appreciate his firmness of character; I would have given it a good direction." [Bour. vi. 158, 159.]

(3) Bour. v. 274.

(4) Bour. v. 272, 273. Nerv. ii. 278.

Several meetings took place between Georges, Pichegru, Lajolais, and the other leaders of the party, and Moreau had a conference with Pichegru on the Boulevard of Madeleine, and another in his own house (1). The principles of Moreau, however, were those of the Revolution, and therefore it was impossible that he could agree with the Royalists upon ulterior measures, and the only purpose of the conferences was to put the Chouan chiefs in possession of the views of this illustrious leader of the Republican party. The agents of Fouché had given the Royalists to understand that Moreau would readily enter into their views; but in this they soon found that they had been completely deceived; and, accordingly, it was proved at the trial that Moreau declared to Pichegru that he knew of no conspiracy whatever; and that Polignac was heard to say to one of the party, "All is going wrong; we do not understand each other; Moreau does not keep his word; we have been deceived." Discouraged by these appearances, the conspirators were about to leave Paris, and Georges was on the point of setting out for la Vendée (2).

Fouché reveals the plot to Napoleon, and is restored to power.

But matters had now arrived at that point when Fouché deemed it expedient to divulge the information he had acquired, and reap the fruit of his intrigues. He had previously written to Napoléon that "the air was full of poniards," and prepared him, by various mysterious communications, to expect some important intelligence. Regnier, who was intrusted with the duties though not the situation of minister of police, was totally ignorant of what was going forward, and confidently maintained that Pichegru had dined a few days before in the neighbourhood of London, when Fouché arrived with evidence that he had been for some time in Paris. Napoléon upon this devolved the farther conduct of the affair upon the ex-minister, whose superior information was now clearly manifested, and the immediate charge of the matter was entrusted to Real, one of his creatures, with orders to take his instructions from Fouché alone. At length, matters being ripe for the *dénouement*, the whole suspected persons, to the number of forty-five, with the exception of Moreau, Georges, and Pichegru,

Feb. 17, 1804. (1) The accurate intelligence which the secret police of Fouché had of all the proceedings of the Royalist leaders, and the art with which they led them into the snare prepared for them, is completely proved by the proclamation published by the Government on the day of their arrest. "In the year 1803," said Regnier, the head of the police,

"a criminal reconciliation took place between Pichegru and Moreau, two men between whom honour should have placed an eternal barrier. The police seized at Calais one of their agents at the moment when he was preparing to return for the second time to England. In his possession were found all the documents which proved the reality of an accommodation inexplicable on any other principle but the connexions which crime occasions. Meanwhile the plot advanced. Lajolais, the friend and confident of Pichegru, passed over secretly from Paris to London, and from London to Paris, communicating to Moreau the sentiments of Pichegru, and to Pichegru those of Moreau. The brigands of Georges were all this time preparing, underhand at Paris, the execution of their joint projects. A place was fixed on between Dieppe and Treport, at a distance from observation, where the brigands of England, brought thither in English ships of war, disembarked without being perceived, and there they met with persons corrupted to receive them; men paid to guide them during the night, from one station to another, as far as Paris. There they found rooms ready hired for them by trusty guardians;

they lodged in different quarters at Chaillot, in the Rue du Bac, in the faubourg St.-Marceau, in the Marais. Georges and eight brigands first disembarked; then Coster St.-Victor and ten others; and in the first days of this month a third party arrived, consisting of Pichegru, Lajolais, and others; the conspirators met at the farm of La Potterie; Georges and Pichegru arrived at Paris. They lodged in the same house, surrounded by thirty brigands, whom Georges commanded. They met with General Moreau; the day, the hour, the place, where the first conference was held, were known: a second was fixed on, but not realized: a third and a fourth took place in the house of Moreau himself. The traces of Georges and Moreau have been followed from house to house; those who aided in their debarkation, those who, under cloud of night, conducted them from post to post; those who gave them an asylum at Paris, their confidants, their accomplices, Lajolais, the chief go-between, and General Moreau, have been arrested."—Bour. v. 293—295.

(2) Bour. v. 283, 287. Norv. ii. 274, 275.

This is established by the testimony of Napoléon himself:—"Real (the head of the police) told me," said Napoléon, "that when Moreau and Pichegru were together, they could not come to an understanding, as Georges would undertake nothing but for the interest of the Bourbons. He had therefore a plan, but Moreau had none; he wished to overturn my power, but had no person in view to put in my place. It was no wonder, therefore, they could not come to terms of agreement."—Bour. vi. 100.

who had not yet been discovered, were arrested at once in Paris, and thrown into prison. Among them were two young men of noble family and generous dispositions, destined to a melancholy celebrity in future times,—Counts Armand and Jules Polignac (1).

Feb. 15, 1804. **Arrest of Moreau.** Moreau was the first of the three who was seized. Charles d'Hotzter, one of the prisoners, had attempted to commit suicide in prison, and his dying declarations, wherein he had implicated that general, were made use of as a ground to order his arrest, although the subsequent report by Regnier admitted that the police had been throughout privy to all his meetings with the conspirators. Returning from his country estate to Paris, he was arrested and conveyed to the Temple; and on the morning of the 17th, all Paris was astonished by the following order of the day, addressed to the garrison of the capital. "Fifty brigands have penetrated into the capital; Georges and General Pichegru were at their head. Their coming was occasioned by a man who is yet numbered among our defenders, by General Moreau, who was yesterday consigned to the hands of the national justice. Their design was, after having assassinated the first consul, to have delivered over France to the horrors of a civil war, and all the terrible convulsions of a counter-revolution (2).

**Consternation which it excites in Paris.** No words can convey an adequate idea of the consternation which prevailed in Paris on this intelligence being promulgated. Moreau was looked up to by a numerous and powerful party, especially in the army, as one of the greatest men of the Revolution; his name was illustrated by the most glorious exploits; the simplicity and modesty of his private life had long endeared him to all classes, and especially the numerous body who were enamoured of Republican manners. To find so illustrious a name coupled with brigands, to hear the known supporter of Republican principles accused of a design to bring about a counter-revolution, was so violent a revulsion, so inconceivable a change, as to excite in the highest degree the suspicions and passions of the people. The Revolutionists regarded Moreau as the leader of their party, and the only consistent supporter of their principles; the soldiers looked back with pride to his military achievements, and burned with indignation at the incredible imputations cast upon his honour; the ancient and ill extinguished jealousy of the armies of Italy and the Rhine, broke forth again with redoubled fury; the latter openly murmured at his arrest, and declared that the first consul was about to sacrifice the greatest general of the Republic to his ambitious designs; he had then good cause to congratulate himself that Richepanse and twenty-five thousand of the conquerors of Hohenlinden had met with an untimely end on the shores of S.-Domingo (3).

Feb. 28, 1804. **And of Pichegru.** Napoléon, however, was not intimidated. The arrest of Moreau was soon followed up by that of Pichegru, who was seized in his bed a fortnight after. It was not without difficulty that this renowned leader was made prisoner; his ready presence of mind, undaunted spirit, and prodigious personal strength, made it no easy matter to secure him even under circumstances the most favourable to the assailants. He was at length betrayed by an old friend, in whose house he had sought refuge. This infamous wretch, who was named Leblanc, had the baseness to reveal his place

(1) Norv. ii. 276. Bour. v. 274, 275, 287.

(2) Norv. ii. 276.

(3) Norv. ii. 277. Nap. vii. 243.

"The crisis," says Napoléon, "was of the most violent kind; public opinion was in a state of fer-

mentation; the sincerity of Government, the reality of the conspiracy, was incessantly called in question. All the violent passions were awakened; the rumours of change were incessant; the storm was tremendous."—LAS CASES, vii. 243. and iii. 361.



of retreat for 100,000 crowns. "His treachery," says Napoléon, "was literally a disgrace to humanity (1)." Guided by this traitor, and fully informed as to the means of resistance which he always had at his command, a party of police, strongly armed, entered his bedroom at night, by means of false keys, furnished by their perfidious assistant. They found the general asleep, with a lamp burning on a table near the bed, and loaded pistols by his side. Advancing on tiptoe, they overturned the table so as to extinguish the light, and sprung upon their victim before he was aware of their approach. Suddenly awaking, he exerted his strength with undaunted resolution, and struggled long and violently with the assailants. He was at length, however, overpowered by numbers, bound hand and foot, and conducted, naked as he was, to the Temple (2).

Feb. 26, 1804. The arrest of Pichegru was immediately followed by a decree of the Senate, which suspended for two years trial by jury in all the departments of the Republic, "for the crimes of treason, attempts on the person of the first consul or the exterior or interior security of the Republic." For this purpose the tribunals were organized in a different manner, agreeably to the direction of the law of 23 Florial, 1802. All the persons accused in Paris were sent for trial to the tribunal of the department of the Seine (3).

March 9, 1804. And of Georges Cadoudal. Georges, however, was still at liberty, although a rigid blockade prevented his leaving Paris; but he did not long escape the vigilance of the police. On the 9th March, he was arrested as he was crossing the place of the Odéon, at seven in the evening, in a cabriolet. He never went abroad without being armed, and his arrest in that public manner cost the life of one man, whom he shot dead as he stopped his horse, and he desperately wounded another who advanced to seize him in the carriage. He was instantly conducted to the Temple, and treated with such rigour, that when Louis Bonaparte went to see him the next day in prison, he found him lying on his mattress, with his hands strongly manacled, and bound across his breast; a spectacle which excited the indignation of that humane prince as well as that of General Lauriston, who was present on the occasion (4). Moreau, however, was treated in a very different manner; he met with the most respectful attention, and was surrounded by military men who would not have permitted any insult to be offered to so illustrious a character.

History and character of the Duke d'Enghien. On the day after the arrest of Georges, a meeting of the Council of State was held, in which Napoléon took a step from which his memory will never recover. He decided the fate of the DUKE D'ENGHIEN. This young prince, son to the Duke de Bourbon, and a lineal descendant of the great Condé, was born, apparently to the highest destinies, at Chantilly, on August 2, 1772. He accompanied his father, while yet a boy, in his flight from Paris on July 16, 1789, and had ever since remained in

(1) Las Cas. iii. 362.

(2) Las Cas. iii. 363. Bour. vi. 10, 11.

"Pichegru's seizure was owing to his generosity in declining to receive another asylum, where he would have been perfectly safe. An old aide-de-camp of his, M. Lagrenie, who had retired from the service some years before, and a man of undoubted honour, besought him to accept an asylum in his house; but he positively refused to endanger, by accepting the offer, a man who had given so striking a proof of attachment to his person."—Bour. vi. 11, 12.

(3) Big. iii. 327, 328.

(4) Bour. vi. 27, 45.

When examined before the judge of police, Georges openly avowed his intention to overturn

the first consul. "What was your motive for coming to Paris? To attack the first consul. What were your means of attack? By force. Where did you expect to find the means of applying force? In all France. There is, then, a conspiracy extending over all France, under the direction of you and your accomplices? No, but there was a reunion of force at Paris. What were the projects of yourself and your associates? To place a Bourbon in the room of the first consul. What Bourbon did you mean to place on the throne? Louis Xavier Stanislas formerly, whom we now designate Louis XVIII. What weapons were you to use? Weapons similar to those of his escort and guard."—See *CARRIQUET—Hist. de la Restauration*, ii. 159, and *NOYAN*, ii. 279.

exile, attached to the noble but unfortunate corps which, under the Prince of Condé, continued, through adverse equally as prosperous fortune, faithful to the cause of the monarchy. A noble countenance, a commanding air, and dignified expression bespoke, even to a passing observer, his illustrious descent, while the affability of his manners and generosity of his character justly endeared him to his numerous companions in adversity. On all occasions in which they were called into action, these shining qualities displayed themselves. Ever the foremost in advance, he was the last to retreat, and by his skill and bravery eminently contributed to the brilliant success gained by the emigrant corps at Bertshiem in an early period of the war. On that occasion a number of Republican prisoners fell into the hands of the Royalists; the soldiers loudly demanded that some reprisals should be made for the sanguinary laws of the Convention, which had doomed so many of their comrades to the scaffold; but the young prince replied, "the blood of our companions, shed in the most just of causes, demands a nobler vengeance (1). Let them live; they are Frenchmen, they are unfortunate; I put them under the safeguard of your honour and humanity (2)."

His arrest is unjustly resolved on by Napoléon and the Council of State.

It was on the fate of a prince, thus richly endowed with every noble virtue, that the Council of State, under the presidency of Napoléon, sat at Paris on the 10th March, 1804. It appeared from the depositions of two of the prisoners who had been apprehended, that a mysterious person was present at some of the meetings of the Royalist chiefs, who was treated by Georges with the utmost respect, and in whose presence none of the persons assembled sat down (3). Suspicion turned on some prince of the blood as the only person to whom these marks of respect were likely to be shown; and no one was thought to answer the description so completely as the Duke d'Enghien, who at that period was at Ettenheim, a chateau situated on the right bank of the Rhine, in the territories of the Duke of Baden, and four leagues from Strasbourg. A confidential officer was despatched to Strasbourg to make enquiry; he ascertained that the duke was frequently at the theatre of Strasbourg, lived a very retired life, was sometimes absent for ten or twelve days together, and appeared passionately fond of hunting, in which the greater part of his time was employed (4). On this slender basis did this iniquitous Council of State, under the immediate directions of Napoléon, hold it established that the Duke d'Enghien was the mysterious stranger alluded to in the depositions of Georges' associates, upon

(1) *Réfutat. de M. le Duc de Rovigo*, 134.

Jan. 24, 1802. (2) The Prince of Condé, (after to the Duke d'Enghien, had acted in an equally generous manner, when a proposal was made to him by a person who offered to assassinate the first consul. In a letter to the Count d'Artois, he gives the following account of the transaction:—  
"Yesterday, a man arrived here (in London) on foot, as he said, from Paris to Calais. His manner was gentle, and tone of voice sweet, notwithstanding the errand on which he came. Understanding that you were not here, he came to me at eleven o'clock in the morning, and proposed, with the greatest simplicity, to get quit of the usurper in the most expeditious manner. I did not give him time to conclude the details of his project, but instantly rejected them with the horror they were fitted to inspire, assuring him, at the same time, that if you were here you would do the same; that we should ever be the enemies of the man who had usurped the power and throne of our king, as long as he excluded him from it; that we had com-

bated him with open arms, and would do so again, if an occasion should present itself; but that we would never carry on hostility by such means, which were suited only to the Jacobins; and that if they be-took themselves to crimes, certainly we should not follow their example. I then sent for the Baron de Roll, who confirmed all that I had said of your determination in that respect."—*Réfutation de M. le Duc de Rovigo*, 49.—*Pièces Just. No. 1.*

(3) The description they gave was as follow:—  
"Every ten or twelve days, their master received a visit from a person with whose name they were unacquainted, but who was evidently a man of high importance. He appeared to be about thirty-six years of age, his hair was light, his height and size of ordinary dimensions, his dress elegant; he was always received with great respect, and when he entered the apartment all present rose and remained standing, without the exception even of M. Polignac and Rivière. He was frequently closeted with Georges, and on these occasions they were always alone."—*Rovigo's Memoir*, 11.

(4) *Rovigo, Mem. ii. 34.*

which Napoléon himself dictated and signed an order for his arrest in a neutral territory, with such minute directions for the seizure of the prince and his conveyance to Strasbourg, that it was evident his destruction was already resolved on. Cambacérès, the second consul, who had voted in the convention for the death of Louis, made the strongest remonstrances against this proposed measure, especially its accomplishment by means of a violation of the neutral territory of Baden; but Napoléon cut him short by the observation (1);—"You have become singularly chary of the blood of the Bourbons (2)."

Occupa-  
tion of the  
Prince at  
that time.

The truth was, that the unfortunate prince was at Ettenheim, on account of a passion with which he was inspired for the Princess de Rohan, an emigrant lady of distinction in that neighbourhood, and it was to visit her that he was absent for the periods which in the suspicious mind of the first consul, could have been for no other purpose but to concert measures with Georges in the French metropolis. His mode of life is thus described by Savary, who afterwards was so deeply implicated in his execution. "Several emigrants had arrived in the environs, and were entertained by the prince. He was passionately fond of the chase, had a *liaison de cœur* with a French lady who shared his exile, and was frequently absent for several days together. This may easily be conceived, when it is recollected what a passion for the chase is, and what the attractions of the mountains of the Black Forest (3)." In truth, he had never been at Paris at all, nor engaged in any conspiracy whatever against either the government or life of the first consul; and the mysterious stranger who was supposed to be him in the conferences with Georges afterwards turned out to be Pichegru (4).

He is  
seized and  
conducted  
to Stras-  
bourg.

The designs of the first consul were too faithfully carried into effect. The execution of the order was intrusted to General Ordaner, who following punctually the directions he had received, set out from New Brisach with three hundred gens-d'armes, and arrested the prince in his bed at night on the 13th March. He was immediately conducted to Strasbourg, with all his papers and all the persons in the house, and intelligence despatched to Paris by the telegraph of his arrest. When it was known at the Tuileries that he had been seized, Joéephine, who never failed to exert her influence in behalf of misfortune, implored the first consul to show mercy. She threw herself on her knees, and earnestly begged his life; but he said, with a stern air, "Mind your own matters; these are not the affairs of women; let me alone." His violence on this occasion exceeded any thing that had been witnessed since his return from Egypt. He was so prepossessed with the idea that the Bourbon princes were one and all leagued in a conspiracy against his life, that he was incapable of exercising the natural powers of his mind in considering the evidence on the subject. "I am resolved," said he, "to put an end to these conspiracies; if the emigrants will conspire, I will cause them to be shot. I am told there are some of them concealed in the hôtel of M. de Cobentzell" (the Austrian ambassador), "I do not believe it; if it were so, I would shoot Cobentzell along with them. The Bourbons must be taught that they are not to sport with life with impunity; such matters are not child's play (5)."

M. Talleyrand, aware of the imminent danger which the duke ran if he con-

(1) Bour. v. 305, 306. Rovigo, ii. 37.

(2) Napoléon enjoined the officer intrusted with the mission to take 200 dragoons, and send 300 more, with four pieces of light cannon, to Kehl, and 100 men, with two pieces of cannon, from New

Brisach.—See ROVIGO, ii. 266.—*Pièces Just.* No. 1.

(3) Rov. ii. 35.

(4) Bour. v. 307. Rov. ii. 59.

(5) Bour. v. 316, 341.

He had been vainly warned of his danger. continued in his residence at Ettenheim, had secretly sent him warning to remove, through the lady to whom he was attached at that place, and similar intelligence was at the same time transmitted by the King of Sweden, by means of his minister at Carlsruhe; and it augments our regret at the issue of this melancholy tale, that he was only prevented from availing himself of the intelligence, and escaping the danger, by the tardiness of the Austrian authorities in procuring him passports. Upon receiving the warning he resolved to join his grandfather, but in doing so it was necessary that he should pass through part of the Austrian territories. Sir Charles Stuart, the English ambassador at Vienna, wrote for this purpose to the Austrian Government to demand a passport for the duke, and it was their tardiness in answering, that occasioned the delay, which permitted his arrest by Napoléon, and cost him his life (1).

He is removed to Paris and sent to Vincennes. Orders arrived at Strasbourg from Paris on the 18th March to have the Duke d'Enghien forthwith forwarded to the capital. The carriage which conveyed him arrived at the barriers of Paris on the 20th, at eleven o'clock forenoon. He was there stopped, and detained for above five hours, until orders were received from the first consul. No council was summoned; Napoléon took upon himself alone the disposal of his fate. At four in the evening orders arrived to have him conducted by the exterior barriers to VINCENNES, an ancient castellated fortress of great strength, a mile and a half beyond the faubourg St.-Antoine, which had been long used as a state prison, and it was dark before he arrived there. Every thing was already prepared for his reception; not only his chamber was ready, but his grave was dug (2).

Where he is delivered over to a military commission by Napoléon's orders. No sooner was Napoléon informed of the arrival of the Duke d'Enghien at the barriers, than he wrote out and signed an order for his immediate delivery to a military commission, to be tried for bearing arms against the Republic, for having been in the pay of England, and engaged in the plots set on foot by that power against the external and internal security of the Republic (3). The order was directed to Murat, the governor of Paris, who forthwith sent for General Hullin and six of the senior colonels of regiments in Paris, to form a military commission. They immediately proceeded to Vincennes, where they found Savary, with a strong body of *gendarmérie d'élite*, in possession of the castle and all the avenues leading to its approach. The subsequent proceedings cannot be better given than in the words of M. Harel, the governor of the castle (4).

"In the evening of the 20th March, when the prince was arrived at the barrier, they sent to enquire of me whether I could lodge a prisoner in the

(1) Bour. v. 304. 305. Rev. ii. 300.

(2) Bour. v. 328, 330.

(3) The order was as follows:

"Paris, 29 Ventose, Ann. xii., (20 March, 1804.)

"The Government of the Republic decrees as follows:

"Art. I.—The late Duke d'Enghien, accused of having borne arms against the Republic, of having been and still being in the pay of England: of being engaged in the plots set on foot by that power against the external and internal security of the Republic, shall be delivered over to a military commission, composed of seven members named by the governor of Paris, who shall assemble at Vincennes.

"II.—The grand judge, minister of war, and

general governor of Paris, are charged with the execution of the present decree.

"The First Consul (Signed) BONAPARTE.

"By the First Consul (Signed) HENRI MARIE.

"A true copy.

"The General-in-Chief, Governor of Paris,  
"(Signed) HENRI."

See *Mémoire de M. Dupin sur les actes de la Commission militaire pour juger le duc d'Enghien*, 26.—*Pièces Just.* No. 2.

In Murat's order, following on this decree, the commission was directed to "assembler immédiatement at the chateau of Vincennes to take cognizance, without separating, of the accused, on the charges set forth in the decree of the Government."—*Ibid.* 93.

(4) Bour. v. 328, 329. Rev. ii. 30.

castle. I answered that I could not, as no rooms were in repair but my own chamber and the council hall. They desired me then to prepare a room for a prisoner, who would arrive in the evening, and to *dig a grave in the court*. I said that would not be easy, as the court was paved. They replied, I must then find another place, and we fixed on the ditch, where in effect it was prepared.

“The prince arrived at seven in the evening; he was dying of cold and hunger, but his air was by no means melancholy. As his room was not yet ready, I received him into my own, and sent out to get food in the village. The prince sat down to table, and invited me to partake his refreshments. He put many questions about Vincennes, and told me he had been brought up in the environs of the castle, and conversed with much kindness and affability. He repeatedly asked what do they want with me? what are they going to do with me? but these questions made no alteration upon his tranquillity, and indicated no disquietude. My wife, who was unwell, was in bed in an alcove in the same room, concealed by a tapestry; her emotion was extreme, for she was foster-sister to the prince, had enjoyed a pension from his family before the Revolution, and she at once recognized him by his voice (1).”

Gross in-  
quity com-  
mitted to-  
wards him.

The duke went to bed shortly after; but before he had time to fall asleep, the officers arrived, and conducted him into the council-chamber. General Hullin and six other officers were there assembled; Savary arrived soon after the interrogatories began, and took his station in front of the fire, immediately behind the president's chair. The accused was charged with “having borne arms against the Republic, with having offered his services to the English Government, the enemies of the French people, with having received and accredited the agents of the English Government, and furnished them with the means of obtaining intelligence, and conspired with them against the exterior and interior security of the state; with having put himself at the head of an assemblage of emigrants and others in the pay of England, formed on the frontiers of France in the territory of Baden; carried on communications in Strasbourg calculated to disturb the peace of the adjoining departments, and favour the views of England, and being engaged in the conspiracy set on foot at Paris against the life of the first consul, and about, in case of its success, to enter France (2).” The law in such a case required that a counsel should be allowed to the accused; but none was permitted to the prince, and he was obliged, at midnight, to enter unaided upon his defence (3).

He is con-  
victed upon  
his declara-  
tion only,  
without any  
evidence.

No evidence whatever was brought forward against the accused; no witnesses were examined; the documentary evidence consisted only of one single writing, namely, the act of accusation (4). The whole case against him rested upon the answers he gave to the interrogatories put by the commission, and they were clear, consistent, and unequivocal, openly avowing the truth, but containing not one single admission which could be tortured into evidence of his culpability, (5) “There

(1) Bour. v. 330, 331. Biog. des Contemporains. Art. D'Enghien.

(2) Jugement sur le Duc d'Enghien. Mém. par Dupin, 49.

(3) Dupin, 12, 13.

(4) “On n'avait,” says Savary, “qu'un seul document pour toute pièce à charge et à décharge; c'était l'arrêté des Consuls du 20 mars. La minute du jugement rédigé à Vincennes le porte textuellement. ‘Lecture faite des pièces tant à charge qu'à décharge au nombre d'une.’”—Rovico, ii, 251.

(5) The material parts of the declaration were as follow:—

Being asked if he had taken up arms against France? he answered, “That he had served through the whole war; that he had never been in England, but had received a pension from that power, and had no other means of subsistence; that he had resided for two years and a half at Ettenheim in the Brisgaw, by permission from the sovereigns of that country; that he had applied for permission to reside at Fribourg, also in the Brisgaw, and remained



were," says Savary, the warmest apologist of Napoléon, "neither documents, nor proofs, nor witnesses, against the prince; and in his declaration he emphatically denied the accusation brought against him. His connexions with England, in the rank in which he was born, his correspondence with his grandfather, the Prince of Condé, could not be considered as evidence of any conspiracy. And even if it had been otherwise, what judge is so ignorant as not to know that the admissions of an accused person are never sufficient to condemn him, if unsupported by other testimony (1)?" "I must confess," says General Hullin, "the prince presented himself before us with a noble assurance; he indignantly repelled the aspersion of having been directly or indirectly engaged in any conspiracy against the life of the first consul, but admitted having borne arms against France, saying, with a courage and resolution which forbid us even for his own sake to make him vary on that point, 'that he had maintained the rights of his family, and that a Condé could never re-enter France but with his arms in his hands. My birth, my opinions, render me for ever the enemy of your government' (2)."

His noble  
demeanour  
before the  
judges.

At the conclusion of his declaration, the prince added:—"Before signing the present *proces verbal* I earnestly request to be permitted to have a private audience of the first consul. My name, my rank, my habits of thought, and the horror of my situation, induce me to hope that he will accede to that demand." A member of the commission proposed that this request should be forwarded to Napoléon; but Savary, who was behind the president, represented that such a demand was inopportune (3). The request, however, made such an impression, that when the sentence was about to be made out, the president took up the pen, and was beginning to write a letter, expressing the wish of the prince to have an interview with him, but Savary whispered to him, "What are you about?"—"I am writing," said he, "to the first consul, to express the wish of the council and of the accused."—"Your affair is finished," replied Savary, taking the pen out of his hand, "that is my business (4)."—"In truth," says Savary, "General Hullin had received the most severe instructions. Even the case of the accused demanding an interview with the first consul (5), had

only at Ettenheim for the pleasures of the chase; that he had corresponded with his grandfather in London, and also with his father, whom he had never seen since 1795; that he had been commander of the advance guard since 1796, and acted with the advanced guard before that time; that he had never seen General Pichegru, and had no connexion whatever with him; that he knew he desired to see him, but he congratulated himself upon his not having seen him, if it be true that he had intended to make use of the vile means ascribed to him; that he had no connexion with General Dumouriez, and never saw him; and that since the peace he had occasionally corresponded with some of his comrades in the interior of the Republic on their own affairs and his, but no correspondence had taken place of the kind alluded to in the interrogatory." [See the declarations in Savary, ii. 275. *Pièces Just.* No. iv.]

The iniquities committed on the trial of the Duke d'Enghien were so numerous, as to render it one of the most atrocious proceedings recorded in history. 1. The neutral territory of the Grand Duke of Baden was violated by an armed force, without a shadow of reason, to arrest an individual engaged in no overt acts of hostility, upon the mere suspicion of being engaged in correspondence with the conspirators in France. 2. The arrest was illegal, on the footing of having borne arms against the Republic; for the decrees of the Convention and Directory on that subject, inhuman as they were, ap-

plied only to emigrants taken in France, or in an enemy's or conquered country, and Baden was neither the one nor the other, but a friendly state. 3. The laws against the emigrants did not apply to the Bourbons, who were a class apart, and were never banished from the French territory, and even such as they were they had been universally mitigated in practice since the accession of the first consul. 4. The military commission was incompetent to try plots undertaken against the Republic, their cognizance being confined to the ordinary tribunals. 5. The whole proceedings at Vincennes were illegal, as having been carried on, contrary to law, in the night; as no defender or counsel was assigned to the accused; as no witnesses or documents were adduced against him, as his declarations admitted nothing criminal, and if they had, they would not *per se* have warranted a conviction; as the conviction did not specify of what he was found guilty, and left a *blank* for the laws under which the sentence was pronounced, all directly in the face of statutory enactments.—See an able *mémoire* by Dupin, i. 20, *Discussion des actes de la Commission militaire pour juger le Duc d'Enghien*.

(1) *Rev.* ii. 252.

(2) Hullin, 8.

(3) Hullin, 13.

(4) Hullin, 13, 14.

(5) *Rev.* ii. 250.

been provided for, and he had been prohibited from forwarding such a communication to the government."

His sentence and execution.

Without a vestige of evidence against the prince, did this iniquitous military tribunal, acting under the orders of a still more iniquitous Government, find him guilty of all the charges, and order him to be immediately executed. After the interrogatory had ceased, and while the commission were deliberating with closed doors, he returned to his chamber, and fell asleep. "He was so well aware of his approaching fate," says Harrel, "that when they conducted him by torch-light down the broken and winding staircase which led to the fosse where the execution was to take place, he asked where they were taking him, and pressing my arm, said, 'Are they going to leave me to perish in a dungeon, or throw me into an *oubliette*?' " When he arrived at the foot of the stair, and entering into the fatal ditch, saw, through the grey mist of the morning, a file of men drawn up, he uttered an expression of joy at being permitted to die the death of a soldier, and only requested that a confessor might be sent for; but this last request was denied him. He then cut off a lock of his hair, which he delivered with his watch and ring to the officer who attended him, to be forwarded to the Princess de Rohan and his parents; and turning to the soldiers, exclaimed, "I die for my king and for France!" calmly gave the word of command, and fell pierced by seven balls. His remains were immediately thrown, dressed as they were, into the grave which had been prepared the evening before at the foot of the rampart (1).

No other authority than that of Napoléon himself is required to stamp the character of this transaction. Immediately after the execution was over, Savary hastened to the first consul to inform him of what had been done. He received the account with much emotion. "There is something here," said he, "which surpasses my comprehension. Here is a crime, and one which leads to nothing (2)." The prince's innocence was soon completely demon-

His innocence is completely established after his death.

strated. Hardly were his uncoffined remains cold in their grave, when the witnesses who had spoken of the mysterious personage who met with Georges, and was supposed to be the Duke d'Enghien, upon being confronted with Pichegru, at once recognised him as the person to whom they had alluded. "The first consul," says Savary, "upon receiving this information, mused long, and gave vent, by an exclamation of grief, to his regret at having consented to the seizure of that unhappy man. Notwithstanding his obvious interest to have the affair cleared up, he enjoined absolute silence regarding it, either because he considered such conduct most conducive to his interest, or because he was unwilling to confess the error into which he had fallen (3)."

(1) Mém. sur le Duc d'Enghien, ii. 171, 172. Rev. Vindication, 40 Bour. v. 332, 333.

The spot where this murder was committed is marked by a little cross in the bottom of the fosse of Vincennes, on the side of the forest, about twenty yards from the drawbridge leading into the inner building. The author visited it in August 1833, when the cannon on the ramparts were loaded with grape-shot, and the whole walls of the fortress were covered with workmen armed to the teeth, converting the Gothic edifice into a stronghold destined to bridle the licentious population of Paris, and establish the Oriental despotism of Louis-Philippe. The monument of feudal power, the scene of despotic cruelty, the instrument of revolutionary punishment, arose at once to the view. "Les hommes agitent," says Bismarck, "mais Dieu les mène."

(2) Rev. ii. 45.

Napoléon's (3) The murder of the Duke d'Enghien was so atrocious a proceeding, of himself that almost every one concerned in it at St. Helena has made an effort to throw the blame off his own shoulders, and implicate more deeply the other actors in the bloody tragedy. Savary, General Hullin, and Napoléon himself, have all endeavoured to vindicate themselves, at the expense of their associates in the crime; but the only inference which can justly be drawn from a comparison of their observations is, that they were all guilty, and the first consul most of all. In commenting on this subject, which frequently recurred to his thoughts during the solitude of St. Helena, he at times ascribed the catastrophe to a deplorable excess of zeal in the persons by whom he was surrounded; [Las Casas, vii. 257.] at others to an unfortunate prepossession, taken up at an unguarded moment, when he was

Remark-  
able retri-  
bution  
which  
reached  
all the ac-  
tors in the  
murder.

A memorable retribution awaited all the actors in this bloody tragedy. Murat, seized eleven years afterwards on the Neapolitan territory, when attempting to excite the people to a revolt, was delivered over to a military commission, tried under a law which he himself had made, and shot. General Hullin, after having spent, as he himself said, "twenty years in unavailing regrets; bowed down by misfortune; blind, and unhappy," wished for the grave to relieve him from his sufferings (1); Savary lived to witness calamities to himself and his country sufficient, in his own words, to draw from his eyes tears of blood (2), and Napoléon, vanquished in war, precipitated from his throne, stript of his possessions, was left an exile amidst the melancholy main, to reflect on the eternal laws of justice which he had violated, and the boundless gifts of fortune which he had misapplied. Whether Providence interferes in the affairs of mankind by any other method than general laws, and the indignation which deeds of violence excite in the human heart, must remain for ever a mystery; but in many cases the connexion between national, equally as individual, crime, and its appropriate punishment, is so evident as to be obvious even on the surface of history. The murder of the Duke d'Enghien lighted again the flames of continental war, and induced that terrible strife which ultimately brought the Tartars of the Desert to the walls of Paris. From it may be dated the commencement of that train of events which precipitated Napoléon from the throne of Charlemagne to the rock of St.-Helena.

Consterna-  
tion which  
this act ex-  
cited in  
Paris.

When the melancholy event was known in Paris on the morning of the 21st, an universal stupor and consternation prevailed. Few were to be found who approved of the deed; distrust, terror, anxiety, were depicted in every countenance. It was openly stigmatized by a great proportion of the people as a bloody and needless assassination; among none was the general grief more poignant than the warmest partisans of Napoléon; the bright morning of the consulate seemed overcast, and the empire to be ushered in by deeds of Oriental cruelty. Crowds issued daily through the barrier de Trône, to visit, in the fosse of Vincennes, the spot where the victim had suffered; a favourite spaniel, which had followed the prince to the place of execution, faithful in death, was to be seen constantly lying on the grave. The interest excited by its appearance was so strong, that by an order of the police the dog was removed, and all access to the place prohibited (3).

And in the  
foreign am-  
bassadors.

The consternation which prevailed among the members of the diplomatic body was still greater. Couriers were instantly des-

worked up to madness by the reports he received of conspiracies and plots in every direction around him; [Las Cas. vii. 253, 257.] but in his testament he reverted to the more manly course of admitting the deed, taking upon himself its whole responsibility, and endeavouring to justify it on reasons of state necessity. "I arrested the Duke d'Enghien," said he in that solemn instrument, "because that measure was necessary to the security, the interest, and the honour of the French people, when the Count d'Artois maintained, on his own admission, sixty assassins. In similar circumstances I would do the same." [Test. de Nap. sec. 6.] As if any reasons of honour, interest, or security can ever call for or justify the death of an innocent man without either enquiry, evidence, or trial. [Test. de Nap. sec. 6.]

It is but justice to Napoléon, however, to add, that he said at St. Helena,—"Most certainly if I had been informed in time of certain features in the opi-

nions and character of the prince, and especially if I had seen a letter which he wrote to me, but which was never delivered, God knows for what reason, till after he was no more, most certainly I would have pardoned him." [Las Cas. vii. 258.] Savary asserts that Napoleon said to Real, after hearing the circumstances of the prince's death:—"Cahap-py T—, what have you made me do?" [Savary. Vindication, 60.] and Napoleon said to O'Meara at St.-Helena, that "Falleyrand had kept the duke's letter, written to him from Strasbourg, and only delivered it two days after his death;" [O'Meara, i. 321, 340.] but Bourrienne asserts that the whole story of such a letter having been written and kept back is an entire fabrication. See BOURRIENNE, v. 312.

(1) Hullin's Mémoires, 1.

(2) Savary, iv. 382.

(3) Rev. ii. 45. Bour. v. 330. Big. iv. 343.

patched to St.-Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, and London; and the ambassadors of all the powers at Paris met to concert measures on the subject. "All Paris," says M. Dalberg, the plenipotentiary of Baden, "is in consternation; Europe will shudder at the deed. We are approaching a terrible crisis; the ambition of Bonaparte knows no bounds; nothing is sacred in his eyes; he will sacrifice every thing to his passions. M. Cobentzell, Lucchesini, and Oubril are concerting measures on the part of Austria, Prussia, and Russia (1)." M. Talleyrand, the minister of foreign affairs, gave a ball on the night of the day on which the prince was executed; but its aspect was mournful, and several members of the diplomatic body sent their apology. The Cabinet of Prussia presented an energetic note, complaining of the violation of the territory of Baden, while that of Russia ordered a court mourning for his death, which was worn by all the ambassadors of that power at foreign courts, and addressed a vigorous remonstrance to the French Government. The higher classes at Vienna, Petersburg, and Berlin, were vehement in their condemnation of the sanguinary proceeding; the indignation of the English people, the vehemence of the English press, knew no bounds; and already were to be seen, both in the diplomatic relations of the European powers (2), and the feelings awakened in their subjects, the seeds of the coalition which brought the continent in arms to the fields of Austerlitz and Eylau.

**Courageous conduct of M. Chateaubriand.** That indignation which the monarchies of Europe did not as yet venture openly to express, a single courageous individual, but one whose weight was equal to a nation in arms, did not hesitate immediately to manifest. The illustrious author of the "*Génie du Christianisme*," M. CHATEAUBRIAND, had been recently appointed ambassador of France at the republic of the Valais, and he was presented to the first consul on the morning of the 21st, to take leave preparatory to his departure. He observed at the time a striking alteration on the visage of the first consul, and a sombre expression in his countenance; his matchless powers of dissimulation could not conceal what was passing in his mind; but Chateaubriand knew of nothing at the time to which it could have been owing. Hardly had he left the Tuileries when intelligence arrived of the death of the Duke d'Enghien; he instantly sent in his resignation of the appointment. This intrepid conduct excited a vehement burst of anger in the breast of the first consul; and the friends of Chateaubriand were in the greatest alarm every morning for a considerable time, expecting to hear of his arrest during the night; but the Princess Eliza, who was inspired with the highest admiration for that great author, at length succeeded in averting a tempest which in its outset might have proved fatal to one of the brightest ornaments of modern literature. From that period, however, may be dated the commencement of that enmity between that great author and the first consul, which continued uninterrupted till the Restoration (3).

**Opinion which Napoléon entertained of him.** Napoléon was strongly irritated by any opposition to his wishes, or resistance to his will, and accordingly he never forgave Chateaubriand for the public reproof administered on this memorable occasion; but his feelings had no influence on his judgment, and no man could better appreciate dignified or heroic conduct in an adversary. Although, therefore, the author of the "*Genius of Christianity*" never afterwards received encouragement from the first consul, he occupied a high place in his

(1) M. Dalberg's letter, March 22, 1804, Paris. Rev. ii. 290.

(2) Big. iii. 345. Ann. Reg. 1804. State papers, 612. Bour. vi. 4, 5. Rev. ii. 244.

(3) Bour. v. 348, 349. Big. iii. 344.

estimation, and this continued in exile even after the essential injury done by that author to his cause by the celebrated pamphlet on the "Constitutional monarchy," published at the Restoration. "Chateaubriand," said he, "has received from nature the sacred fire; his works attest it; his style is not that of Racine, it is that of a prophet. There is no one but himself in the world who could have said with impunity in the Chamber of Peers that the great-coat and hat of Napoléon, placed on the end of a stick on the coast of Brest, would make Europe run to arms from one end to another (1)."

Death of  
Pichegru.

This tragic event was soon followed by another still more mysterious. Early on the morning of the 5th April, General Pichegru was found strangled in prison. Since his apprehension he had undergone ten separate examinations, in the course of which he had been repeatedly confronted with Georges, Lajolais, and all the witnesses who were examined against them. On all occasions, however, he had evinced an unconquerable firmness and resolution. No one was injured by his answers; and nothing whatever had been elicited from him calculated to effect the great object of implicating Moreau in the conspiracy. Such was the effect produced by his courageous demeanour, that Real said openly before several persons on coming from one of his examinations,—“What a man that Pichegru is?” In all his declarations he was careful to abstain from any thing which might involve any other person, and exhibited a grandeur of character and generous resolution in his fetters, which excited the admiration even of his enemies. He positively refused, however, to sign any of his judicial declarations; alleging as a reason, that he was too well acquainted with the arts of the police, who, having once got his signature, would by a chemical process efface all the writing which stood above it, and insert another statement, containing every thing which they wished him to admit. He loudly announced his intention of speaking out boldly on his trial, and in particular declared that he was resolved “to unfold the odious means by which he and his companions had been entrapped into the conspiracy by the police. That they had at length become fully sensible of the Machiavelian devices which had been practised upon them, from the facility given to their landing and coming to Paris, and the utter nullity of all the reports they had received of the general disposition in their favour. That having had their eyes at length opened, they were only solicitous to get out of Paris, and were making preparations April 16, 1804. for that purpose when they were arrested by the police.” This intention to speak out at the trial was in an especial manner declared on the day of his last examination taken before Real, and next morning at eight o’clock he was found strangled in his cell (2).

Surgeons’  
report on  
his death.

The surgeons who were called to examine the body of the deceased signed a report, in which they stated that “the body was found with a black silk handkerchief hard twisted round the neck by means of a small stick about five inches long, which was kept tight on the left cheek on which it rested by one end, which prevented it from unwinding, and produced the strangulation which had terminated in death.” The *gendarmes* in attendance declared that they heard no noise, except a considerable coughing on the part of the general, which lasted till one, when it ceased; and that the sound resembled that of a person who had difficulty of respiration (3). This is all the light which positive evidence throws on this mysterious transaction; but it were well for the memory of Napoléon if mo-

(1) Nap. in Mont. iv. 248. Bour. v. 349, 359.

(2) Bour. v. 23, 31. Big. iii. 411.

(3) Bour. vi. 31, 32. Rev. ii. 55. Ann. Reg. 1804, 368. State papers.



ral presumptions of greater strength than any such testimony did not incline to the darker side (1).

Reflections  
on the pro-  
bable pri-  
vacy of the  
first consul  
to his death.

“When you would discover,” says Machiavel, “who is the author of a crime, consider who had an interest to commit it.” Judging by this standard, moral presumption weighs heavily against the first consul. He was on the eve of the greatest step in his life; the imperial sceptre was within his grasp, and the public authorities had already been instructed to petition him to assume the crown of Charlemagne. At the same time the crisis was of the most violent kind. The Royalist party were in the highest state of excitement, in consequence of the execution of the Duke d’Engbien; the Republicans, in sullen indignation, awaited the trial of Moreau. In these critical circumstances it was impossible to over-estimate the effect which might have been produced on such inflammable materials by the bold declarations of Pichegru at his trial, openly denouncing the intrigues and treachery of the police, and tearing aside the veil which concealed the dark transactions by which Fouché had precipitated the leaders of the opposite parties into measures so eminently calculated to aid the ascent of Napoléon to the throne. The first consul, it is true, had no cause either to be apprehensive of Pichegru, or to doubt his conviction at the trial; but his ministers had every reason to fear the effect which might be produced by the revelations made by so energetic and intrepid a character, and the strongest grounds for believing that he would utterly negative all attempts to implicate his great rival Moreau in the conspiracy. In these circumstances, private assassination became the obvious expedient, and within the gloomy walls of the Temple numerous wretches were to be found, trained to crime, and profoundly versed in all the means of perpetrating it in the way least likely to incur detection. There can be no reasonable doubt therefore, that Pichegru was murdered, but there is no evidence to connect Napoléon with the act; and the probability is, that it was perpetrated by Fouché and the police, to prevent the exposure of the infamous means used by them to implicate both Moreau and the Royalists in the trammels of a conspiracy, which they had so much reason to apprehend from the illustrious captive’s known character and declared resolution.

This view is strongly confirmed, when it is recollected, on the other hand, Pichegru himself had no conceivable motive for committing suicide. Death to so old a soldier and determined a character could have few terrors; and the experience of the Revolution has proved that its prospect hardly ever led to self-destruction. He had uniformly and energetically declared his resolution to speak fully out at the trial, and nothing had occurred to shake that determination, for his own condemnation he must from the first have regarded as certain. Voluntary strangulation in the way in which Pichegru perished, if not an impossible, is at least a highly difficult act; the religious impressions which he had preserved from his youth upwards rendered it highly improbable; and the secrecy which Government maintained in regard to his declarations, necessarily led to the conclusion that they contained matter which it was deemed advisable to bury in the tomb. So universal was the impression produced by these circumstances, that M. Real, on the morning of his death, said, “Though nothing can be more apparent than that this was a

(1) It is not the least interesting circumstance in this melancholy story, that Pichegru had been the school companion of Napoléon at the military academy of Brienne. They had been bred up in the same house, and it was he who taught Napoléon the four first rules of arithmetic. Though considerably

older than the first consul, they had received their commissions as lieutenants of artillery at the same time. Now the one was about to ascend the throne of France, while the other was strangled in a dungeon.—See BOUILLONNE, vi, 13, 15.

suicide, yet it will always be said that, despairing of conviction, we strangled him in prison (1); a *cri de conscience* coming from such a character, at so early a period, which is not the least remarkable circumstance in this mysterious case. Bourrienne, Napoléon's private secretary, declares it as his firm conviction that he was murdered (2); and Savary, while he denies this himself, tells us that the belief of his assassination was so general, that a high functionary, a friend of his own, spoke of it some years afterwards as a matter concerning which no doubt could be entertained, and mentioned the *gendarmes* as the persons by whom the bloody deed had been carried into execution (3). The populace of Paris, struck by the mysterious circumstances of his death, ascribed it to the Mamelukes who had accompanied Napoléon from Egypt, and had been trained to such deeds in the recesses of Eastern seraglios (4).

At length, after long and tedious preparatory examinations, Moreau, Georges, the two Polignacs, La Rivière, and all the accused, were brought to trial. Before leaving the Temple, Georges harangued the other prisoners in the court, and earnestly recommended prudence and moderation, and that they should abstain from criminating each other. The solemnity of the occasion, and the recollection that it was from the same walls that Louis XVI had been taken to the scaffold, had subdued to a sadder and milder mood his naturally daring and vehement character. "If in the trials which await us," said he, "your firmness should ever forsake you, look on me, recollect that I am with you, remember that my fate will be the same as your own. Yes! we cannot be separated in death, and it is that which should console us. Continue, then, mild and considerate towards each other, redouble your mutual regards, let your common fate draw tighter the bonds of your affection. Regard not the past. We are placed in our present position by the will of God; in the hour of death let us pray that our country, rescued from the yoke which oppresses it, may one day be blessed under the rule of the Bourbons. Never forget that it was from the prison which we are about to quit that Louis XVI went forth to the scaffold. Let his sublime example be your model and your guide (5)."

Trial of Moreau, Georges, and others. Early on the 28th May, the doors of the Palace of Justice were thrown open, and the trial began. An immense crowd instantly rushed in, and occupied every avenue to the hall; the doors were besieged by thousands, urgent to obtain admittance. The public anxiety rose to the highest pitch. Persons of the chief rank and greatest considera-

(1) Rev. ii. 56.

(2) Bour. vi. 25, 35.

(3) Rev. ii. 56.

Napoléon's defence of himself on this subject at St. Helena. In discoursing on this subject at St. Helena, Napoléon observed, "that he would be ashamed to defend himself against such a charge; its absurdity was so manifest on its very face. What could I gain by it? A man of my character does not act without sufficient motives. Have I ever been known to shed blood by mere caprice? Whatever efforts may have been made to blacken my memory, those who know me are aware that my nature is foreign to crime; there is not in my whole career, a single act of which I could not speak before any tribunal on earth, I do not say, without embarrassment, but with advantage. In truth Pichegru saw that his situation was desperate; his daring mind could not endure the infamy of punishment; he despaired of my clemency, or despised it, and put himself to death. Had I been inclined to commit a crime, it was not Pichegru, but Moreau, that I

would have struck." [Las Cas. vii. 244] Had Napoléon's veracity been equal to his ability as a chronicler of the events of his time, this passage would have been deserving of the highest consideration; but the slightest acquaintance with his writings and actions must be sufficient to convince every impartial person, that he had no regard whatever to truth, in any thing that he either said or wrote, and fired off words as he would do shot in a battle, to produce a present effect, without the slightest idea that they ever would be sifted by subsequent ages, or ultimately recoil upon himself. He forgets that it was to secure the conviction of Moreau, and cut off the damning evidence that he could give in regard to him, that the private assassination of Pichegru became expedient, and that the more he elevates the character of the Republican General who was brought to trial, the more he magnifies the probability of the destruction of the Royalist chief whose testimony might have led to his acquittal.

(4) Ann. Reg. 1804, 165.

(5) Bour. vi. 47.

tion in Paris were there; the remnants of the old nobility, the leaders of the modern Republic, flocked to a scene where the fate of characters so interesting to both was to be determined. The prisoners, to the number of forty-five, were put to the bar together. Public indignation murmured aloud at seeing the conqueror of Hohenlinden seated amidst persons, many of whom were regarded as the hired bravoës of England. In the course of the trial, which lasted twelve days, a letter from Moreau to the first consul, written from the prison of the Temple, was read, in which he stated his case with so much simplicity and candour, that it produced the most powerful effect on the audience (1). The result of the trial was, that Moreau's innocence was completely established, or rather the prosecutor totally failed to prove any criminal connexion on his part with the conspirators; not one witness could fix either a guilty act or important circumstance upon him. He admitted having seen Pichegru on several occasions, but positively denied that he had ever been in presence of Georges; and, though two witnesses were adduced who swore to that fact, their testimony was unworthy of credit, being that of accused persons under trial for the same crime (2). Throughout the whole trial his demeanour was dignified, mild, and unassuming. On one occasion only his indignant spirit broke forth, when the president accused him of a desire to make himself dictator:—"Me dictator!" exclaimed he, "and with the partisans of the Bourbons! Who then, would be my supporters? I could find none but in the French soldiers, of whom I have commanded nine-tenths and saved above fifty-thousand. They have arrested all my aides-de-camp, all the officers of my acquaintance, but not a shadow of suspicion could be found against any one, and they have all been set at liberty. Can there be such folly as to suppose that I proposed to make myself dictator by means of the partisans of the old French princes, who have combated for the Royalist cause since 1792? Do you really believe that these men, in twenty-four hours, should have been so suddenly changed as to make me dictator? You speak of my fortune, of my income; I began with nothing, and might now have been worth 50,000,000 francs; I possess only a house and a small property attached to it; my allowances amount to 40,000 francs, and let that be compared with my services (3)."

Letter of Moreau to Napoléon. (1) Moreau there said, "In the campaign of 1797 we took the papers of the Austrian staff; amongst them were several which seemed to implicate Pichegru in a correspondence with the French princes; this discovery gave us both great pain, but we resolved to bury it in oblivion, as Pichegru, being no longer at the head of the army, was not in a situation to do injury to the Republic. The events of the 18th Fructidor succeeded, disquietude became universal; and two officers who were acquainted with that correspondence, represented to me the necessity of making it public. I was then a public functionary, and could no longer preserve silence. During the two last campaigns in Germany, and since the peace, he has occasionally made remote and circuitous overtures to me as to the possibility of entering into a correspondence with the French princes, but I considered them so ridiculous that I never made any answer.

"As to the present conspiracy, I can equally assure you that I have not had the smallest share in it. I repeat it, general, whatever proposition may have been made to me, I rejected it in opinion, and regarded it as the most absurd of projects. When it was represented to me that the occasion of a descent into England would be favourable to a change of government, I answered, that the Senate was the au-

thority to which all Frenchmen would look in case of difficulty, and that I should be the first to range myself under its authority. Such overtures made to me, a private individual, wishing to keep up no connexions, neither in the army, nine-tenths of which have served under my orders, nor in the state, imposed upon me no duty but that of refusal; the infamy of becoming an informer was repugnant to my character; ever judged with severity, such a person becomes odious, and deserving of eternal reprobation when he turns against those from whom he has received obligations, or with whom he has maintained terms of friendship. Such, general, have been my connexions with Pichegru; they will surely convince you that rash and ill-sounded conclusions have been drawn from a conduct on my part perhaps imprudent, but far from being criminal." These words bear the stamp of truth, and they embrace the whole of what was proved against Moreau. Not one of the 119 witnesses examined at the trial said more against him.—*ROMANIANNE*, vi. 118, 120.

(2) Lajolais and Picot were the persons who spoke to it, and Lajolais was the secret agent of Fouché throughout the whole transaction, and both were fellow-prisoners at the bar with Moreau. [*Rovigo*, ii. 63.]

(3) *Four.* vi. 115, 123, 124. *Rov.* ii:

Intense interest excited at Paris.

As the case went on, and the impossibility of convicting Moreau of the capital charge preferred against him became apparent, the disquietude of the first consul was extreme. He sent in private for the judges, and questioned them minutely as to the probable result of the process; and as it had become impossible to convict him of any share in the conspiracy, it was agreed that he should be found guilty of the minor charge of remotely aiding them. Some of the judges proposed that he should be entirely acquitted, but the President Hemart informed them that such a result would only have the effect of impelling the Government into measures of still greater severity; and therefore this compromise was unanimously agreed to. Napoléon strongly urged a capital sentence, in the idea probably of overwhelming his rival by a pardon; but the judges returned the noble answer: "and if we do so, who will pardon us?" In truth, the temper of the public mind was such, that any capital sentence on so illustrious a person would probably have produced a violent commotion, and it was extremely doubtful whether the soldiers of the army of the Rhine would not have risen at once to his rescue. So intense was the interest excited by his situation, that when Lecourbe, one of the bravest and most distinguished of his lieutenants, entered the court with the infant child of Moreau in his arms, all the military present spontaneously rose and presented arms; and if Moreau had given the word, the court would that moment have been overturned, and the prisoners liberated. Whenever he rose to address the judges, the *gendarmes*, by whom he was guarded, rose also, and remained uncovered till he sat down. In fact, the public mind was so agitated, that the influence of Moreau in fetters almost equalled that of the first consul on the throne (1).

Stoical indifference of Georges.

The demeanour of Georges throughout the whole trial was stoical and indifferent; he rejected the humane proposals made to him by Napoléon to save his life, if he would abandon his attempts to reinstate the Bourbons, saying, "that his comrades had followed him into France, and he would follow them to death." Armand and Jules Polignac excited the warmest interest, by the generous contest which ensued between them as to which had been really implicated in the conspiracy, each trying to take the whole blame upon himself, and to exculpate the other (2).

Condemnation of the prisoners.

When the debates were closed, and the judges retired to deliberate, the public anxiety rose to the highest pitch; they remained four-and-twenty hours in consultation; and all the while, the court, and all its avenues, were thronged with anxious multitudes. The most breathless suspense prevailed, when the judges returned to the court, and Hémart, seating himself in the president's chair, read out the sentence, which condemned Georges Cadoudal, Bouvet de Lozier, Roussillon, M. de Rivière, Armand de Polignac, Lajolais, Picot, Costor San Victor, and others, to the number of sixteen, to death; and Moreau, Jules de Polignac, Leridant, Roland, and a young girl named Issay, to two years' imprisonment (3).

Public feeling on this subject.

Though the preservation of Moreau's life, which had been placed in such imminent hazard, was universally considered as a subject

(1) Bour. vi. 124, 126; Big. iii. 420.

(2) Armand de Polignac first declared publicly, that he alone was accessory to the conspiracy, and that his brother was entirely innocent, and earnestly implored that the stroke of justice might fall on him alone. On the following day, his brother Jules rose and said, "I was too much moved yesterday at what my brother said to be able to attend to what I was to advance in my own defence; but to-day, when I am more cool, I implore you not to

give credit to what his generosity has prompted him to suggest in my behalf. If one of us must perish, I am the guilty person. Restore him to his weeping wife; I have none to lament me; I can brave death. Too young to have enjoyed life, how can I regret it?"—"No," exclaimed Armand, "you have life before you; I alone am the guilty person, I alone ought to perish"—Bour. vi. 138, 139.

(3) Bour. vi. 138, 140. Big. iii. 421. Rev. ii. 62, 63.

of congratulation, yet the condemnation of so great a number of persons, many of whom belonged to the highest society in Paris, to death together, spread a general consternation through the capital. During four years of a steady and lenient administration, the people had not only lost their indifference, but acquired a horror at the shedding of blood; and a catastrophe of this sort, which recalled the sanguinary scenes of the Convention, diffused universal distress. To this feeling soon succeeded a sense of the gross injustice done to Moreau, found guilty upon the unsupported declarations of two conspirators who were condemned along with himself; and with so strong a sense of the iniquity of the conviction in the breast of the judges, that they were obliged to sentence him to a punishment, ridiculous and inadequate if he were guilty, oppressive if innocent (1).

Clemency  
of the first  
consul,  
after the  
convictions  
were ob-  
tained

Napoléon, however, was not really cruel; he was, on the contrary, in general averse to measures of severity, and only callous to all the suffering they occasioned, when they seemed necessary either for the projects of his ambition, or the principles of his state policy. His object in all these measures was to attain the throne, and for this purpose the death of the Duke d'Enghien, which struck terror into the Royalists, and the condemnation of Moreau, which paralysed the Republicans, seemed indispensable. Having attained these steps, he yielded not less to his own inclinations than the dictates of sound policy in pardoning many of the persons convicted. Murat, immediately after the sentence was pronounced, repaired to Napoléon, and earnestly entreated him to signalize his accession to the imperial throne by pardoning all the accused; but he could not obtain from him so splendid an act of mercy. Joséphine, never wanting at the call of humanity, exerted her powerful influence in favour of several of the persons under sentence; many other persons at the court followed her example, and others were pardoned, in particular Lajolais, in consideration of the services they had rendered to the police during the conspiracy. In these different ways, Bouvet de Lozier, Rivière, Armand de Polignac, Lajolais, and Armand Gaillard, and three others, experienced the mercy of the first consul. The remainder were executed on the 25th June, on the place de Grève; they all underwent their fate with heroic fortitude, protesting with their last breath their fidelity to their king and country, and Georges, in particular, insisted upon dying first, in order that his companions, who knew that he had been offered his pardon by the first consul, might see that he had not deserted them in the extreme hour (2).

His lenity  
to Moreau.

Napoléon asserted to Bourrienne, shortly after the trial was over, that he had been greatly annoyed by the result of the process, chiefly because it prevented him from utterly extinguishing Moreau as the head of a party in the state; that assuredly he never would have suffered him to perish on the scaffold; but that his name, withered by a capital conviction, would no longer have been formidable, and that he had been led to direct a prosecution, from his Council assuring him that there could be no doubt of a conviction. He added, that if he had foreseen the result, he would have privately urged Moreau to travel, and even have given him a foreign embassy to colour his departure (3). After the sentence was pronounced, he acted with indulgence to his fallen rival. On the very day on which he requested permission to retire to America, Napoléon granted it; he purchased his estate of Gros-Bois, near Paris, which he conferred upon Berthier, and paid the ex-

(1) *Rev.* ii. 63, 64. *Bour.* vi. 140, 141.

(2) *Bour.* vi. 142, 144. *Rev.* ii. 66.

(3) *Bour.* vi. 156, 157. *Rev.* ii. 66.



penses of his journey to Barcelona, preparatory to embarking for the United States, out of the public treasury. His ardent mind had been singularly captivated by the stern resolution of Georges; after his sentence was pronounced, he sent Real to the Temple, and offered, if he would attach himself to his service, to give him a regiment, and even make him one of his aides-de-camp; but the heroic Vendéen remained faithful to his principles even in that extremity, and preferred dying with his comrades to all the allurements of the imperial throne (1).

Death of  
Captain  
Wright, in  
prison, at  
Paris.

One other deed of darkness belongs to the same period in the government of Napoléon. Captain Wright, from whose vessel Pichegru had been disembarked, was afterwards shipwrecked on the coast of Morbihan, and brought, with all his crew, to Paris, where they were examined as witnesses on the trial of Georges. This intrepid man, who had formerly been a lieutenant on board Sir Sidney Smith's ship, when he stopped the Eastern career of Napoléon at Acre, positively declined to give any evidence, saying, with the spirit which became a British officer, "Gentlemen, I am an officer in the British service; I care not what treatment you have in reserve for me; I am not bound to account to you for the orders I have received, and I decline your jurisdiction." He added, after his deposition, taken in prison, was read over in court, that "they had not annexed to that declaration the threat held out to him, that he should be shot if he did not reveal the secrets of his country (2)." Some time after this, but the precise date is not known, as it was not revealed by the French Government for long afterwards, Captain Wright was found in his cell in the Temple with his throat cut from ear to ear. By whom this was done remains, and probably will ever remain, a mystery. The French authorities gave out that he had committed suicide in prison; but the character of that officer, and the letters he had written shortly before his death, in which he positively declared he had no intention of laying violent hands on himself, rendered that event extremely improbable. The previous threats which he publicly declared on the trial they had made to him, and the strong desire which the French Government had to implicate the English Cabinet in a conspiracy against the life of the first consul, in order to weaken the force of public indignation in Europe at the death of the Duke d'Enghien, render it more than probable that he was cut off in order to extinguish the evidence which he could give as to the disgraceful methods resorted to by the police to extort declarations from their prisoners; or possibly, as was asserted in England at the time, to destroy the traces of torture on his person (3).

Napoléon  
resolves to  
assume the  
Imperial  
Crown.

It was in the midst of these bloody events that Napoléon assumed the IMPERIAL CROWN, and the shadow of the expiring Republic was transformed into the reality of Byzantine servitude. Eighteen months before, he had declared in the Council of State, "that the principle of

(1) Bour. v. 159. Ann. Reg. 1804, 195. Rev. ii. 65, 66

His opinion "There is one man," said Napoléon, "among the conspirators whom I regret, that is Georges. His mind is of the right stamp; in my hands he would have done great things. I appreciate all the firmness of his character, and I would have given it a right direction. I made Real inform him, that if he would attach himself to me, I would not only pardon him, but give him a regiment. What do I say? I would have made him one of my aides-de-camp. Such a step would have excited a great clamour, but I should

not have cared for it. Georges refused every thing. He is a bar of iron. What can I now do? He must undergo his fate, for such a man is too dangerous in a party; it is a necessity of my situation." [Bour. vi. 159.] This is a sufficient proof that Napoléon was aware that assassination formed no part of the design of the conspirators against him, for assuredly he would never have taken the chief of such a band into his service.

(2) Bour. v. 135, 136. Rev. ii. 60. Scott, v. 126, 128.

(3) Scott, v. 127, 129. Ann. Reg. 1805. Sir Robert Wilson's Egypt, 72. O'Meara, i. 275.

hereditary succession was absurd, irreconcilable with the sovereignty of the people, and impossible in France (1);” and four years before that he had announced to the Italian states, “that his victories were the commencement of the era of representative governments;” and already he was prepared to adopt a measure which should establish that absurd and impracticable system in that very country, and overturn, within all the states that were subjected to his influence, those very representative institutions. *Vestigia nulla retrorsum* was the principle of his policy. He never looked back to the past, or attempted to reconcile former professions with present actions; success, not duty, was the ruling principle of his conduct; he deemed nothing done while any thing remained to do.

This explains his murdering the duke d'Enghien. It was neither from a thirst for blood, nor a jealousy of the Bourbons, that he put the Duke d'Enghien to death. Expedience, supposed political expedience, was the motive. “When about to make himself emperor,” says Madame de Staël, “he deemed it necessary, on the one hand, to dissipate the apprehensions of the revolutionary party as to the return of the Bourbons; and to prove, on the other, to the Royalists, that when they attached themselves to him, they finally broke with the ancient dynasty. It was to accomplish that double object that he committed the murder of a prince of the blood, of the Duke d'Enghien. He passed the Rubicon of crime, and from that moment misfortune was written on his destiny (2).” Interposing boldly, like the Committee of Public Safety on occasion of the fall of Danton, between the Royalists and Republicans, he struck redoubtable blows to both; proving to the former, by the sacrifice of their brightest ornament, that all prospect of reconciliation with them was at an end; and to the other, by the trial of their favourite leader, that all hopes of reviving in the people the dreams of democratic enthusiasm were extinguished; while to the great body of revolutionary proprietors, the millions who had profited by the preceding convulsions, and were desirous only to preserve what they had gained, he held out the guarantee of a hereditary throne, and a dynasty competent to restrain all the popular excesses of which the recollection was so deeply engraven in the public mind (3).

First broaching of the project to the Senate. The season chosen for the first broaching of these ideas, which had been long floating in prospect in the thoughts of all reflecting persons, was shortly after the death of the Duke d'Enghien; and when a vague disquietude pervaded the public mind as to the result of the conspiracies and trials which excited so extraordinary an interest. In a secret conference with several of the leading members of the Senate, held six days after that event, Napoléon represented to them the precarious state of the Republic, dependent as it was on the life of a single individual, daily exposed to the daggers of assassins; passed in review the different projects March 24, 1804. which might be adopted to give it more stability, a Republic, the restoration of the ancient dynasty, or the creation of a new one; and discussed them all as a disinterested spectator, totally unconnected with any plans which might be ultimately adopted. The obsequious senators, divining his secret intentions, warmly combated the transference of power to any other hands, and conjured him to provide as soon as possible for the public weal, by making supreme power hereditary in a race of sovereigns, commencing with himself. Feigning a reluctant consent, he at length said: “Well, if you are really convinced that my nomination as emperor is neces-

(1) Thib. 454.

(2) Rév. Franç. ii. 328.

(3) Bign. iii. 377.

sary to the welfare of France, take at least every possible precaution against my tyranny; yes, I repeat it, against my tyranny; for who knows how far, in such a situation, I may be tempted to abuse the authority with which I may be invested (1)?"

The project thus set on foot was the subject of secret negotiations for above a month between the Senate and the Government. It was agreed that the first public announcement of it should come from the Tribune, as the only branch of the legislature in which the shadow even of popular representation prevailed. So completely had the strength of that once formidable body been prostrated, and its character changed by the alterations made on its constitution when the consulate for life was proclaimed, that it proved the ready instrument of these ambitious projects. Every thing was arranged with facility for acting the great drama in presence of the people. The moment was chosen; the dispositions were made; the speeches, addresses, and congratulations agreed on; the parts assigned to the principal actors, before the curtain drew up, or the people were admitted to the spectacle. At length, on the 25th April, the representation began in the hall of the Tribune (2).

The Tribune is put forward to make the proposal in public.  
April 25, 1804.

MM. Curée and Siméon were the most distinguished orators on the side of the Government in that branch of the legislature. "Revolutions," said they, "are the diseases of the body politic; every thing which has been overturned was not in reality deserving of censure. There are certain bases of public prosperity at the foundation of every social edifice. Seasons of discord may displace them for a time, but ere long their own weight restores them to their natural situation; and if a skilful hand superintends the reconstruction of the building during that period of returning stability, they may regain a form which shall endure for centuries. It is in vain that we are reminded of the long possession of the ancient dynasty. Principles and facts alike oppose their restoration. The people, the sole fountain and depositary of power, may displace a family, by virtue of the same authority by which they seated them on the throne. Europe has sanctioned the change by recognising our new government. The reigning family in England have no other title to the throne but the will of the people. 'When Pepin was crowned, it was only,' says Montesquieu, 'a ceremony the more, and a phantom the less. He acquired nothing by it but the ornaments of royalty; nothing was changed in the nation. When the successors of Charlemagne lost supreme authority, Hughes Capet already held the keys of the kingdom: the crown was placed on his head because he alone was able to defend it.'

Speech of the Movers on the occasion.

"An eternal barrier separates us from the return of the factions which would tear our entrails, and that royal family which we proscribed in 1792 because it had violated our rights. It is by placing the crown on the head of the first consul alone that the French can preserve their dignity, their independence, and their territory. Thus only will the army be assured of a brilliant establishment, faithful chiefs, intrepid officers, and the glorious standards which have so often led it to victory: it will neither have to fear unworthy humiliations, disgraceful disbanding, or horrid civil wars, where the bones of the defenders of their country are exposed to the winds. Let us hasten then to demand hereditary succession in the supreme magistrate; 'for in voting this to a chief,' as Pliny said to Trajan, 'we prevent the return of a master.' But at the same time let us give a worthy name

(1) De Staël, *Rév. Franç.* ii. 329, 330. Thib. 455. Bour. vi. 52.

(2) Bign. iii. 379, 380. Bour. vi. 52. Thib. 455.

to so great a power; let us adorn the first magistrate in the world by a dignified epithet; let us choose that which shall at once convey the idea of the first civil functions, recall glorious recollections, and in no ways infringe on the sovereignty of the people. I see, for the chief of the national power, no name so worthy as that of **EMPEROR**. If it means victorious consul, who is so worthy to bear it? What people, what armies were ever more deserving of such a title in their chief? I demand, therefore, that we lay before the Senate the wish of the nation, that Napoléon Bonaparte, at present first consul, be declared Emperor, and in that quality remain charged with the government of the French Republic; that the imperial dignity be declared hereditary in his family; and that such of our institutions as are only sketched out be definitely arranged (1)." No sooner was the harangue delivered than a crowd of orators rushed forward to inscribe their names on the tribune to follow in the same course. The senate of Augustus was never more obsequious.

Notwithstanding the headlong course which public opinion was following towards despotic power, and the obvious necessity for it to stay the discord from which such boundless suffering had ensued, there were some determined men who stood forward to resist the change, undeterred by the frowns of power, unseduced by the cheers of the multitude, uninstructed by the lessons of experience. Carnot in the Tribunate, and Berlier in the Council of State, were the foremost of this dauntless band. There is something in the spectacle of moral courage, of individual firmness withstanding public transports, of conscious integrity despising regal seductions, which must command respect, even when advocating a course which is impracticable or inexpedient. "In what a position," said they, "will this proposition place all those who have advocated the principles of the Revolution! When hereditary succession to the throne is established, there will no longer remain a shadow to the Republic of all for which it has sacrificed so many millions of lives. I cannot believe that the people of France are disposed so soon to abandon all that has been so dearly acquired. Was liberty, then, only exhibited to man to increase his regrets for a blessing which he never can enjoy? Is it to be for ever presented to his eyes as the forbidden fruit to which he dares not reach out his hand? Has nature, which has inspired us with so pressing a desire for this great acquisition, doomed us in its search to continual disappointment? No! I can never be brought to regard a blessing so generally preferred to all others, without which all others are nothing, as a mere illusion. My heart tells me that liberty is possible, and that the system which it goes to establish is easier of institution, and more stable in duration, than either arbitrary power or an unrestrained oligarchy." Every one respected the courage and motives of these upright men, but the fallacy of their arguments was not the less apparent, the public tendency to despotism not the less irresistible (2). In the Council of State the hereditary succession was carried by a majority of 20 to 7; and in the Tribunate by a still larger majority, Carnot alone voting in the minority.

The theatrical representation thus got up in the Tribunate, and the exchange of addresses, consultations, public and private, which followed, soon produced the desired effect. In Napoléon's words, it was now evident that the pear was ripe. Addresses flowed in from all quarters, from the army, the municipalities, the cities, the chambers of commerce, all imploring the first consul to ascend the imperial throne;

(1) Bour. vi. 55, 56. Dign. iii. 381, 382.

(2) Bour. vi. 61, 62. Dign. iii. 382, 383. This. 400.

and vieing with each other in the strains of servile adulation. Their general strain was, "Greatest of men, complete your work; render it as immortal as your glory; you have extricated us from the chaos of the past; you have overwhelmed us with the blessings of the present; nothing remains but to guarantee for us the future." To the address of the Senate, imploring him to assume the purple, Napoléon replied, "We have been constantly guided by the principle that sovereignty resides in the people; and that therefore every thing, without exception, should be rendered conducive to their interest, happiness, and glory. It is to attain this end that the supreme magistracy, the Senate, the Council, the Legislative Body, the Electoral Body, and all the branches of administration, have been instituted. The people of France can add nothing to the happiness and glory which surround me; but I feel that my most sacred as my most pleasing duty is to assure to its children the advantages secured by that revolution which cost so much, and above all, by the death of so many millions of brave men who died in defence of our rights. It is my most earnest desire that we may be able to say, on the 14th July in this year—'Fifteen years ago, by a spontaneous movement, we ran to arms, we gained liberty, equality, and glory.' Now these first of blessings, secured beyond the possibility of chance, are beyond the reach of danger; they are preserved for you and your children. Institutions, conceived and commenced in the midst of the tempests of war, both without and within, are about to be secured, while the state resounds with the designs and conspiracies of our mortal enemies, by the adoption of all that the experience of ages has demonstrated to be necessary to guarantee the rights which the nation has deemed essential to its dignity, its liberty, and its happiness (1)."

Key which it affords to his whole policy on the throne. In this answer is to be found the key to the whole policy of the first consul on the throne, and the secret of the astonishing facility with which he established, on the ruins of revolutionary passions, the most despotic throne of Europe. Aware that the great body of mankind are incapable of judging on public affairs, but perfectly adequate to a perception of their private interests, he invariably observed the principles there set forth, of carefully protecting all the revolutionary interests, and constantly addressing the people in the language of revolutionary equality. By steadily adhering to these rules, he succeeded in at once calming their interested fears, and flattering their impassioned feelings; by constantly holding out that the people were the source of all power, he blinded them to the fact that they had ceased to be the possessor of any; and by religiously respecting all the interests created by the Revolution, he rendered the nation indifferent to the abandonment of all the principles on which it was founded.

He is declared Emperor of the French, May 18. All things being at length matured, the Senate, by a decree on the 18th May, declared Napoléon EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH; but referred to the people the ratification of their device, which declared the throne hereditary in his family, and that of his brothers, Joseph and Lucien. The obsequious body hastened to St.-Cloud with the decree, when the Emperor received them with great magnificence. "Whatever," said he, "can contribute to the good of the country, is essentially connected with my happiness. I submit the law concerning the succession to the throne to the sanction of the people. I hope France will never repent of the honours with which she has environed myself and my family. Come what may, my spirit will be no longer with my posterity from the moment that they shall cease to merit the love and the confidence of the great nation (2)."

(1) Bour. vi. 65, 70.

(2) Bign. iii. 337.



General  
concur-  
rence of the  
nation.

The appeal to the people soon proved that the first consul, in assuming the imperial dignity, had only acted in accordance with the wishes of the immense majority of the nation. Registers were opened in every commune of France, and the result showed that there were 3,572,329 votes in the affirmative (1), and only 2569 in the negative. History has recorded no example of so unanimous an approbation of the foundation of a dynasty; no instance of a nation so joyfully taking refuge in the stillness of despotism.

Rank con-  
ferred on  
his family.

Various changes, necessarily flowing from this great step, immediately followed. On the day after his accession, the Senate published a *senatus consultum*, by which the imperial dignity was established in the Bonaparte family, and the rank and precedence of his relations, as well as the other dignitaries of the empire, regulated. Various important alterations on the constitution were made by this decree, if constitution it could be called, which had only the shadow of representative institutions with the reality of military despotism; but they will more appropriately come to be considered in the chapter relating to the internal government of the Emperor. The whole real powers of government were, by the new *senatus consultum*,

Absolute  
power vested  
in the Em-  
peror.

peror. The Legislative Body continued its mute inglorious functions. The Tribunate, divided into several sections, and obliged to discuss in these separate divisions the projects of laws transmitted to it by the Legislative Body (2), lost the little consideration which still belonged to it, and paved the way for its total suppression, which soon after ensued. In every thing but name the Government of France was thenceforward an absolute despotism.

Creation of  
the Mar-  
shals of the  
Empire.

Napoléon's first step on coming to the throne was to create the Marshals of the empire, and it was ordered that they should be addressed as *M. le Maréchal*. Those first named were eighteen in number, well known in the annals of military glory; Berthier, Murat, Moncey, Jourdan, Masséna, Augereau, Bernadotte, Soult, Brune, Lannes, Mortier, Ney, Davoust, Bessiéres, Kellermann, Lefebvre, Pérignon, and Serrurier. He already projected the creation in their favour of those new patents of nobility, which were destined to recall the most glorious events of the empire, and form a phalanx of Paladins to defend the imperial throne (3).

Rapid pro-  
gress of  
court etl-  
quette.

On the same day Napoléon fixed the titles and precedence of all the members of his family. He directed that his brothers and sisters should receive the title of imperial highness; that the great dignitaries of the empire should adopt that of most serene highness; and that the address of "my lord" should be revived in favour of these elevated personages. Thenceforth the progress of court etiquette and Oriental forms was as rapid at the Tuileries as in the seraglio of the Byzantine empire. "Whoever," says Madame de Staël, "could suggest an additional piece of etiquette from the olden time, propose an additional reverence, a new mode of knocking at the door of an antechamber, a more ceremonious method of presenting a petition, or folding a letter, was received as if he had been a benefactor of the human race. The code of imperial etiquette is the most remarkable authentic record of human baseness that has been recorded by history (4)."

(1) Bign. iii. 388.

(2) Art. 96. *Senatus Cons.* May 19, 1804. Bign. iii. 363. Bour. vi. 76, 77.

(3) Bour. vi. 78. Bign. iii. 401.

(4) *Rév. Franç.* ii. 334, 335. Bour. vi. 77, 78.

Dignified  
protest of  
Louis  
XVIII.

No sooner did he receive intelligence of the assumption of the imperial crown by Napoléon, than Louis XVIII, on the shores of the Baltic, hastened to protest against an act so subversive of the

Reflections  
on these  
events.

Such was the termination of the political changes of the French Revolution : such the consequences of the first great experiment tried in modern Europe of regenerating society by destroying all its institutions. Born of the enthusiasm and philanthropy of the higher and educated classes, adopted by the fervour and madness of the people, coerced by the severity of democratic tyranny, fanned by the gales of foreign conquest, disgraced by the cupidity of domestic administration; having exhausted every art of seduction, and worn out every means of delusion, it sunk at length into the stillness of absolute power. But it was not the slumber of freedom, to awaken fresh and vigorous in after-days; it was the deep sleep of despotism; the repose of a nation worn out by suffering; the lethargy of a people who in the preceding convulsions had destroyed all the elements of durable freedom.

Difference  
between  
the English  
and French  
revolutions.

In this respect there is a remarkable difference between the state of the public mind and the disposition of the people in England during the usurpation of Cromwell, and in France under the empire of Napoléon. Both were military despotisms, originating in the fervour of former times; but the philosophic observer might discern under the one symptoms of an unconquered spirit, destined to restore the public freedom when the tyranny of the moment was overpast; in the other, the well-known features of Asiatic servility, the grave, in every age, of independent institutions. The English nobility kept aloof from the court of the protector; he strove in vain to assemble a house of peers; the landed proprietors remained in sullen silence on their estates; such was the refractory spirit of the commons, that every parliament was dissolved within a few weeks after it assembled, and when one of his creatures suggested that the crown should be offered to the victorious soldier, the proposal was rejected by a great majority of the very parliament which he had moulded in the way most likely to be subservient to his will. But the case was very different in France. There the nation rushed voluntarily and headlong into the arms of despotism; the first consul experienced scarcely any resistance in his strides to absolute power either from the nobility, the commons, or the people; all classes vied with each other in their servility to the reigning authority; the old families eagerly sought admittance into his antechambers, the new greedily coveted the spoils of the empire, the cities addressed him in strains of Eastern adulation, the peasants almost unanimously seated him on the throne. Rapid as his advances to absolute power were, they could hardly keep pace with the desire of the nation to receive the chains of a master; and with truth might he apply to all his subjects what Tiberius said of the Roman Senate :—"Oh! homines ad servitutem parati."

Which were  
all owing  
to the  
violence and  
injustice of  
the French  
convul-  
sions.

We should widely err if we supposed that this extraordinary difference was owing either to any inherent servility in the French character, or any deficiency in the spirit of freedom among the inhabitants of that country when the contest commenced. There never was a nation more thoroughly and unanimously imbued

\*rights of his family. "In taking the title of Emperor," said the exiled prince, "Bonaparte has put the seal to his usurpation. That new act of a revolution, in which every thing has been fundamentally null, cannot doubtless impair my rights; but being accountable for my conduct to other sovereigns, whose rights are not less injured than my own, and whose thrones are shaken by the principles which the Senate of Paris has dared to put forth; accountable to France, to my family, to my own honour, I should consider myself guilty of

betraying the common cause if I preserved silence on this occasion. I declare, then, after renewing my protest against all the illegal acts committed since the commencement of the Revolution, that far from recognising the new title conferred on Bonaparte by a body which has itself no legal existence, I protest against that title, and all the subsequent acts to which it may give rise." This protest was so little regarded by the French Government, that it was published on the 1st July in the *Mémoires*.—See BIGNON, iii, 389, 391.

with the passion, both for liberty and equality, than the French were during the early years of the Revolution; and in the prosecution of that object they incurred hardships, and underwent sufferings, greater perhaps than any other people ever endured in a similar time. It was the magnitude of the changes produced by the Revolution, the prostration of all the higher classes which it induced, which produced this effect. When France emerged from the Revolution, almost all the old families were destroyed; commerce and manufactures were ruined, and the only mode of earning a subsistence which remained to the classes above the cultivators of the soil, was by entering into the service, and receiving the pay of Government. Necessity, as much as inclination, drove all into servility to the reigning authority; if they did not pay court to persons in power, they had no alternative but to starve. Necker, in his last and ablest work had already clearly perceived this important truth. "If by a revolution in the social system, or in public opinion," says he, "you have lost the elements of great proprietors, you must consider yourselves as having lost the elements requisite for the formation of a tempered monarchy, and turn, with whatever pain, to a different constitution of society. I do not believe that Bonaparte himself, with all his talent, his genius, and his power, could succeed in establishing in France a constitutional hereditary monarchy. There is a mode of founding a hereditary monarchy, however, widely different from all the principles of freedom; the same which introduced the despotism of Rome; the force of the army, the Prætorian guards, the soldiers of the East and the West. May God preserve France from such a destiny." What a testimony to the final result of the Revolution, from the man who, by the duplication of the Tiers-État, had so great a share in creating it (1)!

Vast concentration of influence at this period in the hands of Government.

Madame de Staël has well explained the prodigious and unprecedented accumulation of power and influence which was concentrated in the hands of the first consul when reconstructing the disjointed members of society after the preceding convulsions. "Every mode of earning a subsistence had disappeared during ten years of previous suffering. No person could consider himself secure of his livelihood; men of all classes, ruined or enriched, banished or rewarded, equally found themselves at the mercy of the supreme power. Thousands of Frenchmen were on the list of emigrants; millions were the possessors of national domains; thousands were proscribed as priests or nobles; tens of thousands feared to be so for their revolutionary misdeeds. Napoléon, who fully appreciated the immense authority which such a state of dependence gave him, took care to keep it up. To such a one he restored his property, from another he withheld it; by one edict he gave back the unalienated woods to the old proprietors, by another he suspended the gift. "There was hardly a Frenchman in the whole kingdom, who had not something to solicit from the Government, and that something was the means of existence. The favour of Government thus led, not to an increase of vain or frivolous pleasures, but to a restoration of your country, a termination of exile, the bread of life. That unheard-of state of dependence, proved fatal to the spirit of freedom in the nation. An unprecedented combination of circumstances put at the disposition of a single man the laws passed during the Reign of Terror, and the military force created by Revolutionary enthusiasm. All the local authorities, all the provincial establishments were suppressed or annulled; there remained only in France a single centre of movement, and that was Paris; and all the men in the provinces who were

(1) Necker, *Dernières Vues*, 235, 246.

driven to solicit public employment were compelled to come to the capital to find their livelihood. Thence has proceeded that rage for employment or situations under Government, which has ever since devoured and degraded France (1)."

Total destruction of the liberty of the press. Another element which powerfully contributed to the same effect, was the complete concentration of all the influence of the press in the hands of Government, in consequence of the changes and calamities of former times. "The whole journals of France were subjected," says the same author, "to the most rigorous censure; the periodical press repeated, day after day, the same observations without any one being permitted to contradict them. Under such circumstances, the press, instead of being, as is so often said, the safeguard of liberty, becomes the most terrible arm in the hand of power. In the same way, as regular troops are more formidable than militia to the independence of the people, so do hired writers deprave and mislead public opinion, much more than could possibly take place when men communicated only by words, and formed their opinions on facts which fell under their observation. When the appetite for news can be satisfied only by continued falsehood; when the reputation of every one depends on calumnies, universally diffused, without the possibility of their refutation; when the opinions to be advanced on every circumstance, every work, every individual, are submitted to the observations of journalists as a file of soldiers to the commands of their officers, the art of printing becomes what was formerly said of cannon, 'the last logic of kings (2).'"

Inference in political science to which this leads. These profound observations suggest an important conclusion in political science, which is, that the press can be regarded as the bulwark of liberty only as long as, independent of it, the elements of freedom exist in the different classes of society; and that if these elements are destroyed, and the balance in the state subverted, either by an undue preponderance of popular or regal power, it instantly changes its functions, and instead of the arm of independence, becomes the instrument of oppression. It immensely augments the power of the weapons with which the different classes of society combat each other; but the direction which this great engine receives, and the objects to which it may be directed, are as various as the changing dispositions and fleeting passions of mankind. In a constitutional monarchy, where a due balance is preserved between the different classes of society, the cause of freedom is strengthened by its influence; but in another state of things it may be perverted to very different purposes, and become, as in Republican America, the organ of democratic, or in Imperial France, the instrument of sovereign oppression. The only security, therefore, for durable freedom, is to be found in the preservation of the rights and liberties of all classes of the people; in the due ascendancy of wealth and education, as well as the energy and independence of popular industry; and the gates to Oriental servitude may be opened as wide by the vehemence of democratic injustice, as the advances of regal ambition or the force of military power.

(1) De Staël, *Rév. Franç.* ii. 259, 261, 372, 373.

(2) De Staël, *Rév. Franç.* ii. 263, 264.









